Review Article

Methodological Disputes in Comparative Politics

Michael Bernhard

Henry E. Brady and David Collier, cds., Rethinking Social lnqui,y Diverse Tools,
Shared Standards, Lanham, MD, ROWlnan and Littlefield, 2004.

Barbara Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles: TheOlY Building and Research Design
in Comparative Politics (Analytical Perspectives on Politics) Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 2003.

James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in

the Social Sciences (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, Passion, Craft. and Method in Comparative
Politics, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.

Within comparative politics there is a long-standing tension between general theory and
its application to diverse areas of the globe. Yet one can argue that this has been a produc-
tive tension. Good work that is grounded in a firm understanding of history and place
often contributes to the expansion of the theoretical horizons of the discipline as a whole.
One only needs to think of Juan Linz's investigation of the particularities of the regime in
Spain, or Robert Putnam's consideration of the differences between northern and south-
ern Italy, to appreciate how empirical studies grounded in olle place can move concepts
such as "authoritarianism" and "social capital" to a central place in the discipline. I
Attempting to extend the reach of established theory to explain a broad range of
cases is precisely what political science should aspire to do. This endeavor can become
problematic when researchers fail to make an intellectually sound case for the applicabil-
ity of established theory to the central problems confronting a region to which the theory
has not yet been applied. Consideration of a new set of cases is most productive when
new observations lead to the reconsideration and the refinement of theory. This is when
the tension between general theory and the particularities of place is most productive.

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Still, some scholars persist in calling for a universalistic approach to the study of
politics, though recently such claims have been more methodological than th oretical.
The most influential work to propound a "one- ize-fits-all" view of social science ha
been Designing Social Inquity by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sydney Y, rba
(hereafter KKy).2 Its argument is explicitly methodological. Put simply, KKY argue
that there i one way to make valid eientific inferences in the social sciences, and that
is by using the regre sion model. The implication i that qualitative researcher hould
emulate the logic of quantitative work.
Many political scientists, among them Henry Brady and David Collier, whose re-
cent edited volume is reviewed here arc uncomfortable with the methodological uni-
versalism advocated by KKY, seeing it as epi temologically premature or even mis-
guided. One can value the analytic power of quantitative analy is that use the regr ssion
model and still take issue with the exclusivist claims KKY make conceming cientific
inference. Increasingly, sophi ticated practitioner of the regression model augment
quantitative work with fieldwork. This provides greater certainty that the causal con-
nections te ted in regre sions arc valid through the observation of cases rei vant to the
theory. Fieldwork al 0 provides the opportunity to make in-depth ob. ervations that
can lead to new ideas and insights grounded in real politics. Moreover, though KKY
have a strong position on how to answer questions, methodological universalism pro-
vide no guidance as to which questions are worth answering. Should the ability to im-
plement a particular strategy of inference be the driving force behind the disciplinary
research agenda?
Given the importance of qualitative re earch in comparative politics, KKY created
constemation among many in the ubfield. They entered into an ongoing discus ion on
the nature of inference and the mo. t appropriate methods to u. e in diverse circum-
stances. Many comparativists hold that ther is a hierarchy of inference based on the
type of control that the available data allow one to exercise. At the top of the hierarchy
are experimental methods, followed by stati tical methods, and then comparative small-n
methods ba ed on John Stuart Mill's logic.3 Arend Lijphart i a well-known advocate of
thi position.4 Others, uch as David Collier, have argued that comparative politics
studie problems that place important limitations on the kind of data that can be col-
lected and on the inferential leverage that can be brought to bear (a degree of freedom
problem), and thus must rely on Mill's methods.5 Finally, Charles Ragin is prominent
among tho e who argue that the causal logic us d by qualitative researcher is funda-
mentally different from and has certain advantages over the regression model of politi-
cal science.6
Whether one is upportive or skeptical of their argument, KKY have provoked in-
ten e methodological introspection and reconsideration of how logical inference is
made in comparative politics. The many rejoinders to their work have helped illuminate
the u e of qualitative analysi and have increased intere t in mall-n method, often
through mixed methods research designs that combine large-n and small-n analyse .. 7

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The four books reviewed here and their receptions are, at least in part, a product of
the sharpen d debate over methods prompted by KKY's advocacy of the regression
model. The es ay in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by
lame Mahoney and Dietrich Rue chemeyer, draw attention to the accomplishment of
one of the most influential brands of qualitative work in political cience and sociology-
macrosocial historical analy is. The book highlight the accumulation of knowledge
generated by thi method, discu ses the tool that qualitative historical social seienti ts
employ, and defends it methodological as umptions. As a tate-of-the-art overview, the
book fills the same niche for macrosocial historical analysi. that KKY's volume,
Analytic Narratives, and Beyond the Cultural Turn, fill for the large-n, rational choice,
and po tmodem schools of ocial inquiry.8
Paradigms and Sandcastles by Barbara Gedde is akin to KKV' book in that it ar-
gues a particular view of what constitutes cience. While her claims are not as deeply
embedded in method a their, Gedde can b seen a a kindred pirit in her trong pref-
erence for the regression model of inference. Unlike KKY, he advocate a strong
agenda for theory building and engage in an extended polemic against many of the
seminal works of the comparative hi torical school, trying to show the weakness of the-
ory not inspired by rational choice.
Rethinking Social Inquiry, edited by David Collier and Henry Brady, is a direct re-
joinder to KKY's po ition, explicitly intended to open up methodological space for
qualitative re earchers along ide the regre ion model. Its essential theme is that both
qualitative and quantitative researchers can acknowledge hared standard of inference,
with neither side in the debate holding a monopoly on cientific truth.
Finally, in Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, Gerardo L. Munck
and Richard Snyder maintain that the practice of good comparative politics is not just a
question of choosing the correct method. Munck and Snyder conducted structured in-
terview with fifteen of the mo t accomplished and visible comparative scholars of the
last fifty years, who comprise a highly diverse group both in term of their theoretical
inspirations and methodological preferences. These outstanding members of the profes-
sion discuss how great researchers choose comp Iling research topics, frame research
question ,and et about finding an wer . Method i but one critical part of the proces .
The interview ugge t that the process of formulating questions worth an wering i
complex and draws inspiration from various sources.

Showcasing Comparative Historical Analysis

Comparative historical analysi ha been one of the mo t theoretically fruitful and

methodologically influential trains ofre earch in comparative politics. In Comparative
Historical Analysis in the Social Science, Mahoney and Ru chemeyer characterize
this method as combining causal analysis with understanding proces. es over time and

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using systematic and contextualized comparison (p. 11). Despite the growing impor-
tance of more normal science approache link d to the regression model the volume
demon trates that comparative historical analy is has produced advance in both politi-
cal science and sociology over the last decade and a half, and continue to play an im-
portant role.
Unlike the Gedde and Brady and Collier volumes, the selection in thi book are
not explicitly confrontational and do not trongly polemicize with other traditions.
Rather, they demonstrate the continued richness of small-n historical analysi and its
use of state-of-the-art research tools. The showcase quality of the book makes it excep-
tionally useful as a teaching tool both for graduate courses on scope and methods, as
well as for more pecialized course on mall-n research.
The fir t section of the book traces how comparative historical analysis has I d to
the accumulation of knowledge in everal important areas of social scientific inquiry-
revolution, social policy, and regime chang . Thes are areas in which the method has
yielded trong contribution to theory; and the entrie in thi section buttre S the claim
that uch theory remain relevant because re earchers have refined it over time in respon e
to new developments and new data.
Jack Gold tone's essay on revolution makes the provocative and insightful obser-
vation that comparative historical analysis engages in a kind of implicit Baye ian analy-
sis.9 Bayesian statistics u e assumptions (often grounded in earlier r search) about
how the phenomenon under investigation operates, and then uses expected patterns of
observation to draw inference. Comparative hi torical analysis engages in a logically
similar exercise in it r Iianee on pattern tracing and congruence te ting to theorize and
falsify. Congruence testing checks to ee if causal pattern pre ent in new observation
conform to e. tablished theories. Where congruence is not found, researchers engage
anew in pattern tracing of the causal sequence in discordant ca. es. Identifying distinct
patterns can then be used to synthe ize a higher order theory ba ed on the different
path to the same outcome (p. 51).
James Mahoney's essay expounds on how comparative historical analysis treats
theory falsification, citing a an example numerou studie that provid only "limited
and conditional support" for Barrington Moore's hypothe es about regime type in The
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (p. 145). At the. arne time, he points out that
Moore's findings sparked an extensive literature-exploring how issues of accumula-
tion of wealth, development, class tructure, and thc incorporation of subaltern groups
into the polity potentially shape the fonn that regim s take-and led to the reformula-
tion of more comprehensive and refined theories. The in piration provided by Moore
shows why certain works remain cIa sics despite being subjected to prolonged and tren-
chant criticism.
The econd ection of the book purportedly is devoted to showing that comparative
historical analysi use a range of analytical tools. However, only the essay by Roger
Gould focuses on a specific tool of research-network analy is. The other essays

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 Michael Bernhard

concentrate on the conceptualization of social processes in temporal or developmental

terms. Paul Pierson, writing on the role of time in social and economic processes, and
Katherine Thelen, exploring issues of in titutional innovation and reproduction, sum-
marize important work that ha since been published in book-length treatments.10 Both
author are concerned about the large number of practitioners of the regression model
who fail to take time into account and limit themselves to temporally proximate indica-
tors to determine the correlate of their dependent variable. This i not n ce sarily an
inherent limitation of the method but perhap of the imagination of some researchers.
Legacies can be directly incorporated by using count variables, which track the passage
of time, as well as event history techniques and indicators that capture the variable im-
pact oflegacies, including tock and flow treatments. Thi is an area where comparative
historical analysts hav thought in creative way and have inspired researchers using
other approaches.
The last essay in this section, by Ira Katznel on, returns to the structure/agency
dichotomy-how to integrate macro ocial inquiry's strengths in inve tigating and peri-
odizing large-scale change with microlevel work that u es th prefer nce of individual
actor as the key explanatory variable. Katznelson supports privileging the preference
of actors at critical junctures, suggesting that agency overcomes historical constraint
during periods of great ferment. This i an interesting way to think about the ten ion,
but it also open a range of thorny questions. What makes one time period a critical
juncture? Are attempt by actors to induce radical change always futile unle s they hap-
pen to be at a critical juncture? Does human agency playa role in creating critical junc-
ture ? Do actors sometimes miss the opportunitie open to them through critical junc-
ture due to elf-imposed constraints posed by their own beliefs?
The selections in the final section of the book discuss important methodological
i sues raised by the use of comparative historical analysi . Dietrich Rueschemeyer con-
centrates on the utility of one case or a small number of ca es for theory generation.
lame Mahoney hows that different types of comparison, such a cross-national analy-
si using nominal or ordinal typ s of measurement and within-ca e analy is, yield dif-
ferent means for assessing cau al relationships.
Perhap the most provocative e say is that of Peter Hall on the di Juncture between
ontology and method. Hall broadly define m thodology as "the means that scholar
employ to increase confidence that the inferences they mak about the social and polit-
ical world arc valid" (p. 373), and ontology as "the fundamental as umptions that
cholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the
nature of causal relationship in that world" (p. 374). Much of our inference is provided
by regressions that are probabili tic in worldview and predicated on strong a sump-
tions-for example, that unit homogencity exi ts, that important causal variables are in-
corporated and their independence from each other is established, that the causal direc-
tion between the dependent and independent variables is properly pecified, and that
the outcome in one observation does not affect other.

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Yet much of the innovative theory in the. ubfield calls for mor complex kinds of
causation. It has a profoundly dcterministic ontology ba ed on th notion of logical ne-
cessity that certain causal factor must be pre ent for an outcome to occur. Many influ-
ential theories maintain that variable are pecific to time or region, that certain factors
are only causal in the presence or absence of certain conditions, or that certain cau al
variables are inexorably linked to others. Many game theoretic and path dependent
model of political processe ee political outcome as highly contingent upon the con-
ditions in which they are mbedded. Such theorie do not easily lend them elves to un-
covering universal causal regularities. The nature of these theories i., to .ome extent, at
odds with the assumptions underlying regression analysis (noted above and further dis-
cu ed below).
Hall discu ses how the discipline ha reacted and coped with the disjuncture be-
tween ontology and methodology. Fir t, some argue that political science needs to move
away from tudying big que tions holistically and to concentrate on understanding key
social mechani m that produce big outcome. Among the advocates of this tum toward
microproce es are many formal theori ts, a well a prominent historicist, including
Charles Tilly. Barbara Geddes takes this position as well. Second, others advocate ex-
panding the cope and sophi tication of tatistical method to try to better model the
ontological as umptions of theory. And, as noted above, where regression analy is doe
not explain everything, re earchers turn to case tudies to elucidate and enrich stati ti-
cal findings. Third, Charles Ragin favors using more sophisticated methods for testing
necessary and sufficient condition, uch a Boolean algebra, as the way out of this dis-
juncture. Finally, orne analysts, like tho e in the constructivi t school in international
relations, tum away from po itivi m and toward understanding the development of
rules and nonns bounded by time and place.
Hall advocates comparative historical analysi to bridge the gap between method-
ology and ontology for two reasons. First, it does not represent a broad departure from
the po itivist underpinning of the main tream of the di cipline because variable are
u ed to uncover causal relationships, though according to deterministic rather than
probabilistic logic. Second, when comparative historical analysis engages in "proce
tracing," it ha certain advantages over regression analy is, uch a the ability to u e
multiple ob ervation within ca es to te t the pecific claim of a theory.

Paradigms Lost and Found?

Paradigms and Sand Castles is part of the s ries, "Analytical Perspectives on Politics, '
devoted to providing an overview of new idea in the discipline while making" trong
minded prescriptions ... for future work in the field" (p. iv). Geddes takes thi chal-
lenge eriou Iy. As with KKY, the target audience are advanced undergraduate and
beginning graduate students. However it is more than a textbook a it takes. trong

500
 Michael Bernhard

positions on the nature of comparative politics and the practice of political science.
Like KKY, Geddes advocate a more "scientific" comparative politics but placcs for-
mal theory (especially game theory), not ju t the regression model of inference, at the
center of this enterpri e.
Thc book's title evokes the idea that comparative politics is constantly reshaped as
unanticipatcd events in pire a perpetual search for explanation. Geddes notes that theo-
ries of authoritarianism and state-guided industrialization have been discarded in the
face of wide pread democratization and ncoliberal economic refonn (though from the
perspective of 2009 this obituary may eem premature). Invoking Kuhn, she argues that
the problem of paradigm meltdown in political scicncc is particularly acut becau e in-
ufficient attention is paid to research design (pp. 4_5).11
She believe the earch for n w theory will fail because comparative politic has
re orted to developing theory by induction. While acknowledging that induction can
lead to generalization, correlation, and eventually theory, he feel it mainly generate
"a disorganized mass of infonnation." In noting that relationships derived from the
study of one case often do not hold in others, Gedde complain that insufficient effort
i made to determine whether they do and that historical detail and de. cription of
events have become substitutes for detcrmining cau. e and effect. "As a result, long-
lived theorie all too often fail to emerge from inductive work" (p. 5).
In her indictment of theorizing from induction, Geddes leaves a number of critical
question unanswered. For instance, if historical induction is the problem, why are there
paradigm shift in natural sciences that rely on experimental methods? Given that un-
derstanding the political world is bas d on the observation of real political phenomena
rather than the manipulation of object in the laboratory, how are researchers to pro-
ceed, at least in the preliminary stage of theorization, if not by induction? How are ax-
iomatic prcmises for deductive reasoning d rived without omc ob ervation or tipula-
tion of the immutable propertie and nature of hWl1anity? Are there broadly applicable
alternatives to theorization about new political phenomena oth r than by observing
vents and trying to understand the changes that create new outcomes? While deduc-
tion certainly i a mor powerful tool for drawing inference, both logic hav an essen-
tial role in theorizing.
Gedde makes the provocative argument that there i a more profound cri i in
comparativ politics, especially in the study of the' developing" world. With the
demise of the earlier paradigms ofmodcrnization and dependency, no new paradigm
has emerged. Instead, she argues that new "approaches"-including historical insti-
tutionalism and rational choice-that pinpoint certain actor or factors as crucial,
and that utilize specific methods to invc tigate key questions, arc now more promi-
nent (p. 21).
Geddes believe that no new paradigm has emerged for everal rea ons: the shat-
tering of previous paradigms' 'the emergence of urgent qu stion that 0 far have
seemed inexplicable by the kind of simple, elegant theorie on which paradigm rest";

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and the accumulation of greater quantities of factual knowledge which has made it
harder to produce paradigmatic theories (p. 22). Again, thi leave many critical ques-
tions unanswered. From a Kuhnian perspective, the hattering of old paradigms should
promote rather than obstruct the emergence of new ones. The accumulation of data is
not an impediment to formulating and te ting new theories. Doe "paradigms lost" sug-
gest that the complexity of human exi tence has out tripped our ability to understand
politics? Or is the imposition of unitary explanatory framework on complex political
life a nineteenth century ambition that require the unchecked intellectual optimism of
a Spencer or a Marx?
For Geddes the answer to these two last questions is a definitive no. She uses
small-n historical approaches (comparative macrohistorical analysis and historical in-
stitutionali m) a the foil that elucidate her po ition, claiming that historicist social
science has come to tenns with the idea that the age of paradigms is ]0 t, and

... [I]n consequence, [it] defend[s] complicated, highly contingent inelegant explanations
as the only kind likely to reflect accurately the causal complexity of the world. In myjudg-
ment, this position is tantamount to giving up on the 'science' in our ambitious name for
ourselves; I do not think we should settle for such a compromise (p. 22).

If the world is as causally complex as historicist believe, why i trying to model

that complexity giving up on cience? ]fhistoricist are wrong about causal complexity,
how so; and what principle hould order our understanding so as to render the world
more intelligible? Geddes' respon e i that if we do thing better methodologically, our
trouble will be reduced. The key for Gedde is to become more cientific, u ing the ra-
tional choice approach, and to think of human beings as homo economicus (maximizers
of utility) (p. 26). However, this is not really a method or an approach to drawing logi-
cal inference but a road to theorization based on a simplifying assumption about how
human being behave.
Geddes claims that her work i not intended to proselytize for rational choice, but
rather to how that a more scientific approach to the study of politics i universally de-
sirable. But thi ring fal e as she spend a great deal of time criticizing cia sic tudie
that u e mall-n historicist methods and inductive theory. She move beyond KKV'
argument for universalistic scientific inference by posing rational choice theory as the
key to framing research questions.
Gedde ' predisposition to ralionali t theorization is explicitly linked to three build-
ing blocks of research design: te ling thc implications of theory rather than theory it-
self, avoiding election bias, and evaluating evidence. The first element of Geddes'
recipe for sueces ful re earch design concerns the election of research que tions.
Gedde believes comparative politics needs to continue addressing big questions like
democratization and development, but not holistically. Rather, she claims that large
phenomena involve multifaceted and complex processes that no one theory can fully

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 Michael Bernhard

explain. She proposes limiting theorization and teo ring to individual parts of the
processes but provides no scientific rationale for proceeding in thi. fashion:

In contrast to much ofthe methodological advice given in this book, the suggestions in this
chapter do not derive ITom the logic of quantitative research. [ cannot make a claim that this
research strategy is more "correct" than any other. My argllment rests, rather, on the judg-
ment that it is a more effective route to an accumulation of theoretical knowledge. The
proof of the pudding i in the eating, however, and until we have some pudding, we cannot
taste it (pp, 27-28).

The question is whether to privilege testing parts of a theory over testing it directly
a priori. If one can collect and operationalize data for the dependent, the main indepen-
dent and a likely complement of control variables in a comprehensive or at least rep-
resentative sample of cases and thereby directly test a theory wby not do so? Testing
parts of a theory is useful when direct testing is not possible because of limited data or
other prohibitive complications. But second order confirmation should not be the start-
ing point.
The second element of Geddes' strategy for research design is to avoid selection bias.
Choosing cases on tile basis of the outcome on the dependent variable can lead one to
misconstrue any characteristic that the cases share as causal (p. 92). She makes a strong
case for avoiding errors of this type and argues that influential small-n cross-national re-
search suffers from such problems. 12 This explains why she strongly opposes theorization
on the basis of induction. Still, there is reason to question whether such a blanket prohibi-
tion is warranted-an issue revisited below in the discussion of Brady and Collier.
The third element of Geddes' program for research design revolves around issues
of evidence, in particular the issue of nonconforming cases. She criticizes how practi-
tioners of historicism respond to cases that do not conform to the expectations of the-
ory. The standard practice has been to seek an explanation for why the cases do not con-
form, and then to formulate a more general theory that covers both the conforming and
deviant cases (for example congruence testing and pattern tracing as discussed above).
Geddes condemns this practice:

After holding out for an admirably long time, they have now reached the point that practi-
tioner of the comparative historical method seem always to reach eventually: the variables
outnumber the ca e', and explanation degenerates into description. Thi degradation occur
because of the failure to internalize fully the implications of the probabilistic nature of
social science theories. We feel an intuitive need to explain outcomes inconsistent with
theoretical expectations, even though we know that no theory will explain all the variation
that exists in the real world (p. 151).

She tak s a strong po ition on what is es entially an irre olvable dilemma in the
ocial sciences, regardless of one's perspective and methodological preference. One

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way to cope with nonconforming cases i to try to incorporate them by modifying the-
ory, as many small-n comparative researcher do. Research that uses large-n regression
techniques may not face the arne problem with nonconforming ca es (as long as there
are not so many as to lead to a non-significant finding). In any large data set there are a
large percentage of cases whose values contradict any finding of stati tical ignifi-
cance. Probabilistic research of this sort only sugge t , all other things being equal, the
factors that make it more likely that a country will have a given outcome. Thus such
studie have an cxtremely low probability of identifying causal factor that meet tan-
dards of logical necessity or sufficiency. Nonconforming cases in the data et particu-
larly if they are few and far between, do not nccessarily prcscribe rejecting hypotheses
because the logic i probabilistic, not deterministic. The two traditions, of small-n and
large-n r search, confront the problem of nonconforming ca es in different way ac-
cording to their different logics.
Tn her critique of how small-n hi torical methods treat nonconforming cas s,
Gedde argue that all theory should be probabili tic. I wonder if she has not taken
the logic of large-n inference and po ited it to be the way the world work rath r than
confronting the divergcnce between ontology and methodology a framed by Hall.
Thi is ven more unsettling given that rational choice theorists especially when talk-
ing about the microfoundations of politic or engaging in analytic narrative, do not
characterize the world in probabili tic terms. They u e deductive logic and the lan-
guage of cause and effect.13 Probabili tic and detcrmini tic views of the world are
only explanatory frameworks imposed on the world to try to make sense of it. In the
absenc of experimental control, is there ever certainty that an occurrenc wa the di-
rect outcome of a particular cause or wh ther that cau e made the outcome more
likely?
Despite the diffi rent way in which these two varieties of social cience deal with
anomalous ca es, Geddes stigmatizes small-n historical work as being unfalsifiable.
She says, 'If one 'te t ' hypothe es on the arne ca e used to develop them one will
certainly confirm them. Such research designs do not subject arguments to the possibil-
ity of falsification" (p. 172). These as ertions ignore and are contradicted by the atten-
tion paid to congruence testing in the mall-n methodological literature. Fir t of all,
small-n practitioner di pute each other's theori based on contesting evidence from
the same ca e. In Rethinking Sociallnquily, Rogowski argues that the work of Rudolf
Heberle refutes Moore' thesis; and in Comparative Historical Analysis, as previously
noted, Mahoney cites many studie that take issue with Barrington Moore.
Second, theory is modified or discarded based on its applicability to new case, ge-
ographically or chronologically. This is the point of congruence te ting in small-n
methodology. When theory does not eem to apply in a new context small-n compara-
tivists try to modify the theory to account for new findings. T there anything unscien-
tific about modifying thcory in the face of confounding evidence? Theoretical refine-
ment rcpresents a r jection of the theory in it previous form. In Comparative

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 Michael Bernhard

Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Goldstone argue that this is congruent with
Imre Lakatos' notion of a scicntific research program. 1f theory cannot be refined, it is
di carded. Just think of the fat of dependency theory ince the rise of newly industrial-
izing states in Asia or Latin America. But sometimes theories confronted with con-
founding evidence can be refined by maintaining their core theories and adjusting aux-
iliary theories to incorporate the discordant evidence (p. 51).

Shared Standards for Logical Inference?

Rethinking Social Inquiry i an explicit critical response to KKV's argument for one
logic of valid inference in the ocial cienees. While the authors praise KKV for their
contribution, the purpose of their essay i to dispute overarching claims about valid
logical inference.
The critique i three pronged. The first part i based on stati tical theory. In partic-
ular Brady and Larry Bartel, well-known quantitative re earcher pecializing in
American politics feel that KKV underplay the limitation inherent in the regression
model, especially in establishing causality. The econd part addresses the limitations of
orne of the methodological principles advocated in w1iversalistic term by KKV The
third part is based on the argument that KKV omit or even misunderstand how qualita-
tive re earch contributes to social science, notably in developing concept, handling
complex and heterogeneous forms of eau ality, controlling for differences in context,
and maximizing inferential leverage from a mall number of ob ervation . The authors
challenge KKV' as ertion that qualitative re earchers hould become more like th ir
quantitative brethren positing instead that maintaining a unique set of qualitative tool
i justified by both statistical theory as well as its distinct logic in drawing inference.
The first prong concems the assumptions of the standard regression model with re-
gard to causal homogeneity, independence of ob ervation , and conditional indepen-
dence. With regard to the assumption that' all units with the same value of the explana-
tory variables have the same expected value of dependent variable," Collier, Seawright,
and Munck point out that if causal homogeneity does not hold, there is evidently more
than one kind of causality at work in the phenomenon under investigation. And if there
i more than one cau al mechani m producing outcomes on the dependent variable, a
regression will estimate an average of the various causal logic in play rathcr than cap-
ture the essential logic of any of them (pp. 29-30).14
The essays also challenge the a sumption of the independence of observations-
that each ob ervation of a particular variable is unaffected by others. There are statisti-
cal means to gauge the interdependence of ob ervations and methods to control for the
effect of one observation on another. However, not identifying and correcting the prob-
lem can lead to overestimating the variance in the relation hip between variable and
thereby producing mL leading finding. (pp. 30-3\).

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Comparative Politics July 2009

1n questioning the last a sumption of the regression model, the essays note that a -
serting the conditional indepcndcncc of as ignmcnt and outcome rclies on counterfac-
tual reasoning. 15 When it i possible to e tablish experimental control, one can ob erve
the dependent variable when it is subjected to a "treatment" (t) of something hypothe-
sized to affect it, and when it is ab ent as in a control group (c). 1fthe dependent vari-
able can be measured, the two values (Yt and Yc) can be compared and the cau al im-
pact of the independent variable (Yt - Yc) can be gauged. It is very difficult to establi h
experimental control because many questions can only be tudied with data collected
through observing real political processes (though experimcntation to understand indi-
vidual political behavior is advancing rapidly).16 Since xperimental control can rarely
be e tablished, researchers often engage in counterfactual thought experiments, judging
whether a partictLlar outcome would occllr in the ab ence of the' treatment" hypothe-
sized as causal and comparing an event and a non-event. Since there is no such thing as
alternative univer es in the mundane live of political scientists, the regression model re-
lies on multiple observation of processes as umed to be imilar (for example, all possi-
ble ob ervation of the phenomenon under tudy). Logical inference i thu a product of
how politics distributes observations bctwe n the tr atment and control groups.
The second prong of the book's countcrargument is that KKY overstate the univer-
salism of quantitative mcthodology and undervalue the importance ofa diverse set ofre-
search tools. Several authors take issue with the principles that increa, ing the number of
observations improves inferential leverage and that selecting ca es based on the depen-
dent variable inherently lead to biased results. The irony of telling small-n researchers
that they should enhance the validity ofthcir rcsults by increasing the number of ob er-
vation , es entially giving up the mall-n re earch enterpri e, i not lost on these authors.
Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright maintain that increasing the number of cases or obser-
vations will actually acrifice a portion of the inference drawn from the study. Small-n
qualitative research draws inference not only from cross-case comparison but from in-
tcrtemporal compari ons within ingle cases (pp. 94-98). Whereas cross-case de ign
can draw incorrect conclusions from selection bias (similar to a regression on a trun-
cated and bia ed sample), inferences that examine the cau al mechanisms at play in one
case by looking at change over time are not subject to election bia .
1n eparate essays Brady and Bartels point out that unretlective attempt to in-
crea c observations can lead to other sort. of problems. Here they draw on Giovanni
Sartori's work on conccptualization and measurement. 17 They note that increasing the
number of obs rvation by including in the ample additional observations that are
clo ely linked to the phenomenon under inve tigation can lead to concept stretching
(including units in the sample that fallout of the exten ion of the concept being opera-
tionalized), and thus to the 10 of causal homogeneity.
Another of KKY's forceful suggestion is to avoid election bias on the dependent
variable. Their argument, also made by Geddes, i that if ca e exhibiting a po itive out-
comc on the dependent variable al 0 share. imilar characteristics on a key indcpendent

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 Michael Bernhard

variable small-n designs can incorrectly attribute causal significance where large-n
tests will find no correlation whatsoever. Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright point out
that selection based on the dependent variable i not alway inappropriate, especially
where there is little knowledge of the phenomenon in question and in-depth work is
necessary even to begin the process of theorization.
Another way the issue of selection bia may mislead re earchers i connected to
the issue of causality and the limitations of probabili tic research de ign. The differ-
ence between necessity and sufficiency in cau ation i critical. In particular, regre sion
is not particularly well equipped to detect causal nece sity. Brady, Collier, and Seawright
sec this as one of the important trade-offs between probabilistic and deterministic re-
earch de igns (pp. 213-16).18
Thi is inadvertently demonstrated by Geddes in her discussion of selection bias.
She criticizes those who argue that' newly industrializing countries" (NlCs) have exer-
cised trong control over organized labor and wage levels as part of their growth trat-
egy for selecting on the dependent variable. She bases her claim on a regression per-
formed on a large sample of developing countries in which she does not detect a
statiotically significant relationship between labor repression and rates of economic
growth.
Gedde ' ample include a large number of countries which have repressive labor
policies but are mired in pov rty traps and other low-growth syndromes. In a regression
run on a sample of countries in which there is a subsample indicating a necessary rela-
tionship between the dependent and independent variables (for example, that all NIC
controlled the co t of labor), and in which there are al 0 a large number of countrie
with low growth and high labor repre ion, it i piau ible no probabili tic relationship
will be detected. This i because a regression will test if higher levels of labor repres-
sion are correlated with higher levels of growth. If lower wages are a nec ary, but not
ufficient, condition for growth, labor repression will not alway promote growth. Thu
r gression analysi will not always detect nece sary condition in many sample where
it exists.
Rogowski's contribution also represents a practical rebuttal of KKV's stricture
against selection bias on the dependent variable. He focuse on how the standard re-
gre ion model ignore the problem of theoretical anomaly in cases, citing several in-
fluential studies which engage in theory testing using a technique Harry Eckst in called
s lection of "most likely cases." The arc cases where, given the existing condition,
an outcome radically different from that predicted by a theory hould be observed.
Anomalous ca es of this sort are particularly u eful in testing and refining theory. One
example is Lijphart's observation that the Netherlands had a stable, well-functioning
democracy despite its reinforcing rather than cross-cutting social cleavage. This obser-
vation not only challenged what many thought wa commonplace in a table democ-
racy, but launched a cont nding "consociational" explanation of why some democra-
cies are stable. Rogowski al 0 points out that two of the mo. t influential works in

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comparative political economy, Bates' Markets and States in Tropical Africa and
Katzenstein's Small States in World Markets, focus on a small number of ca es where
something of interest occurred-the very kind of election of dependent variable that
KKV argue hampers logical inference.19
The third prong of the argument builds on the discu sion of the limitations of the
regres ion model and KKV's overarching pro criptions for re earch. Brady, Collier, and
their collaborators argue that KKV's di cussion of the trade-off between qualitative and
quantitative methodologie seriou Iy underplays the potential contribution of qualita-
tive work. They build the case that qualitative methods have unique strengths, can accom-
plish things the tandard regression model cannot, and contribute to an wering research
questions in way that complement quantitative research.
Qualitative research has been very influential in comparative politics in generating
concepts. Ragin argues this is a function of how qualitative re earchers approach their
questions. Rather than strictly formulating hypothe es and devi ing te ts, qualitative re-
search ha a more interactive relationship between theory, concept, and evidence.
Theory i refined as greater detail of relevant ca e become apparent and ca e which
seem anomalous are integrated, rather than relegated to the error term. Sometimes this
integration bring about refinement in concepts or improvement in theory (pp. 124-28).
According to McKeown, it is precisely the interplay of evidence and theory that make
qualitative research adept at conceptual refinement. He de cribes this proces as an "it-
erated dialogue among theory, data, and research design" (p. (41). The position of these
authors stand in sharp contrast to Geddes' condemnation of refining theory a a failure
to frame fa[ ifiable hypothese .
In their critique of the role of concept and theory in KKV's model of social sci-
ence, Collier, Brady and Seawright are aware that quantitative and qualitative re-
searchers theorize in different ways. They take strong exception to KKV's contentions
that "the goal is inference" and "the content is method." [n contrast, they argue that the-
ory need to take precedence because it help make ense of ocial and political life.
They defend the use of typologies, in stark oppo ition to KKY, as the means by which
qualitative researcher make ense of a complex world and generate new concepts. In
this sense, KKV seem more concerned with easy operationalization than with under-
standing th phenomenon underlying the mea ure (pp. 202-03).
Another advantage of qualitative research is that it does not have to rely on increa -
ing the number of cases to increase inferential leverage. McKeown and Munck explore
this in great detail, positing that qualitative and quantitative researchers have diverse
tools to respond to the problem of too many causal variables and not enough observa-
tions. For quantitative researchers, this is a degrees of freedom problem and explains
why KKV advocate increasing the number of observations. In place of increasing the
number of observations, qualitative researchers attempt to establish causality through
in-case analysis. First, they carefully pick ca e central to understanding the phenome-
non of interest. The use of typologies is often crucial in narrowing the set of applicable

508
 Michael Bernhard

cases. Second, they pay close attention to the contextual disparities of the cases they are
analyzing, working most frequcntly at a middle or low level of abstraction. These two
steps help to avoid the problem of causal heterogeneity and concept stretching. Third,
they attempt to establish cause on the level of the ca e through "pattern tracing."
Sydney Tarrow points out that the analogous technique of "proce s tracing" yields
richer theory, putting qualitative "flesh" on quantitative "bones" when u ing mixed
method (p. 176).20
Brady, Collier, and their collaborator make a trong argument that it is preci ely
the close attention paid to individual ca es that makes small-n research more likely to
capture important differenc s in context. By drawing inference from within cases, one
doe not have to increase the number of observations and run the risk that concept
stretching will aggregate related but distinct social phenomena into one mcasure. Close
attention to pecifics of cau al processes al 0 make it ea ier to check on their homo-
geneity. Identification and comparison of cases of heterogeneous causation i why
the e authors view qualitative work a more adept at coming to term with difference
in context and incorporating them carefully into research. For thi rea on, qualitative
research has greater flexibility in addressing nonlinear and conjunctural forms of
cau ality.
Rethinking Social Inquily i both a constructive and vigorou re pon e to KKV
The author frame their re ervation in a respectful tone and do not turn their argu-
ments concerning the merits of qualitative techniqu s into an attack on the contribu-
tions or utility of quantitative research. The book's strength is its empha is on the com-
plementarity of diverse tools rather than on the singular uperiority ofa "one-size-fit -all"
model. The book' call for "shared standard" challeng tho e who are prepared to ho-
mogenize inquiry through methodological discipline.

What is the Source of Inspiration?

Like the three books reviewed above, Passion, Crajt, and Method in Comparative
Politics hould be on the list of required reading for graduate student in the subfield.
Munck and Snyder engage in the exerci e, found more often in older di ciplines, of
chronicling the intellectual development of the field. Munck and Snyder carried out in-
depth structured discussions with fifteen esteemed political scientists from the postwar
and baby boom generations.21 Some might have chosen a slightly different mix of inter-
viewees, but Munck and Snyder undoubtcdly have assembled a ca t of cholars who
have profOlUldly affected the subfield.
The book itselfis out tanding in its II e ofqllalitative intervi w tcchniques. Munck
and Snyder u ed a structured questionnaire to conver e at length with each of these di -
tingui hed comparativi ts on a range of subject, covering their intellectual origins and
motivations, the experience of graduate school, how they conduct res arch, and their

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Comparative Politics July 2009

views on the development of the ubfield. At the same time, they allowed the conversa-
tions to verge off into interesting tangents that reveal fascinating details about the de-
velopment of comparative politic. One of the more entertaining aspects of the work i
how the personalities of the interviewees come through, even in print. There are a cou-
ple of world-class curmudgeons in the mix, who provide a degree of comic misan-
thropy (when viewed from a distance).
Most intere. ting i that the luminarie interviewed do not eomerrom one particular
methodological perspective; behavioral, historicist, and rationalist scholarship are all
repre ented. Some ar well known for deploying narrative evidence while others are
strong proponents of tatistical inference. Some, uch as Adam przeworski, havc
worked in all three tradition over the course of their career. Others, like David Laitin,
advocate a strong melding of the strength of multiple tradition . Still others are un-
abashed partisan of one approach.
What all of them hare is a lifetime of contributions based on their ability to ask
and address large and compelling research que tions. And it i thi , rather than their de-
votion to any particular method, that di tingui hes them from th ir peers. They al 0
share orne other interesting commonalities. Almost all of them havc pent ignificant
time outsid the United States, either because thcy w re born elsewhere or have period-
ically carried out ficldwork.22 Only Huntington eem less committed to fieldwork a
an intrinsic part of research (p. 223). Both Laitin and Bates, the two researchers most
strongly a sociated with a rationalist framework, seem to have b nefited tremendously
from going to the field, challenging the stereotype that tho e committed to rationalism
and science are not concerned with nuance of time and place. Among tho e a sociated
with more historici t and small-n traditions, Stepan, Collier, and Scott have spent a
great deal of time in the field.
Onc of the most curious stances is held by przeworski, who believes that, becau e
comparativi ts need both methodological training and in-depth area knowledge, it makes
more sense to train foreign rather than American graduate students (pp. 501-02). If we
were to take this contention to a logical extreme, we could perhap stop teaching com-
parative politic altogether and just leave it to foreigner to study them elves. Stepan,
while eeing the nece sity of acquiring both area and methodological kills, i more
practical in his re ponse. He believe that U.S.-born comparativi t trongly benefit
from immersion in another culture, and propose that students postpone graduate. tudy
to live in another country and thereafter enroll in graduate school in order to master the
requi ite methodological and theoretical skills (p. 451).
Stepan's discu sion of the centrality of good fieldwork, including his insights into
how to conduct it, make for compelling reading to anyone embarking on fieldwork for
the fir t time. H make the fundamental point that fieldwork provides the opportunity
to collect information and to gain insight in a way that is not pos ible from a di tance.
Navigating the mor , culture, and practices of another place and eeing how the ab-
stract variables used to explain social phenomena actually influence conditions on the

510
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ground, make social scientists more adept at observation and more sensitive to the nu-
ances of causality.
Two other commonalities emerge from the interviews. Almost all the luminarie
interviewed spent a ubstantial amOlmt of time reading political philosophy, especially
in their fom1ative years. Cia sica I works of social theory also get a great deal ofm ntion-
first and foremost Max Weber, but also Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and some of hi
follower (notably, Antonio Gramsci). It seem that expo ure to the classics of political
and ocial theory promote the framing of important and enduring que tions, though
clearly this is not enough in itself. The academic work of many of these scholars. eem"
to b motivated by olving problems about which they have trong normative con-
cern, such as poverty (przeworski, Bates), order (Huntington), powerle ness (Scott),
violence (Moore), and de potism (nearly everybody interviewed). Empirically oriented
university departments that believe political theory is best confined to departments of
philosophy may inadvertently be depriving their graduate tudents of one of the very
ourees of inspiration for cientific study.
Another strong commonality among the majority of these cholar i a commit-
ment to science. Again, the one exception is Huntington, who reserves the term science
for the natural and biological sciences (p. 224). However, the range of responses to the
que tion of whether they consider themselves scientist reveals ubtle difference in
how closely related scholar view the human and natural sciences. Still, there i a
strong consensus on many epistemological issues, including the de irability and feasi-
bility of a general theory of human political behavior, the central role of logical argu-
ment, and the testing of falsifiable claims. There is scarcely a hint of postmodemism
here; th e comparativists all eem to be childr n of the enlightenment.
The questions on the r levance of nonnative theory and the scientific method high-
light that good comparativists need to be humanists (especially when it comes to for-
mulating relevant and compelling re earch que tions), a well as scienti t (especially
in thinking about ways to verify or reject theory). Munck and Snyder's labor helps to
place the discussion of method in a different perspective. Clearly, compared to a gener-
ation ago, comparativists requir a broader range of methodological skill. At the same
time, method training does not guarantec uccess. Good comparativists till necd to
know the abiding que tions that have fired human imagination over the centuri sand
should have a deep familiarity with place. Some of the mo t successful comparativists
also have borrowed heavily from other disciplines to advance their understanding of
politic (for example, przeworski or Bates from economics, Laitin from linguistics,
Almond from public opinion and marketing re earch, Scott from anthropology, Linz
from ociology, and Moore and Skocpol from history).
When considering why the work of this elite group of comparativi ts ha wide ap-
peal and taying power, one understand that contributions to the di cipline are based
on something more than method training. In that en e, one wonder if the preoccu-
pation with method, whatever side one takes in the debate, does not detract from more

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important projects, like identifying the m aningful questions of the day. In. piration is
ultimately more important than technique. Improving methods can yield different an-
swers to old que tions but cannot alone create a compelling intellectual agenda for the
di cipline. TIle question of theory at the metalevel is radically different from issues of
hypothesis formation and te ting. Both are critical to good science, but concern for the
latter without the former may be far les meaningful. Certainly Munck and Snyder' in-
terview give the reader an appreciation for a rare pecies of political cientist and a
en e that the things that make their work inspiring may not in the end, be t achable or
as easily transferable as methods training.

Conclusions

One reason Hall's essay makes a powerful impression i that it combines a remarkable
intellectual incisivene s with humility in the face of the daunting ta k of practicing 0-
cial ci nee. While hi approach to the i ue of the disjuncture between ontology and
methodology is grounded in comparative historical analy. is, he acknowledges the value
of a multiplicity of approaches, from rejecting positivism to pioneering new stati tical
techniques. Given the complexity of the ocial world and the reality that we have yet to
uncover a philo opher's tone to universally unravel the my teries of politic, the prac-
tice of more than one approach is important for the healthy development of the disci-
pline as a cientific enterprise.
Abandoning other approaches in order to embrace a program of re earch dictated
by method runs the ri k of abandoning forms of knowledge that may prove highly pro-
ductive in understanding the political world. If different methods and forms of infer-
nee yield imilar answers to important re earch questions we can have greater confi-
dence in those findings. Where results diverge, careful consideration of how different
theories and methods lead to disparate results may provoke ju t the sort of questioning
and reconsidering that will yield a more profound understanding of particular prob-
lems. Contending methodological and theoretical chool provide each other with im-
portant check on how well they are doing. The exi tence of different research tradi-
tions allow each one to assess it re ult by triangulating with the result generated by
other varieties of social science. The fact that Ourkheim Marx, and Weber all noticed
similar ph nomena (such as alienation, disenchantment, and anomie) in coming to
grips with the birth of modernity in the West has alway impre ed me that they were
onto something central.
Theorization seems to be extrinsic to method. Method is a means to arrive at valid
logical inferences. It does not intrinsically help to generate new or interesting theory; it
only enhance our ability to te t. The authors di cussed here who would make a partic-
ular methodological per pective c ntral to the di cipline do not really have compelling
answer to the question of what makes for innovative theory. KKY stay away from it,

512
 Michael Bernhard

raising proscriptions on how to draw correct inference as the central concern of the dis-
cipline. Theory is reduc d to testable hypotheses. Geddes adopts the behavioral as-
umption of neoclassical microeconomics and says we should proceed from there. She
a ks us to assume that when human beings are political, they act as homo economicus,
attempting to maximize utility in all deci ion-making. Proceeding from this, the impli-
cations of larger theories of politic can be te ted. Where, though, do the larger theorie
come from?
In the four books, only the historici ts as a group embrace macrolevel theorizing
about big questions as practical, though by no means do they have a monopoly on its
successful practice.23 The irony is that those who practice political science with power-
ful tatistical tools and who treat their units of observation in a more abstract manner
a k the smaller, more discreet questions, whereas those who get into the nitty-gritty d -
tail of time and place seem more focused on the bigger question and larger implica-
tions of their findings. The interactive relationship between theory, concept, and evi-
dence, grounded at a less ab tract level, allows one to think about how the variable
affect each other in a more concrete, complex, and contingent fashion. Such concrete
exploration of real political phenomena provide the basis for more creative theorizing.
In this regard, I strongly di agree with Geddcs; induction, whilc a potentially weaker
form of inference, is sometime a better starting point for theorizing than a singular ab-
stract notion of what motivates human behavior. Exceptional ca es, new phenomena,
and atypical development demand explanation; and a keen eye for uch conting ncies
i critical, no matter the content of one's toolkit. Mixed methods are attracting many
comparativists of the younger generation, equipping them with a range of tool for in-
fer nce and grounding them in a perspective that promote the formulation of better re-
s arch questions.

OTES

I wi h 10 thank Slephen Hanson. Douglas Lemke, Yitzhak Brudny, as well a the members of the Editorial
Committee of Comparotil'e Politics, for providing me with thoughtful and detailed comments.
I. Juan J. Linz, "An Altlhoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjii Liuunen, eds.,
Cleavages. Ideologies and Party Sys/ems: Contribulions 10 Comparalive Poli/ical Sociology. Transactions of
the Westermark Society, vol. 10 (Helsinki: The Academic Bookstore. 1964), pp. 291-341: and Roben
Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella y, Naneui), Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradilions in
Model'll I/aly (Princeton: Princeton University Pre ,1994).
2. Gary King, Robelt O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba, Designing Sociallnqui/:v: Scicn/ific Inference in
Qualilalil ..e Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994),
3. John Stuart Mill, "Two Systems of Comparison," in Amatai Elzioni and Frederic L. DuBow. cds.,
Comparalive Perspectives: Theories and Methods (Boslon: Liule Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 205-13.
4. Arend Lijphan. "Comparative Politic and lhe Comparative Method," American Political Science
Review. 65 (September 1971), 682-93.
5. David Collier, ''New Perspective on the Comparative Method," in Dankwart A, Rustow and Kenneth
Paul Erickson, eds., Comporalive Polilical Dynamics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 32-53.

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Comparative Politics July 2009

6. harles Ragin, The Comparative Method (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Pre s, 1987).
7. Evan Lieberman. "Nested Analysi as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,"
Amer;ca/l Poli/ical Scie/lce Review, 99 (September 2005),435-52.
8. Roben H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R, Weingast,
A/la~v/ic Narratives (PrincetOn: Princeton University Press. 1998); and VictOria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt,
ed ., Beyond Ihe Cliitural TlIm: New Directions ;/1 the Siudy afSociety and Cui/lire (Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1999).
9. Bayesian analysis uses prior assumptions about the distribution of ob ervational data to test the proba-
bility that a panicular hypothesis is true. Simply speaking, the extent to which observed patterns correspond
to the assumed distribution of observations allows for the testing of uch assumptions.
10. Paul Pierson, Polit;cs ;n Time: flislOIY. I/lsti/lifio/ls, a/ld Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton
University Pre s, 2004); and Kathleen Thelen, How I/lsti/u/ions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skill in
Germany. BriIain. Ihe United State, and Japan ( ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
II. TIlOmas Kuhn, The Sll'lIClare of Sci en/i fie Relloll1lion, Third Edition (Chicago: University of hicago
Press 1996),
12. Geddes first addressed these issue in her innuential anicle, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the
Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," Polilical Analysis. 2 (1990), 131-50.
13. Take the following example: "If one knows who make in titutional choices and how they expect thl;:
various alternatives to affect their interest, then one can predict what choices will be made." Barbara
Geddes, "A omparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," omparalil1e Political
SlIIdies, 28 (July 1995),239.
14. Douglas Lemke note that most connict in Africa i intranational rather than international. Thu u ing
the state as the unit of analysis may not capture the dominant pattern ofconnict there. If this is the case. then
including Africa in the literature on global connict (the correlates of war, MIDs, etc,) may introduce causal
hetcrogeneity into the data. "African Lessons for International Relations Research." World Polilics. 56
(October 2003), 114-38.
15. This notion of causation is widespread. It is not only KKV's notion of causation, but also Weber's and
thus of many qualitatively oriented scholars. See Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation
in Historical Explanation," in Edward Shils and Henry Finch, cds" The Mefhodology aIrhe Social Scie/lces
(Glencoe: Free Pres , 1949), pp. 164-88.
16. Donald P. Green and Alan S. Gerber, "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science," in
Hclen Milner and Ira Katznelson. cds .. Slale oIllIe Discipline, Vol. III (New York: W.W. Norton. 2002).
PI'. 805-32.
17. Giovanni Sartori. "Concept Misfonnation in Comparative Politics." American Political Science
Review. 64 (December 1970). 1033-53.
18. Much of this come from Ja on Seawright's path-breaking work on this topic, "Testing for Necessary
and/or Sufficient Cau ation: Which Cases are Relevant?" Political Analysis, 10 (May 2002), 178-93.
19. Petcr Katzenstcin, Small Slate in World Marke/s: Industrial Policy ;/1 Europe (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985); and Roben Bates, Stales aIld JI4arkels i/l Tropical Afi'ica: The Polilical Basis of
Economic Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
20. Pallern tracing was coined by Alexander George, but simi lar techniques for understanding cause
within cases have been posed by a number of other authors, including Banon and Lazerfeld (process analy-
sis), Smelscr (with-in unit comparison), Campbell (pattern matching), Dessler (causal theory), ewell (causal
narrative), Hall (systematic proce s analysi ). and Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingasl (analytic nar-
rative). oilier. Mahoney. and Seawright, p. 93.
21. Of the fifteen scholars. three were born before or during WWI (Almond. Moore, and Dahl); seven
were born in the interwar era (Linz, Huntington, Lijphart, O'Donnell. Schmitter, SCOtt, and Stepan); three
were bom during WWII (przewor ki, Collier, and Bates); and two were born in its immediate aftermath
(Laitin and kocpol).

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22. Linz, Przeworski, Lijpl13rt. and chminer werc bom in Europe and O'Donnell in Argentina. Only
chmiller did not live through a period of political strife, though he did come from a family with a strong set
of international political commitments. Almond spent a great deal of time in Gennany working for the U.S.
Occupation Military Govemment. Bates, Collier, Laitin, SCOll, and Stepan have spent long period doing
fieldwork.
23. There is no paucity of cholars who use game theory, large-n regression methods, and/or a combina-
tion of the two to pursue big questions. One only need think of the recent work of Daron Acemoglu and
Jamc A. Robinson, Adam przeworski, or Carles Boix.

515