Comparing Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics.

Plato and Aristotle are generally regarded as the two greatest figures of Western philosophy. For
years Aristotle was a student at the Academy in Athens, an institution founded by Plato. Although
Aristotle was heavily influenced by his teacher, his philosophy eventually departed from Plato’s in
important respects. Aristotle investigated areas of philosophy and fields of science that Plato did not
seriously consider. I think one quote sufficiently displays the difference between the two:

“It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether
the wax and its shape are one” (De Anima ii 1, 412b6–9)

The general consensus is that Plato’s philosophy is abstract and utopian, whereas Aristotle’s, is
empirical, practical, and commonsensical. Perhaps most importantly, the two philosophers differed
in view on ‘the fundamental nature of reality’, metaphysics.

The difference is famously shown in the School of Athens, depicting Plato and Aristotle together in
conversation, surrounded by philosophers, scientists, and artists of earlier and later ages. Plato
points upward to the heavens, hinting on a utopian world filled with perfection. Aristotle points
outward to the world, regarding empirical logical, and thus realistic thoughts.

Plato relied on the premise of Dualism which derived from his theory of forms. This idea essentially
argues that the physical world is not the ‘real’ world; ultimate (perfect) reality/Realm of Forms exists
beyond our physical world. “The Forms are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that
transcend time and space; they exist in the Realm of Forms.” (The Theory of Forms by Plato:
Definition & Examples, 2015) For example, concepts like redness, beauty, goodness are Forms, and
should have a perfect idea of what they look like in the realm of Forms. The physical world is thus
continuously changing (flowing) and imperfect.

Resultingly Plato used the same principle on the metaphysical aspect, and in this case, the soul.
“According to Plato, man is a dual creature. We have a body that ‘flows’, is inseparably bound to the
world of senses, and is subject to the same fate as everything else in this world– a soap bubble, for
example. All our senses are based in the body and are consequently unreliable. But we also have an
immortal soul– and this soul is the realm of reason and not being physical, this soul can survey the
world of ideas… Plato also believed the soul existed before it inhabited the body” (Sophie’s world,
Gaarder 88). An example of soul-body duality is that willing the arm to be raised causes it to be
raised, whereas being hit by a hammer on the finger causes the mind to feel pain. Thus maintaining
that the body and soul are separate entities, both fulfilling different roles and significance. He saw
the mind as identical to the soul and argued that it pre-existed the body as part of a continual
process of reincarnation which relates back to forms. Here, the body is seen as a vessel of the mind.

Aristotle, on the other hand, developed a very different perspective and instead of the dualistic
metaphysical premise of Plato, found monism. Arguing that the soul and the body are inseparably
linked to form one entity. Aristotle referred to the soul as the anima – a non-physical aspect of
humans that comes directly from the body, giving it reason for existence and allowing it to achieve
potential. Here, the thinking takes the soul as a measure of someone’s value rather than a separate
mysterious thing.

A subtle but great difference is on the idea of the mind. They seem to agree that the soul brings life
to the body as we see in De Anima “the soul is the first actuality of a natural body that is potentially
alive.”(De Anima, 412a27) and Phaedo “Now answer,” said he. “What causes the body in which it is
to be alive?” “The soul,” he replied.” (Plat. Phaedo 105c). However, their ideas on the soul and
composition of it differs in an important way: “Readers of the Phaedo sometimes take Plato to task
for confusing soul as mind or that which thinks, with soul as that which animates the body.”(Broadie
2001, 301).

When looking at a plant (a living being) for example, two viewpoints arise:

Plato argues that the soul is “crucially characterized by cognitive and intellectual features”(Lorenz,
"Ancient Theories of Soul", 2009). Therefore the soul is something that reasons, controls the body
and its desires and affections. Thus, since everything that partakes in life has a soul, the plant has a
mind of its own that can experience sensation and desires (Timeaus 77b).

Aristotle on the other hand has a much more developed view of the mind. He argues that all living
things can have a soul, but different capacities of it: nutrition(which exists in all living beings),
perception and mind(which only exists in humans). And that these various kinds of souls also form a
hierarchy: “Everything then that lives and has a soul must have the nutritive soul, from birth until
death; … Sense-perception is not necessary in all living things; for those that have a body which is
simple cannot have the sense of touch”( De Anima iii 12, 434a22) Thus, plants show up with only the
nutritive soul, animals have both perceptual and nutritive faculties, and humans have all three.

Essentially, Aristotle argues that the mind is a non-essential part of the soul, and only one small part
of it: “the part of the soul by which it knows and understands” (De Anima iii 4, 429a9–10; cf. iii 3,
428a5; iii 9, 432b26; iii 12, 434b3) meaning there can exist living beings without mind. Whilst Plato
argues that the mind is ever-present in every living being and the mind inseparably one with the soul
“Plato’s the Republic offers a theory of soul which, among other things, allows attribution of all
mental or psychological functions to a single subject, the soul.” (Lorenz, Hendrik, "Ancient Theories
of Soul”,2009). This small quote directly opposes Aristotle’s ideas: “It is certainly not part of
Aristotle's theory that the soul is specially and directly responsible for mental functions by
performing them on its own.” (Lorenz, Hendrik, "Ancient Theories of Soul”,2009).

Perhaps a more important argument that arises, is the separability of the body and soul. Aristotle
holds that all mental states are also physical states; dualists deny this because they hold that the
soul is a subject of mental states which can exist alone when separated from the body.

“What Aristotle called the ‘form’ chicken is present in every single chicken as the chicken’s particular
set characteristics– for one, that it lays eggs. The real chicken and the form chicken are thus just as
inseparable as body and soul” (Sophie's world, Gaarder 107). Aristotle looks at soul-body relations as
a special case of form-matter relations. For example, the wax of a candle and its shape are different
because the wax could exist when the particular shape is no more, or, that the particular shape
could survive the recreation of its material basis, so one might equally deny that the soul and body
are identical.

However, Aristotle argues “It’s clear that the soul is not separable from the body – or that certain
parts of it, if it naturally has parts, are not separable from the body” (De Anima ii 1, 413a3–5). When
looking at physical objects, it is clear the form is what makes an object. When a house is made of
bricks, it is only a house because of its form, the bricks could equally be used to make an oven or a
simple wall. Aristotle thus acknowledges that the soul is distinct from the body, and is indeed the
actuality of the body, but he sees that these concessions by themselves provide no grounds for
supposing that the soul can exist without the body.

Looking back at the example of wax and its shape, essentially the body and the soul, we can see the
reason for Aristotle’s approach. “It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is
not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one”(De Anima ii 1, 412b6–9). He essentially
means that just as we shouldn’t worry about the unity of shape and wax of a candle, we shouldn’t
worry about the unity of the body and soul. Aristotle’s thinking is clearly much more empirical and
based on logic and research. He moved away from utopian, perfect ideals and focuses on what he
can analyze in the physical world. Whereas Plato remains thinking in abstract idealistic concepts.
For this reason Aristotle is often regarded as the first ever scientist.

Citations:

- Shields, Christopher, "Aristotle’s Psychology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/aristotle-psychology/>.

- Robinson, Howard, "Dualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/dualism/>.

- Schaffer, Jonathan, "Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/monism/>.

- Duignan, Brian. "Plato and Aristotle: How Do They Differ?". Encyclopedia Britannica, Invalid
Date, https://www.britannica.com/story/plato-and-aristotle-how-do-they-differ. Accessed
24 February 2022.

- Dr. Steven Zucker and Dr. Beth Harris, "Raphael, School of Athens," in Smarthistory,
December 15, 2015, accessed July 19, 2017, https://smarthistory.org/raphael-school-of-
athens/.

- Lorenz, Hendrik, "Ancient Theories of Soul", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/>.

- "The Theory of Forms by Plato: Definition & Examples." Study.com, 13 May 2015,
study.com/academy/lesson/the-theory-of-forms-by-plato-definition-lesson-quiz.html

- Plato. ( 1911). Plato's Phaedo. Oxford :Clarendon press

- Aristotle. ( 1994). Aristotle's "De anima". Leiden ; New York :E.J. Brill

- Plato. ( 1937). Plato's cosmology; the Timaeus of Plato

- Gaarder, Jostein, 1952-. Sophie's World : a Novel about the History of Philosophy. New
York :Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994.