World Development 170 (2023) 106323

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World Development
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Can CSR strategy mediate conflict over extraction? Evidence from

two mines in Peru
Deborah Avant a, Devin Finn b, Tricia D. Olsen c,⇑
a
Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, United States
b
Lehigh University, United States
c
Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: We argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies can shape political contexts to mediate or
Accepted 29 May 2023 exacerbate the resource curse. Using a relational pragmatic approach—one that recognizes actors are
Available online 19 June 2023 dynamic and focuses on the interactions that shape how they see their interests—we develop expecta-
tions about two ideal type CSR strategies: transformational and transactional and their relational impli-
cations. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach through the examination of two mines in Peru.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in 2017 and 2018 and secondary research, we show how one mine’s
transformational strategy connected the company to common, or public, concerns in ways that rearticu-
lated politics to dampen curse dynamics. The second mine’s transactional strategy narrowed its local
engagement in ways that reduced its influence and played into curse dynamics. This research illustrates
both the value of pragmatic approaches for integrating CSR into governance and the way in which CSR
strategies can help mitigate the resource curse.
Ó 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Researchers have linked extractive resources to political and
economic ills, often termed ‘‘curses”. These include clientelism,
corruption, violence, and meager economic development. But
exploiting resource wealth may also lead to economic expansion
that avoids violence and improves government capacity. Recent
scholarship identifies multiple factors in the political context that
condition the impact of resources, focusing on investment in
human capital (Kurtz & Brooks, 2011) and governing institutions
(Arce, 2014).
Less understood is how corporate engagement plays into this
context. We argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) strate-
gies can activate interactions that influence political contexts and
thus curse dynamics. Examining two mining companies in similar
environments, we find that what we call transformational and
transactional CSR strategies—understood as ideal types—con-
tributed to different paths. The transformational strategy helped
shift politics in ways that mediated a ‘‘cursed” trajectory while
the transactional strategy fed into curse dynamics. In both scenar-
ios, the mines’ approaches to CSR influenced the understanding of,
and political mobilization around, mining – and thus also shaped
the options for grappling with it.
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Deborah.Avant@du.edu (D. Avant), dmf221@lehigh.edu (D.
Finn), olsen351@umn.edu (T.D. Olsen).
Using an approach rooted in relational ontology and pragmatic
philosophy (Hellmann, 2009; White, 1995), we assume that actors
and their interests are dynamic. We build on the CSR and non-state
governance scholarship to identify how interactions articulate, or
join and narrate actors’ interests, to explain the difference between
two cases. Rather than undertaking a correlational analysis of the
general ways CSR strategies affect social conflict, we use a rela-
tional pragmatic approach to illustrate how different CSR strategies
shape relations in particular contexts. Through their impact on
relations, we argue, CSR strategies can contribute to different gov-
ernance dynamics – exacerbating or mediating curse dynamics.
We draw on fieldwork in Peru along with primary and secondary
sources to describe how company strategies interacted with those
of other actors to affect government capacity and the propensity
for violence – both key concerns of the resourse curse literature
(See Fig. 1).
Reforms in the 1990s led to exponential growth in Peru’s min-
ing sector. With this growth came an explosion of ‘‘social conflicts,”
as recorded by the Peruvian ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo,
2019). The magnitude of conflict around mines, however, has var-
ied. The two mines we consider in this study, Yanacocha and Cerro
Verde – located in the regions of Cajamarca and Arequipa, respec-
tively – both experienced conflict at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury but followed divergent paths after 2005 (See Table 1). The
mines have similar sizes, surrounding populations, operational
expansions, and timelines. How did these different trajectories

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106323
0305-750X/Ó 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen World Development 170 (2023) 106323

localization policy related to mining failed to stem curse dynamics

Fig. 1. GDP by Department (INEI, 2018.).
unfold? What role do corporate strategies have in managing con-
flict with local communities?
In what follows, we outline arguments about the politics and
actors that mediate and shape curse dynamics at the community
level. We then explain our relational pragmatic approach and
how it intersects with these arguments. Next, we provide an over-
view of the political starting points for each case and analyze the
two mines’ strategies. We conclude by discussing the value of
the relational pragmatic approach for understanding how CSR
affects political articulation in ways that can exacerbate or mediate
the curse.
1. Resources, institutions, corporate social responsibility, and
politics
Most scholarship that seeks to explain the mitigation of delete-
rious impacts from resource extraction focuses on the quality of
pre-existing institutions. Ross (2012) argues that resources do
not cause problematic effects in countries with strong democratic
institutions. Luong and Weinthal (2006) suggest that the structure
of ownership around mineral resources could feed into this
dynamic. Kurtz and Brooks (2011) argue that the investments in
human capital and diverse economies associated with stronger
institutions create links between the resource sector and the
broader economy to improve investment in public, or common,
concerns. Others agree that better institutions can mitigate curse
dynamics (Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006).
Better institutions can operate at local and national levels.
Ponce and McClintock (2014) argue that greater local bureaucratic
capacity in Peru is associated with fewer pernicious effects from
resource extraction. Arellano-Yanguas (2011, 2018) claims that
and increased the chances for conflict. With a somewhat different
focus on protest activity, Arce (2014) finds that mobilization is
more likely in democratic areas with greater political competition
but that the intensity of the mobilization varies depending on
whether it is aimed toward acquiring services or protecting rights.
These studies offer important insights for the mines in our
study. Arequipa had a more diverse economic base with greater
investments in human capital than did Cajamarca prior to the pro-
tests in the early 2000s. Thus, Kurtz and Brooks (2011) might
expect better economic outcomes and fewer protests in Arequipa.
Ponce and McClintock (2014: 124), though, rate the institutional
capacity of Arequipa and Cajamarca as nearly identical. And any
difference between the areas did not prevent violence from break-
ing out in the early 2000s. Arce (2014) claims that protests over
services are easier to dampen than those over rights, and thus
might suggest the demand for services in Arequipa and rights in
Cajamarca explains the difference. As we demonstrate below,
though, in the early 2000s both communities made similar
demands for rights and services. While each of these arguments
is useful, none captures the process through which relations
around mining improved in Arequipa while they worsened in Caja-
marca. Our approach more accurately captures how these pro-
cesses evolved and their relevance for each community’s
subsequent path.
1.1. Pragmatism and the political implications of transactional and
transformational CSR
Pragmatism is a tradition that rests on relational ontology. It
assumes that actors are emergent and that interactions can lead
them to understand their ‘‘interests” in various ways. Instead of
specifying interests ex ante, as is common in the resource curse lit-
erature above, relational ontology encourages an exploration of
how interests change over time as the processes and interactions
of which relations are comprised shape how actors understand
their preferences (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Jackson & Nexon,
1999).
A key feature of actors’ relations is the type of social capital they
value and practice. Burt (2005) writes of two broad logics – open
and closed. Open logics facilitate new ties, broaden the set of actors
involved, and are associated with coordinating around new ways of
understanding the issue at hand. Closed logics centralize coordina-
tion among established relations and understandings, leading
coordination to rest on transactions between a fixed set of actors.
Neither logic is locked, but one or the other is articulated as inter-
actions unfold.

Table 1
Comparative data on Cerro Verde and Yanacocha mines.

Cerro Verde Yanacocha

Location Southern Peru, Arequipa Northern Peru, Cajamarca
Distance from city 20 miles 30 miles
Type of mine Open-pit Open-pit
Mineral Copper Gold
Mine size 21,000 ha 27,000 ha
Original ownership Anaconda Mining Company Newmont Mining, Buenaventura, and Bureau de
Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM)
Current ownership Freeport-McMoRan (53.56 percent); SMM Cerro Verde Newmont Mining (51.35 percent);
Netherlands of Sumitomo (21 percent); and Buenaventura Buenaventura (43.65 percent); Sumitomo (5 percent)13
(19.58 percent).12
Company headquarters U.S. (Freeport-McMoRan) U.S. (Newmont Mining)
Expansion efforts (years) 2003 and 2011 Failed efforts in 2000/2004 and 2008
12
2017.
13
Business Wire, 2018.

2
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
The act of articulation refers to both speaking about or framing
a concern and affecting how those around it are ‘‘jointed”. It indi-
cates both how people’s interests are expressed and organized
through political action and how these forms integrate with other
bodies and organizations—for instance, how political parties, civil
society groups, companies, and/or movements join forces to mobi-
lize around a concern (Finn, 2016: 5; Slack, 1996).
An important element in pragmatism is whether relations are
articulated around common concerns (Dewey, 1927; Farrell &
Knight, 2021). When people understand themselves as interdepen-
dent and seek to manage that interdependence together, they are
more likely to transform their relations. This tracks with a broad
range of literature on contemporary governance involving state
and non-state actors, which also hinges on whether it serves com-
mon concerns (Best and Gheciu, 2014; Brass, 2016; Cammett &
MacLean, 2014; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Murdie, 2014).
Interactions focused on problems can lead people to understand
their interdependence (Dewey, 1927). Also important is connecting
previously unconnected actors, facilitating dialogue that is open to
new information and contestation, and being attentive to the
workability of solutions. When these build on one another, interac-
tions are more likely to generate creativity or shifts in how actors
see themselves relative to others (Avant, 2016).
Pragmatism is an apt logic for exploring whether and how dif-
ferent CSR strategies affect politics. Though not explicit, the claims
behind CSR share a skepticism of interest fixity. Unlike arguments
about other corporate strategies like lobbying or using payoffs to
influence political processes, which assume companies want to
simply maximize their interests, many early analyses of CSR
assumed, implicitly, that companies could understand their ‘‘inter-
ests” in various ways (Carroll, 1991). As analyses of CSR and what it
entails have expanded, many have remarked on its fluid and con-
tested nature (Crane & Glozer, 2016; van den Broek, 2022). CSR
is ‘‘an idea, a normative and changing belief about how firms
should give meaning to their impact on society and the environ-
ment” (van den Broek, 2022: 2).
Some argue that CSR can push companies toward a more open
orientation attentive to public concerns (Carroll, 1991, 2016;
Haufler, 2001; Ruggie, 2004; Olsen et al., 2022). Others claim that
it can also be a tool with which with to manipulate public relations,
feigning openness while maintaining social capital closure (Vogel,
2008). There is evidence to back both sides of this debate. Rather
than weighing in on which is more accurate in general, we build
on the different logics in these arguments to develop two ideal
types of CSR strategies, transactional and transformational. We dis-
cuss these as ideal types for ease of understanding but note that in
practice, relations are best understood as points on a continuum
rather than fitting neatly into one or the other box.
A transactional tilt to CSR is related to what Laszlo and
Zhexembayeva (2011: 105-106) call ‘‘bolted on” sustainability
strategies. In this situation, CSR might operate in isolation from
the rest of the company, conceiving of its relationship with the
community as zero-sum, and leveraging transactional relation-
ships and visible benefits. Comparable to what is called ‘‘green-
washing” or ‘‘bluewashing” mentioned in Vogel (2008), this style
of CSR is primarily a public relations effort toward the community
and other stakeholders. For this ideal type, CSR is not seen as con-
sequential to company operations, thus considerations about social
responsibility are isolated from broader company policies.
Pragmatism draws attention to the relational potential of this
approach. Companies that see CSR as transactional are more likely
to point to specific material gains that can be made through com-
munity alliances rather than engaging with the community over
problems. They also tend to publicize their efforts rather than try-
ing to understand public concerns or interact with other stakehold-
ers to create a new understanding. The company may engage in
3
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
marketing efforts or make targeted payouts to gain stakeholder
approval. Its instrumental and relatively closed nature, though,
leaves it unlikely to shift the way the company understands itself,
the community, or their relations.
But companies can instead engage with the community in a
transformational way. This is related to what Laszlo and
Zhexembayeva (2011, 100) discuss as sustainability strategies that
are ‘‘embedded” in the organization, ‘‘incorporating environmen-
tal, health, and social value into the company’s core business” as
a means of strengthening the company’s performance. Transforma-
tional CSR goes beyond public relations to alter how a company
describes itself and does business.
Again, pragmatism focuses us on the consequences that this ori-
entation might have for a company’s relations. Seeking to incorpo-
rate social concerns to strengthen a company’s performance
implicitly notices some interdependence. It also can generate
greater openness to new information and relations on the part of
business leaders. More interactions, especially when accompanied
by a willingness to learn from contestation, can deepen under-
standing. Openness to information and connections can also lead
companies to see themselves, their interests, and their relation-
ships in new ways. This can generate innovative ways to tackle
problems (Adler, 2019; Avant, 2016; Avant et al., 2019; Olsen,
2023; Padgett & Powell, 2012). A more transformational CSR
approach not only embeds the strategy in the company as a whole,
but also orients companies toward broader social, political, and
economic concerns. It thus opens opportunities for relations more
inclined to address common concerns and more likely to generate
the shifts that advocates for CSR like Ruggie (2004) hoped for.
Given these are ideal types, how any company practices CSR is
likely to fluctuate on a continuum that includes transactional and
transformational modes at each end. Moreover, neither CSR strat-
egy determines how politics is articulated. Because processes are
products of interactions, no one entity controls how they develop.
But just as civil society engagement and contestation around min-
ing can change institutions (Bebbington et al., 2008), so too can
company responses to that contestation. We argue that how com-
panies approach CSR, indicated by different language, policies, and
evaluation (as outlined in Appendix 1), can help generate political
articulations that alter actors’ interests and power. Transforma-
tional approaches should be more likely to generate relational
shifts that can improve government capacity and mediate violence.
We conduct a within-case analysis of mining in Peru, which is
also a cross-case analysis of mining relations in different local com-
munities. We selected cases by identifying mines of similar size,
located in areas with similar government capacity, similar opera-
tional expansion, and protest timelines, but with varying levels
of violence. Yanacocha (in the region of Cajamarca) and Cerro
Verde (in Arequipa) are large mines located near cities. The
national characteristics of Peru’s government, levels of inequality,
perceptions of corruption, and regional bureaucratic capacity are
relatively similar (Ponce & McClintock, 2014: 124). Both mines
attempted expansions in the early 2000s that elicited violence.
After that, however, their paths diverged; violent protests contin-
ued around Yanacocha but diminished around Cerro Verde.1
Our relational pragmatic approach directed attention to the
processes that led to these different outcomes (Hellmann, 2009).
We thus sought to understand how company officials saw their
role in the community and how their strategies related to local
1
The trajectories of the two regions have diverged further since the events we
describe. Arequipa grew by 6.3 percent between 2007 and 2017, driven by
manufacturing, large-scale agriculture, and mining. Cajamarca, however, grew more
slowly (3 percent) driven mainly by mining. As of 2019, Cajamarca was the poorest
department in Peru and its education, infrastructure, and electrification fell well
below the national average (Mendoza & Gallardo, 2011).
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
stakeholders and designed our interview strategy accordingly. We
drew on what sociologists call a ‘‘life story” approach—an open-
ended set of questions that allow interviewees to chart the main
events, turning points, and narratives in their story (Bertaux &
Kohli, 1984). We adjusted this approach to ask about either the
‘‘company story” or the ‘‘community story” of each mine, generat-
ing multivocal evidence in each site. We visited both mines and
spoke with people in management, community relations, and
day-to-day operations—from hydraulic engineers and cafeteria
workers to geologists and drivers. We also spoke with employees
at the corporate headquarters. We then visited multiple areas sur-
rounding each mine, interviewing individuals as well as represen-
tatives from NGOs, academia, and the local government. This
methodology facilitated a thorough understanding of how people
in different roles understood and assigned meaning to their actions
and interactions. We conducted over 75 interviews in Lima, Caja-
marca, Arequipa, and Denver and bolstered these with news arti-
cles, company reports, government records, and ethnographic
observations of interactions related to mine activities.
2. Background and initial political contexts
The Cerro Verde copper mine occupies a swath of the Atacama
Desert near Arequipa, Peru’s second largest city. The mine was
owned and operated by the Anaconda Copper Company until it
was appropriated by Peru’s socialist military regime in 1970. As
part of privatization policies under Fujimori, the government sold
the mine. Phelps Dodge owned the mine in the early 2000s and
it was acquired by Freeport-McMoRan in 2007. Cerro Verde is
one of the largest copper reserves in Peru, with estimated reserves
of 4.63 tons of copper ore.
The Yanacocha mine sprawls over varied terrain thirty miles
outside the city of Cajamarca. Newmont, Buenaventura, and Bureau
de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) discovered gold on
the site in the 1980s, and mining began in 1993. Yanacocha is the
second largest gold mine in the world, located on 27,000 ha of land
at an altitude of more than 13,000 feet (Wesley & Puffer, 2012).
The history of economic development in the two areas and its
relationship to the mines are distinct. Relationships in both areas
soured, however, as communities began to worry about water
usage and pollution associated with mining activity. Arequipa is
a more prosperous area with a wider variety of economic activity.
Cerro Verde had a long and relatively cordial relationship with Are-
quipa that became more contentious in the early part of the 21st
century as Arequipa’s population grew alongside mining activity.
The simultaneous population growth and mining activity produced
an increased strain on water, alongside concerns about contamina-
tion and dust. In 2003 many thought Arequipa’s water system was
on the verge of collapse (Roca-Servat, 2012: 117-120). Cerro
Verde’s expansion plan exacerbated water and pollution concerns,
fomenting rights complaints against the mine.
The Yanacocha mine began with controversy in 1993 as it paid
low prices to acquire the land and forcibly relocated twenty-six
families (Wesley & Puffer, 2012: 3). The partnership that began
the mine collapsed in 1994 amid allegations of corruption and
bribery (FRONTLINE/World, 2005). When Yanacocha became oper-
ational, residents complained that the mine offered few job oppor-
tunities as most positions required education and skills that area
residents lacked (Wesley & Puffer, 2012) even as it generated dra-
matic growth that dominated Cajamarca’s economy. Residents also
expressed concerns about the environment, which were exacer-
bated when a truck contracted by the mine spilled 151 kg of mer-
cury in the town of Choropampa. More than 1,000 people were
sickened, and unaccounted-for mercury likely made it into the
Jequetepeque River watershed (Wesley & Puffer, 2012: 5). The
4
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
mine’s proposed expansion into Cerro Quilish exacerbated envi-
ronmental concerns, fomenting rights complaints not unlike those
surrounding Cerro Verde’s operation.
While both communities’ concerns around the mining expan-
sion are similar, one might argue that there are differences in
how companies contributed to local economies. The primary mech-
anism through which mining revenues reach localities in Peru,
though – the canon minero, or mining canon – is similar in the
two cases.2 Canon amounts vary over time, contributing to revenue
volatility at the municipality level (Interview C3, 2018), but transfers
to Arequipa and Cajamarca were nearly identical (Fig. 2). From 2001
to 2015, the average annual transfer in Arequipa was approximately
317,621,661 nuevos soles (approximately USD $96 million), while the
average annual transfer in Cajamarca was just slightly larger,
318,460,062 nuevos soles (a difference of about USD $253,000).3
Some may also wonder whether the different minerals played a
role. We draw from a literature in environmental sociology on
materiality (Dougherty & Olsen, 2014, 426), however, that suggests
their similar material impacts. Both are open pit mines that use
explosives, generate dust, and emit toxic mine waste harmful to
water supplies as well as human and wildlife health. These are
the concerns that residents voiced about each mine.
Finally, the historically powerful role of mining unions around
the Cerro Verde mine contrasts with the more recent mobilization
of communities around Yanacocha, which was part of a mining
boom brought on by neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Bebbington
et al., 2008; Bury, 2004). The powerful labor base of historical
anti-mining mobilization in Arequipa may have shaped local
groups’ organizational support and their receptivity to Cerro
Verde’s transformative CSR strategy. In initial interactions, though,
the community was not interested in engaging with Cerro Verde to
identify solutions but sought to stop their expansions outright.
Overall, ‘‘distinct geographies of social mobilization and of mineral
investment” (Bebbington et al., 2008) and relations of power
among different civil society organizations shifted over time. Com-
munities’ interpretations of ‘‘development” affected how they
engaged with Cerro Verde and Yanacocha in their efforts to make
demands. Below we describe how actors’ strategies interacted
and changed in the areas surrounding each mine.
In sum, though there are differences between the two regions,
proposed expansions in the early 2000s led both communities to
make rights-based claims to halt mining expansion. And, in both
cases community concerns led to protests and violent exchanges
between protesters, the mines, and authorities (Interview I7,
2018; CAO, 2007). The two companies, however, responded to the
protests differently. The Cerro Verde mine adopted a new CSR strat-
egy that reflected a transformational approach. Many reported this
as a critical turning point for relations between the mine and sur-
rounding communities. Even though other factors may have aided
the uptake, the mine’s change in strategy was pivotal. The Yana-
cocha mine invested additional resources but maintained a transac-
tional approach to the community. Few saw this moment as a
turning point in Yanacocha’s relations with surrounding communi-
2
As of 2004, the national legislature required that ‘‘25 percent [of the canon] would
be transferred to regional governments, 40 percent to municipalities of the region, 25
percent to municipalities of the province (regions are divided into provinces) and 10
percent to district municipalities” (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). There are other mining
taxes, including mineral royalties, special taxes, and special obligations, but the canon
constitutes the lion’s share—approximately 81.19 percent of funds transferred to non-
federal units, 75% of which were municipal governments between 2005 and 2014
(Aresti, 2016, 9).
3
Given the canon transfer revenues in Figure 2 and the two regions’ comparable
demographic data in 2017 when the last census was carried out (Arequipa had
1,382,730 residents, while Cajamarca had 1,341,012), mining revenue per person is
similar for the two regions. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) -
Censos Nacionales de Población y Vivienda, 2017.
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen World Development 170 (2023) 106323

Fig. 2. Total canon transfers to Arequipa and Cajamarca (MEF, 2019).

ties. We now turn to an examination of how each company’s strat-
egy helped shape what would follow these initial protests.
3. Cerro Verde: protests, transformational CSR, and
rearticulated politics around common concerns
the expansion while others tried to get a better deal, even demand-
ing a profit-sharing arrangement (Interview I7, 2018). Protests
escalated; FREDICON joined with the larger movement (supported
by Arequipa’s newly elected leftist mayor and governor) to encour-
age ongoing protests, which became violent (Interview I7, I8 2018).

‘‘If you generate a language of development, you set the stage for 3.1. Shift to transformational CSR
political leaders to speak it”4
As the crisis escalated, Cerro Verde hired external consultants to
In late 2003 Cerro Verde announced a proposed expansion that
help secure EIA approval. The consultants had only begun to for-
required additional water rights and generated concern over water
mulate a strategy when the movement marched against the mine
shortages and contamination. Coming on the heels of protests in
in 2005 and halted Cerro Verde’s operations for a week (Roca-
2002 against the privatization of two regional, state-owned gas
Servat, 2012: 134; Interviews I7, I8 2018). One mining official
companies (known as the ‘‘Arequipazo”), local civil society organi-
recounted, ‘‘I remember watching how crowds of people climbed
zations were mobilized. At the forefront was FREDICON (Front for
the mountains into the mine and thinking: ‘Oh my God, what are
Development and Integration of the North Cone), which began as
they doing?’”6
a leftist project to help low-income families obtain land and homes
Drawing explicitly on a logic of conflict management and
through a process of informal land registrations (Roca-Servat, 2012:
human development, the consultants advised Cerro Verde to shift
118). As part of its activism, FREDICON joined with COFREN (Coor-
its CSR strategy. Instead of instrumental promises, they should
dinator of Fronts) to raise public awareness about Cerro Verde’s
focus on the company’s role in the community as a whole. Mine
environmental record and initiate a public shaming campaign tar-
employees should consider who the protesters were, (many of
geting the mine (Roca-Servat, 2012: 191).
them lived in shantytowns outside the city), why they were
FREDICON also requested access to the Environmental Impact
protesting, and recognize their concerns as legitimate rather than
Assessment (EIA) for Cerro Verde’s expansion in early 2004
reacting defensively to heated rhetoric. The key to obtaining a
(Roca-Servat, 2012: 133-134). The EIA, mandatory for all extractive
social license to operate, the consultants argued, was acknowl-
projects as of the 1990s, identifies possible problems and proposes
edgement by the community that the mine was making Arequipa
mitigation plans.5 The central government approves EIAs, but local
a better place (Interviews I7, I8, I9, 2018).
or regional governments can challenge the quality of the report,
appeal on procedural grounds, or request that external parties
address their concerns. EIAs serve as both a locus of activism and a 3.2. The process of rearticulation of human development
target for criticism.
The company’s initial engagement with FREDICON and COFREN Company officials, community groups, and politicians all speci-
was guarded and relied on a transactional strategy. Cerro Verde fied this moment as a key turning point between Cerro Verde and
communicated community gains that would come from the min- Arequipa. Several dimensions of the transformational CSR strategy
ing expansion including employment opportunities and specific were apparent in company language, policies, and evaluation
investments in local initiatives. Some community groups resisted strategies and shifted the mine’s relationships in ways that reartic-
ulated politics in Arequipa. First, the company embarked on an
4
Interview I7, 2018.
5 6
EIAs stipulate when and how the public should be invited to participate, and even Personal communication with mine official, July 2010, cited in Roca-Servat 2016,
define ‘‘participation” (Jaskoski, 2014: 875). 46.

5
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
approach that emphasized the needs of stakeholders to identify
common concerns. Second, company leadership encouraged dia-
logue but respected ongoing contestation. Third, the company
was careful to participate alongside government and civil society
groups to learn how the mine might contribute to human develop-
ment in Arequipa. We elaborate on each of these dimensions.
The company made a concerted effort to connect with a wide
range of community members and understand their concerns. This
included protesters as well as organizations that coordinated pro-
tests, like FREDICON. Company employees spoke of the importance
of engaging with local officials and interested parties from other
segments of the economy, including agriculture. Such engage-
ments did not aim to assuage the concerns of each group but to
air grievances so that they could be related to one another as col-
lective concerns. Company language implied the potential that
engagement might lead parties to see each other differently. The
engagement revealed that access to water and services were most
prominent (Interviews I7, I9 2018). Cerro Verde began to grapple
with this information and identify how the mine could support
such access under the logic of human development.
While focused on dialogue, the company also accepted criti-
cism. They recognized that discussions around expansion would
entail a long and complicated process involving contention and
posturing. Company representatives reported efforts to recognize
that political leaders and civil society organizations needed to ‘‘talk
tough” to maintain legitimacy with their supporters. The initial
process to resolve the protests involved six months of what one
interviewee referred to as ‘‘rituals” – whereby political leaders
demonstrated that they had not been coopted by the mine (Inter-
view I7, 2018). The interviewee said the company needed to accept
the criticism and resist the urge to respond. Cerro Verde’s CSR team
coached company leaders and employees to interpret public slights
as part of that process. Rather than countering insults about the
company, they were encouraged to recognize them as important
demonstrations of the politicians’ integrity to their constituents.
‘‘So, you just accept them” (Interview I7, 2018).
Cerro Verde aimed to work through local processes (Interview
I7, 2018). They suspended efforts centered on publicly touting
the benefits of the mine, more reflective of a transactional
approach, and engaged around the EIA to discuss with political
and community leaders how best to improve the quality of life in
Arequipa through the human development frame. The company
thus negotiated its political access while it jointly designed the
meanings of CSR in Arequipa (van den Broek, 2022). The provision
of water and sewage services as an avenue toward sustainable eco-
nomic activities was accepted as something that would benefit
agriculture, small enterprise, communications, textiles, and others
alongside mining. The idea was to support economic activity that
could sustain the region beyond the life of the mine (Interviews
I7, I9 2018).
As the consultations coalesced around human development, the
mine offered to pay for a study to identify key impediments to
human development. The mine also supported advice from
subject-matter experts in development—from international orga-
nizations, universities, and other groups—to engender shared lan-
guage with which to discuss development issues. In addition,
they invested in education and capacity building for local authori-
ties and community groups, alongside mining representatives and
other commercial actors (Interviews I7, I8, I9, C6, 2018).
Over time, the strategy outlined regular institutional engage-
ment with the community and fostered understanding of the CSR
approach throughout the organization. According to a water engi-
neer, ‘‘the community’s concerns can be very valuable. Working to
explain or solve their doubts takes patience and time but results in
a better outcome. I have spent my entire career working with
water. The reality is that cities need treatment plants for both clean
6
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
water and energy” (Interview I11, 2018). The same employee
reported being proud of his efforts to help Cerro Verde be a positive
force in the community and explained that many looked to Cerro
Verde’s water treatment as a model for other cities. Cerro Verde
also used the human development frame to shape the evaluation
of the company’s policies. They incorporated indicators from the
human development index about the region of Arequipa into
how they evaluated the mine’s CSR success (Interview I7, I9 2018).
The leadership at Phelps Dodge was initially skeptical about this
strategy, but they became more accepting once it succeeded in
tempering the protests and gaining EIA approval. When Freeport
McMoRan acquired Phelps Dodge in 2007, the company’s new
CEO, Richard Adkerson, was more interested. He was acutely aware
that Freeport’s sullied global reputation threatened its economic
vitality and saw the consultant’s recommended approach as the
kind of innovative strategy that could address this concern. He thus
heartily embraced the new approach (Interview I7, 2018).7
The transformational strategy shifted political possibilities. FRE-
DICON saw new potential for connection with the mining company
as ‘‘a possible alternative to attain their basic water needs” (Roca
Servat, 2012: 187). The company’s engagement with FREDICON
enhanced civil society’s power to demand that the water authority,
SEDAPAR, should treat all residents as citizens who deserve basic
services (Roca-Servat, 2012: 139-140). Increased access for new
groups of citizens also opened potential for politicians to think
about new constituencies.
Furthermore, the mine’s strategy supported greater public ori-
entation among local politicians. Mayors came to use human
development language, such as improvements in health, education,
and income, in their interactions with constituents (Interviews I7,
I9, C6, 2018). In a country where the incentives to focus on patron-
age politics are legion, this rearticulation of politics toward more
public concerns is notable. Cerro Verde also invested in workshops
for local officials on executing budgets, carrying out development
projects, and relating to the regional and national government. This
engagement aligns with general claims on how institutions can
mediate resource curse dynamics (Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum
et al., 2006), even as it reveals processes through which institutions
can be improved.
A regional council member in Arequipa emphasized that Cerro
Verde’s practices generated public participation and saw the nego-
tiation between the company and society as improving social
development. The council member, elected in a mining-affected
province, claimed that the company’s approach led mining not
only to contribute to the canon minero and corporate taxes, but also
to strengthen other economic sectors like agriculture, industry, and
tourism. Mining revenue tied to social purposes, he said, serves as a
base on which to construct sustainable economic activity (Inter-
view G1, 2018).
3.3. Extending the rearticulated framework of service provision
A transformational approach worked for Cerro Verde. It came to
terms with Arequipa’s power company, EGASA, to provide Cerro
Verde with electricity from 2007 to 2015 in exchange for Cerro
Verde’s financing construction of the Bamputañe Dam (Roca-
Servat, 2012: 152; SMCV, 2011). After the expansion was complete
and the dam constructed in 2011, though, the city still lacked a
sewage system and 300,000 people remained without access to
7
This is a short summary of why the consultants were able to shift Cerro Verde’s
strategy, which is the subject of a different paper. The depth of the crisis generated
openness to try something new, initial success with the EIA bought more time, and
Adkerson’s enthusiasm was important. The way the strategy was received in
Arequipa, possibly related to its more cohesive community (Amengual, 2018), likely
also played a role.
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
potable water. Some community members pondered organizing
more protests (Interview I7, 2018). Cerro Verde’s ongoing connec-
tions with the communities, though, alerted them to this develop-
ment and allowed them to link the community’s concern with
sewage to the mine’s further expansion plans.
The mine worked with stakeholders on a plan to address the
city’s sewage problem, increase access to water for portions of
the city without it, and gain the water needed for further expan-
sion of its mining operation. The plan was to build a wastewater
plant that would secure potable water for Arequipa and rehabili-
tate the Río Chili, which runs through the middle of the city, while
also providing more water for the mine (Interviews I7, I9 2018).
Planning included the municipal utility company, which adminis-
ters the system. After its completion, the water treatment plan pro-
vided clean water to 95 percent of the city.
In 2011 Freeport’s CEO Richard Adkerson stated that despite
the challenges in Peru, Cerro Verde had ‘‘come up with an
approach [to obtain more water rights] that is being favorably
received by the local community and the government of develop-
ing a wastewater treatment plant for the city of Arequipa, and
that will improve standards of living there but also provide us
the water for our plant [sic]” (Seeking Alpha, 2011 Q2, Q4, cited
in Roca Servat, 2012: 174). When questioned about protests of
the nearby Conga project in Cajamarca, Adkerson replied by say-
ing that, ‘‘with respect to our issues, we have worked effectively
with water rights. We are doing a water project for the city now.
We’ve come up with this solution for improving life in Arequipa
through this wastewater project which is giving us water for
our plant” (Seeking Alpha, 2011 Q4, cited in Roca Servat, 2012:
175). In 2015, the company completed the second $4.6 billion
expansion of Cerro Verde, which nearly tripled the mine’s copper
output (Freeport, 2017; Reuters, 2015).
3.4. Enduring political change
The mine’s leadership reports that their ongoing dialogue,
respect for continued contestation, and commitment to meet its
promises on collective concerns have been key to a stable, peaceful
partnership with the community. But they are quick to point out
that this requires continual engagement and learning. Local leaders
shape these processes, so Freeport invests in trying to improve
local politicians’ capacity to govern as well as their attention to
common concerns (Interviews I8, I9, C6, 2018).
The relations between Cerro Verde and Arequipa communities
remain contested. Organizations have voiced worries about the
negative effects of mining in the region, including water, health
issues, and impact on small-scale farmers (CORECAMI Arequipa,
2008). Mine employees have struck for improved wages and bene-
fits (El Comercio, 2011; El Comercio, 2017) and farmers have pro-
tested the allocation of water benefits to the Cerro Verde company
(Servindi, 2016). Some claim that the mine still contaminates
neighboring areas and is not responsive enough to requests for jobs
and other economic benefits (Interviews C7, C8 2018). Peru’s
Supreme Court ruled that the tax regulator SUNAT could recover
$250 million from Cerro Verde in unpaid mining taxes between
2006 and 2009 (Sellwood, 2017).
Cerro Verde’s transformational strategy, though, helped shift,
and then institutionalize, processes in Arequipa that contributed
to stronger governmental responses and mediated, rather than
encouraged, violent protests. Its practices allow for community
input and facilitate a collective focus on common concerns rather
than individual payoffs. Contestation over extractive activities con-
tinues, but its sustained engagement makes Cerro Verde’s opera-
tions far less antagonistic than is typical in Peru.
7
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
4. Yanacocha: protests, transactional CSR, and rearticulated
clientelist politics
‘‘When you build a school in a community, you have one commu-
nity that is grateful and several others that say, ‘Where’s my
school?’”8
Yanacocha’s rough beginning turned even more difficult after a
mercury spill in 2000. This, combined with ongoing worries about
water use and contamination, led university students (rallied by
local priest and activist Marco Arana) to collaborate with GRUFIDES
(Sustainable Development Training and Intervention Group, a col-
lective oriented toward defending the environment and human
rights in mining areas) around informing residents of potential dan-
gers to their water and food supplies and advocating for their rights.
Others pushed for a greater share of benefits from the mine’s oper-
ation (Interview C15, 2018; CAO, 2000).
As the mine struggled to manage the mercury spill’s fallout, it
also was planning a major expansion into Cerro Quilish, a moun-
tain which some community members believe is sacred and others
see as an important water source. The project would have fed
wastewater into the Río Grande, which in turn feeds into the
Porcón basin and water supply for Cajamarca city. The mine’s ini-
tial expansion plans were interrupted when local authorities
declared the mountain a protected area in 2000. Yanacocha chal-
lenged the decision in Constitutional Court and won. But GRU-
FIDES, other civil society organizations, and peasant committees
mobilized against the expansion.
4.1. Transactional CSR strategy
Amid the proposed expansion and controversy, Larry Kurlander,
senior vice president and chief administrative officer of Newmont
Mining Company, called the spill and the company’s handling of
the crisis a wake-up call (Perlez & Bergman, 2005). He emphasized
that Newmont’s social license to operate was key to restoring its
stained reputation and launched an internal audit of Yanacocha’s
environmental practices. Though the report was not made public,
it purportedly revealed substantial shortfalls that Kurlander
warned incoming CEO Wayne Murdie ‘‘could jeopardize the mine’s
continued operations and leave senior executives subject to ‘crim-
inal prosecution and imprisonment’” (Perlez & Bergman, 2005).
Yanacocha invested more in CSR but continued its transactional
approach, which focused on providing communities with specific
benefits. The mine invested in environmental remediation, includ-
ing a water treatment plant at the mine and two dams. The com-
pany also established an NGO, ALAC (Asociación Los Andes de
Cajamarca), in 2004 to contribute to sustainable development in
Cajamarca (Interview C3, 2018).9 Though these were substantial
efforts, and addressed similar water concerns as Cerro Verde, Yana-
cocha did not engender new interactions with the Cajamarca
community.10
Yanacocha neither opened itself to new ways of relating to the
Cajamarca community, nor did it promote new interactions among
different parts of the community. Furthermore, the CSR initiatives
did not change the company’s operations, apparent in its language,
polices, and evaluation. The company’s CSR remained focused on
visible benefits and public relations, not on engaging with the com-
munity or shifting company operations. This transactional strategy
did little to focus the community on common concerns in ways
8
Interview I1, 2017.
9
ALAC worked on a wide range of projects, often requiring matching funds, to
promote private enterprise in Cajamarca.
10
The mine reported spending $1 billion between 1993 and 2012 (https://www.
newmont.com/operations-and-projects/global-presence/south-america/yanacocha-
peru/default.aspx).
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
that could mitigate resource curse dynamics. Indeed, few of our
interviewees saw this moment as a turning point in Yanacocha’s
relationship with Cajamarca.
4.2. Company absence from articulation and continued transactional
CSR
Even before the mercury spill, community representatives
brought their concerns to the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) of the World Bank (then a 5 percent stakeholder in Yana-
cocha). In response, the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)
of the IFC convened a multi-stakeholder mesa, or roundtable dia-
logue, in late 2001 to generate mutually developed solutions by
Cajamarca residents and company representatives (CAO, 2007).
But the dialogue failed. Local organizations rejected the company’s
approach, claiming it was an effort to divide and conquer by using
the conversation to discover what different people wanted and
then address the concerns that were easiest to meet (CAO, 2007:
37).
When the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) authorized
Yanacocha to begin work on the expansion into Cerro Quilish in
2004, GRUFIDES galvanized to thwart it. As the project began,
hundreds of campesinos blockaded the road leading from Caja-
marca to the mine. Protests spilled into the city with a region-
wide strike and demonstration on September 15, 2004. Arana
served as an intermediary, and not long after the demonstrations,
the company yielded to protestor demands. It halted its efforts
and asked MEM to withdraw the permit (Perlez & Bergman,
2005).
Other expansions, including Carachugo II did advance, but not
without controversy. Farmers and authorities from the town of
Combayo expressed concern about the water impact of the Cara-
chugo expansion. Dissatisfied with Yanacocha’s response, they ini-
tiated a large protest in August 2006 in which a farmer, Isidro
Llanos, was killed (Sosa & Zwartveen, 2012).
In its interactions with community members, Yanacocha
focused on specific complaints rather than more general concerns
and met them with denials or payoffs. When Mr. Llanos was
killed, the mine paid compensation to his family. Also, rather
than responding to fears about water quality, the mine con-
tended that these changes were not attributable to the mine
but to agriculture (Atkins & Montoya, 2005: 42). And it used
its efforts through ALAC to reward individual projects that
embraced private sector growth (Interview C4, 2018). Worried
that people may view the NGO suspiciously if it was too closely
associated with Yanacocha, the mining company also operated at
arm’s length from ALAC (Interview I3, 2018). This orientation left
the mine poorly situated to either understand community con-
cerns or affect how the mining problem was articulated in Caja-
marca. While individual communities saw the mine differently,
GRUFIDES along with some government leaders vied to articulate
the politics surrounding the mine through a rights-based fram-
ing, while other government leaders focused more on the ser-
vices the mine might provide to specific communities
(Interviews C11, C13, G9, C18, 2018).
4.3. Conga, continued transactional CSR, and a rights-based frame
against mining
As Yanacocha abandoned the Cerro Quilish expansion, New-
mont proposed a new project in nearby Conga. MEM approved
exploration in 2008 and gave the green light for the new mine
to begin in 2010 (Banktrack, 2016). A $4.8 billion copper and gold
project, Conga would have been the largest single mining invest-
ment in Peru’s history and promised to pay $3 billion in taxes
over 19 years, half of which would stay in Cajamarca (The
8
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
Economist, 2011). The mine had approval from the national gov-
ernment and an initial understanding with the newly elected
leftist governor of Cajamarca, Gregorio Santos (Interview I1,
2017).
The company touted Conga’s contribution to the local economy,
promising jobs and training facilities in a transactional way. But
some community members focused more on the costs. Maxima
Acuña, a peasant farmer who owned property indispensable to
the project, did not want to leave or sell her land given its intrinsic
value to mother earth. Her efforts to thwart the project supported
the articulation of a trade-off between mining and the environ-
ment.11 Others in the community mobilized over the EIA and the
potential to gain greater services or profit sharing, as in the Cerro
Verde case (Balch, 2016).
Newmont did not have processes through which it could inter-
act with these stakeholders, nor did it focus on shared concerns in
Cajamarca or listen to how the Conga expansion might affect resi-
dents over the long term. During the ongoing legal struggle with
Acuña (which would tarnish Yanacocha’s reputation and ulti-
mately result in a ruling against the company (Reuters, 2017),
the company sought political agreements that would allow them
to move forward. The regional governor of Cajamarca, Gregorio
Santos, initially agreed to support the project in opposition to the
then presidential candidate, Ollanta Humala (Balch, 2016). Once
Humala was elected in 2011, though, he flipped positions and
pushed for the project to go forward. Santos, in turn, switched
sides in anger and joined the call for an indefinite ‘‘strike” to stop
Conga (Interview I1, 2017; The Economist, 2011).
As conflicts with unions and surrounding communities began
to mount, the mine’s leadership was reactive and resulted in
significant turnover of company executives (Interview I3,
2018). In November 2011 an estimated 10,000 protestors
marched in Cajamarca city. Demonstrators blocked roads and
shut down the airport; public offices and private businesses
closed. Losses mounted to $10 million a day, according to the
local chamber of commerce, and the government issued a state
of emergency (The Economist, 2011). The national government
asked Newmont to suspend the project pending review, and
Newmont agreed.
As protests continued, the government hired international con-
sultants to review Newmont’s EIA in 2012. The consultants found
that the EIA largely met required standards and thus the govern-
ment cleared the project to begin again in late June. In July, though,
protests renewed and turned violent. Several people were killed in
clashes with police and many more were arrested, including Arana.
The government issued yet another state of emergency and
another pause in the Conga project. In 2016 Newmont suspended
their plans for Conga indefinitely.
Newmont employees (at Yanacocha and headquarters) admit
that the company did not have an effective strategy for community
relations in Cajamarca (Interview I1, 2017; Interviews I3, I5 2018).
Kurlander’s wake-up call generated some attention to community
concerns, but the company’s approach was instrumental. Whether
through direct or indirect (ALAC) payouts, Newmont’s strategy did
not engage with the community in ways that opened its policies
and operations to new understandings. As the quote at the begin-
ning of this case illustrates, Newmont later felt its efforts led to
continually escalating demands from stakeholders in Cajamarca
(Interviews I3, I5 2018). This strategy offered the company few
tools for affecting the articulation of politics surrounding the mine
in Cajamarca.
11
Acuña’s quiet but steady resolve won her international recognition (Interview
B24, 2018).
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen
4.4. Renewed efforts, transactional strategies, and limited results
After the Conga crisis, Yanacocha engaged in a set of dialogues
with individual communities about its future. In 2017, the com-
pany leadership concluded that the communities wanted the mine
to continue its work, but not to expand its footprint. Newmont
thus began working on expansion plans into existing pits at Yana-
cocha for copper (Interview I1, 2017). Few employees we inter-
viewed have given up hope on the Conga project, though, and
uniformly opined that the mine was critical to Cajamarca’s
economy.
Newmont also established CSR teams to engage with surround-
ing communities. The teams developed relationships in communi-
ties surrounding the mine, but the community treats them as
conduits to jobs and other resources from the mine, rather than
as partners in a conversation about public matters. The programs
the company arranged also focus on individual rather than
community-wide concerns (Interview I2, 2018). One involved a
slide show on skin cancer, how to avoid it, and distributed
Yanacocha-branded hats to schoolchildren and their parents
(Interview I2, 2018). The CSR teams can inform Yanacocha about
tensions in communities, but do not have direct access to company
leadership or key community members – and they often must tra-
vel with security (Interview C13, 2018).
In a similarly transactional fashion, the mine’s reaction to water
concerns has been on a case-by-case basis, helping to build micro-
reservoirs for specific communities (Interview C13, 2018). Reflect-
ing after the fact, some in the company wonder why they did not
do more to solve the water problem in a more general way (Inter-
view I6, 2018). Interviews in communities near Yanacocha
revealed a palpable hostility and distrust of even the language of
development—and the intentions of those who promote it, which
they claim has disrupted communities, their values, and traditional
practices. ‘‘Now there are no more communal work projects,” one
interviewee lamented (Interview C30, 2018).
4.5. Politics rearticulated: ‘‘Agua sí, Conga no”
Newmont’s approach won it neither support nor successful
expansions. As one interviewee bluntly described it: ‘‘the people
of Cajamarca hate the guts of Yanacocha” (Interview I7, 2018). Pro-
tests halted both the Cerro Quilish expansion and the new Conga
mine. In 2012 some 78 percent of Cajamarca’s population opposed
the Conga expansion (GNAD, 2012). Six years later, the hills sur-
rounding the city of Cajamarca continued to carry the painted mes-
sage, ‘‘Agua sí, Conga no”.
The mine continues to operate and pay taxes. But ‘‘the use of the
canon in some mining districts could have been easily qualified as
‘sumptuary,’ such as bullring or sports stadiums, which raises mis-
givings in other provinces and districts of the region” (Barrantes
et al., 2012: 63). A Newmont executive criticized decisions by local
authorities in Cajamarca to spend canon funds on useless monu-
ments, rather than investing in social development and expressed
frustration that the mine’s efforts had not been better received
(Interviews I1, 2017). The company’s transactional strategy,
though, has fed into, rather than mediated, the patronage politics
they criticize.
Instead of discussions about Cajamarca’s future, stakeholders
around the mine used EIA processes to engage in hyper-polarized
campaigns for or against mining. Much of the mobilization is
against mining in the name of protecting rights over land and
water. Mining employees – from management to water engineers
– assert that without Yanacocha the economy in Cajamarca would
9
World Development 170 (2023) 106323
collapse. While some in the community agree that the mine is cen-
tral to Cajamarca’s economy, no one suggested that the mine was
contributing to a better future (Interviews C22, C13, C30 2018).
5. CSR strategy and the articulation of politics: implications for
resource curse dynamics
Analysts of the resource curse have argued that good gover-
nance and investments in human capital can be tools for mediating
curse dynamics (Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006). Others
have shown how community strategy can shape corporate behav-
ior (Gustafsson, 2018). In this paper, we demonstrate how a com-
pany’s CSR strategy can also feed into political dynamics. In
response to violent protests, the Cerro Verde mine adopted a more
transformational CSR strategy. Company employees spoke of the
mine as a part of the community and engaged with stakeholders
to target common concerns. The mine’s support for expert advising
and use of human development indicators also encouraged the
same among relevant authorities. This orientation linked public
services (e.g., water and waste) to continued mining operations.
It also connected with civil society organizations to elevate voices
of underserved members of the community. The company’s strat-
egy contributed to a rearticulation of politics with more support
for governance and investments in human capital, which other
studies have linked to the mitigation of resource curse outcomes.
Though Gramscian analyses may dispute the normative benefit of
this approach (Gamu & Dauvergne, 2018), they would not dispute
its difference from the Yanacocha case.
The Yanacocha mine continued a CSR strategy rooted in trans-
actional logic. In response to protests, it sought to extend benefits
to individuals or groups in Cajamarca in exchange for their sup-
port. Without a process for engaging with the community, the
company’s strategy offered few innovations that could contribute
to the rearticulation of politics in Cajamarca. Instead, politics sur-
rounding the mine was articulated by community groups and
politicians, often in polarizing ways. Though Yanacocha delivered
what many would see as ‘‘public goods” such as schools and water
projects, it did not promote new processes of interaction or cause
the community to see its concerns as interdependent. Meanwhile,
continued company payoffs fed into the kind of clientelist politics
and inequality in Cajamarca that resource curse arguments expect.
The rearticulation of politics around what the mine could do for
the community, including the provision of services, and away from
a discourse about the legitimacy of the mine’s very existence was
critical to the shift in relations between Cerro Verde and Arequipa
(Interview C13, 2017). This orientation, though, was not clear at
the start. Between 2004 and 2005 many argued that Cerro Verde’s
expansion should be halted. Only interactions made possible by
transformational elements in its strategy led to a focus on what
the mine could provide for Arequipa in the long term (Interview
I9, 2018).
Similarly, Yanacocha’s rough beginning notwithstanding, there
were avenues for the mine to be seen as more beneficial to Caja-
marca’s development. While the mine did little to foster such
investments, one community near the mine, Porcón, elected a
more public-oriented mayor whose strong leadership and commit-
ment to transparency and public purpose facilitated better uses for
the canon minero and investments from ALAC toward public works
and human capital. This resulted in a more generous view of how
the mine might contribute to a better future and is emblematic of
the potential for more productive relations had Yanacocha pursued
a different path (Interviews C4, G9 2018).
D. Avant, D. Finn and T.D. Olsen World Development 170 (2023) 106323

The cases also suggest how processes shift power in lasting economy and society. Our relational pragmatic approach uncovers
ways that are not zero sum. The power shifts around Cerro Verde the ways in which CSR strategies can activate interactions that
gave influence not only to the mine but also to social movements. shape the political context. We show how a transformational
The interaction between Cerro Verde and FREDICON led communi- approach can help rearticulate politics to focus on collective con-
ties in the North Cone of Arequipa to garner more capacity to shape cerns and generate investments in human capital. Strategies that
their fate (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). While maintaining their objec- are more transactional in nature, on the other hand, hold little
tives of equitable development and a voice for mining-affected potential for influencing rearticulation, improving government
communities, social movements took advantage of the mine’s capacity, or reducing violence. Our argument demonstrates both
attention and investment in broader socially minded projects. Iron- the usefulness of the relational pragmatic approach for integrating
ically, though, because local politicians came to see their role as CSR and governance arguments and the potential relevance of CSR
facilitating development outcomes, they did not see themselves strategies for articulating politics in ways that move governance
as ‘‘losing” power. Even as local communities surrounding Are- practices away from – or further toward – curse dynamics.
quipa acquired greater capacity to negotiate with the Peruvian
national government as part of Cerro Verde’s efforts, the national Data availability
government did not see itself as losing ground either. Contestation
persists in Arequipa over the very presence of ‘‘la mina” – a univer- The data that has been used is confidential.
sal reference to any extractive industry operations – in the region
and continues to give form to changing local political interests and
Declaration of Competing Interest
alliances among different actors. As a result of the altered relation-
ship between the mine and the communities, however, Cerro
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
Verde has continued to function in a way that both communities
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
and the government perceive as contributing to continued human
to influence the work reported in this paper.
development. As pragmatic arguments would expect (Avant, 2016;
Ralph, 2018), discovering common concerns reframed the problem
Acknowledgements
and led to creative solutions at the local level.
While such solutions exist at the local level, they have not
This project was supported by a Carnegie Corporation grant,
incited changes at the national level. Our research shows, though,
entitled ‘‘Inclusive Approaches to Violence Reduction, Peacebuild-
that resource curse dynamics are not intractable at the local level.
ing, and Governance: Research and Implications for Practice” and
They can be mitigated by strategies that help those involved artic-
the University of Denver’s PROF grant. IRB protocol number:
ulate their concerns in ways that foster an open logic toward find-
1195991-1. We thank Loosineh Markarian for her invaluable work
ing common solutions. All actors are strategic and may have the
as a research assistant on the early phases of this project. We also
capacity to shift the trajectory of such relations; but our research
thank Abdul Trelles and Edwin Bustinza. Dogus Aktan, Amanda
highlights how corporate actors can adopt strategies that improve
Murdie, and Juanita Uribe provided useful comments on earlier
government capacity and reduce the propensity for violence.
versions. We also thank Dr. Javier Arellano-Yanguas for generously
Rather than identifying what type of CSR strategy firms use and
sharing data and providing the source, where we were able to find
why, this research seeks to understand how such choices affect
additional figures for canon transfers.
political dynamics that shape the lives of those in nearby
communities.
Many agree that political contexts affect whether extractive Appendix 1
resources contribute to greater or lesser ‘‘curses” to a country’s

Appendix 1
Indicators of Transformational and Transactional CSR Methodology and Case Selection.

Company Language:
Policy Design and
Implementation:
Policy Evaluation:
Transformational Transactional
Speaks of interests as changeable Speaks of interests are fixed
Speaks of interactions as potentially positive sum Speaks of interactions as zero sum
Speaks of contestation as potentially productive Speaks of contestation as something to be curtailed
Speaks of community concerns as potentially Speaks of community concerns as threatening
legitimate
Emphasizes the company’s role in community Emphasizes the company’s concerns
Emphasizes a productive role in the community Emphasizes community access and acquiescence
Emphasizes integration throughout the company Emphasizes specialization for those who work on CSR and operates in isolation
culture from company culture
Emphasizes the creation of institutions for two-way Emphasizes the creation of institutions to bolster the company’s image
communication
Emphasizes engagement with local government Emphasizes processes that best serve the company
processes
Evaluates CSR performance based on community Evaluates CSR performance based on specific actions/investments
progress

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