982327

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ANR0010.1177/2053019620982327The Anthropocene ReviewSimangan

Research article

The Anthropocene Review

Can the liberal international order

2022, Vol. 9(1) 37­–51
© The Author(s) 2020
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survive the Anthropocene? Three sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2053019620982327
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019620982327
propositions for converging peace journals.sagepub.com/home/anr

and survival

Dahlia Simangan

Abstract
A state-centric, militaristic, and capitalist-driven model of the liberal world appears incompatible
with the measures required for addressing the global environmental threats in the proposed
new geological epoch called the Anthropocene. While there have been discussions suggesting
or implying the rejection or radical disruption of existing sets of institutional arrangements in
global politics, I propose the possibility of locating effective responses to the Anthropocene
challenges within the existing order, albeit a reformed or revised one. This paper presents ways
of transforming the liberal international order, without abandoning some of its core values and
institutions, through a greater emphasis on human security, global disarmament, and alternative
economic models. The convergence of the liberal pursuit of peace and the global pursuit of
survival is possible in the Anthropocene.

Keywords
Anthropocene, circular economy, disarmament, human security, liberal order, liberal peace,
peace

Introduction
The Anthropocene marks the time when humans have collectively become the main geological force
behind the changes in the Earth system (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). It echoes earlier conceptual
framings regarding human influence on Earth processes, such as the deep ecology philosophy (Naess,
1973), the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock and Margulis, 1973), and the Earth system analysis
(Schellnhuber, 1999). Critiques about the universal narrative of the Anthropocene have also led to
more specific terms, such as Capitalocene (Malm and Hornbog, 2014; Moore, 2016), Technocene
(Malm and Hornbog, 2014), Plantationocene, Chthulucene (Haraway, 2015), and Eurocene (Grove,

Network for Education and Research on Peace and Corresponding author:

Sustainability, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Dahlia Simangan, Hiroshima University, 1-3-1 Kagamiyama,
Sciences, Hiroshima University, Japan Higashi-Hiroshima, Hiroshima 739-8530, Japan.
Email: simangan@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
38 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

2018). Although the International Commission on Stratigraphy is yet to validate the Anthropocene as
a separate geological age, scientific evidence reveals the significant human impact on stratigraphic
signatures distinct from the current official Holocene epoch (Waters et al., 2016). Scientists are yet to
reach a consensus on the onset of the Anthropocene as several studies point to different transitions in
geological history (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). Regardless of when the Anthropocene started, its mani-
festations are already felt in climate change, biodiversity loss, forest depletion, droughts, air and
water pollution, and extreme weather conditions. Human-driven changes to the environment under-
mine the Earth’s viability for human civilization (Steffen et al., 2007). We face unprecedented threats
to our collective existence, and we are likely accelerating our very own extinction. The Anthropocene,
as a conceptual framing, allows us to scrutinize the social values and structures, embedded in the cur-
rent liberal international order (LIO), that contributed to global environmental change.
The LIO has a long history of triumphs and failures, but it flourished after World War II with the
creation of institutions and organizations, such as the United Nations, that aim to promote interna-
tional peace and security. The war’s victors shaped this order, which is led and maintained mainly
by the US, together with its allies. However, with the US becoming more disinterested in exercis-
ing its hegemonic leadership on liberal internationalism since the election of Donald Trump in
2016, concerns have been growing over the future of this order. There are also views that the fail-
ures of liberal democracy within countries and liberal internationalism overseas to meet simultane-
ously various economic and human security requirements gave rise to populist leaders like Donald
Trump and fueled the recent wave of nationalism in many parts of the world (e.g. Bieber, 2018;
Noonan, 2020). For example, in its pursuit of economic openness through international trade
regimes, the LIO has lost sight of social protection, integral to the liberal value of human rights,
and increasingly favored unlimited economic growth. This order has also shown limitations in
addressing new and more global challenges, such as environmental destruction and health epidem-
ics, despite (or due to) the expansion of its membership and functions (Ikenberry, 2018).
The realities of the Anthropocene are also driving ongoing discussions about a “new global
political project” (Burke et al., 2016) that call for a rejection or radical disruption of existing insti-
tutional arrangements in global politics (Chandler et al., 2018). These discussions view incremen-
tal change as insufficient to “bring about societal change at the level and with the speed needed to
mitigate and adapt to the Earth system transformation” (Biermann et al., 2012: 52). The
Anthropocene challenges the foundations of the current LIO duly preserved by values and struc-
tures based on a state-centric, militaristic, and consumption-driven model. The static characteris-
tics of the international order present hurdles in mitigating the negative impact of human activities
on the biosphere. Further, the environmentally harmful practices related to militarization and capi-
talism accelerate environmental degradation on a global scale. Eliminating the structures and prac-
tices that contribute to the unsustainable characteristics of the Anthropocene is logical, but is it
possible for the same order to reverse or mitigate environmental catastrophes? Can the Anthropocene
present opportunities for nation-states and the global governance system to demonstrate the rele-
vance of their material and normative foundations amidst views that the LIO is now in decline?
I propose the possibility of locating effective responses to the Anthropocene challenges within
the existing order, albeit a reformed or revised one. This proposition returns to a liberal interna-
tionalist logic of economic openness, multilateralism, security cooperation, liberal democracy,
and the capacity for reform (Ikenberry, 2018), while drawing on the normative foundations of the
liberal peace framework. None of the failures of the LIO were due to its foundational logics.
Liberal democracy, for example, is historically linked to capitalism, but it does not necessitate
unlimited economic growth. In fact, the causal relationship between democracy and economic
development appears weak (Heo and Tan, 2001). Relatedly, although this order has championed
economic openness, it does not rely on the premise of unlimited economic growth; instead, the
Simangan 39

purpose of economic openness is to facilitate the advancement of living standards and human
well-being. A global economy that sidelines basic human rights and commodifies nature for the
purpose of unlimited growth is a departure from the foundations of the LIO. And finally, although
US leadership played a pivotal role in maintaining this order, it is not a “creature of American
hegemony” but a “more general and longstanding set of ideas, principles and political agenda for
organizing and reforming international order” (Ikenberry, 2018: 9). In this regard, reform of the
LIO is possible.
Three points of compatibility between the existing LIO, without disregarding its flaws, and the
actions needed for humanity to deflect its possible demise will be elaborated in this paper.
Specifically, I argue that pursuing international peace and security within the liberal premise could
complement the actions needed for human survival in the age of the Anthropocene by rethinking
state-centrism, militarization, and global consumption. Despite its permutations, this order ulti-
mately rests on the principles of peace and reform. To echo Ikenberry (2018: 9), the liberal inter-
nationalism that gave birth to this order “is a way of thinking about and responding to modernity—its
opportunity and its dangers.” This paper, therefore, is a theoretical exploration of the convergence
of the liberal pursuit of peace and the global pursuit of survival by presenting ways of transforming
the LIO through a greater emphasis on human security, global disarmament, and alternative eco-
nomic models.

(In)compatibilities between peace and survival

The LIO reinforces certain values and practices that accelerate the arrival of extinction on a global
scale, particularly that of state-centrism and the elitist development agenda (Burke et al., 2016).
The entities of the international system, such as the UN, international organizations, and interna-
tional legal regimes, are the safeguards of this state-centric system, but they are also considered the
champions of “sustainable” development. Hence, several scholars from the politics and interna-
tional relations discipline started engaging with discussions surrounding the Anthropocene. Some
scholars advocate for updated political perspectives and a new system of global governance (Burke
et al., 2016; Fishel et al., 2018) while others raise caution over the reproduction of the shortcom-
ings of the liberal internationalist framework (Chandler et al., 2018). The middle-ground for these
seemingly bipolar constructions can be found through a convergence of peace and survival. If the
current international order wants to maintain its relevance amidst the pressing environmental
issues, it needs to rethink, revise, or expand its traditional objects of security (i.e. states and
humans) as these objects could also be the agents of insecurity (Simangan, 2019b).
This paper contributes to the Anthropocene discourse by outlining the common trajectories of
the LIO, particularly the liberal peace agenda, and the urgent need for addressing the environmen-
tal issues in the Anthropocene. This objective can be easily regarded as a futile attempt to problem-
solving using ineffective liberal interventionist tools within modernist frameworks. However, there
are several reasons for locating radical but realistic, effective responses to the Anthropocene chal-
lenges within the existing order. First, it is a resourceful approach to the problems at hand by draw-
ing on “existing resources and capabilities to make the most of opportunities and interconnections”
that have emerged in the Anthropocene (Chandler, 2017: 124). It presents an opportunity for trans-
forming the LIO without abandoning some of its core values and institutions. Second, converging
liberal peace and human survival is both desirable and plausible as it deals with the ontic and
ontological issues of living in the Anthropocene. It is philosophically desirable because it serves as
an “ontological shock,” which is necessary for provoking “multiple forms of rethinking” (Burke
et al., 2016: 522) and “positive possibilities” (Mitchell, 2017: 18). It is also politically plausible
because it encourages, rather than chastises, the guardians and brokers (i.e. international
40 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

organizations and institutions, nation-states, political elites, and even business enterprises)1 of the
LIO to join in, rather than reject, the imagination and construction of political options.
The third reason for locating potential responses to the Anthropocene within the LIO is that it
integrates existing top-down institutions and bottom-up agency into a unified transformation of the
structures that are oppressive to all living beings. The institutions of this order are integral to the
structures that need transforming, such as international law (Fishel et al., 2018). Beyond accepting
the possibilities of extinction and embracing the inhuman and “beings-to-come” (Mitchell, 2017: 21),
contemplating the extinction of humanity urges human agency to preserve, or at the very least extend,
its existence. The possibility of mass extinction and the instinct for survival at the individual level
generate or reinforce the existing multitude of bottom-up approaches, hopefully toward “a concerted
assault on the systemic practices, institutions and imperatives” (Chandler et al., 2018: 207) of an
“anthropocentric, state-centric, and capital-centric” international order (Burke et al., 2016: 504).
The state-centric, militaristic, and consumption-driven characteristics of the global system cre-
ate difficulties not only in mitigating human impact on the Earth system but also for the pursuit of
peace. Peace, in this case, is based on Galtung’s (1967) definition, which includes not only the end
of physical violence and direct conflict (i.e. negative peace) but also the absence of structural or
more invisible forms of violence (i.e. positive peace). Positive peace is manifested in social har-
mony and cooperation, consisting of “freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth
and development, absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism, and
dynamism” (Galtung, 1967: 14). These positive relations intersect with the essential elements of
liberal peace: human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy. In the more recent
history of interventions these elements of liberal peace have become the guiding principles of
statebuilding in newly independent states and conflict-affected territories (Richmond and Franks,
2009). In these contexts, liberal peace can be considered as a Western imposition, carrying with it
the unsustainable economic models that flourished in the Western industrialized world, as well as
other paradoxes of implementing liberal ideals, such as liberal states being capable of restraint
when going to war and at the same time willing to wage war. As Doyle (1986: 1163) wrote about
wars waged by Kant’s republic, “these wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; they also
can generate enormous suffering.”
On the other hand, the appeal of internationalizing liberal peace lies in the history of its propo-
nents fighting alongside the struggle for human rights and defeating colonialism, fascism, and
communism (Dunne and McDonald, 2013) and responding to humanitarian crises through solidar-
ist engagement with various humanitarian agents (O’Hagan, 2013). In the economic sphere, mar-
ket liberalization jumpstarted post-world war economic growth in Europe and, later, in other parts
of the world, and economic interdependence brought by free trade made war and conflict unpalat-
able to trade partners (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Although international peace operations with
liberal frameworks have contributed to the decline in civil wars and major conflicts (Doyle and
Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008), the illiberal outcomes of the illiberal implementation of liberal
values in conflict-affected societies, however, have led to assertions that liberal peace is in crisis
(Cooper, 2007). These assertions are especially valid for liberal peacebuilding missions that were
neither liberal nor peacebuilding because they departed from the liberal elements and holistic
understanding of peace (Simangan, 2019a).
Finding solutions to a global catastrophe partly driven by the LIO using the mechanisms of that
same order seems counterintuitive. For one, the state-centric nature of the global system is yet to
prioritize human security over state sovereignty. This view is especially true when prioritizing
human security necessitates foreign intervention, as unresolved disputes surrounding the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) suggest. In addition, the consistent annual increase in global military
expenditure and sustained production and trade of military weapons (SIPRI (Stockholm International
Simangan 41

Peace Research Institute), 2019) depart from the goals of human development and ecological well-
being. These activities are permitted by the liberal political and economic systems despite being
destructive and unsustainable. Furthermore, the political stalemate regarding necessary reductions
in the use of fossil fuels for addressing climate change, including the potential of some climate
change solutions for inciting socio-economic disruptions for industries and economies with heavy
carbon footprints, leaves little room for optimism (Aklin, 2018). The 2015 Paris Agreement for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, despite
being born out of the current order, are yet to fulfill the parties’ commitment toward environmental
sustainability and human development. The UN (United Nations) (2019a, 2019b) even acknowl-
edged the deterioration of SDGs implementation and the insufficient response to the combined
implications of environmental degradation and conflicts for sustainable development.
I propose, on the other hand, that the liberal approach to international peace and security is not
entirely incompatible with the global pursuit of survival. The state-centric, militaristic, and con-
sumption-driven global politico-economy brings to a compromise liberal peace and ecologically
aligned living in the Anthropocene. The environment emerged in the 1970s as a challenge to liberal
internationalism in which inter-state narratives based on postcolonial and nationalist agenda down-
played a rights-based approach to the environment at the individual and local levels (Conca, 2015).
Although state sovereignty remains to be the UN’s priority, it has demonstrated willingness in the
past to link environmental issues with its foundational mandate on security. According to Conca
(2015), the UN system managed to raise awareness and marshal support toward specific aspects of
environmental protection using its law and development pillars, such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol
to protect the ozone layer. However, in order to effectively sustain broader environmental issues
such as climate change, the UN also needs to exercise its mandates on the other two pillars—human
rights and peace (Conca, 2015)—which are also considered key elements of liberal peace.
Despite drawbacks, a rights-based approach to the environment and an acknowledgment of its
nexus with peace have started taking shape. Earlier in 1992, the outcome document of the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (1992) recognized the unsustainable global patterns
or production and consumption. Later in 2015, the UN bureaucracy provided peace-and-rights
approaches to development for the formulation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(Conca, 2015). Several studies have also been informing the debates in the UN regarding the envi-
ronmental aspects and climate consideration of UN peace operations (e.g. Day and Caus, 2020;
Krampe et al., 2018; Matthew, 2014). Some of the political and economic demands of the
Anthropocene could be met within the current global system if state sovereignty does not subvert
human security, environmental protection is linked to peace, and continuous economic growth
through unsustainable patterns of production and consumption is no longer an option. Human
rights and liberal peace are tacitly entrenched in the way the global system operates. A return to
these values could address the current shortcomings of how the system addresses the socio-ecolog-
ical challenges in the Anthropocene. In a globalized world in which environmental problems are
also global in scope, state-centric responses that are mainly territorialized and sovereignty-bound
will fall short of addressing transboundary and rights-based issues. Table 1 summarizes the poten-
tial intersections of peace and survival by rethinking the dominant perspectives and practices in
international relations, with the following sections scoping the prospects and challenges of living
in the Anthropocene within the current LIO.

Rethinking the state-centric foundation of the international order

The principle of non-intervention is at the core of the LIO (Vincent, 1974). Foreign intervention is
widely considered a violation of nation-states’ right to self-governance and an aberration in the
42 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

Table 1. Three propositions for converging peace and survival in the Anthropocene.

Pursuit of peace Propositions Survival in the Anthropocene

Human rights  Prioritize human security over  Human survival
state security
Absence of war  Abolish militarization and war  Reduced environmental impacts
caused by militarization
Reduced structural  Replace consumption-driven  Increased access to means of
inequality and economy with sustainable survival and well-being of all
violence economic models

international order. Glanville’s (2013) historical investigation reveals, however, that the “responsi-
bility to protect” precedes the more recent right to state sovereignty, with the principle of non-
intervention established only in the 20th century. Nevertheless, attempts to dislodge state sovereignty
for humanitarian purposes are met with skepticism or outright rejection. Critics of humanitarian
intervention argue that dismissing or compromising the principle of non-intervention could encour-
age neo-colonial practices and encroach on state sovereignty (e.g. Ayoob, 2004; Hehir, 2013).
However, state sovereignty, while protecting states from foreign intervention, also prevents inter-
vention in cases of transnational and non-traditional security threats, including environmental
issues. Authoritarian regimes may use the virtue of sovereignty to block humanitarian assistance.
For example, in 2008, the military junta in Myanmar refused entry for foreign aid workers and
essential equipment in the wake of Cyclone Nargis (Özerdem, 2010). In Syria, Russia claims that
the cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid infringes on Syria’s sovereignty (Averre and Davies,
2015). Abusive states also shield themselves from human rights investigations using their right to
state sovereignty. In these cases, state security overrides human security. When the means of advanc-
ing human security contradict with state security and sovereignty, state-centric priorities might side-
line the liberal principle of human rights, which is an essential element of liberal peace.
Human rights will play a unifying role in making sense of the unsettling circumstances in the
Anthropocene. As Hey (2018) argues, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, specifically the
right of everyone “to share in scientific advancements and its benefits,” is an appropriate venue for
reconstructing more Anthropocene-relevant international instruments. Human decision-making in
times of doubt and uncertainty is likely to be contingent on background values (Krakoff, 2011).
Despite criticisms of their shortcomings, human rights enable entities in the international system to
“establish duties, entitlement, moral boundaries, and governance obligations that could create the
foundation of a legal normativity” for humanity to live within the bio-geophysical thresholds of the
Earth system (Kotzé, 2014: 271). The most basic level of human rights is the right to life, and many
of the environmental manifestations of the Anthropocene threaten the right to life. Here, I refer
again to Galtung’s work, specifically on the dimensions of violence. Violence is defined as the
“cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and
what is” (Galtung, 1969: 168). The challenges in the Anthropocene may increase the difference
between the potential of life and the actuality of life. The resulting human suffering from these
challenges is an expression of violence inflicted by humans, collectively, upon themselves because
the catastrophes in the Anthropocene are avoidable and yet accelerated by humans. Relatedly, in
cases where states block humanitarian aid on the grounds of state sovereignty, the states are violat-
ing the right to life of their citizens.
In times of environmental disasters and humanitarian emergencies, human security must super-
sede state security (Dalby, 2009). However, in some circumstances, state security obstructs the
Simangan 43

means and resources essential for human security. The pursuit of peace requires the advancement
of human security before state security, which does not necessitate the removal of the state but
rather elevates human security above it. The liberal value of human rights, therefore, steers away
from state-centrism and toward peace and survival. Furthermore, surviving the Anthropocene
demands a move beyond the conventional means of protecting human rights from humans’ harmful
actions toward each other. The human rights discourse needs to encompass the protection of human
rights from humans’ harmful actions toward the biosphere because harm toward the biosphere is
harm to all humans. This expansion of rights entails a paradigm shift from an anthropocentric to an
ecocentric governance system in which the Earth and all its components are entitled to their own
rights (Berry, 1999). The state, meanwhile, will continue to play a crucial role in environmental
protection through domestic policies, multilateral cooperation, and inclusion of non-state actors
(Barry and Eckersley, 2005).
In the Anthropocene, however, the state-centric version of security needs revision to accom-
modate ecological considerations. Drawing on the securitization process, McDonald (2018: 166)
conceptualized ecological security with ecosystem resilience, or “the capacity of ecosystems to
function to sustain life across time and space” despite perturbation and change, as the referent
object. Securitizing ecosystem resilience also securitizes the “rights and needs of the most vulner-
able across time, space, and species: impoverished population in developing states; future genera-
tions; and other living beings” (McDonald, 2018: 155). Cognizant of the criticisms toward the
concept of resilience, McDonald (2018: 167) maintains that resilience in the context of ecological
security is not simply “acceptance of and adaptation to change”; it also entails “proactive and radi-
cal measures to minimize the scale and severity of change.” In this sense, ecological security aligns
with Dryzek and Pickering’s (2019) ecological reflexivity, which is constructive and dynamic
rather than preservative and retentive. An ecocentric system will eventually devalue environmen-
tally destructive state-centric practices, such as militarization, that ultimately threaten human sur-
vival. For its epistemological capacity to extend rights from humans to nonhumans, human security,
therefore, is more aligned with environmental considerations than state security.

Rethinking militarization as a means of protection

Another characteristic of the current international order obstructing the liberal pursuit of peace and
the global pursuit of survival is militarization, which is also a by-product or instrument of state-
centrism. Protecting state sovereignty sometimes entails waging war against other states, and plac-
ing state sovereignty as the primary object of security sanctions environmentally harmful actions,
such as nuclear arms proliferation. Kapferer (2004) explained the inseparability of state from war,
that the maintenance of peace within the state’s sovereign borders may be used to justify the con-
duct of war with other states. According to Dalby (2013), unilateral action and state rivalry in the
Anthropocene increase the potential for new forms of warfare and violence. The act of militariza-
tion to preserve state sovereignty at the cost of environmental well-being weakens the long-term
prospects of human survival. It has a negative effect on the Earth system and destabilizes natural
ecosystems (Jorgenson et al., 2010; Lawrence et al., 2015). In fact, one of the proposed starting
dates of the Anthropocene is the first detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1945 in New Mexico
(Lewis and Maslin, 2015; Zalasiewicz et al., 2015). Powerful states build nuclear arsenals to deter
military assaults or perceived threats against their sovereignty. Nuclear tests release radioactive
elements and other materials harmful to the global ecosystem and human health. The International
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons), 2012) estimated that around two and a half million people around the world would
eventually die from cancer because of the nuclear tests conducted from 1945 to 1980.
44 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

In liberal understandings, the international community strives for peace. The liberal peace
agenda purportedly promotes peace, albeit a separate one. Liberal democracies prefer not to go to
war with each other in order to facilitate a free and peaceful trading relationship (Doyle, 1983).
Achieving what Kant calls “perpetual peace,” however, may sometimes require the use of force to
“protect and promote–sometimes forcibly–democracy, private property, and the rights of individu-
als overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of
individuals, have no rights to noninterference.” (Doyle, 1986: 1162). On the other hand, according
to democratic peace critics, the promotion of democracy has become a justification for going to
war, and capitalism has stirred violent conflicts caused by economic inequalities (e.g. Layne, 1994;
Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). Marketization may exacerbate the socio-economic inequalities that
cause initial conflict, and rapid democratization is susceptible to exploitation by actors who are
incentivized for conflict (Paris, 1997). National or state security should, therefore, also go hand in
hand with the advancement of living standards through social and economic security (Ikenberry,
2018). However, the failure of the global economic system to use economic openness for reconcil-
ing state security and human security illuminates the problematic, neo-liberal leanings of the cur-
rent order. The environmentally harmful economic practices of the modern, neo-liberal world will
be discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
The liberal pursuit of peace does not have to abandon its liberal values of democratic represen-
tation and human rights, but it should reject the option of going to war for the sake of those values
considering the broader, global challenges in the Anthropocene. Besides, efforts to spread these
liberal values through forceful means have proven to be counterproductive. In the past, these for-
cible measures and their failures have raised skepticism over the legitimacy and effectiveness of
liberal values and institutions. Moreover, the accumulated environmental impacts of wars and
violent conflicts have long-term effects on all living beings. An approach that is relevant in the
Anthropocene commends and underscores the importance of states that do not militarize for the
preservation of their sovereignty. After all, giving socially constructed states special protection in
the face of extinction is pointless. The absence of war and the demotion of militarization not only
satisfy the liberal pursuit of pacifism but also increase humanity’s chance of long-term survival.

Rethinking global consumption as a driver of economic growth

The third problematic characteristic of the LIO is capitalism, particularly the growth- and con-
sumption-driven economy on a global scale. The Anthropocene exposes the environmental impact
of globalized, industrialized capitalism’s virtue of unlimited growth and overconsumption (Cook
et al., 2015). Hence, “Capitalocene” could be a more appropriate term for this age that permits the
commodification of nature for the purpose of capital accumulation (Moore, 2016). Economic
growth under capitalism has improved human conditions in many respects, but it has also subjected
human societies to “abstract forms of domination”—from commodified social interactions to envi-
ronmental destruction (Sewell, 2014). In addition, economic inequalities are often attributed to
unregulated capital accumulation and glorified consumption. Economic inequality, heightened by
the Industrial Revolution, and other destructive dynamics of capitalism are at the core of the
Marxist critique. Moore (2017) correctly directs the attention of scholars involved in the
Anthropocene discourse toward thinking about the history of modern ecological crisis, including
capitalism, and not just about geological history. This thinking allows us to see capitalism as more
than the exploitation of work or degradation of nature, but a broader “world-ecology of power,
capital, and nature” that “incorporates geobiophysical processes and social and economic history
within a relational field” (Moore, 2017: 78–79; see also Moore, 2003). Capitalocene, therefore,
illuminates the destructive dynamics of capitalism.
Simangan 45

My critique here of capitalism, however, focuses on unlimited growth, while remaining faith-
ful to the foundational logic of economic openness championed by the LIO. Echoing Foster
(2011), the ecological crisis in the Anthropocene is better understood as a critique of deaccumula-
tion rather than simply degrowth. Hence, to rethink global consumption as a driver of economic
growth is a critique of endless growth and accumulation, an impossible virtue given the geobio-
physical limits of the Earth. This proposition does not advocate for a drastic downsizing of the
economy; rather, it re-aligns the purpose of economic openness with the liberal value of human
rights by prioritizing human and ecological well-being and tempering the accumulation of wealth
and capital. A consumption-driven economy feeds structural forms of violence by incentivizing
those with capital to consume more than necessary while depriving those without capital from
consuming what is sufficient. Economic inequality also undercuts the sweeping effect of global
catastrophes. The wealthiest of the population can afford safety nets while the poorest are the
most vulnerable to the challenges in the Anthropocene. Even new forms of environmental govern-
ance and institutions continue to disproportionately impact the developing nations and poorer
communities that source their livelihood directly from nature (Ogden et al., 2013). However, the
wealthy should still be alarmed. Capital will allow them to purchase safeguards from natural
catastrophes but only in the short run because extinction on a global scale renders capital and
consumption ultimately worthless.
As mentioned earlier, peace is not just the absence of war; it is also the absence of structural
violence. For the proponents of liberal peace, the reduction of economic inequalities and other
structural forms of violence is one of the goals of the liberal peace agenda. In liberal understand-
ings, liberal peace promotes an open market economy but does not justify economic inequality,
even though this is often one of the unintended consequences of its economic model. It also pur-
ports to cultivate peace by encouraging economic interdependence among states on the assumption
that a state is less likely to go to war with another state to which it has strong economic ties
(Keohane and Nye, 2001). In other words, the liberal peace agenda promotes an open market
economy for the purpose of achieving peace. Peace is the goal, and economic development is only
the means to achieve that goal through an open market economy. Meanwhile, survival is the goal
in the age of the Anthropocene. In this case, peace and human survival have two points of conver-
gence. First, both are undermined by the current consumption-driven global economy. Second, a
reduction of inequalities and other structural forms of violence increases access to means of sur-
vival. By providing access to needs and services that overcome inequalities and structural violence,
disadvantaged populations are granted the necessary safeguards during extreme environmental
conditions. This provision is imperative, especially given the accounts of some people succumbing
to death because they did not have access to health services or were not able to purchase emergency
supplies in times of calamities.
While an open market economy in a neoliberal order goes hand-in-hand with industrial capital-
ism, it can also thrive in a different model that promotes both human development and ecological
well-being. Several economic models have been proposed to update the current one by integrating
ecological and social considerations given the limits of unlimited, linear economic growth (e.g.
Raworth, 2017; Swilling and Annecke, 2012). A model of common utilization of available resources
can still operate within an open market system while remedying the negative impacts of production
on the environment and society. However, transitioning to alternative economic models or energy
policies is not without hurdles. For example, although carbon emissions reduction is imperative for
climate change mitigation, decarbonization will likely generate destabilizing political impacts and
deeper economic inequalities at both the national and global levels (Bernstein and Hoffmann,
2018; Malik and Lan, 2016). For any transition, the key is to tailor the transition according to the
unique needs of societies, manage the transition to minimize negative repercussions, and sustain
46 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

the benefits of such transition. For instance, the use of renewable energy technologies, especially
in poorer regions, could enhance much needed economic and institutional development
(Holstenkamp, 2019; Karekezi, 2002). The management of this transformation is likely to have
implications for both environmental sustainability and peace and security.
The prospects and challenges of economic transitions are evident in the discussion about circular
economy, one of the more popular alternative economic models. Simply put, a circular economy is
largely based on production of resources that can be reused, recycled, upcycled, or repaired to mini-
mize quick disposal and extend the life of a product. In contrast to the wasteful and unsustainable
linear economy that has dominated modern production, which has prompted rapid but only short-
term economic growth at the cost of the environment and social equity, a circular economy optimizes
virgin resources to reduce resource consumption and environmental waste (Sauvé et al., 2016; see
also Prieto-Sandoval et al., 2018). One of the schools of thought of circular economies follows a
performance-based economy in which manufacturers sell performance instead of objects, and con-
sumers pay for service instead of quantity (Stahel, 2006). In a performance economy, the producers
profit while the consumers benefit from the quality of performance and not the quantity of produc-
tion. In these economic frameworks, service is valued over goods, and business and environmental
interests may overlap by maximizing and enhancing the interdependency between human-made capi-
tal and natural resources (Hawken et al., 1999). The circular economy model appears viable not just
for economic growth but also for sustainable economic growth. Its knowledge-based and non-
resource means of wealth creation provides opportunities for developing countries to overcome the
challenges of industrialization and “leapfrog to the same vision of the future” (Stahel, 2006: 3).
Several studies, however, underscored the conceptual and practical limitations of translating the
idea of a circular economy into real-world policies. The concept of circular economy remains
widely contested, variedly interpreted, and even worryingly misunderstood. Scholars examining
the concept mainly equate it with recycling (Kirchherr et al., 2017), and regulatory mechanisms
tend to focus on the recycling component of the model, failing to diversify policies related to
reducing and reusing of products and materials (Ranta et al., 2018). Several technological, socio-
cultural, and production hurdles are at play that may prevent a systems and multi-level approach to
circular economy, undercutting its potential benefits for the environment (e.g. Korhonen et al.,
2018; Zink and Geyer, 2017). Most importantly, the promotion of circular economy would only
resort to another greenwashing option for global corporations unless there is an acceptance that
continued growth is impossible with finite resources (Narberhaus and von Mitschke-Collande,
2017), “progressive anti-consumerist policies” are in place (Savini, 2019: 687), and it is aligned
with efforts toward social equity (Millar et al., 2019). Alternative economic frameworks need to
address simultaneously both environmental degradation and socio-economic inequities brought
about by the industrial capitalist model of endless growth and consumption.

Conclusion
“The universe is not required to be in perfect harmony with human ambition,” is one of the
famous quotes of science popularizer Carl Sagan. Yet, to survive, humans are required to be in
perfect harmony with the universe, starting with the Earth. The “age of humanity” is a reminder
of the origins of human entanglement with nature as well as human interconnectedness. The
Anthropocene not only confirms human agency for changing the environment but also exposes
human vulnerability to environmental change. Human interventions to reverse the events of the
Anthropocene will be a trial and error process. There is no guarantee that corrective (but still
anthropocentric) actions would save human societies from global catastrophes brought about by
anthropocentric activities. They also do not guarantee immediate effectiveness considering that
Simangan 47

the Anthropocene brings to light the vastness of material existence, in which human existence is
just one component (Clark, 2014). However, considering that human actions have collectively
accelerated the extreme changes in the Earth system, corrective actions have a higher potential to
moderate these extreme changes than doing nothing and treading the same anthropogenic trajec-
tory. The impact of climate change is worse than expected, and according to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2018), the health
of the Earth cannot be reversed if carbon emissions do not drastically decrease by 2030. Extreme
weather events are becoming more frequent and life-threatening, as seen in the recent record-low
temperatures in the US and record-high temperatures in Australia.
With claims that the current international order, along with its liberal values, is now in decline, the
Anthropocene presents an opportunity to return to the holistic origins of liberal peace and reinstate its
relevance in this new era. The liberal values of democracy, justice, development, and individual rights
and freedoms may prove useful in ecologically re-aligning the institutions and strategies of interna-
tional peace and security toward more inclusive and equitable approaches to living in the Anthropocene.
In the past, unfortunately, the ways and means for how these values have been promoted and pre-
served have not only led to environmentally harmful consequences on a global scale but have also,
and even more so, weakened pacifism, human rights, and sustainable development. For these values
to continue and thrive in the future, they have to be embedded in a more social democratic and soli-
darist methodology than a neo-liberal blueprint (Ikenberry, 2018), taking advantage of the
“Anthropocenic turn” by orienting the transformative agency of human societies toward problem-
solving (Arias-Maldonado, 2016). The demand for such methodologies becomes even more urgent if
human societies with liberal values wish to overcome both environmental crises and peace and secu-
rity challenges simultaneously. And for the LIO to survive these challenges, liberal democracies out-
side the neo-liberal West would have to return to the original vision of liberal democracy—a stable
but inclusive economy (Ikenberry, 2018). If the US wishes to keep its political leadership of this
order, it would have to shed off its neo-liberal brand and revive its postwar goal of reconciling eco-
nomic security with social protection of workers and the middle class (Ikenberry, 2018). In the con-
text of the Anthropocene, it would also integrate both social and environmental protections.
The political impetus for the required revision or reform of the LIO will rely, not just on inter-
national organizations and institutions, but also on national governments, subnational entities, and
local communities. Bridging global action and local capacity takes into account the risk of a uni-
versalizing agenda to create new hierarchies and exclusions (Chandler et al., 2018). Ideally, it will
be a collective and streamlined action toward a better promotion of human security, conflict pre-
vention, and inclusive economies. The cooperation of liberal democracies within this order has
already created several instruments to achieve these goals. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Agenda on Sustainable Development, and more recently, the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons are examples of international milestones that demonstrate the LIO’s capacity
for reform. Some of these agreements have also become embedded in the national agendas of com-
mitted countries, and local solutions to global challenges are proliferating. These are signs of hope,
but hope must an active verb, especially when confronted with the possibility of extinction.
Scholars engaged with the study of the Anthropocene can contribute to bridging these actions and
capacities by “embracing a multi-species, multidisciplinary action plan” (Burke et al., 2016: 502).
They can also be crucial in pluralizing an otherwise Western-centric Anthropocene discourse by
“bolstering our understanding of indigenous agency, human-nature entanglements and differenti-
ated vulnerabilities at regional and local levels” (Simangan, 2020: 224).
This theoretical exploration of the complementary points between the pursuit of peace within the
current LIO and the global pursuit of survival in the Anthropocene hopes to provoke a rethinking of
the normative foundations of international relations and encourage action away from the material
48 The Anthropocene Review 9(1)

priorities of international actors. In this paper, I have presented possible ways of surviving the
Anthropocene through the liberal peace framework. First, prioritizing human security over state
security would promote human rights, such as the right to life and access to basic needs, which are
more crucial when human beings are subjected to environmental hazards, thereby enabling the
extension of rights to the environment. Second, the abolishing of militarization and war would
reduce the incidence of direct violence and physical conflict, consequently reducing the environ-
mental footprint of militarization. Third, replacing the consumption-driven economy with genuinely
sustainable economic models could increase access to means of survival and improve human and
environmental well-being, therefore reducing structural inequality and violence prompted by capital
accumulation. Future research for modelling these propositions would identify and quantify their
relational components and dynamics. These propositions are targeted toward the updating of the
LIO to make it more relevant in the Anthropocene while continuing to promote the liberal values of
democracy, human rights, and an open economy. By converging the complementary pursuits of
peace and survival, the normative and material foundations of the existing institutions of interna-
tional order need not be completely eradicated. Instead, a revision of these foundations and institu-
tions could give way to values and practices that are more attuned to the changing Earth system.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Dahlia Simangan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9418-969X

Note
1. These guardians and brokers are similar to what Dryzek and Pickering (2019) describe as non-ecologi-
cally aligned actors stuck in pathological path dependencies, that is, established institutions and practices
resistant to changes in response to the feedback from the changing Earth system.

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