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Politicians, political parties' funding in Greece and anti-money

laundering regulatory framework

Article in Journal of Money Laundering Control · January 2014

DOI: 10.1108/JMLC-07-2013-0027

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JMLC
17,1 Politicians, political parties’
funding in Greece and anti-money
laundering regulatory framework
110
Spyridon Repousis
Department of Economics, University of Nicosia, Nicosia, Cyprus

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine politically exposed persons and major Greek
political parties’ funding sources as well as the anti-money laundering regulatory framework for
political parties’ funding sources.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper aimed at investigating data about Greek political
parties’ funding by identifying new problems and developing solutions.
Findings – The main findings are that Greek political parties’ major sources of revenues are public
subsidies and bank loans. Also, data show that two major Greek political parties cannot easily repay
their bank loans (especially PASOK) and must renegotiate terms with banks and must agree for a new,
long-term and lower payment schedule at a lower interest rate. Extending the period of repayment is
necessary for viability of debts, and banks will protect themselves against default and total losses of
about 253.1 million euros from the two major political parties. Public subsidies are the only collateral
that Greek political parties offer to banks.
Practical implications – As a result of research, structural changes are necessary to immediately
be made in order to cope with politically exposed persons and political parties’ corruption and funding
in Greece, especially during the current fiscal crises. Greek political parties need to raise funds from
other sources than only public subsidies. Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework have to stop
conduit contributions and force banks to apply Know Your Client Principle for donors. Also, to include
on Suspicious Activity Report a checkbox of “Political Finance Violations”. Establishing a code of
conduct informing employees of the risks and subsequences of political corruption, creating a culture
of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with
corruption in political parties’ funding can help to recover ill-gotten assets. Finally, implementing
Business Principles for Countering Bribery and UK Bribery Act will increase transparency in funding
of Greek political parties.
Originality/value – The paper examines corruption and funding sources of Greek political parties,
especially during the period 2009-2011, suggesting policy measures to deter and detect money
laundering and illegal funding to politically exposed persons and political parties. Findings offer
important measures for political analysts, government and society as a whole. A stable political
system is prerequisite for a healthy society and for economic growth.
Keywords Money laundering, Political funding, Political parties
Paper type Research paper

Journal of Money Laundering Control
Vol. 17 No. 1, 2014
pp. 110-120
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1368-5201
DOI 10.1108/JMLC-07-2013-0027
1. Introduction
Greece, after 1974 is dominated by two major political parties, New Democracy and
PASOK. From national parliamentary elections of 2007 up to now, their power decreased
(Table I) due to the worldwide financial crisis and especially due to the Greek fiscal crisis,
structural reforms and austerity measures.
During two national parliamentary elections that took place in 2012,
New Democracy, continue to be between two major political parties (it is the first
political party in votes, ruling government), but PASOK is not anymore. PASOK now
is the third political parties in votes, because political party called “Synaspismos” (now, Politicians,
new name of political party is “Syriza”) is the second one (Table II). political parties’
Corruption is a known phenomenon in Greece, taking place in state and in funding
of political parties. According to the General Inspector of Greek Public Administration, funding
only 1 percent of corruption in Greek public sector is detected and Greek state fraud
losses from corrupted public servants are estimated to 20 billion euros annually
(Newspaper Kathimerini, 29 May 2010). Also delays in judicial processes are a common 111
feature.
According to 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
Greece had 4.6 CPI score which indicates medium to high degree of public sector
corruption as perceived by business people and country analysts. CPI score ranges
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
The “party-state” in Greece and revelations of corruption has caused in past
the fall of former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in 1989 and forced a
re-examination of some of the basic characteristics of the Greek party state
(Featherstone, 1990). Political party funding came under scrutiny as concerns grew
that the largest Greek political party during 1996-2004, PASOK, and members of
parliament from the same political party, probably were involved in illegal funding.
About that there are three examples:
.
Example 1. A high profile case involved a former transport minister who
admitted to accepting payments from the Greek branch of German electronics
company and was arrested and charged with money laundering. According to
minister’s testimony, received 200,000 German marks between 1998 and 2000
and were deposited into the Swiss bank account of minister’s best man in
November 1998 (Newspaper Kathimerini, 28 May 2010).
.
Example 2. Another widely publicized example includes the case involving the
former close aid or right-hand man of former Greek Prime Minister, admitting in
June 2008, that had received one million German marks in 1999, from a German
electronics company, “for the political party”. The money never landed in the
political party’s coffers, claimed executives.
Table I.
Elections results of
March 2004 September 2007 October 2009 May 2012 June 2012 two major parties,
New Democracy
85.91% 79.94% 77.39% 32.03% 41.94% and PASOK

March 2004 September 2007 October 2009 May 2012 June 2012
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

New Democracy 45.36 41.84 33.47 18.85 29.66

PASOK 40.55 38.10 43.92 13.18 12.28
Communist Party 5.90 8.15 7.54 8.48 4.50 Table II.
Synaspismos 3.26 5.04 4.60 16.78 26.89 Results of Greek national
Total 95.07 93.13 89.53 57.29 73.33 parliamentary elections
JMLC In both examples, it was said by politicians involved, that it was a political sponsorship
17,1 or campaign donation and a common practice among politicians. Both politicians were
ejected from their political party in June 2008 after admitting to accepting money:
.
Example 3. The most widely publicized example is a currently enjailed formerly
Greek politician who served as a minister in several cabinets between 1981 and
2004 also founding member of political party. On July 2011, accusations of
112 economic scandals and off-shore companies, lead Greek Parliament to vote in
favor of pressing charges against him and charged him for the attempt to pass
off money obtained through illegal means as legitimate. Also accusations
lead president of the political party to expel him from the party on April 2011.
He was involved in briberies from German electronics companies as Minister
for National Defense during 1996-2001 in relation to the purchase of
submarines. On April 2012, he was arrested and sent to jail on charges of
money laundering.

The next section of this paper provides an overview of anti-money laundering

framework in Greece. Section 3 presents data and results about political parties’ funding.
Finally, Section 4 provides policy measures and concluding remarks.

2. Overview of anti-money laundering framework in Greece

The cornerstone of the relevant framework in Greece is Law 3691/2008, which
considerably strengthens AML/CFT mechanisms and transposes Directive 2005/60/EC
of the European Parliament and the Council, as well as Commission Directive
2006/70/EC laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC. The most
significant amendments that Law 3691/08 subsequently underwent were by virtue of
Law 3875/2010 (regarding the criminalization of the terrorist financing offence) and
Law 3932/2011 (regarding the structure of the Greek Anti Money Laundering and
Counter Terrorist Financing Authority and the procedures for freezing the assets of
persons, groups or entities subject to targeted financial sanctions).
The Bank of Greece, is the authority responsible for supervising credit and financial
institutions and compliance with the legislative framework on the prevention and
suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing (Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism – AML/CFT – Framework) by the institutions
supervised by it.
The Bank of Greece, in the context of its supervisory tasks, checks supervised
institutions’ compliance with their AML/CFT-related obligations and assesses the
adequacy and effectiveness of their AML/CFT procedures.
It should be pointed out that the Bank of Greece has no power to conduct
preliminary investigations or to examine in substance suspicious transaction reports
submitted by supervised institutions. These powers are reserved to the AML/CFT
Committee, the law enforcement or judicial authorities, as appropriate.
By Law 3932/2011 which amended Law 3691/2008 the Anti-Money Laundering,
Counter-Terrorist Financing Commission was renamed the “Anti-Money Laundering,
Counter-Terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority”. The authority
is a national unit aiming at combating the legalization of proceeds from criminal activities
and terrorist financing, assisting in security and sustainability of fiscal and financing
stability.
 Its mission, according to Law 3691/2008, as amended by Law 3932/2011, is the Politicians,
collection, the investigation and the analysis of suspicious transactions reports (STRs) political parties’
that are forwarded to it by legal entities and natural persons, under special obligation,
as well as every other information that is related to the crimes of money laundering and funding
terrorist financing and the source of funds investigation.
The authority has been restructured into three individual units as follows:
(1) The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). In addition to the President, the FIU 113
comprises seven board members of the authority. At the end of each year, the
FIU submits an activities report to the Institutions and Transparency
Committee of the Greek Parliament and the Ministers of Finance, Justice,
Transparency and Human Rights and Citizen Protection.
(2) The Financial Sanctions Unit (FSU). In addition to the President, the FSU
comprises two board members of the authority. At the end of every year, the
unit submits an activities report to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice,
Transparency and Human Rights and Citizen Protection.
(3) The Source of Funds Investigation Unit (SFIU). In addition to the President, the
SFIU comprises two board members of the authority. At the end of every year,
the unit submits an activities report to the Institutions and Transparency
Committee of the Greek Parliament and the Ministers of Finance and Justice,
Transparency and Human Rights.

The President is an acting Public Prosecutor to the Supreme Court appointed by a

decision of the Supreme Judicial Council and serves on a full-time basis.
Anti-Money Laundering Framework takes also into account Law 3023/2002 about
funding of politically exposed persons and political parties. According to Law
3023/2002, Article 8:
[. . .] financing of a political party from the same person during the same year must not exceed
15,000 Euros and financing of members of parliament or candidate members of parliament
from the same person during the same year must not exceed 3,000 Euros.
The Third Money Laundering Directive includes the following definition of a politically
exposed person: “Politically Exposed Persons” (PEPs) means natural persons who are or
have been entrusted with prominent public functions and the immediate family
members, or individuals known to be close associates, of such persons.
Close associates must be identified only when their relationship with a PEP is
publicly known or when the institution suspects there is a relationship.
Business relationships with individuals holding important public positions and
with persons or companies clearly related to them may expose a political party to
significant reputational and/or legal risks. Such PEPs are individuals who are or have
been entrusted with prominent public functions, including heads of state or of
government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior
executives of publicly owned corporations and important political party officials.

3. Greek political parties’ funding

Political party financing can distort the electoral process and is a major motive for
corruption both developed and developing countries. Political finance regime, include
bans and limits on certain kinds of revenues and expenditures, transparency of
JMLC political funds by disclosure and reporting as well as enforcement of rules and
17,1 sanctions for infringements. Revenues of political parties can be collected from
individual citizens, party membership dues, lobby groups, professional organizations,
bank loans, companies and public subsidies.
The pressure on political parties to raise money increases the power of monied
interest groups, companies and individuals to influence party behavior in exchange for
114 financial support.
In Greece, main sources of revenues for two major political parties are public
subsidies and bank loans. Maximum regular public subsidy can be up to 1.02‰ of
regular revenues of public budget per year. But only parties winning a minimum level
of electoral support of 1.5 percent of the votes qualify for subsidies (Law 3023/2022,
Articles 1, 2). Additional subsidies of 0.1‰ of regular revenues of public budget
per year are paid by public for parties’ research and seminar purposes. Public subsidies
decreased during 2009-2011, as a result of the Greek fiscal crisis.
Public subsidies and support for party development do not seem to probity in party
financing. Although public subsidies were significant, even during the current year of
the severe Greek fiscal crisis (Table III), there were important cases of political
corruption, briberies and money laundering, as shown with three above examples.
Data about political parties’ funding are collected from Bank of Greece, Supervisory
Department and Revenues-Expenditures Financial Statements of Political Parties and
analyzed. During years 2003-2007, bank loans were the most important source of
revenues for the two major Greek political parties and especially for PASOK (Table IV).
Also, total bank loans’ balance of four Greek political parties’ accounted to 272.4
million euros end of February 2012 (Table V). As a guarantee (collateral) for receiving
bank loans, political parties have offered their public subsidies.

Elections 6 May 2012 Elections 17 June 2012

(total subsidy) (only 40 percent of total subsidy)

New Democracy 2,129,908.91 476,025.46

Table III. PASOK 2,794,958.81 197,148.13
Public subsidies to Communist Party 479,890.29 72,287.00
Greek political parties Synaspismos 292,865.85 431,572.77
during 2012 especially Total 5,697,623.86 1,177,033.36
for national
parliamentary elections Source: Government Gazzette B’ 1321/23 April 2012 and Government Gazzette B’ 2169/20 July 2012

New Democracy PASOK Communist Party Synaspismos

2003 0.0 23.0 5.3 10.1

2004 43.8 Not available 6.8 13.9
2005 27.2 Not available 0.0 24.5
Table IV. 2006 5.4 45.9 0.2 24.5
Bank loans as percentage 2007 42.2 62.7 12.0 Not available
to total political
parties’ revenues Note: The values are in percent
As shown in Tables VI and VII, bank loans of political parties’ is not easy to be Politicians,
repaid. Especially, PASOK is in a very difficult position, to repay its bank loans political parties’
because during years 2009-2011, it is receiving new loans to repay older loans and
interest (snowball effect). Also, has a high deficit between revenues and expenditures funding
and bank loans repayments plus interest paid for bank loans exceed public subsidy.
After elections during 2012, public subsidy of PASOK will decrease more and will
not be able to cover operating expenditures and bank loans repayments. 115
Political parties (New Democracy and PASOK) must renegotiate terms with banks
and must agree for a new, long-term and lower repayment schedule at a lower interest
rate. Extending the period of repayment is necessary for viability of debt. So, banks
will also protect themselves against default on payments and partial or total losses.
Otherwise, loans cannot be repaid. Also, political parties have to cut their costs and
close branches around Greece which are not necessary as they cannot receive new
loans because they cannot offer any other collateral.

Political party Balance 29 February 2012

New Democracy 132,438

PASOK 120,757
Communist Party 10,977
Synaspismos 8,277
Total 272,449 Table V.
Bank loans of Greek
Note: In thousands euros political parties’

Revenues Expenditures
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011

Public subsidy 26,280 15,056 12,750 Operating 8,025 8,091 7,537

expenditures
Additional public subsidy for 7,054 – – Expenditures for 36,228 17,960 4,672
elections services, etc.
Memberships dues 3,525 2,810 4,049 Interest paid for 3,656 6,357 9,992
bank loans and
bank commissions
Revenues from property 1,551 122 89 Other party 2,436 7,034 837
expenditures (to
branch all over
Greece)
Difference between new bank 32,665 24,957 4,449 Expenditures 27,565 – –
loans and repayments of bank during elections
loans period
Cash (beginning of year) 365 743 2,356 Cash (end of year) 743 2,356 300
Total revenues 71,440 43,688 23,693 Total expenditures 78,653 41,798 23,338
Difference between total 2 7,213 1,890 355
revenues and total
expenditures (deficit/surplus)
Table VI.
Note: In thousands euros New Democracy
JMLC
Revenues Expenditures
17,1 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011

Public subsidy 24,175 19,810 16,309 Operating expenditures 6,050 6,133 5,425
Additional public 6,506 – – Expenditures for 24,554 13,511 6,784
subsidy for elections services, etc.
116 Memberships dues 4,501 2,942 1,687 Interest paid for bank 3,497 6,493 10,259
loans and bank
commissions
Other revenues 547 23 24 Other party 6,253 5,621 1,921
expenditures (to branch
all over Greece)
Bank loans 46,800 40,810 12,510 Expenditures during 24,132 – –
elections period
Bank loans repayments 26,175 35,310 12,036
Total revenues 82,529 63,585 30,530 Total expenditures 90,661 67,068 36,425
Difference between 28,132 23,483 25,895
total revenues and total
expenditures (deficit)
Table VII.
PASOK Note: In thousands euros

Perhaps, public subsidies decrease parties’ interest in sustaining or increasing their

membership. The parties’ dependence on membership dues and other voluntary
financial contributions may decline. Also parties’ important incentive to mobilize and
activate members declines.
Literature suggest that public subsidies cannot explain the decline in party
membership in cross-national data nor is there evidence to suggest that the public
subsidies were introduced as a response to membership decline and that other income
sources have lost their significance for political parties (Pierre et al., 2000).
Greek political parties need to raise funds from other sources than only public
subsidies. This is a necessity not only due to the bad economic crises in Greece and the
pressure on public finance but also to the viability of economics and debts of Greek
political parties.

4. Policy measures and conclusions

Greek public financed parties, especially those in power, are tempted to take advantage
of opportunities to corruptly acquire additional illegal contributions. Also,
expectations of Greek citizens from politics were low but included receiving favors
at elections and from their elected representative on their election. The better prospects
now of improving services and tackling corruption more widely creates the possibility
of changing expectations. Civic education should aim to persuade citizens to explore
new kinds of demands as for example, for honest and effective public services in place
of vote-buying.
There is a need for implementation of a regulatory framework and reforms about
disclosure of funding sources and bans on foreign donations.
Experiences from political finance reform debates in Germany suggested that even
when scandals lend salience to the issue of party finance reform, parties will not
necessarily sacrifice assured economic gains for possible political payoffs (Scarrow, 2007).
 But, in Greece, regulations are only a partial solution because ways are often found Politicians,
of evading or exploiting loopholes through channels which remain unregulated to exert political parties’
influence through secret funds.
Measures also have to be taken to stop conduit contributions. According to Law funding
3023/2002, banks’ cannot deny the acceptance of deposits above the limit of 15,000
euros for political parties and 3,000 euros for members of parliament or candidate
members of parliament but it is recommended to contact and inform them. A conduit 117
contribution is a political donation made through someone else. The individual making
the contribution acts as a straw donor in order to conceal the identity of the real donor
and the true source of funds.
Conduit contribution scheme is designed to circumvent political contribution limits,
which were established for the purpose of reducing influence on incumbent and
potential public officials. Conduit contributions are a violation of Law 3023/2002, and a
felony, with possible additional charges for money laundering being brought.
Detecting a conduit contribution scheme requires a review of the political account,
identifying the red flag associated with the scheme, then following the money trail.
A red flag regarding the timing of conduit contributions is that they may be
intentionally made very late in the campaign cycle, even after the election, since some
expenditures may not be due immediately. Also, banks must apply Know Your Client
Principle for straw donors because can be anyone but his/her socio-economic profile,
may be a tip-off to a conduit contribution scheme and analysis may reveal that he/she
does not fit the profile of someone who may be politically active. Like other economic
crimes, banks are uniquely positioned to expose this particular violation of law.
This is an open issue on political corruption and political parties’ funding in Greece
since there is excessive reliance on banks for implementing PEPs policy and
anti-money laundering methods to deter and detect political corruption. The obligation
to undertake enhanced due diligence for PEPs is probably a controversial aspect.
Dealing with political corruption and identifying it is undoubtedly extremely
challenging and poses difficult challenges of “guarding the guardians”, these individuals
and political parties that are by definition politically influential and generally command
substantial resources. Greek banks as a measure to promote political transparency,
expect PEPs policy, is to include on Suspicious Activity Report, a checkbox of “Political
Finance Violations”.
Because accepting and managing funds from corrupt PEPs and political parties will
severely damage the bank’s and own reputation and can undermine public confidence
in the ethical standards of an entire financial centre, since such cases usually receive
extensive media attention and strong political reaction, even if the illegal origin of the
assets is often difficult to prove. In addition, the bank may be subject to costly
information requests and seizure orders from law enforcement or judicial authorities
(including international mutual assistance procedures in criminal matters) and could
be liable to actions for damages by the state concerned or the victims of a regime.
Under certain circumstances, the bank and/or its officers and employees themselves
can be exposed to charges of money laundering, if they know or should have known
that the funds stemmed from corruption or other serious crimes.
So, Greek banks should gather sufficient information from a new customer, and
check publicly available information, in order to establish whether or not the customer
is PEP. Have appropriate risk-based procedures to determine whether the customer
JMLC is a political party or a PEP and obtain a written statement from all customers, in
17,1 which a customer states whether or not it is a PEP. Banks should investigate the source
of funds before accepting PEP. The decision to open an account for PEP should be
taken at a senior management level.
Government investigation must determine if bank filed a suspicious activity report
for a PEP or a political party and then can perform an analysis of the target and finally
118 determine when and how to notify person of the arrest or freeze and confiscation of
accounts and other assets. A restraining order or court order, subpoenas and
summonses will freeze a bank account and assets from being withdrawn or moved.
The frozen funds or other assets remain the property of the political person(s) or
political party(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time
of the freezing and may continue to be administered by the financial institution or other
arrangements designated by such political person(s) or political party(ies) before
initiation of the action under a freezing mechanism.
Forfeiture laws are the legal means by which political persons or political parties
who gain illicit profits are divested of their illegal gains. Forfeiture is a legal action that
Greek Government authorities initiate against the proceeds of an illegal activity.
In a typical forfeiture case, government authorities brings suit against the property
or owner of the property. If the suit is successful, Greek Government gains the
right, title and interest thereof. To initiate a forfeiture action, Greek Government
(the prosecutor) needs to show that probable cause exists. Probable cause, in forfeiture,
is a belief that the property and assets in question of political persons or political
parties were either used illegally or represents the proceeds from illegal activity.
When ill-gotten income and assets from corruption are found, then a restraining
order or court order will help to recovery assets by freezing and finally confiscating
them by two types of forfeiture, criminal and civil forfeitures. Establishing a code of
conduct informing employees in banks and political parties of the risks of corruption
and money laundering, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing
Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with off-shore companies trading,
can help to deter corruption and recover ill-gotten assets.
Greek Legislation can cope with off-shore companies’ problems by implementing
Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation (or CFC legislation). Controlled Foreign
Corporation rules are features of an income tax system designed to limit artificial
deferral of tax by using offshore low taxed entities. Taxpayers must include in their
income statements, amounts earned by foreign entities they or related persons control.
Simultaneously, Greece must fight not only political parties’ corruption but also
corporate corruption. To fight such corruption Greece must fully implement the Business
Principles for Countering Bribery (Business Principles) released by Transparency
International (2009) intending to engage the private sector in anti-corruption efforts.
An anti-corruption program should target areas such as political contributions, PEPs,
charitable contributions and sponsorships, gifts, hospitality, and expenses.
Disclosure of donors’ identity because public’s right to know about financial
backers may interfere with the need to protect privacy of political preferences.
A practical solution is distinguishing among categories of donors or defining a cut off
point for privacy, e.g. 10,000 euros. But Hogan (2005), demonstrated that limits on
political contributions leads to other forms of electioneering in support of candidates
such as increased voter mobilization. Also suggests that public subsides may divert Politicians,
more private resources and influence to outside groups. political parties’
Currently none political party provides full transparency of all political revenues
and expenditures. Reporting and monitoring revenues and expenditures in Greek funding
Parliament with control from external charted accountants is a useful solution for
transparency avoiding money laundering.
Greek parties first have to follow an accounting system based on revenues and 119
expenditures financial statements annually and publish them each year. Especially
during election period, have to publish revenues and expenditures financial statements
two months after elections (Law 3023/2002). But this is not really happening up to now.
Also, Greece has to update the country’s anti-corruption laws, implementing laws
such as UK Bribery Act in May 2010. Legislation must criminalize direct and indirect
acts of general bribery (including commercial bribery), bribery of foreign officials and
must exercise broad jurisdiction over all individuals and corporate entities occurs
in Greece.
Another solution for avoiding money laundering would be if Greek public subsidies
were given to candidates or member of parliament rather than to political parties.
Members of parliament should be free to make independent judgments that reflect
constituency preferences and the common good rather than be influenced by particular
groups. But politicians think that when public funds flow directly to candidates or
members of parliament should weaken the party because members would become less
reliant on the party for funds and would not create party cohesion. Literature suggests
that party-controlled does not create party cohesion (Cantor and Herrnson, 1997;
Damore and Hansford, 1999).
There is also a need for international action on political party financing. OECD
convention on bribery currently covers only the bribery of foreign public officials
which includes members of parliament but does not extend to political party financing.
Open issues on political corruption and political parties’ funding are: excessive
reliance on the private sector for designing and implementing PEPs policy, problem of
how far to expand PEPs coverage both vertically (down the hierarchy) or horizontally
(to PEPs’ families and associates).
Examining political funding and corruption we must see money laundering and
anti-money laundering as coupled activities, subsystems each of which stimulates the
other to expand its own powers within its particular domain, so that the harder that
anti-money laundering pushes, money laundering pushes back. Argues that anti-money
laundering is not a “solution” to the “problem” of money laundering, and that there can
be no solution: money laundering is as old as money itself.
Policy of party financing is difficult even if there are regulations, independent
electoral commissions and parliamentary ethics committees. The effectiveness of
measures depends on the commitment of the main political parties and electorate to
more ethical behavior.

References
Cantor, D. and Herrnson, P. (1997), “Party campaign activity and party unity in the US House of
Representatives”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, pp. 393-415.
Damore, D. and Hansford, T. (1999), “The allocation of party controlled campaign resources in
the House of Representatives: 1986-1996”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, pp. 371-385.
JMLC Featherstone, K. (1990), “The ‘party-state’ in Greece and the fall of Papandreou”, West European
Politics, Vol. 13, pp. 101-115.
17,1 Hogan, R. (2005), “State campaign finance laws and interest group electioneering activities”,
Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, pp. 887-906.
Newspaper Kathimerini (2010), 28 May/29 May (in Greek language).
Pierre, J., Svasand, L. and Widfeldt, A. (2000), “State subsidies to political parties: confronting
120 rhetoric with reality”, West European Politics, Vol. 23, pp. 1-24.
Scarrow, S. (2007), “Explaining political finance reforms: competition and context”, Party Politics,
Vol. 13, pp. 437-455.
Transparency International (2009), Progress Report 2009: Enforcement of the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Transparency International, Berlin, June.

About the author

Spyridon Repousis received his BA degree in economics from the Athens University of
Economics and Business in 1994, his MSc degree in banking and finance from University
of Stirling, Scotland, UK, in 1995 and his PhD, degree in economics in 2012 from the Department
of Economics, University of Peloponnese. Now, he is an MBA student in University of Nicosia,
Cyprus. He has taught in Technological Educational Institute of Patras (state-owned educational
institute) and he is working in a private bank. He has written scientific articles that have been
published in English journals, in areas such as banking, finance, fraud and money laundering
and has participated in international conferences. Spyridon Repousis can be contacted at:
spyrep@otenet.gr

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