Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2021

Vol. 15, No. 2, 375–378, https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2021.1922967

Hitler: Downfall 1939–1945

by Volker Ullrich
translated by Jefferson Chase
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 838 pages

Reviewed by Stephen G. Fritz

Professor of History, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City

Adolf Hitler is such a familiar figure that a new biography would appear to
require either previously unknown information or a new interpretation. Volker
Ullrich offers neither, but nonetheless has written a book very much worth
reading. Although Ullrich acknowledges the importance of the willing assistance
of military leaders, state bureaucracies, and broad segments of the German public
in the realization of Hitler’s radical goals, as in his earlier volume (Hitler: Ascent,
1889-1939) he relies on extensive research into the papers of major protagonists
of the Third Reich, published primary sources, and recent secondary works in
order to refocus attention on the person of Hitler himself. Thus, in the longstand-
ing debate between intentionalists and structuralists over the role of Hitler in the
Nazi state, and thus of personal influence versus larger economic and social forces
in the making of history, Ullrich intends to amend the structuralist approach of
Ian Kershaw. In his highly regarded biography, Kershaw downplayed the role
of individuals in history. He depicts Hitler as a sort of “unperson,” a mediocrity
upon whom people projected their hopes and fears, but through whom impersonal
structural forces operated, seemingly confirming Marx’s dictum that men make
history only within existing circumstances transmitted from the past.

Ullrich, though, contends that Hitler was a vivid example of how an individual
can shape history. He certainly understands and acknowledges the importance
of the larger historical context that made Hitler possible and that unleashed
much of the dynamism of the Third Reich. However, he insists that in order to
understand this era, the crucial role of Hitler—alongside his personal character-
istics, ideological obsessions, and homicidal urges—must be examined. His is thus
a synthesis of the competing interpretations. In contrast to Kershaw, Ullrich “nor-
malizes” Hitler, in the sense that he takes pains to describe his daily routine, his
interactions with the people around him, and his personal life. The author notes
Hitler’s particular talents (such as his oratorical ability, his aptitude as an actor
and his flair for the dramatic, his organizational abilities, and his political gifts),
but also stresses that the “Hitler phenomenon” can only be understood by exam-
ining German society and the connection between Hitler’s vision of German res-
toration and the collective response of the German people. Hitler represented
both continuity and a break with German history, in that he effectively expressed

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the entrenched German yearning for the unity of the Volksgemeinschaft [ethnic-
racial community], resentment at the outcome of World War I and the Treaty
of Versailles, and the antisemitic undercurrent associated with the strains of
modernization. True to form, he tapped into these currents in German society,
radicalizing them, and pushing them to the extreme. In so doing, he was able to
enlist the support of key elements of the German power structure, especially tra-
ditional conservative political and military elites, whose goals often overlapped to
a considerable extent with his own. Hitler was also able to sniff out the weak-
nesses of his opponents and exploit favorable external circumstances. Finally,
he could rely on the support, and complicity (either active or passive), of the
German people. Few could have failed to notice the disappearance of their
Jewish neighbors, for example, or the distribution of clothing and household fur-
nishings to German citizens that had been taken from formerly Jewish-owned
apartments or from Jews in occupied countries. Moreover, equally few seemed
to care, at least as long as the war was going well.

Hitler, in Ullrich’s telling, was no mere power-hungry opportunist. Although the

book starts at the outset of the German campaign against Poland, as in his previous
volume, Ullrich emphasizes that in waging war, Hitler aspired to create a German
empire in the east—at the time referred to as Lebensraum [living space]—a desire
that was limitless in its goals and exterminationist in its intent. His vision encom-
passed not only a murderous ethnic reorganization of Eastern Europe, but also the
better-known plan to annihilate the Jews. In his discussion of the Holocaust,
Ullrich demonstrates a deft understanding of the complex evolution of this
process. Hitler’s lethal brand of antisemitism and absolute determination to solve
the alleged “Jewish problem” were the starting points and the decisive motivational
factors. However, in line with most recent research, Ullrich also notes the “fits and
starts” nature of Germany’s anti-Jewish policy; the uncertainty over exactly how
to solve the “problem;” the various so-called territorial solutions that would have pre-
sumably taken place after the war; the impact of local initiatives in radicalizing policy;
and the way in which Hitler avoided an overt decision. He preferred instead to give a
“nod” in the direction of outright eradication, trusting his subordinates, in Kershaw’s
famous phrase, to “work toward the Führer,” thus accelerating the process of
destruction. Although he concludes that without Hitler there would have been no
Holocaust, Ullrich’s explanation demonstrates that the complicity of the German
elites made this horrifying event possible. Still, at all stages of the unfolding human
tragedy, Hitler was informed of developments, aware of what was transpiring, and
eager to ensure that all Jews under German control fell victim to his murderous rage.

The same level of nuance is found in Ullrich’s extensive discussion of the military
events of the war. In his telling, the constraints on the German war effort were
just as likely to be external (the overwhelming power and resources of his
enemies) as internal (Hitler’s stubborn fanaticism). Ullrich’s Hitler is not an incom-
petent military dilettante, but a man with a generally perceptive understanding of

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modern military technology and operations, and whose decisions, so often criticized
after the fact by his generals, were for the most part based on larger strategic and
economic factors that they failed to take into account and appreciate. After the fall
of France, though, for which Hitler could justifiably claim considerable credit, his
generals deferred to him. When he prevented a catastrophe of Napoleonic dimen-
sions following the Soviet counterattack at Moscow, he ridiculed their resolve.
Even before the disaster at Stalingrad, sensing that the war had been lost, he dis-
missed their advice.

From that point on, Hitler ran the German war effort, but his increasing inflexi-
bility had perhaps less to do with his unwillingness or inability to learn than is
commonly supposed. Indeed, Ullrich, relying on the work of Bernd Wegner,
sees Hitler as a military leader who relatively early on—perhaps as early as late
1941—understood that Germany could not win the war. Then, in the wake of
further setbacks from 1942–44, he decided to stage his exit, and the downfall of
the Third Reich, in such a way as to create a lasting, pseudo-Wagnerian legacy
of rebirth through sacrifice. Hitler realized more clearly than those around him
that any notion of a negotiated peace was a chimera, especially given the extermi-
natory reality of the Holocaust. As Hitler correctly understood, no one would
negotiate with him. Also interesting is the fact that as German military fortunes
declined, and as Hitler lapsed into a stubborn tactical inflexibility removed
from reality, he also withdrew into isolation. He refused to address the German
people, as if he knew that the bond between them that had fueled his rise was
now lost. The man who had drawn such strength from his public speeches—
and who had been so insistent on maintaining domestic morale in Germany—
now had nothing to draw upon and nothing to offer.

In almost disturbing fashion, Ullrich demonstrates the way in which Germany’s

creeping destruction was mirrored in the body of its Führer, whose physical
deterioration in the last months of the war stunned all those who had not seen
him for some time. Still, despite his frail appearance, Hitler remained what he
had always been: the string-puller and key decision-maker, the resolute all-or-
nothing gambler, the ferocious and unrelenting antisemite, and the Social Dar-
winist unconcerned by the fate of his people, who had proven unworthy. In
this beautifully written and engaging work, superbly translated by Jefferson
Chase, Volker Ullrich, in “normalizing” Hitler, took the risk of humanizing
him. Whereas Alan Bullock dismissed him as an opportunist, Joachim Fest and
Ian Kershaw viewed him as an unperson, and Kershaw shifted attention from
his personality to the structure of the Nazi regime, Ullrich turned the focus
from Hitler the monster to Hitler the man. Precisely because of this, he has
created the most disturbing portrait of the German leader to date: someone
who was intelligent, gifted, charming, sentimental, yet also brutal, ruthless,
cold-blooded, racist, and a narcissist determined to realize his vision even at the
cost of millions of deaths and unparalleled destruction.

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Even now, eighty years after the cataclysmic German assault on the Soviet Union,
the magnitude of his impact on events constantly forces us to return to the person
of Adolf Hitler in search of an explanation for his unimaginable crimes. Volker
Ullrich is to be commended for his work in furthering our understanding of
that diabolical figure.

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