‘The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala: Economic Reorganization As a Continuation of War Carol A. Smith, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4, Guatemala, Debt, and Drugs (Autumn, 1990), 8-41. Stable URL: httplinksstor.orgsici?sici=0004-582X% 28 199023442017%3A4%3C8%3ATMOCSI®SB2.0,COWSB2-9 Latin American Perspectives is curcently published by Sage Publications, Ine.. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at fp (fw. jstor orglaboutitersihtml. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless You. have obtained prior permission, you ray not download an entire issue of &joumal or multiple copies of aricies, and You may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bupsforwer,jstor.onp/jounals/sage.himl. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR twansmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sercen or lnted page of such transmission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving.a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hup:srwwjstor.orgy Sat Jul 9 19:23:10 2005The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala Economic Reorganization as a Continuation of War by Carol A. Smith Since January of 1986 Guatemala has been headed by a Christian Demo- ‘rat, Venicio Cerezo, the second civitian president since 1954, Because this president was clected in relatively fair and open elections, Guatemala has been touted as one af Latin America’s fledgling democracies. Its clear to ‘everyone famitiar with the circumstances preceding, and following these ‘elections that the military stil kolds most of the power in Guatemala and that ‘Cerezo can do litle without tke explicit approval of the Army Fligh Com ‘mand, As Naica and Simon stated: Guatemala's “frst chief of state in twenty years who would not order the killing of an unarmed civilian... has stated publicly that he will not plan social reforms because the army would oppose it? (1986; 13-14). [es also clear that the elections themselves were part of an overall plan by the military to develop a democratic facade in Guatervala inorder. that it might beter implement ils own “security and development” plans for Guatemala (AVANCSO, 1988), What isnot clear is what “security and development" will mean in economic terms to the target population, the rucal people of western Guatemala. The bulk of this article is devoted to answering that question. My basic thesis is thal, while economic control has replaced military ‘coercion as the Guatemalan slate erectsa democratic veneer for intervational consumption, the current pattem of economic restructuring in the highlands, whether guided directly by the military by international funding arganiza- tions, oF by the market, has been exttemely successful in reducing the ‘economic and political autonomy of indian communities, the main source of resistance to Guatemala’s military state This pattern of economic resteuctut- ing imps significant changes inthe role of the tate and military and tl Gaol A. Smith 2 prewar of Antroglogy at Dike University. Her mos recent work, Guatemalan Indians ard the State: (509-1989, wl be published in the lof 1990 by the University of Texas Pes. The wthor woul! ie than the Elling people Fe thei kept ‘comments Chris Rrseger, Haws Machinger, Ren Wifars, Marcie Mere, Linda Gren, Rachel Gus, Paula Wet, Mariya Moots, acd Bl Reseber, LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, 69067. Ya. ITNo. 4. Pal", 644 18 tama ain Arsen Beasties 8Sith MILITARIZATION IN QUATEMALA, 9 relationship each other. Thus I inttoduce and conclude my analysis of socioeconomic changes in Indian communities by situaing those changes within broader political and economic contex+—both sational and international. ‘STATE ANI CIVIL SOCIETY IN MODERN GUATEMALA “The military has been in effective political contrat of Guatemala since 1954, when the United States assisted the overthrow ofthe popularly elected government of facobo Arbenz in order to end the brief periad of political reform begun in 1944. By the mid. 1960s i¢ was the strongest, most fully ‘nsttutionalized, and most nationalistic military force in Ceneal America (Aguilera, 1980; Dunketley, 1988). Militarization of Guatemalan society has gone through suecesive stages since 1954, becoming more deeply et- {cenched with exch period of popular resistance ti, Aer facing down the threat from small nsingont groups in the 1960s with assistance supplied by the United States, Guatemala’ military moved from simple seizure of high office to the establishment of & political security apparatus, which taday penetrates all levels of society; this apparatus, which works bath formally and informally, contals opposition movements by the systematic use of threat, torture, and assassination (McClintock, 1985). In a word, state terror ‘vecame normal politics in Guatemala by the late 1960s, Economie institu- vigmatizaton of the military also took place over the last two decades, with the army establishing ts own bank, credit nsiations, and publishing house, aswell athe meas ake contol of productive resources Aguilera, 1980), “Thus the military became no longer merely the prop, but rather an organic par of the country's cennomically dominant class For reasons tao complex to describe here (se Smith, 1984b; CETDOC, 1988; Davis, 1988), an insurgent movement developed inthe western high- Jands amon the primarily Indian population in thelate 1970s. The movement was strong enough to require drastic reaction om the part of Guatemala’s rilitary state. The mounting of major countesnsurgency campaign inthe western highlands allowed the Guatemalan slate o move beyond Guate- ral’ cities easter hightands, and plantation aceas co penetrate the Indian bightands of western Guatemala—which upto tha time had been considered pottically marginal and had eeceive litle tention from either the army or the state. Beginning selectively in 1975 in response to guerrilla actions, the Guatemalan military moved toward the indisriminate use of violence aginst, any peasants im its way, and by 1981 set out to eradicate subversion by attacking those Indian villages in which any form of popular mobilization had developed (sce Cattirsi Survival, 1985; Carmack, 1988). The period of10 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES. raraltervor oughly 1980 through 1983, involved village massacres, selec Live torture and assassination of rural leaders, burning of houses and crops, and displacement of nearly half te rural population ofthe hightands. Noone knows the exaet numbers, but human rights agencies commonly report that at least $0,000 peasants were Killed; three to five times that number were forced into permanent exile; and up to a mitlion peasants, half the rural population of the western highlands, were physically displaced for some period of time. For a fuller depiction ofthe first phase af counterinsurgency jn Guatemala, see Davis and Hodson, 1982; Cultural Survival, 1983; and Marz, 1988.) ‘Aller the destruction, 2 new phase of militarization began as the military state faced the human and economic wreckage it had wrought i three years of burning, looting, and murdering of highland peasants. ‘The military's presence was insitutionalized in the highlands where previously there had been only 2 few small garrisons. Today major military bases are located in 20 of Guatemala’ 22 departments, and military garisons exis in vietvally every town of mare than 10,001 people. Smaller military camps oF squadrons, remain inthe rural areas of highland townships where insurgent groups made their presence known. Taking in some 7,000 to 8,000 new recruits cack year, ‘mainly from rural areas by coercive means, the army incorporates between 10 and 20 percent of the rural male population between the ages of 18 and 24 to serve two-year hitches,’ Once released from direct military service, many recruits become military commissioners in thei Tocal areas, paid &© assist in further recruitment and local intelligence gathering. Military com- missioners played @ major role in organizing the “civilian” civil patrol ‘system, which in most places operates under the direct control of the army. ‘The civil patrol system, the main means by which the slate now controls the western highlands, was established berweers 1982 and 1983 as military control of the region was secured. In 1984 the civil patrols incorporated nearly one align men and included virtually all Indian males in the western highlands between the ages of 16 and 60. Mer conscripted into the patrols arc required to undertake unpaid service sn their local area for periods of 8 to24hours every 4to 15 days, depending on the size of ther local commucity and the strictness with which focal population moversents needed to be ccontallec(Kruegerand Enge, 1985). As af 1988 these militias have operated mainly inthe areas where the insurgency efforts were songest, that is, about half the previous area (WOLA, 1988) The civil patrol system now involves sitferent things in efferent areas, a5 1 document mare fully below, but remains everywhere a moans of registering and Keeping tabs on the where- abouts of rural Guatemalan civilians. The military also appointed mostSmith /MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 11 political officials ((1om local mayors to departmental governors) in the ‘wester highlands afer 1982, but allowed elections ta take place atthe local and national levels in 1985, Needless to say, open political protest had long, since ended in rural communities, so diteet control ofthe politcal apparatus, was no longer needed ‘The ather majar means of establishing state control io the western high lands have been economic. Between 1982 and 1983 the army herded those Indian peasants remaining in the areas of greatest rural unrest (especialy in the éepariments of El Quiché, and Alte Verapaz) into several dozen “model villages” alang the major strategic roads it builtin the area (Richards, 1985). Most construction was undertaken by lacal peasants in “food for work” programs (Garst and Barry, 1989). Some model villages were to become ‘development poles or sites of planned and directed economic programs; the military has in fact provided litle direct development aid to the. model villages it established, but militarization ofthe highlands has itself created deuovatc changes in the highland economy (2s described below). Tefore the insurgency of the 1980s, which posed the most serious threat to the state in meccsn Guatemalan history, the armed forces did litle to challenge the economic and political power of the agrarian-industial-financial ‘ligarciy. ina sense, the aligarehy’s interests became those of the military in the 1960 and 1970s, as members of an increasingly corrupt military High ‘Command became businessmen of sors in theirawn right. ln the 1980, after waging a very costly counterinsurgency campaign in terms of both fives and ‘money, the interests ofthe army end oligarehy began to diverge, specifically ‘over issues af taxation (Anderson and Siman, 1987), the country’s interna- tignal image (AVANCSO, 19892), and the development of the Indian bigh- lanes. Given this divergence, it is important to consider whose interests are served by the current ceanamic changes inthe highlands ALTERNATIVE PATHS 10 SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT Direct military intervention in the economy receded sigrificantly after 1986, Ieading a number of scholars to question the nation that the army (as ‘opposed to a few of its members) had a “development” plan for the western highlands. Krueger and Enge (1985) suggest that the army did fittie more than devastate the regional economy, leaving it a marginalized, controlled reservation. Anderson: and Simon (1987) atgue that it wes mainly over rmilltary issues thatthe army's interests divergeePfrom those ofthe oligarchy. To answer the question about whose interests are secved, one must not only Took closely at the development plans propased by the army and what they12. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES require in the way of state-milicary intervention, but one must also look at information about the position taken by the oligarchy. “The Natianal Plan for Security and Development, published by the Center ‘of Militasy. Studies in 1982, pravides some early examples of military evelopment thinking: “The causes of the subversion ace heterogeneous, based on social fnjustie, palitical rivalry, unequal developenent, and the dramasof hunger, unemployment, and poverty; but it can be controlled if we. tiem to solve the most pressing human problems” (Ejércita de Guatemala, 1982: 1) Of the fourteen “general, national” abjectives outlined in the plan, nly two directly tat economic development: ove merely calls for “eco- nomic recovery within the free enterprise system.” but the other calls for an “improvement inthe standard of living of the population in order to dieninish existing contradictions.” The remaining objectives cover political changes (Guch as the development of “cemacratic institutions”) and the issue of national integration, Many of the fatter objectives emphasize the particular importance of “establishing. nationalist spirit... imaarporating ous differ- ent ethnic groups” and stimulating within civil society “a new way of 1g, Cevelopmentalist, reformist, and nationalist.” While not strictly economic, these objectives have significant economic ramifications “The army’s 1982 counterinsurgency plan (Plan de Campafa Victoria) makes similar points, observing that “Subversion exists because a smrall raup of people suppor itand 2 large numberof people tolerate i, ether out of fear or hecause there ace causes Which give rise to it. [Hence] the war ‘must be foughton alt fonts militar, political, butaboveall socio-economic” (Black, 1954: 179), Later military plans observe that the principal focus of the army should be 10 satisfy the basic needs ofthe eivilian population (the 1983 plan), and provide the resources necessary for refugees to return to & normal life with the clemenis necessary for ceanomic development (the 1984 plan) (cited in AVANCSO, 19894: 112), Colonel Eduardo Wohlers, one of the architects of the model village program, stated in a 1986 interview that the development strategy for model villages was patterned after Israeli kibbutain, Taiwanese farms, and Korean communes. According to Colonel Woblers, “politcal atitudes would follow i seund economic base was buil” (WOLA, 1988: 105-107), In Wobler’s ‘view, economic problems were not created by the military atrocities in the area but existed long before, The main problem was the marginality of large sectors ofthe population and their conparticipation in the national develop- ment project - A civic affairs division (S-5) of the army was established in 1982 to promote both development and national integration. Ina May 1987interview, Colonel Mario Enrique Morales, head ofthat division, described army tactics‘Sosth MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA, 13 ‘with respect to relations with the civilian population, emphasizing the orig- inalty ofthe army's develapment goals and tacties:""We row understand that we can gain more with civie action than with war, This represents 2 very profound change in the military mentality, ia the Guatemalan Army; and io this we ate being original, we are not copying models ... we have dane all of this by ourselves, without foreign advice” (AVANCSO, 1988; 53). As it turned aut, the military dropped most ofits own direct labors in the development arca after the 19RS ek ver. Thus the army's madel village plan was never fully implemented—loss than half of the 49 projected model villages were built (AVANCSO, 1989b), ‘One could corelude that the army Was more interested in “security” than in “development.” Ifone loaks at actions rather than words, itappears that what the military achieved inthe highlands, in terms of economic changes, differs litte from what Guatemala's business classes would want: (J) it removed Indian peasants from ane large “undeveloped” zone slated by Guatemalan businessmen (many of them members of the military) far forest clearance, cattle ranches, and the extraction of minerals; (2) it forcibly nucleated dispersed farening papulatians so that they could not farm, farcing them «a seek wage work in order to survive; and (3) it helped redvee peasant economic self-sufficioncy throughaut the highlands, Although army objcetives do not directly contradict those of eapitalisns cor even of same Guatemalan capitalists, they are quite different from what most Guatemalan capitalists want in the way of an expanded state (and military) apparatus. One must concede that Guatemala’s oligarchy is now ivided imo two main tendencies: the old guard, who wants as little economic and sociat change as possible; and “the new right modernizers,” who seek new ways and means of investing eapital and who support the development ‘of new civil (ather than state) instiusions that will hegemonicafly maistain peace in Guatemala (Mersky, 1989)." The two groups ate politically united, however, in that both believe that current saciaecanamic problems in Gua- teroala are the Fault of the state and military; neither group wishes 2 state-led solution to Guatemala’s uederdevelopment, thats, to pay higher taxes which could support developmentefforts in the highlands; and both groups wish as litte state interference in the “fice market" as possible. In this sense, Guatemala’s daminant classes are appased to those military planners who seck state solutions to ecanomie problems. While neither the enlitary nar the civilian apparatuses of the state have ‘made much headway in providing their own financing (from the oligarchy) for development effarts in the highlands, they have had considerable success infinding external sourcesaf aid (AVANCSO, 1989). Thisaid, together with 42 coherent state development policy, has been sulficient to make dramatic.14 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES interventions in the highland economy which should eventually draw the majority of highland peasants into a “nationally integrated” development project, The military continues to put pressure on the oligarchy to come up with some of the financial means to succeed in this project." My point here isnot that the interests of the military and the oligarchy ace inalterably opposed on every issue. The military is quite willing to supportSith MILITARIZATION (N GUATEMALA. 15 the institutions of private property and the free market; the oligarchy ig 2ls0 quite willing to let the military maiatain its control over “contested” parts of the highlands. Military goals, however, require. an enlarged and hegemonic or integrated “national” tate apparatus, while the “new right modernizers” wish to see an expansion of civil rather than of state institutions in Guatemala. Astong as levels of external assistance remain high, it seems likely that most ‘members of the oligarchy will accept the expansion of state institutions. In the follawing sections, 1 aiempt to provide evidence for this view hy describing haw the economic autonomy of Indian communities has been reduced while state control has expanded since 1976-1978—a period for hick Fhave baseline information.‘ wil] also argue thatthe loss of economic ‘autonomy reduces Indian capacity to take independent political action, To tmake these points I first describe the premilitary economy of the westem highlands and haw it was affected by the counterinsurgency campaigns; 1 then provide more detailed information on ecaromic changes in three spe- cific areas, selected to show variation within an overall pattern of economic rearganizatian in the wester® highlands. VARIATION IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS {In the late 1970s, the western highlands of Guatemata held some twa lion people, threc-quarters af them Mayan Indians, My regional surveys in that period showed three different ways in which Indians made a livel hhood, which roughly corcesponded (a three different zones of the area (sec: ‘map). About one-quarter of the population, located in areas peripheral to the regional marketing system, supplemented farming for their own food needs swith regular, seasonal wage labor on leveland plantations lacated masily on. the South Coast. Another quater of the population, Socated ncar the major highland towns at the core of che regional marketing system, maintained themselves primarily thraugh artisaral productian and wade. The remainder ‘ofthe population, located tetween the core and peripheral zones, grew most ‘af their own food, praduced some food and craft goods for market sale, and ‘worked on a less regular basis for wages in towns, in government projects (uch 2s roadwork), and on plantations. ‘These zones do not divectly correspond to areas of greater or lesser insurgent or counterinsurgent activity, though there is some relationship Detween the two. Indians in the care zone mastly escaped the military sweeps that massacred thousands of people and eliminated hundreds of villages; relatively few people were forcibly removed fram their homes, thaugh some community leaders were kidnapped or assassinated. Membersof the guerilla organizations appear to have made litle aternpt at active recruitment jn this16 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, area, In this respect, rural tndians of the core shared an experience similar to that of most non-Indians (kaown in Guatemala ladinas),* and people living inthe larger towns ofthe western highlands, As I cacumnent below, primarily nthe basis informatian from San Miguel Totonicapén. rural people ofthe natescape a major resinicringof their economicand political lives. ry reprisal against supposed subversives and their supporters. In mich ofthis area the present population has been reduced to half its former size; many died, but many more were permanently relocated elsewhere. One. ‘cannot assume from this, however, that people in the peripheral zone were more inclined ta revolutionary activity than people elsewhere. Guerrillas ‘were highly active inthe area, but they were also highly active in the Lowland plantation area where litle military action against the cesident population ‘was taken. Guerilla presence, moreover, is nota sure indicator af popular ‘suppor, given the Guatemalan patter of armed groups basing themselves, far from population centers. Guerilla groups are still highly active in parts of the peripheral zone from which the resident population has been forcibly removed. ‘After the period of extreme violence, parts of the petipheral area were selected for tatal economic and social restructuring by the military, who constructed model villages and concentrated most ofthe remaining popula- tion in or around them, The part ofthe periphery about which mast is known is the lil area, in the department of £1 Quiche (see Manz, 1988; CEIDOC, 1988; AVANCSO, 1989h), and I will base my discussion of this pattern of coanomic restructuring on this area.* A targe area of the highlands, located between the core and the periphery (ce map), experienced levels of violence that varied from as high as those in the Txilatea to as low as chose in Totanicapdén. In this erea, especially in ‘Chimaltenango and the sonthern part of El Quiché, Indian politcal activism ‘was probably higher than in ary other partof the region. Much (and prabably most) of this activism occurred independertly of any association with guer- ‘organizations, yet activist communities were hit especially hard by the military (See Carmack, 1988; Manz, 1988), The usual burning, massacring, ani aids ocearted in the more remote commenities; more selective potitical assassination, kidnapping, and torture occurred in communities near major toads or towns. Most of this area has not been directly restructured by the ry in the (xilarea fashion, but has been left to restructure itself as, displaced persons return to their homes. I tske the department of Chimal- tenango as an example ofthis pattern of economic tearganization, one that represents the fate af most Indian communities in western Guatemala."Smith /MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 17 RESTRUCTURING BY THE MILITARY ‘What distinguishes the Ixil tex of northern Quiché from other parts of ‘he periphery is not the level of violence suffered but the degree to which there has ben a near total restructuring of sertlement, economy, and socio cultural activities under the guidance of the military. People who survived the violence and wia continued {or returned) to live in these areas have now tncea relocated in several large settlements (some “temporary” camps, some ‘model villages” or development poles) ia which their movemtents are heavily restricted, their access to land ard livelinoad extremely limited, ant the possibilty of returning to-a “normal” life inthe foreseeable fueure quite unlikely. Certain other areas (Alta Verapaz, northern Chimaltenango, and northern Hucimetenango, in particular) were siated for a similar kind of reconstruction, but the plans projected for the entire peripheral zone in 1986 hhave nat yet been implemented (AVANCSO, 1989). “THE INILAREA IN THE 19706 “The Ful area, thee large contiguous tavnships (Nebaj, Chal, San Tuan Cotzal) bordering Mexico whose indigenaus population speaks a distinctive Mayan language (Iul), wes comprised ia the fate 1970s of thee distinct sociaeconomic graups. Most numerous ws the local Mayar population, some 15,000 houscholds scatered about in hundreds of designated rural communities, located mainly in the southera highland portion of the area. Most Mayan houscholds grew com and beans an ewa ta six acres of Fand (much of it untitled an Held in plots in different ecological zones), raised a few animals whase products they sold, and frequently sent merahers oftheir households to wark several manths each year on South Coast plantations ta zmeet thei cash needs. Next in importance was the population in and acound several large coffee plantations in the northern lowlands af the area, many of ‘whose inhabitants resided same of the time ic the highland part of the area and worked part of the time on the local plantations. Finally, there was the population of three small administeative towns, daminated commercially and palitically by same. 1,200 ladinas who had moved into the area in the letter part of the nineteenth century as part of the general ladino expension accompanying the development of coffee plantations (Calby and van den Berghe, 1968). The admiaistative towns also held fairly large Indian popue lations, same residing there temporacily in oxderto fulfil hei civil-retigious abligations, others residing permanently in some sort of service relationship tothe ladinas. This economic and social patters was typical ofthe peripheral zone of the western highlands in the mid-1970s,18 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, ‘The Ejército Guerillero de los Pabres (Guerilla Army af the Poot, or EGP), che insurgent group mast commicted ta a mass (Indian) mabilizatian strategy, worked primarily in the peripheral zane of western Guatemala (Manz, 1988), The rugged iowlandsof the [xilarea hardering Mexico, remote from: population centers and relatively unpopulated, ft their needs for secu- rity, and thus the Til population was ane af the Indian groups mast heavily recruited to the EGP's revolutionary cause. Meeting considerable suspicion at rst, the EGP eventually established fairly close tes with many ofthe rural inhabitants of the area. They announced theie presence in the area in 1975 when they executed the “Tiger” af the Ixcén, the notoriously brutal and explaitative owner of La Perla, a large plantation located ia narthert: Chajul. From thes on, the Ixil were targeted as “subversive” by the military who indiscriminately attacked and burned virtually every cural Indian community the area, killing many people and scattering the rest. Only the towns, dominated by ladinas, eseaped massive retaliation (see Stoll, 1988). ‘THE INTL AREA INTHE LATE 198s As noted above, he Ixl previously lived in a dispersed settlement pattern ‘Today, the surviving population in the ovo largest townships, Nebaj and Chajul, is concentrated ia approximately 25 nucleated settlements (Gen of them military “development poles") located along the main strategic roads in the southern part ofthe townships. Except for two large plantations, most of the lower-lying northern sections of these tawnships have either been abandoned ar sustain u few people still in hiding. (Io Chajul, for example, 59 designated settlements an a local map, mostly in the lowland portion, were teported abandoned; the It remaining settlements were mostly highland recongrogations af several graups.) The population in Cotzal had always congregated into 4 relatively few hamlets, att in the highfands; Corzal therefore still sustains the same numaer of hamlets, but these hamlets have became more concentrated as peaple have moved into their nucle- aed centers, abandoning the previous pattern af household dispersion, In 1986 the municipal authorities in each of the three main towas esti- mated that approximately one-third of their cural populations had actually ‘been killed. Virtually everyone else in the rural area had een displaced for some period of time. Thousands of people Med to remote areas of the three toweships when military sweeps were heaviest (1980-1982) and many remained there for several years, hiding in oaves, planting, crops in small scattered fields vulnerable to military sweeps, and sometimes eating only forest products. Others fled the axca altogether, and it appears that few of these people have retumed. By 1983 rnuch of the local refugee population‘Sh MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 19, had been rounded up or had voluntarily scturned to one or another of the population centers or military bases, hough in L988 there were still people straggling dawn. “from the mountains.” Some people, no daubt, remained in the mountains. The populated area was considered “secured” by both the ilitary and civilian populations. The “secured” population of the Jxl area was about 45,000 people, rwo-thieds ofthe former population. Military presence is still massively visible everywhere in the fxil area There are five military camps in or immediately ssound Nebaf, and an uncounted number in the other townships. Large military posts exist inthe towns of Nebaj and Chajul, though noc ip Cotzal, Most ofthe army people appeared to be ladinos from castern Guatemala, In 1985 people steted that the military was tess abusive than before, and a considerable amount of socializing takes place between military and nonmilitary people, especially inthe towns. Atthe 1986 titular fiesta in Nebaj, for example, soldiers wearing their Galil (Israeli-made) rifles danced with local women—maialy ladinas, ‘One ofthe most striking effects ofthe military presence isthe state of the local roads, Once virtually impassable during the rainy season, they are row wider ané bette constructedthan in any other part of rural Guatemala except the care zone, Mast ofthe model villages and refugee camps are located along, the roads which lnk the three town centers, Road constriction continues with plans to link the Ixil arca cast through the Verapaz acea and west through northern Huchuetenango. Civil patrols were organized in the [xi area in 1981-1982 atthe same time that mos! people were forcibly celocated into the several types of nucleated settlements. Until quite recently, people on duty had to accompany military ‘zraups an sweeps through the mountains, looking for “subversives,” or an roundups of loca! peaple stil hiding in the moutains. Members of civil patrols interviewed in 1986 reported that they had gone on sclatively few sweeps after 1984. Yet virwally everywhere all adult men are required to serve 24-hour shifts every few days. (For those in small settlements, duty falls every four or five days, and in lacge settlements every week or so.) In the past, those who refused patral duty or who simply did not show up were punished by the military—a standard punishment being submersion in water ‘or a mud hole for several hours 0; days. Today, regulation of the patrol is mate lax, and in many places people can pay for substitutes oF obtain permission to miss duty while warking outside of the ates (mainly in plantation work). “The repant prepared by WOLA (1988) desesibes each of the Tx settle. rments visited by Chris Kruoger or me in 1986 and 1987. Here [ry co sumt- matize the situation by describing more specifically the econo situa- tion in the four different types of settlements that presently exist in the Exil20. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES area: the three original towns; cen madel villages; the dozen or so self: ‘eanstituting centers, und twa large coffee plantations (San Francisco and La Perla). ‘The populations of the three towns, each having a sizable ladina popula- tion, are as large as, pethaps larger than, before because of the large number of recent migrants from the rural areas. The towns custained little damage uring the period of greatest Violence, though municipal buildings were bbumed in Chajul and Covzal. The towns were always the major market centers of the area, each town holding its main market day on a staggered schedule to facilitate communication and exchange in the area. The markel- paces provided the main arena far trade berween local and other highland Indians. ‘The markets still function, but ata much reduced level. One sees far ewer merchants fram outside the fxil area than formerly, ané there is much, less diversity af goods available for purchase. Urban shops, the domain af local Iadinas, in contrast, scem to continue a lively business, Lowland corn, ‘which has supplemented local produetion for many decades ia the are2, seems to be sold mostly in the lading shops rather than in the Indian marketplaces Several temporary ps" used for housing people coming down from. the mountains are focated on the obtskirts of Neb and Chal Some ofthese ‘camps once housed thousands af refugees but the largest of them at present only holds some 400 people (AVANCSO, 1989b), Refugees are usvally fed by the military for ane month and then left to their own resources. The main resources available are day labar in the towns for payment of ane ar two quetzales (Q) or less por day, or work on lowland plantations, wich usually paid Q3.20 per day in 1986 and (4.25 per day in 1988. People are usuatly hhaused in large galerias (long-roated sheds, ditfloored, and open on the sides) ofthe sort typical of camps set up for temporary workers on planta- tions. One galeria can provide spaces (roughly 10 x 10 ft divided from one another by kanging picees of plastic) for up to 50 families. Since the Txil towns are all located at an altitude of about 6,400 feet (whereas miost plantations are located below 3,004 feet}, refugees, who usually lack clothing, and blankets, suffer considcrably from exposure. Today refugees remain such camps for relatively shart periods of time, whereas formerly camps of this sort would hold refugees for more than one year ‘Tes model villages have been but inthe il area (four each in Nebaj and Cotzal, two in Chajul) to house the refugee population. The villages ate all located on the rowls connecting the three main towns #8 ar€ most of the spontancously developing villages. While poptlation was always densee in this area than elsewhere, che intensified coacentzation af the Lx (mativated primarily by security considerations) is the chief source of economic bard-Sith MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA. 21 ship, Move! villages ll Iaid aut in the square, tightly ncteated, griron pattern typical ofthe Spanish urban form in the New World,” Some of the larger madel villages have unnivg water (usually one source far several families) and elecwiity. Few have schools or other public services. None of the tauted development projecis (each crops, fish ponds, beehives, craft centers) have bees implemented. Though planned to house populations of 2,000 oF more, virally all af the present model villages have oany more families than can be accommodated by the housing built by forced labor under military supervision, Thus many ofthe model Kouses often accomma- date several families. “The most severe ceonamic problem in all madel villages is lack of access to land. On the one hand, est people in the villages, if they have legal tile to land anyowhere, own Land chat is Far from the village often in “unsecured areas" whcte civilians ate not permitted to go. People who oxgivaly lived ‘the model village site, on che other hand, have rately been compensated for the land taken fram ther forthe village. While they may sometimes rent land to village residents for theee to four quetzales per cuerda (roughly one-tenth of an acre) 0: make skatecropping arrangements, Few residents of these areas have « title which is secure enough to enforce rental canteacs. Morcaver, the residents ofthese areas, located close towns and roads, tend ‘o ov land in much smaller amounts than needed for subsistence. Remote lands of low productivity (usually untied) almost always made up the bulk of the land farmed by nil Indians. Since mast of the remote fail area is considered “unseeured” and thas off limits 10 civilians, and since most villages have a night curfew, eost people face extreme land scarcity. Most people must purchase corn (the basi staple) and ane sees very few domestic. aimnls, which had been the main sure of eash in the area ‘The other major economic hardship is unemployment. In general it appears tha those communities ar househalés which had regular plantation employment, cither locally 0: on particular South Coast plantations, cao still, find work on plantations today—though often for less than the minimum ‘wage. But peaple without such tes, which includes the majority outside che peripheral zone, have much more difficulty. fn 1988 large numbers of workers from the Txil area were tucked into the Coban ares for the coffee farvest fr the first time in recon history People explained that Ixil workers ‘weve willing to accept much lower wages than peopl fram the Coban area ‘As noledcarlir, two large plantations coatnuc operations in the Tx area, ‘ae Francisca Cotzal ané La Perla (Chajulf. (Many smaller plantations ceased to function when theic buildings were bumed oF theit owners oF managers left the area.) Large numbers of refugees were located on these plantations in 1986, existing in subhuman conditions. Most had left for22 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES approved military settlements (whether spontaneous or of military consteuc- tion) by $988. Various sources indicated that workers on these plantations received O} per day in subcontracts with regular plantation workers who received the national minimum wage of 04.20 per day ar per quinad (100 pounds) of picked rige coffee. (The present minimum wage, in real value, is boat one-third ofthe subminimal earnings of mare than one decade ago.) ‘The present owner of La Perla (Gon of “El Tigre”), Roberta Arena, isa key figure in the Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship International, a right- swing evangelical organization hased in California which atempis co foment evangelical missionary work throughout Central America. He has reportedly ““uined La Perla aver tothe Lote” (Resource Center Bulletin 10, 1987: 1) Between the Finca San Francisco and the town of Chajul are several communities which were once part ofthe exteasive fincas de mozos" owned by the Herrera [bargen Corapany (which also owns many lowland coffee plantetions, the largest sugar plantation in Guatemala, and considerable real estate in Guatemala City}, Some of this lané was sold by the company to ‘Guatemala’s Institute for Agrarian Transformation (INTA), which has in urn consinicted several model villages on the lanc. (INTA, it should be noted, appearsto have paid only plantation land donorsto the made! village project.) In this area INTA charges residen's Q250 for a model house and for 130 ceuerdas (soughly 13 acres) of local land, to be paid in installments over a 5- to 10-year period. Residents reported that many families were unable to make the payments for INTA lands znd therefore ended up camping on the outskicts of the village or living with extendes kin in one of the madel households. Holdings ofthis size should be sufficient to support a family, though the land inthis area appears be af exceptionally poor quality. Most people, whether jn made! or spontangous villages, must find outside sources of income and do s0 mostly by migrating to South Coast plantations. ‘Corn and beans appear to be the only erops grown by peasants of the [xl area, and few households appear to’be able io pravision themselves with even these basic staples. Corn was selling for Q25 per quintal in August of 1986 (the prcharvest season). Most families consume one quintal per month and Uhus at the going local wage rate (mostly Ql per day, unless one is lucky enough fo find road work or a plantation paying the minimum wage) they simply cannot feed themselves anything, but com. Women in many Ixit ‘communities grind corn by hand rather than making use of the small grist nills that had become ubiquitous in the highlands by the early 1970s. Since grist ills exist on the plantation, one can only surmise that the families cannot afford the five cents usually cherged for grinding 10 to 15 pounds of cam. The essential condition of the “secured” Ixil population, then, is desperate dependency on some form of handout from the lity or evanSmith MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA. 25 sgelicel missions, bth af whose resources appeac tobe diminishing. The main alternative option is to work increasingly longer periods an lowland planta- tions where workers usuaily obtain a food cation in addition to « wage that varies from QI to Q3.20 per day. More and more families appear to have resumed farming om distant lands despite the heavy risk af working in unsecured areas, the high cost of traveling many hours carrying heavy burdens without mules, and the uncertainty that the crop will survive military sweeps or depredation by the roaming hungry. People in all of these settle- ments, whether they were brought in by the military or came later of their ‘awn accord, whether they live in camps of their owa construction or model villages, face similar problems brought an by the military success in nucle- ating a formerly dispersed paputation, RESTRUCTURING THROUGH AID. As noted above, the death and destruction wrought by the military counterinsurgency campaigns of 1980-1983 affected other parts ofthe west- ex highlandsas much as the periphery. The numberof dead or “disappeared” in about 35 fo 40 of the mostly Indian townships in the central zane (roughly one-half of those in the area) ranges from 10 to 25 percent, What differenti- atesthe central arcainterms of restructuring thatthe population ofthe zone received victual'y ro military aid in reconstruction. Instead, people gradually returned to the homes they had abandoned and fashioned new homes with ‘what was available addition, significant numbers of nongaveenmertal organizations (NGOs) as well as some government institutions gave irregular economic assistance @ selected hamlets and towns, masily places along the main roads. The patters of NGO aid is especially pronouaced in pats of the Chimaltenango atce, bt it can also be found in southern Quiché and Solotd, Places targeted for aid scem to be the more traditional Indian villages where women Wear traditional clothing, NGOs have paid much less attention to Indian areas ‘where clothing has changed (and peaple appear non-Indian to omsiders), es in noethern San Marcos. ‘The department of Chimaitenango may have received more. aid from [NGOs om a per capita bass than any other. There are now literally hundceds of such organizations in the department (Resource Center, 1988), each with 4 paicular ard usually very localized project. The most significant aid projects in Chimalterango, however, are those funded by USAID, which have focused primarily an horticulture, These projects have had three major aims: opening up 4 “free” land market to allow the more efficient farmers 1024 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, sain access to more land (USAID, 1983); introducing new, nontraditional crops for export (e.g, strawberries, snowpeas, broccoli), which require Less fand bot mare labor in production (USAID, 1985); and providing loans ta initiate the use ofthe technology and capital needed to produce new crops (heavy use of chemical fertilizers, fungicides, pesticides, end the like). Relatively less has bcon done to open market channels, USAID ideology boeing that free markets wil salve such problems. ‘THE CMIMALTENANGO AREA INTHE 19705 Inthe late 1970s, Chimaltenango, located within easy marketing reach of Guatemala City, was a relatively prosperous department, predominantly Indian (80 percent), Most Indians lived in raral harnlets ¢s inthe rest of the ‘westem highlands, but a significant cumber lived in small towns, Those bordering the Pan American highway (about haf ofthe 16 in the epariment) exported agricultural products to both the western region and to the cepital, both staples (corn and heans) and luxury goods (vegetables), boeing able to produce a surplus through the heavy application of chemical fertilizers introduced jn the 1960s. The active domestic market economy provided employment (ar land-shorthousetiolds, The devastating earthquake ‘of 1976, whose effects were most sttongly fel in Chimaltenango, provided work in construction to stil others, While the entte department had exported seasonal Isborers ta the South Coast plantations in the early 1970s (though neveras many asthe townships in the periphery), only the theee northernmost townshipsof Chimaltenango exported more than 10 percent in the late 1970s, Because of the 1976 earthquake, Chimaltenango Indians were extcemely active in the local grassroots organizations which were self-generated to rebuild the large devastated area, Some ofthese groups protested ie fact that much of the ittemational aid donated for reconstruction was diverted to the private use of the military who ditected the reconstruction effort. Some of these groups formed to agitate for greater political contrl in their commu nities, many of which were politically dominated by Iadinas, Some groups joined or supported the. farmworkers organization, CUC. Few Chimal- terango Indians gave theie public support tothe guerrillas 2s did the commu nities in the Ixil area. Noretheless, between 1980 and 1983 many parts of ‘Chimaltenango sustained levels of military violence as high as that which ‘occurred in the Ixil area, AC least 20 percent of the population was displaced for some period of time, and civil patrols, closely manitored by the military, were established everywhere between I98T and 1982 (WOLA, 1988). These patrols remained active in 1988 in mast townships, though they were moreSmith MILITARIZATIONIN GUATEMALA. 25 Felaxed in organization than they had been in previous yeats and offen ‘operated only at night. CHM ALTENANGO IN THE LATE (9805 ‘The report prepared by Krueger and Enge (1985) suggests that the economic situation fn Chialtenango in March 1985 may have been worse than that which follawed the 1976 earthquake. They noted that there had been no com harvests between 1981 and 1983, that severe malnutrition was evident, that indebtedness was common and new credit unavailable, and that the obligation ta wark in the civil patrols had grcally reduced the possibility cof earning 2 living through migration. “Few resources are available with which fo cespond tothe disaster; many village peopleare afraid to reconstruct theic lives there; and army control frequently undermines the potential of local initiatives to confront pratlems” (1985: 4) ‘The economic situstion hud stabilized sornesehat by August 1986 in that ‘most of those displaced had returned (0 theie homes and had begur planting crops and rebuilding. The economic situation a that tiene was probably worse in Chimaltenango than elsewhere hecause the scourge of the 1980-1983 ccoonterinsurgency campaign (massacres, burning, looting, and the displace- ‘ment of thousands) hit villages nat yet recovered fram the 1976 earthquake. ‘On top of physical devastation was economic disaster: The commonly reported wage for local agricultural work was Q2, half the 1978 wage and about one-fourth the value of the 1978 wage. People reported an extreme shortage of employment, both locally and an the South Coast, and earnings from wade were small o nonexistent. Those people who had any remaining, capital sold it ta feed theie families; thase without capital crowded the departmental towns, Guatemala City, ard the South Coast looking, far work. Up ta this point peaple in Chimaltensngo had received very litle in the way of governmental or nongovernmental aid, though the situation began to change dramatically fox some communities in 1986. (My information on the economic and social situation in Chimaltenango in 1988 indicates hat the impact of the development effortsin Chimaltenango is extremely uneven: Some areas have received a great deal of aid, ethers virtually none. Aside from this, one finds certain patterns emenging in the areas of greatest development cffort: concentration of land in fewer hands, Iandessness and {ull protetarianization of some 10 to 20 percent af howse- holds, considerable internal migration ie search of work, large numbers of women employed in households other than their own, and @ significant reduction ip cansumption by the majarity af households a result af incomes boeing far lower than they were in the 1970s,25 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES My information derives mainly (om 1988 resurveys af four communities on which {had 1976 baseline information. One was an urban Indian comme nity, one was a rua hamlet relatively close ta good raads, and two were communities fat removed feom good roads. fn all but the urban community, there wasasriking concentration of land over that extant in 1976. The urban barrio, where most af the ratives had been farmers, had more than doubled in popslation; the distribution of land among the native inhabitants of the brria remained about the same as i the previous periad, but the nonnative population was essentially landless. Econamic conditions in the sampled places were not uniformly better or worse than before but were extremely polarized. One casan forthe polarization is thatthe USATD goal of ereating market in land had become a reality in many communities, allowing the riches farmers to buy out the poorer farmers 1n 1988 the daily wage for males in agricultural work varied from Q2-3 per day (inthe more remote communities) to Q7 per day (in the towns). The ‘Q7 wage was roughly equivalent ie value to half the Q4 per day wage of tke late 1970s; the O2 wage would buy ten pounds of coro, slightly more than half the amount consumed by the average family per day. Women working in egetable production typically earned one-half to one-third the male wage. In the communitics well serviced by roads, there was plenty of work for ‘women (and also higher wages for men) because of highly intensified vegetable production, [n more remote communities law wages for men prevailed, and there was no work for women. For the frst time in local memory, the majority af people in the remote communities sought work cutside their area ether in more prosperous communities ar an the South Coast. Nat all were abe ta find work, however, and some people hadto settle for work at low ras in high wage areas Inthe mare prosperous communities the economic situation of zhout half the population was nearly as desperate as that of almost everyone in the more remote communities—except that local work was wsually available. J the tural community situated near te road, where vegetable growing had be- come a big-time operation, over half the land was owned by less than 10 percent ofthe owners (whereas formerly half the land had been held by 20 to 25 percent of the owners). More striking was the number of completely landless poople. Whereas in 1998 there were few if any landless Indians in ‘Chimaltenanga (in part because the landless would leave theit communities forather paris of Gustemata, in 1988, 20 percent or more ofthe households intwo of the sampled communities were completely landless. Many either rented or “borrowed” plots on which they exected extremely inadequate housingSeis MILITARTZATION IN GUATEMALA 27 ‘The level of commercial agricultural production had expanded in all the sampled communities by nearly 50 percent in the communities near roads and by about 15 percent in the others. Com production was not only lower, but farmers everywhere complained that cost them mare to grow corn than to buy it—because of the extremely high cas of fertilizer. Most households ‘continued ta produce some cam for subsistence, but virtually no one planted an excess forsale. Households engaged in commercial farming over the last five years have had extremely variable success in the market, Some made large windfall profits when nontraditional crops were frst introduced, hut as ‘others entered into the unstable market, most barely recovered their costs. “The only producers who maintained profitable level af commercial farming were large farmers wha could diversify their crop mx and who could afford the necessary amounts of fetiizers, insecticides, and other capital goods [Nonagticultural production was significantly reduced from what i¢ had been inthe 1970s, For one thing, virtually no one was employed in construc ‘ion, whereas in the 1970s between 10 and 25 percent of the men had been 0 occupied, For another, small craft production for market sale (pottery, rope, baskets) was much less common than it had been before, There were. also fewer jobs in local eommerce. In the. 1970s, some 19 to 15 percent at adult men in Chimaltenango engaged in small-scale itinerant commerce; in the late 1980s; the only people in“sel{-owned businesses” were storckeepers and tcuckers tha is, people with relatively large amounts of capital. Thus ‘Chimaltenango today is more rather thas fess dependent on agriculture than in the past. Those making a livelihood from local farming are even fewer than before. The majority of people, both men and women in the Chimal- tenango communities I sampled, now work for others rather than for thei ‘own families. Their teal wages, on average, are about half of what they were before. RESTRUCTURING BY MARKET FORCES ‘The core area of Totonicapin and highland Quezaltenango was not directly touched by the counterinsurgency violence and has historically received very little assistance from the government or from NGOs. Thus one might assume that the area constitutes a contral group—an example of how rural highland communities might have evolved connomically and socially had the violence directed against them never oecurred. It would be wrong, however, to reach such a conclusion because the core area was indeed heavily affected by the violence, albeit through the agency of market forces and28 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES. communications. [nthe following description ofthe atea, focused mainly on ‘ne large ‘ownship (San Miguel Tatonicapan). I attempt to (race some very significant social and economic changes resulting from the violence (see Smith, 1988), THE TOTONICAPAN ARES IN THE 19708 ‘The eight ownships in the department of Totonicapsin, mast of them large and. all of them more than 90 percent Indian, together with about eight Quicke-speaking townships inthe departmect of Quezaltenango, have ong suffered from the most extreme land shortage in the region, Few families meet even half of their consumption needs feom farming, Yet the Indians in this area are among the most prosperous inthe region. Specializing in durable antisanal goods (cloth, lathing, shoes, blankets, high-quality potery, furni- tore, and so forth), as well as in the trade ofthese goods througout the Indian markets ofthe region, mary households earn moch higher incomes than do Indians in other parts of the region wha lave access to much more Land. igh cash incomes have allowed large mumibers of core-atea Indians to purchase trucks ard wholesale businesses in the focal towns, displacing the urban laginos wha onee monopolized such resources. The latest Indian investment has been in education, resulting in a fairly substantial number of young Mayans becoming teachers, development promoters, and other kinds of professionals ‘Weavers in Totonicapsn supply appraximatcly three-fourths of the cartes (skirt loth) worn by the Indian women of the region as well a8 many other items of Mayan dress (guipiles or blouses, belts, sandals). They produce both general “Indian” designs, recognized as originating from the core area, and ‘ocal” designs, tailored to the traditional styles once hand-loomed by the wearers, Though commercialized, the “native” corte of Guatemala remains an important and authentic sytabol of Indian ethnic identity, as do other artisanal goods produced in the core (eg. the blankets of Momostenango). ‘The elaboration of ethnic goods, moreaver, has become a means by which many Indian communities sustain themselves economically and by which they retain certain degree of autonomy from the dominant, incustrial culture emanating from Guatemalan cities. In this respect, then artisamry syenbolizes the econamic ard political autonomy of core-area Indian communities. ‘The wealth of care Indian communities is heavily dependent upan the growth and increasing commodification of t%€ regional economy. To the extent that Indians in peripheral consmusities spend their wages on goods tmade or sold by Indians af the core, the core prospers. When Indians inSmith MILITARIZATIONIN GUATEMALA 29 peripheral communities fase disposable income or spend it on goads from ‘ther sources (such as plantation stares), care Indians lose earnings. The rarket dependence af care Indian communities also requires the uncestricted ability of core-area merchants, In the early 1970s, core-area merchants constituted acelatively high percentage of al maret merchants i the region (roughly 10 percent) and held capital stocks ie these markets whose value ‘wag at Teast 50 pezccnt of all goods sold in rural and small-iown markets No guerilla group appears to have attempted arganizing in either Totoaie capin or highland Quezaltenango—possibly because Indians inthe area were considered petty bourgesis. The guerillas were probably wrong in their assessment, given the long radical traditions and the degree of sympathy 10 radical causes apparent amang the youth of the area, When T last visited ‘Totonicapan for “normal” fieldwork in 1979, everyone there was cheering the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The elders in these communities ae extremely cautious, hawever, and their basic stance throughaut the period of violence was that what happened elsewhere in Guatemala was ao concern of theits, Events were to prove them wrang on the economic front, Yet by keeping. low profile most communities in Totonicapan ané northern Quezal- tenango avoided serious encounters with the military; indeed few of these communities were farced to maintain civil-defense patrols for more than several manths, TOTONICAPAN INTHE LATE 19805 Mast of the documentation 1 ea provide about the current economic changes taking place in Totonicgpin rests upon the results of several accu- pational gurveys carried out in one community in San Miguel Tatonicapée, located near the Lown center, The community was surveyed in 1977 in my earlier study; it was resurveyed in January 1984 ard agaio in December 1986 (see Smith, 1988). The community is a celatively prosperous one, nated for its highly skilled weavers. What | document below is a severe slump in production by artisans, coupled with a large inerease in prolecarianization. do nat have the sume kind of data on other parts af the core ates, but my impression is that the pattern described below is widespread in the area My survey eantrasted the primary occupations of males between the ages ‘of 14 and 80 for 1980, 1984, and 1986 (2 sample of 201 individuals). The information for 1980 is based on retcaspective (and then Follow-up) inter- views with members af households that existed th 1984, checked against my 1997 data." Nearly 5 percent of the 1984 households tad disappeared as hhousehalds in 1986, and no new ones had been formed. In addition, many40 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES young men who left the community to find “outside” work in the period of greatest economic disruption (1980-1983) were not picked up as cases. Even with this problem of tracking I found that a large numberof men (7.3 percent in 1984, 6.7 percent in 1986) had left the community between 1980 and 1986 to seek work elsewhere. Most were reported to be either in the southern plantation area or in Guatemata City, trying co make a living in pet trade. In addition, more than 20 individuals left the community for the military betwees 1980 and 1986, mast having been forcibly drafted. When all the people who have: “autside” employment are added together, one sees arise fram 8 percent (3980) to 17 percent (1984) to 29 percent (1986) in nonlocal ‘employment, ‘The nature of nonlocel employments also different than before, Whereas mos individuals wio were notemployed localy in 1980 were either students ‘or teachers, very few people were so employed in 1984 oF 1986. OF the 18, individuals who were employed as ural eackers in 1980, only six maintained their postions in 1984 and two additional people found jobs benween 1984 and 1986, Most ofthe increase in the mamber of people working outside the. hamlet was made up of those who had found na steady employment, This is very significant change in the emplayment picture of the care area where labor bas always becn somewhat scarce relative 10 demand (See Smith, 1984), “The survey also provided indicect evidence of a significant degree of underemployment, First, there is a jump between 1980 and 1984 in the numberof men secking work as plantation laborers (from 1.3 percent in 1980 to 5.3 percent in 1984), even though demand far plantation labor had been extremely low in the 1983-1984 season. More significant isthe increase of men employed in petty commerce: from 17.4 percent in 1980 (0 22.9 percent in 1984. This occurred in a period when everyone in the community com plained about the lack of market demand. The most draenatie change between 1980 and 1984 isthe drop in people employed in artsanty (From $2.70 33.3 percent. ‘The employment situation in 1986 had improved over that of 1984, especially in artisamry In fact, the number of self-employed artisans in 1986 is almost as high as the number in 1980. In 1986 as oppased to 1980 artisans considered artisanry part-time work, usually combining it with some kind af trade. People explained to us that mast who returned to artisanal work had sought work in petty commerce or casual Iebor; but finding little wark or profit in this arca, they shored up casual Tabor of various sorts with & continued stake in atisonel production, che anly area in which core coremu- nites had a teal occupational advantage. Most retursed to artisanal occupa- tions other than weaving —mostly tailoring, carpentry, and sweater-makingShih MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 31 (lo 1980, 82 percent ofthe actisans were weavers; in 1986, only 48 percent were weavers.) Thus the artisanal goods produced met demand in Tadino turban centers (which were much less affected by the violence) as well as among rural Indians. The number of people warking for wages in ertisanry had actoally dropped between 1984 and 1986, reflecting the failure of the larger ertisanal enterprises who hired labor. Only five new apprentices had bbeen taker on in any ofthe trades between 1980'and 1986—and they were apprenticed in tailoring rathcr than weaving. Thete were, in fact, no appren- tices in weaving in 1986, “There was alsa a shift in what was being woven which I can describe but ‘cannot quantify. All weavers complained in both 1984 and 1986 that deraand for their “traditional” products was lower than they had ever experienced. By 1984 several weavers were switching imo the production of “utility cloths,” ‘baught by non-Indian as well as Indian consumers, and by 1986 even more were weaving “nontracitional” cloth, The elaboration of design had dimnin- {shed to reduce cost, and weavers were returning to thread and dyes that were. locally produced rather than imported raw materials. (Prices of most im ported goods were ncarly ten times their 1980 level.) Even with all these adjustments, the cost of ethnic clothing remained high, the cast of a simple corte in 1986 being about QSO compared with QLS in 1977. In addition © checking om occupational changes in one Totonicapdn community, [ gueried people i the area about prices and wages in the pretarvest period forthe years 1980, 1984, and 1986, [found that wages had rapped precipitously by 1984, in some cases fa half the earlier level, atthe same time that prices rose sharply. By 1986 wages had risen, but no faster than prices, such that the 1986 relative wage was about the same as that of 1984, Thus an average daily wage could buy 30 pounds of carn in 1980, 12 pounds of corn in 1984, and 15 pounds af com in 1986. Wages fell most ‘dramatically For artisans (especially weavers} and agricultural labore in 4984 (from Q3 to Q2 per day). There was same recovery in artisan pay by 1986 but nat in agricultural labor. Housebuilding, which was a booming industey in the core inthe late 1970s, had fallen off sharply. The few people able to find work as albaites (builders) were being paid, in 1984, half the ‘amount earned in 3989, ever as prices nearly doubled. Preliminary figures from 1988 showed no significant improvement in the wageiprice ratio ‘The consequence af rising prices together with drapping real Wages inthe core, then, has been 2 major restructuring of the local econamy. Perhaps the. most significant change has been the percentage of people working, for others: In 1980, 29 percent of the men in the survey worked for wages, ‘whereas in both 1984 and 1986 nearly $0 percent did. This change is all the ‘more significant given the transformation in the conditions of wage work. In32 LATIN AMERICAN eG RSPECTIVES ‘the 1970s, mast wage workers in the care were young men who were working, ‘within an artisanal specially in order to oblain the skill and capital needed to set up their own businesses—vhich mast young men did upan marriage (see Smith, 1984n), Under these conditions, the core did not have @ permanent proletatiat. It had an artisanal economy ir which people changed positions ‘within acisanal firms as they matured and leasned the business, The wage workers in 1984 and 1986, by contrast, were older men working in enterprises ‘fram which there was linic hope of escape: farm wark, construction, urban shops, and urban factories, Seen inthis light, then, the major restructuring af the core economy was the reduction of many independent producers into salatied workers; whether these people will regain their positions as auton fomous producers remains (0 be seen. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING Trere can be litte doubs thatthe economic restructuring of the western highlands has raker an monumental proportions, Peasants have access (0 much less land than they formerly did—pertaps a fourth or less of the land they once farmed in he Isl atca. Reral incomes have drapped precipitously as prices for basic goods have doubled and tripled. The volume of regional trade is half or less is Former level. Thus peasant means for maintainieg autonomous forms of emiployment—in foad production, artisan production, ard trade—is dramatically less than what ithad been in the late 1970s. Large numbers of people, probably the majority, must now seek wage employment either inthe cites orn plantations. Because ofthe scarcity of work (and the desperateness a thei situation), most highland Tndians are willing co sccept Whatever wage they car get. would be wrong. however, to assume thatthe military and big businesses in Guatemala will now suffer the consequences of having destroyed the «econamie bases of the western highland economy. Guatemala is suffering an economic setback due to some capital flight and the overall deterioration of| Latin America’s export-depcadeat economies. I seems likely, however, that Guatemala wil experience a relatively fast recovery (now that “peace” has cen secured) if world export prices rise (see faforpress, 1989). More important, Guatemala is nom in a much better position to tura toward intensitied industrial production or assembly, based on cheap lor, because ‘thas ented so much mare “free” cheap labor than it had before. taforpress (1987) projecis the possibilty of limited grawth in the Future due largely to intensified use of cheap labor in agricaltutal harvests, increased plantation production of subsistence cxops, ané continued geawith in the aew laborSmith /MILITARIZATIONIN QUATEMALA, 30 intensive maquila industries, where goods produced by multinational firms ‘uiside of Guatemala are assembled in Guatemals by poorly paid, son- unionized labor, It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the Guatemalan economy will continue along the path of substituting capitalist forms of production for peasant forms of production in bot the agrarian and industrial sectors, The economy will craain ane in whick its basie world advantage is, he maintenance af extremely law wage rates. ‘The key point here is thatthe economic health of the western highlands is not necessarily advantageous (0 big, capital in Guatemala, In fact, the severely deterirated concition of people wha were once autonomous peas- ants.can only wark co the advantage of capt, even ift doesnot wank tothe Advantage af most Guatematans. In shart the lang-icrm effec af econamic resircturing in the highlands will be the creation of a large reserve army af unemployed who, for both security and development reasons, will Rave to be controlled by an ever-expanding state apparatus Already one sees an enormously enhanced state presence ia local highland townships—partly because local governments arc being given 8 percent of the national budget to support local development projects, as mandated by the 1985 constitution (elahorated when General Victor Mejia Méndez. was in power) National state ministries (as wellas NGOs) are now visibly present in many more highland arcas than ever before. While mast locals complain of he ineffectiveness af these ministries, the organization of local politics im the highlands now seems to revolve around various state-directed or state~ supported development projects eather han local concerns (Annis, 1988), ‘There are also a surprising number of highland Indians who have gained secondary education over the last 5 to 10 years (England, 1988), and while ‘many remain unemployed, they play asigeficaat cae i aking Jocal Indian corumunities to state institutions. This is not to suggest that the economic ‘noals held in fndisn communitics ae the same as those of the state. Nori it to suggest that these development projects have led to a reduction eather than an increase in ral misery—as he information presented abave mskes clear Tf nothing else, the contradictory economic and political pracesses at play at state and local levels heve begun to involve Indian comsmaunites ix “natione ally integrated" developmen: project. ‘Those who believe that an increase in economic enisery leads inevitably to political protest, if not revalution, will consider Guatemala's state and nltary policies contcadiciory to their aims of maintaining tight politcal conttof ip Guatemala, Indeod, the amount of popular urban. protest over economic issues has increased since Cerezo took office. But one could also angue that revolutionary encray is now sidetracked by localized economic34 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES issues, Most protests have been consumer- rather than wage-telated; most strikes have been organized against the government (a relatively safe move at this politcal moment) rather than the private sector.” Inthe ral sreas— ‘where most political energy was located in the late 1970s, where land ‘ownership remains the most skewed in all of Latin America, and where the level of economic suffering is unprecedented—one sees litle facal-levet political organizing or protest of any sort.” ‘What the long-tcrm political consequences of this massive economic restructuring willbe is not so certain. The Indians of western Guatemala ate, fo be sire, much more quiescent than they have been in the fast several decades. They have experienced a direct assault on theit way of life as a whole, an assault that has done more to break down local autonomy and corporate community boundaries than carter forms of tepression—which hhad always becn much morc sclective. With Indian political parochislism ‘now shattered, the next armed revolutionaries in Guatemala may be much ‘more successful in ereating a unified poputar movement in support of them. Certainly antimilitary and antistate sentiment remains strong, At the same time, however, dissidence of any kind only reinforces the need for a strong military and state. Simply stated, the current political climate is both contra dictory and unstable. CONCLUSIONS What conclusions might we draw fram the pattern of development ofthe state and miliary in modera Guatemala, a pattera which may be unique but ‘one that certainly has its analogues elsewhere in the Third Workd? One ofthe first things we might note is that until the military took charge in 1954, Guatemala had a “weak” state which, though despotic, had limited in- frastnuctural powers (see Mann, 1986). From its founding as part of the Spanish empire in 1524 tothe 1980s, Guatemala’s state was controlled by tiny Earopeamized clite which had limited capacity to directly controt local (especially Indian) communities (sce Smith, forthcoming). Guatemal became a capitalist class im the late nineteenth century, but becau ‘upon coercive mechanisms 10 obtain much af its labor force depended litle upon faw and other features of civil society common to ‘Western capitalism (see Gramsci, 1971; Anderson, 1977). Indeed Guatemala had very litle experience with the institutions of a developed civil soci- ety—essentilly only the ten years between 1944 and 1954, Dusing that time ‘he Indians and much of the est of the rural population, the vast majority, ‘were not fully enfranchised or involved in national politicsSmith MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA, 35 In addition, Guatemala has an ethnically divided population, one group ‘of which (the Indian majority) has been especially resistant to proletarianiza- tion and national incorporation (see Smith, forthcoming). Even today, Gua- (emala lacks unifying symbols around wick it can build a sense of itself as aration, This situation hes led not only to numerous revolutionary attempts, Cover the past 30 years, bul also 10 a pattern of continuous mass rebellion against the varions measures ofthe state ( establish itself at the Local level, Until the 1980s, the state had litle power over Guatemtala's rural population Finally, Guatemata nat only remains extremely underdeveloped by all stan- dard measures (health, education, GNP), but also its rural population kas suffered a significant deterioration in its standard of living over the past 20 years. suggest that the pressure ofthese various forces inthe contextof the ‘current world political conjuncture has forced the Guatemalan state to expand bath is security and development apparatuses, “Theda Skocpol (1979) argues that competition in the international arena forces weak states to modemnize—to develop thelr infrastevctural powers in Corder that they not be taken over by already developed states. Were we t0 accept a thesis developed for a few large states, we would have to assume that state competition in Latin America created the military states in that region. Yet itis well known that strong military apparatuses arose in Latin ‘America mainly in order to control local populations rather than to carty out struggles in the international arena. Not that the iatemational area was irrelevant (othe process. The arming af weak Third World slates (as well as the major powers) has been big international business forthe last 30 years and, according {0 some, the means by which the most recent crisis of international capital was resolved (see Harvey, 1982). There is no question thatthe first massive militarization of Guatemala (in the 1950s and 1960s) was the result of the national will in the United States rather than io Guatemala, Even today, the techniques of building a military infrastructure that can control civil society have been borrowed from the developed world—in the case of Guatemala from the United States, Israci, and Taiwan (See McChintock, 1985), But the Guatemalan military can no longer be considered a tool of the United States. Ever since 1978, when Guatemala sefused to be subjected to President Carter's human tights’ standards (in order that it might be further militarized), the Guatemalan military has pursued an independent course, first from the United States and now fram the oligarchy, Guatemala’s traditional niling class Geatemala's new military regime is & nationfiis regime, concerned that its awn oligarchy is too greedy and careless to protect the national i Members of Guatemala's High Command, most of whom come from Guate- rmala’s lower (nae-white) middle sectors, have become a class unto them=36 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES selves in Lerms of both their origins and itetests (Aguilera, 1980; Sereseres, 1986). While this new military regime quite clearly intends a capitalist path ‘of development for Guatemala, itis witling to replace the old capitalist class ‘with another, The question thus becomes what kind of class and form af capitalist development this will be. ‘Anderson and Simon argue that “Army officers are far too engaged as individuals in the oligarchy and the market structure to seek (a conporatist state} (1987; 15). Thus rather than devetoping the highlands, they plan to “teave the highsnds us a permanent military reservation” (1987: 48), At the same tim they argoe that “the military's national project [is] to consolidate itself as the-cental institution within the state, in a socicty whose central institution i tobe, in tum he state and nat the private business community” (1987: 12) These arguments are contradictory. tis certainly plausible that the military does not plan to construct a enrporatis state, But iteannot “leave the highlands asa perrnanent military reservation’ and make itself rather than the private business community Guatemala’s central institution while retain- ing a free-market form of capitalism. Through their management of state institutions and their insistence upon drawing the marginalized hightaads into the national economy (for security reasons), they will necessarily be involved in creating a state-Ied form of capitalism as well asa consolidated counterinsurgency state—a logical response tothe failure of other state forms ta develap Guatemala’s economy, conteol generat social unrest, and capture what has until now remained a relatively autonomous peasantry, Michel Burawoy (1985) describes the several diferent kinds of relation- ships the state has had (© capitalism aver time and place, arguing trat capitalism has taken mary different forms (eg. despotic, hegemonic, patri- archal, bureaucratic), degending upon the way it has been insttutionalized by the state, sshich in turn depends upon the world-historical period during which capitalism develops within 2 state, Me does not describe anything resembling the form of militarized-state-capitalism presently developing in Gustemala, Guatemala exists in a new world-histoical period from which ‘one might expect its development (and those of otter states a a similar level of development) to take a distinct form. I expect that such indeed will be the case. ‘One might argue that Guatemala is merely experiencing a belated stage of forced proletarianizatin, necessary for full capitalism. But Guatemala ‘went through such a siage some 100 years ago, and its economic and political insttotions are now fully capitalist and quiterdifferent from whet existed earlier when the problem for capitalism was labor scarcity rather than labor redundancy. Ta maintain a miliiery reservation in the highlands, to control ‘Guatemala’s traitionaloligarehy, and to constantly renew itself for perma-Smit MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 37 nent counterinsurgoncy in the absence of ouside military aid, Guatemala’s new miliary leaders will have 1o create a new form of economy, probably capitalist in is formal features (Le, sutplus value appropriated privately rather than publicly}, but with military need and logic defining its organiza tional forms. That is, public forced-wark projects for bath economic and military devefapment wil become an enormous sector within an economy that is otherwise privately orgenized and the private sector will be increas- ingly assigned its cconamic tasks by the military state. While the class structure may remain divided between owners and workers, it will be redivided between public (state and military) and private sector, in which the public sector may come to dominate the private. ‘Weak Third World states ofthe past, while they lacked the traditions of ‘Westem civil society that might prevent such a transformation, did nat have (he infrastractural resources for it, The new militarized states of the present ‘which require greater economic resources than the private sector ofthe Third World is able o produce, are developing such an infrastructure. The leaders of such states are impatient with the national development prospects prom- ised by tradition, privatized, international capitalism. They willonlybe able to consolidate theie political snd military power atthe local and rational levels by taking steps toward ereating @ new economic order. NOTES 1. These umber ace hase primal ot les etimaes. They ft MeCtige’s (1988) -supgeaion thatthe marr of eta jer inthe Gusteralz ary ae 1980 vated ror. 13.09 e100. Masters mew ate drawn fom ew! ans ip serve two-fear ems ad Goatemals presently is sporoximely 17040 rural mon of rerotable age. Fer further Information en he organiation oe litany, ae Sereseres (1988) 2 Mersky'iformation ete inst secon Gstmal i besed on rece iterviws as well a4 an examinason ofrecer sarerens by vaious members of Te eptesertaive ‘vgumenions sch the Comié Catninedar de Asbeaciones Agricslas, Comescaie, lds niles y Piancieres(CACIF) 2 wells represenalves nthe mes (nich ay the weekly Le Cri) The inierzsef Customelas army anc oligarchy begen ta diverge publicly in 1987, specially ever txation. ic. who was to pay for Guster’ peace and seeriy pros (Guaterala'y ie presealy poy ie ofthe awe! ts ay the heaps) The miey tits cars on te table wa 2 public roeting with ae oligarchy in August 987, arguing ta Guatemaias ive ome Pon a social anc asecunty det coe “arly of Gute" (Anderson a Simo, 1987: 19). They demance bat supprt for ke Aris peace plan (an expression of Guaterstas independence (tm th Urites Sata gantry poliey)and anes, What rast take Foe military waa Guatemala mainain ts “ration independence—an ise fheout which the oligareny is gerctally indent. The amy explicitly wished ta avaid the ills os redecsas ho Fad been coupe bythe ulgichy), of Nicaragua Samora38 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (hse amy became privatized, and a El Salvador’ Buse (whose sem andcate appt {sini si fora "esenea by the Une Site), The Guatemalan ery has ned wo poe ‘ax reform twice before (once in 19RD and aga in 1985) an fled. A he present moet, the itary doce rot eer likely fo back down in ts tsp wth he oligarehy "4. {base the fllowing gencralizaions about vation In eral pradution aegis in western Guatemala on te research U cation 4976-1978, nde by Naina Science Foundation Gram Mo. ONS 18-2147 (we Sith, 1984), 5: In Gusta al mcneindins are termed lacie ome lage ae ait same ate asin snd sane a “recsaly dremel” or aril) ladians (ore Sith, Forbconing) 1, The ating secoans of re miliary pac on he highlans are hasd rial 98 ro aves Leunaceic wh Cas Kreger i (98) afd 19, While au ieee wee systemale, ey gave us ugasd picute ofthe earamicctiss acing most aciens in he westem Fighands since lar 1983, | would like 1g acknowledge tbe Caren received om the Washioglon Olfce on Lain Ameriex QWOLM, and Dake University’s Council on Lain Amerce 7. Caren normaton oe Teoniapin and Chimallerango is howe on dat Lelie in 1988-185, sparta by te Mach Foundations Ineatonl Peace and Sevity Program 1 The minimus wage rate af 4.25 was exablshed in 960 a ares of ihe planation “tek ed by the Cette de Ura Carpesine (Commnie 4 Campsie Ut, oF CU, i 1987¢he minum ate was rate to 425, Since 1980she velco he quetal, hen equivalent 1a USS fay Heli ng abou need it fonmer value dla ems a stout one eg fame vale tel ems, 9, Good desrpions of mode! villages cane fours in Guatemalan Church in Bile (1984), Krueger anc Enge (1988) 494 Richards (1985). Aa especially interesting etspeane fm eri proved by a ok rcerly produces bythe sry (Eitete de Oraterals, 1985), calles Development Pots. la which a aie davelapmen stay ound 10, Fincasde easier, “serplarationsy were crested mainly i the deparent of Ex Quick inte late nnecen cntiy by sven! nee plataion owners who sgh eans at tying labor One mers of ying labor was buying vp highland edo whic Liens Nad 2c clea lea paving the Insane wi gree passes! thofe lade with igh 9 canting faxing hem in cacherge er eegier moran thesourern larttions at rede wagesnence se plantains 1, Tse the 1686 eraspctve dat here eer than the cial 1977 dat ensue shat shea refecs the some nv: he 1977 dt, however, rvides profile gain, whieh vo dhack he 1980 ein 12 AC presen only tnee major central unions representing fewer than 100,000 workers ‘ext in Guatemala, Too of hee sions a new ad losly anointed with he govemmmeni: ‘most of tcl eos have ben smc 3 nluncing government olcy. A aly lege samber Df government workers have guneonsinke forhigher pg. ut eaively few workers or private firs fave dane 90, um ayn general apres oe very cusous llcepresy, 1987 4-45) 12. Thee is 2 mations “olen” cxgenzain nsird 2d led by Catholic pie Falher Andrés Ginn wiih eumersus sappocer—riety among the germaneal owes} workers father as the ensonat (igh aed planation workers, The goa ofthis ganization eto find searces of eed fe laniaion workers to purchase govecmentcwned planation, mary af them peeseniyvafarmed. Gusta’ Sasiwie for Ageian Temsformaton (INTA) and USAID euppot the baie proposal but te varowsorpantatons representing lege landowencs ftrenunsly oppose it So fe Cerezo has led on the ave an itl has ben doe. The osSmith MILITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 39 olable cement im the development of this sing Guatemala i the ener limited etre acmmorker movement in peserieday demands, Ban if socesfl the purchase of excess plaiaon lad by the landless would sob bata sal fecctin of the presently ‘mnempleyed The fac that ile fas been dane tz tplement tis small emeioreive efot sugges hat the gover! feels coniden ins ability eat eal paplation by ther REFERENCES, ‘Agilers Pera, Gabrieh 1980"Teror an ileneé us weapons of counlrnsargency ia Cutetal” Latin Ameren Perspectives (Spring and Summer}: 91-13. ‘Anerson, Kenan Jean Mane Simon 1987 “Permanent courterisurgeney in Guaterl.” Teas 73: 9-46, Anderson, Per 1977 “The an. Annis, Seon 1968 *Can te World Bank be 3 grassroots funder io rural Guatemala?” Unpublished smasuscn AVANCSO (Asnciacin para ol Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guntemald) 198 Lapin de desarrllo del nada uatemaleco, 1986-1987. Caaderwo 2 Gastemale Gy TferpeessCenosmericara 19894 Politica evterur y eveildad esata. Cuadema 5. Guatemala Cay: Inorprest Ceniaamercas, 1989 Poticaisinciomat hacia el despleai ierno en Guatemala, Cenden0 6. Gua real Cit lores Certoareica lack, George 1986 Garrison Guasemela, New York: Monthly Review Pres. ‘Berawoy, Michel 1985 The Potincs of Product. Landon: New Left Books Carmacl, Robert (ed) 1988 Harvex of Voence, Norm: Univers f Okiahoms Press. (CEIDOC (Cente Ue Ess Integra e Deserilo Camunal) SAR Gasca: Polos desurrell, Mexica Cy: CEIDOC. ‘Coy, Benjamin Nan Pere van cen Merge 3969 fad Camo A Plu! Society e Highland Guatemala. Beftley: University of alsoria Pres Catt Survival Quanerty 983 Decth ond Disorder in Guatsmala, Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival, Fs. Davis Seldon a Tovractom: sowing the secs violence," pp. 2-8 ia R. Carmack (el), Hares of lung. Nornan” Usiverity af Oklsbors Press Davis, Selon and Jute Hocsor . 1982 Witness ra Police! lence Guatemala” Heston. Oxfam Americ, Impact Audit No.2. of Antonia Gams” New Left Revow 109 (November. Jeary)4) LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES Duka, faes ER Poser the ons Poluical Haar of Madera Coral Amenes. Lenn: New Let Boos Efecto de Gutemale(Gantenalan Arn) 1882 Pl nace de seguridad ydesarrt, Guatemala Cay: Eaorial del Eject. 1594 Pola de desarnlo Gusterala Cty: Esher cel Bere, gland Nowe 1988 “Language sad etic definition among Costemalan Mayans” Unpublished! manu ser. Gar, Rachoe! and Tom Bary 1989 Feeding the Crisis: U.S. Food Ado Conve! America. Albuquargue, NM: Resource Center Gram Aneario 1921 Seleuons fram he Prison Noeboats, 0, Hoste and G. Nowell Sith (es). New York: International Pb eher, Guatemalan Charen in Geile 1584 “Gualctala,wmcw way off: the developeent poles." Gustematan Church in Bile 46) 128 Harvey, David 982 The Limi to Copia. Chicag: Universi of Cicepo Pres. afore 987 Guntmate 1986: The Yor of Promise. Guaterals City Iforgress Centeamesica 689 Comrsamerie, 198 alist eeonbzosypolucessobrela rege Cusiemslaiy, Ieforptess Cenvoamericans Krueger, Cris nd Kjell Bape 1985 Securay an Development Condon i the Guatemalan Mighlends.Washng’na, BC: ‘wou. Mac, Michtel "986The atanamans ower ofthe st: agin, mechanisms esl pp 107 in 8 al eStores Fiz. Landon Bla, ‘Manz, Bese ORS Refapeen of Haden Wie. Any: Stat Livery of New York Pes, MeCintack, Mice! 1985 The Americon Concticn: Store Terr and Popular Rexuance bx Cuatomala Landon: Ze Pres, Messy, Marcie 1889 Larpresaros y arse plica en Guaterala Unpublished manusctp ‘aim, Allon and fen-Masc Siren 1984 "Buresteey of deen The Now Republic Sune 30: 13-17 Resaurce Center 1988 Prva Orgenation in Guatemala, 1988, Albucuergue, NM: Resource Cente, Rickards, Michael 1985 “Counopati wld view and ceunteviowrgesey in Gate Quarterly 159-107 Serer, Gast 1986 "The Guacemalas less: casa! challenger and military poles” pp 17-50in SAIS (Report an Guazarita, Bere Johns Htpidas University Press Skacpel, Thess 1979 Sous and Social Revolution. Cambridge: Cartridge Univesity Pres AntiopologieatSmith /MIUITARIZATION IN GUATEMALA 1 Sith, Cal A, 1982 "Does a commeiy economy ccuably ei he fev white runing she masias?™ Joarval of Peasas Studies V (Ap: 609, 195i “Lees story i labs comet sect! and econo nition in western Gute rrala* Comparoie Suds oe Socie and Hit 26: 153-228, 1988-Desuaio of he mini base or Ia cle," pp. 206-23 in R, Carmack (et. Harvscof Vee. Navan. Usverty of Oklahoma res. Fosthcoming "Origins ofthe national question i Gantt: a hypothesis” inC. A Sith {ed}, Guetmolan acans aad dhe Sit: 154.1968. Aust: Univer ol Teas Pres, Sul, Ovid 1985 “Evangelicals, uecilles, and eh smyth langle under Rios Mont” pp. 8118 in B, Carmack et), Horescof Wolence Norman Usiversity af Oklaboma Pes sain 1985 Terr y abo on Guatemala: una evalucldn, Wesingto, DC. USAID. 1985 a griousinessDeselanment. Projet No. 5201276, Washington, DC: USAID. WOLA (Washiegtan Ocean Latin Amerie) 16 Wha Pays te Pace? The Cost of Warne Guauomclan Higaands, Washington, DC WaLA.