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government and politics of Nigeria: The struggle for Power in a n African State

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Emeka Anthony Obi Victor Iwuoha

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University University of Nigeria
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First Published 2006

2nd Edition 2017

© BOOKPOINT LTD.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means electronic, or mechanical including photocopying, recording or otherwise
without the prior written permission of the publishers.

ISBN 978-055-718-4

Published in Nigeria by BOOKPOINTLTD.

71 OldMkt,Rd.,Onitsha. 08063758338

CKNOWLEDGMENT

In the course of producing this book, we received the encouragement of many. We therefore deem it
necessary to show a little bit of appreciation. We wish to thank a/I your students from whom the
inspiration to write this text largely came from. The role of Late Mr, Innocent Ozoemena of Onitsha
Library in sourcing materials for the first edition of this work is highly appreciated.

The diligent effort of Miss Chijioke Asiagwu in typing the manuscript of the first edition is equally
appreciated. Also appreciated are Ogochukwu Ezenwaokolo and Augusta Onwuka, who typed this
second edition.

To you the reader, we owe a debt of gratitude and plead that you should in all you do, be a good
Nigerian for the journey to build a strong and virile nation involves all of us.
Finally, we give utmost thanks to God Almighty from whom all knowledge and inspiration ultimately
flows.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA 1

CHAPTER TWO

EUROPEAN CONQUEST OF AFRICA 16

CHAPTER THREE

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA 32

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONALISM 49

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CLIFFORD CONSTITUTION OF 1922 69

CHAPTER SIX

NIGERIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 97

CHAPTER SEVEN

EVENTS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE 124

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE MAKING OF THE 1979 CONSTITUTION 144

CHAPTER NINE

MILITARY IN POLITICS 170

CHAPTER TEN

FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF

REVENUE ALLOCATION IN NIGERIA 230

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE POLITICS OF POPULATION CENSUS IN NIGERIA 271

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 284

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE OBASANJO GOVERNMENT 343

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE LATE YAR'ADUA GOVERNMENT 356

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

PRESIDENT GOODLUCK JONATHAN ADMINISTRATION 361

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

WOMEN AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA 399

BIBLIOGRAPHY 409
CHAPTER ONE

PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA

Nigeria as it is presently constituted is in all honesty the creation of the British. Before 1914, the entity
now known as Nigeria composed of many independent ethnic groups which had little in common except
in trade and commerce. Essentially, the accurate number of the ethnic groups that make up Nigeria is
not yet accepted by scholars. While some put the number at 250 some others believe we have more
than 350 ethnic groups in Nigeria. However, the actual number may not be a major concern to us. What
is certain is that, there are many autonomous communities that cherish their identity and had their
individual political, social and economic life prior to the coming of the Europeans.

These groups include: Hausa, Fulani, TV, Nupe, Gwari, Koi, Kanuri, Igala to mention but a few in the
Northern part of the country. In the South East, there are Igbo, Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, Ikwerre, Ogoja and
others too numerous to mention, The South Western part of the country including the present day Delta
and Edo is equally populated by, the Yoruba, Edo, Itsekiri, Urhobo, etc. Each of these groups, as we have
already noted had its peculiar culture and tradition. Scholars who have studied Nigerian history, have
categorized the culture of Nigerians prior to the inception of colonialism into three main broad
categories. These are the centralized system of the Hausa/Fulani, the semi-centralised system of the
Yoruba and the republican, eqalitarian and decentralised system of Igbos of the South East. Other ethnic
groups in Nigeria share similar cultural and political systems with any of these three categorizations. It is
in the light of the above that our brief review of pre-colonial history of Nigeria is based on these three
categorizations. We shall start our discussion on Nigeria by having a brief look at some of the major
ethnic groups that now constitute Nigeria. Our first attention will be focused on the Hausa/Fulani group.

THE PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY OF SOME GROUPS IN NIGERIA

The Hausas are the largest ethnic group in Nigeria. They are mainly Moslems and are quite spread out in
many parts of Northern Nigeria. Their principal cities and towns include: Kano, Kastina, Sokoto and
Zaria. Before the Fulani invasion in 1804 the Hausa established flourishing kingdoms and states whose
fame and importance extended to North Africa. Following the Fulani religious wars of 1804, most of the
Hausa cities were conquered by Fulani Islamic lords.

POLITICAL HISTORY

The Political History of the Hausa/Fulani in the pre-colonial era is categorised under the centralised
states. The term centralised states mean large political units, each of which covered large territorial
areas, covering hundreds and in most cases, thousands of square kilometers. Each of such political units
was controlled by large number of rulers, led by a king. The most important period in the formation of
centralised kinds of states in Hausa land was the rise of the seven original states namely, Daura, Kano,
Zaria, Gobir, kastina, Biram and Rano. These seven were called the Hausa Bakwai. The other seven,
called the Banza Bakwai, were Zamfara, Kebbi, Nupe, Gwari, Yauri, Kwarafa and Ilorin.

All parts of each state were controlled from the centre through several subordinate officials, arranged
according to seniority. Such rulers earned their living through taxes, tributes, labour and other resources
obtained from the people. With the conquest of the Hausa land by the Fulani Islamic rulers, the Fulani
overlords introduced Fulani dynasties; they incorporated the Hausa language, economic, social and
political institutions.

Unlike the Ibo system, the Hausa/Fulani had more elaborate structures and organs for performing social
roles. There was a central bureaucracy having linkages with several peripheral communities within an
Hausa emirate. There were also structures for law enforcement, tax collection, articulation and
processing of demands and external defence. The political structure of the Hausa/Fulani was given
greater impetus by the reorganisations introduced by Uthman Dan Fodio after the Islamic Jihad. Uthman
Dan Fodio had a system in which he was the Amir almuminin - a king of absolute head with supreme
powers- (Commander of the faithful) his junior brother Abdullah acted as the Waziri (Chief Minister), his
son, Muhammad Bello acted as a sort of Minister of Defence and Aliyu Jedo acted as the Commander of
the army. With time it was considered necessary to have the caliphate divided into administrative units
due to the vast nature of the caliphate. The division was effected in 1812. While Bello had his newly
established capital, Sokoto, which he started to build in 1809, Abdullah temporarily used Bodinya as his
headquarters before he moved to Gwandu, after Uthman Dan Fodio's death in 1817. Abdullah took
charge of the Western part of the caliphate while Bello was put in charge of the Eastern part. The North
was given to Aliyu Jedo, while Muhammad Bukhari and Abubakar Atiku, also sons of Uthman Dan Fodio
shared the south. Both the north and the south came under Sokoto once the capital was moved there.
In order to discharge his duties to the communities of the other parts of the caliphate, Uthman Dan
Fodio appointed Emirs to their respective localities. The Emirs were assigned specific responsibilities
such as, the maintenance of mosques, the maintenance of markets, and the prevention of illegalities.
The Emirs depended on the authority of Uthman Dan Fodio for acceptability to at least the leadership of
the community. The reverence of his authority was vital for settling disputes among the multitude of
claimants to Emirships.

Uthman Dan Fodio enjoyed loyalty as a result of the intellectual, religious and political leadership which
the central government continued to provide. The Emirates were supervised by the central government
based at Sokoto. The eastern Emirates, for example were supervised by the Waziri. He was in charge in
Kano, Zazzau. Hadejia, Gombe, Katagum, Misau, and Adamawa. Other Sokoto officials supervised the
other Emirates such as Kastina, Daura, Zamiara and Muri. But the Waziri still had the general supervision
even over the eastern Emirates which were not directly under his control. He was therefore constantly
traveling round his Emirates, discharging his responsibilities such as confirming the appointment of
Emirs, seeing to the implementation of policies emanating from the caliphate, such as the establishment
of ribats (fortresses) promotion of all aspects of the economy and establishment of institutions of higher
learning.

The Emirates also had their administrative structures which were hierarchically arranged. In the other
Emirates, especially the larger ones such as Adamawa and Zazzau, sub-Emirs enjoyed autonomy. All they
needed to do was to ensure that tributes, levies and taxes were sent to the Emirates headquarters.

The Emirates had a number of obligations to the central government based at Sokoto. One of these was
joint military contribution for annual campaigns against the caliphate's enemies, or for putting down
revolts or rebellions within the caliphate. The central government in Sokoto depended on the joint
military expeditions as it had no standing army. The Emirates also sent tributes and gifts to Sokoto. Each
Emirate sent mainly what it was more favourably endowed with. These ranged from slaves and horses,
to industrial goods such as textile materials.

In other words, at the head of an Hausa political system was an Emir who was in many respects a
political sovereign. Though he was surrounded by a number of political elites as palace advisers, he
exercised substantial authority and influence throughout his domain. Such officials as Sarkin Feda- the
organizer of the palace workers, Galadima- the administrator of the capital territory, Waziri- the Emir's
Prime Minister and adviser, Madawaki- the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces, Maaji or Magaji- the
treasurer of Government, Sarkin Ruwa- the regulatory of the use of water resources, Sarkin Pawa- the
head of all buchers, Yari- Chief Superintendent of Prisons,were all involved in running the emirate.
Despite the presence of these officials, the Emir was still absolute in the exercise of power and
authority. The position and prestige of the Emir was enhanced by the enormous resources he
commanded. He presided over an extensive patronage system and used its resources not only to reward
supporters, but also to punish those who challenged him or dared to exercise independent political
power. Political administration of the Emirates had close links with religious matters, as the government
of the Emirates was based on a theocratic system of administration in which sharia was the focal point
of attention. The Emir could legislate on matters where sharia was silent, and of course, he should do so
in consonance with Islamic injunctions. In this sense, the Emir was the custodian of the legislative,
executive and religious functions of the state. In summary, the Hausa/Fulani pre-colonial political
organization was centralized, with the Emir at the apex of the hierarchy and a retinue of other officials
who worked for him occupied the lower hierarchy.

PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY OF THE HAUSA/FULANI

The political and economic history of the Hausa/Fulani prior to the advent of the British were
interwoven with religious practices. A wide range of economic activities was undertaken throughout
Hausa land, and by the end of the eighteenth century, it had fully developed especially in terms of
integration between agricultural and livestock production and the manufacturing and processing centres
of the economy, thereby leading to the production of large quantities of goods that fuelled the distance
trade. By the end of the 18th century, a network of trade had developed and these were linked to long
distance trade routes, the forest regions of the Niger area and other parts of West Africa, especially the
Volta basin where kolanuts were obtained in large quantities, North Africa, Europe and the Middle East.
Along these trade routes were conveyed well-processed and high quality textiles, leather and other
goods produced in Hausa land which were exchanged with goods produced in various parts of West and
North Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

The major tools of production in the Hausa/Fulani included hoes, cutlasses, baskets, sickles and knives.
These tools were locally manufactured, thus making it possible to create tools relevant to the society's
needs and reduce to the barest minimum technological dependence on other societies. Secondly, the
tools were simple and this made large-scale production possible. Labour requirements were mostly met
through the lineages or family unit. Most activities, be it economic, political or religious, were performed
within the lineage circuit. The lineage had various household units within it. The household comprised
the man, his wife or wives and their children, relatives and dependants. The man organized and
coordinated the activities of these people. They did not work for wages but the man had the
responsibility of feeding and clothing them. It was partly because households did most of their own
economic work that the people placed value on large families. This called for many wives and children.

Despite the reliance on family labour, it was at the same time recognized that a household unit could
not always do its work on its own. There were some other avenues for securing additional labour. The
institution of domestic slavery provided warriors, wealthy traders and the political elite with labour
which could be used for diverse activities, especially those considered odious by the freeborn. The use
of slaves was an indication of the existence of socio-economic inequalities and of a labour market in pre-
colonial Nigeria. Domestic Slavery probably grew out of the desire to solve the problem of shortage of
labour in a booming economy. To further secure their allegiance and to fully exploit their labour, the
slaves were usually promised redemption as soon as they had the means to buy their freedom. In the
centralised societies (e.g. Borno. Oyo and Bini), the rulers had farms worked by slaves who had the right
to only a small portion of the harvest which could keep them alive. As already noted, agriculture, animal
husbandry, hunting, fishing (carried out by professional fishermen among the Nupe, Hausa and Borno),
mining which revolved around the working of iron, gold, salt, silver, tin, copper, all flourished. However,
manufacturing was more diverse than mining. Hundreds of objects were made from plants, minerals
and animal products. Among the leading articles were food stuff, cloth, leather, wood, and ceramic
products. Generally the economy of the Hausa/Fulani was self-sustaining and the citizens were self-
reliant. There was no major importation of goods rather exports took place along the trade routes.

The activities of Uthman Dan Fodio in the Jihad led to the remarkable expansion of the economy of the
Hausa/Fulani and the caliphate. The expansion in the economy was partly through the efforts of the
caliphs, but especially Caliph Muhammad Betto. This Caliph, through a series of letters, urged the Emirs
to take special interest in economic development ranging from provision of security on the trade routes,
construction of markets to regulating business transactions. Those born in the royal family were
guaranteed wealth and affluence, made possible by the vibrancy of the economy.

PRE-COLONIAL CULTURE OF THE HAUSA/FULANI

As we shall later see in this study, culture is generally regarded as the way of life of the people. The
advanced political and economic systems of the Hausa/Fulani greatly promoted cultural development,
particularly religion. Both Islam and traditional religion flourished. The former due to its universality,
increasingly had an edge over the latter. By the second half of the eighteenth century, there were large
concentration of members of Malamai (Islamic scholars) in the birane (cities), towns and settlements of
Hausa land. The cities of kastina, Yandoto and Zaria, to mention only a few, were famous for their
Malamai. Most of these were involved in teaching and in the governmental affairs of the various
kingdoms. Many were Ulama al su (venal scholars) who superstitiously claimed to provide solutions to
the problems of the members of the society who cared to engage their services. These two types of
scholars supported the maintenance of the status quo. The sharia Islamic laws were the general code of
conduct of the people and they were to be guided in their everyday relations by these sharia laws. The
laws covered a wide spectrum of human interactions and included such aspects as property ownership,
divorce, stealing, murder, arson, marriage, adultery, slander, etc.

In conclusion, the Hausa Pre-colonial system according to Levine (1991) was a status system which
strongly favoured qualities of servility, respect for authority, allegiance to the powerful and rejected the
qualities of independent achievement, self reliant action and initiatives.

The origin of the Igbo who occupy the South-Eastern part of Nigeria is traced to different places. Places
often cited include Egypt, Israel or simply to some place in the Middle-Eastern territory. In spite of the
varying and sometimes conflicting views on the origin of the Igbo people, one fact which stands out
clearly is that the Igbo are of the negro race whose origin cannot reasonably be traced to any place
outside the present African continent. Historical excavations of Nri-Awka-Orlu complex reveal that the
complex is the Igbo core. Most Igbo groups on the periphery of the Nri-Awka-Orlu complex always refer
to the complex as the point from which they migrated.

The development of the Igbo society was achieved by the fusion of previously scattered semi-
independent villages into larger units. These larger village units later developed into clans. This process
was facilitated by the rapid expansion of population and the common need which arose from village
inhabitants to secure land for farming purposes, exclusive to themselves. The transition from the small
village to a larger village group coincided with the evolution of the society from food gathering stage to
food cultivating stage of development.

The depth of the culture of the Nri-Awka-Orlu complex is revealed from the excavations made at Igbo-
Ukwu. The civilization at Igbo-Ukwu was discovered as far back as the 19th century. The civilization is
believed to have developed around a highly ritualized priest kind. It thrived upon a flourishing
agriculture coupled with game hunting and far-flung commercial activities which involved trade in locally
produced goods exchanged for items obtained from places as far away as Venice and India. Igbo-Ukwu
excavations also revealed other facts of economic and social relations of the inhabitants of these core
areas with the neighbouring peoples. Evidence of these relations was manifested in their roles in the
installation of chiefs, purification and title-taking rites all over Igboland in the neighbourhood. Nri priests
and diviners had considerable influence in Idah, Igala, and to some extent, Bini.
An important stage in the development of the society was marked by the invention of iron technology.
This development occurred first in Awka. The iron technology assisted in the conquest of the forest,
made farming an easier occupation than it had previously been and improved game hunting and the art
of war-fare. Blacksmithing became a well known profession especially among Awka people. Its
performance was not only ritualized but its members became so organized that the profession became a
source of privilege and rights for practitioners. Awka technologists established 'colonies' wherever they
went. For example, among the Nkwerre and Old Orlu division and Abiriba, they practiced with, as well as
taught their profession to local inhabitants.

IGBO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The Igbo political, social and economic institutions came under the variant usually referred to as
segmentary, although there are isolated kingdoms such as those of Arochukwu, Onitsha and Oguta.
Various social units based on kingship existed. The smallest was the family, usually made up of the man,
his wife (wives) and children. The next higher social unit was extended family usually made up of a man,
his wives, brothers, unmarried sisters and married sisters and their children. Above the extended family
was the lineage, which was made up of a number of extended families. Then, there was the village,
made up of a number of lineages which claimed common ancestry for the constituent lineages. The
highest social unit was the clan which was composed of a number of villages also claiming common
ancestry. Thus, we note that social organization in Igboland was based on various levels of kingship
relations. Yet, there were other factors which influenced social organization and indeed helped to
ensure that the emphasis on kingship did not keep groups apart from one another. Among them were
religion, wealth, marriage, confraternities or secret societies and markets. For example, some practices
like incest were described as taboo or "nsoani". Priests of various divinities enjoyed special respect in
the communities. Religious festivals also brought peoples of various groups together, The Igbo, like
other Nigerian peoples, believed in the importance of wealthy men (those who had many yams,
domestic animals, wives and children) were given special respect in the society. Marriage influenced
one's social standing because chronic bachelors and spinsters were treated as irresponsible or immature
persons. Marriage also broadened friendship between groups and indeed widened the bases of
friendship. Finally, membership of confraternities increased one's social position, helped to strengthen
the unity among the people and through the observance of certain pious principles, members lived
upright lives which gave them an enhanced status in the communities. Therefore, though the social
organization in Igbo society was mainly based on segmentary social units, several other factors
influenced the organization.

The political organization was also very related to the social structure already described, that is, political
organization was in the main, based on the special units. This is the reason why the political system has
been described as segmentary or fragmented. What this actually stresses is that Kinship was an
important factor in the political system or organization. And there were no large empires as was the
case in the Hausa/Fulani.

The elders at all levels of government played a preeminent role as the holders of authority though they
did not rule alone. Although age generally influenced one's political role and position in Igbo society, the
Igbo did not respect one's age without limitations.
Closely related to the second point above was the fact that the Igbo government was republican or
democratic. At all levels, all adults took active part in the various processes that resulted in important
decisions.

At the family level, there was a little government as such. At the same time, the man was usually the
head of the family. At the extended family level, some form of government emerged with the head of
the senior household called the Okpara at the centre of affairs. The Okpara took decisions in
consultation with other heads of the family. He offered sacrifice on behalf of the sub-lineage and
ensured that things went on well in the whole unit. He also represented the unit in meetings with other
extended families. The Okpara was also the keeper of the extended family's 'Ofo' which is the Igbo
symbol for authority, right conduct, justice and link between the dead and the living.

At the lineage level, the head of the senior extended family or sub-lineage was at the centre of affairs,
Matters which could not be settled at the extended family level or which affected the welfare of the
whole lineage were taken up at the assembly of the unit which was usually made up of the adult male
members. Again in some cases, prominent women were invited to the meetings and their views were
listened to.

Above the lineage assembly was the village assembly, usually made up of all adult male members. All
members participated fully in the village assembly debates or proceedings. At the same time, the village
assembly had an inner council of lineage heads called the 'Ama-ala' or 'Ndi isi Ofo'. Whenever meetings
of the village assembly became inconclusive, the 'Ama-ala' and other elders withdrew to a private
session and reached decisions which were later announced to the whole assembly for approval. This
action of the 'Ama-ala' was called 'igba-izu' and was repeated as often as necessary during village
assembly meetings.

The highest level of political organization was the village group or clan assembly. At this level, except in
emergencies, only representatives of the constituent village attended in full, for consultations to
ascertain the wish of the village before attending clan meetings. Normally, decisions taken at clan
meetings were binding on all villages.

These political communities existed as independent and sovereign states and had only minimal and
tenuous relationship with one another. Other features of the Igbo political organization were the age
grades, titled societies, priests, laws and oracles. Age grades were made up of people born within the
same age range. Groupings differed from community to community. In some communities where
population was high, the range of two years was accepted while in others with sparse population, a 10
year range was used to form an age grade. Age grades at various levels served as the main executives in
some parts of Igboland. This however, depended on the prevailing circumstances in the communities.
For instance, the older age grades could recline to articulation of views that would enhance
development and peace while the younger ones that are more militant engaged in security and
execution of, and enforcement of policies. Secret societies were important both for law making and for
execution of specific duties. Priests were important political figures since they were also in charge of
oracles whose declarations were final in certain disputes. Also titled societies played a crucial role in
Igbo government. The most common of them was the 'Ozo' title. Holders of the title could among other
things, intervene in disputes and bring peace in their communities. The Igbo concept of law was also an
important influence on the political organization of the society. The Igbo believed that law came from
the earth goddess or 'Ala' and what the elders did was to hand over the laws to the people. Thus, it was
believed that going against the law also meant going against 'Ala'. Closely related to this was the Igbo
belief that their ancestors were still interested in the welfare of the communities and that the law
derived from them. Therefore, it was in the interest of both the living and the ancestors that justice was
maintained in the land.

In conclusion, the Igbo social and political decisions were reached not by a single leader, but by
collective efforts of the members of the council. Often in discussing issues, alternative courses and their
consequences were considered. The talented and informed members led discussions and exercised
greater influence in decision making

THE PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE YORUBA PEOPLE

The Yoruba inhabit the Western part of Nigeria. They are made up of several sub-cultural groups and
classes, the most important of which are Ife, Egba, Ijebu, Owo, Ilesha, Ekiti, Ondo and Ibadan. The
Yorubas have a myth of common descent from Oduduwa who was supposed to have descended from
heaven. Victor Olorunsolo (1972) says that as the Yorubas regarded Oduduwa as their progenitor, their
rulers often claimed to be direct lineal descendants of Oduduwa. It was from the ancestral home of Ile-
Ife that the children of Oduduwa went forth and became founders of kingdoms and dynasties in all parts
of Yoruba land.

The Yoruba pre-colonial system could be grouped as one of the centralised states of Southern Nigeria.
Among the states that had centralised kingdoms were Ife, Oyo, and Bini as well as the delta states of the
Niger, barely, the Itsekiri, Efik and Ijaw. We must however, note that the centralised system varied from
one locality to another but generally speaking, the centralised system was not by all means comparable
to the Hausa/Fulani system. In Yoruba land, the system could be essentially the same, and
accommodated numerous checks and balances.

Ile-Ife was regarded as an important cultural and religious centre for all the Yorubas. Though the
Yoruba's lacked common leadership and were divided into several political systems that can be classified
as centralised chiedfdoms. Empires such as Oyo, Ife and others existed and there were large areas
controlled by kings. Similarly, the political culture and behaviour of these chiefdoms, stem from the
myth of common descent and conquest. Ile-Ife is seen as the centre of dispersal for rulers who
subsequently founded neighbouring Yoruba kingdoms including the Kingdom of Bini.
The community's chief, was called the Oba, but the title of the Oba differed from community to
community. For instance the Oba of Ife was known as Oni while the Oba of Oyo was the Alaafin. The
king or Oba secured greater compliance from the people if his claim to rulership was solid and he was
able to trace his lineage to Oduduwa. As Oduduwa was regarded as the founder of the Yorubas, the Oba
was regarded as the founder of his political community. As an Oba (King) his power and authority were
highly circumscribed. His practice and ritual status far exceeded his political power.

Legitimately below an Oba were lesser provincial and village chieftains who exerted some measure of
military, administrative and ritual powers within their domain. The titled chiefs were often hereditary
and they were major representatives of major territorial and associational groups in the community. The
congregation of the community chiefs constituted the Oba's council. Unlike his Hausa counterpart, a
Yoruba monarchy was not a free agent. Fundamental and many routine decisions were made by the
Oba's council. Apart from the council, there were other rulers. These include various differentiated
occupational groups and secret societies. It is in line with this that Falola et al (1993) in their book titled
History of Nigeria wrote that, the political organization of Old Oyo centred around the Alaafin of Oyo
who was the head of the Imperial Administration. He combined spiritual and temporal powers in his
office. In his spiritual capacity, the Alaafin was seen by his subjects as the companion of the gods. As far
as temporal powers were concerned, he exercised power over a central administration; designated
administrative officers reported to him as well as owed him allegiance in exercising powers over
provincial matters. But whilst in theory the Alaafin's power was absolute because he was 'Ekeji Orisa',
that is to say, the companion of the gods and the owners of the land, in practice the Alaafin was
circumscribed by a system of checks and balances which greatly limited his influence and power. The
Alaafin's first check was the Oyo Mesi, the Council of Ministers, a body made up of councillors of the
seven wards of metropolitan Oyo. This council was headed by the Bashorun, the Prime Minister, whose
part it was to tell an erring Alaafin to commit suicide if it was thought that the Alaafin had overstepped
the constitutional bounds of his power and thereby incurred the anger of the gods. It was not expected
that the Bashorun and the Council of Ministers should use their power over the Alaafin indiscriminately.
Hence to ensure that there was no abuse of power, it was the practice that members of the Council of
Ministers were to die with any Alaafin so advised to commit suicide. The fact that the Alaafin was usually
not expected to venture out of his palace or be seen in public because of his divinity meant that he
usually had to act under great influence from state officials and palace informers. This meant also that
he could neither take unilateral decisions nor become tyrannical and unnecessarily high handed.

As for the provincial administration of the Old Oyo, the Alaafin was also assisted by 'Osi Efa, the Eunuch
of the Left; Ona Efa, the Eunuch of the Middle and Otun Efa the Eunuch of the Right. The Osi Efa helped
the Alaafin with the political affairs of the empire, whilst the Ona Efa advised on judicial matters. The
Otun Efa advised the Alaafin on matters of religion.

Another set of officials also assisted the Alaafin with the administration of the provinces. Each town in
the provinces existed as a semi autonomous unit with its own Oba at the helm of administration. But the
Alaafin oversaw all government affairs in the provinces through the Ajele or Asoju Oba. These officials
were the Alaafin's eyes and ears in the vassal states, the watch dogs of the imperial government. Their
task was to ensure that the vassal or tributary states paid their dues regularly. They also maintained law
and order in the territories, as well as protected the empires trade routes. Because these officers owed
their appointment to the Alaafin, they therefore gave him considerable loyalty. Through them, the
Alaafin exercised immense control over the affairs of the province.

The military equally constituted a vital element in the administration of the state. The rank and file of
the imperial army was raised on ad-hoc basis but there was an officer corps which played the military
role on a permanent basis. The military class was about seventy. These standing officers, called the Eso,
operated under the command of the Are-Ona Kakanfo, who was himself directly accountable to the
Alaafin for his appointment, promotion and discipline. The discipline in the Oyo army was to such an
extent that in the event of defeat in war, the Are-Ona Kakanfo was obliged to commit suicide.

This extensive expose on the political history of the Yoruba is to display the extent of administrative
structure that existed in the Yoruba enclave prior to the advent of the British. Inspite of the constraints
that limited the powers of a Yoruba monarch he could still, as a person within his political community
distribute many favours to his favourites and clients. The patronage system which was part of the
Yoruba social traditions sometimes made the monarch acquire influence and importance higher than
that of his chiefs and titled men.

The Oba made laws in consultation with his chiefs and titled men from the various villages. He was not
an absolute ruler. The laws he made with his council could be for the imposition of taxes, land
allocation, marriage, divorce, etc. But they were guided by the general laws of the land. As it was in Oyo
Empire, so was the case in other kingdoms of Yoruba land, though with some minor variations in line
with peculiar circumstance of the Kingdoms.

THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE PRE-COLONIAL YORUBA

Yoruba land was noted for its art and culture. Life size sculptures produced in Ife exemplified an
accomplishment and beauty which was unique in Africa. Magnificent bronze castings in Ife were
exported to Bini, a neighbouring Kingdom.

Yoruba empires grew because the land was fertile for extensive agriculture. This was one major factor
that helped the rise of Oyo Empire. Additionally, its strategic location on the savanna belt made it
especially suitable for commercial enterprise. Thus, the products of the forest states were received in
Yoruba land and transported to the relatively drier savanna areas. In the same way, savanna products
like salt, leather goods and glass were received in Yoruba markets and exchanged or sold to traders of
the coastal states. The commercial activities of the Yoruba people particularly of the Oyo people were
conducted through special trade routes across the Niger to Kano and probably beyond, to Goa,
Timbuktu and Jenne on the Niger. In addition to the goods already listed, certain clothing and smithery
products were indigenous to the Yoruba people, and constituted part of the general trade items. Horses
received into Oyo from the Savanna regions soon became the most important item of this trade.
It may be necessary to state that the economy of Nigeria before the advent of the British was
indigenous, self-reliant and self-sustaining. The tools that were used were indigenous and suited each
particular locality. The tools were locally manufactured and simple. Agriculture was the main stay of the
people but other activities went on to boost the economy. Animal husbandry, hunting, fishing, mining,
manufacturing went on in the various parts of Nigeria before the inception of the Europeans. In addition
markets and trade routes developed to help in the evacuation of the goods produced in Nigeria.

One remarkable feature of the agricultural and industrial systems was that they operated far above the
subsistence level. All sectors of the economy were capable of generating surpluses. These surpluses had
to be disposed of. This partly examines why trade and markets formed integral parts of the country's
indigenous economy. Markets developed because the Nigerian community was self-sufficient in its
economy. The people in the Savanna region needed coastal products such as salt and fish. Those in the
coast also needed goods such as Shea butter, hides and skin produced in the Savanna region. Even
within the same region, location and geographical differences led to marked variations in the goods
produced, thus encouraging and promoting trade.
REFERENCES

1. Falola, T., Mahadi, M., Uhornobhi, M. & Anyanwu, U., (1991) History of Nigeria, Nigeria before
1800, Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Ltd.

2. Ifemesia, C. (1979) Traditional humane living among the igbo: An historical perspective. Enugu,
Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.

3. Isichei, H. (1977) A history of the igbo people. Lagos, The MacMillan Press Ltd.

4. Madiebo, A. A. (1980) The Nigerian revolution and the Biafran war. Enugu, Fourth Dimension
Publishing Co. Ltd.

5. Nnoli, O. (1978) Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.

6. Okonjo, I. M. (1974) British administration in Nigeria 1900 1950, A Nigerian view. Lagos, Nok
Publishers.

7. Okoye, M. (1981) Storms on the Niger: A story of Nigeria's struggle. London, Billing and Sons
Limited.

8. Onyeneje, E. C. & Ugwu L. I. (1997) The Foundations of Social

Psychology. Enugu, Auto-Century Publishing Company Limited.

9. Stride, G. T & Ifeka, C. (1977) Peoples and Empires of West Africa, West Africa in History 1000-
1800. Ikeja, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd
CHAPTER TWO

EUROPEAN CONQUEST OF AFRICA

The world we inhabit today consists of six continents partitioned to be so by Europeans. These
continents are Africa, Europe, Asia, North America, South America and Australia. Before the
bastardization of the world into these continents, the Europeans made some efforts to conquer the
world in what was known as the exploration of the world. There are some arguments on the origin of
world civilization. While the Europeans believe that civilization started in Europe and spread to other
parts of the world, Africans now cite the case of Biblical Egypt as the origin of civilization. While we do
not intend to join in this debate, we wish to state that all parts of the world at certain times in history
did not recognise the existence of human beings in other parts of the world.

History reveals that series of events made the European nations to venture into the discovery of the rest
of the world. It is on record that in those years in Europe, wars of all types were the order of the day and
these did not avail the rich and prosperous nations of Europe the opportunity to engage in the voyages
of discoveries.

But there were two nations in Europe that had relative peace at the time. These were Spain and
Portugal. As a result of the relative peace in their domains, the two countries had the opportunity to
reach out to the world. Spain and Portugal had the following reasons for embarking on the exploration
of the world. The primary aim was Geographical factor. There had been some debates at the time as to
the nature of the world, i.e. whether the world was flat, round or spherical. While some people in
Europe believed that the world was round, others held the opinion that it was flat while some others
believed it was spherical. The desire to ascertain which one was the real state of the world prompted
the first set of Europeans to engage in exploration. However, the Spaniards and the Portuguese were
content to restrict their interest to the coast of Africa.

Through the coastal towns, the explorers moved up the Atlantic and reached America - referred to as
the New World. The movement from Europe to America via Africa was not easy. Many of the explorers
died in the process as a result of the crude implements which they used. Notwithstanding their losses,
they remained undaunted and persevered until they got to North America. With their arrival in the New
World that is America, they noticed that America was a fertile land yearning for cultivation and
exploitation. Thus, there was the need to exploit the rich land and therefore labour was needed to do
this.

On their way to America on the Coastal towns of Africa, they had seen some blacks. The American
natives looked fragile and not strong enough to till the American soil. The Europeans then resorted to
the use of blacks from Africa and had to invade Africa for human labour and thus ensued the era of
trans-Atlantic Slave trade. This therefore became another reason for the exploration or Voyage of
discoveries which could be classified as economic missions. It became a period of massive slave trade
along the Atlantic Ocean. Slave trade and slavery went on for close to a century and led to the
depopulation of Africa and the removal of the able bodied men and women who would have
contributed to the economic development of Africa. Slave trade was carried out in the most inhuman
conditions. Human beings were packed like fishes and indelible marks placed on them to identity them
for their owners. Those who died in the tortuous journey were thrown into the Ocean for the fishes to
feed on.

On getting to America, they were subjected to all sorts of hard labour, and were used for production
without wages. This use of African slaves in production in America went on for years until the period of
the Industrial Revolution. Industrial Revolution means that machines were invented and had to replace
human labour in production. This feat started in England and then spread to other parts of Europe. With
the Industrial Revolution, it became imperative to stop slave trade and slavery and thus the role of
religion was essential. Christian religion was then needed to teach Africans about Jesus Christ and hence
appeal to both Africans and Europeans to stop slave trade. At this period, the Europeans then added
that they came to Africa for religious and humanitarian reasons, that Africans were worshiping idols and
were engaged in inter tribal wars and there was the need to salvage Africans. We must note that the
Industrial Revolution created some added needs and opportunities. To start with, goods were produced
in large quantities at cheaper rates and so there was the need for markets and territories. Africa, Asia
and Latin America offered this market. The European powers had to move into Africa for economic
purposes. Secondly, the Industrial Revolution brought about the need for other goods in the form of
raw materials and Africa became a place to encourage the natives to cultivate what the Europeans
tagged 'legitimate crops'. These legitimate crops which included cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, palm
produce, etc, were to replace the trade in human beings.

To give legal backing for the conquest of Africa, laws were made on the abolition of slave trade and thus
it became unlawful to engage in such a business. To further enforce the abolition of slave trade,
strategies were devised to penetrate African hinterland and thus began colonialism.
In summary, we can say that the reasons for the European conquest of Africa were:

1. Geographical /Scientific knowledge

2. Economic

3. Religious

4. Humanitarian

5. Political

Geographical/Scientific: This has already been dealt with.

Economic:

This later became the primary purpose for the coming of the

Europeans to Africa and indeed other parts of the world. Vested European business interests wanting to
promote their trade in Africa by exploiting African inland waterways, the trade with Africa was
motivated to help secure the raw materials for European industries.

Religious/Humanitarian factors:

Foreign missionaries also played extremely important roles in furtherance of contacts between Europe
and Africa especially in the nineteenth century. They came from Britain, France and other parts of
Europe and America. Their activities, mainly centred on converting souls by making Africans accept
Christianity, this flourished between 1842 and 1892.

For instance, the presence of missionaries in Nigeria was a direct result of the Europeans philosophical
changes in which a more humanitarian world view was becoming better understood and more
acceptable to the general masses. European humanitarians felt that the slave trade could not be
eradicated simply by force, or by-using naval patrol boats alone; they felt that efforts would have to be
made at striking at the root of the entire system itself. Their aim in using missionaries was twofold; to
promote legitimate commerce between Europe and Africa, and to win Africans over to the Christian
faith.

A missionary expedition made up of British missionaries called the Niger Missions reached the Niger
River in 1841. The object of their expedition was to establish a model farm in Nigeria, to penetrate the
interior for trade and to conclude treaties with local Nigerian hinterland rulers. In the end all these
objectives were achieved.
SUPPRESSION OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE

An event that was crucial in the shaping of relations between Africa and Europe during the nineteenth
century was the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade. The trade in slaves had started during the
fifteenth Century and reached its peak in the eighteenth century. Britain had been the leading slave-
trading nation in Europe. Then, in 1807 the British Parliament passed an act which proclaimed that trade
in slaves was illegal. So in an ironic change of positions, it was the British themselves who finally
championed the campaign to end the slave trade.

REASONS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF SLAVE TRADE

The Industrial Revolution

It was probably the industrial revolution and, with it, the extensive use of non-human labour which,
more than any other reason, accounted for the British decision to abolish the slave trade.

The industrial revolution swept through England during the latter part of the eighteenth century, and it
brought to Britain the status of being the first industrialized nation in Europe. As a result of this
industrialization, British businessmen were more keenly interested than other business men on the
continent in expanding existing markets and opening new ones. Buying and selling of slaves was an
activity which was not conductive to production and expansion of markets for industrial goods.

Ocean-going vessels which had hitherto been used for slave trading were easily reconditioned for the
transportation of cotton and palm oil, both of which were far more profitable commodities of export.
Both commodities were also dearly needed fuel in the industries back home. Newly built industrial
centres in Britain needed the raw materials to keep the factories productive and growing. For her
industries to be lubricated, and soap and lighting provided, Britain required an assured quantity of palm-
oil- a quantity which the West African interior could supply.

The economic motive therefore, must be considered as one of the main reasons for Britain's campaigns
to suppress the long established slave trade. The profitable exploitation of African coastal cities and
inland regions (Nigeria inclusive) would help to supply the budding Industrial Revolution with the
needed raw materials. With Industrial Revolution spreading to other nations of Europe, these nations
equally became interested in acquiring territories in Africa, and other parts of the world. As a matter of
fact, to acquire the territories outside Europe became a means to measure the capability of European
nations as a world power. The desire to secure territories led to the scramble and partition of not only
Africa but parts of Asia and Latin America. France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal were all
bent on acquiring territories in Africa and thus, there were conflicts between these European nations. To
resolve these conflicts and confusion that arose as a result of the scramble, the German Chancellor at
the time, Bismark, summoned the European nations involved in scramble for territories in Africa,
particularly West Africa, to a conference in 1884. The conference which was called the Berlin
Conference lasted from 1884 to the early months of 1885. The conference was to find a solution to the
conflicts that had arisen among these European nations. One major proposal for ending the conflicts
was that the principle of Effective Occupation was accepted by all the contending European nations. This
principle implied that for any European nation to be claiming any portion of African soil, such a nation
must show its presence by making concrete demarcation of its boundaries, and instituting some form of
political administration in the area so secured. It was on the basis of this that Britain increased her
tempo of securing parts of Nigeria by all known devices and strategies.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE

With the abolition of slave trade, it became imperative that the European nations must secure
territories in Africa. This was to be so because the acquisition of these territories would guarantee
increased and sustained sourcing of the legitimate commodities needed for the industries in Europe.

The process of abolishing slave trade helped to strengthen the involvement of Britain in Nigeria. The
establishment of a naval squadron to patrol West African slave routes and arrest or detain ships which
continued to carry slaves was an extremely important measure taken by Britain to end the slave trade in
West Africa. The British naval squadron was the instrument through which the implementation of the
British policy in Nigeria through the use of force if necessary was executed.

In the course of assisting in the suppression of the slave trade, the British naval squadron stationed
along the coast of West Africa had the ample opportunity to familiarize itself not only with the specific
geography of the coastal region but eventually with the political realities of the local cultures. The
familiarization would prepare the British for their future role in the region; the suppression of social
political and economic rights of the Nigerian people and their rulers. At this juncture we can now x-ray in
particular the efforts of Britain in carving out Nigeria.

THE ERA OF TREATIES

A notable outcome of British's efforts at abolishing the slave trade was that it ushered in a period during
which several treaties were signed between Britain and Nigeria which directly affected relations
between the two countries. This was the beginning of a period during which various European powers
attempted through persuasion or military means to force African rulers, in this case, Nigerian chiefs to
sign treaties which were formulated in Europe. These treaties were designed to reserve for the foreign
powers the rights and privileges to trade and, in some cases to exercise a monopoly over trading
activities.

These treaties became increasingly common as the nineteenth century progressed not only with Britain
but with other European nations. It should be noted that the terms of these treaties usually had to be
interpreted to the African rulers and there were more than a few cases in which these rulers would sign
treaties without full knowledge of exactly what they were agreeing to.
As already noted, once the interior regions of the African Continent had been penetrated and explored
by the Europeans, the foreigners soon realized that there were enormous profits from the new trade.
The strong desire to secure territories in Africa led to the struggle and partition of Africa. The European
nations employed all available strategies to own territories in Africa. In the case of Nigeria, the Germans,
the French and the British were all involved in carving out territories for themselves in Nigeria, and this
was the case in most parts of Africa. As a result of these conflicts, the German Chancellor at the time- in
the person of Bismark-summoned a meeting of the European nations involved in the acquisition of
territories in Africa. The meeting- tagged the Berlin African Conference was intended to formulate the
modus operandi for the acquisition of territories in Africa. One major decision that is of interest to us
was the principle of Effective Occupation. This principle had in mind that all European nations aspiring or
claiming to have secured a territory in Africa should back it up with effective boundaries, indicating its
possession and the establishment of an administration over the claimed territory. It was the Berlin
Conference resolution of Effective Occupation that pushed the Europeans to effectively carve out
colonies over the African continent. Thus, the political factor of colonial administration and image
making of the European nations became an additional factor to the reasons for the conquest of Africa.

BRITISH PENETRATION OF NIGERIA

As already noted, Spain and Portugal first started the voyage of discoveries but their adventures ended
around the coastal fringes of Africa. The important European explorers notably Mungo Park, Claperton
and Henriench Barth came mainly from Britain. Unlike the Portuguese predecessors who were content
to limit their explorations to coastal regions of West Africa, these English adventurers focused on the
Nigerian interior, especially along the Niger and Benue Rivers.

With Industrial Revolution, the need to stop slave trade gave the British added impetus to engage in
treaties with the illiterate local people. Once the interior regions of the country had been successfully
penetrated and explored by the British, the foreigners soon realised that profit from the new trade
could easily be improved. This could be done by replacing local Nigerian rulers with either British or
Europeans, or by placing in positions of power Nigerians who owed their new found authority to their
foreign benefactors. In some cases consular authorities were set up in areas along the coast with powers
covering large areas of the interior.

The era of consular authority signaled the beginning of a new period of aggression by the British against
Nigerians. It marked a new phase of British's effort to intervene in Nigeria's internal affairs and to
dictate to the people of the country through the use of the gunboat.

The reactions of the Nigerian people to this new British attitude varied, some communities, as in Bonny,
reacted by protesting, others as in the case of the Ijaw of Brass, responded by arming themselves and
countering the Europeans by force. In the lower Niger and on the Benue, Nigerians occasionally robbed
European ships or British commercial houses of their valuables.
Regardless of local reactions, the British consular authorities succeeded in imposing their will on the
people.

TRADING COMPANIES AND THE CONQUEST OF NIGERIA

British merchants dominated the trade with Nigeria for the most part of the nineteenth century. Britain
took the lead mainly because she was the first industrial nation. France was second to Britain. Germany
joined in the second half of the nineteenth century, and by the 1880s had been handling a third of the
total West African overseas trade. Germany's rise and rapid trade expansion have been attributed to
three main reasons: the rise of palm kernel market which was dominated by Hamburg because German
farmers were the main buyers of cattle cake, and because the Dutch were the largest manufacturers of
margarine; the ability of Hamburg to supply cheap liquor; and the development of steamship services
between Germany and West Africa.

The European merchants came with their articles of trade mostly to the Nigerian water edge. Among the
commodities brought by European traders were guns and gun powder, hardware, beads, tobacco, salt,
iron, textiles, spirit and some food items.

In return, for the Europeans goods, Africans sold a variety of articles which included, slaves, timber,
rubber, coffee, pepper and indigo, palm oil (from 1830s onward), cotton, groundnuts, palm kernel and
cocoa. As a result of the Industrial Revolution, the need for more oil and fat arose. The greatest center
for the production of palm oil was the Niger Delta in Nigeria, an area known to the Europeans as Oil
Rivers (i.e. palm oil). Calabar, Brass and Bonny in the Delta were the homes of oil.

The ports along the coast were the major ports of exchange. Many of the merchants received goods on
credit from merchant houses in Europe (e.g. From Messers Forster and Smith, Messers W. B. Hutton,
Sewell Ross and Co, W, King of Bristol, Frand A. Swanzy, and Bannes Brothers, all of Britain).

Because of the substantial profit from the trade, Europeans usually competed with each other for the
control of West African trade. The competition for trade caused bitterness among the established
trading houses, the small and new ones, and the African merchants. In the search for more trade and
profit, many of the Europeans merchants penetrated the hinterland.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL NIGER COMPANY

One company which made active contribution to the making of Nigeria was the Royal Niger Company
(RNC). The architect of the Company was Sir Taubman Goldie. A successful British man, Goldie played a
major role in the colonization of Nigeria and contributed immensely to British colonial administrative
policies. He used the RNC to establish an empire on the Niger, an empire that was the prototype of most
other chartered companies in Africa.

The beginning of Goldie's involvement in Nigeria was in 1877, and this was a time of cut throat
competition for trade by many European merchants. The Delta chiefs collected levies from traders
making use of the waterways and there were constant rivalries among the African chiefs over the
control of the River Niger.

It was then that Sir Goldie came out with a plan to solve the problems of trade for British merchants. In
1879, he organised all the important trading interests into a single company known as the United
African Company (U.A.C). The competition with two French companies- the Compagme Francaise del'
Africa Equitorial and the Compaghie du Senegal, the quest of the French to establish a colonial empire in
West Africa, and the advance of Germany from the Cameroons to Northern Nigerian forced Goldie to
improve the organization and activities of the UAC. In 1882, he increased the subscribed capital of the
UAC from £200,000 to £1 million and offered shares to the public. He also changed the name of the
Company to the National African Company. His problem was how to deal with the two French rival
companies. Having failed to persuade them to join the NAC, Goldie used his skill and money to undercut
their prices by almost 25 per cent. By 1884 they had been forced out of business.

Faced with the threat of the colonial expansion of the French and the German into the Niger, Goldie
applied for a royal charter from the British government to enable his company not only to control trade
but also the Niger territory. In conformity with the resolution of the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, the
British Government had no choice than agree to this request. He obtained the charter in 1886 and the
company was renamed the Royal Niger Company. The charter empowered the RNC to govern these
territories with which it had signed treaties of protection, acquire new territories, abolish slavery and
slave trade and to collect taxes and duties in order to defray the cost of its administration. The RNC must
not, however, interfere in the course of its administration with the people's customs and religion,
prevent other firms from trading or transfer any part of the Niger territory to any person or organization
without the consent of the Secretary of State, that is, the British Minister in charge of foreign territories.

The shareholders of the RNC benefitted from its activities more than Nigerians. The annual dividends
that went to the shareholders were made from the exploitation of Nigeria's resources. The RNC did not
spend its profits on the transformation of Nigeria. Neither did it develop the transport system or
introduce new industries and crops. The Royal Niger Company tapped the trade of eastern Nigeria until
its charter was revoked in 1889. It received a handsome compensation of £865, 000 and a ninety-nine
years right to exploit in Northern Nigeria.

The RNC played an active role in the partition of Africa. It collaborated with the British government to
prevent the penetration of France and Germany into Eastern and Northern Nigeria. In the 1870s, both
the Germans and the French considered the West coast a major area for expansion. By the early 1880s,
the two French companies earlier mentioned had become well established in the Delta. Goldie
anticipated the German and French ambitions. Not only did he succeed in driving away those two
companies, he employed his extensive trade networks and gunboats to control coastal chiefs.

The RNC penetrated into the hinterland. By 1884 Goldie had concluded thirty-seven treaties with local
chiefs. In addition, he used his fleet of twenty gunboats to spread his monopoly and bombarded Akassa,
Brass, Patani and Asaba for attacking his trading posts. He assisted chiefs like the Emir of Nupe who was
friendly with the RNC with military support. With all these gains, Goldie was able to advance the interest
of Britain at the Berlin Conference of 1885. It was in the same year that Britain formally proclaimed its
protectorate over the Niger areas; defined as the territories or the line of coast between the British
Protectorate of Lagos, on the right or Western bank of the Rustle Bay and the territories on both banks
of the Niger, from its confluence with both banks of the River Benue from the confluence up to and
including Ibi.

With the Charter of 1886, the RNC became ambitious. It established its headquarters at Asaba on the
River Niger, together with a high court of Justice and a constabulary. The RNC used monopolistic powers
not only to antagonize Nigerian merchants but also to obstruct the activities of the French and the
Germans. The RNC successfully dominated the Oil Rivers and other areas; as far as Jebba. It extended its
influence to Borgu, and its frontiers northwards into the territory, and westward to Ilorin. Through all
these, the RNC contributed a great deal in curbing the penetration of France into Nigeria.

THE USE OF CONSULAR AUTHORITY IN THE OCCUPATION OF NIGERIA

The occupation of Nigeria was not done by British firms and traders alone. The British firms thought that
they could only derive the maximum advantages from trade, if the British government exercised total
control over Nigeria. But up till the 1880s, the British government was opposed to the acquisition of
colonies and strong political influence along the coast where foreign traders had to interact with their
African counterparts. Consuls-state agents living in foreign territories to protect their countrymen-were
appointed to promote trade and impose several commercial and political terms on Nigerian chiefs.

John Beecroft was the first Consul. He was appointed as Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra. During
his six years service as Consul he wielded influence in Lagos and in the Delta. His goal was to involve
Britain in the political affairs of the coastal states. He never hesitated to interfere in local politics and
was an advocate of colonial acquisition of the coastal states. In 1849, he settled the dispute between
British traders and King William People of Bonny. In 1850, he deposed Oba Kosoko of Lagos and installed
Akitoye who promised to abolish the slave trade. Again, in 1850 he intervened in the slave rebellion in
Old Calabar. Three years later he sent People on exile.

The aim of Beecroft and other Consuls was to use power to secure maximum advantages for commerce.
They worked for the downfall of Chiefs who were regarded as obstacles in the way of trade. They
protected chiefs who were unpopular with their people. The Consuls intervened in disputes between
European and Nigerian traders. They used military forces to suppress the people and groups opposed to
them. Finally, they worked for the gradual acquisition of Nigeria. They provided for the use of Britain,
vital information on the country's economy and security. They also took part in the actual process of
acquisition. In 1861, the Consul was instructed to annex Lagos in order to secure forever the population
of Lagos free from the slave traders and kidnappers who formerly oppressed them; to protect and
develop the trade of which their town will be based; and to exercise and influence the surrounding
tribes which might, it was hoped, be permanently beneficial to the African race. The Consuls
concentrated their interests in other strategic areas. They interfered in Yoruba politics in order to assist
merchants to obtain palm oil and other products. They forced or persuaded some Yoruba states to open
their routes, and they sent peace missions to settle their wars. By 1885, British officials in Lagos had
reached the conclusion that direct British interference in Yoruba land would be necessary to end the
wars and control the Yoruba states. This was done in the 1890s.

In the Niger Delta, they intervened in the local affairs because of the intense competition for palm oil
between the Delta states and the European traders. British and French merchants engaged in bitter
competition which led the British to proclaim a protectorate in 1885. This was in accordance with the
Berlin Conference resolution of the same year. The Consuls therefore played enormous roles in the
British occupation of Nigeria.

THE CONQUEST OF THE REST OF NIGERIA

The British conquest of Nigeria was accomplished in two distinct phases. The first phase saw the
occupation of Lagos in 1851, the Yoruba land up to Ijebu in 1892. Also during the first phase, the British
speeded up their encroachment on the sovereign rights of the rulers and peoples of the Niger Delta
areas. Opobo under Jaja, was dealt with in this phase. In 1891 Jaja was banished because be resisted the
penetration of the British. Similarly, in 1894 Nana of Itsekiri was banished after a vigorous British
military attack. In 1897 Oba Ovoramwen was banished to Calabar. This provides examples of British
intention to impose its rule by threat of force or by force itself.

The second phase of the British conquest of Nigeria took place from the turn of the nineteenth century
until 1914. It was brought about by the withdrawal in 1899 of the royal charter which had been granted
to the Royal Niger Company to dominate the affairs of Northern Nigeria. The most significant events
during this phase were the occupations of the Sokoto caliphate, Borno, Tiv land, Kano and Northern
Nigeria's central belt. It was during this phase that groups of "stubborn" individuals in parts of Southern
Nigeria were attacked, conquered and brought under British rule. The Aros were defeated at this time.

In summary, the following events made the conquest of Nigeria by British an inevitability.

i The granting of charter to the Royal Nigeria Company in 1886 and the need to conclude
protection treaties with African rulers.

ii. Britain's efforts at suppressing the slave trade in consonance with the Abolition of Slave Act
passed by the British Parliament in 1807. Because of the reluctance of Nigerian rulers to adjust to the
new trade, such rulers as Oba Kosoko of Lagos, Nana of Itsekiri, Jaja of Opobo, Oba Ovoramwen of Bini
were deposed and banished.

Iii. The imposition of legitimate commerce led to the establishment of administrative and
organizational structures to run the new trade. These structures in turn, helped to weaken traditional
power structures.

THE AMALGAMATION AND EARLY COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

By 1900, Nigeria had come to be recognised by other colonial powers as a British colony, this was as a
result of Britain being the first to establish an occupation on the area by signing so-called treaties of
protection with Nigerian rulers, and later by invading and occupying their territories. The desire to
achieve a total and effective control over the Nigerian area was in line with the resolutions of the Berlin
Conference of 1884/1885. To occupy Nigeria, the colonial authorities used both violent and non-violent
means.

A major administrative measure taken by Britain to strengthen her rule in Nigeria was amalgamation.
Amalgamation meant the bringing together of the various Nigerian peoples under one administrative
and political authority. By 1900, there were three separate independent territories (all of which were
under British control) in the country. One was the Niger Coast Protectorate (created in 1891 as the Oil
Rivers protectorate). It was ruled by Consuls who had their headquarters at Calabar and were
responsible to the Foreign Office in London.

The second was the Colony of Lagos which was ceded to Britain in 1861. The colony was ruled by a
Governor who was also responsible to the Colonial Office in London. From 1866 to 1874, the Governors
were resident in Sierra Leone and resided in the Gold Coast up to 1886 when Lagos began to have a
Governor of its own.

The third was the Territory of the Royal Niger Company. This was the equivalent of Northern Nigeria.
The agents of the company who were responsible to a board of directors in London ruled the territory
from 1886 to 1900 when the British Government declared a Protectorate over Northern Nigeria and
appointed Sir Frederick Lugard as the High Commissioner.

Before 1900, specifically by 1898, the British Colonial Secretary had set up a committee on the future of
the various administrations in Nigeria. The committee headed by Selborne recommended the fusion of
the different governments into one Nigeria. Thus, Lugard from the first year in office as High
Commissioner showed concern for the amalgamation of what was described as the three Nigeria's. The
ambition to merge Nigeria as one by Lugard was manifested in his speeches and confidential proposals
to the British Secretary of State in 1905.
Although the British had desired to amalgamate the various administrative units of the country by 1898,
the first policy was manifested in May 1906 with the creation of the Colony and Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria. This was the fusion of the colony and protectorate of Lagos and Protectorate of
Southern Nigeria. The new Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria had its headquarters at Lagos
and was placed in the charge of a Governor. A legislative Council was set up to advice the government.
Also three provinces, namely, Western, Eastern and Central were created. Thus the fusion of 1906
brought the whole of Southern Nigeria under a single administration, leaving Nigeria to be composed of
two administrations: the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Colony and Protectorate of Southern
Nigeria. Therefore, there was still the need for an amalgamation that would place all the territories
under one political and administrative authority. This was achieved on January 1, 1914. The
proclamation was carried out by Sir (later Lord) Lugard who was also made the Governor-General.

REASONS FOR THE AMALGAMATION

The primary aim of the British in amalgamating the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in
1914 was economic. Compared with the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the Protectorate
of Northern Nigeria proved a relatively poor neighbour. Northern Nigeria had no direct access to the sea
and so could not raise revenue from there. She had a large area and population and spent much on
railway construction and river dredging. She thus could not find sufficient funds to maintain her
administration. The Imperial Treasury in Britain and the South provided some subsidy or grants-in-aid
for Northern Nigeria. Britain hoped that the amalgamation would relieve the Imperial Government of
this financial burden.

On the other hand, the south was relatively richer than the north. Amalgamation made it easier to
utilize the revenue from the south for the development of the whole country. It would also save costs
because the duplication of certain technical and administrative departments would be avoided. Also, the
boundary adjustment which accompanied the amalgamation left some geographical imbalance between
the north and the south thereby creating some adverse impact on subsequent nation-building efforts.

The absence of a central legislature after the amalgamation meant that respective Nigerian groups did
not have much that could bring them together to discuss the affairs of their country. A certain level of
separateness was thus nurtured among Nigerian groups and their administrations. This aspect of the
amalgamation was to have two opposite effects. In the first place, it laid the foundation for Nigerian
Federalism. Secondly it sowed the culture of parochialism in national affairs; this parochialism has
continued to pose problems to our national development.

THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF NIGERIA AFTER AMALGAMATION INDIRECT RULE

In principle, indirect rule was one of the non-violent measures adopted by Britain in ruling her colonies.
Indirect rule in theory was a concept of local governance in which it was believed that the British were
to rule Nigeria and other colonies through indigenous rulers and institutions. The system was based on
the belief that British officials had to supervise the indigenous rulers ruling their communities. British
political officers were to have no direct dealing with the people. For instance, all instructions or
directives had to reach the people through their native rulers. Indigenous institutions were to be utilized
in administration though they were to be purged of practices considered repugnant or against
humanity.

Before we continue with other issues concerning Lord Lugard and colonialism in Nigeria, it may be
necessary to x-ray, some other events that went on in Nigeria during this period. These are
constitutional developments and nationalism. The next chapter is therefore devoted to this discussion.
We must note that other topics inherent in indirect rule are equally concluded in that chapter.

REFERENCES
1. Chinweizu (1978) The west and the rest of us. Lagos, Nok Publishers.

2. Dike, K.O. (1956) Trade and politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885. Oxford.

3. Hopkins A.G. (1973) An economic history of West Africa. London, Longman.

4. Falola, T. (1987) Britain and Nigeria: exploitation or development? Zed.

5. Falola, T., Mahadi A., Uhomoibhi M., Anyanwu U. (1991) History of Nigeria 2, Nigeria in the
nineteenth century. Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Limited.

6. Odey J. O. (1996) Africa, The agony of a continent can liberation heory offer any solution?
Enugu, Snaap Press Limited.

7. Onwubiko, K.B.C. (1913) History of West Africa (book two) 1800 present day. Onitsha, Africana
Educational Publishers (Nig.)
CHAPTER THREE

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA

An understanding of Nigerian Constitutional Development will be better achieved when we briefly

explain the making of Nigeria. This is so because Nigeria as it is presently constituted was the handiwork
of the British colonial masters. A brief summary of the last chapter will be quickly done.

The road to the creation of Nigeria began with the end of slave trade and the commencement of
legitimate trade, (legitimate trade was trade in those commodities that were approved by European
traders as being acceptable alternative to slaves). The first serious attack on Nigeria was the conquest
and occupation of Lagos. Britain began to register her presence forcefully in this area with the expulsion
of king Kosoko and the acquisition of Lagos as a Crown Colony in 1851. The authority of king Kosoko was
threatened because he refused to cooperate with the British traders who wanted to penetrate the
interior in the pretext that they wanted to enforce the abolition of slave trade. The refusal of King
Kosoko to cooperate made him to lose his position to somebody else -Akitoye who was amenable to
British intrigues. With the forceful occupation of Lagos, there was no stopping of Britain in her quest to
occupy Nigeria. Even the French who had strong presence in today's northern Nigeria could not stop
Britain.

By 1869, France was well established at the upper Niger and had made considerable in-road into Nigeria
along the River Niger and made frantic efforts to expand down to the coast. This made competition
between France and Britain to be fierce and brutal as they struggled for Nigerian territory. This brutal
struggle not only in Nigeria but in other parts of Africa among the European nations, continued until
1884. The fierce competition is known as "Scramble for Africa". By 1884, the German Chancellor at the
time, Bismark summoned a meeting of European nations involved in acquisition of territories in Africa,
The conference which was held in Berlin, a city in Germany, became known as Berlin African
Conference. The conference which lasted from December 1884 to January 1885 was called to support
the French and Belgium demands for the sanctioning of British excesses in colony acquisition especially
around the Congo and sub-Saharan Africa - Nigeria inclusive. To help resolve the destructive
competition, the Berlin treaty made some outstanding resolutions. The most remarkable was the
principle of effective occupation. This principle simply implies that any European power with dominant
interest in any African territory could be regarded as the rightful administrative power of that colony in
so far as it could show enough presence and administrative competence. It was in order to give legal
teeth to her claims that the British declared a protectorate over the Niger territories. This territory
included the territories on the line of the coast between British protectorate of Lagos and the right of
Western Bank of Riodaley. With the carving out of the Niger territory, the whole of Yoruba Land was
known and called the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos.

Because the British government was not eager to invest money in the development of foreign lands, the
Royal Niger Company was given a charter in 1886 to oversee the Northern part of River Niger. The
company also helped in the conquest of most parts of Northern Nigeria. For example, Lokoja, Nupe,
Ilorin, Sokoto, Gwandu and Bornu were taken by the company either by force or by treaties. By 1899,
the charter given to the Royal Niger Company was revoked, so that by 1900 Nigeria had come to be
recognized by other colonial powers as a British colony. This was as a result of Britain being the first to
establish an occupation on the area by signing the so called treaties of protection with Nigerian rulers,
and later by invading and occupying their territories. The desire to achieve a total and effective control
over the Nigerian area constituted the prime objective of British colonial administrators in the early
phase of their rule which lasted from 1900 to 1914. To achieve this, the colonial authorities used both
violent and nonviolent means.

By 1900, the British military power had been firmly planted in the territory that is now known as Nigeria.
But the conquered communities were different in race and language and in social and political
organization. For example, the emirates of Northern Nigeria were Moslems. They had been under the
impact of Islamic culture for over six centuries and had little in common with the Yoruba and Igbo tribes
in the south. The situation created the problem of how to merge the discordant elements into a
coherent whole, while preserving for each, sufficient autonomy to satisfy its cultural aspirations,

By 1906 the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were joined into
the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The entire south was very viable and richly endowed
with surplus resources. The north was not as rich as the south, and was costing Britain money since it
was not generating enough revenue to sustain itself. It was in the bid to offset the cost of Northern
Nigeria that Lord Lugard who was the Governor appointed a committee to recommend ways of running
the almost barren North at a minimal or no cost to Britain.

In 1913, Lugard commissioned a study group made up of first class British residents and merchants to
make recommendations on how to run the north without extra cost on Britain. The group
recommended the amalgamation of the north and south. Lord Lugard in turn recommended the
amalgamation to Britain to join the two vast areas as one country. On January 1, 1914, Northern and
Southern Nigeria were amalgamated into one country and named the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria.

The amalgamation was purely for administrative convenience and economic exploitation and as
Chinweizu (1978) stated British profits were too important to be allowed to suffer. The above summary
indicates the making of Nigeria and we can observe that amalgamation of Northern and Southern
Nigeria was not in the interest of Nigerians as they were not consulted before the amalgamation. The
questions that readily come to the mind are; what were the constitutional changes introduced by Lord
Lugard in governing Nigeria, and what were the reasons for the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914.

LORD LUGARD'S ERA AND INDIRECT RULE

As early as 1903, Lugard showed clearly that the major policy-making role lay with the British Crown not
with the African chiefs. Lugard emphasized who were the new rulers and executives and whose orders
the chiefs should carry out even if by so doing their otherwise African institutions were radically
transformed. Lugard did not disguise the autocratic nature of British rule. At the higher level, there was
considerable force in the statement made by Secretary L. Harcourt in June 1912 concerning the major
features of the Crown Colony form of government. According to him;

The position of the Colonial Secretary on the Crown Colony side of his Department carries with it the
powers, duties, responsibilities and anxieties of a practical and laborious despot, controlled only by the
forces of nature, by his own discretion and by the sporadic curiosity at question time of friends or
opponents - inspired either by imagination or information - and often with the best intentions creating
difficulties thereof, and not seldom innocently damaging the causes to which they are devoted. But even
a despot under democracy is glad to have an opportunity of justification and of proof that his mild
autocracy is not inconsistent with benevolence, or that the machinery of legislation by ordinance or
letters patent may in the circumstances of un-development be a not unsuitable, though temporary,
substitute for more representative methods (H.CDeb. 5 40,27June 1912, 505-6).

Corroborating the above statement Lugard in part of his speech at Sokoto in 1903, stressed:

The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the High
Commissioner, have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this
country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and create kings. They in turn
have by defeat lost their rule which have come under the hands of the British. All these things which I
have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and
the principal officers of state will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country...
The Emirs and chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take such taxes as
are approved by the High Commissioner, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in
accordance with the advice of the Resident...

The above indicates the manner in which Lugard carried out his function. He was autocratic and all
powers centred on him. This reflected on the constitution and administration he instituted in Nigeria
during his rule. Before we discuss the indirect rule system and other constitutional issues during his era,
we shall briefly concern ourselves with the reasons for the amalgamation of Southern and Northern
Protectorates.

REASONS FOR THE AMALGAMATION

Even though Lugard was the principal architect of the amalgamation, it was not necessarily his brain
child. Instead it was the brainchild of the British government. Again, amalgamation was not a moral
issue. This consideration was not given as to how much Nigerians would gain or lose from it. The
concern was clear, how to run a more economical administration by the British.

One of the factors that made the unification of 1914 imperative was that before 1914 the north could
not find sufficient funds to maintain its own administration in spite of the annual grants from the
imperial treasury and from the southern administration. The financial position of the South was
satisfactory due to the rapid development of trade. Amalgamation was aimed at relieving the imperial
treasury of its annual contribution towards the upkeep of the north. Northern Nigeria had no direct
access to the sea and so could not raise revenue from there. She had a larger area and population and
spent much on railway construction and river dredging. She thus could not find sufficient funds to
maintain her administration. Britain hoped that the amalgamation would relieve the imperial
government of this financial burden.

Falola et al believe that the south was relatively richer than the north. The fact was that the south had a
long coastline with ports from which revenue was raised. Amalgamation would make it easier to utilize
the revenue from the southern ports and also save costs because the duplication of certain technical
and administrative departments would be avoided.

In addition, amalgamation would coordinate development plans for the whole territory. For instance,
there was the need to coordinate the railway policy or system. By 1914, three separate lines were in
existence and a fourth line was being proposed. It was clear that a rational development of complex
railway system could only be done under a unified control. This was how the railway situation became
one of the reasons for the 1914 amalgamation.

There is also the other reason which had to do with the relations between the administrative and
political officers in the two protectorates. There was much tension, due mainly to disagreements over
policies and personality clashes between officers in the two protectorates. Amalgamation was a
measure taken to reduce or indeed remove the tension. Closely related to this was the personal interest
or ambition of Lugard. It has been suggested that Lugard supported amalgamation for personal reasons,
namely, to secure firm control over the south as he had done in the north, and to extend the policies he
had introduced in the north to the south. Essentially, economic reasons were responsible for the British
decision to amalgamate the northern and southern Nigeria.
FEATURES OF THE AMALGAMATION AND LUGARD'S ERA

The amalgamation did not mean the complete fusion of the two administrations. In the northern
provinces, important departments such as Medicine, Education, Police and Prisons were separated in
policy and control from their southern counter-parts. What could be regarded as the 1914 constitution
was really the making of one man, Sir Frederick Lugard. Its key features include the appointment of a
single Governor and Commander-in-chief of the whole country without fusion of both administrations.
The north and the south maintained their divergent policies and conceptions of colonial administration
which they had evolved over the years.

Secondly, the executive power was concentrated solely in the Governor who acted at his own discretion
in the exercise of his powers. Thirdly, both the Executive and the Legislative Councils were composed
predominantly of British officials who were appointed by the Governor and responsible to him. The
Councils were not meant to associate Nigerians in the government of their country but to provide a
forum to enable the British official's articulate issues that might be useful to them. Both Councils had
neither executive nor legislative powers. In practice, they did not have control over the Governor.

Essentially Lugard was firmly resolved in maintaining the differences in the administration of the north
and south. There was no central secretariat until the 1920s. The actual control of affairs was done by the
Lieutenant - Governors, who referred issues that touched on the whole country to Lugard.

While the south was broken into nine provinces, the north was left intact. The authorities claimed that
they left the north intact because it was culturally more homogeneous than the south. But the
implication was that from the on-set, the north began to see themselves as one while the idea of
diversity was inculcated in the south.

Divisional courts were established in the east and west. Under the divisional courts, were provincial
courts headed by Residents. Indigenous or Nigerian Lawyers were barred from practicing in the
provincial courts. This brought much resentment among the nationalists who had started to
acknowledge the injustice in colonial administration.

Generally, amalgamation preserved the differences among the people and their administration. The
adverse national issues were now looked at from local interests. Closely related to this was the
unhealthy rivalry which developed between the respective administrations as they struggled for
different group interests which they represented. So that even in Lugard's time, Nigeria was divided
along north-south lines. Thus, the way the amalgamation was implemented left a legacy of tension
among the component parts of Nigeria. Also, the boundary adjustments which accompanied the
amalgamation left some geographical in-balance between the north and south thereby creating some
adverse impact on subsequent nation-building efforts.
The absence of a central legislature meant that respective Nigerian groups did not have much that could
bring them together to discuss the affairs of their country. In order to administer the country, Lugard
relied on traditional institutions. The system was indirect rule.

MEANING OF INDIRECT RULE

Here we shall also re-visit this topic. In a simple sense, Indirect rule was an administrative strategy
entrenched by Lord Lugard during the colonial time to ensure the effective control and exploitation of
the colonies. In principle it was one of the non-violent measures adopted by Britain in ruling her African
colonies. Indirect rule in theory was a concept of local government in which it was believed that the
British were to rule Nigeria and other colonies through indigenous rulers and institutions. The system
was based on the belief that British officials were to be advisers to indigenous rulers ruling their
communities. British political officers were to have no direct dealing with the people. For instance, all
instructions or directives had to reach the people through their native rulers. Indigenous institutions
were to be utilized in the administration though they were to be purged of practices considered
repugnant or against humanity by British standards.

REASONS FOR INDIRECT RULE SYSTEM

Several factors necessitated the introduction of indirect rule system. These include:

(a) The wideness of the Nigerian territory at a time when transportation and communications
were still at a rudimentary stage of development. It should be borne in mind that there were no motor
cars and even if these cars existed there were no motorable roads. Hence, the need to leave
administration in the hands of the traditional rulers.

(b) There was also the issue of suspicion and misunderstanding between the natives and the
colonial officials. The tendency was that frequent exposure of the British officials to the people did not
create peaceful relationship with the people who were feeling marginalized, exploited and abused. The
correct step was to reduce the frequency of direct interaction and contact with the people. Suspicion
was also exacerbated by the newly-established and steadily expanding colonialism, which disturbed
relations between the new rulers and those they had displaced, warranted the institution of indirect
rule.

(c) The use of imperfect interpreters. At times, the granting of language bonuses encouraged some
of the political staff to learn some of the language of the people but a lot more relied on interpreters
whose command of the English language left much to be desired. Language problems helped the foreign
interpreters to defraud the ignorant natives who believed whatever the court clerk translated. Such
distortions were therefore minimized with the system of indirect rule.
(d) Added to the language difficulty was the poor state of anthropological information necessary for
satisfactory administration of alien people. Thus, indirect rule was copied to supplement manpower
which was in short supply; to reduce the financial cost of running the affairs of the territory; and to
reduce the impact of communication problems on the administration of the country.

There was also the fact that Lugard had adopted indirect rule because he has seen the system work
successfully in Uganda and India and so believed that it could work here. Furthermore, he believed that
the political institutions and organizations of Nigeria and the rest of West Africa would suit indirect rule.
Specifically, he noticed that the emirate system in northern Nigeria would serve adequately the purpose
of indirect rule.

Finally, the colonial officials stressed that indirect rule was adopted in order to protect and preserve
Nigerian indigenous institutions; that it was a means of helping the people to rule themselves while the
British officials acted as advisers; and that it was a means of preparing Nigerians and (Africans) for
eventual self-government. But these explanations as it concerns Lugards' intentions for the country are
faulty and distort the situation.

ADVANTAGES OF INDIRECT RULE

a. Indirect rule helped the traditional rulers to learn some elements of administration and
exposed them to British operational strategies.

b. Indirect rule wanted to introduce some uniformity in administrative machinery of the local
people of Nigeria.

c. Indirect rule made the people to have contact with their traditional rulers and not the white
man. This made the people to be committed and still loyal to the traditional administration, as if nothing
had changed.

d. Indirect rule system made the people to have a sense of belonging.

e. Indirect rule helped the abolition of some obnoxious practices that were no longer in the
interest of the people.

PROBLEMS OF INDIRECT RULE

Some of the issues raised above in favour of indirect rule cannot go without some inherent weaknesses.
The system did not consider the environmental and cultural situations in Nigeria. For example, in the
eastern part of the country, warrant chiefs were created and this was against the cultural practices of
the people. The net effect was that the chiefs with time became dictatorial which was not in line with
the culture of the Igbo people.

The traditional institution was abused. The chiefs were humiliated and made to carry out all manner of
assignments. Some of the assignments were too bad for the person in that status and position.
Educated Africans were deliberately marginalized in the indirect rule system. They were not allowed to
participate in the administration of the country. Indirect rule did not make efforts to prepare the people
for modern democratic government as the colonial officials retained the cultural practices of host
communities.

The people were exploited without much in return for their efforts. Taxes and forced labour were meted
out on the people without commensurate sacrifice on the part of the colonial officials.

Africans who were qualified for certain positions in the civil service were denied such positions whereas
Europeans with less qualifications were considered and recognized than Africans.

THE OPERATION OF INDIRECT RULE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF NIGERIA

For clarity, we shall discuss the operation of indirect rule in three sections of Nigeria as our case studies.
These are: Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and the Igbo. We shall start with the Hausa/Fulani.

Hausa/Fulani

Indirect rule was very successful in the Hausa/Fulani enclave. This was so because of the existence of a
centralized system of government before the advent of the British. The centralized system entrenched
by Uthman Dan Fodio gave fillip to the operation of indirect rule in the north. The centralized system
had emirates as political units with Emirs in charge of these emirates. The emirs enjoyed absolute
authority and thus had complete control of their subjects. Their words became laws and the people had
implicit confidence on their rulers.

There was also a well established judicial system. In other words, the Emir also enjoyed religious
solidarity from the people. The sharia laws stipulated the code of conduct and therefore inculcated
ethical values acceptable to the Emirs in the people.

The emirates had officials who handled departments that had peculiar significance to the people. For
instance, there were officers in charge of water, meat, defence, trade and commerce etc. These people
reported to the Emirs who had final control over these officers.

Besides taxes, tributes and royalties were paid by the subjects to the Emir before the Europeans came.
The effect was that the payment of taxes needed for indirect rule to function was not a problem
whenever it was instructed by the British officials that taxes should be collected from the citizens.
Collection of taxes was done with ease, devoid of tension and hostility that greeted similar efforts in the
east.

Essentially, the cultural setting before the coming of the British made it possible for the success of
indirect rule in the north. The introduction did not have any adverse effects nor did it warrant some
changes in the already existing structure in the north. Consequently, the natives and the traditional
rulers did not find it difficult adjusting to the new administration.

The Yoruba

The Yorubas occupy the western part of Nigeria. They also enjoyed a centralized system of
administration prior to the coming of the British. But the system was not as absolute as was the case in
the north. The Yorubas had Obas as their head but the Oba did not govern alone. He ruled in
conjunction with other traditional chiefs. The chiefs were organized in such a way that they constituted
a kind of checks on the power of the Oba. There were also some cultural institutions such as Ogboni and
Oyomesi, which had big influence over the actions of the Oba. The Oba was therefore not as free to act
as was the case with the Emir. His actions were determined by decisions taken in the council. He had no
power to go contrary to the consensus reached in the council.

But indirect rule needed a strong, powerful and autocratic ruler and this was not to be in the Yoruba
enclave. There was also the problem of taxation. Indirect rule needed payment of taxes to oil the
machinery of government. The Yorubas never paid such taxes or tributes before the British came. The
requirement that taxes should be paid also made the people to detest the system of indirect rule.
Because they did not imbibe most of the ideals of indirect rule, it was a partial success in the west. We
must state that it succeeded halfway because of the presence of a centralized system and the existence
of a traditional ruler in the person of the Oba. To ensure effectiveness of indirect rule, the colonial
administration stressed the strengthening of the position of the paramount chiefs, notably, the Alaafm
of Oyo, the Awujale of Ijebu Ode, the Alake of Abeokuta, and the Osemawe of Ondo. The Obas
performed legislative, executive and judicial functions. Between 1914 and 1916, Lugard created
traditional rulers or Native Authorities with similar powers, and enjoying, the same loyalty from their
people as the Emirs of the north. The usual four grades of Native courts were established with the
traditional rulers or Native Authorities as Presidents. As in the north, Native Authorities, were, however,
subordinate to the administrative officers or political officers, namely, the Residents, and District or
Assistant District Officers. Native Treasuries were also established and managed along the same lines as
the ones in the north. For instance, direct taxation was introduced. Because the Yoruba Obas did not
command the type of instant loyalty which the emirs of the north had from the citizens, payment of
taxes was not well received by the people and authoritarian rule by the traditional rulers was also
abhorred by the people. The presence of educated elites who were opposed to indirect rule also made
the system a partial success in the west.

INDIRECT RULE IN EASTERN NIGERIA

Some authorities opine that indirect rule was practiced in eastern Nigeria before1914. Eastern Nigeria
included the Igbo, the Efik, Ibibio and Ijaw. These people had no large centralized administration prior to
the coming of the British to the east. There were also no recognized traditional rulers in these areas as
the village was the highest centre of political activities. In the absence of recognized traditional rulers,
the British made people who were bold to welcome them warrant chiefs.

By 1900 a proclamation gave legal backing to the indirect rule system. This created the native court
system. The fact was that in the proclamation, two categories of native courts were provided for. There
were those presided over by a Native Authority which were called Minor Courts. The second were those
presided over by an European officer and were called Native Councils. These two types of native courts
continued to form the bases of indirect rule in eastern Nigeria in the years before 1914. Before Lugard
introduced his pattern of indirect rule, each native court had a clerk who recorded its proceedings. Each
also had a treasury and generated revenue from fees and fines. Each native court saw to the
development of work in its area of jurisdiction. For example, by means of the local treasuries, native
court houses were built, roads were constructed, rest houses were built and maintained, and salaries or
rewards were paid to the Warrant Chiefs. To make the system uniform with what was in vogue in the
north, Lugard introduced some changes after the amalgamation, which included direct taxation to
strengthen Native Treasuries. He sought to create Native Authorities or Paramount chiefs; to establish
Native Treasuries with revenue derived mainly from direct taxation; and to separate the executive from
the judiciary by discarding the arrangement which enabled political officers to serve as Presidents of
native courts.

Because of the absence of sole Native Authorities and due to the social and political organization of
people of the east, the implementation of these measures was difficult. The paramount chiefs
appointed were authoritarian, repressive and corrupt. The result was that the people became
disenchanted with the Lugardian system of indirect rule.

Open protests followed in the late 1920s when it was believed that the Lugardian system of indirect rule
was being utilized for a census that would extend direct taxation to women. This resulted in the well
known Aba Women Riot of 1929. The women's riot ended the warrant chief system in eastern Nigeria.

SOME CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES IN THE LORD LUGARD ERA

Every constitution should identify the structure of government in a state. Even though we do not credit
Lugard with any concrete constitution for Nigeria, he created some structures which operated in the
Crown Colony of Lagos. These include;

(a) Legislature: Before the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914,
there existed in Lagos a Legislative Council which made laws only for the Crown Colony of Lagos. When
the amalgamation was concluded, the Legislative Council was changed to the Nigerian Council. Between
1900 and 1913, the Legislative Council of Lagos essentially served the colony. The main functions of the
colonial Legislative Council with an official majority were the following:

(a) It served a useful purpose as a safety valve, and gave an opportunity for the few persons in the
colony, who really had views on public questions, to air those views and to ventilate individual and other
grievances.

(b) It afforded the opportunity for unofficial members to give the government useful advice: how
far the unofficials took advantage of this opportunity depended, of course largely on the caliber of the
unofficial members, and therefore depended very largely on the colony.

(c) It afforded an opportunity for the government to deliver speeches on issues dear to the
Governors, and to some extent necessary for all.

(d) It could have served as some check on official extravagance.

Before 1914, the Legislative Council had an official majority which did not make it attractive to the
African community as a forum for an adequate and sympathetic consideration of its problems.
Moreover, the basis of African representation there left much to be desired. Despite the African
superiority in population, the African and European communities each had two representatives between
1897 and 1900. From 1901 to 1905 there was one African and two European unofficial members. Both
communities had equal (3:3) representation between 1906 and 1913.

African confidence in their representatives was further shaken by the fact that the basis of selection was
nomination, not election. Until 1913, the European unofficial members of the Legislative Council
represented commercial, banking and shipping interests and the government gave considerable weight
to the representation of property as against the claims of Africans who wanted greater representation
of men on the basis of population and election.

The official majority in the legislature continued notwithstanding the grumbling of Nigerians even in the
New Nigerian Council. The New council was made up of officials who were all Europeans and six
nominated Nigerians (three from the north and three from the south. It was to advise the Governor -
General. However it had no powers and met only once a year and so had little or no legislative and
advisory influence. The Nigerian Council was made up of 36 members consisting of the Governor,
members of the Executive Council, First class Residents, political secretaries of northern and southern
Provinces as officials.
Joye & Igweike (1982) opine that the powers of the Legislative Council were restricted to the colony. It
was made up of the Governor and thirty others nominated by the Governor as members. Of the
nominated members, seventeen were ex-officio while the rest were unofficial members. Seven of the
thirteen unofficial members were nominated to represent commercial, shipping, mining and banking
interests. The remaining members, mostly chiefs represented as far as might be the native population
both of the coast and the interior.

THE EXECUTIVE

Prior to 1914, the appointment of unofficial members to the Executive Council was dependent on the
existence of suitable candidates for the position. This was particularly the case in the colonies where the
issue did not begin to arouse public opinion until after the First World War Before 1914, the Executive
Council existed but the colonial office was unwilling to share decision making powers. The Executive
Council was the policy -making body, particularly on bills for enactment, even though they required the
colonial offices' sanction before becoming law. Its other major function was disciplinary: it could
suspend or dismiss government officials and exercises the Governor's power of pardon in cases of
capital punishment. Although the council was executive in the sense that it advised the Governor in the
exercise of the Governor's executive functions, the Governor could dispense with this advice in
emergencies, again subject to the colonial offices' approval. With amalgamation, Lugard retained the
existing Executive Council but the council became the Executive Council of the whole country. In
practice, full powers were exercised by the Governor - General and the Lieutenant Governors.
Lieutenant - Governors were appointed for the north and south respectively. Lugard became the
Governor and Commander- in-Chief for the whole country.

LIMITATIONS OF LUGARD CONSTITUTION

If we accept Lugards arrangement as the first attempt in giving Nigeria a constitution, we should then
assess some of the weaknesses of that constitution. They include;

Apart from the choice of a single chief executive, the Governor, for the whole country or territory, there
was in reality no fusion of both administrations. The north and south maintained their divergent policies
and conceptions of colonial administration which they had evolved over the years.

Again, the executive power was concentrated solely in the Governor who acted at his own discretion in
the exercise of his powers. Both the Executive and the Legislative Councils were composed
predominantly of British officials who were appointed by the Governor and responsible to him. The
Councils were not meant to involve Nigerians in the government of their country but to provide a forum
to enable the British officials to obtain as much local advice and opinion as might be useful to them.

The Council had neither force of law nor executive power, and so it was merely an advisory body, whose
advice could either be taken or dropped at the discretion of the Governor who had a veto power. The
Queen could even also reject a bill that had been passed by the Governor. The Council was not
representative of the people and attendance to meetings was very poor and consequently official
decisions were reached with ease and implemented unchallenged.

AN ASSESSMENT OF LORD LUGARD'S ERA

Available literature indicates that Lord Lugard was an autocratic leader who never considered the
interest of the people he governed. Proclamations and ordinances made by one man were very rampant
during the period under review. He allowed the British officials to be despotic and authoritarian. Even
some British officials condemned the grave despotism that existed at the time. For example, Mac-
Gregor condemned "the arbitrary system which we have established in our Crown colonies". He hated
the colonial offices' attempts to protect their Governors at any cost; condemned the despotic one-man-
power given to these Governors, detested the combination of the militarism and despotic government
as a source of wrong and robbery and advocated the checking of the arrogance of the authorities in
southern Nigeria.

Enlightened foreign rulers would be expected to consider not only interests of their home government
but also those of the people under their charge. That in turn would entail giving the people under their
charge an adequate means of expressing their views. But this was not so in the case of Lord Lugard.
Rather in 1903 he promulgated the Newspaper Ordinance as an attempt to check frequent libels and to
provide against any reckless statements and controls to deal with blasphemous, seditious and other
forms of libel. Mac-Gregor agreed but emphasized the dangers of press indiscretion.

Another proof of colonial high handedness under Lord Lugard was the promulgation of the seditious
offences ordinance of 1909. The essence of this ordinance was that through it Governor Egerton sought
to control political unrest and protect the government officers generally from public criticism. The
newspaper ordinance made the newspaper business in Lagos more expensive and therefore checked
the previous tendency towards the proliferation of newspapers.

CONSEQUENCES OF LUGARD CONSTITUTION

The net effect of Lord Lugard's arrangement was that it helped to increase the tempo of nationalism in
Nigeria. As a matter of fact, the agitation for changes had started to gather momentum as a result of
many factors. To start with, the few educated Nigerians at the time resented Lord Lugard's
constitutional set - up as most unsatisfactory. As a result, they joined their counterparts from the other
British colonies in West Africa namely, Gambia, Gold coast (now Ghana) and Sierra Leone in the
formation of a political organization called the National Congress of British West Africa (N.C.B. W.A)

The activities of the congress together with other nationalist movements are better discussed under the
section - Nationalism in Nigeria. Suffice it to say that nationalism and constitutional development went
on concurrently in the colonial days and nationalism precipitated changes in constitution making.
Because of the inter-twined nature of the two issues, it may be necessary to treat nationalism before we
continue with other constitutions. This is imperative because sub-sequent colonial constitutions
particularly the 1922 constitution were culminations of the agitations and demands of the nationalists.
REFERENCES

1. Amucheazi E. C. (1986) Church and Politics in Eastern Nigeria 1945 -1966, A study in pressure
group Lagos, MacMillan Nigeria Publishers Limited.

2. Ayandele et al E. A. (ed) (1967) The growth of African civilization: The making of modern Africa
volume 2: The Late Nineteenth Century to Present, Longman.

3. Falola, T., Mahadi A., Uhomoibhi M., Anyanwu U. (1991) History of Nigeria 2, Nigeria in the
nineteenth century. Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Ltd.

4. Ikime, O. (ed.) (1980) Groundwork of Nigerian history Ibadan, Heinemarm.

5. Isichei E, E, (1983) A History of Nigeria Ikeja, Longman.

6. Joye E.M and Igweike, K. (1982) Introduction to the 1979 Nigerian constitution. London, The
Macmillan Press Ltd.

7. Stride G. T., Ifeka C. (1977) Peoples and empires of West Africa, West Africa in history 1000 -
1800. Ikeja, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.

8. Tankh (1970) Indirect rule in British Africa, Vol. 3, No.3, London Longman.
CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONALISM

For better understanding of this topic, we shall divide the topic into the following sub-topics.

(i) Meaning of Nationalism.

(ii) Origin of Nationalism in Africa.

(Iii) Factors that prompted Nationalism in Africa.

(iv) Factors that promoted Nationalism in West Africa.

(v) Impact of Nationalism on West Africa.

MEANING OF NATIONALISM

It will be difficult to state one generally accepted definition of nationalism that will serve all societies,
individuals and circumstances. This is because, individuals and scholars define nationalism in a manner
that will suit their milieu, to reflect the time and place. For instance, in some situations, nationalism is
taken to mean determination, commitment and resolve to make earnest contributions towards the
development of one's state. In another sense, nationalism is seen from the perspective that a particular
people are dominated by foreigners and the desire to be free from such colonial bondage.

In view of the varying definitions of nationalism, it will be necessary to provide some definitions offered
by some scholars on the subject. Okafor (1981) believes that, nationalism may be described as the
conscious awakening of a people to project their image in and out of their boarders to assert their
separate existence and group individualism in world affairs expressed through self-determination,
political and economic independence.

Another scholar who has defined nationalism is Appadorai (1975). According to him, nationalism is but
recognition of the principle that states should vary in their methods of law and government, reflecting in
their variety of distinctions of human groups. Not only does each nation gain in its individuality, but
humanity as a whole thereby adds to its cultural wealth. For the human race is not at its best when
every man or every group is a copy of every other, civilization progresses by differentiation as well as by
assimilation of interests and character. From the above, Appadorai maintains that states that are unified
by national sentiment are always more stable and their laws always better obeyed than states that are
only held together by subjection to a common authority. For him nationalism implies that people who
are one nation (ethnic group) should be allowed to be free from external control.

The above is one of the instances of the difficulty with the understanding of social science concepts. If
we are to accept this definition, it will definitely mean that the Igbos who wanted Biafra in 1967 should
have been allowed to pull out of Nigeria and stay on their own and the Ogoni in 1993 should have been
given a republic as they demanded. If the above explanation is accepted, Nigeria would disintegrate into
at least twenty nations. The same story goes for many other African countries that were brought
together by colonialism.

J.S. Coleman (1965) has equally explained the meaning of nationalism. He said that it includes
sentiments, activities and organizational developments aimed explicitly at the self-government and
independence of Nigeria as a nation. He goes further to highlight its distinguishing features:

(a) The explicit goal of Nigerian self government,

(b) The concept of Nigerian unity;

(c) The predominance of Westernized elements in leadership groups;

(d) The development of permanent political associations to pursue nationalist objectives and

(e) The predominance of modern political values and ideals.

Ibezim (1994) also opines that nationalism is a strong patriotic feeling to ones own country. It also
means the desire for the political independence of one's own country. Finally on conceptual
explanation, is the definition given by Olisa et al (1991). They believe that nationalism is spiritual and
sentimental; the nationalist group is united because its members feel the same way about various
matters which concern them. The concern of Africans was how to be free from foreign domination and
be independent. In order to be free they took many actions to assert their independence. These
activities, actions, reactions and movements in order to achieve self rule were known as nationalism.

ORIGIN OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism in Europe arose with the era of Enlightenment, when members of nation states began to
clamour for freedom from powerful nations. In Europe the sentiment to be free from domination could
be regarded as period of European nationalism.

In Africa the origin of nationalism could be dated to the 19th century with the resistance efforts of such
individuals as Jaja of Opobo, Nana of Itsekiri and Ovonranwem of Benin to oppose the British conquest.
This opposition constitutes the early phase of nationalism in Nigeria, for instance. These chiefs, who
knew that British rule would deprive them of their powers resisted British penetration, some resisted it
to preserve their cultural values or to halt the penetration of foreign traders into the hinterland. This
resistance took many forms: non-cooperation with the British in trade; ill-treatment of British officials
and wars against British punitive expeditions. These actions and reactions on the part of the natives
constituted the early stage of nationalism in Africa. Although they were subdued by the use of force,
they perceived from the onset that foreign rule was not in the interest of the natives. This was
confirmed during the period of colonialism.

Another phase of nationalism could be the period between 1914 and 1959. This was the period in which
many Africans particularly Nigerians, had received some education that availed them the opportunity to
fully appreciate the negative impact of colonialism. With education and exposure, Africans were better
equipped to fight colonialism.

AIMS OF NIGERIAN NATIONALISM

Many political historians have given reasons which generated the desire for self-government.

(1) To bring about economic emancipation of the country as a whole. The country had been
subjected to economic impotency and exploitation by the British economic institutions such as Banks,
the UAC, insurance companies and other British companies in Nigeria. All avenues of economic progress
had been closed against Nigerians. It was against this that the nationalists fought to reverse the order of
things.

(2) To bring political freedom and independence for Nigeria. The rallying focal point of the
nationalist activities was mainly geared towards winning political freedom for the country. For many
years even prior to 1914 or precisely by 1861, most parts of Nigeria had come under foreign control and
Nigerians were denied the political administration of her citizens. Consequently, there was oppression
of the citizens and few Nigerians participated in the political process. Decisions on issues concerning
Nigeria and Nigerians were taken by foreigners and imposed on Nigerians, and the decisions were
obviously the suppression of our people, discrimination in political matters, and the urge to participate
in the governance of the country made Nigerian nationalism the focal point. Mokwugo Okoye (1981) has
also stated another aim of Nigerian nationalism. This, according to him, is because of the deterioration
in the health and living standards of the African people since the subjugation by western imperialism.
For instance, He quotes W.E. Mccullach who surveyed the diets of the Hausas and Fulanis of Nigeria in
1929 and maintained that the dieting of the people showed that it was ill-balanced with an undue
proportion of carbohydrates resulting in malnutrition and disease. And in 1950 the Nigerian livestock
Mission reported that in the Niger province, 51% of the children did not survive the fifth year due to
malnutrition. Medical opinion in the colonial era, suggested that the large majority of Nigerians suffer to
a greater or lesser degree from under nutrition and an ill-balanced diet. This situation had been brought
on the people because the colonial production methods were still primitive, the greater majority of the
population were illiterate and standards of nutrition, housing and medical care were low. The people
therefore became anxious to live better and hence to produce more goods, in greater variety; they
wanted to become better educated, they showed a growing willingness to modify those social
institutions that were not conducive to progress. This desire for progress was another factor that
precipitated the spate of nationalism.

Again, after a hundred years of British rule, Nigeria boasted of only one University college, one technical
institute, 8 trade centres, 137 teacher training centres, 120 secondary and 9,393 primary schools (nearly
all of them run by the Christian churches). In the same period, there were only 161 hospitals and 95
doctors for 32 million people. Although revenue had grown from 5 million pounds in 1904 to 200 million
pounds in 1952, the benefits had of course gone mainly to the capitalist monopolies. Up to 1952,
government expenditure was still over-weighed with civil service salaries most of which went to aliens in
the upper segment known as the senior service. This state of affairs that was oppressive to Nigeria made
nationalism an inevitability.

In concluding this section of our discourse, we maintain that the aims of nationalism in Nigeria were to
wrestle political power from the British colonial rulers and to use such power to better the lots of
Nigerians who had suffered dastardly in the hands of british officials.

FACTORS THAT PROMPTED NATIONALISM

Nationalism in Africa was prompted by many factors. Some of these factors that ignited nationalism
include; Injustice on the part of the European officials on the natives. This could be explained in the
sense that Africans were not regarded as human beings. They were marginalized, suppressed,
oppressed, discriminated against, and dominated as if they were beasts. Some of the areas of injustice
meted to Africans were;

a. Economic Exploitation: The economy of the colonized states was deliberately plundered by the
Europeans to the disadvantage of the people. The foreigners used the goods and services of Africa to
develop their home states whereas no concerted effort was made in investing substantially to the
development of the natives. For instance, the Europeans dictated the prices of goods produced in Africa
and at the same time dictated the prices of goods imported into this land. Again, some goods produced
here were regarded as illicit and no effort was made in encouraging the production of goods by Africans
instead, drinks, clothes, were branded substandard and producers suppressed.

b. Political Domination:

The indigenes of the colonies were regarded as inferiors who had nothing to contribute towards
the progress of their states. They were not considered eligible for any positions and were never
consulted before issues affecting them were decided. Constitutions were made and imposed on them,
and elections were conducted with restricted franchise to deter the natives from participation. Their
rights and liberties were dangerously curtailed so as to keep them perpetually subservient to the
European authority.

c. Social Discrimination:

This was another factor that prompted Africans to agitate for self-rule. Discrimination was in the
area of employment where Africans were not considered worthy to have certain positions in the public
service even when they had equivalent qualifications with the Europeans. Another source of
discrimination was that separate areas of settlement were carved out for the whites and Africans had
little interaction with the whites as they were deemed to be inferior. Government Reserved Areas were
created and made comfortable for the Europeans and the blacks were barred from living in these areas.
Generally, Africans were regarded as inferior human beings who had nothing to offer to humanity and
were therefore to be treated anyhow.

d. Another factor that ignited nationalism was the imposition of alien religion or doctrine on the
people and fanatical desire to spread a defined religion at the expense or detriment of native religions.
This sparked off resistance of the foreign religious domination.

FACTORS THAT PROMOTED NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

Authors believe that colonialism sowed the seed that germinated and destroyed it. This assertion is
correct in many respects, especially when we consider the following factors. However, these factors
could be grouped into external and internal factors.
INTERNAL FACTORS

a. Economic factor: The Europeans wanted Africans to pay taxes. They therefore needed money
with which to pay taxes. It therefore became imperative that they had to work for the Europeans who
controlled the money needed for the payment of taxes. To be free from such payment of taxes which
was alien to many places in Africa, the natives teamed up in order to resist the payment. Such collective
resistance was one major force that helped to galvanize the energy of Africans towards the agitation for
freedom. Still under the economic factor was the fact that the Europeans discriminated against Africans
in the areas of employment and wages. Qualified Africans were not considered worthy of employment
whereas their inferiors who were whites were offered jobs. More discouraging and humiliating was the
point that there was unequal payment for equal work. The European officials were paid more while the
blacks received peanuts in their homeland. This also generated hatred for the foreigners among the
blacks.

b. Education: Education was one primary factor that promoted nationalism in Africa. The
Europeans brought their western brand of formal education to Africans. Initially, education was not to
benefit Africans but to imbue them with the opportunity of being able to read, write and calculate
simple arithmetic which would enable the Africans relate with the whites in their economic exploitation
of our resources. With this education, Africans began to read and appreciate issues concerning them. It
was this acquisition of western education that helped to expose them to even the European history and
literature and the Africans became conscious of the in human treatment being meted to them. Thus,
education became the vehicle through which the injustices, humiliation, exploitation and oppression
were fully appreciated. The reading of activities of other nationals in other countries helped to ginger
Africans to demand for their freedom. In summary, education was the major factor that exposed
Africans, motivated and sustained their determination to remain persistence in their demand for self-
rule and better life for their people.

C. Formation of Groups and Organizations

With exposure which came as a result of education, Africans came to realize that they would
achieve their goal of self rule faster if they formed groups. Their knowledge of group resistance helped
to inform them that such groups should be formed. Some of these groups included tribal associations
such as Egbe Omo Oduduwa for the Yorubas, Jamiyya Mutanem Arewa for the Hausa-Fulani. There were
also political organizations which started as protest movements against particular colonial measures. For
example, was the Peoples Union established in 1908 which was formed to protest the proposed water
rate in Lagos by Governor Walter Egerton. The People's Union organized rallies where it called on the
people of Lagos to reject the proposal.

There was also the Reform club which was formed in December 1920. Its membership was drawn from
the Lagos elite. Its main contribution was its opposition of direct taxation in Nigeria.
There was also the National Congress of British West Africa known as the (Congress). The leader was
Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and the Congress was formed in 1920. Casely Hayford,
the founder was a distinguished lawyer and politician. He was later assisted by the father of Nigerian
nationalism, Herbert Macaulay. Other members were J.B Danquah (Ghana),and Wallace Johnson (Sierra
Leone). Three major factors led to the formation of the Congress. The first was the impact of the First
World War on Africa. The participation of Africans in the War made many of them to be aware of
international problems. The elite then began to demand for freedom and equality among races.

The second reason was the ideological influence of writers such as Edward BIyden, the West Indian
who called for the liberation of the culture of the blacks from European domination, and J.P. Jackson,
the Liberian editor of the Lagos Weekly Record, who criticized British rule in Africa.

The third factor was the influence of external organizations like the Indian National Congress and the
Pan-African Movement. Some West African educated elite were associated with the Pan-African
Movement which held its first congress in Pairs in February 1919. At this meeting, the Pan-African
Movement made a profound declaration that:

The (Africans) shall not be denied on account of their race or colour a share in their own government,
justice before the courts and economic and social equality.

Inspired by the ideals of the Pan-African Movement, a few West African elites formed the National
Congress of British West Africa with the headquarters of the Congress in Gold Coast (Ghana).

DEMANDS/OBJECTIVES OF THE CONGRESS

This organization which was inaugurated in Accra, Gold Coast in 1920 wrote a petition to the Colonial
Secretary for the introduction of representative government and other democratic reforms in West
Africa. The objectives of the Congress were:

(i) to ensure the effective participation of Africans in their own government;

(ii) to promote unity among the British West African countries;

(iii) to remove the discrimination in the colonial civil service so that Africans can fill some
top positions;

(Iv) to achieve increase in the number of Africans in the Legislature- half of which should be elected
Africans;

(v) to ensure that appointment of chiefs were proposed and determined by the people;

(vi) that a university to serve the whole British West Africa was to be established;

(vi) that Africans should be appointed to the judiciary;

(vii) compulsory education should be introduced;

(viii) separation of the judiciary from administrative control;

(ix) repeal of ordinances regarded as obnoxious;

(x) ensure that discrimination was completely abhorred. The limiting of the immigration of Syrians;

(xi) The partitioning of African colonies should be done with the consent of Africans.

STEPS TAKEN TO ACHIEVE THE ABOVE DEMANDS

The meeting of the Congress was held in Accra from 11 to 29 March 1920. Representatives were drawn
from all the four British West African colonies - Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Ghana. Eighty-
three resolutions were made, the major ones have been stated above. The resolutions, all on
Africanization, were to enable the elite play a major role in the colonial administration. There was no
demand for immediate self-government.

The Congress also decided to become a permanent organization and to put its resolutions before the
Secretary of State for Colonies in London. A nine-man delegation of the Congress was in London
between September 1920 and March 1921. They sought the support of organizations and the public
before presenting their petition.

The Congress's delegation to London failed in its demand, for the Secretary of State for Colonies refused
to give it a hearing. The Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Milner had been prejudiced by the British
West African Governors against the Congress. In Nigeria, the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, described the
Congress as being in no way representative of the people. He described the members of the congress as
a self selected and self appointed congregation of educated African gentlemen and in a most
devastating manner denounced any concept of a West African Nation and even of a Nigerian Nation.

REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF NCBWA

We had already noted above that the National Congress of British West Africa seemed not to have
succeeded in its bid to bring their demands across to the British Government. We have equally noted
that the hostility of the colonial administration was responsible for the failure of its London delegation.
In other words the colonial Governor did not co-operate with the intellectuals who were seen as
potential opposition leaders.

Another reason for the failure of the Congress was the hostility of some chiefs to the educated elite. In
Ghana, Nana Ofori Atta, a prominent chief attacked the congress and wrote to London not to accord any
recognition to the Congress. Some chiefs in Nigeria held the same view.
Again, the Congress remained an affair of the elite centred in Lagos, Accra, Freetown and Bathurst. No
attempt was made to bring the common people into its fold. So the contention that it did not represent
the masses seemed to be true.

There was also the problem of internal struggle for positions among its local leaders. This weakened the
various branches of the congress especially in Lagos.

Finally, the Congress lost its initial enthusiasm and became conservative as its leaders began to be
elected or nominated into the legislative councils in the territories. This led to lack of solidarity and co-
operation amongst the people who could not speak with one voice.

SOME ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CONGRESS

Though the congress did not achieve all its objectives, it recorded some achievements. Some of these
achievements included:

(i) Certain constitutional reforms did take place shortly after its delegation to London. For instance,
2 years later, apparently compelled by the growing influence of the members, one of the demands of
the congress was met. The colonial Governor apparently recommended, and the colonial office
approved the abolition of Lord Lugards' council and a new Executive Council established in 1922. New
constitutions were also introduced in Gold Coast (1925) and Sierra Leone (1926).

(ii) These constitutions made provisions for African elected membership. Limited franchise was
introduced in Freetown, Accra and Cape Coast, Lagos and Calabar.

(iii) The demand for higher education was met by the establishment of Achimota College in Accra in
1927 as a nucleus of a University.

(iv) There was the reconstitution of the West African Court of Appeal and this lessened the control
of the judiciary by colonial Governors.

(v) Certain Senior posts were earmarked for Africans in the civil service. This gave some Africans the
opportunity to be absorbed into the administrative class of the colonialcivil service.

(vi) There was also the introduction of the elective principle in Nigeria in 1922. The elective principle
was later extended to Sierra Leone in 1924 and the Gold Coast in 1925.
(vii) Finally, other parties formed after 1923 drew some lessons from the collapse of the Congress.
For instance, the other parties solicited the support of the chiefs unlike in the past when the educated
elite thought that the traditional rulers were inconsequential.

THE NIGERIA NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NNDP)

This was another organization that was formed to challenge the colonial administration. The party was
founded by Herbert Macaulay in 1923 following the introduction of Hugh Clifford's constitution of 1922.
The constitution made provision for the election of four Nigerians (three from Lagos and one from
Calabar) to the Legislative Council.

This party was formed on 24 June 1923, by Herbert Macaulay and his friends. The party was formed to
contest elections into the Legislative Council. The principal officers were Macaulay - Secretary; Joseph
Egerton - President; and Eric Moore - Vice President.

Other foundation members were Dr. C.C. Adeniyi Jones, Dr. Adeyemo Alakija and Dr.J.T. Caulcrick.

The objective of the party was to secure the safety and welfare of the colony and the protectorate of
Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial Common wealth and to carry the banner of Right,
Truth, Liberty, Justice and Democracy.

The party was opposed to forced labour, dispossession of land, plantation estates, and harsh laws. It
wanted better transport facilities, more production of palm produce and better health and educational
facilities. It also demanded municipal self-government for Lagos, compulsory education, Africanization
of the civil service and a West African Court of Appeal. It was the first elite movement which kept touch
with the common people and so fostered political consciousness among the Lagos populace. The party
had national or Nigeria wide objectives such as the establishment of branches all over Nigeria; the
economic development of Nigeria's natural resources; fair prices for Nigerian produce; and the
development of higher education.

The party won the Lagos seats in the legislative council in 1923, 1928 and 1933. Between 1925 and
1938, it also won all the elective seats in the Lagos Town council. The party was very successful because
of its strategy and effective organization.

First, it had a newspaper, the Lagos Weekly Record, which propagated its ideas and criticized the
government. Secondly it brought together both the traditional and modern elite. Thirdly, the party
enjoyed the support of trade guilds, market women associations and the elite, majority of who were
Yoruba.
Nevertheless, the party confined most of its activities to Lagos. Macaulay was also criticized for being
overbearing. It is noteworthy however that the party attracted the largest number of the elite in Lagos
and Calabar. It would have found it difficult to operate in the north where there were barriers to
rewarding political contacts between southerners and northerners. Besides, the colonial government
was hostile to the formation of pan-Nigerian parties, so as to prevent the emergence of a strong anti-
colonial force.

The NNDP was not without its weaknesses. First, its members were assimilationist in attitude. What
this means is that they were prepared to work with the established colonial institutions. They failed to
challenge the legitimacy of colonial rule and hoped that the British would willingly leave the country. In
other words, the NNDP gradually lost its initial vigour as its leaders developed conservative tendencies
and compromised with the colonial administration.

THE NIGERIAN YOUTH MOVEMENT (NYM)

The rise of youth movements in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone in the 1930s was another manifestation
of West African nationalism. The youth organizations arose as a reaction against the domination of the
old parties by the ageing elite who were fast drifting into conservatism.

The birth of the NYM was due to the yearnings of the Lagos educated elite for a new nationalist
organization and the response to the establishment of the Yaba Higher College in Lagos on 19 January
1934. The colonial administration established the Yaba Higher College to provide education for youths
to fill posts in the civil service. The college was not affiliated to any University in Britain. It was to grant
diplomas in such disciplines as Medicine, Arts, Economics, Engineering and Agriculture.

The educated elite criticized this college for a number of reasons. First, they said that it was inferior in
status to a British University. Second, its diplomas were inferior, and its holders would work in
subordinate positions to graduates of British Universities. The elite thought that this was a device to
prevent Nigerians from rising to the top in the civil service. Third, the diplomas would not be recognized
outside Nigeria.

To put pressure on government to enhance the status of the Yaba college, the elite formed the Lagos
Youth Movement in 1934. This group was led by Ernest Ikoli, Samuel Akinsanya and Dr. J.C Vaughan. In
1936, it changed its name to the Nigerian Youth Movement. It was restricted at first to Lagos until
Nnamdi Azikiwe and H. O. Davies joined it on their return to Nigeria in 1937 and 1938 respectively. From
then it became a powerful national movement with a national outlook.
AIMS OF NYM

The political programme of the NYM attempted to foster the political advancement of the country and
to enhance the socio-economic status of its citizens. In 1938, it published its charter which had among
its objectives, the promotion of Nigerian Unity and national consciousness and the achievement of
complete autonomy within the British Empire.

There were also the socio-economic charter which wanted mass education and the economic charter
which requested for equal economic opportunities for all, irrespective of race. For the promotion of
national unity and consciousness, the movement established branches in important cities throughout
Nigeria.

ACHIEVEMENT OF NYM

In 1938, the movement's candidates won elections to the Lagos Town Council and all the three Lagos
seats in the Legislative Council. This victory ended the electoral monopoly of the NNDP. The prominent
members of the NYM during this period included Kofo Abayomi, Ernest S. Ikoli, an Ijaw and celebrated
journalist (Vice President) H.O. Davies, a lawyer and journalist (secretary), H. A Subair, S. L. Akintola, O.
Awolowo, J. A. Tuyo, Duro Emmanuel and Nnamdi Azikiwe.

The N YM tried to be national. In 1938, it had forty branches outside of Lagos with a total membership
of over 20,000. Some of its active branches were in Maiduguri. Makurdi, Uyo, Ibadan, Ijebu-Ode, Warri,
Sapele, Kano, Benin, Aba, Zaria, Enugu, Kaduna, Port-Harcourt, Jos and Calabar. The NYM had more
spread than the NNDP. However, the branches in the north were dominated by the southerners who
lived there. This was due to the hostility of the colonial administration to parties with southern
connection.

It concerned itself with a wide range of national issues such as Africanization of the civil service,
provincial representation in the Legislative Council, reform of education and the welfare of African
businessmen and farmers. In 1937, it supported the Nigerian Motor Transporters Union in the agitation
of double licence. It encouraged the formation of trade Unions. It also fought against the cocoa pool of
1938, a measure designed by foreign firms to keep the prices of cocoa down. Two years later, the NYM
also agitated against the ban on the exportation of palm kernels from the western provinces. The
agitations forced the government to rethink some of its policies.

Finally, it established a powerful journal the Daily Service through which it campaigned for its ideals of
national unity and political emancipation.

WEAKNESSES AND DECLINE OF NYM

The members of NYM were mainly moderates and did not demand any rapid overthrow of the colonial
system. From 1941, the movement began to decline owing to intense internal strife among its leaders.
For instance, there was the competition between the Daily service and the West African Pilot which
Azikiwe felt was unnecessary. In 1941, Abayomi resigned from the Legislative Council and there was a
crisis as to who should replace him. Awolowo with some Lagos members supported that Ikoli should
replace Abayomi. The controversy generated bitterness among members. The NYM eventually chose
Ikoli. Azikiwe and some others left the movement. Many easterners and Ijebu's followed them and the
NYM collapsed.

EMERGENCE OF POWERFUL PERSONALITIES

This was another important factor that increased the tempo of political mobilization and national
consciousness among Nigerians. Some of these personalities particularly in the southern part of Nigeria
gave immense impetus to nationalism in Nigeria. Some of these individual include:

(i) Herbert Macaulay

(ii) Nnamdi Azikiwe

(iii) Obafemi Awolowo

(iv) Ernest Ikoli

(v) John Payne Jackson (a Liberian who lived in Lagos)

The profile and activities of these individuals in the growth and development of political process of
Nigeria will be given prominent attention later. Suffice it to state that these individuals contributed
fundamentally to the political awareness and national unity that now exist in Nigeria today.

THE PRESS

From four news papers in 1912, the number grew to thirteen in 1926. The press was interested in
policies and national consciousness. The press was the guardian of the liberties and rights of the people.
It also tried to interpret the people's ideals and aspirations. Some of the papers were;

The Lagos Weekly Record established by Jackson John Payne in 1890. The paper championed the cause
of Africans.

a. The Lagos standard.

b. The Nigerian Chronicle.

c. The Nigerian Times.

d. The Lagos Weekly Record.

e. The Lagos Daily News.

f. The West African Pilot.

g. The Comet

h. The Nigerian Spectator.

i. The African Messenger

After 1910, a few printing presses also joined by publishing polemical literature. These pamphlets and
newspapers contributed to the awakening of political consciousness. These African owned newspapers
also kept the elite united in fighting a common cause - the defence of African interests against the
oppressions of alien rule.

THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War had a far reaching political, economic and social impact on the growth and
development of nationalism in West Africa in particular and Africa in general. Although the causes of the
war are not the main pre-occupation of this book, we must state like Chinweizu (1978) that soon after
1900, the European late comers to imperial expansion, Germany and Italy, began a serious search for
lands on which to prey. Italy snatched parts of Libya (1911 to 1912) and intrigued to annex parts of the
Balkans. Germany, the strong rising power, arriving late at the expansionist game sought overseas
commercial outlets commensurate with her industry but found that most of the world was already
occupied by other great powers. Not satisfied with what territory she had grabbed in Africa and New
Guinea, she turned her attention to Eastern Europe and South-West Asia, and also joined in starting the
scramble in China. In Europe, Germany sought an eastern empire at the expense of the industrializing
Russian Empire, and also through gaining hegemony over the medieval Hapsburg and Ottoman empires,
which were in danger of breaking up under the pressures of Russian ambition and the revolt of their
captive nationalities. If successful, this east ward thrust of German imperial effort would create an
imperial Germany with a sphere of influence that would reach France. France was alarmed at this
prospect. Their alarm intensified as Germany forged assistance alliance with Austria-Hungary and
Turkey, proclaiming themselves the Entente Powers, Britain, France and Imperial Russia ganged up
against the German, Hapsburg and Turkish imperial allies and sought to prevent the coalescence. When
in 1914 Serbia sought to assert her independence from the Hapsburg Empire, Austria moved to crush
her, Russia moved to aid Serbia; Germany and Turkey moved in to protect their ally Austria; and Britain
and France went to the aid of Russia. The Entente powers, finally pitted against their feared rival,
Germany, and World War I had begun.

Hoping to receive a good share of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, Italy joined the Entente
powers. Japan's design on China made her fight on the Entente side.
Back here in Africa, one outstanding political result of the war was the British and French occupation of
the German colonies of Togo and Cameroons and the consequent conversion of these colonies into
mandated or trusteeship territories. The reason was that during the war, British and French West
African troops captured and occupied Togo and Cameroons. After the war following decisions reached
at the Treaty of Versailles, these colonies were taken away from Germany and handed over to Britain
and France to be administered by them on behalf of the League of Nations, that is, under its mandate.
As a result Togo and Cameroons were each divided into two portions - Western Togo and Western
Cameroons going to Britain, and Eastern Togo and Eastern Cameroons going to France. Britain
administered Western Togo as part of the Gold coast (Ghana) and Western Cameroons as part of
Nigeria.

Again, West African soldiers from both French and British territories fought the Germans in Togo,
Cameroons and East Africa (Tanganyika). During these campaigns, they gained some knowledge of the
outside world which widened their outlook. They fought side by side with the white man and gained
better knowledge of his strength and weaknesses. They returned home with experiences which deeply
influenced their desire for freedom and liberty.

Also, the arbitrary division of Togo and Cameroons between Britain and France by the treaty of
Versailles in 1919 without reference to their peoples offended the African's sense of justice and fair-play
and developed in them a strong hatred of European colonialism. Nationalist resentment against
arbitrary division of African peoples began to feature prominently in West African newspapers and on
the list of nationalist grievances against colonial rule.

It is equally important to mention that the National Congress of British West Africa owed its rise to the
war. Influenced by war-time developments, the elite of British West African colonies organized this body
to protest against some of the short-comings of British rule in West Africa.

The First World War was equally significant for the growth of nationalism as it had tremendous impact
on the thoughts, aspirations and activities of literate people in West Africa. For instance, the statements
of Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America and Prime Minister Lioyd George of Britain about
self determination greatly influenced nationalist thought in West Africa. Lioyd George had stated in
1918 that the principle of self determination was applicable to colonies as to the occupied territories of
Europe. Although, attempts were made to modify the statement to preclude its applicability to African
territories, yet the nationalist aspirations of West African elite had been aroused by it.

On the economic front, economic and social development projects were halted and local industries were
developed to produce those goods which could not be produced because of the war. A typical example
was the development of coal-mining at Enugu during the war to offset the shortage of imported coal.
Finally, there was a sharp rise in the price of West African export goods soon after the war as those
goods were in great demand in Europe. The resulting post war boom brought prosperity to the people
and with it greater demand for social and economic development.

EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT PROMOTED NATIONALISM IN WEST AFRICA

African Church Movement

Another interesting manifestation of early nationalism in English-speaking West Africa was the African
church movement referred to by some historians as Ethiopianism. It was concerned with the struggle
between African clergymen and white missionaries for power and position in church administration just
as in the secular sphere where Africans were struggling for higher positions in the civil service. It led to
the breakaway of large numbers of African converts from the white dominated Christian (Protestant)
churches and to the establishment of indigenous churches.

These separatist movements were a nationalist reaction against white domination in the religious
sphere and an assertion of the African's ability to organize a religious body to work out his own spiritual
salvation without European leadership.

The point that is being emphasized is that Africans had realized that their position in the scheme of
things was nothing to write home about and they began to take steps on all fronts to emancipate their
poor reputation as a people who have nothing to offer to the progress of humanity. This movement led
to the adoption of African names at baptism, adaptation of church songs to native languages, and the
translation of the Bible and prayer books into vernacular.

Negro World Movements

Nationalism and political awareness in Africa was equally given enormous impetus by some external
factors particularly the period immediately following the end of World War I. Negro groups outside
Africa began movements which stimulated the tempo of nationalist movements in West Africa. One of
these movements was that which has come to be known as Pan Africanism.

Pan Africanism

The movement officially debuted at the first Pan African Conference organized by a West Indian
Barrister Heavy Sylvester-Williams in London in 1900. It began as an effort to bring peoples of African
descent throughout the world together to fight racial discrimination in America and colonialism in
Africa.
Other individuals who were prominent in this movement were W.E.B. Du Bois (an African Negro),
Marcus A. Garvey, and Blaise Diagne of Senegal. Other conferences were held in Paris 1918, London and
Brussels 1921, London and Lisbon 1923 and New York 1927.

One important feature of Pan Africanism at this time was that its leaders did not concern themselves
with any demand for self-government for African peoples. Another was that the early congresses were
dominated by Negro intellectuals from the New World. Nevertheless, the deliberations and resolutions
of these congresses reported in West African newspapers stimulated among the elite strong feelings of
kinship with Negroes in other parts of the world and kindled their desire to restore the lost dignity of
this black race.

Suffice it to state that these persons preached not only racial equality but also cultural and economic
emancipation of the black race.

THE WEST AFRICAN STUDENTS UNION (W.A.S.U)

Another movement organized by Africans outside Africa which contributed greatly in stimulating
political and racial consciousness among West Africans in this period was the W.A.S.U in Britain,
founded in London in 1925 by Solanke, a Nigerian law student. The W.A.S.U. became the nursery of
many future West African nationalist leaders. Although its objectives included the promotion of the
welfare of its members and of goodwill and understanding between Africans and peoples of other races,
it regarded the fostering of a spirit of political consciousness and racial pride among its members as its
primary aim.

Between 1925 and the outbreak of World War II, W.A.S.U. contributed in several ways in fostering
political and racial consciousness not only among its members but also among many communities that
came under its influence in British West Africa. First, it became a powerful centre of West African
nationalism in Britain and a training ground for leaders who were to influence nationalist activities in
their countries after the Second World War.

Second, it provided a forum for the expression of Africa's political and cultural yearnings, for instance,
through the platform of West African Students Union (WASU) the members appealed to anti-colonial
groups and progressive societies in Britain for the decolonization of Nigeria. In 1941 WASU submitted a
resolution to the Governor of Nigeria, requesting among others,

…A united Nigeria with a federal constitution based on a Swiss or US model ... Local tribal loyalty
(should) gradually be transcended, submerged in the development of Nigerian national loyalty.
In 1943, WASU and eight journalists, including Azikiwe submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in which they called for ten years of representative government to be followed by
five years of full responsible government. Generally WASU was instrumental to the spread of nationalist
ideas in West Africa. From the late 1930s, more West African students were going to the United States
of America for further studies. By 1941, an African students' Association in close link with the WASU was
founded in America. Like WASU, it produced important leaders of the West African nationalist
movements of the period after the Second World War. The Union submitted memoranda, prepared and
distributed pamphlets and held public lectures advocating for constitutional reforms.

NEGRO REACTION TO THE ITALIAN INVASION OF ETHIOPIA

This was another factor that stimulated nationalism in Africa. The ancient independent African Kingdom
of Ethiopia was invaded by Italy in 1935 producing a world Negro protest movement of unprecedented
scope which gave a strong boost to Negro racial unity and consciousness.
REFERENCES

1. Appadorai A. (1975) The substance of politics. Delhi, Oxford University Press.

2. Chinweizu (1978) The west and the rest of us. Lagos, Nok Publishers (Nigeria) Ltd.

3. Oleman J. S (1965) Nigeria background to nationalism. Berkeley; University of California Press.

4. Eronini A. E. (1978) The growth and decay of parliamentary democracy to Nigeria. Owerri,
Marble Press Ltd.

5. Falola T., Mahadi A, Uhomoibhi M, Anyanwu U. (1991) History of Nigeria in the twentieth
century. Ikeja, Longman Nigeria, Plc.

6. Ibezim E. O. (1994) comprehensive government for West African senior school certificate,
Onitsha, Hybrid Publishers Ltd.

7. OIusanya, G. O. (1973) The second world war and politics in Nigeria 1939 1953. Lagos, Evans
Brothers Ltd.

8. Okafor, M. I. (1981) Ground work of social studies for teacher training colleges and colleges of
education. Onitsha, EMBA Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.
9. Olisa M. S. O., Okoli E., Nwabufo, E. (1991) Government for senior secondary schools. Onitsha.
Africana FEP Publishers Ltd.

10. Okoye, M. (1981) Storms on the niger. A story of Nigeria's struggle. Enugu, Eastern Nigeria
Printing Corporation.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CLIFFORD CONSTITUTION OF 1922

It is important to observe that the nationalist activities during the Lord Lugard era ignited many changes
in the political terrain of Nigeria. We should be reminded of the formation and demands of the National
Congress of British West Africa besides other nationalist activities which helped to force some
constitutional changes in Nigeria. Although Sir Hugh Clifford who became the Governor in 1919,
ridiculed the Congress and bitterly attacked and denounced the supporters of the Congress in 1920,he
later yielded to one of the demands of the Congress. He recommended and the Colonial Secretary
approved the abolition of Lord Lugard's Councils and their replacement with a single Legislative Council
and a new Executive Council. These changes were effected in series of constitutional instruments which
together comprised the Clifford Constitution of 1922, named after the Governor.

FEATURES OF 1922 CONSTITUTION

i. The Legislature: The new Constitution established a law making body known as the legislative
Council in place of the Nigerian Council of the Lord Lugard era. The new Legislative Council was
composed of forty-six members. Out of this, 27 were official members whereas 19 were unofficial
members. Out of the 19 unofficial members, four were elected in the municipalities of Lagos and
Calabar. These two towns enjoyed the elective principle because they had the largest concentration of
educated elites who could use their franchise. 3 of the elected members were for Lagos and 1 for
Calabar. The other 15 members were nominated by the Government. In all, there were 10 Africans in
the Legislative Council, 4 of whom were elected for the first time in colonial British West Africa.

The Qualification for the election was adult male suffrage and those who had resided in the area
for at least 12 months, and a gross annual income of #100.00. The new Legislative Council was
competent to legislate for the order and good government of the colony of Lagos and Southern Nigeria.

ii The Executive Council: The Executive Council was composed entirely of British Officials responsible
to the Governor. By the Royal instruction of 1922 (Colony) the principal administrative officials of the
Government were made ex-officio members of the Council. The Governor was also empowered to
nominate other officials with the consent of the Secretary of State as members or extraordinary
members when he wished to obtain specialized advice. Although the Governor was to be advised by the
Council, he had absolute powers subject only to the supervision and control of the Secretary of State.
Beyond the obligation to consult, he was not bound by the advice of the Council.

iii The Legislative Council made laws for the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria alone
excluding the North. But when it came to matters of expenditure of money, the North participated. In
other words, the North was a special province and definitely placed in the Governor's office for his
personal administration. Thus, he ruled the North by proclamation and the Lieutenant Governor of the
North was a member of the Executive Council. Even if the North had any spokesmen at all, they were
the European representatives of the British colonial economic interest, for instance, the representatives
of the Chamber of Commerce and mining, the Senior Residents etc. The only connection between the
North and south was the possession of a single budget.

iv. The Legislative Council was subordinated to the Executive Council. Foreigners dominated the
Executive Council, majority of whom were agents of the British financial Oligarchy representing Banking,
shipping, Mining, Commerce etc. The Executive Council was chief adviser to the Governor on matters of
policy.

v. The tenure of office for the nominated unofficials was five years subject to renewal. This was
also true of the elected members. In the Executive Council in which no Nigerian was a member, the ex-
officio members who were heads of departments held their offices by royal instructions. These made
them more or less permanent members.

THE MERITS OF THE 1922 CONSTITUTION

From the features of the constitution already discussed above, one can identify some important
advantages of the constitution. They included;
(i) The expansion of the Legislative Council from what it was after the amalgamation to 46
members, and accommodation of 10 Nigerians in the new Legislative Council.

(ii). The introduction of the elective principle was another milestone in the political terrain of
Nigeria. The campaign and publicity that go with elections helped to sensitize and mobilize Nigerians in
the political process and national consciousness. Political organizations were formed together with
newspapers. All these were geared towards political awakening of Nigerians. (Refer to the activities of
NNDP etc).

(iii) Under this constitution, Cameroons was brought as part of Eastern Nigeria sequel to the defeat
of Germany in the First World War

Defects of the 1922 Constitution

Although the 1922 constitution brought some political engineering in Nigeria, so many issues that
tended to make the constitution deficient could be pin pointed. Some of them had already been treated
in the features. Attempts will be made here to highlight some.

(i) One of the provisions of the constitution read, 'every member in the Legislative Council was
allowed upon due notice given to propose an Ordinance or a resolution provided that such ordinance or
resolution had nothing to do with tax or public revenue'. This provision precluded the Legislature from
discharging its function of controlling the national purse and of granting money to the executive and
also controlling the executive in the way in which it spent public money. The power for initiating
monetary bills lay with the Governor alone. In a modern parliamentary practice, it is the work of the
legislature to grant money to the executive but under the 1922 constitution it was the executive
granting money to the legislature.

ii The Executive council, did not act as a check on the Governor as the body was merely advisory
to the Governor and the Governor was not bound to take all its advice. As a result the Executive Council
could not hold the Governor both accountable and responsible.

Iii The composition and functions of the Executive Council were regulated from abroad that is by
Royal instructions which favoured the Royal interests. Essentially, the Executive Council was made up of
Europeans with no Nigerian as member. There were neither Nigerian principal officials nor heads of
departments.

Iv. The constitution was silent on the wanton seizure by the Northern Lieutenant-Governor of a
place known as Okwugo-Igalla in Idah district to the south of Benue which was formerly under the
administrative jurisdiction of the Resident of Onitsha. This portrayed the picture that issues concerning
the North were treated as sacred.

v. The Legislative Council was a misnomer for it was merely advisory and had no initiative either in
ordinary or financial legislation and its official majority saw things in the same vein or lens as the
Governor. What was worse, the few Nigerians elected into the Legislature represented their social class
and not the people. Besides they lacked the power to influence the course of governmental actions.

vi. No effort was made on the part of the colonial administration to unify and integrate the North
and South many years after amalgamation. Rather issues that would further separate the units were
made constitutional. For instance from 1914 to 1934, the only Emirs that came down to the South was
on their way to London in 1934. Obviously deliberate attempts were reinforced to keep Nigeria
perpetually separate and disunited. The Legislative Council legislated for the South while the North was
governed by proclamation. The major connection of the North and South was the budget. It was not
until 1946 that the North and South sat in the same Legislative Council. The North was taken seriously
when it came to the question of revenue sharing.

BRIEF COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 1922 AND 1960 CONSTITUTIONS

For academic purposes, it is necessary to reflect on the 1922 vis-a-vis the 1960 constitution. Closely
examined, the 1922 constitution was not different from the constitution of the First Republic of Nigeria
which had a Parliament and the Executive -the Cabinet.

In the first Republic, the parliament met less than 4 months during the session under Abubakar and
because of pressure of time; it could hardly deal with most public businesses effectively. For this reason
the legislature could not hold the Executive responsible and accountable and this was the case in the
colonial period of 1922.

Possibly aware of the fact that the Nigerian cabinet ministers lost contact with public opinion and
became invisible princes who conspired to hold power in the same manner as the white majority in the
executive council of 1922 conspired to hold power at the pleasure of the imperial government, there
was that attraction to discuss money bills as contained in the national budgets which sustained the life
of the Legislative Council. This became a forum where they served not fellow Nigerians but foreign
British financials.

Under the constitution of the First Republic, Parliamentarians met in Lagos not by the desire to practice
parliamentary democracy but to continue to maintain their stay in office, enjoy the privileges and
rewards which accrue from holding public office.
The difference, however, between the composition of the legislature in 1922 and 1960 was that in the
latter, Nigerians dominated whereas in the former foreigners dominated. In the 1960 experiment, the
legislature could be described as peoples assembly. But in 1922, it could not be described as such for the
British colonial and commercial interests appeared to be more important than Nigeria's.

Both constitutions went off in like manner. The coup of January 15, 1966 blew off the 1960 Constitution
or the first Republican Constitution, while the 1946 constitution also blew off the 1922 Constitution.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1922 CONSTITUTION

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1922 TO 1945

The 1922 Constitution had enormous political consequences. Some of these are hereunder identified
and discussed. Elections became a regular and constitutional process in Nigerian politics. The
constitution stimulated an unprecedented political awakening especially in the coastal cities of Lagos
and Calabar. This gave automatic expression to the rise of political parties and newspaper organs. The
names of these newspapers have been mentioned elsewhere in this book. These newspapers emerged
during this period. Political parties some of which were short lived because of political rivalry or
inadequate financial backing equally sprang up. It was during this period that Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP) emerged. The activities of this party founded by Herbert Macaulay have been
discussed in the section that dealt with nationalism.

Note should be taken that this period was the era when nationalism began to gather momentum in
Nigeria and Africa in general. Other political movements which came up to challenge the supremacy of
NNDP was the Lagos Youth movement founded in 1934,and later the Nigerian Youth Movement in
1936. In 1938 the NYM challenged the NNDP and described it as neither national nor Nigerian. With the
involvement of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in the political terrain events took a wider dimension. Azikiwe soon
became the leader of NYM which became the most influential Nigerian party. The activities of the NYM
have also been discussed elsewhere in this book.

CONSEQUENCES OF 1922 CONSTITUTION

The 1922 Constitution witnessed an upsurge of forces making for political progress, both within and
outside the country. The elective system gave rise to political thought and action among the educated
Nigerians, particularly in Lagos. It resulted in the formation of a number of political parties, the most
prominent being the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led by Herbert Macaulay. The Nigerian
National Democratic Party dominated politics in Lagos, indeed in Nigeria, winning the Lagos seats in the
Legislative Council in 1923 and 1933. It was not until 1938 that another political party, the Nigerian
Youth Movement emerged to challenge this domination, winning the elections to the Lagos Town
Council and the Lagos seats in the Legislative Council. The Movement soon collapsed, and another party,
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) emerged.
Another effect of the 1922 Constitution was the rise of Newspapers. The Lagos Daily News 1925, the
Daily Times 1926, the West African Pilot 1937, the Comet 1932, the Nigerian Spectator, the African
Messenger and the Lagos Standard. All these emerged during this period. By this time, the press did not
disguise its nationalist feelings and soon began to mount a series of anti-colonial views. In 1943 a group
of eight West Africa journalists, among who was Dr. Azikiwe of Nigeria, were invited to London by the
British Council. The delegation took this opportunity to meet with the Secretary of State for the
colonies, to whom they submitted a memorandum advocating, among other things ten years of
representative government for the British West African colonies.

Other groups that played prominent roles as a result of the political changes were the trade unions and
African Students abroad. The West African students in London submitted memoranda, prepared and
distributed pamphlets and held public lectures advocating constitutional reforms in West Africa. In 1941
the Union submitted a memorandum to the Governor of Nigeria and the Sultan of Sokoto demanding
among other things a federal constitution for Nigeria.

NIGERIA BEFORE (1946) THE NEXT CONSTITUTION

Nigerian constitution making cannot be complete without some discussions of some events and
personalities that made constitutional amendments possible particularly in the colonial days.

During this period, nationalist movements were characterized by their militancy and the support of the
masses. This period witnessed the return of educated Nigerians who had gone abroad for education.
These included Nnamdi Azikiwe and H.O. Davies. These highly qualified Nigerians, especially Azikiwe
contributed to the development of national consciousness through their bright political ideas, through
establishment of newspapers and their articulation of issues. They organized rallies, agitations, and in
alliance with trade union leaders, organized strikes as well as a general mobilization of the people. It was
the arrival of people like Azikiwe from overseas which resulted in taking politics and anti-colonial
agitations out of Lagos to other parts of Nigeria through the nation-wide circulation of the West African
Pilot and his anti-colonial campaign tours. Before the 1946 constitution, some colonial officers made
some impact on the political/constitutional development of Nigeria. Their contributions will be
discussed as we proceed.

PERIOD BETWEEN 1923 TO 1945.

Sir Graham Thompson became Governor in 1926 and remained until 1930 without much to the credit of
this administration. When Sir Donald C. Cameron took over in 1930, the country was in financial distress,
and Sir Donald remained best known in Nigeria as the Governor who left his own son without a job
because retrenchment was one of the major answers to the country's economic problems. He governed
the country until 1936 without a single major political concession, although it was in his time that the
agitation for home rule became the concern of the younger generation such as Professor Eyo Ita.
Before the next constitution in 1946, series of political changes and social mobilization had taken place
in Nigeria. The impact of the World War II in accelerating socio political forces and generating external
and internal influences must be stressed as they had impact on Nigeria's constitutional developments.
These can equally be regarded as factors that added impetus to nationalism in Africa.

(i) The Atlantic Charter: On August 9, 1941 Wiston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt met in Placenta
Bay in New Found land and made a common declaration of purpose with respect to winning the war,
which began in 1939. From the conference emerged what is known as the Atlantic Charter which in its
third clause declared that the signatories to the charter "must respect the right of all peoples in
choosing the form of government under which they will live". The charter promised hope of freedom to
the colonial people when the war was over. Thus, it fired the zeal and aspiration of the nationalists. For
example, Indians, Indonesians, and Nigerians picked up from the charter such ideas as self-government,
self-determination and national independence. At a time, Churchill regretted the words of the charter
and was out to restrict it to Europe but Roosevelt was not prepared for any compromise and maintained
that the Charter applied to all humanity.

(ii) The American Influence: America had no colonies of its own and in fact had nothing to lose at
the end of the war. Because of this, it launched fierce attacks against imperialism and colonialism. In
October 1941, Wendel Wilkie an American presidential candidate during his world tour declared in
China that: "this war must be the end of the empire of nations over nations". He called on the imperial
powers to make definite time tables with which to hand over power of self-government and
independence to the colonial peoples. To the African and Asian people (especially nationalists) this was
a new found hope. Continued attacks from Americans fortified the spirit of African students in America
who were not only articulate and vocal but spearheaded the movement or struggle for national
liberation. In Britain, The Times welcomed the criticism of America describing it as wholesome and
appropriate. The struggle for independence, which had been on in India, could no longer be delayed and
by 1947 India gained her independence.

(iii) Flexibility Of Britain's Colonial Policy: American criticisms seemed to have been well taken by the
British government. Britain saw that history was on the side of the colonial peoples with respect to their
demands for self-determination, self-government and independence. It began to relax some of the
rigidities of her colonial policy. They saw the need to prepare colonial subjects for government within
the context of an international family (The British Common wealth). It then embarked on passing series
of colonial Welfare Acts. The British government empowered the secretary of state for the colonies to
make schemes which were likely to promote the development of resources in the colonies and their
peoples. It prescribed a minimum of 5 million pounds for this purpose and reserved 500,000 pounds for
the promotion of research and enquiry. Nigeria obtained considerable sums from these allocations.

Another aspect of the British foreign policy was reflected in the role of the British Labour Party.
This party emerged as a dynamic force in the British domestic politics. It acted as a catalyst by
quickening the pace of colonial emancipation. It mounted pressures on the British coalition government
to recognize that self government for the colonial people was a priority. The party's policy was "the
belief that all people of whatever race have an equal right to freedom and to an equitable share of the
good things of the earth". In its manifestoes for the general election of 1945 the party spokesman
Arthur Greech Jones justified the party's policy by saying that, "the attitude of the party was caused not
by emotional humanism or political radicalism but labours dislike of imperialism and labour's belief of a
cooperative world".

Iv. Nigerian Leaders as well as African students studying overseas swallowed some of these ideas
which were to be used in the struggle for national liberation. The West African Students Union became
vociferous, organized themselves as lobby groups and agitated en mass for constitutional reforms in all
the British colonies of West Africa. By so doing, they aroused a fairly enthusiastic if not considerable
segment of the British public opinion in favour of African freedom. In a conference in 1941, the Unit
submitted a memorandum to the Nigerian Governor and the most influential Nigeria traditional ruler at
the time and the spiritual head of the Moslems the Sultan of Sokoto and requested among other things
a United Nigeria with a federal constitution based on the US or Swiss Model but with necessary
modifications. Thus, they were the first organized body to suggest federalism as a solution to the multi-
ethnic and multi-lingual diversities in Nigeria.

Before the Second World War, Nigerian students moved to the United Kingdom for studies but
after the Second World War, there was a shift from the United Kingdom to the United States of America.
By this time people like Dr. Azikiwe and Eyo Ita returned from the US as students and became staunch
nationalists. While in the US, most of these students toured the US giving public lectures and writing
articles. Back home, most of them became militant nationalists and became links through which other
students went to the US for further studies. While in the US, they observed and were influenced by the
anti-imperialist tradition, the dynamic, aggressive and competitive nature of the political, economic and
social behaviour of America. The African students in the US carried most of these values with them back
to Africa and all these ingredients became social facts, and political facts with mobilizing effects on West
Africa.

v. The Second World War: The impact of the Second World War was manifold. It resulted in
intense awakening of Nigerians. When the Far East was cut off by the Japanese conquest, the Western
world turned hungrily to Africa and particularly to Nigeria for tropical raw materials with which to
support their factories or those of the allied nations.

The war also resulted in stringent inflation, but rising prices however stimulated production of
various primary products and this gave rise to a sharp increase in the volume of import and export
between 1939 and 1946. The end of the war also brought about an increase in the population of cities.
Soldiers were demobilized and they moved into the cities and increased their population. These people
swelled the rank of the unemployed. As a result of a large number of well trained men, physically fit and
used to discipline, they provided the society with centers which would be easily roused into either
agitation or violence. The propaganda of the Allies throughout the world war was based on the concept
of freedom after the war. The idea of freedom was heightened by America's aggressiveness against
imperialism, so that a mental climate was engendered not only in Nigeria but in West Africa as a whole
as they all favoured self determination.

vi. Internally, the activities of the Nigerian Youth Movement, Trade Unions and political parties
were significant in the constitutional development of Nigeria. For instance, with the creation of the
Labour Department in 1942, labour unions were formed in many parts of the country. Each became a
pressure group advocating not only for economic change but for general social and political reforms. It
helped to call for a strike in 1943, which lasted for 37 days, and virtually paralyzed the economy of the
entire nation. Again, the emergence of the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons on August, 26
1944 helped to exert mass pressure in order to accelerate the political development of the country. In
January 1945, the NCNC held its first constitutional convention with the following objectives:

1. To extend democratic principles and to advance the interest of the people.

2. To adopt suitable means of imparting political education to the people of Nigeria with a view to
achieving self government.

3. To afford the members the advantages of a medium of expression in order to secure political
freedom, economic security, social equality and religious tolerance in Nigeria and Cameroon under
the British mandate as a member of the British Common Wealth of free nations.

THE RICHARDS CONSTITUTION OF 1946

The period 1946 to 1950 was the second major period in Nigerian Constitutional development. Direct
rule by Governors was gradually abolished and government of Nigeria from this time onwards was
based on constitutions and each constitution aimed at establishing a government which was both
representative of the country and responsible to the elected representatives of the people.

In 1943, Sir Arthur Richards succeeded Sir Benard Bourdillon as the Governor of Nigeria. The political
horizon in the country at the time was already charged with more widespread agitations from the
nationalist groups for constitutional reforms. The Governor prepared constitutional reforms, which he
hoped would;

A. Promote the unity of Nigeria

b. Provide adequately within that desire for the diverse elements, which make up the country.

c. Secure greater participation by Nigerians in the discussion of their own affairs.

The white paper embodying these proposals was subsequently tabled before the Legislative Council for
its approval and adoption. The proposals were dispatched to London where after minor amendments
they were passed into law in August 1946.
FEATURES OF 1946 CONSTITUTION

i. The Office of the Governor: Under the Richard Constitution the Governor still remained a
potentate direct ruler not bound by the decisions of the Houses of Assembly and Chiefs. He had
legislative powers over all matters both formal and urgent. On all matters, he could receive advice from
the Legislative Council or regional councils or houses. His office was the main link between the different
parts of Nigeria. He presided over the Executive Council and the Legislative Council and selected
members of the former. He had the power to appoint and depose chiefs both in the colony of Lagos and
Northern and Southern Nigeria.

The constitution also contained the Crown Land Amendment Ordinance and Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance. Under this law, lands acquired by the government in the colony and in the
protectorates were declared Crown land. Their control and utilization were vested in the office of the
Governor. The constitution also gave the Governor the responsibility for the control of minerals in
Nigeria.

ii. Executive Council: The new constitution did not change the composition and powers of the
Executive Council. The Executive Council still remained primarily a council not of Nigerians but of
Europeans.

iii. The Legislative Council: Many changes took place in the Legislative Council. It was enlarged this
time to include members from Northern Nigeria and to give unofficial members a majority in the
council. The members were elected or nominated as follows:

a. The Governor

b. 16 officials (13 ex-officio and 3 nominated)

c. 3 elected Africans from Lagos Area

d. 1 elected African from Calabar Area

e. 9 Northerners chosen from the regional assembly

f. 6 Westerners chosen from the regional Assembly

g. 5 Easterners chosen from the regional assembly

h. 4 special members nominated by the Governor

iv. Creation of Regions: This was one of the steps taken by Arthur Richards to meet his objectives of
providing adequately within Nigeria for the diverse elements that make up the country and to secure
greater participation by Nigerians in the discussion of their own affairs. Three regions were created in
Nigeria. Before Bernard Bourdillon left the political stage of Nigeria, he had suggested the partitioning of
the country into three regions- East, West and North. This was in line with the ethnic groups that make
up the country. But Bourdillon did not stay to implement the idea and this was done by Arthur Richards.

(v) Regional Assemblies and Councils: The 1946 constitution saw to the establishment of regional
assemblies and councils. Each regional council comprised traditional rulers while the regional assemblies
comprised representatives of native authorities. These councils were primarily deliberative and advisory
with no legislative powers whatsoever. They could only consider and comment on matters referred to
them by the Governor and any legislative proposal to be introduced in the legislative council, which
were applicable to the province. Thus each set of councils and assembly served as panels which selected
regional representatives for the central legislative council in Lagos. In other words, they were primarily
intended to act as a connecting link between the Native Authorities and the legislative council.

In the North, provision was made for the setting up of a House of Chiefs. The House had the
Chief Commissioner as its president; and all first class chiefs in the province and not less than ten
second-class chiefs selected by and from among themselves. There was also the House of Assembly in
the North Composed of the Senior Resident as President, 18 officials, 15 unofficial provincial members, 6
unofficial special members (Note that the 15 unofficial provincial members were selected by the native
authorities from among their members, the 6 unofficial special members were appointed by the
Governor from among the communities and special interests not adequately represented).

In the West and East, there were slight deviations. The Chief Commissioners in these regions
were the presidents of their regional assemblies. Other members in the Western unicameral assembly
were 13 other officials, 7 unofficial provincial members, 5 unofficial special members and 3 Head chiefs.
The Eastern House of Assembly was composed of 13 other officials, 10 unofficial provincial members, 5
unofficial special members. Appointment of unofficial provincial members and unofficial special
members was as in the case of the North. Only the West had Head Chiefs appointed by the Governor
after consultation with the Head chief of the province.

By the Nigeria (protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 1946, the Cameroons were
administered as if the northern and southern portions respectively were parts of the Northern and
Southern Provinces of the Protectorates.

(v) Electoral Provisions: The constitution still contained the elective principle initiated in 1922
constitution with some slight changes. The qualification for voting was reduced from 100 to 50 pounds.
This was to enable more Nigerians participate in voting during elections.
 Generally therefore, there were two levels of government under the Richards Constitution of
1946. Though the system of government was apparently federal, but it was not federal in terms of
structure and functions. First the central government in Lagos had powers to pass laws on any subject
including subjects in which the regions were competent to pass laws. Second, bills passed by the regions
required certification and approval by the central government before they became laws.

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF 1946 CONSTITUTION

a. The legislative Council consisted of the Governor as the President, 13 ex-officio members, 3
nominated official members, 24 nominated unofficial members and 4 elected members.

b. The ex-officio members were as follows;

a. The Chief Secretary to the Government

b. The Chief Commissioners of the three regions

c. The Attorney General

d. The Financial Secretary

e. The Director of Medical services

f. The Development Secretary

g. The Director of Education

h. The Director of Agriculture

i. The Director of Public Works

j. The Commissioner of Labour

k. The Commissioner of the Colony

c. The nominated official members were:-

1. Three Residents, one from each region and appointed by the Governor

2. The nominated unofficial members were:-

a. 4 members being members of the Northern House of Chiefs appointed by the House

b. 5 members, being unofficial members, of the Northern House of Assembly, appointed by the
unofficial members of that House.

c. 2 members, being chiefs appointed by the Governor from those chiefs who are members of the
western House of Assembly
d. 4 members, being unofficial members of the western House of Assembly appointed by the
unofficial members of that House

e. 5 members, being unofficial members of the Eastern House of Assembly appointed by the
unofficial members of that House.

f. A member of the Colony appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Native Authority
in the colony.

g. 3 members appointed by the Governor to represent interests of certain communities which in

his opinion were not otherwise adequately represented

The four elected members were three from Lagos and one for Calabar.

The Official members in 1947 comprised the following members

The Chief Commissioner, Eastern provinces, Sir Bernard Carr, Rt, C.M.G (President).

The Resident Onitsha Province, Mr. R. J. Hook DFC

The Resident Cameroons Province, Mr. A.F.B Bridges

The Resident Owerri Province, Mr. D. A.F. Shute

The Resident Ogoja Province, Mr. A.T.E. Marsh

The Resident Calabar Province, Mr. C.J. Mayne

The Ag. Secretary Eastern Provinces Mr. S.P.L Beaumont

The Ag. Secretary, Finance, Eastern Provinces M r. W.D. Spence

The Ag. Deputy Director of public Works, Eastern Provinces Dr. W. Hunter

The Deputy Director of Education, Eastern Provinces Mr. S. Milburn.

The Deputy Director of Agriculture, Eastern Provinces Mr. J. E. Wallace

The Ag. Deputy Director of Medical Services, Eastern provinces Mr. J.M. Sleigh

The Senior Crown Counsel, Eastern Province Mr. S .A. Mckirtry

UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS

The member for Urban Areas other than Port Harcourt

Rev. O. Effiong O.B.E.

The First Provincial Member of Cameroons Province

Chief Marga Williams QBE

The Member for professional Salaried and wage earning classes

Mr. E.N. Egbuna

The member for African Commercial interests, Mr. G.H.H. O'Dwyer.

The First Provincial member for Onitsha Province, Mr. P.E. Chukwurah

The first Provincial member for Owerri province, Mr. M. W. Ubani

The Provincial member for Ogoja Province, Dr. F.A. Ibiam.

The first Provincial member for Calabar Provice, Mr. Asuguo Okon.

The second Provincial member for Cameroons Province, Galega Fon of Bali.

The second provincial member of Onitsha Province, Mr. C.D Onyeama

The member for Urban Life in Port Harcourt, Rev. L. R. Potts Johnson.

The second Provincial member for Owerri Province, Mr. D.N, Achara

The Provincial member for Owerri (Rivers) Province, Mr. H. Bowari Brown.

The member for Educational Interest, Mr. A. Ikoku

The second Provincial member for Calabar province, Chief Nyong Essien

From these unofficial members the- following 5 persons were elected for the Legislative

COUNCIL IN LAGOS:

1. Mr. C.D. Onyeama

2. Mr H. Bowari - Brown

3. Mr. A. Ikoku

4. Dr. F.A. Ibiam

5. Chief Nyon Essien

MERITS OF THE I946 CONSTITUTION

The constitution of 1946 was an improvement on what had been the case since 1914. For instance, it
gave Nigeria for the first time a legislative council with an unofficial majority. The implication was that
more people begun to participate in the legislative arm of government. Ordinarily, the net effect should
have been a better state of checks on the executive.
Again, the constitution translated into reality Bernard Bourdillon's idea on the establishment of regional
councils. It was therefore the constitution which created regions out of the former colony and
protectorates of Nigeria. It also gave each region a Council or House which served as center for
consultation and link between the central government in Lagos and the local authority or native
authority. The Native Authorities selected members of the Regional Houses and members of the
Regional Houses selected members of the Legislative Council based in Lagos.

The constitution created a bicameral legislature in the North and the posts of Head Chiefs in the
Western region in line with cultural antecedents of these sections of Nigeria. The constitution
recognized that it was not easy to introduce mass adult suffrage or the use of ballot boxes. It approved
indirect election and by so doing many Nigerians in 1946 took part in choosing the members of Native
Authorities, the Native Authorities chose the members of the Regional Houses and the Regional Houses
chose the members of the Legislative Council sitting in Lagos. Also the Richards constitution brought the
North and South together for purposes of legislation. In that case it did what the amalgamation of
Nigeria did not do and the 1922 constitution failed to do.

DEMERITS OF THE 1946 CONSTITUTION

The new constitution fell short of what Nigerians wanted. To start with, the constitution was conceived
and promulgated with the least possible consultation with Nigerians for whom it was intended. It
contained many lapses and deficiencies and could not in any manner be said to have achieved the
objective for which it was conceived. In terms of constitutional advancement, it had nothing to offer to
Nigerian's for though it was conceived as a new constitution it retained some of the unacceptable
features of the one it replaced.

For instance, the Executive Council remained virtually unchanged comprising only British officials. The
number of elected members of the Legislative Council remained at the 1922 figures. Besides, the
membership of the Legislative Council remained practically constituted of nominated instead of elected
members. The implication was that these nominated members owed allegiance to the person who
nominated them rather than to the people. The Legislative Council still discussed matters and advised
the government but it could not make laws or pass bills, which the government must enforce.

Many urban areas did not enjoy the right given to Lagos and Calabar and the qualification for voting was
still very high, as wealth became the major parameter for voting. Even though regional houses were
created, they merely became debating societies whose discussions had little or nothing to do with the
chief executives of the regions. These legislative bodies were intended to consider and advice on
matters referred to them by the Governor. The Richards Constitution did not differ from the Crown
Colony type. Effective power remained with the Governor, the Executive Council (still nominated by the
Governor) and with the administrative staff of predominantly British officials.
Unfortunately, the constitution laid down by law and for the first time that any workable constitution
must not only recognize the tribal diversities of the country but must acknowledge the fact that the
Hausa, the Igbo, and the Yoruba are the major tribes, the political importance of which must supersede
that of any other. The unfortunate lopsided partitioning of the country in favour of the north helped to
sow the ember of distrust and disunity in Nigeria. This was done in 1946 by the Richards Constitution.

Agitations Against Richard Constitution

From the inception of the 1946 Constitution, it became clear to all Nigerians that the constitution would
not last its expected nine years. Nationalists challenged it from many fronts. The NCNC, which was born
in 1944, objected to the continued practice of nomination of members and suggested that it should be
replaced by popular representation based on adult suffrage. The Nationalists alleged that the office of
the Governor used its immense powers to amend the Crown Lands and Chiefs Ordinance and to
introduce the minerals and public lands acquisition laws. Politicians interpreted the implications to the
masses. These laws soon became unpopular throughout Nigeria.

Secondly, Nigeria's neighbour, the Gold Coast was moving towards self-rule and independence.
Therefore Nigerians could not accept the idea of this constitution lasting 9 years,which meant that the
issue of independence would not come up for at least 9 years.

Thirdly, India in Asia had gained its independence from Britain, Nigeria's master at the time. Nigerian
leaders or nationalists or opinion managers felt at the time that the rate of political change in Nigeria
was too slow.

In Britain at this time, the Labour party was in power and favoured the call by Nigerian leaders for
constitutional reforms. But the Richards Constitution was not sufficiently liberal and flexible to
accommodate the changes envisaged either by Nigerians or the Labour Party in Britain.

The nationalists and the foremost party (NCNC) of the time criticized the constitution as unilateral and
autocratic and called for the revision of the constitution. The revision led to what was known as the
Macpherson constitution of 1951.

MACPHERSON CONSTITUTION OF 1951

Sir John Macpherson arrived Nigeria in 1948 and promptly applied himself to the question of finding a
solution to the political problems that had been created by the Richard's Constitution. The making of the
constitution gave Nigerians their first opportunity of expressing themselves on the type of constitution
that they wanted. This was achieved in six major steps taken by Sir John Macpherson and the
government in their review of Richard's Constitution. The process of the former was described as
undemocratic and this time, Sir John Macpherson emphasized democracy. He set up a series of
processes to guarantee popular participation in national affairs and especially in the making of this
constitution. These were through a select committee of the legislature. The committee consisted of all
the unofficial members of the Council (all Nigerians), together with the three Provincial Chief
Commissioners, the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary and the Chief Secretary who was the
chairman. The problem then arose as to how best to achieve this review and its basic aim of consulting
the people. It was eventually resolved that this should be done by compiling a series of questionnaires
which should be submitted for discussions and comments at various levels. The first was meetings and
conferences at village, district, provincial and divisional levels, followed by regional conferences, Lagos
and colony conference rounding up with a general conference. These constitutional processes took
place between 1949 and 1950 and at the general conference at Ibadan, a draft proposal on the
constitution was adopted. The draft was subsequently approved by the select committee of the
Legislative Council and the full Council before it was sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for
his approval. The Secretary of State gave general approval to the draft proposals. The draft finally
formed the basis of the new constitution in the form of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council of
1951.

FEATURES OF 1951 CONSTITUTION

a. Office of the Governor: The constitution retained the office of the Governor in Lagos. This time,
the Governor in Lagos had regional Lieutenants in the three regions assisting the Governor. In the field
of law making, the Governor in Lagos could still veto regional laws or disallow any laws made or
proposed by the center. The Governor's power to appoint, promote, discipline or dismiss civil servants
remained. This time, anyway, it was provided in the constitution that the Governor would be advised by
a Civil Service Commission.

Again, subject to the constitutional provisions, the Governor lost the power of choosing
members of his Executive Council. Each region was entitled to four ministers in the Executive Council.
The Governor was thus bound to choose only this number from among regional representatives in the
Central House of Representatives.

The Governor lost the position of being the main link between the different parts of Nigeria.
Leaders of Nigeria at the time were under the new constitution serving in the central House of
Representatives and in the Central Executive Council. These became the main links that held Nigeria
together. In fact they were assisted by the constitution and the major political parties that emerged, all
of which accepted the idea of a united Nigeria.

Lastly, the Governor however retained full powers and responsibilities over Nigeria's three key
areas, namely;

a. Defence

b. Security

C. External affairs
(b) The Executive Council the Cabinet (Central): The Executive Council under the Macpherson
Constitution consisted of the Governor, six European officials and twelve ministers drawn-on a parity
bases from all the three-regions in Nigeria. The Council of Ministers was the representatives of the
country but not responsible to the central legislature. There were three categories of central ministers:

a. Central Ministers responsible for Defence, External Lffairs, law and Finance- these were all
European officials.

b. Central Ministers responsible for central government functions who were Africans.

c. Central Ministers responsible for regional government subjects who also were Africans.

Only European Ministers were senior and important leaders of the civil service. The African
Ministers were not allowed to control the civil service. The Governor took decisions with both African
and European Ministers but left the execution of these decisions in the hands of the European Ministers.
However, the African Ministers were useful links between the House of Representatives in Lagos and
Houses of Assembly in the regions and the Local Councils. The existing Executive Council was renamed
the Council of Ministers, with the Governor as the President.

(c) Central Legislature: The central legislature was enlarged and became known as the House of
Representatives, the former name was Legislative Council. The House consisted of 142 members, 6 ex-
officio members, 136 Nigerian members elected by the Regional Houses of Assembly, acting as electoral
colleges, and 6 special members appointed by the Governor. In addition, it had a President appointed by
the Governor from outside the House. The House was given a plenitude of powers to legislate for the
peace, order and good government of the whole country except that the Secretary of State for the
Colonies could disallow a law passed by the House even after the Governor's assent. A procedure was
incorporated for consulting the Regional Legislative Houses before the House of Representatives could
consider a Bill, but it was also provided that non-compliance with this procedure shall not prevent the
introduction of a Bill in the House and, if the Bill became law, shall not affect its validity.

(d) Electoral Provisions: Election into the various Houses was by a combination of direct and indirect
methods. Members of the House of Representatives were elected by the Regional Houses of Assembly
from among their own members. The members of the Regional Houses of Assembly in turn were elected
partly by persons entitled to be registered as voters (i.e. direct election) and partly by electoral colleges,
members of which were elected by the same person (i.e. indirect election).

To qualify for registration as a voter a person must be an adult tax payer and either must have
been born in the native authority area in which he wished to vote or be voted for or resident in any area
for at least twelve months, if a non-native.
THE REGIONS IN THE 1951 CONSTITUTION

The 1951 constitution greatly increased regional autonomy and established larger and more
representative legislatures with wider powers in the regions and at the center. The House of Assembly
continued in each Region with a House of chiefs in the Northern and Western Regions. The Regional
legislative bodies were given powers to make laws on a limited number of subjects mainly to do with
local matters. But these laws were subject to reference to the Governor.

We must note that the name regions were used in 1951. The regions were formerly known as provinces.
The membership of each Regional House of Assembly was as follows:

a. Northern Region: 90 elected, 4 ex-officio and 10 special members

b. Western Region: 80 elected, 4 ex-officio and 3 special members

C. Eastern Region: 80 elected, 5 ex-officio and 3 special members.

The Western House of Chiefs created by this constitution consisted of Lt. Governor as President, 4 chiefs
and 3 ex-officio members.

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE

An Executive Council was also established and a Lieutenant Governor appointed in each region. Each
Executive Council consisted of the Lieutenant Governor as the President, 6 ex-officio and 9 other
members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor FROM THE REGIONAL HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.

MERITS OF 1951 CONSTITUTION

This constitution not only reflected the increasing trend toward regionalism, but also a major
constitutional advance for Nigerians. Not only did its formulation afford Nigerians their first opportunity
ever of participating in the framing of the constitution under which they were to be governed, but also
really advanced their country towards responsible self-government.

The Regions ceased to be mere administrative units to become political entities, each vested with both
executive and legislative powers in respect of a specific area of the country.

Again, for the first time ever, both the central and regional legislative houses composed of not only an
elected majority but also of elected Nigerians. The central executive became the principal instrument of
policy thereby substituting the autocratic rule of the Governor and his officials in the previous
constitutions with a rule of the elected representatives of the people.
Because Arthur Richards was accused of not consulting with the people before promulgating the 1946
Constitution, Macpherson never wanted to be associated with such problem. This was a constitution
that emerged after series of intensive consultations and inputs made by Nigerians.

WEAKNESSES OF THE 1951 CONSTITUTION

Some shortfalls of the 1951 Constitution could be identified notwithstanding the impressive inherent
advance in Nigerian constitution making. They include:

a. There were still the reserved legislative powers of the Governor and the Lieutenant Governors.

b. The creation of regions sharpened and deepened the ethnic diversities inherent in the country.

C. Electoral laws were not democratized as qualification was still on the bases of payment of taxes.

THE FALL OF 1951 CONSTITUTION

The collapse of the 1951 Constitution was not mainly as a result of weaknesses already mentioned but
principally as a result of environmental factors inherent in Nigeria geo-politics.

After only 2 years of operation, the 1951 constitution broke down. Several factors led to this, the most
prominent being the ethnic rivalry between the Igbos and the Yorubas which by this time had become
intensified and extended to the North.

The crisis of confidence was also aggravated by the emergence of political parties, which sprang up on
the basis of regions. Thus, the NCNC degenerated into a party for Igbos. Action Group had no pretense
at its inception that it was a Yoruba party whereas Northern Peoples Congress originated from Arewa
Peoples Congress, a Hausa Fulani cultural organization. These regional parties helped to poison the
cohesion that hitherto existed among the nationalists, and orchestrated the diversities that existed
among Nigerians.

Other factors that led to the demise of 1951 constitution were:

i. The Eastern Region crisis of 1951.

ii. The 1953 crisis in the center between the Northern and Southern Representatives.

THE 1953 CRISIS AROSE OVER THE ISSUE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

An Action Group member had brought a motion to the House demanding there should be self-
government by 1956. The Council of Ministers as the Executive of the Central Government was divided
against itself over the motion. The four representatives of the Action Group resigned their
appointments, but it was apparent that the Northern Region was not ready for self-government and did
every thing to frustrate the debate of the motion. This culminated into a chain-reaction, which left the
country more divided than ever.

As a result of these crises two constitutional conferences were held in London in 1953 and in Lagos in
1954 to review the 1951 Constitution. These conferences strengthened the regional governments'
powers at the expense of the federation. The civil service was regionalized so was the Judiciary. Specific
subjects were assigned to the federal government and to the regional governments were passed
residual powers.

At these conferences, agreements were reached between the representatives of the three major
political parties then in power in each of the regions; on one hand, and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies on the other. Although the new structure came into effect as from 1st October 1954 many
important amendments were subsequently made. Oliver Lyttleton's name has been closely associated
with the constitution in view of the fact that he figured prominently in its formulation.

THE LYTTLETON CONSTITUTION OF 1954

We have noted in our past discussions, some of the factors that prompted the collapse of the 1951
Constitution. The 1954 constitution which was known as Lyttleton Constitution made radical changes
not only as regards the structure of Nigerian federation but also in the distribution of legislative,
executive and judicial powers within the federation. The features identified with the 1954 Constitution
were:

1. Federalism Nigeria became a federation of five component parts, viz, the Northern, Western,
and Eastern Regions, the Southern Cameroons and the Federal Territory of Lagos. Lagos was excised
from the Western Region to become the federal Territory of Lagos, over which the federal Legislature
and the executive had authority, while the Southern Cameroons was excised from the Eastern Region to
become in effect a separate region having the same devolved authority, but no ministerial responsibility
until 1958. The new constitution made a complete transfer of all legislative and executive powers to the
Northern, Western and Eastern Regions.

2. A significant change in the status of the Nigerian civil service came with the 1954 Constitution. It
brought about the regionalization of the public services and the creation of four separate civil services.
The civil service was decentralized in such a way that the central or federal government had its own
federal civil service while each of the regions had its own civil service.
3. Federal/Regional Executives: The office of the Governor was renamed Governor General and was
still retained in Lagos. The constitution recognized the regional representation on the Council of
Ministers. In the regions, the offices of the Lieutenant Governors were renamed office of Governor. In
terms of power and function at the national level, the Governor General became a constitutional Head
of State. He acted on the advice of the Council of Ministers or cabinet but could exercise the powers of
the veto or invoked the reserved powers of this office during periods of emergency. These changes
definitely curtailed the absolute powers of the Governor in the past. On the selection of Ministers, the
office of the Governor General lost more powers.

TWO FACTORS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS:

a. The growth of political parties

b. The political convention that ministers were chosen from the leading political parties in a
representative assembly.

The Council of Ministers was smaller than it was under the Macpherson Constitution but it has similar
powers. The composition of the Executive Council was thus:

a. The Governor General

b. Three Ex-official members - the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney General.

c. Ten Ministers, three from each Region and one from Cameroons

4. Federal Legislature: The Constitution provided for a central legislature and called it the House of
Representatives. It drew a list of subjects which only the central legislature could make laws. These
were;

i. Currency

ii. Defense

iii. External Affairs

iv. Foreign Trade

v. The Central Court of Justice.

These were under the Exclusive list under the jurisdiction of the central government. The
members of the House of Representatives were increased to 184 and the members were elected
directly from single member constituencies based on population. The constituencies when drawn were
92 in the North, forty two in the East, forty two in the West, two in the Federal Territory and six in
Southern Cameroons.

The House of Representatives was presided over by a Speaker as President, three ex-
officio/European (Ministers) members, 184 elected members- North 92, East 43, West 42, Southern
Cameroons 6, and Lagos 2. All the elected members were now directly elected. The election of members
of this House was made separate from elections into Regional Houses. There was also a House of Senate
consisting of 12 members from each region including the Oba of Lagos and four special members
appointed by Governors. The Governors were members of the upper House.

5. The Constitution provided another list of subjects - the Concurrent list on which both the centre
and the regions could make laws. The list included: High education, industrial development, insurance
and the regulation of labour.

6. There was a residual list of subjects i.e. List which were neither exclusive nor concurrent. This
list was said to belong to the regions and regions could make laws governing such subjects.

7. The Constitution regionalized the judiciary by establishing a Federal Supreme Court and High
Courts in the Regions.

8. Regional Powers: There was the almost complete disappearance of British officials in the
legislative houses. The existing unicameral legislature was to continue in the Eastern Region but all the
officials and special members were withdrawn leaving the Eastern House of Assembly to consist entirely
of elected members.

The existing bicameral legislature was retained both in the Western and Northern Regions but
while in the Western House of Assembly, both the official and the special members continued to sit until
1957, the former were with-drawn except for the Attorney General who was withdrawn in 1959. The
Southern Cameroons had all its 26 members elected.

9. Direct System of election replaced the indirect system in the Eastern and Western Regions and
in the Southern Cameroons. In the Northern Region direct elections were to be held in 18 urban areas
while the indirect system was retained for the rest of the Region.

10. The Franchise provisions differed from region to region with the result that members of the
House of Representatives were not elected under a uniform franchise. In the Eastern region and
Southern Cameroons, universal adult suffrage was introduced for all elections. In the Western region,
the elector must have paid income tax or rates for one financial year if he was a native and for two years
if he was a non native in which case must also satisfy a residency qualification of 2 years. In the Northern
region, the franchise was limited only to adult male tax payers who satisfy a residency qualification of 12
months if not a native, and in the case of a native foreigner, who was not a British subject or protected
person, 5 years.

11. The Constitution separated Lagos from the Western Region and it constituted a federal territory.
Unlike Cameroons, Lagos had no legislature of its own but all laws affecting Lagos was handled by the
House of Representatives, and a Federal Minister was appointed to be in charge of Lagos affairs.

It was therefore the Lyttleton constitution which gave Nigeria a true federal framework and a true
House of Representatives. In other words, it introduced federalism and responsible parliament.

Again under this constitution, three major political parties emerged namely - NCNC, AG, and NPC. These
parties became fully involved in Nigerian politics and government. The parties themselves recognized
the constitution of parliamentary democracy. The parties contested elections, won seats, and ensured
that the Governor General chose members of his Executive Council from the successful party members
in the House of Representatives:

By October 1, 1954 when the new constitution came into force, the Sarduana of Sokoto,Sir Ahmadu
Bello leader of the Northern Peoples Congress became the Premier of the Northern Region. Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe, leader of National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons became the Premier of the Eastern
Region. Chief Obafemi Awolowo the leader of Action Group became the Premier of Western Region. Dr.
E.M.L. Endley of Cameroon National Congress was sworn in as Premier of the Southern Cameroons.

WEAKNESSES OF 1954 CONSTITUTION

The constitution though was a federal constitution had a number of restrictions on the exercise of
legislative power, both by the House of Representatives and the Regional Houses of Assembly. Although
both the Governor General and the Regional Governors ceased to be members of any legislative house,
they still retained a measure of discretion over the enactment of legislation. The Governor General
assented to all bills and had veto power acting in his discretion.

Again the Governor of a Region was granted power to reserve to the Secretary of State, acting in his
discretion any Bill which appeared to be likely to impede or prejudice the performance by the
government of the federation of any of its function or to endanger the advancement of federal
government of Nigeria.

Again the Secretary of State also had the power to disallow any law made by any legislature even after
the Governor General or the Governor, as the case may be, had given his assent.
Another weakness of the constitution was that the speaker of the House of Representatives was
appointed from outside the House by the Governor General. He was to appoint persons who were loyal
to him and not who had the aspirations of Nigeria at heart.

The Constitution had no provision for the post of Prime Minister even when it was intended to be a
parliamentary constitution. The constitution nurtured the growth of ethnicity which had been
deliberately introduced and encouraged by previous constitutions by allowing regional based political
parties and effective regionalization of all facets of our national life.
REFERENCES

1. Adamolekun and Osuntokun (1977) Government and politics for West African students. Ibadan,
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

2. O. Ikime, Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan; Heniemann.

3. Eronini, A. E. (1978) The Growth and decay of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria. Owerri,
Marble Press Ltd.

4. Ibezim, E. O. (1996) Comprehensive government for West African senior school certificate.
Onilsha, Hybrid Publishers Ltd.

5. Joye E. M. And Igweike K. (1982) Introduction to the 1979 Nigerian constitution. London, The
MacMillan Press Lid.

6. Nwosu, H. N. (1977) Political authority and the Nigerian civil service. Enugu Fourth Dimension
Publishers.

7. Obiozor, G. A. (1994) The politics of precarious balancing: An analysis contending issues in

Nigerian domestic and foreign policy. Lagos, Printing Press Division, Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs.

8. Onwubiko, K.B.C. (1973) History of West Africa book two 1800 - present day. Onitsha, Africana
Educational Publishers (Nig.)
CHAPTER SIX

NIGERIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

We have already noted from our previous discussions that Nigeria was gradually moving towards self-
government. National and global issues were helping to aggravate the pressure for self-rule by
Nigerians. Before we move into the constitutional conferences that engineered the independence in
1960, we deem it important to highlight on the following vital topics, which were quite important in the
colonial period. They include among others;

(i) Formation of political parties in the colonial era

(ii) Major crises in Nigeria during colonial rule

(iii) The 1953 and 1954 constitutional conferences.

(iv) Regionalism and its impact on Nigeria's development

(v) general impact of colonialism on Nigeria.

EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE COLONIAL ERA

We had earlier observed that due to the elective principle of the 1922 Constitution some political
parties, particularly the Nigerian National Democratic Party, were born. We wish to state that as a result
of the evolving global interest in the colonized territories, the rise of some personalities, and internal
pressure from the natives, more political parties emerged to challenge colonial policies in Nigeria. Here,
efforts are made to identify and discuss these parties.
a. The Nigerian National Democratic Party: This was the first political party that came into
existence in Nigeria in 1922 as a result of the elective principle entrenched in the Clifford Constitution of
1922. The leaders were Herbert Macaulay, Egerton Shyngle and Dr. C.C. Adeniyi Jones. It won all the
legislative council elections and elective seats in the Lagos Town Council from 1923 till 1938 when it was
over taken by the Nigerian Youth Movement. The efforts of this patty in trying to sensitize and mobilize
Nigerians towards political emancipation cannot be over stressed. Note must be taken however, that
the party was not a national party as the elective principle was only for Lagos and Calabar areas.

b. The People's Union: This party also came into existence in the 1920s. The foundation members
were Dr. O. Obasa, Mr. R.J.K. Randle and Sir Adeyemo Alakija. Its political programme was gradualism. It
was formed to be an opposition party to the Nigeria National Democratic Party. It later vanished from
the political scene. Again no attempt was made to make this parry a national party as it only existed in
Lagos.

c. The Nigerian Youth Movement: The Nigerian Youth Movement was formed in 1934 by Dr. J.C.
Vaughan, Ernest Ikoli and Oba Samuel Akinsanya to galvanize opposition against the establishment of
Yaba High College. At its inception it was a pressure group, and it was known at that time as the Lagos
Youth Movement. However, in 1936 the Movement became a real political organization and was
renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement with branches all over the country, and with that a truly
nationwide nationalist organization was formed in Nigeria. Notable Nigerian nationalists like Eyo Ita, H.
O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe belonged to this party. These people were full of ideas and enthusiasm
for the battle for the emancipation of Nigeria from British colonialism.

THE AIMS OF THE MOVEMENT WERE

1. The development of a united nation out of the conglomeration of the people who inhabit
Nigeria.

2. To encourage the understanding and a sense of common nationality among Nigerians.

It advocated compulsory and free mass education, adult suffrage, the separation of the judiciary from
the executive, equal economic opportunities for Nigerians, protecting them against unequal
competition, better conditions of service, and more ranking executive appointments for Africans and
greater use of Africans in administrative branch of the civil service. It opposed discriminatory
emoluments in the civil service as between Nigerians and Europeans.

In 1938, the Movement gave the NNDP a real opposition and won the entire seats in that years
Legislative Council elections. However, in spite of its efforts, the organization faded, because the
consensus among its leaders was narrow and the ambition of its top leaders were irreconcilable and in a
serious conflict with the aims of the organization. In February 1941, a tragedy struck and the Nigerian
Youth Movement was dealt a devastating blow from which it never really recovered. The first
nationwide nationalist movement was dissolved at the alter of tribalism, sectionalism and political
intolerance, a destructive legacy which still today haunts this country like a bad dream.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS (NCNC)

Since the collapse of the NYM, and with the growing importance of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his fiery
journalism, Zik had rallied a considerable number of Nigerian youths to his side. In August, 1944 a group
of students and ex-students of Kings College Lagos visited Dr. Azikiwe and complained that the youth of
the country were ready for action but there was no leadership. At Dr. Azikiwe's suggestion and with
strong support of the press, the students called a conference in Lagos of all supposed nationalist
organizations including the moribund Nigerian Youth Movement (which declined to send any
representatives) for the purpose of organizing a national council to wield the heterogeneous masses of
Nigeria into one solid bloc. On August 26, 1944, the inaugural meeting of the conference was held at the
Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos. The meeting of the convention without the National Youth Movement
(NYM) adopted series of resolutions which gave birth to the National Council. In its inaugural meeting,
Herbert Macaulay was elected President and Dr. Azikiwe the Secretary General. Its membership
included various organizations, trade unions, professional associations, political parties and tribal fronts;
and because three Cameroonian groups joined the association, the name of the movement was changed
to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). But what remains, as a historical fact is
that participation in the NCNC was in the beginning hugely confined to Southerners and to a lesser
extent, to the Northerners of the Middle Belt.

In January 1945, the NCNC held its first constitutional convention with the following objectives:

1. To extend democratic principles and to advance the interests of the people.

2. To adopt suitable means for impacting political education to the people of Nigeria with a view to
achieving self government.

3. To afford the members the advantages of a medium of expression in order to secure political
freedom, economic security, social equality and religious tolerance in Nigeria and Cameroon under the
British mandate as a member of the British Common-wealth of Nations.

In April 1946, the NCNC began a protest campaign led by Herbert Macaulay who died in the tour
of Northern Nigeria. It is important to note that the nationwide tour of NCNC was not entirely successful
in unifying all or most of the nationalist forces across the country under the banner of the NCNC.
Actually it was only in the Eastern provinces that the delegation made its greatest impact and achieved
its greatest financial success.

THE ACTION GROUP (1951)

The regionalization of nationalism in Nigeria occasioned by the 1946 Sir Arthur Richards (later Lord
Milverton) Constitution, more than any other factor encouraged regionalization of politics in Nigeria and
the formation of other political parties. Politicians simply exploited the latent ethnic rivalries that were
rife everywhere in the country. The leaders of Action Group knew this fact and maximized it to their own
advantage.

In 1945, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa was formed in London by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. It functioned in
London till 1948 when it was introduced into Nigeria as a pan Yoruba cultural organization. The major
objective of the organization was the protection of the interest of the Yorubas so that future generation
of Yorubas would have a secured place in Nigeria.

In 1951, it provided a forum or a rallying point from which the political conceptions of the Action Group
were formulated. Freedom for all and life more abundant, belief in a socialist system and welfare state
for Nigeria. It opted for federalism as essential in fostering the unity of Nigeria. Chief Awolowo was the
master builder while other leaders included, Chief Bode Thomas, Chief S.L. Akintola, and Chief
Shonibare. The party had an internal crisis in 1962 and this led to a division in the party. From its
inception, Awolowo had no pretence of fashioning a national political organization.

THE NORTHERN PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (NPC) (1951):

The year 1951 also saw the emergence of another political party in Nigeria, this time in the Northern
Region. The party started as a Northern cultural organization in December 1949 and was revived as a
political party in October 1951. It had the support of traditional rulers in the Northern Region and the
leader was the Sarduana of Sokoto. Its motto was 'one North one People, irrespective of religion, rank or
tribe.' It believed in the attainment of self-government for Nigeria and the formulation of a federal
constitution, which will permit the Northern Region to make effective progress at its own pace. By the
time of Nigeria's independence, the NPC was firmly entrenched in the North and had won the largest
number of seats in the 1959 federal elections. It became the senior partner in the NPC/NCNC coalition
government in Nigeria.

ITS OTHER OBJECTIVES INCLUDE:

a. Regional autonomy within one Nigeria.

b. Local government reforms within a progressive emirate system based on tradition and custom.

c. The voice of the people to be heard in all the councils of the North.

d. Drives for education throughout the whole North, laying due emphasis on the improvement of
the social economic and cultural life of the people.

e. Membership of the Northern People's Congress to be open to all people of Northern descent
whether as individuals or as a union or as a political party. Before the formation of NPC, the North
viewed the presence of NCNC as an encroachment into their own area of dominance and with NPC,
there was no effort made to extend the party to other parts of Nigeria.

OTHER PARTIES

Two other minor political parties were also formed in the North. They were the Northern Elements
Progressive Union (NEPU), which featured Malam Aminu Kano and the United Middle Belt Congress
(UMBC) with Joseph Tarka as the principal character and founder.

The above was the situation in terms of political party formation and from those early days of their
formation to the post independence years, the situation remained essentially the same. It was NPC for
the North, AG for the West and NCNC for the East. The parties were regional parties and all attempts
were made to strengthen the tribal bases, based on ethnic sentiments. For instance in the eve of the
founding of the NPC, a Northern leader had to say, "We despise each other.., we call each other
ignorant, the South is proud of Western knowledge and culture; we are proud of the Eastern (culture).
To tell you the plain truth, the common people of the North put more confidence in the white man than
in their black Southern brothers or, educated Northerners". The coalition Government formed by
NPC/NCNC was bedeviled by suspicion.

The net effect was that the parties that arose in the colonial period were tribal based parties. No efforts
were made in penetrating other regions and parties who made such attempts to be national in outlook
were quickly challenged and stopped through political intrigues.

MAJOR CRISES OF THE NIGERIAN NATION

From a historical perspective, we notice that the Nigerian nation started as a fragile structure
constructed by the British administrators for their selfish interest. Ab initio the system was volatile and
was therefore doomed to crises. Some of these crises will be identified and their causes and
consequences examined.

(I) The Minority Crises: No one single region in Nigeria was made up of one tribal group. The big
groups were not keen on dividing their regions into more natural linguistic and ethnic groups. The
Northern politicians wanted to keep together 'one North one People.' This was despite the fact that
there were more than one people in the North. In the West, the Midwest wanted to have a separate
state of their own, but this was resisted by the Western Nigerian Government and Yoruba politicians.

In the East, the agitation for a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state was on. What happened in each case
was that each region resisted being divided while supporting separatist elements in the other regions.
This was one of the reasons behind the crises that hit Eastern Nigeria in 1954. It is estimated that Nigeria
is made up of at least 250 ethnic groups with Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, as the major ethnic groups. The
rest have always struggled to retain their identity, and have often created tension in the land especially,
as the big ethnic groups would always dominate the smaller ones.

(ii) Eastern Nigeria Crisis: On April 15, 1956, Mr. Eyo resigned his Chairmanship of the Eastern
Region Development Corporation because it was suggested by the party (NCNC) members that he had
too many functions and kept too many jobs to himself. Dr. Azikiwe decided to accept his resignation. Mr.
Eyo who had for sometime been his chief confidant then claimed that he had only resigned to test Dr.
Azikiwe's faith in him. To him the time had come to fight in public issues which had not been resolved in
private. Mr. Eyo made allegations before the Eastern House of Assembly that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe had
abused his office by allowing public funds to be invested in the African Continental Bank Ltd in which he
had great interest. Eyo called for an independent commission of inquiry, but Dr. Azikiwe instituted Legal
proceedings against him claiming damages for libel on the grounds that Mr Eyo had made public the
notion that the Premier's conduct was corrupt.

The trouble flared up, with the official opposition in the East backing Mr. Eyo and the majority of
the NCNC membership on the side of Dr. Azikiwe who was then the national President of the NCNC.

On August 4, 1956, the Secretary of State appointed a tribunal of inquiry headed by Sir Strafford
Foster-Sutton, Chief Justice of Nigeria to inquire into allegations of improper conduct on the part of Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, in connection with the affairs of the African
Continental Bank Limited.

On January 16, 1957 the Tribunal's report was published. The report found that, “Dr. Azikiwe's
primary motive was to make available an indigenous bank with the objective of liberalizing credit for the
people of this country”. But the commission was not satisfied that he was attracted by the financial
powers his interest in the bank gave him. “We consider his conduct in the matter has fallen short of the
expectation of honest, reasonable people.” The net effect was that the matter created much division,
acrimony and disorder in the region. It also led to the decline in the popularity of NCNC. Although the
party and the Government of Eastern Nigeria reacted in defence of Dr. Azikiwe, the damage has been
done, and the breakup of NCNC in the East was eminent.

(iii) Crisis Over The Motion For Self-Government: On March 31, 1953, a representative of the Western
Region in the central House and a member of the Action Group, Chief Anthony Enahoro moved a motion
that "this House accepts as a primary objective the attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956".
The Northern members flayed up in a total rejection of the idea, saying that they were not ready for
self-government. They claimed that if self-government was to come in 1956 as Chief Enahoro has called
the North would be dominated by the South and that the North therefore rejects in its entirety any
invitation to commit political suicide.
 Chief Awolowo charged that the North had fallen victim to British propaganda machine and all
the Action Group members including their four central Ministers walked out. They were followed by all
the NCNC members and with the incident the interpretation of Nigerian politics in the contest of North-
South dichotomy needed no further explanation as it has become a historical reality.

Now, the groups who had always suspected each other's political intentions also now realized
that the road to independence as a united nation would not be easy. The Northerners who were then
convinced that working with the Southerners was impossible put forward an 'Eight Point Programme'
which if carried out would have amounted to a virtual secession of the North or partition of Nigeria. The
Northern representatives swore never to have anything to do with the South because of the bad
treatment they got from the Lagos mob.

(iv). Kano Riot of 1953: With the development in the central legislature, the Lagos crowd did not take
the actions of the Northern Representatives kindly. Pebbles were thrown on the Northern
representatives. Lots of abusive language and name-calling were lavished on them. It was on the basis of
the insults they received from the Lagos crowd that they went up north and prepared the eight-point
programme of secession.

With this development, the Southern politicians still felt there was the need for the union of the
North and South in one entity called Nigeria. Some of the Southern politicians went up to the North to
convince their leaders of the need to team up to wrestle power from the colonial masters. They also had
in mind to campaign in partisan fronts. It was this trip up North that sparked off the Kano riot of 1953 in
which many Southerners notably Igbos were killed and property worth millions of pounds at that time
were destroyed.

Thus, Nigeria's march to independence began not as a strictly united entity, a process which would make
political integration even more difficult in the future. The acrimony and bitterness that followed the
formation and operations of political parties and the debates on self-government left no doubt that
Nigeria as a nation faced a difficult task ahead. And the effects of the utterances of the country's
political leaders were not encouraging.

For example, when Dr. Azikiwe received the news of the formation of Egbe-Omo Oduduwa he addressed
the Igbo National Union of which he was the President. He told the highly charged audience:
"Henceforth, the cry must be one of battle against the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, its leaders, at home and
abroad, uphill and downhill, in the streets of Nigeria and in the residence of its advocator. It is the
enemy of Nigeria, it must be crushed to the earth…”

From this time on, hostility between the Igbos and the Yorubas became particularly intense and attacks
and counter attacks became an essential feature of Yoruba-Igbo political relations. And one thoroughly
angry Yoruba said this about Dr. Azikiwe, "We were brought together by the British who named us
Nigeria. We never knew Igbos, but since we came to know them we have tried to be friendly and
neighbourly. Then came the Arch Devil to sow the seeds of distrust and hatred. We have tolerated
enough from a class of Igbos and idle-headed Yorubas who mortgaged their thinking cap to Azikiwe and
his hirelings".

Besides the Igbo-Yoruba conflicts and rivalry in the South itself, there was the North-South rivalry and
mutual hostility. Late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said, 'Many (Nigerians) deceive themselves by
thinking that Nigeria is one... particularly some of the press people. This is wrong. I am sorry to say this
presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this chamber. The southern tribes who are now pouring
into the North in ever increasing numbers, and are more or less domiciled there do not mix with the
Northern people and we in the North look upon them as invaders".

This impression was transferred from the colonial era to the post independent period and many
distinguished Nigerians have called Nigeria all sorts of things; 'geographical expression', 'historical
entity', 'heterogeneous and multi-national state. At independence, the crises continued.

CONFERENCES THAT USHERED IN THE NIGERIAN INDEPENDENCE

In our previous chapters, we were able to arrive at a point where we saw some efforts made by the
British colonial administration to institute formal colonial administration in Nigeria. We have equally
noted that during this process of instituting colonial administration, a lot of injustices were meted out
on Nigerians. Based on the exploitative tendencies of colonial administration, Nigerians who had
become aware of these exploitations began to agitate for their rights. The agitation for their rights and
the need to resolve some inter-ethnic conflicts necessitated many conferences that were held in and
outside Nigeria. These conferences were also held in order to help cope with some constitutional issues
that arose during the period under review.

In this section, we shall devote some attention to some of these conferences, analyzing the reasons for
each conference, the people that attended them, the major issues discussed, resolutions reached and
the consequences of each of the conferences.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1953

The nationalists' agitations resulted in the rapid constitutional changes that took place in Nigeria
particularly after the Second World War in 1945. The Richard's Constitution, which came into effect in
1946, was soon replaced by the constitution of 1951 popularly known as the Macpherson Constitution.
Notwithstanding the elaborate steps taken by Macpherson to ensure an acceptable and credible
constitution, personality clashes and sectionalism or regionalism that had developed with the 1946
Constitution helped to mar the workability of the 1951 Constitution. Following the collapse of the
Constitution, it became imperative to consult Nigerian nationalists to enable the colonial officials to
fashion the way forward. Because of the tense atmosphere in Nigeria, the local environment was not
conducive for the conference. London was accepted as a better alternative for the conference as a result
of the tension generated by the motion for self-government by 1956.

WHO ATTENDED THE 1954 CONFERENCE?

The conference was summoned by Oliver Lyttleton who was the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The
conference held between July 30 and August 1953. The delegates were 19 in number. Each of the three
regions sent 6 representatives and one went from the Cameroon.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE CONFERENCE

The primary objective of the conference was to fashion out a new constitution that would grant greater
autonomy to the regions without much interruption from the center. Other specific areas touched in the
conference were:

a. To identify the defects of the Macpherson Constitution;

b. Consider changes required to remedy these defects.

c. To consider the question of independence in 1956.

DECISIONS REACHED AT THE 1954 CONFERENCE

The London Conference reached the following resolutions;

a. That there should be a federal system of government with functions divided into exclusive,
concurrent and residual lists. With this federal structure, the Northern delegates disclosed that they had
abandoned their eight-point programme of secession. This eight-point programme of secession arose
sequel to the crisis over the motion for self rule in 1956 tabled by Anthony Enahoro in 1953.

b. Lieutenant Governors were to be called Governors, while the Governor was to be called
Governor-General.

c. Dr. E.M.L Endeley demanded that a separate region be created for the Southern Cameroon. It
was agreed that if his party won the 1954 general election, the region would be created.

c. Lagos was to become a federal capital territory and made a "no man's land" and separated from
the Western Region. The Western Region delegates led by Chief Awolowo threatened that the region
would opt-out of the federation if Lagos is eventually separated from the Region. The protest was rather
clamped down with a threat of matching force with force should the West attempt to secede from the
federation.

d. It was also resolved that Britain was to grant self-government to desiring regions in 1956.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1954 LAGOS CONFERENCE

One of the implications of the decisions of the 1954 Conference was that the strength of the regions was
increased to the detriment of the central government. For instance, to implement the new federalism,
the Northern Regional government began to insist on the northernization of the civil service, and in
almost disturbingly violent speeches, the leader of the government had said that they preferred the
service of non-Nigerians to those of southern Nigerians. Efforts were made by the northern leaders to
stop further recruitment of southerners, lay-off the ones already in their employ unless they accepted to
work as contract staff.

Another implication was that it became a political crime for northerners to associate with southern
politicians and any northern political party in alliance with any southern political party was readily
accused of subversive activities and treason. This hatred arose because the northern leaders were afraid
that the south would dominate them politically, in view of the fact that the south had more educated
people and were more exposed on political issues.

The conference also helped to widen the divide and the bitterness among the leaders of the major
ethnic groups. For instance, during the conference, Nigerian leaders demanded that the Yoruba
speaking people of the north now living in Ilorin should be merged with the Western Region and this
was resisted by the Northern government thus, fanning the embers of hatred between the north and
west. Western Region leaders were also bitter with Northern and Eastern Region leaders who favoured
that Lagos should be a separate federal capital territory. Again, the Western leaders teamed up with the
Calabar-Ogoja Rivers people who were demanding for a separate state of their own, whereas the core
Igbo leaders in the Eastern Region never approved such demands.

Essentially, these conferences aggravated the ugly state of hatred and sectionalism in Nigerian politics.
From then on, political campaigns were hinged on destroying one region by the other in line with the
tribal political parties that had emerged.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1957

After the 1954 Lagos Conference, there was no other elaborate conference that was called for the
discussion of Nigerian political problems until 1957. By 1957, Nigeria was gradually approaching self-
governance and events in the country were unfolding so rapidly that it became necessary to resume
constitutional conferences. In January 1957, the Colonial Office announced that the five governments of
the Nigerian federation had agreed that the postponed constitutional conference should be convened in
London in may or not later than the middle of June.

Notwithstanding the impressive constitutional provisions of the 1954 constitution, the demand for self
government had became very rife. Consequently, constitutional conferences became inevitable. The
conferences that helped to prepare the ground for the independence constitution took place in 1957
and 1958.
From May 23 to June 26 1957 Nigeria took another step towards nationhood at the London
Constitutional Conference held in Lancaster House. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, was in the
chair.

SOME OF THE DELEGATES TO THE LONDON TALKS INCLUDED

Action Group:

Chief Awolowo, Chief F. R. A. Williams.

Kamerun National Congress:

Dr. E. M. L. Endeley, Galega Fon of Bali, Mr. J. T Ndze

Cameroon National Democratic Party:

Mr. J.N. Foncha

Kamerun People's Party:

Mr. P.M. Kale

National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons:

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Alhaji A. Adelabu, Mr. T.O.S. Benson,

Dr. K, 0. Mbaduiwe, Dr. M. I, Okpara, Mr. D.C. Osadebey and Dr. S. Onabamiro.

Northern Elements Progressive Union and Allied Parties:

These were represented by Malam lbrahim Imam and Malam Aminu Kano.

Northern People's Congress:

Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna of Sokoto), Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji Isa kaita, Alhaji
Muhammadu Ribadu and Alhaji Inuwa Wada.

United Middle Belt Congress:

Mr. J.S.Tarka.

United National Independence Party:

Dr. U. Udoma.

Other attendants to the conference included chiefs from the regions, the government representatives in
Nigeria; United Kingdom government Advisers, Legal Advisers, etc, The federal Government was
represented by the Governor General, the three Regional Governors, the High Commissioner of the
Southern Cameroons, two federal Ministers and the leader of the opposition in the House of
Representatives. The Capital Territory of Lagos Government was represented by the Colonial Secretary,
Mr. Allen Lennox Boyd - who was the Chairman - ten delegates and nine advisers.

AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE

At the commencement of the conference, the three Regional Premiers and Dr, Endeley, Leader of
Government Business in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly, submitted a joint memorandum
which demanded that the British Government should undertake to grant independence to the
federation in 1959. Mr. Lennox Boyd rejected the demand when he refused to agree in advance to a
fixed date for independence.

The conference decided on:

i. A Senate for the federal parliament and the enlargement of the House of Representatives.

ii. The abolition of the post of Chief Secretary and the creation of the post of Deputy Governor.

iii. House of chiefs for the Eastern Region and the Southern Cameroons and that a satisfactory
formula for the classification of Chiefs in the regions should be evolved.

iv. A revised constitution for the Northern Region in view of its stand against regional self
government in 1957. An all African Executive Council for Western and Eastern regions.

v. That the Eastern and Western Regions should become self governing at an early date after the
conference and the Northern Region in 1959.

vi. That the Governors should cease to preside over the Executive Council though they would be
informed of the Executive Council decisions.

vii. That a Regional Governor should continue to be appointed by the Crown on the advice of the
British Government but after informal consultations with the Regional Government concerned.

viii. That a Regional Governor in his discretion, should appoint as Premier the person that appeared
to him to command a majority in the House of Assembly concerned and on the Premier's
recommendation should appoint other Ministers and assign responsibilities to them.

ix. That the constitution should be amended to provide for safeguards to ensure that on
attainment of self government, a Regional Government did not act so as to endanger the continuance of
the federation or to impede or prejudice the exercise by the federal government of its function.

x. That the status of the Southern Cameroons should be raised to that of a Region, but with the
Governor General retaining ultimate responsibility over the Region as a trust territory while the
Northern Cameroons should continue to remain part of the Northern Region.
xi. The conference stressed the importance of protecting the public Service Commission from
politics. Appointments, promotions and dismissals were to be subject to the commissions'
recommendations to the Governor. Similarly, it was resolved to maintain the independence of the Audit
service through the Public Service Commission.

Xii. Regarding the judiciary, the conference insisted on the importance of ensuring its independence
by protecting it from political interference. It was therefore decided that the Chief Justice of a self
governing Region could only be appointed by the Governor in consultation with the Chief Justice of the
federal Supreme Court. It ruled also that a Judicial Service Commission be set up, that High Court Judges
be protected and that their removal would only be effected by an inquiry carried but by a judiciary
committee of the Privy Council.

xiii. The Conference resolved that the House of Chiefs in the Northern Region should comprise all
first class chiefs and forty-seven others chosen from among them. Other recommendations were for the
creation of a Council of Chiefs to approve appointments, and disposition, the abolition of the post of
Chief Secretary and Financial Secretary, composition of a House of Assembly of 490 elected members
with five special members to be named by the Governor.

xiv. Regarding the federal Council of Ministers, the conference created a Deputy Governor General.
It was also approved that no less than ten members should be on the Council of Ministers. It was to be
placed on record that until independence, the Governor General or his Deputy should preside over the
meetings of the Council.

xv. On federal subjects, it was agreed that naturalization of aliens should be a federal subject, as
well as banking and allied matters, but pointed but that the regions could participate in commercial
banking concerns. On the pressing issue of the police, it was thought wise for it to remain a federal
responsibility in view of the need to check its misuse by politicians.

xvi. Placed on the concurrent list were administration of estates, dangerous drugs, electricity, gas,
industrial development, insurance, sanctioning of films and trustees. Another important ruling was that
in the event of inconsistencies between federal and regional laws, federal laws should prevail.

xvii. The conference also tackled the future of the armed forces. A major decision was taken that as
from April 1, 1958, the right of control at present exercised by the United Kingdom Army Council should
end. It was deemed important that with the progress of Nigeria towards self government, the country
should gain the necessary experience in the administration of the nation's defence forces.

The conference also agreed that the Governor-General should set up a defence committee, comprising
the Deputy Governor General as chairman, the Prime Minister, two other Ministers, the General Officer
Commanding the Nigerian Military Forces, the Regional Premiers or their representatives.

The conference agreed that the existing federal legislature should be allowed to run its full term until
the end of 1959 and that thereafter it should consist of 320 elected representatives.
The conference also decided that the office of the Prime Minister of the Federation should be
established and that the Governor General should appoint as the Prime Minister a person who appeared
to him to command a majority in the House of Representatives and upon the recommendation of the
Prime Minister any member of the House or of the Senate as a Federal Minister.

It was also agreed that the Secretary of State should appoint a commission of inquiry "to ascertain the
facts about fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears
whether well or ill founded".

IMPLICATIONS OF 1957 CONFERENCE

There was mixed reactions among the politicians, indeed the public at large, when the news of these
conference decisions reached Nigeria. Two important political developments followed the conference
and preceded the 1958 conference. First, on 8 August 1957 both the Eastern and Western Regions
formally became self governing. Second, on August 30, 1957, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became
Nigeria's first Prime Minister and formed the first all Nigerian Federal Executive Council. He selected his
Ministers not only from the NPC, the NCNC and the Kamerun National Congress but also from the Action
Group.

From 1957, there were increased reactions for self government. Many groups started to agitate for the
creation of their regions. For instance, there was the demand for the creation of Mid West Region, the
demand for Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers State (C.O.R). It was as a result of the agitations by the minority
groups, that a commission of inquiry was set up to look into their fears. Other issues on which
commissions were set up in 1957 were the Fiscal Commission on the Redistribution of Revenue, and the
Constituency Delimitation Commission. Other unfinished issues in 1957 necessitated the resumption of
another conference in 1958.

THE HISTORIC CONFERENCE OF 1958

The historic conference which began on September 29, and ended on October 27, was mainly concerned
with the consideration of the reports of the fiscal and minorities commissions, which the 1957
conference had appointed. It was also to discuss the request for independence which the Nigerian
delegates had made to the United Kingdom government at the 1957 Conference.

Attended by 114 persons variously classified as delegates, advisers and officials, the conference made
decisions on;

i. Fundamental human rights.

ii. The Police.

iii. Self-government for Northern Nigeria.

iv. The position of Lagos.

v. The Southern Cameroons.

vi. Electoral Arrangements.

vii. Fiscal arrangements.

viii. The minorities.

ix. Nigerian independence, etc.

On the question of fundamental human rights, the conference decided that a number of rights and
freedoms - ranging from the right to life, the right to religion, the freedom of peaceful assembly and
association - should be incorporated in the Nigerian Constitution. These rights were to be enjoyed by all
without discrimination on any ground whatsoever and there shall be no denial to any person of any or
all of these listed rights.

On the thorny question of the police, the conference decided that there should be a single police force
under an Inspector-General responsible to the federal government.

The conference also agreed that each regional contingent should be under the control of a
commissioner, who though under the general supervision of the Inspector General, would be
responsible for recruiting members of his own contingent as far as practicable from within the region,
thus ensuring that constables posted to an area would be those who understood the local language.

On the agitation of the minorities for the creation of new states, the Colonial Secretary stated that Her
Majesty's Government presented two choices on the matter: the abandonment of independence in
1960 and the prosecution of the case for new states. The conference adopted the view of the minorities'
commission that no case had been made out for the immediate creation of new states.

After taking note of the Northern Nigeria Government's desire to become self-governing on March 15,
1959, the conference agreed that constitutional provisions for self-government should follow the
pattern established in 1957 for Eastern and Western Nigeria with certain specific variations.

The conference adopted, in the main, the recommendations of the fiscal commission on the principles it
set out regarding population, on the allocation of revenue and balanced development as added
principles for allocating revenue.
After considering the proposals put forward for constitutional advance in the Southern Cameroons, it
was agreed by the territory's representatives and subsequently approved by the conference that
whatever appropriate constitutional changes that should be made should take place at the choice of the
Southern Cameroons Government which would be formed after the January, 1959 elections.

It was decided, on the issue of electoral regulations that there should be uniform electoral qualifications
for all future elections to the Regional Houses of Assembly and the Federal House of Representatives.

On the issue of self-government, the Colonial Secretary told the conference of Her Majesty's Willingness
to grant Nigeria full independence on 1st October 1960 if the new Nigerian Parliament early in 1960
passed a resolution asking for self-government.

On the judiciary, the conference recommended that the composition of the federal Supreme Court
should be enlarged by adding to its membership as ex-officio members the Chief Justice of each of the
Region. Another issue that had heated debate was the status of Lagos. It was agreed between the
federal and Western Region governments that the closest cooperation between the Lagos Town
planning Authority and the Ikeja Town Planning Authority was necessary. The conference also made
some agreement on the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy, Nigerian citizenship, etc.

AN ASSESSMENT OF COLONIALISM IN NIGERIA

There have been debates by scholars on the contributions of colonialism to the development of Africa in
general and Nigeria in particular. Some western political historians have always opined that they came
to Africa on a civilizing mission and that Africa was nothing until they came. It is in view of this argument
that this section of the study is intended to present our readers with the overall impact of colonialism on
Nigeria. We shall start with the positive impact of colonialism.

THE IMPACT OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

The impact of colonial rule which was formalized with the amalgamation of 1914 had both negative and
positive impacts on Nigeria. The administration of Nigeria under colonial rule operated on two levels,
namely: the central and the local. Local administration developed piecemeal because various parts of
the country were occupied at different times and also because the parts did not constitute one country.
Central administration began in 1914 because of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern
Protectorates by Sir (Lord) F. D. Lugard.

Lugard's successors did not change this situation. When Lugard left in 1919, he was succeeded by Hugh
Clifford who did very little to change the administrative structure instituted by Lugard. Even the reforms
of Sir Donald Cameron who was Nigeria's Governor from 1931-1935 could not change the arrangement
Lugard made for the central administration. Cameron introduced significant judicial reforms especially
the separation of the executive from the judiciary. But these measures did not affect the structure of
administration introduced by Lugard.

Governor Bourdillion who succeeded Cameron also took a step which further strengthened the lack of
emphasis on unity which had characterized the central administration. Bourdillion divided the southern
provinces into the western and eastern groups of provinces. By 1946 Arthur Richards formally made the
three provinces into three regions- northern, eastern and western; each with very strong powers. Even
though the Richards constitution created a central legislature, members were delegates from regional
assemblies. As delegates, they worked for their respective regional interests at the expense of the whole
nation.

The other colonial administrators in Nigeria-Macpherson and Lyttleton did little or nothing to change
the structure set up by Lord Lugard. The important question before us is: what are some of the impacts
of colonialism that have helped to keep Nigeria perpetually backward. We shall start with the positive
impacts.

BENEFITS OF COLONIALISM

It will be a historical fallacy to condemn colonialism in its entireity. This is because of the available
economic, social, political and cultural changes that came with it.

POLITICAL IMPACT

We have already noted that indirect rule helped to groom the traditional rulers to begin to provide
social and economic amenities for their people. We also noted the training which the traditional
authorities acquired as a result of their participation in the administration of their respective societies.
The political structures such as legislature, judiciary and the executive, concepts like federalism,
democracy, rule of law, fundamental human rights etc. and electoral issues we came in contact with, the
liberal democratic ethos we have been trying to improve upon are colonial antecedents. Colonialism
merged Nigeria into one political entity which if properly exploited and managed will become a powerful
nation.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

British colonial authorities encouraged Nigerians to be involved in agriculture for the production of such
crops as cocoa, palm produce, groundnuts, cotton, hides-skin etc. The interest in agriculture led to the
building of railways, roads, post and telecommunication facilities to enhance the evacuation of these
agricultural produce. Industries and commercial ventures were established to enhance the exploitation
and extraction of raw materials from Nigeria. It was their coming that introduced the use of money to
Africa as a medium of change. Extractive industries in coal, tin, gold were set up for economic relations
with the rest of the world, especially the people of Europe.
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In social development, colonialism was significant. One of the primary imperatives was education.
Western Education was introduced in Nigeria by the Christian missionaries in 1842 when a mission
school was opened in Badagary. The importance of education cannot be over stressed. It was as a result
of education that Africans became exposed to the injustices of colonialism and realized the need to
struggle to be free from colonial domination.

Hospitals were set up to cure the diseases that were rampant in Nigeria. Drugs were found for malaria,
tuberculosis, chicken pox etc. Again colonial rule created a wage earning class due to the labour demand
of mining and other establishments brought about by colonial rule. Colonial economic measures also led
to expansion of urban centres and of commerce in the country.

Western education brought Nigerians of different backgrounds and cultures together. For instance
nationalists such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and H. O. Davies were co-students at both the primary and
secondary school levels in Lagos. The contact brought mutual understanding which became useful for
nation building efforts, and anti-colonial struggle. Education also produced the clerical officers and led
to emergence of the working class. It also brought English language as a medium of communication
among different cultures and helped to contribute to mutual understanding.

Colonial rule helped in the creation of urban centres. These urban centres brought Nigerians of different
cultures and backgrounds together. They engaged in many mutually lucrative activities in the fields of
commerce, industry and so on. In this sense, urbanization was a source of national friendships which
developed among urban dwellers of various ethnic backgrounds and these proved helpful to the
integration efforts.

NEGATIVE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM

It is now a widely held view that most of the problems in Nigeria today have arisen as a result of
colonialism. For better understanding of the negative impact of colonialism on the development of
Nigeria, the basic issues would be articulated under economic, political, social and cultural influences.

NEGATIVE POLITICAL IMPACT OF COLONIAL RULE

As already noted the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914 was limited in scope. That is, only for the
respective Lieutenant Governors at Enugu and Kaduna. The Nigerian Council which was created did not
include the north. In spite of the amalgamation, the boundary between the north and south was
retained. Lugard created two groups of provinces the northern and the southern. The northern group
was made up of twelve provinces while the southern had ten (including the Colony of Lagos).

The amalgamation was implemented in such a way that local differences were emphasized and no
attempt was made to use the amalgamation to achieve political unity between the north and south.
There was no Nigerian in the Central Executive Council until 1946 and the central administration was
organized in such a way that local differences were strengthened by the constitutional and
administrative arrangements of the colonial period. Nigerians, especially as between the north and
south had little opportunity to interact in fashioning the affairs of their country. In fact until the 1940s,
the central legislature was mainly an affair of southerners. Though colonial rule did not create the
differences among Nigerian peoples, yet not much was done to reduce the impact of these differences
on the political and socioeconomic life of the country. The result was that various Nigerian leaders and
peoples had little or no regard for national aspirations that ran counter to their respective group
aspirations or interests. Central administration in colonial Nigeria in this sense was a force in the
strengthening of parochialism in the development of the country. As a common knowledge, the failure
of the above parochial interests on the part of Nigerian leaders and peoples became a major legacy of
colonial period. Thus, elections, political parties, census, revenue allocation, religion and other issues
affecting the development of the country were most of the time tackled according to regional interests
during and after colonial rule.

The above situation had helped to sow the seed of disunity, discord, acrimony, rancour, discrimination,
mediocrity, corruption, and generally low level of performance among Nigerians. Political instability,
sectionalism and absence of patriotism are very glaring in Nigeria today. Essentially, Nigerians were not
consulted before the amalgamation and the implications on the long term development of Nigeria were
not considered. The British colonial rule introduced a divide and rule policy as could be seen from the
operation of the indirect rule system.

The indirect rule system was meant to humiliate the traditional rulers. They were treated with disdain
and the respect accorded them was on the decline. Generally, the British officials did not have the
political interest of Nigeria at heart. This impact lives with us till date. There was also the problem of
using the traditional rulers to fight the educated elite who were more visionary in their approach to
national issues.

NEGATIVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF COLONIAL RULE

The economic impact of colonialism on Nigeria was more devastating than the political impact. All the
economic policies were intended to exploit and plunder the resources of Nigeria and never geared
towards the development of Nigeria. If we briefly x-ray the involvement of the British in agriculture,
commerce and industries during the period, we shall observe that there was no real programme for the
development of agriculture. Even, when haphazard interest was shown in agriculture after the World
War II, the aim was to encourage Nigerians to produce those crops (the so-called cash or export crops)
needed by European industries. In other words, agricultural policy was not aimed at improving crops
which had internal or domestic value, but to service colonial needs. As a result, respective parts of
Nigeria came to specialize in the production of certain so-called cash crops (or export crops). Palm oil
and kernel were predominant in parts of eastern Nigeria; cocoa in western Nigeria; rubber in mid-
western Nigeria; groundnuts, cotton, hides and skin and Shea products in northern Nigeria.

Nigerians were forced to give almost desperate attention to the production of these, because British
rule created a lot of social and economic demands on the people (like education and taxation, which
could only be met by using the new currency that came with British rule).

Again, the railways and other means of communication made possible the evacuation of Nigerian
products to Britain and other European countries on trade terms decided by the colonial authorities and
of course, to the disadvantage of Nigerian owners of the commodities. The fiscal and monetary losses
which Nigeria suffered were enormous. For example the palm produce evacuated from Nigeria was
about 66,000 tons in 1901; rose to 272,000 in 1921 and 497,000 tons in 1951. Palm oil alone fetched
£981,330 for 110,243 tons in 1938. In the same year, 180,136 tons of groundnuts valued at £1, 305, 825
and 97,100 tons of cocoa valued at £1,305,828 were evacuated. The greater percentage of this revenue
was either sent to the Imperial Treasury or overseas banks as reserves or used in servicing the colonial
administration in terms of salaries, provision of infrastructures and so on.

Again, the British did not reinvest the large profits from the sale of Nigerian products, both agricultural
and minerals in the country. This helped the British and other European firms to determine the flow of
trade between the two countries, While Nigeria became poorer and thus, more dependent on the
British merchants or firms, the commercial firms of Europe continued to grow richer. This marketing
relationship resulted in the emergence of Nigerian commercial elite that became mere instruments for
the supply of Nigerian products to Europe and for distributing products from British and European
manufacturing industries in Nigeria. This was an aspect of economic dependence which was built up by
the colonial authorities to the continued disadvantage of Nigeria and her peoples.

Furthermore, the way industrial development was carried out prevented Nigerians from relying on their
pre-colonial system of industrial technology for development. In fact quite often, indigenous systems or
institutions of technology were outlawed by the colonial authorities. For example, made in Nigeria gins
were called 'illicit gin'. At the same time, Nigerians were not fully introduced to the essence of the
technology that accompanied colonial rule. As a result, Nigerians lost count on both the indigenous and
foreign systems. During and since after colonial rule, this under-development of Nigeria's technical
capacity has constituted an obstacle to development. Equally, the colonial economic structure made it
impossible for Nigerians to be the final source of solutions to Nigeria's economic problems. Instead, they
became absorbed into an economic system in which they became mere agents of European economic
institutions. In commerce, for example, commercial monopoly by Europeans pushed Nigerian merchants
to a disadvantageous position thus, replacing them with European and Lebanese agents. Economic
relationship was purely tilted to the exploitation of Nigerians and Nigeria for the development of Britain
and the British.
NEGATIVE SOCIAL IMPACT

The negative impact of colonialism on the social development of Nigeria can be organized under
education, urbanization, health services, etc.

In the field of education, the colonial government did not do much to promote its development and
expansion. From 1901 Lugard did nothing to encourage educational programmes in Northern Nigeria.
Instead he strengthened the Islamic basis of the traditional emirates to protect the north from what he
described as the corrupting influence of the western educated indigenes of the Lagos Colony and
Southern Nigeria. Going further, Lugard tried to segregate between the Muslims and non-Muslims in
many other areas which resulted in the slow educational development of Northern Nigeria. Lugard and
his successors did not allow the Christian missions to develop education in that part of country. This
made the northern part to lag behind its southern counterparts as a result of the educational policy.

Generally, colonial administration had a policy of restricted direct involvement in the actual building and
management of educational institutions. For example, up till 1945 the budget for education was only
4.5% with only 20 government owned primary schools in Eastern Nigeria. These government-owned
schools were in the urban centres and the administrative headquarters, leaving the larger section of the
Nigerian population without access to educational institutions. The mission schools were built to spread
the gospel and according to the lean financial resources they could raise. These affected the range of
subjects that were taught which were usually reading, writing and arithmetic. The basic aim was to train
people who could be literate enough to assist the missions in the work of evangelization, and later
producing literate manpower to serve in the clerical sections of the government service and the
commercial firms.

It was as a result of intensive pressure mounted by the nationalists that led to the building of the first
institution of Higher Education in Nigeria, namely, Yaba Higher College in 1934 which awarded diplomas.
In 1948, the University College Ibadan was opened but the limited openings and cost made it very
difficult for qualified Nigerians to gain admission into these institutions.

Western education led to imbalance between the north and south due to the different educational
policies in the two areas. Consequently as colonial rule drew on, the south in relation to the north began
to dominate sectors of national life where western education was necessary (e.g. the civil service, the
firms and education itself). The problems arising from this remain serious source of distraction for
national leaders and the people.

Inequality was also noticeable even within the same zone. For example, towns like Onitsha, Abeokuta,
Lagos and Ijebu had far greater number of educated people by the 1930s than their immediate
neighbours because of the difference in the pace of educational development. Such inequalities became
a problem in inter-group relations in various parts. It tended in general to give some groups an
advantage in occupying positions in the political, economic and social institutions of their areas. The late
comers have often seen this as evidence of domination.

Western education also produced elites who saw their country's problems from western ideas and
methods. In various ways, such elites tended to be neither Nigerian nor western, displaying a confusion
of ideas that was unhelpful to national development.

Finally, colonial education did not promote functional and vocational education, as most of the
educated people were unable to contribute meaningfully to the technological and overall economic
development of the country.

URBANIZATION

Colonialism gave rise to some urban centres. It must be noted that northern and western Nigeria had
urban centres prior to colonial rule. New cities such as Enugu, Port-Harcourt and Kaduna grew as a
result of settlement and migration caused by colonial administrative headquarters. Kafanchan
developed in response to the railway. Mining centres and ports helped some cities to emerge.

The need to secure employment in commercial firms, banking institutions, civil service and public
service headquarters made the people leave the rural areas. Opportunity for self- employment for
traders, artisans, and craftsmen, hoteliers, tailors etc, equally helped the growth of the urban areas.

As a result, it was easier to make quick money in the urban centres because of the opportunities they
offered. Agriculture was abandoned for distributive trade. Again, the Township Ordinance of 1917
created a structure of first, second and third class townships. In that descending order, social amenities
like electricity, water and markets were provided. This led to discriminatory policies of urban
development but generally the urban centres had better social amenities than the rural areas.

Again, urbanization had serious adverse effects on Nigerian society. It helped to create divisions among
Nigerians. It dislocated the original owners of the land because of adjustment to land use and other
property rights, which would enable the immigrants to have a sense of belonging in the city. The
indigenes were required to develop a cosmopolitan outlook that often worked against their cherished
interests and values.

Thus, in many urban centres the migrants and indigenes are often engaged in a cold war. This has
affected the political culture of Nigeria till today, because of tension between the indigenes and the
migrants. Other negative impacts of urbanization are:
i. High cost of living in terms of rents;

ii. The growth of individualism at the expense of kinship relationship;

iii The rise of criminal activities due to unemployment and other forms of hardship;

iv. The underdevelopment of rural areas due to the exodus of many of the youths to the
townships;

v. The consolidation of foreign culture as urban residents quite often queried the validity or
relevance of indigenous culture to modernization;

vi. Colonial creation of urban centres brought about rivalry between towns because the colonial
policy encouraged uneven and unequal conditions for urban development. Some towns were given
more encouragement than others because they were placed in higher status or class for which they
enjoyed preferential treatment in the allocation and development of social amenities.

HEALTH SERVICES

The colonial government gave limited attention to the provision of health facilities. Though health
workers accompanied the British traders, missionaries and administrators they only took care of their
health problems. Health facilities were provided by Christian missions in collaboration with the
communities. They built hospitals, dispensaries, maternities and clinics but such facilities were provided
to the extent the Europeans needed them. The missions provided health facilities primarily to take care
of the health of missionaries and to take care of the converts. In a sense, the health-care development
was seen as part of the evangelization process just as education. By 1917, there were 17 hospitals in
Nigeria and by 1951 the number had risen to 157. Government concentrated her health services in the
urban and semi-urban centres and so there was also a case of uneven distribution. Government did not
also want to invest in the training of the necessary medical manpower in terms of doctors, nurses and
others, besides the training period were long and expensive.

Generally, the health-care institutions were short of manpower, drugs and means of transportation. The
inadequacy of health care facilities forced many Nigerians to rely on indigenous medical system and ill-
trained or indeed fake doctors for their health needs.

Besides these identified short comings of colonial rule, were also cases of observed intimidation,
oppression, discrimination, exploitation, persecution and injustice. Nigerians who qualified for positions
were denied such positions on the basis of race. Our culture was debased and our person's reduced to
nothingness. It was a clear case of man's inhumanity to man in his own very country. The British dictated
the prices' of goods they brought into Nigeria and equally the prices of goods produced in Nigeria by
Nigerians. All forms of injustices, domination and exploitation were used on the people during colonial
rule. Essentially, the present lack of cohesion, harmony and national unity were sowed by the British in a
bid to keep Nigeria perpetually divided so as to be unable to muster the oneness of purpose necessary
for the overthrow of colonialism.
In conclusion, we maintain that the quagmire in which we are enmeshed today was nurtured by the
British colonial masters in their one hundred years of colonial rule.
REFERENCES

1. Chinweizu (1978) The West and the rest of us. Lagos Nok Publishers.

2. Falola, T., Mahadi A., Uhomoibhi, M., Anyanwu, U. (1991) History of Nigeria in the twentieth
century. Lkeja, Longman Nigeria Plc.

3. Joye, E.M. & Igweike, K. (1982) Introduction to the 1979 Nigerian constitution. London,
The Macmillan Press Ltd.

4. Nwosu H.N. (1977) Political authority and the Nigerian civil service. Enugu, Fourth Dimension
Publishers.

5. Obiozor, G.A. (1994) The politics of precarious balancing: An analysis of contending issues of
Nigerian domestic and foreign policy. Lagos; Printing Press Division, Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs.

6. Onuoha, J. (ed) (2001) American pragmatism: An African viewpoint. Nsukka, AP Express

Publishers.

7. Ukeje, B.O. (1978) Education for social reconstruction. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.
CHAPTER SEVEN

EVENTS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE

Three important constitutional developments took place in the period immediately following the 1958
constitutional conference. First, in 1959, the House of Assembly of the Southern Cameroons took a
decision that the territory should cease to be part of the Nigerian federation as from the date of
independence. Also in the same year, the formal establishment of a code of fundamental rights, which
was subsequently incorporated into the constitution took place. Lastly, in June 1960, an Eastern House
of Chiefs was formally created, thereby completing a bicameral legislature in each of the three regions
and in the centre.

1959 was a year of intense activity in Nigeria with regional self government for the north and then
federal elections towards the end of the year. In a proclamation issued on October 28, 1959, His
Excellency, the Governor General announced the dissolution of the federal House of Representatives
with effect from November 1. December 12 was election day for the new House. Elections were held in
312 single-member constituencies throughout the country (election for 8 seats for Southern Cameroons
representatives was suspended pending the outcome of the plebiscite on the future of the territory to
be held on March, 1961). Out of the 312 seat, 174 were in Northern Nigeria, 62 were in Western Nigeria,
73 were in Eastern Nigeria and 3 were in Lagos. The final results of the election announced on December
25 stated that:

Northern Peoples Congress - 142

NCNC and its ally NEPU - 89

Action Group - 72

Other Parties - 9

There were some difficulty in forming the federal government once the election was over, because no
one single party had won enough seats to form the government alone. As the leader of the largest party,
Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was invited by Sir James Robertson - Governor-General to form a new
federal cabinet. Sir Abubakar, the former Prime Minister accepted the invitation, said he had not ruled
out the possibility of forming a coalition government but added that "We certainly cannot compromise"
on the suggestion that a leader of another party might become Prime Minister.
After discussions between the NPC and the NCNC officially described as friendly and cordial, a new
federal government was formed on December 30, 1959. NPC had ten Ministers and NCNC seven.

THE 1960 CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The conference opened on May 10 and ended May 19th. In the decisions of the 1958 London
Conference it was agreed that the final discussions between Nigerian government and the Colonial
Secretary would be useful - after a new federal government had been formed. The conference
authorized a committee of legal draughtsmen to submit a draft of the Order in Council and Act of
Independence for approval by the conference. The lawyers' main task was to produce documents which
succinctly embodied the agreed decisions of the previous conferences.

At the end of the Nigerian Constitutional Conference, the final official communique said that discussions
had covered Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth, constitutional matters, defence, the
Cameroons and technical assistance. Nigeria would become a full member of the Commonwealth on
October 1, 1960. On constitutional affairs, the conference agreed on the way in which decisions of the
various constitutional conferences would be incorporated in the constitution for independence.

The conference agreed that the right of appeal to the Privy Council would he retained after
independence, except in the case of election petitions. Also the federal Legislature of independent
Nigeria would be known as Parliament.

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION OF 1960

By the Nigerian Independence Act of 1960, the British Parliament conceded independence to Nigeria
with full responsible status within the Commonwealth as from October 1 of that year. The name of the
country was changed from the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria to Nigeria and the British Government
ceased from that date to have any responsibility for the government of the country or any part thereof.

FEATURES OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

It established a federation of three regions. The centre had a Parliament which was bicameral made up
of a House of Representatives and the Senate. The Regions also had bicameral legislatures made up of
Houses of Assembly and Houses of Chiefs. The Southern Cameroons was not part of the federation
created by the Independence Constitution. But Northern Cameroon became part of the Northern Region
of Nigeria.

There was a Governor General who acted in a Lieutenant capacity as the representative of the Queen of
England as Head of State. He was a constitutional Head of State because he always acted on the advice
of the Prime Minister who was the effective head of government. The Constitution authorized the Prime
Minister to establish a cabinet or Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister and his cabinet governed
the nation on condition that they had the support of a majority in parliament. In short, the proposals of
the cabinet about how to govern Nigeria were bound to receive the approval of parliament.

In each region, the regional Governor occupied the same constitutional position as the Governor
General at the centre, while the Regional Premiers as the head of the regional government occupied the
same constitutional position in the region as the Prime Minister in the centre. Each region had a Cabinet
or Executive Council. In brief, it was a bicameral Westminster type of parliamentary government.

Principles Of Federalism In The I960 Constitution

The constitution embodied federal principles. It incorporated the principle of division of powers of
government and administration between the centre and the regions. It established three lists of
subjects:

i. Exclusive

ii. Concurrent

iii. Residual list

The federal system was completed by the addition of the constitution of each of the three regions.

The Exclusive List: This consisted of about 14 principal items e.g. Defence, External Affairs, Mines and
Minerals, Public Debts, Railway, Weights and Measures, Currency and Coinage, and Legal Tender,
Customs and Exercise duties. These were reserved for the central government to make laws on and
implement.

Concurrent List:This included Census, Higher Education, Industrial Development, Labour, Scientific and
Industrial Research and Statistics, etc.

Residual List:In this list there was no tabulation of subjects, but it was agreed and provided for that all
subjects not included in the federal exclusive list and concurrent list were regional subjects.

The Legislature

Each region continued to be represented in the Senate by twelve persons elected at a joint sitting of the
legislative houses of that region from among those nominated by the Governor, not below 40 years of
age, and being citizens of Nigeria. There were provisions for a further eight Senators, four representing
the federal Territory of Lagos and the remaining four to be selected by the Governor General.

The House of Representatives consisted of 350 elected members each of whom to be elected must be a
citizen of Nigeria not below the age of 21 and in the case of Northern Nigeria being a male person.

The same qualification was required for membership of all regional Houses of Assembly except that the
candidates or his father must have been born in the region concerned and the candidate must have
been continuously resident there for 1 year, or 3 years in the case of the Northern Region. The
composition of the second chamber, i.e. The Regional Houses of Chiefs, was not the same in all the
regions. Disqualification from membership of a Regional House of Assembly was the same as for the
House of Representatives.

FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS

The Constitution guaranteed the fundamental human rights of the citizens. These were right to life and
personal liberty, the right to free and fair trial, the right to freedom of movement, the right to own and
dispose of property, freedom from servitude - no one should be employed as a slave, freedom from
slavery and forced labour, respect for private and family life, freedom of religion and worship, the right
to hold and express opinion,and lastly, the right to peaceful assembly and association.

The only authority granted by the constitution for the limitation of any of these rights was in respect of a
law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. Even on this, the ruling of the courts rather
than the claims of government were to be final.

REVENUE ALLOCATION

The 1960 constitution provided that both the centre and regions should participate in and derive some
of their revenues from personal income tax. Tax on tobacco and a few other commodities were to be
levied and collected by the centre but the revenues so collected should be distributed to the regions.
The central government was also to give grants to the regions. A distributable pool fund was also
created. The revenue for the distributable pool fund came from 30% mining and mineral royalties and
rents but funds in this pool were shared out into 95 units and distributed as at 1963 as follows: North
40, East 31, West 18, Mid-West 6.

The constitution provided for a Judicial Civil Commission and a Public Service Commission both in the
centre and in the regions. Significantly, it provided for the independence of the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) and other officials such as Accountant General and Director of Audit.

CITIZENSHIP
The constitution tackled the question of Nigerian citizenship by defining who Nigerian citizens are and
how non-Nigerians can become Nigerian citizens if they want to and if Nigeria agrees to confer on them
her citizenship rights.

Lastly, it provided that persons claiming Nigerian citizenship must have established descent from
Nigerian parents in other words citizenship by blood. Parliament also had the right to make
naturalization laws that is laws that would make a non-Nigerian become a Nigerian after fulfilling certain
conditions.

EMERGENCY POWERS

The federal government was given emergency powers which included the power of dismissing a regional
government and taking over administrative control of the region. No unit of the federation could amend
its constitution in such a way as to put the whole country in jeopardy. Principal subjects were
entrenched in the constitution to make them more permanent and more difficult to change. In order to
amend the entrenched clauses of the constitution two conditions were set out,

i. A two-third majority of all members of each house of parliament must approve the amendment.

ii. The legislatures of two regions must by a simple majority of each house of legislature concur.

Ordinarily, clauses of the constitution require a simple majority of each house of parliament to amend
them. The entrenched clauses of the regional constitutions could be amended also under two
conditions. They were;

a. 2/3 majority of all members of each house of the regional legislature initiating the amendment.

b. 2/3 majority of each house of the federal parliament should also concur.

The 1960 Constitution established a federal democratic and parliamentary system of administration for
Nigeria. There were two levels of government each deriving its powers from the people and each
independent of the other, performing its clearly defined functions, but both cooperating and
coordinating their thoughts, plans and actions for the good of the Nigerian people. It emphasized
government through the elected representatives of the people, at the same time, a government that is
responsible and accountable both to the legislature and to the people.

WEAKNESSES OF THE 1960 INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

The independence Constitution did not give sovereignty to Nigeria. For instance, the power to appoint
the country's representatives abroad, were vested in the President acting for the Queen.
Under the independence Constitution non-Nigerians were still Senators. Judges were appointed by the
Queen on the advice of the Governor General. The 1960 Constitution maintained a formal link with the
Queen as Head of State. The Queen of England was still the Head of state of Nigeria. The Highest court
of appeal for Nigeria was in UK and that the British troops could be established in Nigeria any time the
British authority decided upon.

FACTORS THAT NECESSITATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF 1963

With independence in 1960, many crises manifested themselves. Some of these crises were
constitutional. For example, the Governor General suggested that some of the powers and functions of
the Prime Minister be transferred to the Governor General or the President. He mentioned such
functions as the control of the Civil Service Commission, Judicial Service Commission, Census and Audit.
He felt that these functions should be removed from party control. The Prime Minister refused.

The Action Group crisis was another factor that contributed to the revision of the independence
Constitution. It raised many constitutional issues e.g. Governors powers to remove a Premier,
fundamental human rights and the conflict between the federal government and the Supreme Court. In
May, 1963, the Prime Minister and Regional Premiers met in order to settle these constitutional issues.
The conference of Heads of Government in Nigeria agreed to summon an all party conference in Lagos
and to suggest to those body, possible changes in the constitution. In July 1963, the All Party Conference
met. Their first consensus was that Nigeria should be a Republic and that the President of the Republic
should have the same powers and functions with the Governor General as under the independence
Constitution. The conference could not agree on the Preventive Detention Law, because it was believed
that it would curtail the fundamental human rights and vest the government with arbitrarily powers.
Following the conference, a Republican constitution was drafted and approved by both the federal
parliament and regional parliaments.

THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1963

On April 29, 1963 the federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa announced that Nigeria
would become a republic within the commonwealth by October 1963. By June 29, 1963, the federal
Prime Minister and the Regional Premiers discussed the proposed pattern of a future Republican Nigeria
when they met in Jos.

However, many Nigerians were opposed to the defence agreement which Britain signed with Nigeria in
1961. Discussions and debates soon shifted from the defence pact to general discussions on many
aspects of the relationship between Nigeria and Britain. It was at this time that many Nigerians realized
that the independence granted Nigeria by Britain in 1960 had neither military nor economic significance.
As a result of the weaknesses of the 1960 Constitution, many people in Nigeria wanted immediate
changes to be made in the constitution in order to remove these awkward aspects of Nigeria's
relationship with Britain.
Some amendments were therefore made in the independence Constitution and these became the
background of factors for revising the independence Constitution.

CHANGES CONSEquent Upon The Amendment Of The Independence Constitution

The 1963 Constitution made it that the President of the Republic would be elected through an electoral
college of members of the Senate and House of Representatives and the tenure of office would be for a
period of five years. The provision of the 1960 constitution in respect of the executive would remain
except that a Prime Minister will not be removable from office by the President unless as a result of a
vote of no confidence in the government secured on the floor of House. The Police force was to
continue as before, and no police force should be established or maintained on a regional basis.

The constitution contained that under the Republic non-Nigerians might not become Senators, and in
line with practically all commonwealth and other countries, the Judicial Service Commission should be
abolished. All Judges were to be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister who will
have such consultations as he may deem fit before tendering such advice. Removal of Judges would be
by presentation to the President of an address by a majority of at least two-thirds of all the members of
each house of parliament.

All appeals to the Privy Council from the Supreme Court were abolished, the Supreme Court would be
the final court of appeal.

The Republican Constitution retained the parliamentary and cabinet system of government. However,
there was a provision for a prime minister who could not be removed from office except on a defeat on
issue of conflict in the House of Representatives. If the Prime Minister refuses to resign after such a
decisive vote, no other enforcement action could be taken against him except that the President could
proceed in dissolving the parliament.

The constitution also provided that the Regional Governors should be appointed by the President on the
advice of the Regional Premier. The President was still a constitutional rather than an executive head of
state. In fact, he was essentially as ceremonial as the former Governor General. Within the dual
executive or headship structure, the Prime Minister was the head of government, although the
President was the head of state. Nigeria's ascension to Republican status strengthened the position of
the Prime Minister. This was not because it was a natural consequence of all republics but because there
was a clause in the Nigerian Republican Constitution which compelled parliament to seek the removal of
the Prime Minister only at the risk of its own dissolution. In other words, members of Parliament who
lacked the resources to fight election battles were discouraged from supporting critical moves against
the Prime Minister.
The Republican Constitution provided for the principle of parliamentary supremacy, the principle of
responsibility and accountability. Other principles were discussions, effective consultations, open
deliberations in both the House of Representatives and Senate was upheld. Before any law was passed,
it was required that the two houses should pass the bill and the President assents to them before they
became laws. With regards to fundamental human rights, it recognized them as enshrined in the
independence Constitution.

THE CREATION OF MID-WEST

The agitation for the creation of the Midwest and other regions had been on even before
independence. Soon after independence, the demand intensified. One of the procedures for the
creation of new regions was for referendum to be conducted in the affected area. On Saturday, July 13,
1963, the referendum was conducted. By Wednesday, July 17, the results of the referendum in 22 of the
30 voting areas had become known. On Thursday, July 18, 1963, a final result was published. Votes
already counted showed an average of 75.6% in favour of the new region, thus the Mid-West was
created.

The main distinguishing feature of the Republic was that Nigeria became a Republic with a President as
the Head of State and the repository of the federal executive power. The executive authority of a Region
became vested in a Regional Governor while every Nigerian citizen henceforth owed allegiance not to
the British Crown but to the Republic of Nigeria.

EVENTS FOLLOWING THE REPUBLIC

Before the promulgation of the Republican Constitution, the regions of the federation grew in size and
importance. Each regional government developed self-confidence in itself and used its powers in various
ways which made them look more important even than the federal government. Each of the political
parties in Nigeria secured firm control of a regional government. Party leaders paid more attention to
winning and consolidating the whole of the region for their regional government. Furthermore, regional
governments had more leaders and more powers than before.

They controlled education, health, tax assessment, customary court, miles of roads and hundreds of
bridges, They also controlled the prices of cash crops, food production, local government and chieftaincy
matters and many other problems affecting the day to day life of the ordinary citizens. Therefore, party
leaders who carried out these functions assumed more powers.

At the national level, federal political leadership suffered at the expense of the regions. Sir Abubakar
was the Deputy leader of the NPC. Although he was respected, he was not the party leader of the NPC.
He was like other members of the party subject to the party political control of Sir Ahmadu Bello. It was
also believed that some NPC federal Ministers were closer on personal grounds to the NPC leader than
Sir Abubakar. This tended to undermine the discipline in the federal Cabinet.

The other two major political figures at the federal level on the eve of Independence and after were Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The two had so dominated Nigerian politics since the end
of the Second World War that one could conclude that their federal presence must have upset the
absence of Sir Ahmadu Bello and Dr. M. I. Okpara from the federal parliament. Regrettably, this was not
so. Dr. Azikiwe retired from active politics; before moving back to federal public affairs in 1959. He also
left his party, the NCNC and thus had no organized base for his role as President of the Senate and
Governor-General of Nigeria. On the other hand, Chief Awolowo remained in active politics and retained
the leadership of Action Group while he served at the centre as the leader of the opposition.
Unfortunately, his relationship with his deputy, Chief S.L. Akintola, became very strained up to a critical
level which raised doubts in many minds as to the future of democracy in Nigeria.

If Sir Abubakar's coalition government had been tolerant of or accommodative of the views of the
opposition under Chief Awolowo, people would not have developed doubts about the future of
constitutionalism, politics and government which were envisaged in the independence Constitution.
Because of these factors; the internal contradiction of the party, i.e. Action Group, and the party's
neglect by the federal coalition, the Action Group as opposition and its leadership lost interest and
confidence in what they have been able to establish between 1951 and 1960. In fact, with the crisis of
leadership in the country, the centre was the looser and the regions the beneficiary with the result that
minor and major leadership problems of the centre were referred to the regions for solution. Foreign
diplomats and governments intensified their efforts at the regional capitals instead of Lagos and in fact
encouraged the regional governments to deal directly with them in a number of subjects (No wonder
General Aguiyi Ironsi contemplated a unitary system when he took over in 1966).

The other essential aspect of the position of regions following independence in 1960 was also growth in
number as a result of the creation of Mid - west Region.

WESTERN REGIONAL CRISIS

Apart from the constitutional issues which culminated in the change from the monarchical to the
republican status, many political problems faced Nigeria after independence. The first problem was
located in the Action Group crisis which led to the emergency situation in Western Nigeria.

Chief Awolowo the leader of the Action Group developed a programme aimed at making AG a national
party. Behind him were Chief Anthony Enahero and Mr. S. G. Ikoku. According to the plan, the AG
wanted not only to consolidate its position in the West but would move money, men and equipment
into the main minority areas of the Eastern and Northern Regions to win over these areas. To these
ideas, Chief Akintola the Premier of the West and Chief Ayo Rosiji, the former Party Secretary of AG
disagreed vehemently. They feared that the resources mapped out for the programme will be wasted in
vain. Their own alternative programme was to make the West a firm Action Group enclave by capturing
all the constituencies and local council areas which were in the hands of NCNC in the West.

The second major area of disagreement was in connection with the system of federal government in
Nigeria. Sir Abubakar was favourably disposed towards forming a second national broad based
government. Since he already had an NPC/NCNC coalition, all that was necessary to convert the
government into a national broad based government was to integrate the Action Group. Chief Awolowo
maintained that a government and an opposition was a type of democratic system which Nigerian
leaders envisaged.

The Akintola's faction of the AG disagreed on the ground that the West where the AG was in power was
not gaining from the national cake because the AG had no effective representation in the ruling council
of the federal government. He feared that unless the AG joined the federal government, the NCNC
would push the NPC into dismembering the region through the creation of the Mid-west Region and the
extension of Lagos as Federal Territory by 20 miles. There was, therefore the cry for important AG
leaders such as Awolowo, Enahoro and Rosiji to get ministerial appointments at the federal level and get
more involved in the post independence politics and government.

The third cause of the trouble was that the Premier of the Western Region, Chief Akintola complained
that Chief Awolowo was interfering too much in the government and administration of the Region. It
would appear that some decisions relating to appointments, change in Board membership, school fees,
loans to Corporations and Boards, the award of contracts were taken as party decisions, without often
the participation of the Premier, who was expected to carry out these decisions. Because of the strained
relations between Awolowo and Akintola, some of the party policies and programmes became blurred.
The Premier dogmatically maintained that substantive decisions such as these should be executed by his
cabinet or his Executive Council, the Western Regional Parliamentary group and in fact the Western
Legislature and should not be those of the party leader and party secretariat. The Premier charged
Awolowo of disobedience and insubordination which Awolowo counter-charged him with interference
in the way he was running the affairs of the party.

Finally, Chief Awolowo's new Executive Committee wanted democratic socialism for Nigeria expressing
that it was tired of the practice of capitalism and maintained that as a new party of the masses, the
oppressed and the minorities, its ideology will be able to give Nigerian's social Justice, equal
opportunity, control of the economy and safeguarding of basic human rights. This ideology of socialism
was condemned by Chief Akintola and his faction. They saw in it a disguised form of communism - the
nationalization of assets or businesses owned by both Nigerians and foreigners; instead, they insisted
that Nigeria should continue with its free enterprise system of economic organization. As a political
party, the AG was divided into two seeming irreconcilable factions disagreeing on party policies, tactics
and ideology. Mediation came from the elders of the party, for example, Chief F.R.A. Williams, some
Obas and chiefs, but their attempts to settle the dispute were in vain. Awolowo retained very firm
control of the federal executive of the party. He continuously worked with this committee and secured
the support of a majority of the AG members in the Western House of Assembly. His hold on AG federal
Parliamentary Group was not challenged too and from the East and North he was the man in the heart
of every Action Grouper.

To fight back, Chief Akintola rallied behind him some of his important ministers, Chief Rosiji, rich
businessmen, and AG financial patrons who were being frightened by the socialist inclinations of Chief
Awolowo. Again, the Yoruba nationalists and traditionalists who shared his philosophy that the AG
should consolidate in the Yoruba West first by uniting and ridding it of NCNC, and second by joining
hands at the federal level in sharing the national cake with the other Nigerian nationalists. They saw
Awolowo as an unfortunate captain of improperly digested ideas of Chief Enahoro and S.G. Ikoku on
democracy and socialism. Most significantly, the conflict within the AG challenged the life of the
government of the West. The Action Group members expected Chief Akintola to resign following his
removal from the leadership of the western Parliamentary Group of the party. But Chief Akintola
refused to resign. In a petition signed by 66 members of the Western House of Assembly, the Governor
of Western Nigeria was requested to remove Chief Akintola as Premier and appoint Alhaji Adengbenro
to his office. The 66 signatories represented the majority of the members of the House, but their action
was not well organized and well presented on the floor of the Western House of Assembly, where it
would have been legitimated in form of vote of no confidence. Secondly, there was no constitutional or
conventional requirement for this process. The significance of the action was the response of Chief
Akintola. He challenged the signatories with two arguments:

a. That they were bought over through the influence of money, promises of ministerial
appointments and Board memberships and even with intimidation.

b. that some of the signatories were secured for other purposes, but were attached to the petition
to the government without the consent of those concerned. Furthermore, Chief Akintola's group
doubted the correctness of the political party making decisions binding on the Governor.

Without considering whether there were actually 66 signatories or not in the popular house to remove a
Premier, the Governor proceeded with removing the Premier and invited Alhaji Adegbenro to form a
new government. Later, the Governor swore in Alhaji Adegbanro as the new Premier. In doing this any
way, the Governor acted within his powers as provided in the independence constitution.

The crisis in the West would have been over had Akintola accepted defeat and recognized that his
popularity was on the down swing. Regrettably, he did not but instead took legal action to nullify what
the Governor had done and maintained that he remained the Premier of the West and wrote the federal
Government to revoke the appointment of the Governor. Nigerian politics being what it is, where might
is right and objectivity is often not the deciding factor in issues, the matter was allowed to get out of
hand. If well handled, perhaps, the situation would have been controlled. At worst the matter could only
have been settled in the federal Supreme Court where an ultimate settlement would have been
obtained with minimal losses to Akintola, Adegbenro, the Action Group and the Federal Government.
No definitive step was taken and the matter continued. When the federal parliament met to consider
the situation in Western Nigeria, it declared that 'law and order had broken down in the Western
Nigeria'. First, it recognized the existence of two rival regional governments in the West as uncalled for
and declared that this situation was not conducive to order, peace and good government. Secondly, it
realised that the situation, has paralyzed the Western Regional Legislature from the efficient
performance of its legislative duties. Parliament concluded that the situation existing in Western Nigeria
amounted to a State of Emergency and declared so to the country. It proceeded with removing the
Governor, Adesoji Aderemi the Oni of Ife, suspending the government of Western Nigeria, taking over
the functions of the legislature in Western Nigeria- House of Assembly and vesting all powers and
functions of western regional government in a new appointee in the person of Senator Moses
Majekudumi. He was empowered to rule Western Nigeria for and on behalf of the federal Government
of Nigeria until further notice. The institution of state of emergency in the Western Region precipitated
reactions that helped to destroy the first Republic.

OTHER CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE 1ST REPUBLIC

The main causes of the fall of the Nigeria First Republic are traceable to remote and immediate causes.

REMOTE CAUSES

There was always a conflict of powers between the Prime Minister as Head of Government, and the
President as the Head of State during periods of national crisis. The latter was generally referred to as
the father of the nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed forces, but apart from certain obvious
implied powers, he was devoid of all powers even on non-political issues.

There was overemphasis on regionalism. This created a monolith North with its particularistic policies.
They were ready to take or hold the whole country to ransome. The situation in the country at the time
was that East was for the East, West was for West as North was for the North. Under this situation
Nigerian nationalism was eroded by ethnicity. Coupled with this, there was territorial and population
imbalance between the regions. This placed resources or distributable resources equally among the
regions and with these resources each region had a potential strength to settle any armed conflict with
the federal government. All these constituted a threat to national unity.

Next to this was crisis of leadership. Nigeria lacked a leader capable of commanding the support and
confidence of all the ethnic groups in the country owing to the fact that there existed no national
political party. The three parties, NCNC, AG and NPC were all regionally based and were in temper and
attitude not suited to the operation of a federal constitution. Within the concept of incompetent
leadership, Nigeria was eaten hollow by corruption, graft and greed which rid politics and administration
of their moral powers, since there were no constitutional safeguards to check possible corrupt practices.
It therefore hardened into social norms. Power in Nigeria became a lucrative business in the hands of
those who could hold on to it.
The fundamental human rights provisions in the constitution was not only vague, but also lacked
uniform interpretation throughout the country. In the North, the powerful Emirs rode roughshod over
the fundamental human rights of citizens and the constitutional machinery ensured no remedial
provisions for the persons or citizens in the Northern courts known as the Alkali courts.

The election procedure encouraged fissiparous tendencies. Moreover, the parties' political programmes
were distorted by bitterness and intolerance. The parties lacked ideological bent which sustained
organizational capacities. Men were afraid to stand their convictions. Commitment by politicians to
party activity was fluid and confused. Policy contradictions were rife. The NPC bred within it, conflicts
between the new rulers who were not the descendants of Emirs. The rivalry between the Kano and
Bornu blocks blinded the vision of the NPC as regards its external enemies. The AG and NCNC carried
their intra-party squabbles of the pre-independence era into the republican period. The unending
conflicts between the parliamentary group and the party leadership were rampant. There were other
intrusive factors which affected the working of the party system. These were;

1. Owegbe cult which took decisions affecting AG

2. The Igbo state union taking decisions which affected the NCNC

3. The unpredictable alliance tactics of the political parties helped to destroy stability in the
Nigerian party politics.

All these rendered national cohesion impossible.

At the governmental level, the political parties tended to bring about a polarization of alliances. The NPC
and NCNC were in coalition at the federal level but were enemies at the political level. What followed
was the emergence of a self contradictory ministerial class which not only created a mentality to sustain
it but developed proprietary notions of power. This class did one thing at the level of government and
another in their own midst.

The role of the opposition was weak. Because of the weakness of the Action Group, it was not equal to
the task of opposition and the Balewa government exploited the situation to weaken it further. The
independence of the Judiciary suffered especially when the DPP's powers were curtailed and brought
under the caprices of the government.

The federal government exploited Action Group leaders by giving them posts and made them to sign
undated resignation papers in advance. The essence was to force them to be loyal to the government
and not to criticize the actions of the federal government. This approach nullified independent
representation.
At the level of national leadership it could be said that it suffered from paralysis of will. It became
visionless, botherless, hesitant and confused. Criticisms were leveled on the national leadership from
the pin to the pinnacle. Also Abubakar was described as a good man but a lot of bad things happened
around him and he consciously or unconsciously winked at them.

The next problem with Abubakar's position was his subordinate position and his total subjection to the
will and control by the Sarduana of Sokoto. This prevented him from exercising the full measure of
leadership at the national level. He seemed to have ignored the opportunities he had to rectify the ills of
the country. The public and the press charged him of the following:

1. That he condoned corruption;

2. that he was silent on popular protests;

3. that he mishandled two major political crises in the country; the Western crisis and the
Rhodesian crisis.

While Nigeria was burning he showed more interest in Rhodesian affairs especially at the very time
democracy was speaking through fire and smoke in Western Nigeria. When he exercised his emergency
powers it only ended in destroying a virile political party namely, the Action Group because it was
antagonistic to his policies. He refused to implement the decisions of the OAU Ministerial Council.

Leadership at all levels was gripped with poor imagination, bribery and corruption, tribalism and
nepotism, yet the ministerial class wanted to hold on to power at all cost. Another problem was the
obnoxious press law which prevented the press from attempting any exposure of the ills of the society.
Elections were rigged with impunity, ballot boxes missed from time to time. This deprived the people
the right of choosing their leaders. Academic opinions in the universities condemned the ills of the
Nigerian society. In fact everyone became fed up with the working of democratic institutions in Nigeria.

Parliament could not hold the executive accountable. The seatings of the parliament were limited to
three months in a year and this did not give parliament enough time to do the job of a real parliament.
There was the entrenched impossibility of removing the Prime Minister without the consequential
dissolution of the House. Next was the fear among the Parliamentarians of going to the polls to renew
their mandate. The effects of these problems were the decline in the parliament and the Judiciary and
the death of the executive. The role of the DPP and the upper echelons of the Judiciary were subjected
to amendments, abrogations and modifications. The Judicial Service Commission was abolished. The
Electoral Commission sold its will and conscience for a penny and thus lost the confidence of the people.
Discontent, political bitterness, the wide gaps in incomes between the rulers and the ruled, the
breakdown of law and order in Western Nigeria led to the military intervention in the early morning of
January 15, 1966.
EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED THE FALL OF FIRST REPUBLIC

We have discussed the events that led to the collapse of the 1st Republic. For purposes of emphasis, we
state that the North\South dichotomy and ethnic tensions, the politics of vindictiveness, oppression and
thuggery, the Action Group crisis of 1962, revenue allocation disputes, the treason trials of Chief
Obafemi Awolowo and twenty other members of the Action Group, the census controversy of 1962 -
1964, the realignment of political parties before the 1964 federal elections, the 1964 -1965 federal
elections, the dispute between the President and the Prime Minister over the 1964 elections, the
Western Nigeria election of 1965 and the civil violence that followed in the Region, contributed in
varying degrees to hasten the fall of the First Republic and to the Military takeover of 15 January, 1966.

The first military incursion into politics lasted for approximately 13 years until a new constitution was
promulgated in 1979 and a second civilian administration was ushered in. Before the 1979 Constitution,
the military administration brought in several constitutional amendments and proposals for a more
enduring constitution for the country.

These amendments started when on 16 January 1966 the Acting President of the Republic - Nwafor
Orizu made a speech over Radio Nigeria to the effect that the Council of Ministers had unanimously
decided voluntarily to hand over the administration of the country to the Armed Forces of the Republic
with immediate effect. He also called on the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army (GOC),
Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, to make statement to the nation on the policy of the new administration.
The GOC in his maiden speech, accepted the invitation stating that he had been formally invested with
authority as the Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Nigerian
Armed Forces. He further decreed the suspension of parts of the 1963 Republican Constitution, namely
the provisions relating to the office of the President, the establishment of Parliament, the offices of the
Prime Minister, Regional Governor, Regional Premiers and Executive Councils and Regional legislatures.
A military Governor directly responsible to the federal military government was appointed in each
region, with the last Governor under the 1963 constitution as his adviser. He stated that the Armed
forces were taking over as an interim administration for the purposes of maintaining law and order and
maintaining essential services.

By section 3(1) of the Decree, the federal Military Government was granted absolute powers to make
laws for peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter
whatsoever. The military Governor of a region was by virtue of the provision of section 3(2) granted
powers to make laws, for peace, order and good governance of that region but not on any matter in the
exclusive legislative list, and with respect to any matter on the concurrent list only with prior consent of
the federal military government. The Decree further set up a Supreme Military Council with the head of
the federal government as the chairman, and the Head of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Chiefs of Staff
of the Armed Forces and the four Military Governors as members.

It also set up a Federal Executive Council with the same membership as the Supreme Military Council,
with the Inspector General of Police as the Deputy Chairman. The Attorney General sat on both councils
in an advisory capacity. Section 11 set up the Advisory Judiciary Committee consisting of the Chief
Justice of the Federation as Chairman, the four Regional Chief Justices, the Grand Kadhi of the Sharia
Court Appeal and the Attorney General of the Federation. The Solicitor General of federation acted as
the Secretary. Commissioners were appointed both at federal,and regional levels to assist the Head of
the Federal Military Government and the Military Governors, respectively, in the discharge of their
functions. The courts were allowed to function as they had hitherto done and the Supreme Court and
the High Court Judges continued to be appointed. Federal laws were to be promulgated by Decrees
while those of the regions were to be by Edicts. It was further provided that a Decree had absolute
authority and that any Edict inconsistent with a Decree was thereby and to that extent void.

On 28 February 1966 the Head of the Federal Military Government set up three Study Groups on
Constitutional, Administrative and Institutional problems in the federation. The study Group on
Constitutional Review was charged inter alia with the responsibility of reviewing all aspects of the
existing constitution including the structure, division of powers, the electoral and party political system
with a view to identifying those factors militating against national unity and the emergence of a strong
central government and recommending possible safeguards. But before the Study Group could make
any progress, its assignment was abruptly brought to an end with the promulgation of the Constitutional
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 34 of 1966. This Decree made constitutional changes of great
significance and magnitude. By that, Nigeria ceased to be a federation and became known as "Republic
of Nigeria." The federal military government, became known as the National Military Government, The
regions were abolished and each thereafter became known as Group of Provinces, which, for
administrative purposes and subject to the authority of the Head of the National Military Government
came under the general direction and control of a military Governor appointed by the Head of the
National Military Government. The National Military Government may delegate either conditionally or
unconditionally to a military Governor of a Group of Provinces power to make law by Edict for peace,
order and good government with respect to any matter specified in the delegation in respect of a Group
of Provinces who may exercise, the powers and functions vested in the Executive Council of a former
region, or of a Governor, Premier or Minister (except in relation to criminal prosecution) of a
government of a former region under any law with respect to that Group of Provinces. A national public
service was set up with the unification of all the existing public services together with a National Public
Service Commission. Earlier, by the Public Order Decree No. 33 of 1966, all political parties, tribal unions
and cultural organizations with political leanings were proscribed.

As all these re-organizations were taking place, a coup d'etat engineered and carried out mainly by the
northern elements in the armed forces saw the elimination of most Igbo officers including the Head of
the National Government. This was followed by wanton massacre of Igbo civilians in parts of the north,
which events precipitated the great return to the East of mostly Igbos and some other Easterners. These
events brought Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon (later General) to power as the next Head of State
and Government, who immediately announced the setting up of an advisory group of civilians to advise
the government on constitutional changes. In the meantime, the Constitution (Suspension and
Modification) (No. 9) Decree, 1966 was promulgated returning the country to the constitutional position
before Decree Number 34 supra, of that year. An Ad Hoc Conference of the advisory groups of civilians
was subsequently convened but before the conference could finalise its deliberations attempts to solve
the constitutional impasse had shifted to Aburi, Ghana, where an interim agreement was reached
among the top military personnel with their advisers. When the Aburi Agreement failed to find a
solution, the Federal Military Government promulgated a series of Decrees including (a) No. 8 of 1967.
The Constitution (Suspension and Modification), and No. 13 - The Constitution (Repeal and Restoration
which together restored the constitutional position as the Decree No.7 of 1966 except for vesting the
legislative and executive powers of the federal military government on the Supreme Military Council,
and restoring fully the executive and legislative powers of the Regions; (b) No. l2 of 1967 - Parliament
(Dissolution) - which formally dissolved the parliament of the federation and provided that the
President, all Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and all office holders and office bearers of the
Parliament were deemed to have vacated their respective offices with effect from 16 January 1966 and
(c)No. l4 of 1967 - States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) - which increased the number of states
from four to twelve.

In reply to these constitutional developments, Colonel Ojukwu declared the Eastern part of the country
an independent nation under the name "Republic of Biafra". The federal military government replied by
declaring war against Biafra with a view to bringing the territory back to the federation. A civil war soon
broke out which lasted for 30 months at the end of which 'Biafra' capitulated. Soon afterwards General
Gowon announced a nine-point programme after which the military would hand over to the civilians in
October 1976. By 1974 he had changed his mind and instead announced the indefinite postponement of
return to civilian rule. This and other problems led to increased disenchantment with his regime
culminating in another coup d'etat of 29 July 1975, when General Gowon was attending an OAU
meeting in Uganda. This ushered in another military administration with Brigadier (later Lieutenant-
General) Murtala Muhammed as the new Head of State and of the Federal Military Government.

REFERENCES

1. Achebe C. (1983) The trouble with Nigeria. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers

2. Achike O. (1978) Groundwork of military law and military rule in Nigeria. Enugu, Fourth
Dimension Publishers.

3. Ayida A. A. (1990) Rise and fall of Nigeria: The history and philosophy of an experiment in
African nation-building. Ikeja, Malthouse Press Limited.

4. Coleman J. S. (1958) Nigeria: Background to nationalism, University of California Press.

5. Davidson B. (1983) Modern Africa. Lagos, Longman Nigeria Plc.

6. Eronini A. C. (1978) The growth and decay of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria. Owerri,
Marble Press Limited.

7. Falola T. (Ed) (1988) Nigeria under the British 1900 - I960. Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University
Press.

8. Falola, T., Mahadi M., Uhomoibhi M. And Anyanwu U. (1991) History of Nigeria: Nigeria in the
twentieth century. Ikeja, Longman Nigeria Plc.

9. Joye E.M. & Agweike K. (1982) Introduction to the 1979 Nigeria constitution. London, The
MacMillan Press Ltd.

10. Madiebo A.A. (1980) The Nigerian revolution and The Biafran war. Enugu, Fourth Dimension
Publishers.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE MAKING OF THE 1979 CONSTITUTION

Soon after taking over, the new Head of State Brigadier Murtala Muhammed announced a five point
programme of planned transition to civil rule by October 1979. The first stage involved the setting up of
a Constitution Drafting Committee in September 1975 with responsibility of producing a Draft
Constitution for Nigeria for submission to the Supreme Military Council. At the inaugural meeting of the
committee, the Head of State among other things briefly surveyed the country's recent political
experience and gave some of the background thoughts behind the formulation of the new political
programme. The Supreme Military Council, he said, was committed inter alia to;

(a) A federal system of government based on democracy and rule of law and which guarantees
fundamental human rights;

(b) the establishment of genuine and truly national political parties;

(c) the Executive Presidential system of Government;

(d) an independent Judiciary;

(e) the provisions of such corrective institutions as the Corrupt Practices Tribunal and Public
Complaint Bureau; and

(f) constitutional restriction on the number of states to be created.

The second stage of the planned programme of transition to civil rule involved the creation of new
states In february 1976 the number of states was increased from twelve to nineteen. The establishment
of a Federal Court of Appeal as an intermediate appellate Court between the Supreme Court on the one
hand and the High Courts of the States, the Federal Revenue Court and certain other special tribunals on
the other hand. It also involved the reorganization of the local government system hitherto operative in
the federation which was effected by local government Edicts in the states. The reform provided a
common national framework for local governments in the country and was aimed at:

a. Making appropriate services and development activities responsive to the local wishes and
initiatives;

b. facilitating the exercise of democratic self-government close to the local levels of the society;

c. mobilization of human and material sources through the involvement of the public in their local
development;

D. providing a two-way channel of communication between the local communities and the
government;

A Constituent Assembly was established in August 1977 to deliberate upon the Draft Constitution drawn
by the CDC. The Constitution of Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree No.26 of 1978 was promulgated
on 21 September 1978. But the new constitution took effect from 1 October 1979.

FEATURES OF THE 1979 CONSTITUTION

The constitution contained for the first time, Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State
Policy. This was meant to form the philosophical and ideological justification of the state of Nigeria. The
principles, ideals, goals and objectives were referred to as the identification of the ultimate objectives or
the ideals the nation is expected to strive towards, whilst Directive Principles indicate the path or
policies which lead to those objectives. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles were
inserted to provide a yardstick for judging the performance of any government. They also helped it to
define the goals for the nation without which it would continue to drift aimlessly. These objectives
include:

1. Political objectives; Participatory democracy on the basis of the ideals of liberty, equality and
justice.

2. Social objectives: Founded on the ideals of freedom, equality and justice. They include equality
of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law for every citizen, impartiality and integrity of the
courts -and easy access to them, equal employment opportunities, pay and conditions for equal work,
the provision of adequate social facilities and amenities, the protection of children, young persons and
aged against exploitation, moral and material neglect and the provision of social assistance to deserving
ones.

3. Educational Objectives: Section 18 of the constitution provides equal and adequate educational
opportunities at all levels. It also declared that the government shall eradicate illiteracy.

4. On Foreign Policy Objectives, section 19 of the constitution stated that; the state shall promote
African unity as well as total political, economic, and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of
international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and
friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.

DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

The constitution recognised Nigerian federalism of three levels of government; the federal government,
state governments and local government councils. Legislative powers of the federal government were
vested in the National Assembly which consists of the Senate and House of Representatives. The
Legislative powers of state governments were vested in the Houses of Assembly of the states. A House
of Assembly has power to make laws with respect to any matter not included in the Exclusive legislative
list.

1. Legislative Powers were therefore categorized into Exclusive list - meant for the central
legislature, concurrent list, in which the states and federal governments have rights to make laws on.

2. Separation of powers.

3. Bicameralism existed only at the centre while the states had unicameralism.

4. Presidentialism was introduced in which executive powers were vested on one person.

5. Approved multi-party system.

6. Independence of the Judiciary.

7. The local government system which gained high level of autonomy.

8. Checks and balances which is a corollary to the principle of separation of powers.

9. Fundamental rights.

10. Revenue Allocation.

These issues were given elaborate attention by the 1979 Constitution. Basically, the constitution was a
federal constitution with bicameral legislature at the centre, while the states were to have unicameral
legislatures.

WHY DID NIGERIA CHANGE FROM PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM TO PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM?

The 1979 Constitution was a drastic departure for Nigeria from its original adoption of a parliamentary
system under the independence Constitution of 1960, and the subsequent constitution of 1963. The
decision in favour of a Presidential system could be attested to by General Murtala Muhammed's
speech to the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee when he stated that the Supreme
Military Council came to the conclusion that we require:

An executive presidential system of government based on the influential features of the system.

One of the most important reasons was the desire of the makers of the 1979 Constitution to create an
executive consisting of a single individual. They wanted to avoid a dual executive, i.e. the separation of
the head of state from the head of government, a common feature of the parliamentary system. The
separation of the head of state from the head of government involves a division between real authority
and formal authority. The division is meaningless in the light of African political experience and history.
The experiences of Nigeria, Uganda, and Lesotho resulted in a clash of personalities and interests, a
conflict of authority and unnecessary complexity and uncertainty in governmental relations.
Parliamentary system presupposes a non-political Head of State but the lessons of African experience
with the system is that if non-political Heads of State are not already in existence; mere constitutional
provisions alone will not bring them into being. The clashes and conflicts inherent in parliamentary
system produce instability in government and in society and also endanger national unity. The system of
separation clearly fails to provide a clear focal point of loyalty, which is indispensable to national
integration.

The makers of the 1979 Constitution believed that the dual executive of the parliamentary system is not
in accord with African tradition and experience. The historical process by which in other lands, heads of
state, whether a king or president have become figureheads are not part of our African tradition. To us,
honour and respect are accorded to a chief, monarch or president not because of his symbolism, but
because of the authority and responsibility he holds. We are not used to the division between real
authority and formal authority.
The makers also wanted to reject parliamentary system because it was part of our colonial legacy and a
reminder of imperialism. Presidentialism was seen as the culmination in the constitutional field of the
nationalist struggle for emancipation from colonialism.

In Nigeria, the head of state was given to a person of greatest eminence and influence who preferred to
be the head of government, since that is where actual power lies. The separation of the two offices thus
set the stage for an almost inevitable clash of personalities. This happened because the most powerful
political leader the head of government was required to act as if he were subordinate to the head of
state and of lesser political eminence and influence and with very restricted governmental powers, and
this led to series of mutual suspicion.

The Head of Government, Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, did not readily show
subordination to the Head of State, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe the titular President. The Prime Minister
regarded himself as the President's superior and often behaved as such towards him. For his part, Dr.
Azikiwe appeared unable to restrain entirely the political impulses that had driven him so strongly
throughout his life. While Head of State, he often took outspoken positions concerning political
problems and events. The result was that his comments were interpreted in many quarters as showing
partiality for his tribe and for his political party of which he was formerly the leader.

Thus, neither the Head of State nor Head of Government was playing his assigned role in the manner
necessary to successfully operate the executive branch in a Parliamentary system.

Another aspect of the Presidential system that made the constitution makers to prefer it was the fact of
the certainty of the tenure of office of the President. The number of years is well specified by the
constitution and a vote of no confidence does not remove the President from office. The President can
only be removed from office by the rigorous process of impeachment which is difficult to execute.

The Presidential system was also chosen because the president once elected has little control of his
party. He has the freedom to make his appointments from any section and any individuals who may not
even be members of his party. This avails him the opportunity to choose people who he feels would
deliver the needed services. This is quite different from the parliamentary system which is party
profiled.

Another reason for the choice of presidential system was that the single executive has the merit of
unity, energy and despatch. Although some people argue that presidential system could lead to the
danger of dictatorship of one man and imposition of personal rule, but the precision by which the chief
executive carries out his functions could lead to imaginative and efficient administration.
The complete separation of powers inherent in the presidential system makes it difficult for
dictatorship, and this is made possible by efficient checks and balances. Because the executive members
are clearly not members of the legislature, the legislature has the opportunity of debating bills and
motions without sentiments or intimidation which is not the case when the two organs fuse in one as in
parliamentary system.

WEAKNESSES OF PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION

Some observers have stated that presidential system is bound to result in tyranny. Because the
president is given unlimited powers, all executive powers are vested in him, all bills passed by the
legislature have to receive his assent before they become laws. This could make the executive president
to become tyrannical in his use of powers. The point that the executive president has so much power
makes people apprehensive that he could become dictatorial in the use of his powers.

OTHER CONSTITUTIONS

By 1983, most of the factors that featured in the 1st Republic had become noticeable in the Second
Republic. In particular was the presence of corruption, abuse of office with impunity on the part of the
elected officers. Elections were rigged, inflation heightened and the economy was far from being
healthy. In the light of the above, the army struck once more on the 31st of December 1983.

First were General Buhari, and later General Babangida. Babangida instituted a transitional process
which culminated in the making of the 1989 Constitution. The constitution was a federal constitution,
which endorsed bicameral legislature and most other features of the 1979 Constitution. Two remarkable
differences between the two constitutions were the fact that the 1989 Constitution approved a two-
party system and even created the two parties the Natonal Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social
Democratic Party (SDP), and the electoral procedure which endorsed open/secret election of option A4.
The constitution did not last long as the President annulled a presidential election which was acclaimed
to be peaceful, free and fair. The cancellation of the election brought about crisis in the political system
of the country and the instability engendered equally helped to destroy the Interim National
Government which Babangida handed over to.

As a result of the escalating tension in the country, General Abacha sacked the Interim National
Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan and came to power on 18 November, 1993, and thus
ended the 1989 Constitution.

ABACHA'S CONSTITUTION
As usual, Abacha started a transitional programme which was seemingly intended to usher in a
democratically elected government. Between 1994 and 1995 a constitutional conference was held and
the result was the making of the 1995 constitution. During the constitutional conference, the delegates
agreed to have six geo-political zones in the country and for the presidency to rotate among these
zones. The conference also returned the country to multi-party system. The six geo-political zones were
3 in the south, namely - South East, South West, and South South; and 3 in the North - North East, North
West and North Central.

Abacha's constitution did not see the light of the day as he put up frantic efforts to retain himself in
power. Incidentally he died mysteriously on June 8 1998. When General Abubakar came in, he produced
a constitution that ushered in a democratically elected civilian administration on May 29, 1999.

THE MAKING OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION

The making of the 1999 Constitution was an important effort taken by the military towards the
entrenchment of democratic governance in the country. Though, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the
Chief of Defence Staff in the late Abacha's government, whose regime saw to the preparation of the
1999 Constitution, took over the reign of power as a military leader after the demise of his boss, he was
absolutely committed to ushering in a true democratic government in the country. Therefore, having
successfully dismantled the dubious political structures instituted by the former military junta, General
Abdulsalami, on 11 November 1998, inaugurated the Constitution Debate Co-ordinating Committee
(CDCC) in respect of the preparation of the 1999 Constitution. The 23- man Constitution Debate
Coordinating Committee (CDCC) was headed by Justice Niki Tobi. The CDCC was charged with the
responsibility to 'pilot the debate, co-ordinate and collate views and recommendations canvassed by
individuals and groups and submit the report not later than 31 December 1998.' In his inauguration
speech, the Head of State called for 'fresh ideas' on the various contentious issues in the 1995 Draft
Constitution, which was overwhelmingly rejected by Nigerians, as they generally preferred a
consolidation of the 1979 Constitution. The major tasks which the committee was charged with, as
contained in Abdulsalami's speech, were to address:

(a) The Proposed Provisions on the principle of zoning and rotation. Is it durable to entrench these
in the Constitution? And if so, what offices should they affect? For how long and between which
identifiable geographic or geopolitical zones? What other ways and safeguards are there to allay fears of
political domination and marginalization of groups, individuals and other elements in the society?

(b) What is the best way of cultivating a sense of belonging in all segments of our society, in the
light of our recent experience in the political arena and those of other nations the world over, through
political engineering, without forsaking ideals of democracy or sowing the seeds of permanent discord
that may have disastrous consequences in the future?

(c) What are the merits and demerits of the provisions, which call for multiple vice-presidents? How
feasible or workable is the idea given our experience with the operation, during the Second Republic, of
a single Vice-President and the Deputy Governors under the 1979 Constitution?

(d) As some have vigorously canvassed, what constitutional provision could serve as the most
effective anti-dote to future forceful seizure of political authority other than through constitutional
means? On the other hand, are there sufficient checks and balances in the survival of our impending
trial with democratic governance?

(E) With a view to devolving more powers and responsibility to lower tiers of government, the draft
has created three legislative lists thereby expanding the competence of state and local governments in
sectors such as education, agriculture, health etc. More ideas as how to make this workable will be
welcomed;

(f) The draft has attempted to address the issues of the principle of derivation as a criterion for
distributing the national wealth by increasing the current percentage to 13. We shall welcome some
ideas on how to make this feasible;

(g) Over the years it has become fashionable to create more and more commissions at federal and
state levels and entrench same in the constitution. Should all such commissions receive constitutional
sanctity as is presently the case, in view of the manifest and untold hardship that this has occasioned in
the last two decades? How best can we retain its ideas but avoid this rigidity;

(h) The draft has a proposal for the establishment of a National Judicial Council, a body designed to
enhance the independence of the judiciary in Nigeria. How workable or compatible is such a body within
a federal system in which greater autonomy is being devolved to the lower federating units? Are there
other ways and means of enhancing the autonomy and independence of the judiciary without
undermining a truly federal arrangement?

(i) The draft has introduced the novel idea of a Constitutional court charged with the responsibility
of handling election petitions and hearing matters pertaining to the enforcement of fundamental rights.
How justifiable is it to confer such wide jurisdiction on the court and what impact will it have on
litigants? And

(j) How workable is the novel provision for proportional representation of political parties in the
formation of the cabinet within a presidential system of government? Similarly, how workable is the
provision, which permits ministers appointed to the Federal Cabinet to continue to retain their seats in
the National Assembly?

Based on this mandate, individuals and groups especially the civil societies, both at home and abroad,
were called upon to make tangible contributions towards these terms of reference. However, one
important organization that significantly influenced the 1999 constitutional making process was the
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), an institution set up by West Africans to work towards
the creation and consolidation of democracy in the region. This group, having rallied the collaboration of
other civil organizations, convened an expert group meeting in London between November 16 and 17,
1998, on the method and process of constitution-making in Nigeria. This was made possible with the
assistance of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (I-IDEA) in Sweden. The
expert group meeting was convened in part, as a follow up activity to the meeting of the leaders of
Nigeria's pro-democracy and human rights community, facilitated by CDD in August 1998, after the
announcement of General Abubakar's transition programme. The meeting had urged democracy
activists and other civil society workers to participate actively in the constitutional debate.
Importantly, the idea of bringing together experts from other settings into direct contact with Nigerian
activists and academics was informed by the singular need to draw on comparative knowledge from
other parts, without reinventing the wheel and mindful of the unique situation which every country was
facing. Mainly, the team was put together to interact and have the civil society advise the government
on some of the real and perceived inadequacies in the 1995 Draft Constitution. The group was also to
suggest a process-based institutional mechanism for managing ethnic, religious, gender and other forms
of polarization among the constituent parts of the Nigerian political unit.

These experts, particularly those invited from abroad, were nominated on the basis of their individual
participation as civil actors in constitution-making in circumstances, at times, more trying than Nigeria's,
in which pragmatic and innovative solutions have been found to resolve deep-seated conflicts. They
include; Deputy Speaker of the South African parliament, Baleka Mbete-Kgositsile and Witswatsrand
Law Professor Halton Cheadle, both of who were involved in the South African constitution making
process; Bereket Selassie, who chaired the recently concluded Constitution-Making process in Eritrea;
Reg Austin, former Director of Legal Services at the Commonwealth Secretariat and now Director of
Programmes at International IDEA, who was involved in the Zimbabwean and Namibian constitution-
making process; Kamal Hussein, former Attorney-General of Bangladesh and until recently, Chair of the
Commonwealth Human Rights Advisory Commission, he has been involved in constitution-making
processes in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Thailand; and Mary Engena-Maitum, an Electoral
Commissioner in Uganda, who previously worked on the Ugandan constitution-making process. From
Nigeria came also constitutional and public law experts, Prof. Jadesola Akande and Prof. Itse Sagay.
Others were prominent scholars of federalism Prof. Peter Ekeh, Prof. Attahiru Jega and Prof. Adele
Jinadu, as well as democracy activists- Ogaga Ifowodo of Civil Liberties Organisation and Usman Bugaje
of the Network for Justice, also joined the participants.

The two-day workshop examined specific issues in relation to the content of the constitution, but
concentrated mainly on process and best practice mechanisms- especially as it relates to the production
of an inclusive document and strengthening constituencies, whose support is critical to the attainment
of the overriding goal of a 'living' document owned by the people. The workshop identified the
fundamentals of constitutionalism, highlighting the key areas that require institutional changes for the
Nigerian political system to be equitable, transparent and accountable. The proposed areas for reform
include: 'power shift' from the centre to the constituent/federating units; effective independent
commissions for the promotion of transparency and accountability; representative institutions for
citizens participation in democracy & power sharing; sustainable mechanisms for economic
development, social justice; rule of law; human right and gender equality. Although, in the view of the
participants, the time-table guiding the transition programme made it almost impossible to achieve any
comprehensive changes to the flawed 1995 Draft Constitution document, participants were unanimous
that if the process of the constitution making was to be inclusive and successful, it must have to begin
with a number of steps: (i) That the 1995 Constitution be promulgated as an Interim Constitution - after
which the government that emerges in May 1999 will begin a full process for the making of the
Constitution; (ii) That the process for the Constitution and the consultation should be written into the
Interim Constitution, to ensure an inclusive, participatory approach, in which public input is paramount;
(iii) That the process must adopt a specified series of benchmarks to ensure openness and reflect the
demographic character and gender complexion of the Nigerian state; and (iv) That the 1995 Constitution
should be amended in some specific areas immediately, so that it can serve as a workable Interim
Constitution for the newly elected representatives of the people.

However, being a major platform for the making of the 1999 Constitution, these submissions did not
preempt CDD's commitment and effort to enunciate enduring proposals towards the achievement of a
democratic constitution in the country. We therefore proceed to examine the general principles or
features that guided the 1999 constitution.

The General Guideline for the 1999 Constitution

The general principles that guided the amendment of the 1995 Constitution (and indeed the process for
a final Constitution) which came to be known as the 1999 Constitution were as follows, that:

1. The issue of over-concentration of powers at the federal level should be addressed. The
government should be concerned, for example, about power sharing, revenue allocation, amongst other
things, with a view to significantly increasing the allocation of resources to local and mineral producing
areas.

2. There was need for the de-centralization of the Police, not as it is presently constituted but one
that will derive final authority from the local authority and not the central government.

3. A consideration for gender equality has become particularly urgent, because society, by
discriminating against women, was ultimately under-developing its own foundation too;

4. The promotion of independent commissions with broad investigatory powers and prosecutorial
authority to promote accountability and transparency in government;

5. The enforcement of fundamental rights should be reserved in the High Court. The attempt to
transfer such to a constitutional court, with only zonal representation, will amount to depriving citizens
an easy access to enforcing their constitutional rights.

6. Review of the fundamental principles of party formation is crucial. The electoral process should
be specifically dealt with. This should not be construed as an interim process. For example, Section 41a
of the draft 1995 Constitution is a breach of the right of association and should be amended. The
membership of the National Electoral Commission should reflect a balance of interest in the political
parties and the geographical spread.

7. The authority of the federal government - with reference to section 12 of the 1995 Constitution
should be dealt with. The Federal Government should not have the powers to take over a state
government at will. The criteria, which constitute an emergency, should be highlighted. (Participants
cited as examples the four pages of clauses guiding emergency powers in the South African Constitution
and similar clauses in the Thai and the Eritrean Constitutions). Provisions should be made for the judicial
review of the validity of any such attempt to impose emergency powers by the Constitutional Court.

8. Land and mineral rights should be addressed with the view to arrive at a just and equitable
revenue allocation formula.
THE NIKI TOBI REPORT

However, despite the short notice given, other Nigerians graciously responded to the advertisement for
the submission of memoranda in respect of the new constitution. The Niki Tobi Committee received a
total of 405 memoranda from Nigerians within and outside the country. Those outside the country sent
in their reports through the e-mail, all of which the committee found most useful. Worthy to mention
were the Report of the Forum on the Nigerian 1995 Draft Constitution, held at the Grand Hyatt Hotel,
Washington D.C on December 5, 1998 and submitted by Nigerians in the United States, which also
encompassed contributions made to the group from Nigerians worldwide via the internet. Another US
based group, the Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue in the United States also sent in their
memoranda. Remarkably, the contributions of Nigerians in diaspora and those at home did not differ
significantly. This made the work of the coordinating Committee much easier. In all, the outcome of the
various contributions was the call by the Constitutional Committee for the reawakening or incremental
amendment of the 1979 Constitution. In his presentation of the report, the Chairman of the Constitution
Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC), Justice Niki Tobi stated that:

I think I should also say that by sheer coincidence, Nigerians abroad generally shared the same views
with Nigerians at home, not only on the eleven issues raised by the Head of State, but in other areas in
the Draft Constitution. This shows that Nigerians wherever they are, think alike on the nature of the
Constitution that should govern them. And that gladdened my colleagues in the Committee. I personally
watched the debate in five centers (including Abuja). I am happy to say that the debate was not only
cordial but also most patriotic and purposeful. Reports I received from abroad, particularly the
Washington D.C debates in the Unites States of America, showed similar trend and response. In the light
of the memoranda and the oral presentation on the 1995 Draft Constitution, it is clear that Nigerians
basically opt for the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments. Putting it in another language, the
common denominator in the mouths of Nigerians the world over is the 1979 Constitution with relevant
amendments. They want it, and they have copiously given their reasons for their choice in the different
memoranda and oral presentations. So we have recommended to the Provisional Ruling Council the
adoption of the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments from the 1995 Draft Constitution (CDCC
Report, 1998).

From the foregoing therefore, the 1979 Constitution was carefully amended based on the various
submissions rendered. We have earlier highlighted them. What this simply means is that what we have
presently as the 1999 constitution is not per se a brand new democratic constitution, rather, an
amended constitution. This was a major oversight. Thus, the question becomes: Did we achieve a
constitutional making or amendment? Of course, the process initiated was that of a constitutional
making/replacement, as it did not go through the lawmakers table for proper amendment proceedings.
Yet the outcome was a constitutional amendment. Whichever one, the short time provided has shown
that the Committee could only effect little incremental changes to the 1979 constitution. In fact, one can
hardly observe the said changes in the twin constitution if closely compared (i.e. 1979 and 1999). The
implication of this development herein, was that unknown to most contributors who clamoured for the
reincarnation of the 1979 constitution, the 1979 constitution was merely compatible with a civilian
regime, but not inherently prepared to be in proper tune with the dynamics of an emerging democratic
state such as Nigeria. The hindsight of preparing a workable constitution for Nigeria that would achieve
more expanded governments, with the creation of more states, indirectly resulting to increased
agitations, was also lacking at the time of this so called constitutional making.

It should be noted that General Abubakar announced his intention of returning the country to civil rule
as soon as practicable and he immediately began to prepare a transition programme to that end. He had
to, within a very short time; fashion out the criteria for the formation and registration of political
parties, prepare for the conduct of general elections at all levels, and create a new constitution for the
country. There were in fact pressures from the politicians, the press and the public for a quick transition
to civil rule. Nigerians were so much in a haste to see democratic governance happen in the country.
There were even suggestions from the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Secretary General of the
United Nations, that Abubakar should go ahead and conduct the general elections which Abacha had
scheduled for October 1998, so as to quickly put an end to military rule. Such was the general
atmosphere at the time. Consequently, in such prevailing circumstances, it could be discerned that
General Abubakar's political programme was unduly rushed, making it impossible for an ideal
constitution to emerge. Hence, there was very little, if any, input from the public in terms of its content.
Because of the political uncertainty and the general restiveness in the country at the time, the
constitution that emerged was therefore a political document put together by the military and a small
group of civilian leaders, to divert the country from the path of impending disintegration, and not
purposefully for democratic posterity and practicality.

In view of this inchoate constitutional foundation have emerged so many pressing federalist and
democratic issues, threatening the coexistence of the country. Therefore, the issues of citizenship,
indigenous discriminations, resource allocation, power sharing, tenure benchmark for presidents,
agitation for state police, incessant communal violence, bad governance, insecurity etc., which were
glossed over and never addressed in the acclaimed democratic constitution are major concerns. From
the perceived inadequacies of the 1999 Constitution therewith, a general reform and constitutional
conference was set up by the Federal Government of Chief Olusegun Obasango in 2004, to look into
ways of amending the constitution. The conference produced a Draft Constitution, suggesting about 116
amendments. The National Assembly sent a copy of the Draft to each of the 36 State Houses of
Assembly for their input in accordance with section 9 (2) of the Constitution. In the main, it is hoped that
constitutional amendments, whichever time suitable to the Federal and State lawmakers, should
confirm to the comments and contributions of the Obasanjo constitutional conference. All the same, we
suggest that such Drafts should equally be made available to the ordinary citizen so as to avail all and
sundry the opportunity of making tangible inputs in the country's constitutional matter.

BASIC ISSUES IN NIGERIA SINCE THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The first Republic which began on the 1st October 1960 saw Nigeria as a federal state with three
Regions:East, West and North. On this date, Nigerians assumed the responsibility of governing
themselves. Some of the features of the immediate independent years could be identified as follows:

1. Nigeria was a federation of three regions until 1963 when the fourth region was added. This
was Mid-West which was carved out of the Western Region in 1963.
2. The first republic witnessed multi-party system. The major parties were the NCNC, AG and NPC.
It must be noted that these parties were regional parties and none made an attempt to become a
national party; NCNC started as a national party an ended up almost an Eastern party, Action Group was
rooted in the West and NPC started as a Northern party. These ethnically based parties affected the
desire for national integration.

3. The First Republic started on a politics of divide and rule and 'unity in diversity' slogan with
issues that tended to divide the various peoples been religiously stressed. There was dichotomy along
north and south, religion and ethnicity. The republic therefore started on a fragile note.

4. It was a parliamentary democracy. There was the Governor-General who later became the
President. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Head of State, the Governor-General and the Commander in-
Chief of the armed forces. His position was ceremonial. At the early stage of independence, he
represented the Queen. He became the Head of State as a result of the Coalition entered into between
NCNC and NPC. Coalition or alliance became imperative because none of the parties was able to win a
comfortable majority after the 1959 general election. Abubakar Tafawa Belawa was the Prime Minister.
He was the action man and a member of the NPC. In other words, he was the head of government and
in-charge of the day to day administration of the country.

5. Parliamentary system also meant that the members of the two organs of government were
fused in their operations. The Prime Minister was chosen because he had won an election as a
member of the legislature and his party has equally won the majority of the seats in the legislature.
There was also the principle of collective responsibility and the tenure of office of the government was
not fixed as a vote of no confidence could lead to the dissolution of the government.

6. The First Republic also had a bicameral legislature in terms of the Senate and House of
Representatives which were called the Parliament and bicameral legislatures also in the regions.

7. By 1963, Nigeria became a full Republic; this meant that our Head of State became the President
and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He was elected by the people or their
representatives and no longer held brief for the Queen of England. He became a full-fledged head of
state.

8. By 1963, the Judiciary gained autonomy. The Supreme Court became the highest Court of
Appeal and no longer the British Privy Council.

9. The three Major Political Parties were NCNC, NPC and AG and major political actors were Dr.
Nnamdi Azikiwe of NCNC, Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Action Group and Alhaji Ahmadu Bello of NPC.

10. There was no election to appoint the members of the Executive. Elections were for the
members of the legislature.

11. The government received the mandate to govern through the parliament, that is, the
legislature. The parliament delegated its authority to its members who then formed the executive. Not
all the members of the legislature were appointed into the executive; the others were expected to
remain in the parliament.

12. The executive was made up of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet of Ministers.

13. The Prime Minister was the head of the executive.

The President was elected by a joint meeting of both the House of Senate and the House of
Representatives. The President's office becomes vacant at the end of his term of office. He could also be
removed if he commits any of the offences listed in the constitution.

The constitution stipulated that the President should appoint the Prime Minister from a list of people
capable of commanding the support of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives.
The Ministers were appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Ministers
ceased to hold office when the Prime Minister is removed through a vote of no confidence or when the
House is dissolved. The Prime Minister and his Ministers were responsible to Parliament in all functions
except in a few matters.

REGIONS IN THE FIRST REPUBLIC

At the regional level, each region had two Houses: the House of Assembly and the House of Chiefs. The
House of Assembly was made up of elected members whereas the members of the House of Chiefs were
not elected. The executive powers of a region were vested in the Governor. The Premiers and the
Council of Ministers however, acted for the Governor and the administration. A Governor was
appointed by the President on the advice of the Premier. The process of removal was similar to that of
the federal government.

The Premier was chosen from among the members of the House of Assembly. In the case of the
Northern Region, he could also be selected from the House of Chiefs. The Ministers were appointed by
the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The ministers were expected to be members of the House of
Assembly.

Every region had a High Court of Justice with a Chief Judge, and at least six other judges. These were
appointed by the Governor who acted on the advice of the Premier. All the regions were entitled to
Courts of Appeal, and the North also had a Sharia Court of Appeal with-proceedings governed by the
Muslim Law and conventions.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The First Republic faced numerous problems shortly after the attainment of political independence in
1960. Before the total demise of the Republic in 1966, the republic recorded some achievements.

The new government had to address the issue of economic development. This involved the creation of
another and better system of production different from the one inherited from the British. The national
resources had to be used to produce more wealth. There was an attempt to gain real independence by
reducing or eliminating foreign control and a cultural revolution on the use of new technology. The
process of development also called for revolutionary changes and requirements such as

(A) Central control by government of the national resources;

(b) the creation of an efficient infrastructure (e.g. better transport and communication
facilities) lo aid the production and exchange of goods and services;

(c) rapid changes in special services, notably in education and health and the promotion of new
methods in production and exchange.

The above requirements could be achieved through a plan or strategy. The government in the First
Republic had two options either a strategy of free enterprise (that is, capitalism) or of collective
enterprise (that is socialism). It also had to choose one or two priorities; either to emphasize changes in
the rural areas and in farming, or in towns and in industries.

The government chose a capitalist strategy. Its socio-economic programme was based on the principle
of mixed economy which allowed the state and private enterprises to participate in the economy.
Financial allocations were concentrated on electricity, transport, trade, industry, education and primary
production. Precisely the achievement of the First Republic included:

a. An opportunity to govern, given to Nigerians.

b. Participation by Nigerians in the affairs of their country.

c. Some people went into banking and big businesses where they had hitherto been barred during
colonial rule.

d. Freedom, openings as well as self-respect were enjoyed by Nigerians. Now, the world
and the gates of knowledge were thrown open to thousands of people. Nigerians had the opportunities
to know more about their country, the African continent and the world.

E. Arts developed. Old skills in sculpture were revived. New dramatic art gained acceptance.
Writing in poetry and prose flourished.

F. Better means of public information were created. These included, Radio, Television. Cinema and
book publishing. The newspapers expanded their circulations. By 1967 Nigeria was far ahead of many
other African countries with weeklies, eighteen daily newspapers and twenty-two periodicals.
Added to these were seventeen radio transmitters and five television stations. These facilities
enhanced the spread of information, news and ideas and entertainment.

g. Some Nigerians moved into profitable businesses where they had been previously barred. There
was the Nigerianizing of managerial and professional jobs. Training programmes enabled Nigerians to
take the place of expatriate technicians, civil servants and managers.

h. Both the federal and regional governments allocated money for the building of new libraries,
dispensaries, public toilets and hospitals. Old ones were maintained and expanded. Education witnessed
the greatest expansion during the First Republic. There was increase in the number of schools. More
primary and secondary schools were built. Four new universities were established in Lagos, Ife, Nsukka
and Zaria. Colleges to train teachers were increased. Change was not limited in increasing the number of
schools. Attempts were also made to Nigerianize the syllabuses and text- books. Different types of
education were provided, especially in the humanities where there was a stress on cultural revolution.
This became necessary because colonial education assumed the inferiority of the black race. And it was
not intended to prepare youths to offer dedicated service to their country.

THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

By 1966 when the Republic was brought to end, it had failed to:

a. Eliminate the devastating legacy of colonial rule. It could not decolonize the economy that is cut
down the large amount of wealth that was going overseas. The subsequent government also failed in
this respect;

b. Create a strong basis for a sound economy. There were signs of declining food production,
unemployment, and rising population which called for urgent policies.

c. Solve the problems of national unity. There were ethnic rivalries and competition.

d. Lay a strong basis for constitutional democracy.

The failure of the First Republic could be linked up with the following factors:

A. Party Politics: Politics was played mainly by regional parties. Although smaller parties such as
United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), Kano Peoples Party (KPP) Mid-
West Democratic Front (MDF) and the Northern Elements Progress Union (NEPU) existed, the big Parties
dominated the regional politics. Sectional and ethnic politics were manifested. Little attempt was made
in the formation of political parties that were national in outlook. The implication was that politics of
dichotomy, hatred, acrimony, and rancour was encouraged and nurtured.

b. Coalition in Government Equally Helped to Mar the First Republic: The absence of a party
with a national outlook plus the fact that none of the parties was able to gain clear-cut majority when
elections were held, led to an unstable federal government. The NPC had to enter into a partnership
with the NCNC to be able to form a coalition government. The NCNC members joined this coalition so
that its members and the Eastern Region would be able to benefit from the federally controlled
resources. The implication of coalition government was divided loyalty. There was also the problem of
which party should be the senior partner. These combined to weaken the government.

c. The Sectionalism and Parochialism Led to Corruption: Many were less concerned in the
entire system. Nigerian's did not see the country as a nation. Many were more concerned with what
they would benefit than what they would contribute for the development of Nigeria. As a result
corruption became rampant as each individual wanted what would benefit him/her and not what would
promote the well being of Nigeria.

d. There was also the 1962/63 Census Crisis: The 1962/63 census crisis sharpened regional
rivalries. The census result gave the north a voting force that was big enough to dominate the federal
parliament. Both the AG and the NCNC had hoped that the census would change the representation
ratio of the regions. When the results were announced in July 1962, the figures were believed to have
been manipulated. The results had to be cancelled, following the controversies which they generated. A
fresh one was conducted in 1963 which did not enjoy a unanimous approval. The census crisis left a lot
of bitterness among the regions and further deepened the already bad state of affairs.

E. The 1964 Federal Elections: The elections were the first to be conducted after
independence. The NPC needed the election to consolidate its power at the centre. The AG wanted to
dislodge Akintola from power in the west while the NCNC had to improve its bargaining strength.

Two main coalitions contested the elections; the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) made up of
the NPC and some other minor parties and the United Progressive Grand Alliance. This generated much
bitterness and violence especially in the West. The elections were rigged, electoral officers were
harassed, and candidates were returned unopposed even in constituencies where it was clear that they
would never win. The NCNC on its own prevented elections in the east.

In spite of those irregularities, the Federal Electoral Commission announced results and the
President, Dr Azikiwe in accordance with the constitution invited Balewa to form the government,
though after much persuasions. The elections revealed the fragility of the Republic. Tensions, conflicts
and controversies marked the era. With the parochial interests in personal gains by the major political
actors, it was not surprising that disaster followed.

F. The Colonial Legacy: Essentially the First Republic failed because of the manner the British
nurtured the Nigerian nation. Colonialism and neocolonialism largely limited on what independence
could achieve. The economy, education, culture and politics of the people had been bastardized and the
notion of divide and rule became the major thrust of colonial rule. With that Nigerians grew up to hate
themselves.

g. The Constitutional Factor: Certain aspects of the constitution were exploited by politicians for
very narrow ends. The power given to the regions became a threat to the federal system. These regions
and the politicians which represented them, engaged in bitter rivalries. Several aspects of the
constitution were still alien to the country. They were based on the experiences of Europe and not the
conditions in Nigeria, and these were counter-productive to our national progress.

h. Ethnicity: Ethnicity or what used to be called tribalism was another cause of the fall of the First
Republic. Politicians struggled to defend their regions and did not care much for the positive
development of others and the centre. There were also problems within the regions because of the
domination of minorities. Minority groups struggled with the large ethnic groups. The representatives of
the smaller groups generally complained of neglect and discrimination.

i. Western Nigerian Crisis: In the West, the Action Group encountered a crisis which led to a split
within its rank and left the West in great turmoil throughout the First Republic. The rift within the Action
Group led to clashes in the parliament. Two factions emerged; the Awolowo and the Akintola groups.
The causes of the conflict were ideological as well as personal. Following the clash, the Federal
government intervened in a manner that would favour the NPC. It dissolved the House, suspended the
Governor who was in the Awolowo camp and imposed a state of emergency. Chief Majekudumi was
then appointed as the administrator for six months.

Other developments that hastened the fall of the First Republic were the attempt to discredit Chief
Awolowo through the Coker Commission of Enquiry. He was arrested in November 1962 and charged
with treason. In June 1963, he was sentenced to jail for ten years. The jail term on Awolowo further
helped to create bitterness in some sections of Nigeria.

In concluding this segment of our discussions, we wish to state that the Nigerian nationalists, leaders
and politicians did not fare better than the colonial authorities in promoting national consciousness.
Except when it suited their personal interests and ambitions, they did not have any commitment to
genuine national unity. They contributed in sowing the seeds of discord which led to the fall of the First
Republic. Their main interest has been the attainment of power as Premiers, Prime Ministers,
Presidents, Governors, Ministers, Commissioners etc. These positions enabled them to amass enormous
wealth at the expense of the Nigerian masses. They did not care for the interests of the masses. The
politicians always looked for opportunities to emphasize their differences and were notorious for
making unguarded, inflammatory statements which led to negative reactions throughout the country.
Nigerian politicians reinforced the divisions created by the British among Nigerians and that was why
they failed woefully to create a truly national unity. Based on the acrimony, hatred, prejudice, rancour
and bitterness inculcated in Nigerians, the stage was set for the military intervention of 15 January 1966.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND SHEHU SHAGARI 1979 -1983

The making of the 1979 Constitution

Two key bodies were responsible for the making of the 1979 Constitution; namely: The Constitution
Drafting Committee and the Constituent Assembly. In appointing members of the Constitution Drafting
Committee, the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime employed their understanding of consensual
government. Two main criteria were used in appointing the 'fifty wise men': representativeness in the
sense of political representation of the then existing states, and relevant specialized knowledge.

The constituent assembly that considered the report of the drafting committee was selected through a
process of election by electoral colleges constituted by elected councillors in the local government
areas. The presidential form of constitution fashioned in the manner of the USA presidential chief
executive system was decidedly adopted in Nigeria. The shortcomings inherent in the parliamentary
system necessitated the adoption of the presidential constitution.

Under the 1979 presidential constitution, executive power resided in the President who was the Head of
State, Chief Executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the federation.
There was a Vice President who assumes office if the President dies or is impeached. In addition the
constitution provided for the office of ministers of the government of the federation. In exercising the
executive power vested in him, the President was expected to rely on a fairly significant extent on the
cabinet, which had to meet regularly to perform specified functions. This idea of a presidential
government functioning as a quasi -cabinet government was one of the major difference between the
Nigerian presidential system and the American model to which it was commonly compared.

A second distinguishing feature of the Nigerian Presidency was the fact that the constitution formally
required the president to obtain advice from, or consult with, certain executive bodies before making
decisions on certain issues. The executive bodies were; the Council of State, the Federal Civil Service
Commission; the Federal Electoral Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission; the National
Defence Council; the National Economic Council; the National Population Commission; the National
Security Council; The Police Service Commission. For instance; the Council of State could advise the
President, whenever requested to do so, on the maintenance of public order within any part of the
federation. The National Defence Council had power to advice the President on matters relating to the
defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.

The Executive And Political Parties

While executive power was formally separated from legislative power in the Nigerian constitution, as is
the case in the American constitution, the executive provisions on the political parties in the Nigerian
constitution saw this separation in a manner that is unknown in the American system. Both the
president and the members of the national assembly had to be members of political parties, and each
party was required to ensure that its programmes conformed with the Fundamental Objectives and
Directive Principles of State Policy. In other words, the role of political parties in the functioning of the
Nigerian presidential system was a key factor which would have a significant influence on how the
president exercised his executive powers and on how he related to the national assembly. However, the
legislative powers of the assembly and its functions of oversight over the actions of the executive branch
were almost as extensive as is the case in the American system. Thus for example, large number of key
appointments made by the President- notably members of the cabinet, the country's envoys overseas
and a majority of the members of the different federal executive bodies-were subject to confirmation by
the Senate. And it was the national assembly alone that has the power to make laws subject only to the
need for presidential assent. Where the President withholds his assent, it could be overridden by a two
third majority in each house. Either house could invite a Minister to explain to the house the conduct of
his ministry. Most important of all, both houses had extensive powers to investigate all aspects of
governmental administration.

The Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) argued that an executive president would give the President
an independent right to govern and avoid politics of personality clashes as was the case in the split
executive of the First Republic. The Executive President was to choose his ministers from outside the
parliament. The election of the President was to be such that he would have the highest number of the
votes in at least 2/3 of the states of the federation. Multi-party system was also recommended.
Elections were based on a single member constituency. Members of the National Assembly were to be
elected directly from all the states of the federation. The direct responsibility of the President to the
mass of the population through direct universal suffrage was recognized as making him fully responsible
for the conduct of governmental administration.

The Fall of The Second Republic

The Second Republic began with a resurrection of the old leadership (of the First Republic), schooled in
the politics of intrigues and sentiments to sustain themselves in power. The political party formation
was simply the resurrection of those of the First Republic. The Second Republic began with a
controversy over the election results and what constitutes a 2/3 majority of 19 states. Just like the First
Republic, it became clear by 1983 that the politicians had not learnt much from the past. Virtually, the
same political ills as was witnessed in the political arena between 1960 and 1965 featured prominently
in the second Republic.

Obiozor (1994) believes that the presidential system faded just like the parliamentary system because
the operators of the constitution were incapable of managing a sophisticated constitution. Most of the
politicians of 1979 -1983 era, both at the federal and state levels were politically naive and could not
understand the meaning and process of democracy. After elections many of them became victims of
ethnic and regional biases and prejudices that militated against democratic principles.

Again, charges of corruption, tribalism and political victimizations were rife. The Governors in some
states became demigods running their respective states as Indian Chiefs, ignoring or buying over the
legislators, spending and recklessly borrowing from domestic and foreign banks and financial institutions
combined to bring the entire nation to the brink. Economic prospects seemed doomed and cost of
essential commodities became prohibitive, the alarm bell sounded and the armed forces returned to
power. Thus, it is now clear that democracy fails in Nigeria because of the general political illiteracy of
the political class as well as their propensity for greed, tribalism, regionalism, ethnocentrism, political
intolerance and religious chauvinism. Democracy per se, thrives best under a political atmosphere that
encourages debates, as well as shared sense of a common goal. Elaigwu and Galadima (1994) have tried
to summarize the problems with the operations of the Nigerian presidential system between 1979 to
1983 thus;

1. Lack of understanding of the constitution by the operators of the political system.

2. Ignorance of the operation of a presidential system, political actors confused presidentialism

and parliamentarialism.

3. Legislative blackmail. The legislators grew wings and the Chief executive across the nations
trembled in fear.

4. Militarization of political culture.

5. Corruption of the judiciary.

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Macmillan Press Ltd.

14. Nwankwo A. A. (1981) Can Nigeria survive? Enugu Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.Ltd.

15. Obi, E.A. and Obikeze, S.O. (2004) Federalism and national integration in Nigeria. Onitsha:
Bookpoint Ltd.

16. Umezulike I. A. (Ed) (1993) Democracy beyond the third republic. Enugu, Fourth Dimension
Publishing Co. Ltd., For the Federal Ministry of Justice, Lagos, Nigeria.
CHAPTER NINE

MILITARY IN POLITICS

With the benefit of hindsight, I think the military's involvement in politics hasn't been the blessing it was
supposed to be. Looking back at the situation of the country today, it would have been better we didn't
venture into government. We are blamed for every imaginable crime in the land now. The military which
used to be respected and spoken about with awe are now being attacked with contempt. I now
subscribe to the views of those who believe the 1966 coup could have been avoided. We were supposed
to right the wrongs of the politicians. But we overstayed. Now we are being blamed for the wrongs we
set out to right. It is a terrible thing (Anonymous rtd. General Quoted in Guardian Newspaper Interview).

The role and influence of the military on third world politics is such that cannot be ignored. The reason
being that in many of these countries, the military has been in power for as long as, if not more than
civilians. In countries where they have not directly intervened, their role in stabilizing the polity cannot
be ignored. Military rule is therefore no longer regarded as an aberration; in fact in some countries it is
civil rule that may even be seen as an aberration. Consequently many Third World states (Nigeria
inclusive) can be regarded as being praetorian. Praetorianism according to Mundel "is a word frequently
used to characterize a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent
political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.”

It is this dominance of the military in politics in Africa and other third world states that had led to series
of studies and inquiries aimed at unraveling the reasons behind this phenomenon. It has been the
intention of scholars to discover whether there are peculiar circumstances or conditions in these
countries which have made military rule inevitable or whether there are peculiar traits of the military
establishments in these countries as different from the developed ones that makes politics irresistible to
them or both. This study will not be different. We are therefore going to start the study from looking at
the reasons behind military intervention in politics.

Trying to arrive at a consensus of the underlying factors necessitating military coups has not been a very
easy exercise. Presently there are many theories on military intervention but sadly no one of them has
really explained fully the phenomenon under study. The reason for this is because according to Dudley
(1982) ''One cannot give a satisfactory explanation of a coup without any reference to the contextual
environment of the coup". This is apparently because of the peculiarities of different countries and even
differences in particular societies at different times. This is not however, to say that there are no factors
which can be used in analyzing or explaining military incursion into politics.

Military involvement in politics is usually through a coup d'etat. Nnoli (1986) defines a coup d' etat as
the sudden and arbitrary change of the government by a group of people. While a military coup d'etat is
the act of changing the government by the armed forces or the military establishment. What are
therefore the reasons for coup d'etat? Prof Dudley (1982) has offered three explanatory factors which
scholars have often used in explaining it. They are; political culture, reference group and the custodian
theory. We will explain each of them briefly.

Societies that have low political cultures are prone to military coups. These are societies whose political
structures have not been institutionalized, or weakly institutionalized, and the dominant political norms,
the "rules of the game" have not been sufficiently internalized". It is therefore argued, that since the
structures are weak and the people are not so used to the game and its rules, it is susceptible to abuses
which may result in system collapse and probably military coups. The problem with this factor is that it
looks like some particular countries were its focus and consequently, it fell into a trap. Though most of
the countries that have witnessed coups d'etat can be said to have low political cultures, the theory
failed to tell us why some other countries that equally have low political cultures have not experienced
any coup d'etat, since low political culture invariably breeds coups. Secondly, a country like Greece
which apparently does not have a low political culture experienced a coup d' etat in 1967, and even the
attempted coup in Soviet Union under Boris Yeltsin. So how do we explain these? From the fore going, it
seems that there are other factors outside low political cultures that bring about coups.

The second theory is the reference group. According to Dudley the major premise of the theory is the
fact "that an individual's behaviour tends to be conditioned or influenced by the behaviour of those he
admires or in other words, takes his point of reference- the reference group". Based on this a coup
d'etat would take place in a nation if the role performance of the political leadership falls short of the
expectation of the leadership of the military and when the military feels it is comparatively
disadvantaged relative to other groups that it can compare itself to. According to Okoye (1991) the two
conditions for coup d'etat stated above from the perspective of the reference group theory tend to
assume that the military exists as a corporate entity on the basis of which it stands out as a reference
group comparable with other reference groups. These conditions are therefore not very much at home
with the verdict of empirical evidence.

The point being made above is that the military as a group does not have a generally accepted reference
group by which it compares itself; hence, coups cannot really be attributable to this factor. Though, it
can be argued that coups may occur as a result of feelings of neglect by the military as borne out by the
overthrow of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah based on the fact that he created an elite Presidential Guard
who were very well provided for while the regular army were utterly neglected.

The custodian theory, states that the military is the custodian of the country's constitution and as such
will always intervene when it is grossly abused by the government in power. The problem with this
theory is that it is based on a false assumption. The military's role is not to protect the constitution but
to protect the country from external aggression. Achike (1978) has outlined the functions of the military
thus;

1. The defence of the realm from external forces. This will include either prosecuting a war against
any enemy state or defending a war, launched by an enemy state;

2. The maintenance of order within the country. This aspect of military responsibility falls within
the usual domain of police powers; and

3. The responsibilities that may be assigned to the Army by the Head of State. This is what may
form the miscellaneous duties of the Army. It is submitted that this is abroad umbrella which will enable
the Head of State to use the services of the Army in such circumstances that he may deem fit.

Okoye (1991) therefore states that a logical blending of structural functionalism and class analysis is a
more realistic and convincing theoretical approach for explaining military intervention.
Dudley (1982) has however differentiated between what he calls predisposing or orientating factors and
facilitative factors in the intervention of the military in governance. The predisposing or orientating
factors include such variables as the structure and composition of the armed forces taking into account,
the possibilities for mobility within the military, the commitment or degree of professionalism of armed
forces personnel, and the prevailing ideology held by, or normative orientation of, the military.

He lists the facilitative factors to include such things as the degree of permissibility of military
boundaries by which is meant the extent to which societal and extra-societal factors could influence
military behaviour, the extent to which military communication channels were independent of societal
communication media, the institutional complexity, that is the extent to which there were
countervailing forces-forces which on one hand complement each other and on the other hand balance
each other in the society, and of course, the coercive power of the military. While the predisposing
factors would determine the likelihood or otherwise of the military intervening, but whether they will
intervene or not depends on the facilitative factors. Dudley however believes that "the importance of
each of these variables and their mix would vary from one society to the other". It is because of this that
"one cannot give a satisfactory explanation of a coup without any reference to the contextual
environment of the coup" (Dudley, 1982).

Before going into the real causes of military intervention, let us first look at the types of military
involvement. Claude Welch Jnr. (1970) has identified three types:

The first type, relative passivity and abstention from political interference, was usually confined to the
immediate post independence period. The armies remained under substantial expatriate influence
which precluded (or certainly made more difficult) any meddling in politics. This was the period of the
"non-political army".

The second type of involvement saw resentment against European officers and African political leaders
explode in mutinies. These outbursts were not intended at directly unseating the government in power.
They were aimed rather at forcing the government to adopt certain policies, notably higher pay, pension
privileges, or immediate Africanization of the officer corps.

Coup d'etat, the third type, brought full-scale military involvement in politics. The occupants of
presidential palaces were removed, possibly executed; while the initiators of the intervention, intent on
'restoring' the country to normal patterns take over complete governance. Some other theories of
military intervention that has been treated by Jemibewon (1998) are;

1. The Direct Military Participation Theory

2. The Influential Theory

3. The Militarized Society Theory

4. The Cooperative Theory and

5. The Constitutional Theory

THE DIRECT MILITARY PARTICIPATION THEORY

The theory explains the direct intervention of the military in politics as a result of the failure of the
political class to solve societal problems ranging from corruption, economic crises, inefficiency, tribalism
etc. According to Feit (1973)

When soldiers find their countries beset by seemingly insoluble problems and they lack faith in the skill
or -will of politicians to solve them, they may offer themselves as the men of iron to perform the drastic
surgery needed to amputate the cancerous elements of the existing system.

Intervention may also be as a result of political tampering with the army professional integrity, its
hierarchy or ranks etc.

THE INFLUENTIAL THEORY

There are some countries where though the military is not directly in power, but it plays a very
dominant role in government. Israel is a very good example. The influence of the military institution in
such countries emanates from their salience in national security hence such countries are ones that
probably due to their geographical locations are prune to external attacks. In such nations most issues
are seen from the angle of national security and the military usually gets a heavy chunk of the annual
budget.

THE MILITARIZED SOCIETY THEORY

In countries that adopted this theory, there is usually an attempt to militarize the society to such an
extent that defence is seen not as the sole duty of the military but that of the entire citizenry. Libya
served as a good example. This may be a ploy to check further coups by demystifying the military or
better still to fortify the nation against foreign invasion.

THE COOPERATIVE THEORY

Some countries have worked out arrangements of sharing power between the civilians and the military
with the result that there is a high rate of stability in the system. In Egypt, formerly the tendency has
been that the Presidents were military men while the Prime Minister were civilians. This system has
really helped to stabilize the nation's political system.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

In this case, the military usually intervenes to enforce the constitution. For instance, in Philippines
during the Ferdinand Marcos era, the military gave massive support to Mrs. Aquino who was denied her
electoral victory by Marcos. Nothing stopped the military from taking over power but instead, they
helped the real winner - Mrs. Aquino to ascend the throne. By this action, they have intervened to help
enforce the constitution.

Some scholars of military intervention believe that the conduct of the military in any society depends to
a large extent on the social and political condition of the society. Thus, Huntington (1985), posits that:

As societies change, so does the role of the military. In the world of the oligarch, the soldier is a radical,
in the middle class world, he is a participant and arbiter, as the mass society looms in the horizon, he
becomes the conservative guardian of existing order. The extent to which a politicized officer corps
plays a conservative or reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in
society.

We now turn to some concrete factors that have helped to promote military intervention. Our analysis
will draw heavily from a leading authority on military in politics - Claude E Welch Jr. (1970). The factors
are;

1 Declining prestige of the major political party as exemplified by;

(a) Increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance;

(b) a stress on unanimity in the face of separatist forces;

(c) a consequent denial of effective political choice;

The dominant party in the colonial struggle most often enjoyed tremendous support from the people
during and immediately after the struggle. However, since there is a world of difference between
nationalist struggles and governance most of them that inherited power at independence found
themselves unable to run an effective government. The people, who were enticed by the anti-colonial
slogans and sentiments, now look forward to better days. However, the government of the day found
itself so much enmeshed in mediating the conflicts arising from sharing the spoils of office while actual
governance and the people were forgotten hence, a waning of their support. As their support declined,
so did their capacity to attract compliance which invariable meant more reliance on force. The more
force they applied, the more resentment they got from the people and the more people sought for
alternatives. As the choice of alternatives kept decreasing, ethnic and particularistic tendencies
expressed in new and revived groups intensified thus, making the government headed by the dominant
pre-independence parties highly uncomfortable.
Naturally, they had to find ways of containing such challenges to their power base. In most cases they
tried to stress unanimity in order to fight forces of separatism represented by ethnic sentiments. Since
they never really succeeded, they had to resort to the use of brute force and crude tactics to stultify the
opposition thereby denying their citizens the right of political choice. Invariably, this increases the
tension in the society, which inevitably helped in setting the stage for future military interventions.

2. Schism among prominent politicians,

Thus weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former
colonial power. In most African nations, almost immediately after independence, noticeable and often
times irreconcilable differences, developed among the principal characters ostensibly over the spoils of
office. Unfortunately, the divisions soon took tribal dimensions since most African states are multi-
ethnic societies. Because these characters had large followers, the split in their ranks caused major
political problems in the affected countries. In many cases it was these politicians themselves who
invited the military to intervene in order to 'save the nation from collapse or from dictatorship'. When
the military answered the call to 'save the nation' they found it difficult to go back to the barracks.

3. “Contagion" from seizures of control by the military in other African countries

The matter of military coups being contiguous is given ample credence by the rapidity of military coups
in many countries in Africa in the 60's. A sample; Algeria (June 19, 1965), Congo (Nov 25, 1965),
Dahomey (December 22, 1965) C.A.R. (Jan. 1,1966) Upper Volta (Jan. 3,1966) Ghana (Feb. 24,1966)
Nigeria (July 29, 1966) Burundi (Nov. 28, 1966), Togo (Jan. 13, 1967), Sierra Leone (Mar 22, 1967), Congo
Brazzaville (August 4, 1968) and Mali (Nov. 19, 1968).

The seventies and eighties and even the early nineties equally witnessed rampant coups, approximating
to but not as close as the 'bazaar' of the sixties. What actually is the reason behind this contagious
nature of coups? Welch (1970) seems to have an answer, According to him:

Contagion must be considered in two levels, the personal links among African officers in different
countries and the increasing extent of interstate ties. Shared experiences in the French army provided
the leaders of intervention in the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta
(respectively Bokassa, Soglo, Eyadema, and Lamizana) with potentially significant individual ties. All four
served in Indochina. It is quite likely that the success of one in winning political control prompted the
others to consider intervention though no conclusive evidence can be adduced.

Continuing he adds that;

As Africa has increasingly become a subsystem in world politics, reciprocal influences among African
States have multiplied. These reciprocal influences include the germ of military intervention.
Another factor that ties African soldiers and indeed third world soldiers together and which seem to
contribute to the demonstration effect of coups, was the fact that most of them were trained in the
same Academy - mainly Sadhurst Britain.

David Jemibewon (1998) alluded to this when he said;

It is no doubt significant that by 1972 the year of my graduation, the college (United States Command
and General Staff College Fort Heaven Worth Kansas) had been able to number among its alumni 12
officers who had become heads of States or Prime Ministers and 112 officers who had become ministers
of State.

There is no doubt that the belief that "if he can do it, I too can do it" is one of the underlying reasons
behind the spate of coups in the third world executed ostensibly by friends, course mates and
schoolmates. It may not have been out of place for those who have succeeded in toppling their own
governments, to render logistic, financial and moral support to assist their friends in other countries
whenever they needed such in their home countries. In any case "what are friends for?”

4. Ethnicity

This concept was defined by Nnoli (1980) as a social phenomenon associated with interactions among
members of different ethnic groups. It is behavioural in form and conflictual in context. Ethnicity is
characterized by a common consciousness of being one in relation to others. It is usually based on
exclusiveness.

Since most African countries are multi-ethnic, people are always interested in the ethnic origins of those
in power and how they use state power to allocate the states resources. Nnoli (1980) noted that a group
of ethnic watchers - those interested in knowing which ethnic group is dominating which, have emerged
in most African countries. When therefore an ethnic group feels highly marginalized by another or other
ethnic groups it can plan to change the status quo through a coup, if it has the capacity. The second
military coup in Nigeria (29th May 1966) was based mainly on ethnic sentiments: to fight Igbo
domination of the country, arising from the first coup of January 1966. The ethnic character of that coup
was not in doubt as the executors were not interested in hiding it, believing that they were on a revenge
mission. From then onwards, the factor of ethnicity has contributed to political instability in Nigeria.
Other African countries have not been spared the consequences of ethnicity on their political systems,

5. Stagnating Economic Conditions

Independence was expected to bring about a big economic boom for the new states and tremendous
improvement in the lives of the people. Alas, nothing of this sort happened. Instead the economies of
most of these states suffered severe setbacks due to mainly factors of mismanagement and wrong
economic models. In cases where the economies experienced growth, it was growth without
development as the benefits of growth did not trickle down to the people. In some proven cases the
living conditions of the people actually deteriorated. The people were seriously disappointed.

The disappointment stemmed from the fact that during the colonial struggle they were promised better
days ahead at the end of the struggle. Instead what they saw, were bitter days. For people like Nkrumah
that told the masses to "seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added to it", they
found out that they lacked the capacity to better the lives of the people. It was on this mountain of
disillusionment that the military climbed to rationalize their intervention in politics.

6. Corruption

Most of the military coups in the third world had always been predicated on the need to rid the society
of corruption. The first coup in Nigeria had corruption as one of it's justifications. The leader of the coup
major Nzeogwu in his first broadcast said;

Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that receive
bribes and demand 10%, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can
remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least; the tribalists, the nepotists, those that made the country
look big for nothing before international circles; those that have corrupted our society and put the
Nigerian calendar back by their words and deeds.

Almost two decades later, when the military sacked the second republic they equally echoed the same
complaints thus;

The economic mess, the corruption and the unacceptable level of unemployment could not be excused
on the grounds that Nigeria was a practicing democracy as that price was certainly not in the interest of
the people of this country nor indeed would it be acceptable anywhere. The shameless rigging,
widespread perversion of the electoral process-could not in all honesty have been said to have produced
a government of the people by the people (Buhari, 1983).

As expected, immediately they came into office, the military usually embarked on measures aimed at
curbing corruption. Unfortunately they got entangled in exactly the same problems they came to solve.
Their dreams remained what it was - a dream. On this, Luckman (1971) asserts that;

When they took power, the soldiers marched out on a straight path towards their vision of a good
society. But the vision becomes more elusive the closer they come towards it.

7. Military Self-Identification

Military coups occur because officers do not recognize the civilian control of the armed forces as
legitimate. According to Welch (1970), the denial of the legitimacy of the duly constituted civilian
government is the first and probably the most important step in military seizure of power. Finer (1962)
believes "the disposition to intervene" is based on a distinction between 'national interest' and the
practices followed by the government. The military establishment is a unique organization with a high
sense of duty and discipline. Unfortunately, due to the recklessness associated with most African
regimes, the military do not trust them and seriously resisted attempts by the civilians to meddle into
military affairs. This is because they believed that the military if allowed to be controlled by civilians will
end up being destroyed like other sectors. They therefore resented this intrusion. Incidentally, the
civilians themselves never really had much regard for the military. The reason for this contempt for
soldiers varied. According to Ahmadu Bello, when he was at school, there was a military base near his
school and this is what he had to say about the base;

We did not like the soldiers, they were our people and had conquered us for strangers and had defeated
our people ... This feeling was very common all over the north.

In Zaria, a General commenting on this then said:

Who was sent into the force publique? The least promising individuals, the pupils who had been
expelled from school, the refuse of the nation.

This is in line with what Mr. Eneh, a member of the House of Representatives in the first Republic, said;

People are jeered at when they want to join the army, the reason being that soldiers are treated no
better than labourers... There is a psychology in this country that when someone is badly paid that man
is inferior.

Another member of that house Sir Louis Odumegwu Ojukwu told the same House that "Nobody lives
with soldiers".

We have gone this far to show the disdain which members of the public have for the military, and the
fact that the military themselves are aware of this disdain. Somehow it looks as if the military as a
trained institution contained whatever insults that were being heaped on them while waiting for the day
of reckoning.

Most unfortunately the politicians were not aware of this but instead kept inviting the military to help
clean their mess. An analyst observed that the use made by the civilian authorities of the Army for
internal security operations in the Tiv Division and the Western Region was resented by many officers,
both as a challenge to their professional identity as soldiers rather than policemen, and because they
objected to dealing with disorders which resulted from the action of a government with which they
disagreed with and for which they were not responsible.
Further attempts by politicians, to use the army for their often selfish interest was not really acceptable
to them, the army reacted mainly through coups. In Ghana, Major Afrifa (1960) vividly described the
state of the army before the overthrow of Nkrumah, in these words:

(The army) was virtually at the mercy of the politicians who treated it with- arrogance and open
contempt... Because of bad planning, economic mismanagement and political interference, this army
was rendered incapable, ill-equipped, and virtually been reduced to a rabble.

On this note we can say that the need to preserve the integrity, prestige, image and improve the
working conditions of the military is partly responsible for military intervention.

8. Foreign Intervention

It has been proved that military intervention in many Third World societies had the support and blessing
of foreign interests. In the days of the cold war, it was very rampant to see the two super powers
planting their stooges in the peripheral states. In some cases where a Head of State goes against the
interest of western capital, they financed a segment of the military to remove him. The particular case
of Allende of Chile who was removed by the C.I.A. is a celebrated case. Even in Africa, the Congo crises
of the 60's where Lumumba lost his life in the coup that brought Mobutu to power is a classical example
of foreign intervention in Third World affairs which cause coups, counter coups and insurrections.

THE NIGERIAN ARMY

The origin of the Nigerian army is traced to colonial paramilitary forces established by the British to help
in conquering the people for British colonial rule. Jemibewon (1998) traced the real origin of the force to
1862 when Governor Stancrope Freeman of British West Africa sought the permission of the Colonial
Secretary to set up a local constabulary. This body took over duties from the West Indian Regiment.

With the granting of the Royal Charter to the Royal Niger Company in 1886, the company set up the
Royal Niger Constabulary to help it safeguard its assets and maintain law and order within it's territory.
Following France's advance on the Niger and the fact that the government had delegated it's authority
to a chartered company, whilst the French could bring down the full weight of governmental
administration behind their ambitions, it became clear that sooner or later a stand would have to be
made against the French. The British Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain decided on the creation of a
military force under the command of Capt. Lugard, which will hold the position of the Royal Niger
company. In 1898, Lugard formed the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) (Crowder 1965). The WAFF
incorporated regiments from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Nigeria contributed two
regiments to the force namely the Northern and Southern Regiments. With amalgamation in 1914, both
regiments were united to form the Nigeria Regiment. In 1958, when the West African command was
disbanded, the regiments from the four British colonies became separate commands. The Nigerian
Regiment was re-named the Queens Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR), following the tour of Nigeria in
1960 by Queen Elizabeth II. In 1963 when Nigeria attained a republican status the Queens Own Nigeria
Regiment became the "Nigerian Army". The army as expected was dominated by the British. Thus, in
1958 when the British Army Council transferred control over recruitment and promotion to the Nigerian
colonial, government, there were Just 29 Nigerian commissioned officers and a handful of other Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs). However immediately after independence, the Nigerianisation of the
force started in earnest. In Jan 1960, only 18% of the officers corps were Nigerians, by October 1960 it
increased to 22%, 50% in 1962, 89% in 1964 and by 1966 the entire officer corps were Nigerians.

THE TABLE BELOW VIVIDLY ILLUSTRATES THE NIGERIANISATION PROCESS.

Date No. Or No. Of Nigerian % of Nigerian

British Combat Officers Officers

Officers Commissioners Non-Combat

Jan 1960 228 48 2 18

Jan 1962 156 107 50 50

Jan 1964 47 240 132 89

Jan 1966 0 336 181 100

Source: Federation of Nigeria official Gazettes (1960 - 66)

Also Luckham, The Nigeria military, In the military, law and society by D.M. Jemibewon.

The first Nigerian General Officer Commanding (G.O.C), Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi was appointed
in February 1965 to take over from the last expatriate G.O.C. Major-General Welby-Everard.

The Nigerianisation process was facilitated by the establishment of military institutions in the country.
These includes the Nigeria Military School Zaria (1954), the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna (initially
designated the Royal Nigerian Military Training College at it's inception in April 1960); the Depot
Nigerian Army, Zaria, established in 1917 (and later the Depot Abeokuta which was dissolved in 1974).
Many others have since been added since the attainment of independence in 1960.

THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND COUPS

"Coups succeed coups. We will never be at peace again" (Hassan Katsina, 1966). It would not be wrong
to call Nigeria a land of coups. The country has been ruled by seven military rulers and has had a much
higher number of coups both successful, unsuccessful and "arangee" ones.
The report of the 1986 political bureau that conducted a debate on the country's political future
attributed the causes of the incessant military coups in Nigeria to;

1. Systematic collapse which is often a product both of the structural, as well as the inability of the
dramatis personae to play the game according to laid down rules;

2. Crises of legitimacy indicated by corruption, ineptitude, gross indiscipline and bad leadership;

3. The influence of self-seeking powerful civilians and

4. Personal self-regarding interests of the military (coup makers).

Okoye (1991) argues that the history of the governments in Nigeria (Civilian and Military) shows that the
private-regarding interest of some of the key political actors have been made to take precedence over
the interests of the generality of the people in the activities of the respective governments, thereby
making nonsense of their campaign/post coup promises and the fundamental objectives of
governmental institutions, judging from their constitutional functions, or as the functions ascribed to
them by the Decrees/Edicts that established them.

It is therefore, not surprising that the consequent unhealthy struggle for power between the political
elites and their usual resort to using state power for private-regarding aggrandizement have invariably
led to an in-ordinate subversion and exploitation of governmental institutions, in addition to the
polarization of the masses along some historically definable and sentiment - prone parochial cleavages,
and the use of political violence against political rivals as was rampantly witnessed in the 1962 intra-
Action Group factional conflicts in the Western Region.

We will now look at the various coups in Nigeria and try to x-ray the real reasons behind them.

THE JANUARY 15, 1966 COUP

This coup can be linked to the Action Group crises which started in 1962. The crises which started due to
the personal disagreement between the party leader Chief Awolowo and his deputy Chief Akintola over
whether to join the federal coalition of NPC/NCNC led to the federal government declaring a state of
emergency in the Western Region in a pure partisan manner. After the state of emergency, Chief
Akintola with the aid of the federal government was returned as the Premier of the region, this time, on
a different party platform- the NNDP. Thus the A.G lost its political base and leader Chief Awolowo who
was sentenced to prison for treasonable felony. The seed of instability was thus unknowingly sown by
the federal government.The 1964 General elections was contested by two broad coalitions, the Nigerian
National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). While the NNA had the
Northern Peoples Congress and, Akintolas' Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), (UPGA) had the
Action Group and the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The country was set for a real war.
The elections were horrible. Unimaginable things happened. The level of malpractice was
unprecedented. UPGA decided it was boycotting the elections since the electoral commission was
openly favouring the NNA thus jeopardizing it's position as an impartial arbiter. The boycott was only
effective in the East while voting took place in the Northern and Western Regions. As expected the
electoral commission announced results and declared the NPC winner of the elections. Zik, the nations
President and NCNC leader refused to invite the parliamentary leader of the NPC (Balewa) to form a
new government as customarily done in a parliamentary system.

However, after much dialogue and compromise, he accepted and invited the NPC to form a new
government, thus solving the problem at the centre.

Then came the Western Regional elections of 1965. The elections were marred by violence and terrible
malpractice's as the NNDP was bent on retaining power despite its unpopularity. The attempt to return
the NNDP was violently resisted by the people. It was therefore clear that the government has lost
control of the region. Anarchy was let loose on the region; as looting, arson, murder and utter
lawlessness became the order of the day. It was clear that something had to happen. The military
intervened. This is in line with the statement of Jemibewon (1998) that "the military is in fact the only
institution sufficiently organized to intervene when things get out of hand".

The execution of the coup which was not fully successful sowed the seed of future political instability in
the country. The coup led by major Chukwuma Nzeogwu and other majors was foiled by the General
Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi, but not before the Prime
Minister, and the Premiers of the Northern and Western regions with some other top military officers
and senior politicians were killed.

Following the assassination of the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji Zanna Bukar
Dipcharima a senior Cabinet Minister presided over a cabinet meeting on the 16th of January in Lagos,
where the cabinet decided to hand over the administration of the country to the army. Later that same
day Dr. Nwafor Orizu, the acting President in place of Dr. Azikiwe who was in London, announced to the
nation in a radio broadcast that he had been advised by the Council of Ministers to hand over the
government of the federation to the Nigerian armed forces.

The General Officer Commending the Nigerian Army General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi accepted the offer and
made a broadcast thus;

The government of the federation of Nigeria having ceased to function, the Nigeria Armed Forces have
been invited to form an interim military government for the purpose of maintaining law and order, and
of maintaining essential services. This invitation has been accepted, and I General T. U, Aguiyi-Ironsi, the
General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, have been formally invested with authority as Head of
the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
He went ahead to announce the suspension of certain parts of the constitution. Thus, ushering the first
military rule in Nigeria and a cancer which almost destroyed the nation.

Lockham (1971) observes that almost all of the seven conspirators came from the same ethnic group,
Igbo. All of the seven majors except one (major Ademoyega a Yoruba) were Igbo; and nineteen of the
other twenty-three active participants were also of the same tribe. He asserts that no member of the
group was a Northerner, even though some Northerners, and solders from other tribes had taken part
under orders. To compound the problem, the pattern of killings appeared selective in tribal terms. Of
the four Regional Premiers, two were killed and two survived, the survivors were Igbo. The small group
of senior Northern officers was virtually wiped out, while almost all senior officers of Midwestern and
Eastern origin (more than two-third of who were Igbo) survived. Oyovbaire (1995) asserts that the coup
was a watershed in Nigeria's political history as it sowed the seed of feelings of disintegration.

Lockham (1978) believes; "the January coup left a legacy of shock and mistrust among the soldiers,
especially among Northerners." Williams (1980) sees the killing as undermining authority within the
army and the solidarity of the soldiers. While for Dudley (1975), the coup led to a split within the army,
between the men in the South and those in the North.

It was against the backdrop of this state of suspicion that anti-Igbo riots began in the North in May 1966.
Outside the execution of the coup, another issue that helped fuel Northern fear of Igbo domination was
the Unification Decree No. 34 of 1966, which abolished federalism in Nigeria and turned the country
into a unitary system. In fact, some scholars believe this decree was seen by the North as the last straw,
a proof of their marginalization and insecure position in the Nigeria of the future.

Oyovbaire (1995) recounts the belief by Northerners of specific plans of some kind of coup or master
plan aimed against them. This was speculated to take place (in different regions) at some specific date in
August 1966 and to be accompanied by the dismissal of prominent Northerners both in the army and in
civil life, and by the deportation of certain expatriates sympathetic to the North. This provoked personal
fears among Northerners for their own safety and led to a breakdown of trust between these two
groups.

THE JULY 1966 COUNTER-COUP

Perhaps, Ironsi's naivety in handling the coup fallout contributed most to his ouster and subsequent
death. Being a soldier that had little or no interest in politics, Ironsi could not understand the intricate
nature of Nigerian politics. He never wanted to rule and was never prepared for it. Providence foisted it
on him and he tried the much he could, believing he was pulling the nation from the edge where he met
it. It didn't occur to him that the fear of Igbo domination was quite palpable in the North and that he
needed to assuage it by all means and as fast as possible. Rather, he took steps that further worsened
the fear. His indecision on what to do with the coup plotters made the North believe that he may have
been part of it or at worst not really averse to it, after all he and his tribe the Igbos were the major
beneficiaries. As if that was not enough, he introduced the Unification Decree Number 34. That was the
last bus stop definetly the last straw.

As a result of their belief in such nefarious activity against them, the Northerners justified their own
clandestine preparations for the coup which took place on July 28 - 29 1966. Both in conception,
execution and effect, the July coup was sectional and was a counter-coup. This coup is usually referred
to as a counter coup because of the fact that it was carried out to reverse the January 15 coup. The coup
was purely sectional, it was a Northern coup executed by the Northerners, for Northern interests.

Lockham (1978) asserts that:

Cleavages in the military establishment came to parallel and reproduce cleavages in the civil society
because 'tribalism and regionalism' could be made the idiom of Organisational divisions.

He therefore believes that;

…the effect of the military is organisational weakness on political events outside it, was most noticeable
in the period between the July 1966 coup and the beginning of the civil war in 1967. The army was so
unreliable... in fact it was difficult to use it to bring to an end the cycle of civilian violence which built up
in the north in September - October 1966 (in which indeed individual soldiers actually participated).

The consequence was therefore that;

… the structural incoherence caused by cleavage in the army made it a most unreliable arbiter of
political conflict. Though it intervened in politics to put an end to tribal and regional disputes in the
name of national Unity it ended itself divided on those very issues it purported to resolve.

Indeed, it made conflict much more damaging by introducing the use of violence to resolve it. The first
major act of the new government was to reverse the Unification Decree and the country reverted to a
federal structure. According to General Gowon;

As a result of the recent events and the other previous ones, I have come to strongly believe that we
cannot continue in this wise, as the basis of confidence in our unitary system of government has been
unable to stand the test of time.

....Suffice it to say that putting all considerations to test-political, economic as well as social, the bases
for unity is not there or is so badly rocked not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we
should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting
away into utter destruction. With the general consensus of all military governors and other members of
the Supreme and Executive Councils a decree will soon be issued to lay a solid foundation for this
objective.
It was however unfortunate that the Governor of the Eastern region refused to accept the authority of
Gowon. Elaigwu (1979) comments that “if in January, Major Nzeogwu had control over only the North,
in July, the Northern soldiers failed to assert effective control over the Eastern Region.” The problem
arising from this situation led to a thirty-month civil war where over a million lives were lost.

THE THIRD MILITARY GOVERNMENT

On the 29th of July 1975 General Gowon who has been on the saddle for nine years was over thrown,
and the then Federal Commissioner for Communications, Brigadier (Later General) Murtala Mohammed
replaced him. This coup did not raise much dust for two main reasons. First, Murtala Mohammed, just
like Gowon was from the same region - the North, therefore the ethnicity factor was a non-issue.
Secondly, General Gowon had apparently overstayed his welcome. His government was not interested
in fighting corruption, instead the environment was made very conducive for the malaise to grow, and
he became insensitive to the yearnings of the people and was in fact more interested in prolonging his
stay in office than in solving the numerous problems confronting the country.

Indeed some of these problems were actually created by his government. Looking at the rate of
corruption in the Gowon administration, Awolowo (1981) said that;

Corruption had not only flourished, but also had almost become an accepted way of life in our society.
Indeed, our country reached a pass, in recent months, when the brazenly corrupt went scot-free and
were extolled for their virtue whilst those who attempted to expose them were ruthlessly suppressed
and punished.

Instead of planning to disengage the military from politics since the problems on the ground have clearly
overwhelmed them, Gowon was rather trying to prolong his regime. Consequently, he announced on
the 1st of October 1974, that the plan to hand over power to a democratically elected government in
1976 as contained in his nine-point programme has been postponed indefinitely. It was therefore clear
that Gowon has lost touch with reality and the yearnings of the people. His colleagues felt he had to go
and he was subsequently removed from office.

Perhaps, the problem with the military was that they have failed to appreciate their short-comings as an
institution as it regards to governance. They are not suited for governance, For as Awolowo (1981)
observed;

…in my view, the main task of the military regime is to perform a quick and successful surgical operation,
it would be too much of a risk for it to attempt to undertake the massive and never-ending task of
rebuilding or reconstructing our body-politic. It would be too much of a risk because the army would be
embarking on a venture for which it is not by tradition or training equipped, and which by its very
nature, is an ever-recurring phenomenon in any progressive state.
Mohammed in his maiden speech as Head of State declared that;

Fellow Nigerians events of the past few years have indicated that despite our great human and material
resources, the government has not been able to fulfill the legitimate expectations of the people. Nigeria
has been left to drift.

This situation if not arrested would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed. In the
endeavour to build a strong, united and virile nation, Nigerians have shed much blood: the thought of
further bloodshed, for whatever reasons, must, I am sure be revolting to our people. The Armed Forces,
having examined the situation came to the conclusion that certain changes were inevitable.... things got
to a stage where the head of the administration became virtually inaccessible even to official advisers,
and when advice was given, was often ignored.

...it was obvious that matters could not and should not be allowed to continue in this manner and in
order to give the nation a new lease of life and a sense of direction the following decisions were taken;

The removal of General Yakubu Gowon as the Head of the Federal Military Government and
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces....

Unfortunately Mohammed who started on a very promising note as a visionary leader was felled by the
assassin's bullets on the 13th of February 1976, in a coup attempt led by Col. Dimka. Since the attempt
failed though the Head of State lost his life, his deputy General Olusegun Obasanjo the Chief of Staff
Supreme Headquarters took over. In accepting his appointment, as Head of State, General Obasanjo
expressed his reluctance saying;

Fellow Citizens, we are once again passing through a critical period in the history of this country. For me
personally, this has been one of the saddest moments in my life.....

As you have heard in the statement by the Supreme Military Council, I have been called upon against my
personal wish and desire to serve as the new Head of State but I have accepted this honour in the
interest of the nation and in memory of the late Head of State. I know that he would have wished that
somebody should continue the task of nation building from where he left off. I have worked very closely
with him and have shared his beliefs and commitment to the Federal Military Governments policies and
actions. I believe and feel strongly committed to all we have been doing and I can pay no better tribute
than to continue in the spirit with which he led this country: that of complete dedication. All policies of
the federal military government continue as before and all ministries should continue their usual duties.
This tragic incident can only lead to greater dedication to the upliftment and progress of this nation.

In order to placate the Hausa - Fulani oligarchy and their members in the armed forces who were
growing restless, having assumed that the coup was directed against them, the new Head of State
decided to appoint another Hausa - officer as the second-in-command and who had to be promoted
over and above his peers and seniors. This incident vividly illustrated the fact that ethnic feelings
pervade the armed forces and that events are seen and analyzed largely from ethnic perspectives. The
structure of the military has no visible impact on the soldiers. Nigerian soldiers hardly see themselves as
comrades-in-arms but as hostile neighbours that have to be tolerated in the best of times and
eliminated in times of crises. This same disposition is carried over to governance (Oyadare 1998).

The Obasanjo government continued with the policies of Mohammed and handed over power to the
democratically, elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, marking the beginning of Nigeria's Second
Republic.

After a four year tenure that was characterised by massive looting of the treasury, indiscipline and
electoral fraud, the Shagari government was toppled on the 31st day of December 1983.

In justifying the reasons for the coup, the new Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari said that;

…the Nigerian people watched helplessly while over the succeeding four year period of the first term of
the defunct administration most of the governments of the federation failed to provide even the
minimum of good government.

Based on the above therefore;

…the Nigerian armed forces could not stand idly by while this country was drifting towards a dangerous
state of political and economic collapse through the continued ineptitude and insensitiveness of a
political leadership who are apparently unwilling to change.

Since things can't be allowed to continue this way he believed that; the military, "had a duty to
intervene to clean up the economic mess and set this country once again on the path of sanity".

The Buhari/Idiagbon regime knew the country was in a mess when they came, they therefore embarked
on many drastic measures to clean up the mess. Incidentally, most people felt they were high handed
and tyrannical. On August 27th 1985, there was a palace coup, in which Buhari and Idiagbon were
removed, while Buhari's Chief of Army Staff General Ibrahim Babangida took over as the country's first
military President. In rationalizing the coup, General Sani Abacha who incidentally announced the Buhari
coup in 1983 said that;

Events today indicated that most of the reasons which justified the military takeover of government
from civilians still persist. The initial objectives were betrayed while fundamental changes do not appear
on the horizon.

In the same vein Oyovbaire and Olagunju insist that;

By August 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida assumed leadership of the country, the nation had got
close to the verge and thither of collapse. The social foundations were evidently weak, enfeebled and
dithering; General morale was low and national leadership was less than credible.

The coup leader General Babangida himself justified his coup by lashing at the ousted Buhari
government. He said that;

The last twenty months have not witnessed any significant changes in the national economy. Contrary to
expectations, we have so far been subjected to a steady deterioration in the general standard of living;
and intolerable sufferings by the ordinary Nigerians have risen higher, scarcity of commodities has
increased, hospitals still remain mere consulting Clinics while educational institutions are on the brink of
decay. Unemployment has stretched to critical dimensions.

It was on this note that Babangida embarked on the act of “social and political engineering” on a scale
that has never been seen before but apparently with an insincerity of purpose.

The government equally survived some attempted coups. The first which was still at the planning stages
before it was uncovered was led by General Mamman Vatsa. The plotters were all executed despite
pleas from various world leaders and Nigerians.

The second coup which was actually carried out but failed to oust Babangida was the Gideon Orkar
coup. The abortive coup of April 22 1990 was a coup with a difference. We will allow the coup leader
Major Orkar to speak for himself;

We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well conceived, planned and executed
revolution of the marginalized and enslaved people of the middle belt and the south with a view to
freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonization by a clique of this
country. Our history is replete with numerous and uncountable instances of callous and insensitive
diminutive and oppressive intrigues by those who think it is their birthright to dominate till eternity the
political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the middle belt and the South.
They have almost succeeded in subjugating the middle belt by making them voiceless and are now
extending same to the South, It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and
marginalization is against the wish of God and therefore must be resisted with all vehemence (Orkah,
1990).

Orkah gave farther reasons while the change has become imperative thus;

Another major reason for the change is the need to stop intrigues, domination and the eternal
colonization of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few. This in our view has been responsible for
90 percent of our problems as Nigerians. This indeed has been the major clog in our wheel of progress.
This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and unrivaled fostering of mediocrity and absolute
distaste for accountability. All put together have been our undoing as a nation. This will ever remain our
fate if not checked immediately. It is strongly believed that without the intrigue perpetrated by this
clique and misrule, Nigerians will have mainly achieved developmental ratings comparable to those of
Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India and even Japan... Therefore, this cancerous dominance has as a factor
constituted a major and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian State.

The Orkar group therefore decided to excise the core Northern States from Nigeria, pending when a
delegation led by a new Sultan of Sokoto meets with the federal government to "vouch that the
feudalistic and aristocratic quest for domination and oppression will never be practiced in any part of
the Nigerian State". Indigenes of the excised states were also suspended from all public and private
offices in the Middle Belt and Southern States, while Southerners and Middle Belters living in the
affected states were advised to return home.

Needless to say that the coup speech brought utter confusion as discerning minds knew that it was a
recipe for disaster. However the coup was quashed almost immediately and the culprits were arrested,
tried and executed. It however showed that the Nigerian state was still fragile and that the process of
nation building had either not started or far from being completed. As expected of such grand deceit
which the Babangida government embarked upon, it ended in a fiasco with the annulment of the June
12, 1993 election. Babangida stepped aside and handed over power to an appointed interim National
Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan.

The Shonekan's government lasted for barely 83 days when it was sacked by Babangida's Chief of Army
Staff and the Secretary for Defence in the Interim Government, General Sani Abacha on November 17,
1993. Though the world was told that Shonekan resigned on his own accord, it was clear to everybody
that he was forced to resign.

Abacha took over the reins of government, and unleashed a regime of terror on Nigerians without any
clear signals of where the country was headed for. To make matters worse, he had no plans of leaving,
therefore everything he did was crafted towards making himself a life President. Surprisingly, the man
suddenly died on the 8th of June 1998 in mysterious circumstances, thereby bringing to an end his
inglorious and tension soaked regime. Before he died, he introduced yet another dimension to the coup
saga in Nigeria - the 'arrangee coup'. As a means of eliminating his real, perceived or imaginary enemies;
the government 'uncovers' a coup attempt, arrests those it wants to punish for whatever reasons, then
force people to implicate them: a military tribunal is then set up to try them and mete out punishments
to the 'convicts'. Though nobody was executed in Abacha's 'arrangee' coups but it was apparent that it
did achieve result for the head of the junta. It was through this method that critics and opponents of the
government were sent to jail where they will no longer pose any problem for the government. The fear
of being arranged in one of such phoney coups became the beginning of wisdom for most critics of the
government. They therefore either had to compromise, shut up or go into exile. Whichever of these
options they choose, the government was better for it, since they will no longer pose any real problem
for Abacha and his self-succession bid. It was in one of such 'coups' that indicted a former Head of State,
General, Olusegun Obasanjo and his erstwhile deputy, General Shehu Yar'Adua and many others. They
were tried, convicted and sent to jail.

As if that wasn't enough, late in 1997, the Government equally uncovered another coup attempt, this
time, headed by Abacha's deputy General Oladipo Diya. They were tried and convicted. Many of them
including Diya bagged death sentences. Fortunately before Abacha could confirm their death sentences,
he suddenly died. Later events proved that the coups were actually initiated by Abacha cronies to rope
in those they perceived would be obstacles to the man's self succession bid.

General Abubakar who succeeded Abacha brought a bit of sanity to military transitions and handed over
successfully to a democratically elected government on the 29th of May 1999 less than one year in the
saddle as Head of State. This brought to an end almost fifteen years of military rule characterized by
brigandage, recklessness, mismanagement, intrigues, extra-judicial murders, suffering and pestilence,
human right abuses, wanton corruption and looting among other vices.

THE MILITARY AND NIGERIA'S FEDERALISM

Perhaps, it will be in order to take a brief look at the military and Nigerian Federalism since they have
really dominated power in the country and have consequently affected her Federal system.

From independence in 1960 it was apparent that the inherited structure was quite defective as it
allowed the centrifugal forces of ethnic and regional irredentism to over whelm the pull of Nigerian
nationalism. This situation was aptly captured by General Yakubu Gowon when he said in a broadcast to
the nation on 26th May 1968 that;

Our constitution was a glaring contradiction of the fundamental principles of Federalism. The most
important principle to ensure the success of Federation is that not a single State or region should be so
large and powerful as to be in a position to dominate the rest or hold them to ransom. Under the old
Nigerian constitution the regions were so large and powerful as to consider themselves self sufficient
and almost entirely independent.

As at the time of military intervention in 1966 the country had four regions (with the creation of the
Midwest in 1964). The percentage distribution of the country's population was 53%, 23%, 20%, 3% and
1% for the North, East, West, Midwest and Lagos respectively. It was apparent that with the North
having more than half of the country's population, it was in a position to hold the entire country to
ransom. It was therefore partly to correct this imbalance and to also destabilize the Biafran
intransigence that Gowon in 1967 divided the country into twelve states. The exercise significantly
altered the structure of Nigerian Federalism since no one state was strong enough to hold the country
to ransom any more. This therefore is in line with the postulations of John Stuart Mill (1946) that;
There should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest to be capable of vying in
strength with many of them combined. If there be any such one, and only one, it will insist on being the
master of their joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree, and
whenever they differ, everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy, between the rivals.

Further state creations in 1987, 1991 and 1996 had further weakened the states vis-a-vis the centre to
the extent that the states are now seen in some quarters as glorified local governments.

As at the time of the first military coup of 1966, it was quite clear that the inherited political structure
was really defective due mainly to the fact that the regions were so strong that according to Elaigwu
(1979) "the regional tail was wagging the federal dog". The first military leader, Ironsi responded to this
imbalance with Decree NO. 34 of 1966 which abolished federalism in Nigeria and in it's place introduced
a unitary system. According to the government the Decree was;

Intended to remove the last vestige of intense regionalism of the recent past, and to produce that
cohesion in the government structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount
objective of the National Military Government- national unity.

The unification Decree was roundly rejected in the North as it was viewed as an attempt by the South to
dominate the country. It must however be pointed out that, outside the unification of the civil services,
the decree did not really alter the structure of the country. According to Oyovbaire (1995) the decree
was more of paper unification, more an illusion of uniformity than anything else as the so-called group
of provinces still retained their political and administrative organizations, including separate treasuries.

It was in this state of suspicion that northern military officers staged a coup on 29 July 1966. Ironsi lost
his life in the coup and Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon became the new Head of State. The government through
Decree Number 59 of 1966 revoked the unification Decree Number 34 and re-established the Nigerian
federation. Unfortunately, the military Governor of the Eastern Region Lt. Col Ojukwu refused to accept
the authority of Yakubu Gowon as the Head of State. This led to a political crisis which the Ghanaian
Government tried to settle by inviting the two leaders to Aburi in Ghana.

Incidentally the Aburi Accord which would have made the country more of a confederal state was not
implemented because the two sides interpreted it differently. While Gowon saw it as attempt to return
to the constitutional position before January 17 1966 when the first military Government took off,
Ojukwu saw it as extreme decentralization which would have made the Eastern Region and indeed other
regions have full control of their affairs.
Following the differences in interpretation of the Aburi agreement, Gowon began to implement the
Agreement based on his interpretation. This was contained in the Constitution (Suspension and
Modification) Decree Number 8 of 1967. This Decree almost completely decentralized the Nigerian
political system. The Decree, which was rejected by the Eastern Region, would have left Nigeria "only
with that minimum constitutional cement at the centre which would distinguish a federation from a
mere association of independent States” (West Africa, 1967).

The Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col Ojukwu rejected Decree Number 8 and began systematically
to implement his own interpretation of the agreement. It was now very clear that the nation was
headed for trouble. On the 26 May 1967 the Eastern Region Government announced that it had been
given a mandate by Chiefs, Elders and Representatives to declare at the earliest practicable date Eastern
Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic Biafra (Kirk-
Greene, 1971). The federal government reacted to this announcement the next day, 27 May 1967 with
two Decrees. The first was (the Constitution Repeal and Restoration) Decree Number 13 of 1967. The
second was the State (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree Number 14 of 1967. Gowon
reviewed the federal governments failed attempts at a peaceful reconciliation with the Eastern Region.
He consequently declared that;

My duty is clear-faced with this final choice between action to save Nigeria and acquiescence in session
and disintegration. I am therefore proclaiming a state of emergency throughout Nigeria with immediate
effect. I have assumed full powers (Cited in Struggle for One Nigeria 1967 p. 43).

Decree Number 14 of 1967 which created twelve states out of the former four regions was meant "to
correct the imbalance in administrative structure of the country and to minimize future political friction
and ensure a stable federation". Unfortunately, this exercise did not deter the Eastern Region from
declaring its secession from the Federal Republic under the name of Biafra. The attempt to stop the
secession of Biafra, resulted in a 30 months civil war was which formally ended in January 1970.

The third military government under the leadership of General Murtala Mohammed further altered the
structure of Nigerian federalism by increasing the number of states from 12 to 19 in 1976. This action
had no doubt made the centre to emerge stronger than within the twelve state structure (Elaigwu,
1979). Another important act of that government that had an impact on the country's federalism was a
drastic reform of the local government system nationwide. The reform was meant to 'stabilize and
rationalize government at the grassroots level, standardize the functions and financial resources of local
government and harness local resources for rapid development". The local governments were
transformed into effective third-tier of government.

According to Oyovbaire (1985), the reform provided additional flair to the constitutional context of
federalism under military rule. He also argued that military rule bequeathed to the society and polity a
federation of nineteen states structurally weakened in terms of individual size, and the assertion of
political impact or threat; a reformed local government system with political and developmental
orientations not limited to their immediate localities but made to focus upon the national society - it
brought the federal centre to the localities. Military rule also constitutionally appropriated to the federal
centre a large measure of responsibilities previously local in nature and therefore left in the hands of
states - education, transport and communication, agriculture and rural development. With increased
revenue from oil, the federal government became financially stronger while the states revenue declined
because of the reforms of the taxation system and sales of primary products for exports coupled with
their dwindling revenue base due mainly to the creation of more states from the existing ones. The
major effect of this was that the state government became increasingly dependent on the federal
government for their statutory and non-statutory grants.

As a prelude to handover of power to civilians in 1979, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime appointed a

committee to draft a constitution for the second republic, Incidentally, the regime did not give the
committee the mandate to discuss whether federalism was the best form of government for Nigeria
probably because it felt that was non-negotiable. In inaugurating the committee, Murtala Mohammed
said in his speech that;

We are committed to a federal system of government; and a free democratic and lawful system of
government which guarantees fundamental human rights.

At the end of it's work, the committee produced a constitution that was highly integrative in nature.
Instead of separate constitutions for the different states as was the case in the first republic, the
committee produced the same constitution for the nineteen states. In defence of the committee, Chief
Richard Akinjide who later emerged as the Attorney General of the federation In the second republic
said that the CDC produced;

A single document to run 20 governments both the Federal Government and the 19 state Governments'
because the past arrangement of separate Constitutions for the centre and for each of the regions was
divisive, but now if you want to know about the constitution of this country you have got to read the
whole document and be a Nigerian.

MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT

Military disengagement according to Dudley (1982) is the transitional arrangement for the transfer of
power to a properly constituted authority; it can be seen simply as 'return to civil rule'. The logic of
military disengagement is based on the fact that no matter how long the military may have been in
power in any country, it is still clear to everybody that it is an aberration. They are not suited for political
leadership both by their training and orientation. This is why military rule is never acceptable no matter
how well they try in government. For most people therefore military rule symbolizes the failure of the
State.

Ake (1996) avers that:

The ascendency of the military is one of the great tragedies of Africa, for the military is nothing other
than a highly specialized apparatus of violence whose salience begins when sociability has become
impossible and when civilized values no longer apply, when we must take to the killing fields. That is
why military rule is inherently and inevitably de-civilizing.

Going further he stated that;

It is difficult to think of anything that the military can do fully to promote democracy or development
except to disengage from politics. Perhaps the time has come for Africa to consider abolishing the
military altogether in favor of an enhanced police force and civil defense - an arrangement which is
cheaper, more democratic and inimical to coups. In the absence of a credible external threat our military
is redundant and very expensively so; against a credible threat, it is useless and expensively so. The
military in Africa is essentially a tool of internal repression. But it misrepresents itself and intervenes
disastrously in the polity and economy in a futile attempt to conceal it *s onerous dysfunctionality.

It will be in order to state that the military do not embark on transition to civil rule just because of the
realization that they are ill- suited for political power. Rather, it has always been a response to the
collective action of the people against military rule, epitomized by the struggle for democracy. Nnoli
(1994) writes that by early 1970s visually all the independent regimes in sub-Saharan Africa were either
military or one-party states.

They were intolerant of opposition, disrespectful of fundamental freedoms and therefore, took
repressive political actions. The discontent of the people arising from the deterioration of their already
intolerable socio-economic condition was held down with an iron hand by these regimes. The result was
a crisis of democracy. The people were hemmed in and immobilized. Communities were pitted against
each other in a vicious attempt at divide and rule. Political repression was sustained by force and
political manipulations. Having abandoned the search for legitimacy these regimes relied essentially on
the army and police as the pillars of their rule. Thus beginning from 1989, Democratization pressures
erupted into various forms of mass protests.

In response to this democratization pressures most military regimes in Africa, unwillingly organized
transition programmes resulting in what Nnoli (1994) refers to the 'Democratic explosion'. Bennet has
categorized military transition or disengagement into five patterns.

First is the personality transformation. This is the type where a military head of State transforms into a
civilian and continues in power. Africa is replete with examples of such transformations. Togo, Burkma-
Faso, Ghana etc this was what Abacha tried to do before he was stopped by providence. The most
recent case is that of Guei of Cote D'ivore who transformed and contested elections but lost and made
attempts to manipulate the results before he was sacked by the people.
Second, is the orderly transition without legitimizing elections? This normally happens when the military
that is leaving power decides to hand over power to those who were excluded from power in the
previous civilian government. The military government may therefore seem to have intervened basically
to help the opposition into power. The case of the exclusion of members of Nkrumah's CPP in Ghana by
the National Liberation Council (NLC) and favouring the Kofo Busia led Progress Party (PP) is a good
example.

The third pattern is scheduled disengagement with legitimizing elections after short military rule. One
can see the case of Dahomey where Col. Soglo intervened late in 1963 and returned power to civilians
after general elections in January 1964. Though he intervened again in 1965 and was overthrown in
1967 by a group of young officers who decided not to exceed six months in office before handing over to
civilians. Abudulsalami Abubakar's regime in Nigeria falls under this category.

The fourth type is scheduled disengagement with legitimizing elections after long period of military rule.
Nigeria is a classic case of this type from 1966-79 and from 1983-1999.

The fifth and final type according to Benneth is disorderly transition when a military regime is forced
either by internal pressures from the military or from the people to abandon governance. In 1964 the
military regime of General Ibrahim Abbou was forced to leave power by the combined onslaught of
street demonstrators backed by junior military officers. The Babangida handover of 1993 can be placed
under this category. This is because, he was forced to 'step-aside' without organising elections after he
annulled the June 12 elections.

Okoye (1991) has pointed out two theses that explain military disengagement from politics. They are the
mission-fulfilled Thesis and the Death-Threat Thesis.

MISSION-FULFILLED THESIS

Every military regime should have a mission. This mission is usually announced as part of the post-coup
justification. It is then expected that when a government that accepts that it's role is not to rule but to
protect the nation from external aggression, fulfils the mission for which it intervened, that it will hand
over to civilians who are qualified to rule. The remark by Awolowo that;

In my view the main task of the military regime is to perform a quick and successful surgical operation. It
would be too much of a risk to attempt to undertake the massive and never-ending task of rebuilding or
reconstructing our body-politic. It would be too much of a risk because the army would then be
embarking on a venture for which it is not by tradition and training equipped, and which by its very
nature is an ever-reoccurring phenomenon in any healthy progressive state
The mission-fulfilled thesis is geared towards limiting the military to short and realizable goals so that
whenever the goals are fulfilled the military will disengage from politics.

It seems that the problem the military has, is that whenever it intervenes it sets for itself very difficult
and often unrealizable goals, which makes it to stay in power longer than necessary, all in the guise of
trying to fulfill it's set mission. In Nigeria, the only governments that approximates to the mission
fulfilled thesis are the Murtala/Obasanjo regime, that set a goal for itself and handed over power even
though the goal was not fully realized and the Abubakar regime that set the goal of democratization for
itself.

Ordinarily the non-fulfillment of the goal is an enough reason for the government to extend its stay like
most other regimes in Africa and the Third World. Abudulsalami Abubakar's regime did not set nebulous
goals for itself, but was much concerned about organizing a transition programme. Immediately it
succeeded in that regard it handed over, despite the numerous problems plaguing the nation. Perhaps
the regime realized that the military like Awolowo said is not better suited either by tradition or training
to embark on the onerous task of nation-building. Moreover since the task is an unending one, it follows
that any military government that embarks on it and wants to finish it will remain in power for ever.

THE DEATH-THREAT THESIS

The, major plank of this thesis is that a military regime disengages from politics because of the threat of
a coup d'etat which may lead to the loss of lives of those in power. This thesis is premised on the wide-
held belief that under a military regime, every day is a potential coup day. According to Babangida the
former military dictator, he always believed that a coup could happen any day. According to him "I
expected a coup any day. From day one, I was there, I knew somehow, someday there could be a coup.
Because we took it by force, somebody is going to try to take it by force". Therefore living under the
shadow of a coup can pose enough discomfort for those in power to want to handover to an elected
regime. Coups beget coups, therefore those in power may out of fear of future coups hurriedly hand-
over and at least escape with their lives and probably their loot. It is not possible though to point at a
military regime that will accept that it handed over because of the fear of coups or death because that
will be an admittance of cowardice which is purely un-military.

However the fact that those in the military are quite aware that every military government is prone to
coups is enough to reduce the incidence of life Presidents, for as Jemibewon (1978) argues;

To make permanent a system of military rule in any form is to prepare the ground for a continuing cycle
of periodic chaos and bloodshed. It cannot be otherwise since there is no recognizable mode or laid-
down principle for changing government in a military setting. A constant resort to the barrel of the gun
as the deciding factor is an invitation to instability and cataclysm.

MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IN NIGERIA

The second military government in Nigeria which was the Yakubu Gowon regime was the first military
government to announce a programme of transition to civil rule. The programme termed the Nine-point
programme was supposed to terminate in 1976 with the installation of an elected civilian government.

THE NINE POINT PROGRAMME

i. The reorganization of the Armed Forces;

ii. The implementation of the National Development plan and the repair of the damage of the war;

iii. The eradication of corruption in our national life;

iv. The settlement of the question of the creation of more States;

v. The preparation and adoption of a new constitution;

vi. The introduction of a new revenue allocation formula;

vii. Conducting a national population census;

viii. The organization of genuinely national political parties.

ix. The organization of elections and installation of popularly elected governments in the states and
in the centre;

Though the nine-point programme was articulated by the Gowon administration it could not actually
carry it out properly. The national census it carried out was marred with regularities and the results
were trailed by protests. It could not fight corruption because most of the top members of the regime
were terribly corrupt. As the government realized that it could not accomplish the programmes it set for
itself before the 1976 terminal date, General Gowon announced on 1st Oct. 1974 that the 1976 date
was no longer tenable.

This announcement infuriated a lot of people who were happily looking forward to the end of the inept
and corrupt regime. The masses heaved a sigh of relief when on the 29th of July 1975 the regime was
sacked in a coup d'etat. The new regime thereafter introduced its own transition programme.

MURTALA/OBASANJO TRANSITION PROGRAMME

On the 1st of October 1975, Murtala Mohammed announced a five stage programme for handover of
power to an elected president on October 1, 1979. Three days after, on 4th October the government
inaugurated a 50-man constitution drafting committee with Chief F.R.A. Williams as the chairman. The
commission submitted its report in less than one year, on the 14th of September 1976 to General
Olusegun Obasanjo who replaced the assassinated Head of State, Murtala Mohammed.
On the 15th of November 1976 the Head of State established the Federal Electoral Commission
(FEDECO) with Mr. Michael Ani as Chairman. The commission was charged with the responsibility of
organizing elections both for the state and federal elective positions.

The Constituent Assembly with Justice Udo Udoma as Chairman was inaugurated on September 11
1977. It was charged with the responsibility of examining the Draft Constitution. It presented the
constitution to the Head of State on 29th August 1978. The constitution was ratified by the Supreme
Military Council. The Assembly was dissolved on 20th September 1978 while the Head of State, General
Obasanjo signed and enacted the constitution into law through Decree NO. 25 on 21st September 1978,
while also lifting the ban on party politics.

Almost immediately, political activities took off in full swing. 17 parties were able to beat the FEDECO
deadline for submission of applications. At the end of it's screening exercise, the electoral body
approved five parties namely - the National party of Nigeria (N.P.N.), The Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.),
The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) and the Peoples Redemption
Party (PRP). These five parties contested the elections. The elections which were held on a weekly basis,
were held in this order-Senatorial Elections - July 7 1979, House of Representatives - July 14 1979, House
of Assembly-July 211979, Gubernatorial - July 28 1979, Presidential Elections (two weeks interval)
August 11, 1979.

At the end of the presidential elections Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NPN) was announced winner having in the
opinion of FEDECO satisfied the provisions of section 34A subsection (1) (c) (1) of the Electoral Decree
NO. 73 of 1977. The results were however contested by Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the UPN based on
the interpretation of 2/3 of nineteen states. At the end Shagari was sworn in as the first Executive
President of Nigeria, thus bringing to an end thirteen years of military rule marked by three regimes,
four Heads of State, a thirty months civil war, an oil boom and the assassination of two Heads of States.
It was indeed the end of a very long tortuous journey.

THE BABANGIDA TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The Babangida programme still remains the longest, most elaborate, most deceitful and most expensive
transition in the country's chequered history. Some critics maintain that it is longest and most expensive
transition in the whole world. Well, in the absence of a global data on transitions we cannot
substantiate this allegation.

The programme which kicked-off in 1986 was billed to terminate in 1990 but was later shifted to 1992
and subsequently to 1993. Let us now take a look at the transition time table as it was published by the
government, and cited in Okoye (1991).
3RD Quarter-1987;

Establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilization;

Establishment of a National Electoral Commission;

Establishment of a Constitution Drafting Committee.

4TH Quarter -1987:

Elections into the local governments on non-party basis.

1ST Quarter- 1988:

Establishment of National Population Commission; Establishment of Code of Conduct Tribunal;

Establishment of Constituent Assembly; Inauguration of National Revenue Mobilization Commission

2ND Quarter -1988

Termination of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

3RD Quarter- 1 988;

Consolidation of gains of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

lST Quarter-1989:

Promulgation of a new Constitution/Release of New Fiscal arrangements.

2ND Quarter-1989:

Lift of ban on party politics.

3RD Quarter-1989:

Announcement of two recognized registered political partie

4TH Quarter-1989:
Registration of two political parties and the release of their constitutions and manifestoes

1ST Quarter- 1990:

(a) Printing and distribution of parties' Constitutions and Manifestoes; Readiness of party offices -
national, states, local governments and wards.

(b) Translation and printing of constitutions and manifestoes into major languages by the state
governments.

(c) Appointment of administrative staff for - Federal, States, Local Governments and Wards.

(d) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions.

(e) Training of federal and states Administrative Secretaries.

(f) Training of Administrative Secretaries at local Government level.

(g) Training of registration officers at ward level.

(h) Provision of stationery (registers, forms, membership cards).

(I) Registration of party members begins.

(J) Public enlightenment on manifestos and constitutions continues.

2ND Quarter 1990

(a) Registration of party members continues.

(b) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions continues.

(c) Registration of party members ends.

(d) Public enlightenment on manifestoes and constitutions to continue.

(e) Party congress/convention at (a) ward level, (b) local government level.

3RD Quarter-1990;

(a) Party congress/convention at (a) state level, (b) national level.

(b) Workshop for newly elected party executives to be organized by the Centre for Democratic
Studies.

(c) Handing over of party offices to party officials.

(d) Submission of final draft of party manifestoes and constitutions to the Armed Forces Ruling
Council by the political parties.

(e) Armed Forces Ruling Councils' final approval of party manifestoes and constitutions.

(f) Preparation of Local Government elections.

(g) Electioneering campaigns.

4TH Quarter-1990

Electioneering campaigns continue, Local Government elections.

1ST Quarter-1991

Inauguration of Local Government Councils, Nation-wide census.

2ND Quarter-1991 Census.

3RD Quarter-1991

State executives and legislative elections. Inauguration of State Chief Executives and State Legislative
Houses.

1ST and 2ND Quarters - 1992

Elections into Federal Legislatures and convening of National Assembly.

3RD and 4TH Quarters 1992

Swearing -in- of New President and the final disengagement by the Armed Forces.

Since the government was interested in enthroning a new social order, it felt the best way to achieve
this was by excluding all those who have held high political offices in the past. The new order was thus
meant for 'new breeds'. The government through the "Participation in politics and Elections
(prohibition) Decree No 25 of 1987 banned four categories of people from taking part in the elections.
They were as follows:

CATEGORY ONE;
(a) All those politicians who held political offices from 1st October, 1960 to 15th January, 1966 and
from 1st October, 1979 to 31 st December, 1983 and who were subsequently indicted and found guilty
of offences or misdeeds by any Tribunal, Assets' Special Investigation Panel, Judicial Commission or
Administrative Enquiry;

(b) All persons who served as Secretaries to Federal and State Governments, Permanent
Secretaries, Judges, Chairmen and members of Federal and State Boards of Statutory Corporations and
State-owned Companies or on the Governing Boards of Educational institutions as well as all other
public officers who had been found guilty of misdeeds by any Panel, Tribunal, Judicial Commission or
Administrative Enquiry between 1st October, 1960 to the end of the transitional period;

(c) All Military and police personnel who held offices during the period 15th January, 1966 to the
end of the transitional period and who were removed from office or dismissed from service, or who
were or are hereafter found guilty of corruption or other misdeeds or indicted by various Courts Martial,
Tribunals, Assets Investigation Panels and Administrative and Judicial Inquiries at both Federal and State
levels;

(d) All those persons who may not have held any public office but who have been indicted by
various Panels, Tribunals and Commissions of Enquiry for corrupting public office holders; and

(e) All persons in both the public and private sectors who have been or will be dismissed from office
or any employment during the period 1st October. 19601to the end of the transitional period.

(F) All legislators or persons including those elected into Senate, House of Representatives, House
of Assembly of Regions or States from January 1960 to the end of transition period who either
collectively or individually have been liable or indicted and found guilty of acts of unjust enrichment,
corruption, fraud, embezzlement of public funds, election malpractice's or contributed in one way or the
other to the economic adversity of the nation or such persons who exercised corruptive influence on
public office holders.

CATEGORY TWO:

This category includes people disqualified from vying for any elective office or holding any political party
office mainly because of the positions they had occupied in government. They may not have been found
guilty of any offence or misdeeds. The Federal Military Government considers their disqualification a
means of facilitating the emergence of a new political leadership. Those affected were the holders of the
following offices during the periods 1st October, 1960 to 15th January 1966, and 1st October, 1979 to
30th September, 1983. They include;

(a) President;

(B) Prime Minister;

(c) Vice-President;

(d) Regional Premier;

(e) State Governor;

(f) State Administrator;

(g) Deputy State Governor;

(h) Minister, Presidential Adviser/Assistant;

(i) Commissioner;

(j) Parliamentary Secretary;

(k) Presidential Liaison Officer;

(1) National Assembly Liaison Officer;

(m) President of the Senate;

(n) Deputy President of the Senate;

(o) Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(p) Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives

(q) Speaker of the Regional/House Assembly;

(r) Chairmen of Committees or Selected Committees of the Senate, House of Representatives and
Regional and State Houses of Assembly;

(s) Members of the National Executive Committees of all political Parties, and

(t) Members of Regional Working Party/Committees or State Executive Committees of all Political
Parties.

CATEGORY THREE;

Those included in this category are military and police personnel who held or are currently holding the
under-listed public offices from 15th January 1966 to the end of the transition period,

(a) President/Head of State;

(b) Chief of Staff (Supreme headquarters);

(c) Chief of General Staff;

(d) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(e) Chief of Staff (Army Headquarters);

(f) Head of Navy;

g) Head of the Air Force;

(h) Chief of Air Staff;

(i) Inspector-General of Police;

(j) Military Governors/Administrators; and

(k) Members of the Supreme Military Council and the Armed Forces Ruling Council between 31st
December, 1983 and end of the transitional period.

Category Four;

Those included in this category are the chairmen and members of the following Federal Government
Agencies:

(a) the National Electoral Commission;

(b) the National Population Commission;

(c) the Directorate for Social Mobilization;

(d) the Code of Conduct Bureau;

(e) the National Revenue Mobilization Commission; and

(f) the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure.

The Federal Government lifted the ban on party politics on the 3rd of May 1989, thereby allowing
people to form political associations that will apply to NEC for registration. Since the government had
already decided on a two party structure for the country, politicians were aware that scaling the curdle
will be such an onerous task but they still decided to try. To determine the two parties, NEC imposed
very expensive and almost impossible conditions. The parties were expected to establish well equipped
offices with at least three paid staff in all the 435 local government areas in the country then. They were
to supply 25 membership lists of their parties, comprising the names, photographs and personal details
of at least 200 members from each local government in the country (totally at least 87,000 individual
membership files per party) to NEC with a registration fee of N50,000. All these must be done within 3
months.

At the expiration of the deadline, 13 political groups were able to summit their applications. In the
broadcast to the nation on the 6th of October 1989, Babangida said that all the parties had

failed to comply with key conditions in the guidelines such as documentation on members, declaration
of assets and liabilities of individual members of the national executive committees. Most of them
(Parties) had operated underground prior to the lifting of the ban on politics on 3rd of May 1989 ... and
had roots in the party politics of the first and second republics. There were very strong indications of
wealthy individuals in the executive committees of the associations that confirm fears that they were
being hijacked by money bags.
Consequently all the 13 associations were denied registration, instead the military decided to form two
parties - the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). One, leaning
a little to the right and the other a little to the left. According to the government, “All members will now
be equal founders of either parties and that no one except government, which is neutral, sponsors the
two parties." Many discerning Nigerian's saw through the farce and raised their voices against this abuse
of the philosophy of political parties.

Anthony Enahoro, the tireless social fighter said;

My judgment of the two bodies is that they are military government parastatals being paraded as
political parties for the benefit of the outside world.

To General Obasanio;

Those who call the two government created parties, parastatals are even being generous. Parastatals at
least have effective and accountable chief executives, who can enforce order and discipline. The same
cannot be said of the government created parties. And yet they are the vehicle through which it is
hoped that a stable democracy will be nurtured.

Prof. Clande Ake (1986) in his assessment of the military transition programme asserted that;

It cultivated a politics dissociated from issues, ideology and social forces. It created political parties
abstracted from social realities, parties belonging to everyone in general and to no one in particular and
thus constituted as an anarchy of ambitions... After many years of discrediting politics, aggressing and
humiliating politicians, virtually everyone is discouraged from politics except those who have a
neuropatic attachment to power or no other means of livelihood or self-esteem.

Despite all these criticisms Babangida and his cohorts were still bent on their political journey.

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced on September 21 1990 that the open ballot system
will be used for the local government elections scheduled for December 8, 1990. The elections were
held as scheduled, while due to the creation of additional 136 new local government councils in
September 1991 another local government elections were held on November 23, 1991.

Gubernatorial elections were equally held nationwide on December 14, 1991 and the elected Governors
were sworn in, in January 1992. The National Assembly elections were held on 14th July 1992. What
remained was the presidential election. NEC divided the country into six zones for staggered presidential
primaries using the option A4 method, which entailed organizing the primaries through a series of
elections from the ward, local government, and states to the national levels. The primaries took place
between August and September 1992 and as expected were characterised by massive rigging. The
President in reaction to the irregularities cancelled the primaries and banned the 23 aspirants who took
part in the primaries from taking part in the transition programme. He equally dissolved the executive
committees of the two parties and appointed caretaker committees. The hand over date was also
extended to August 27 1993, and new primaries were to be organized.

In the new primaries, Babangida's close personal friends, M.K.O. Abiola (SDP) and Bashir Tofa (NRC)
emerged. The presidential elections were finally held on June 12 after some clandestine attempts by
groups like the ABN to stop it. Unfortunately, the election which was adjudged the freest and most
peaceful election in Nigeria's history was annulled by Babangida on the 23rd of June 1993 for sundry
reasons ranging from "Judicial anarchy" to security reports about the candidates. The transition failed.
Babangida installed an interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan and left Aso Rock on the 26th of
August 1993 like a defeated General. He had thus ripped the fruits of eight years of deceit and a dubious
transition to nowhere, leaving the flanks open for Abacha to take over and unleash a reign of terror on
Nigerians.

Perhaps, S.E. Finer had prophesied about Babangida and his transition when he wrote in his popular
book "The Man on Horseback in 1962 that;

Those armed forces that have tried to disengage from politics have had to hasten back as soon as their
quondam political enemies came within sight of regaining power, while those that have elected to
remain and rule have been ejected only by popular revolt, or by further military revolts of their own
malcontents. In most cases the military that have intervened in politics are in a dilemma: whether their
rule be indirect or whether it be direct, they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize
it. They can neither stay nor go.

THE ABACHA TRANSITION

When General Abacha became the country's Head of State on Nov. 17, 1993, following the 'resignation'
of Chief Ernest Shonekan, he was seen as somebody that would resolve the June 12 debacle that was
tearing the nation apart. He promised that his stay in office will be brief. However, as events showed his
own interpretation of brief differed from that of most people.

As a way of moving the 'Country forward' he convened a constitutional conference in 1994 and said his
tenure will be determined by it. The conference was manipulated to recant its decision that the regime
should leave in 1996. Instead it now left the decision to Abacha. He later drew up a transition that would
terminate in 1998 with the election of the President. Having dismantled all democratic structures he
met on the ground, he vowed to build a lasting democracy.

As expected he constituted the electoral commission and gave it the duty of registering political parties,
since the Babangida parties have been banned. The electoral body, NECON registered five political
parties namely; the United Nigeria Congress party (UNCP), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the
Congress for National Consensus (CNC), the Grassroot Democratic Movement (GDM) and the National
Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN).

It did not take long before it became clear that the governments transition was simply a ruse. It was
geared towards producing Abacha as a civilian president. Many government sponsored groups like
Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) suddenly appeared, all begging Abacha to continue in power.
The government media outfits turned full swing into agents of the self-succession bid.

Meanwhile the government bared it's fangs on both real and imaginary enemies of the self succession
plot. Phoney coups were invented; assassinations, judicial murders, bomb blasts, wanton arrests and
detentions became the order of the day.

Elections into the local governments, state and federal legislatures were held and manipulated to the
benefit of Abacha supporters. It was a selection exercise. Curiously why all these were going on, the
taciturn Kano-born General, said nothing about his ambition to transform into a civilian president. The
country got to the height of absurdity when all the parties individually chose Abacha as their flag bearer,
Nigeria has indeed become a Banana Republic.It was at the height of the deification of Abacha that the
man suddenly died and the madness ended.

Interestingly none of those who threatened to commit suicide, if by October 1, 1998 Abacha did not
continue as the country's president, did carry out their threat. All who claimed, that without Abacha the
country would grind to a halt or go up in flames recanted and joined the Abubukar transition. The
sycophancy of the Abacha era remain unparalleled in the country's history, while the looting and
repression of the regime will be a constant reminder to Nigerians that military rule is never a substitute
for a civilian government no matter how bad that civilian government is.

As expected in the Abacha years, the country retrogressed on all developmental indices.This is simply
because there cannot be development without peace. According to Ake (1996);

A society of beggars, parasites and bandits cannot develop, it cannot know peace or stability, and it
cannot be democratic. It can only gravitate endlessly, as we are doing, in material poverty and moral
regression.

It is not in doubt that the Abacha years were indeed years of both material poverty and moral
regression. It was indeed as the Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka described it as the years eaten by the
locusts. The years of waste.

ABUBAKAR'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The sudden death of Abacha on June 8, 1998 expectedly meant the sudden death of his transition
programme as his successor General Abudusalami Abubakar decided to start all over again, but this
time, with a firm promise that he will not manipulate the programme.

He set up an electoral commission, vowing that the body will be independent of the government, a
veiled reference to Abacha's NEC that was manipulated from Aso Rock. The Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) under Justice Ephraim Akpata registered three parties; the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Action for Democracy (AD).

Right from the first elections conducted by the body in late 1988, the PDP started showing its strength
and spread. This may be because of its origin from the G34, a group that challenged Abacha when it was
very suicidal to do so and the party's national appeal.

Meanwhile, a group of Generals, under the leadership of General Babangida decided to persuade,
General Obasanjo, who has been realized from prison following his role in the 1995 alleged coup to
contest, as they felt it was time for power shift. Incidentally having accepted the need for a power shift
to the South, the northern oligarchy felt there was need to find a Southerner that would be amenable to
their manipulation. Obasanjo's credentials stood him in good stead and he was persuaded against his
wish to contest the elections of the platform of the PDP, which he did and won. On the 29th of May
1999, Abubakar became the toast of the world as he graciously handed over the reins of government to
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the elected president of Nigeria thus bringing to an end over 15 years of
military rule.

General Abubakar, has thus achieved in less than nine months what Babangida could not achieve in 8
years and Abacha in 5 years. The lesson from the transition is that, a transition to civilian rule can be
achieved in a very short time only if the handlers have sincerity of purpose.

Finally the military should not delude themselves with the belief that they can bring about democracy
because it is not possible. Since one cannot give what he doesn't have, what the military can do is to
bring about civil rule while the transition to democracy continues. Commenting on why it has been not
possible for the military to engender true democracy in Nigeria, Prof. Claude Ake said that;

Military rule is not so much the aberration we so often call it, as a negation of what is uniquely human in
the way we relate. The military can never engender democracy because it is the anti-thesis of
democracy in regard to its norms, values, purposes and structure. The military addresses the extreme
and extraordinary while democracy addresses the routine; the military values discipline and hierarchy,
democracy, freedom and equality: the military is oriented to law and order, democracy to diversity,
contradiction and competition, the method of the military is violent aggression, that of democracy is
persuasion, negotiation and consensus building. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the
Nigerian military has never succeeded in designing and implementing a transition to democracy; it is
unlikely ever to succeed.
Some may ask, whether what we have now is not democracy and whether Abubakar did not succeed in
his transition to democracy? Well, Ake equally has an answer to these questions. According to him;

Nigeria democratizes with no separation of power. All powers having been vested in an imperial
presidency. There is hardly any rule of law, no plausible system of justice, no transparency. The
institutions of the state are above the law, civil society is below it, ordinary people are out of sight, far
beyond its protection. The judiciary is dissociated from justice, and the bureaucracy is oppressive and
arbitrary. The Nigerian state like the colonial state before it turns on the calculus of strength. What is
the point of choosing "democratically" those who will control a state apparatus which is inherently
undemocratic? The state must be transformed structurally before such elections can become a
meaningful exercise in democracy.

From the above, it is therefore not surprising that most elected officers of the state in this republic have
failed to live up to expectation because the system they operate is inherently defective, and being
products of a military transition where politics is seen as warfare, they now see their territories as
conquered territories and their people as prisoners of war. What a said reality.

Unless the character of the state which is essentially oppressive, indifferent to and far removed from the
people is changed, politics will remain what it has always been in Nigeria, a battlefield. Democracy will
also remain a pipe dream for what is happening now by way of democratization is that self appointed
military or civilian dictators are being replaced by 'elected' dictators.

THE MILITARY IN NIGERIAN POLITICS: AN ASSESSMENT FROM BUHARI TO ABUBAKAR

THE BUHARI/IDIAGBON REGIME

The Shehu Shagari government which was accused of being very corrupt and that mismanaged the
Nigerian economy was sacked on the last day of 1983, precisely on the 31st of December 1983. The
voice of then Brigadier Sani Abacha rented the air waves announcing the obituary of the Shagari
government. Incidentally, Shagari and his cohorts were still rejoicing over their 'landslide victories' in the
1983 general elections when they were woken up to the rude shock that the party was over.

As expected the new military government headed by General Mohammadu Buhari was highly welcomed
by most Nigerians, who saw the coup as an answer to the socio-economic mess of the NPN led federal
government.

General Buhari and his stern Chief of Staff, General Tunde Idiagbon wasted no time in marching the key
actors of the Second Republic into detention. Tribunals were set up subsequently to try them and quite
expectedly most of them were found guilty of corrupt practices and were jailed. The lords of yesterday
suddenly became the prisoners of today. The transient nature of power became very apparent to all.

The Buhari/Idiagbon regime, from the beginning showed that they were serious about tackling the twin
problems of indiscipline and corruption which got to an unprecedented level during the ousted Shagari
regime. In trying to solve these problems, the regime was not interested in the means. The end was
most important and will expectedly justify the means.

Needless to say the regime became high-handed, issuing draconian Decrees that were in some cases
given retroactive effect. It was based on such retroactive Decrees that three drug peddlers: Bernard
Ogedegbe, Bartholomew Owoh and Lawal Ojuolape were executed amid societal disapproval and
outcry. The three had been arrested before Buhari came to power. The case of Ojuolape was particularly
touching. He was already facing trial before the coup that brought Buhari to power. He was granted bail,
and on the day of adjournment he presented himself to court and never went back again. He was
executed via a Decree made by a government that was not even in power when he committed the
crime. Buhari also added about a dozen offences to the list of capital crimes. These were arson, oil
pipeline vandalization, import or export of mineral oil or ore without licences, electric or telephone line
vandalization, oil bunkering, currency counterfeiting, kidnapping and illegal dealing in arms and
ammunition. Two other Decrees that were simply repressive and reprehensible were Decree No. 2 and
No. 4. Decree No. 2 empowered the Chief of Staff Supreme headquarters (in that case, Tunde Idiagbon
the unsmiling and taciturn General) to detain anybody without trial for whatever reasons he thinks is an
offence against the country. Decree No. 4 was aimed at censoring the press, for Buhari stated ab initio
that he would tamper with the press. Many Nigerians were detained for long periods without trial and in
some cases without a knowledge of why they were being detained via Decree No. 2. The draconian arms
of Decree No. 4 also caught up with two journalists of the Guardian Newspapers; Tunde Thompson and
Nduka irabor.

It was against the backdrop of this dictatorial tendencies of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime that General
Ibrahim Babangida the then Chief of Army Staff and third man in that junta struck on the 27th of August
1985, signaling the end of twenty months of the nation's fourth military government.

It must be pointed out, that despite the oppressive nature of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime, some positive
steps were taken by them to better the Nigerian society. First, the regime tackled head on the issue of
indiscipline through the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) programme. Though some people still quarrel
with the authoritarian method of instilling discipline in the people, the truth remains that Nigerians
learnt, internalized and exhibited a higher sense of discipline in the twenty months that the regime
lasted. This was evidenced by the queuing culture and more decorum in public offices.
Also the fight against corruption was launched and taken quite seriously. All those that were indicted for
embezzlement and mismanagement of public funds were appropriately jailed to serve as a deterrent to
others. Government business was transacted with far more transparency than in the past.

On the economic front, the government fought hoarding of essential commodities through public
auction of hoarded goods. Also in order to fight currency trafficking, which was very rampant then, the
regime changed the colours of various Nigerian currencies thereby bringing to an abrupt end, the
nefarious activities of currency traffickers. The regime also stopped frivolous government spending.
Many unviable government projects were stopped, while projects that were of no immediate
importance were postponed till the "economy improves", which was the popular refrain then. Above all
else the regime brought seriousness to government business as people started taking government and
government business serious once again. This was a sharp contrast to the Shagari government that was
simply a government of anything goes.

On a parting note, it must be said that the substance of the regime's actions were really what was
needed to cure the ills of the Nigerian society then, though the style was too high-handed and
oppressive. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it may not be out of place to say that Nigerians were
so much in a hurry to condemn the regime which apparently had a sincerity of purpose, the patriotic
zeal, courage and focus to attack head-on the ills of a society with so much latent potentials, but still
wallowing in poverty, corruption and indiscipline.

The Babangida Government;

At the risk of being called immodest, if there is any military government that prepared itself before it
went in, it's our government. We knew what we wanted. We knew what areas to address, especially the
economy. We read the barometer of the society and we knew what the people wanted (Babangida,
2000).

The above statement by Babangida himself to a journalist simply shows that contrary to the normal
coup day broadcasts that make coups children of necessity, soldiers actually prepare themselves for
politics. What they wait for is the opportunity to strike. Unfortunately, their governance in Nigeria
which reads like a treatise in corruption, mismanagement, repression and outright frustration on the
part of the people does not show a group that was actually prepared to change the society for the
better..

What the military has always been waiting for before intervening was the right opportunity. According
to Babangida (Quoted in Maier 2000);

You see we are very smart people. We don't intervene when we know the climate is not good for it or
the public will not welcome it. We wait until there is frustration in the society. In all the coups, you find
there has always been one frustration or the other. Any time there is frustration, we step in. And then
there was a demonstration welcoming the redeemers.

When Babangida sacked Buhari/Idiagbon in a palace coup on 27 August 1985, he was indeed hailed as a
redeemer. Moving away from the tradition of previous Nigerian military leaders that bore the title' Head
of State' Babangida adopted the title of President. He immediately abrogated some of the draconian
Decrees of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime. He equally released most victims of such decrees that were in
jail.

As somebody who knew what he wanted, Babangida through Decrees No. 17 of 1985 gave himself
absolute powers thus; 'The President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces shall have the
exclusive responsibility for the appointment of the Chief of General Staff, Minister of Defence and
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; (the Service Chiefs) and the Director of NSO.” From this period, according
to Nnanna (1995), "the junta system was smartly replaced by creeping despotism or one man
dictatorship. The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) of IBBs era and General Sani Abacha's Provisional
Ruling Council (PRC) became a mere rubber stamp deliberative bodies. Absolute powers resided with
the military President or Head of State".

It was with the benefit of this personalized rulership that Babangida presided over Nigeria for eight
years that can indeed be described as extremely eventful. Nigeria was turned into a laboratory where so
many policies and programmes were tested and messed up. Numerous agencies were equally created.
They included: the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFR1), Mass Mobilization for
Social Justice, Self Reliance and Economic Recovery (MAMSER); Center for Democratic Studies (CDS),
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), Peoples Bank,
National Board for Community Banks, National Directorate of Employment etc.

All these agencies were established in order to help the government in its professed socio-economic re-
engineering of the nation that was anchored on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). However
they all turned out as avenues for looting the nations treasury and "creating jobs for the boys" in
Babangida's method of "Government by Settlement" an acronym for corruption.

Babangida embarked on a systematic programme of rehabilitating criminals. He granted state pardon to

convicted politicians. Most of the soldiers dismissed from the force by Murtala Mohammed for
corruption were pardoned. The dismissals were converted to retirements and most of them were given
plum government appointments, as if in atonement for the 'mistake' of punishing them for being
corrupt, it was indeed an unprecedented rehabilitation programme.

It was however at the political front that the self confessed 'evil genius' showed his penchant for
manipulation. From the original 1990 terminal date for his transition programme, which in any case he
set for himself, he ended up pushing it to 1993 but was still not interested in leaving. He took the
Nigerian political class on a rough round-robin trip that was destined to stop, where it actually started -
the beginning. A man that has a penchant for changing the rules at the middle of the game, Babangida
earned the sobriquet: Maradona for his many crafty dribbles.

Babangida's economic policies that were based on the IMF scripted, Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) which he dubiously led Nigerians into believing initially was indigenously formulated (following the
wide spread rejection of the IMF package in a national debate) ended up pauperizing the masses. Thus
"While rampant unemployment and rising inflation slammed the middle classes and the urban poor, a
relatively small group of banks, speculators, corrupt government officials and importers of cheap foreign
goods prospered" (Maier, 2000). In reaction to the increased suffering, the masses responded through
riots, demonstrations and sharp criticisms of the government. As expected Babangida's answer were
mainly repressive. Many Human right activists like Gani Fawehinmi, Beko Ransome Kuti, Chima Ubani
etc. were arrested. Some media houses were closed down for being critical of government.

The regime equally witnessed a lot of religious riots because of Babangida's attempt to register Nigeria
as a full member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in 1986. Though Nigeria has been
attending the O1C meetings for a long time on observer status, Babangida decided to take the bull by
the horn and register the country as a full member in 1986 at the organizations meeting in Fez Morocco.
This singular act inflamed the delicate inter-religious peace in Nigeria, and set the stage for mutual
suspicion that has resulted in Muslim-Christian clashes at the slightest provocation. States like Kaduna,
Bauchi and Kano witnessed these ugly incidents during Badangida's regime.

The Babangida transition programme which kicked off in 1986 perhaps more than anything else showed
the man as a master of intrigue and deceit. It was the way he handled it that made critical Nigerians
believe that he had a hidden agenda, that the transition was transiting to nowhere except making
Babangida the civilian president. (For details of the transition programme see the section on transition
in the early part of this chapter).

It was in a confused state that Babangida 'stepped-aside' as President on August 26, 1993 after eight
solid years of running a government that was aptly described by General Ishola Williams (rtd) as "a
government of the contractors, by the contractors, and for the contractors". This was a government that
equated deceit with statecraft and elevated corruption to an unprecedented level, indeed it became an
acceptable way of life. It is his penchant for corruption that made M. D. Yusufu, a former Inspector
General of Police, to compare Babangida and Abacha thus;

I think Babangida was even worse than Abacha. Babangida went all out to corrupt society. Abacha was
intimidating people with fear. With him gone now, you can recover. But this corruption remains very
corrosive to society (Quoted in Maier, 2000).

Maier (2000) adds that;

in this legacy Babangida remains the dominant political character of his generation... By all accounts,
Babangida is a wealthy man, perhaps the wealthiest individual in Nigeria. And he bears a major- many
Nigerians say the largest responsibility for the crisis Nigerians finds itself in. But he remains ambitious,
and it is doubtful that Nigeria has heard the last of him.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that Babangida's inglorious exit in 1993 was not quite a tidy one.
The reason being because, according to Maier (2000), he left behind a human time bomb in the form of
his good friend, Abacha.

THE INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, the former Chairman of the United
African Company Plc (UAC), who was equally the Chairman of Babangida's Transition Council has gone
down in history as the shortest regime in Nigeria's history. It lasted for barely 83 days before it was
sacked by Abacha. The interim government which was then described as a contraption was installed by
Babangida as an exit valve for him to step aside, when it became obvious that he could not organize
another election after the criminal annulment of the June 12 election.

The interim government that was termed 'a child of necessity' faced enormous credibility problems.
Though Chief Shonekan that headed the government was not just a Yoruba but a fellow Egba like Abiola,
he was roundly rejected by his people, The entire South-west was very restive as many pro-democracy
groups, bent on installing Abiola as President refused to give the government any breathing space. The
government's hope of survival was dashed, when a Lagos high court declared it illegal. Almost
immediately, there were loud cries for it to resign since it was an illegal government. While all these
were happening, Abacha was bidding his time. He was aware that the Decree backing the interim
government, stipulated that in the case of death or resignation of the head of the interim government
that the most Senior Minister should take over. Abacha apparently considered himself the most senior.
It was indeed an "army arrangement'.

With loud calls by most pro-democracy groups and 'progressive politicians' on Abacha to take over
government on the belief that his intervention would be to install Abiola, Abacha struck and they all saw
how wrong and naive they were.

THE ABACHA GOVERNMENT

The Abacha regime took off on a deceitful foundation. Though Abacha forced Shonekan out on the 17th
of November 1993, the nation was told that Shonekan resigned on his own volition. The government
said its stay would be brief, thereby deceiving the pro-June 12 groups into believing it would later hand
over to Abiola. Meanwhile, the regime was consolidating its hold on power. When it eventually dawned
on the pro-democracy groups that they have been deceived, they decided to confront Abacha head-on.
Abacha responded with brute force. It was quite clear to all, that those that invited him to intervene on
the part of June 12 erred. Writing during the Abacha era Amuwo (1998) said;

The progressive politicians have been proved wrong. Many of them who thought the General was a
democratizer, if not a democrat, are today either in jail or undergoing trial in Nigeria or in forced exile in
Europe and North America on account of a political economy of force that, like Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola,
the president-elect, has found them on the wrong side of the political divide.

At inception, the regime promised to convoke a national conference. Therefore, in January 1994 General
Abacha established a Constitutional Conference Commission to handle the responsibility of organizing
the constitutional conference. The conference fell far short of the demands of the 'Progressives'. What
they have been calling for, was a Sovereign National Conference that would have full sovereign powers
to decide on the nations future structure and politics. However, since some believe that half bread is
better than none, many eminent Nigerians decided to take part in it. The conference, which was
inaugurated on 27 June, 1994, had a total of 380 delegates. While 273 delegates were elected, the
remaining 94 were nominated.

In his speech at the inauguration ceremony, Abacha charged the delegates to fashion;

An inclusive system which will guarantee a stable society through its sensitive accommodation of all
shades of political opinion harnessed by full participation of all the component units of our land... (and)
restraints on government as will ensure that no man will be oppressed and no group will dominate or be
marginalized.

The conference initially appeared to be operating freely without undue government interference. Since
the government mandated it to fix an exit date for the junta, it went ahead and fixed January 1, 1996.
From this moment events started happening on a faster pace. The former Chief of Staff Supreme
Headquarters during the Obasanjo regime, General Shehu Yardua who was participating in the
conference, and his erstwhile boss. General Olusegun Obasanjo and almost 40 others were tried and
jailed for their alleged roles in a coup plot, As if that was not enough, the government arrested the
Ogoni activist and writer Ken Saro Wiwa with eight other Ogonis for sponsoring the killing of four
prominent Ogoni Chiefs. They were tried, convicted and hanged. The trial of the 'Ogoni Nine' by a tele-
guided tribunal was globally condemned Well-meaning individuals and statesmen all over the world
including Nelson Mandela, pleaded with Abacha to spare the lives of the Ogoni Nine, but he refused and
went ahead to hang them. A tyrant has indeed taken over Nigeria's political space. A lull blown
dictatorship was in place. The human time bomb has actually exploded; it was therefore tales and tales
of intimidations, arrests, detentions, assassinations and terror.

The assault on the opposition and imagined enemies of the junta was total. The government organized
bomb explosions, and claimed that the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), umbrella bodies for all
Nigerian pro-deocracy groups were responsible for them. Meanwhile the winner of the June 12 election
who was arrested and charged for treason for declaring himself president was still held in solitary
confinement. His wife Alhaji Kudirat Abiola was assassinated in June 1996 by agents of the junta.
NADECO financier and first republic politician Pa Alfred Rewane was also killed, while Alex Ibru the
junta's Former Minister of internal affairs, was lucky to be alive after the assassins bullet hit him on the
head. Afenifere leader PA Abraham Adcsanya, was luckier, the bullets hit his car, but he escaped unhurt.
The homes of the opposition elements abroad were either bombed or set ablaze. Wole Soyinka and
Alani Akinrinade suffered such fate.

General Abacha had announced his political transition programme on Ist October 1995 promising to
restore democratic rule by October 1998. However, despite the General's promise while inaugurating
the constitutional conference that "it is neither in our personal interest nor that of the nation to
perpetuate ourselves in power .., nothing could be further from our plans" and his vow at that same
occasion that;

We are committed to ensuring that there is speedy and unimpeded transition to a civil democratic rule
in which we shall not be participants. We are, in short arranging to surrender power through a peaceful
and orderly process. (Emphasis mine)

The transition was manipulated to produce Abacha as the civilian president on Octoberl 1998.

Just like Babangida used Arthur Nzeribe's Association for Better Nigeria to try and deceive the world into
believing that most Nigerians want him to transform into! Civilian president, Abacha used the Youths
Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEA A) led by an unknown Daniel Kami for the same purpose. The height of
the transformation insanity came in march 1998 when YEAA and other pro-Abacha groups came
together under one group named, National Council of Youth Associations of Nigeria (NACYAN) to
organize the "Two Million-Man March in March'' at Abuja.

So many top politicians attended the rally and pleaded with Abacha to transform. Their argument was
that he was the only person that can hold Nigeria together. If he refuses to continue in power beyond
October 1, 1998, Nigeria, they claimed, would go up in flames and disintegrate The senseless
sycophancy and sheer profanity of the period was exemplified by a pro-Abacha campaigner in the East
who promised to "bury myself alive" if Abacha doesn't continue as the President by October 1, 1998.
Most surprisingly, he did not carry out the threat, for that would have completed the insanity of the
period.

Abacha's transition produced five parties namely: the United Nigeria Congress party (UNCP), the
Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), the Grassroots
Democratic Movement (GDM) and the National Centre party of Nigeria (NCPN). All these parties in an
unprecedented show of shame adopted Abacha as their presidential candidate, even when 'the man
who the cap fits' has not said he is interested in the position. It is this despicable action of these parties
that made Bola Ige to describe them as the "five fingers of a leprous hand".

As Abacha hounded opposition groups at home, he equally rebutted attempts by the international
community to mediate in the political crisis that consumed most part of his rule. It was thus common
place then to see the junta's Foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Tom Ikimi chiding foreign diplomats to desist
from interfering in the country's internal affairs. The ministers "bullish style was later dubbed, 'Area boy
diplomacy".

In April 1998, General Oladipo Diya, the Chief of General Staff in the regime and some other soldiers
were sentenced to death by the Major General Victor Malu Special Military Tribunal for plotting to
overthrow Abacha. General Diya, in the course of his trial, has said that, it was an 'arrangee' coup that
was initiated by the then Chief of Army Staff, General Musa Bamaiyi with the consent of Abacha.

However, before Abacha could sign their death sentences, he suddenly died on the 8 of June 1998. His
death which Nigerians refer to as the 'coup from heaven' brought so much joy to most people as his iron
grip on the nation was loosened forever by the cold hands of death. This brought to an end a regime
that is reputed to be the most tyrannical, brutal, crude, vindictive, overtly sectional, blood-thirsty,
deceitful, corrupt and intellectually hollow in the nation's history.

ABUBAKAR'S REGIME

General Abudusalami Abubakar, the Chief of Defence Staff in late Abacha's government took over the
reins of power following the demise of the head of the junta on June 8, 1998. The General who initially
looked pained by the death of his boss, declared a period of national mourning for the late tyrant.
However his later actions of scrapping Abachas transition programme, unlocking his jail and freeing the
dictator's detainees Military In Politics 219 detainees, arresting members of Abacha's killer squad, and
recovering some stolen funds from his family and cronies, clearly showed that his regime was not a
continuation of Abachas'.

On assumption of office, Abubakar showed a type of openness which the three previous military
regimes never showed and which was extremely scarce in Abacha's

After dismantling the dubious political structures of Abacha he introduced his own transition
programme that was short and more sincere. He set up a 23-man Constitution Debate Coordinating
Committee (CDCC) headed by Justice Niki Tobi, to Co-ordinate a national debate on the unpublished
1995 Abacha draft Constitution. The constitution was over-whelmingly rejected by Nigerians, in
preference for the 1979 constitution with appropriate amendments.
The Government set up a 14 member Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which it
pledged will be truly independent. It was headed by late Justice Ephraim Akpata

The commission swung into action immediately. It reviewed the voters register, registered political
parties and successfully conducted elections. The elections were organized in this format:

Local Government Elections Governorship & House of Assembly Elections National Assembly Elections
Presidential Election.

December 51998: January 91999: February 201999: February 27 1999:

Finally on the 29th of May 1999, Abudusalmi Abubakar became the toast of all when he handed over the
reigns of Government to Chief Olusegun Obasabjo who won the Presidential election on the platform of
the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P). He thus brought to a glorious end the transition programme
which Babangida and Abacha had both tainted with deceit and fraud.

It most however be pointed out that, some are of the view that Abubakar was not completely neutral in
the transition programme. They point to the way and manner Olusegun Obasanjo was released from
prison (along with other prisoners) drafted into PDF and the presidential race which he won. What really
cast doubts on the Head of States neutrality was the role played by the disgraced ex-president Ibrahim
Babangida and other retired soldiers in the Obasanjo project. Babangida is a childhood friend of
Abubakar, both grew up together, were classmates and were then and are still neigbours in Minna. It
becomes therefore very doubtful if Babangida would have gotten so-deeply involved in the Obasanjo
project if he had no assurance that if will not be a waste. Well it remains a matter of conjecture
REFERENCES

1. Achike O. (1980) Groundwork of military law and military rule in Nigeria. Forth Dimension
Publishers.

2. Afrifa A. (1960) The Ghana coup. New York, Humanities Press.

3. Ake C. (1996) Is Africa democratizing? CASS Monograph, No. 5. Lagos, Malthouse Press Ltd.

4. Amuwo K. (2000) “Beyond the orthodoxy of political restructuring: The Abacha junta and the
political economy of force” in Amuwo, Agbaje Suberu, Herault (eds) Federalism and political
restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan, Spectrum Books.

5. Bermeth V. and Kirk. Greene A. H. (1978) Back to barracks: A decade of marking Time: In soldiers
and oil: The political transformation of Nigeria. London, Frank Cass.
6. Claude E.T .W. (Jr.) (ed) (1970) Soldier and state in Africa. Evanston, Northwestern University
Press.

7. Dudley B. J. (1982) An introduction to Nigerian government and politics. Lagos, MacMillan.

8. Elaigwu J. I. (1979) “The Military and state building: Federal-state relations in Nigeria's military
federalism 1966 - 1976" in Akinyemi et al (eds) Readings on federalism. Lagos, NIIA.

9. Feit E. (1967) Military coups and political development: "Some lessons from Ghana and Nigeria"
World politics xx No.2

10. Finer S, E. (1962) The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. London, Pall Mall.

11. Gutteridge W. F. (1966) Military elites in Ghana and Nigeria. African Forum II

12. Huntington S. (ed) (1962) Changing patterns of military politics. New York Free Press.

13. Jembewon D. M. (1998) The military, law and society: Reflections of a General. Ibadan,
Spectrum Books Ltd.

14. Janowitz M. (1964) The Military in the political development of new nations: An essay in
comparative analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

15. Lockharn R, (1971) The Nigerian military: A sociological analysis of authority and revolt, I960-
1967. London, Cambridge University.

16. Maier KT. (2000) This house has fallen Nigeria in crisis. London, Penguin Books.

17. Mill J. S. (1960) Unitarianism, liberty and representative government. London, Aldiue Press.
18. Nnoli O. (1978) Ethnic politics in Nigeria. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers.

19. Nnoli O. (1986) Introduction to politics. England, Longman Group Ltd.

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21. Oyovbaire S. E. (1985) Federalism in Nigeria. London, MacMillan.

CHAPTER TEN

FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF REVENUE ALLOCATION IN NIGERIA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will attempt to look at the contentious issue of federal finances in Nigeria. It will look at
both the pre-colonial and post- colonial revenue allocation commissions and methods. The discourse
will start first with an understanding of the concept of federalism. A note on the theoretical background
of fiscal federalism will be given; this will be followed with a review of the various fiscal commissions
that have been appointed in Nigeria in the past. The problems that confronted such commissions will
also be discussed, while suggestions for future improvement in revenue allocation will be made.

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM

Discussions on contemporary federalism, usually starts with K.C. Wheare's postulations on the concept.
Most other theorists that have written on the issue usually find themselves either agreeing or
disagreeing with Wheare; thus, making him a point of departure on most discussions about the theory
of federalism. Writing on federalism, Wheare (1963) said;

By the federal Principle I mean the method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments
are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent.

This definition is seen as a classical formulation of federalism which draws heavily from the American
experience, which in any case, Wheare saw as the ideal. Other notable theorists on the concept include
Carl J. Friedrich, William Riker, William Livingston, Amitai Etzioni and Daniel Elazar.

Friedrich (1964) tried not to be legal or restrictive in his concept of federalism. Thus, he stated that;

Federalism is a process rather than a design… Any particular design of competencies or Jurisdictions is
merely a phase, a short run view of a continually evolving reality.

He further asserted that "if thus understood as the process of federalizing it will become apparent that
federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation".

While not disagreeing with Wheare, Livingtston (1952) believes that federalism is simply a political
arrangement through which the federal attributes of a society are expressed. He wrote that;
The essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the society itself.
Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of a society are articulated and protected.

It should be noted, however, that despite the differences in conceptualization of the federal concept, it
is still very clear that federalism represents a system of government that emphasizes unity in diversity,
division of powers between levels of government and limited autonomy to the constituent units.

FISCAL FEDERALISM

Federalism entails the constitutional division of powers/responsibilities between the central

government and the federating units. For each of these parties to perform her constitutional roles
presupposes that they have access to independent finance that is not under the control of the another
level of government. Seeing this condition as essential for a federal system, Wheare (1943) states that;

If the governmental authorities in a federation are to be coordinate with each other, in actual practice
as in law, it is essential that there should be available to each of them, under its own unfettered control,
financial resources sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it under the constitution...
For if state authorities, for example, find that the services allotted to them are too expensive for them to
perform, and if they call upon the federal authority for grants and subsidies to assist them, they are no
longer coordinate with the federal government but subordinate to it. Financial subordination makes an
end of federalism in fact, no matter how carefully the legal forms may be preserved. It follows therefore
that both state and federal authorities in a federation must be given the power in the constitution each
to have access to and to control its own sufficient financial resources. Each must have a power to tax
and to borrow for the financing of its own services by itself.

Since revenue sources are not usually stable, the pendulum of financial power has the peculiarity of not
remaining in a state of equilibrium, but tends to swing in the direction of the central government (Dare,
1979). Consequently revenue transfers are usually a norm in all federations.

Olaloku (1979) has clearly outlined the three reasons for the transfer of revenue from higher to lower
levels of government in a federation. The reasons are:

1. The nature of the functions and revenue sources of the three levels; federal, state and local.
Since these are determined either traditionally, constitutionally or from the administrative point of view,
an imbalance may develop between revenues and responsibilities. In order not to make the affected
level ineffective, it behooves the federal government to make financial transfers to it. This is referred to
as 'deficiency' transfers or 'balancing' (Graham, 1964).

2. The variations in the capacities of the lower levels of government to raise revenue. In any
federations, it is expected that every state or local government should maintain a minimum level of
service provision. However, since in any federation there is usually an unequal fiscal capacity, those
regions with low revenue-generating capacity have to impose a heavier tax burden on residents if they
desire to attain the national minimum. The need to avert the incidence of heavier tax burden in the
financially weaker ones leads the higher levels of government to make transfer of resources to them.
These types of transfers are referred to as 'Equalization' transfers. This was what Rufus (1967) had in
mind when he said that;

To be meaningful, therefore, the standard of sufficiency for each unit must be related at least, to the
average or uniform standard of service of all units within the federation. The business of any fiscal
scheme then is to ensure that each unit will be able to reach this standard, preferably by its own efforts
and if it fails, to guarantee it the means of doing so - if it 'chooses.

3. The final transfers are ones meant to primarily encourage particular state or local activities. This
is referred to as 'stimulation', 'incentive', or 'promotional' transfers. They are usually made with specific
instructions on how, when and where they will be used.

While the first two types of transfers are grouped under unconditional intergovernmental transfers, the
third is conditional transfer.

Intergovernmental transfers in federations are usually based on three principles. They are; the
derivation principle, the principle of need and that of even development or national interest.

The derivation principle provides the method of distributing federal revenues to the various units in the
federation the total of some proportion of certain taxes assumed to have been paid by their citizens.

The principle of need emphasizes sharing of government revenues on the basis of fiscal need usually
determined by the size of the population of an area.

That of national interest or even development, bases resource transfers on public expenditures
considered to be in the. interest of the nation as a whole (Olaloku 1979)

FISCAL COMMISSIONS IN NIGERIA

The first remark (to make) about Nigerian federalism is its preoccupation with revenue allocation or the
distribution of rewards. Most people who have either written about or formulated policies for Nigeria,
have placed emphasis on distribution, or what is lyrically referred to as the sharing of the national cake.
Unfortunately, not much emphasis has been placed on the baking of the cake by every member and
component part or segment of the Nigerian political community. Inevitably, distribution or sharing has
completely overshadowed production and effective growth (Ayu, 1994).

The above statement by lyorchia Ayu vividly captures the underlying reasons behind the acrimony and
struggle over revenue allocation in Nigeria. We now turn to the various fiscal commissions that have
been set up in Nigeria.

The introduction of the Richards Constitution in 1946, necessitated for the first time in the history of
Nigeria, a revenue allocation commission. The reason for this was because it was that constitution that
introduced regionalism into the country (See chapter on constitutional development). The initiator of
that constitution, Sir Arthur Richard later explained that it was meant to create "a unitary state with
local government centers in the Regions". More explicitly, the constitution was meant to achieve three
main objectives: the promotion of Unity in Nigeria; the adequate provision within that unity for diverse
elements which make up the country and securing of greater participation of natives in the
determination of their affairs. In a letter to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir Richards said the
constitution was meant:

To create a political system which is itself a present advance and contains the living possibility of further
orderly advance- a system within which the diverse elements may progress at varying speeds, amicably
and smoothly towards a more closely integrated economic, social and political unity without sacrificing
the principles and ideas in their divergent ways of life.

Consequent upon the new regional political structure, Sir Sidney Philipson was appointed to "Study
comprehensively and make recommendations regarding problems of the administrative and financial
procedure to be adopted under the constitution".

The principles of derivation and even development were adopted by the Philipson Commission for
revenue allocation. It should be noted that derivation had more weight than any other consideration.

In 1951, another revenue commission was appointed to review the existing formula in anticipation of
the Macpherson Constitution. The report of John Hicks and Sidney Philipson known as Hick-Philipson
Commission added new criteria to the allocation formula: independent revenues for the regions, need
and national interest became the new additions. For the first time regional governments were given the
power of independent revenue and tax jurisdiction. They were empowered to impose specific taxes. In
summary, the Hick-Philipson Commission de-emphasized the principle of derivation in favour of need
and national interest. Thus, proportions of specified duties and taxes were allocated to regions by
derivation, while special grants were made to them in respect of capitation (that is per head), education,
police and equalization (Osisioma, l996).
The Sir Louis Chick Commission was appointed in 1953 to review the revenue formula in anticipation of
the Lyttleton Constitution that will come into operation in 1954. The Commission was set up with a
mandate to fashion out a formula that will “take care of the need to provide the regions and the centre
an adequate measure of fiscal autonomy within their own sphere of government and that the total
revenue available to Nigeria are allocated in such a way that the principle of Derivation is followed to
the fullest degree compatible with meeting the reasonable needs of the centre and each of the Regions"
(Chicks 1954). Consequently, the 1954 constitution emphasized greater regional autonomy and
derivation as the main criteria on which revenue was distributed between the centre and the Regions.
Derivation now covered all federal revenues allocated to the regions, while 100 percent of revenues
from import duty on motor spirits, federal income tax royalties and rents from mining, 50 percent of
revenue from duties on all other imports as well as 50 percent of all export duties were all distributed
according to the principle of derivation. Estimates of each regions consumption of dutiable imports and
goods on which excise taxes were paid, were used to weight its share of revenue allocated by the
federal government (Olalokun, 1979).

On the 10th of October 1957, another fiscal commission was appointed on the recommendation of the
Nigerian Constitutional Conference held earlier in the year in London. The two-man commission had Sir
Jeremy Raisman as Chairman and Professor R.C. Tress as member. The Commission was charged with
the task of correcting the deficiencies of the existing formula and in particular to look at;

a. The limited range of independent revenues at the disposal of the regions;

b. The weakness in the application of the principle of derivation on which so much stress had been
laid in the past; and

c. The absence so far of any provision whereby a region could be treated for revenue allocation
purposes from the point of view of needs rather than on the basis of the amount of revenues generated
within its boundaries.

The Raisman and Tress Commission tried to play down on the derivation formula. A Distributable Pool
Account (DPA) was set up for other taxes which were not declared regional or federal. This was made up
of 30 percent of mining royalties and rents, and 30 percent of general import revenue to be allocated to
the regional governments in this order; North 40 percent, West 24 percent, East 31 percent, and
Southern Cameroons 5 percent. The recommendations of Raisman and Tress formed the core of
Nigeria's revenue allocation system till the late 1960's. The major significance of that commission
remains its creation of the Distribution Pool Account (DPA) as a counter-balance to derivation thus,
defining to a large extent, the poles of conflict around which the struggles over revenue were to take
place after independence (Obi 1998).

The last revenue commission headed by a non-Nigerian was Binn's Commission, appointed in 1964, but
whose report was published in 1965. The Commission's recommendation was that the DPA should be
increased from 30 to 35 percent of revenue from import duties, mining rents and royalties. It also
recommended the principle of financial comparability (comprising the overall cash position of each
regional government, the extent of its own effort to relieve its financial needs, and the standard of
services provided by the regions) (Anyanwu, l993).

The Binn's Commission's recommendation was still the basis of revenue allocation when the military
struck early in 1966. However, the promulgation of Decree No. 15 of May 1967, which divided the
country into twelve states from the hitherto four regions had some implications for revenue allocation.
Following the crisis situation in Nigeria then, the federal Government could not appoint another
commission to review the formula to reflect the new structure. What was done was simply to sub-divide
each region's revenue among the new states in the region. While the Northern states shared theirs on
the basis of equality, the East and West shared theirs on the basis of population. The arbitrary nature of
this allocation formula was sharply criticized. This led the Federal Military Government to inaugurate in
July 1968, the Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee (IRARC) headed by Chief I.O. Dina. The
Dina Committee was charged to "look into and suggest any change in the existing system of revenue
sources" (Adesina, 1998). The committee submitted its report in February 1969. Its major concern was
trying to fashion out a formula that will take care of the problem of uneven development which it
identified as one of the major problems confronting the Nigerian federation. Thus, it recommended that
90 percent of mining rents and royalties should be paid into the Distributable Pool Account which it
renamed, States Joint Account (SJA), for distribution to the various states while 10 percent goes to the
states; of origin. In sharing the States Joint Account, the major considerations should be need, minimum
responsibility of states, derivation and balanced development. The Dina Committee report was never
implemented, instead the federal Military Government promulgated Decree No. 13 of 1970 which took
retrospective effect from 1st April, 1969.

According to this Decree, revenue sharing was based on 50 percent population, and equality of states 50
percent. The state share of revenue from export duties, motor spirit and excise duties was reduced from
100 percent to 60 percent, and 50 percent respectively. The federal government share of mining rents
was also increased from 15 to 20 percent. Later Decree No. 9 of 1971 gave 100 percent of off-shore
mining rents and royalties to the federal Government. Decree No. 15 of 1972, further amended the
sharing formula, thus, giving the federal Government 100% of all taxes paid by Armed Forces Personnel,
External affairs officers and Pensioners Overseas.

Under Decree No. 6 of 1975, all revenue from import duties on motor spirits, tobacco, mining rents and
royalties on offshore production were paid into the DPA. 20 percent of on-shore receipts go to the state
of production, while the remaining 80 percent goes to the DPA.

In preparation for the-return to civil rule the military government set up the Aboyade Technical
Committee on Revenue Allocation in 1977. The Committees' recommendations for sharing national
revenue were; equality of access to development opportunities (25 percent) national minimum
standards for national integration (22 percent), absorptive capacity (20 percent), independent revenue
effort (18 percent) and fiscal efficiency (15 percent). According to it, the fixed proportional share of the
Federation Account among the federal and state governments are; federal government 57 percent,
states 30 percent, local governments 10 percent, and 3 percent to oil producing states and ecological
problems. The Committee's report was however rejected because it translated the principles it had
recommended into statistical and mathematical calculations that would require a huge volume of
accurate statistical details to back them up. The report was heavily criticized because of its obvious over-
dependence on statistics, it was considered too unrealistic to last for more than a few years (Adesina,
1998).

Since the military did not leave any acceptable revenue formula following the rejection of "the Aboyade
report, President Shagari on assumption of office in 1979 inaugurated the Okigbo Revenue Allocation
Commission. The Commission submitted its report in 1980. It recommended the sharing of revenue as
follows; federal government 53%, states 30%, local government 10%, and special funds 7% to cater for
mineral producing areas and ecological funds. It further recommended that funds among states and
local governments should be shared using the following principles:

Minimum Responsibility or Equality 40%

Population 40%

Social Development Direct 11.25%

Inverse 3.75% = 15%

Internal Revenue effort 5%

The federal government accepted the report with minor amendments as follows:

Federal government 55%, states 30%, local governments 8%, and special funds 7%. The National
Assembly further amended the Bill before passing it into law in 1981. The Okigbo Commissions report
was highly criticized. According to Adesina (1998);

The aspects of the Commission's report which drew the ire of people were the proportion of federally
collected revenue that was assigned to the federal government; the inclusion of the Federal Capital
Territory in the vertical sharing scheme; federal governments control of the special funds and the
proportion of the special fund earmarked for mineral producing areas; and on the relative share of the
federal government from the federation account vis-a-vis the other layers of government.

As if in line with public opinion, the Supreme Court declared the Revenue Allocation Act of 1981 null and
void after it was challenged in court by the then Bendel State Government.

Following the voiding of the revenue Act, the federal government modified it and it was passed into law
in January 1982. The new Act had the following formula; federal government 55%, states 35% and local
government 10 %. 30.5% of the state share was shared on the following basis;
Minimum Responsibility 40%

Population 40%

Social Development 15%

Internal Revenue effort 5%

The remaining 4.5% was shared thus;

Federal fund for Ecological problems 1%

Allocation to mineral producing areas based on derivation 2%

Federal Fund for development of mineral producing areas 1.5%

The military government that sacked the Shagari government enacted the Allocation of Revenue
Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984 which made some slight amendments to the 1981 Act. For instance
it increased the proportion of the Federation Account that was to be shared among the states from
30.5% to 3 2.5 %.

The Babangida government in 1988 set up the National Revenue Allocation and Fiscal Commission with
General T. Y Danjuma (Rtd) as Chairman. In 1989, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) considered
the report of the Commission and adopted the following formula federal government 50%, states 30%,
local government 15%, and special funds 5%.

The principle used to share states fund was;

Equality of states 40 percent

Population 30 percent

Land mass 10 percent

Social Development 10 percent

Internal Revenue effort 10 percent

That formula lasted till 1992 when it was slightly adjusted thus; federal government 48.5 percent, states
24 percent, local government 20 percent, special funds 7.5%.
It was the above formula that the Obasanjo administration inherited in 1999. However the 1999
Constitution empowered the President in section 162 (2) to;

Upon the receipt of advice, from the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table
before the National Assembly proposal for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in
determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the population,equality of
states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density; provided that the
principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than
thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources.

In consonance with this constitutional provision (section 32(b) of the third schedule) President Obasanjo
set up the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMFC) with Engr. Hamman A. Tukur
as Chairman with members drawn from all the states of the federation. The commission as statutorily
empowered, was mandated to draw up a new revenue allocation formula for the country.

The commission after about two years of serious work presented a new revenue allocation proposal to
the President on August 16, 2001. According to the proposal, the federal government will get 41.3
percent, the states 31 percent and the local governments 16 percent, special funds 11.7 percent. The
special funds will be shared as follows; Federal Capital Development Fund 1.2 percent, Ecological Fund
1.0 percent, National Reserve Fund 1 percent; Agriculture and Solid Mineral Fund and its associated
Science and Technology Research 1.5 percent; and Basic Education and Skill Acquisition (BESA) Fund 7
percent.

Almost immediately the report was presented there were loud cries of foul by many Nigerians,
especially State Governors and Local Government Chairmen. The Southern Governors at the end of their
fourth meeting in Ibadan strongly criticized the new revenue proposal. They advocated a uniform 36
percent for both federal and state governments; 25 percent for local governments, 1- percent for the
Federal Capital Territory and 2 percent for Ecology.

The President of the National Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) Dr. Deji Akinwalere called
on his members to reject the new formula. He argued that "most of the resources are still concentrated
at the centre". His argument is quite correct. Though it looks like the federal government's share has
been reduced from the previous 48.5 percent to 41.3 percent, the 11.7 percent allocated to special
funds is still under its control. Going further, Dr. Akinwalere said that;

We know that it is the same kind of elitist schism towards grassroots administration that brought that
kind of proposal. Because the Commission's Chairman while presenting the proposal made mention that
they were not too sure that the local governments would be able to make use of the funds available to
them. It is a display of ignorance on the part of the Commission about the development, the challenges,
expectations and aspirations of the people at the grassroots.
The Association of Local Governments of Nigeria (ALGON) expectedly rejected the allocation formula
which they felt would further compound their problems. While the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and
Fiscal Commission was still tinkering with its duty of trying to come up with a revenue allocation formula
for the federation, the call for the derivation principle otherwise called resource control became very
stringent. The demand made mainly by the oil producing states and which was supported by the entire
seventeen southern Governors, got to a level that the federal government decided to take the matter to
the Supreme Court for a legal interpretation.

The then Attorney General and Minister of Justice Chief Bola Ige, on Tuesday, February 6, 2001, took the
entire 36 states of the federation to the Supreme Court. Though the suit, with number Sc 28/2001
joined the 36 states as defendants, it was actually targeted at the eight littoral states namely; Akwa
Ibom, Balyelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers which all have boundaries with the sea.

In the suit the federal government wanted the Supreme Court to determine the seaward boundary of a
littoral state within the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue
accruing directly to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources derived from that state
pursuant to Section 162 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

He averred that the Federal Government accepted the principle of derivation as contained in Section
162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution, which directs that ''the principle of derivation shall be constantly
reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the
Federation Account directly from any natural resources". However, in calculating the revenue accruing
to states through derivation, it is only the natural resources located within the boundaries of the state
that counts. While for the littoral states, the seaward boundary of the land surface thereof or (if the
case so requires) the seaward limits of inland waters within the state. While the natural resources
located within the territorial waters of Nigeria and the Federal Capital territory are deemed to be
derived from the federation and not any state. Consequently the natural resources located within the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of Nigeria are subject to the provisions of any treaty
or any written agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring foreign state, derived from the
federation and not from any state.

In response to the suit, the Attorneys- General of the seventeen southern states met at Benin the Edo
State Capital on the 14th of February, 2001, to fashion a common response strategy to fight the legal
battle.

As expected, all the Northern States that filed statements of defence at the Supreme Court aligned with
the stand of the Federal Government that the natural resources located within the territorial waters of
Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory are deemed to be derived from the federation and not from
any state.
The case finally ended on the 5th of April 2002 with the Supreme Court judgement which has been
described in many quarters as a landmark judgement.

In a unanimous decision read by Justice Michael Ekundayo Ogundare the court ruled that: The seaward
boundary of a littoral state for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue accruing to the
federation account directly from any natural resources, derived from that state pursuant to Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution, is the low water mark of the surface thereof. While in the case of
Cross River State "with an archipelago of Islands" the boundary is the "Seaward limits of the inland
waterways within the state".

a. Contentions of the littoral states that their boundaries extend to the exclusive economic zone or
the continental shelf of Nigeria is rejected;

b. There is no provision anywhere in the 1999 Constitution which made it possible for revenue
derived from the continental shelf contiguous to a region to be payable to that region:

c. The Federal Capital Territory is not a state or a local government in a state. It therefore cannot
qualify for distribution of the Federation Account.

d. Exclusion by the Federal Government of natural gas as constituent of derivation is

unconstitutional; similarly so is funding of the judiciary as a first line charge on the Federation Account
as well as servicing of external debts as first line on the Federation Account;

e. It is equally unconstitutional and against the grain of the 1999 Constitution to refuse payment of
the shares of Delta State in respect of proceeds from Capital gains taxation and stamp duties, and;

f. Funding of joint venture contracts and the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
Priority Projects as first charge on the Federation account is unconstitutional.

The court also approved a counter claim by Bayelsa State, one of the littoral states, that the 13 percent
derivation fund being distributed to some states under section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution should
have been paid from May 29 1999 when the Constitution came into force and not March 2000 when the
payments was started by the federal government.

The judgement of the Supreme Court which actually favoured the federal government in terms of the
on-shore/off-shore dichotomy was a big blow to the oil producing states. However, President Obasanjo
decided to assuage the feeling of these states through a political solution since they have lost the battle
legally. He therefore set up a committee, headed by the then Minister of Works and Housing, Chief
Anthony Anenih, and mandated it to find a peaceful political solution to the issue and recommend ways
and means of cushioning the effect of the judgement on the oil producing states.

Following the Supreme Court judgement, which voided the existing formula, the federal government
through an executive order changed it. The President through a statutory instrument entitled
"Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account)
(Modification) order 2002" directed that allocation to the tiers of government be modified. The order
states thus;

The Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Act in this order (referred to as "The Principle Act) as
amended is hereby further modified as provided in this order;

1. Section one of the Principle Act is hereby modified by substituting therefore the following;

2. The amount standing to less the sum of 13 percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation
Account directly from any natural resources as a first line charge, for distribution with the Constitution,
shall be distributed among the federal and state governments and the local councils in each state of the
federation on the basis of;

(a) Federal Government will get 56 percent

(b) The State governments will get 24 percent

(c) The local government councils will get 20 percent. Besides, section 2 of the Principal Act is
modified by substitution for subsections (1) and (2) thereof the following new subsections;

(1) The 56 percent specified in section (1) (a) of this Act shall be allocated to the federal
government and utilized as follows;

(A) Federal government will get 48.5 percent;

(b) General ecological problems will get 2 percent;

(c) Federal Capital Territory will get I percent;

(d) Stabilization Account will get 1.5 percent; while

(e) 3% is allocated for development of natural resources

The 36 state Governors also rejected the Presidents amendment, saying it was illegal, because it violated
the Supreme Court judgement. They therefore once again proceeded to the Supreme Court to challenge
the Presidents action. They asked the court for the following to live longer than men;

1. Nigeria is the only country on earth in which the wet coastal area is sparsely populated and the
Sahel hinter land very heavily populated;

2. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high economic activity, as obtained in the Southern
part of the country, is not associated with high population density;

3. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high level urbanization is not associated with thick
population;
4. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high level of water consumption, high level of
electricity consumption, high level of school environment are not functions of population density.

Though the census was not rejected, it was quite clear that it was not generally acceptable. In fact what
actually embarrassed the government was the notion that we have more males in Nigeria than females
which is quite unnatural and unusual. Hence, not even the government uses the census figures. In
conclusion therefore, the 1991 census like its predecessors was actually manipulated to vindicate the
notion or contentious belief that the north is more populous than the south. Nothing can be farther
from the truth since the Sahel region can never and as never been more populated than | the coastal or
forest region. Nigeria can't be different.

THE BUGHARI/IDIAGBON REGIME

The Shehu Shagari government which was accused of being very corrupt and I that mismanaged the
Nigerian economy was sacked on the last day of 1983. Precisely on I the 31st of December 1983. The
voice of then Brigadier Sani Abacha rented the air I waves announcing the obituary of the Shagari
government. Incidentally, Shagari and I his cohorts were still rejoicing about their landslide victories in
the 1983 general 1 elections when they were woken up to the rude shock that the party was over.

As expected the new Military Government headed by General. Mohammadu I Buhari. was highly
welcomed by most Nigerians, who saw the coup as an answer to the I socio-economic mess of the NPN
led Federal Government.

General Buhari and his stern chief of staff, General Tunde Idiagbon wasted no time in marching the key
actors of the Second republic into detention. Tribunals were set up subsequently to try them and quite
expectedly most of them were found guilty of corrupt practices and were jailed. The lords of yesterday
suddenly became the prisoners today. The transient nature of power became very apparent to all.

The Buhari/Idiagbon regime, from the beginning showed that they were serious about tackling the twin
problems of indiscipline and corruption which got to an unprecedented level during the ousted Shagari
regime. In trying to solve these problems, trend, is that even now that the country is practicing a
democratic system, the influence of Abuja doesn't seem to be waning. Events at the states and local
government levels are still coloured by trends at the centre. The system presently in operation cannot in
all honesty be termed federal but may be somewhere near what Elazar (1982) described as 'a hierarchy'
a pyramid of governments with gradation of power flowing down from the top".

Perhaps, one may forgive the distortions of our federal system as one of the prices the nation has paid
for experiencing military rule, since federalism is highly incompatible with autocracy. For according to
Wheare (1963);
Dictatorship, with its one-party government and its denial of free election, is incompatible with the
working of the federal principle. Federalism demands forms of government which have the
characteristics usually associated with democracy or free government. There is a wide variety in the
forms which such government may take, but the main essentials are free election and a party system,
with its guarantee of a responsible opposition.

Now that a new democratic order is here, it is time to start correcting the distortions. So, how are we
going to allocate revenue in Nigeria in order to reduce the frictions that have over the years
characterized this exercise? Well, the Committee on Revenue Allocation of the 1995 constitutional
conference actually hit the nail on the head when it said;

... Allocation should be strictly based on equity and justice and should serve as inducement to the
federating units to achieve self-generating growth. A good revenue allocation formula induces the
federating units to try to excel in economic growth and revenue generation, and since it is based on
equity and justice, it breeds peace.

The need for equity and justice is indeed quite desirable in order to reduce if not eliminate what Suberu
and Agbaje (2000) refer to as intergovernmental or inter-segmental distributive struggles in the Nigerian
federation. They equally outlined the four major areas of conflict as;

1. The conflict among the federal, state and local governments over what proportion of national
revenues should be allocated to each of these three tiers of government;

2. The tensions among the states and among the localities over the criteria to be used in sharing or
distributing federal financial devolution to these two sub-national tiers of government;

3. The tensions between the oil-producing states on the one hand, and the federal government
and many of the states which do not produce oil, on the other, over the proportion of federally-
collected revenues that should be allocated to the former on the basis of the derivation principle and/or
compensation for the ecological risks of oil production and;

4. The general intergovernmental conflict over suspected irregularities or anomalies in the centre's
administration of the Federation Account.

We will therefore conclude this chapter by suggestion a new revenue formula for the country. Our
suggestions are guided by the need to reduce the frictions that have been a permanent feature of
revenue allocation in Nigeria.

First, the practice of allocating a larger chunk of the Federation Account to the federal government is
not really in the best interest of the country. For one, it largely accounts for the Hobbesian' struggle by
the various ethnic groups to capture the centre in order to appropriate this massive resources to their
own advantage. This trend has over the years made the federal government to be super-ordinate
instead of being co-ordinate with the constituent units. The effect today is that while the federal
government has almost more than enough, the other tiers are always in need. They are forced to go
cap-in-hand to Abuja to beg for one financial favour or the other. We are therefore advocating a new
system, where the federal government would not dominate the others as has been the practice.

Another issue that has to be tackled is the issue of derivation or 'resource control' as it is presently
labeled. The truth remains that when it was convenient for the major ethnic groups, derivation was used
in revenue allocation. Now that the major resource that feeds the entire nation is gotten from the
minorities, derivation has been relegated to the background. Since there can never be peace without
justice, there is an urgent need to redress this injustice. This need is more compelling, when we
remember that oil is a non-renewable resource that will exhaust one day. It will be most unfair if at the
end of the day what the Niger Delta region will have to show for their oil is a degraded environment and
penury.

We are therefore advocating that there should be at least 30 percent derivation of the revenue from
mineral resources. In disbursing the 30 percent derivation funds, the communities and local
governments from where the resources are gotten should get at least 60 percent of it, in order to
compensate them for the damages to their environment and also make them enjoy the fruit of what
God has given to them.

The Federation account should be distributed in the following order:

Federal Government 3 0%

State Governments 45%

Local Governments 25%

In sharing out the states funds, internal revenue effort should be encouraged by giving it more weight.
School enrollment should equally be given some weight in order to make the states encourage
education. Consequently the following formula is advocated.

Minimum Responsibility or equality 40%

School Enrollment 15%

Population 15%

Internal Revenue Effort 15%

We equally suggest that the above formula should be used in sharing the local government funds.
THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE CONTROL AND MILITANCY IN NIGER DELTA

The Nigerian nation is indeed a fragile arrangement. The country continues to boil at the instance of any
incidental issue that suddenly crops up. For now, nothing is settled. Everything is in a state of flux. And
everything remains an important issue. Resource control, militancy in Niger Delta, indigenous struggles
etc. are all cankerous issues that elicits diverse, conflicting and acrimonious reactions from the various
groups that make up the geographical location termed Nigeria. It should be noted however, that all
these issues relates to skewed distribution of resources. Thus, the basis of the contention in Nigeria
federalist/democratic experiment can be well located in the structural imbalance between resource
reproduction and reward among certain elements that bargained in the federalist arrangement. But not
only that, the ill feeling of neglect, exclusion or what is generally regarded as marginalization, by certain
elements in Nigeria, particularly the South-South region are core emotions that drive the logic of
resource control and militancy in Niger Delta. Therefore, we pause to ask the question: what is resource
controls

There have been varied opinions on what the adjectival phrase, 'resource control' actually stands for.
The ambiguity hovering around the term has mostly been as a result of too many sentimental
attachments thrust upon the interpretation of the concept by scholars and commentators to the extent
that they allow their prejudices to becloud the definition of the concept. Nonetheless, the term resource
control tells one of something, a resource, being controlled or still being aspired to be controlled. The 17
Southern states Governors defined it as “the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the
federating units express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and
make agreed contributions towards the maintenance of common services of the government at the
centre” (Dafinone, 2001). The former Edo State Governor, Mr. Lucky Igbinedion, who is a well known
advocate of resource control, says:

Resource control means that if I as a Bini man goes to Kebbi State and finds Gold, the resource should
belong to me and not to the state or the Federal Government. All I owe the Federal Government is to
pay taxes and royalties. The same principle should apply if a Kano man comes to Edo, Delta or Bauelsa
and strikes oil. He only pays royalties and taxes to the State or Federal Government (cited in Dafinone,
2001).

For Senator David Dafinone himself, the quest for resource control is nothing but “a clamour for
adequate compensation, a cry for redistribution of the revenue allocation formula, and nothing more.
The only thing a government should do is impose tax to be used for the welfare of the community”
(Dafinone, 2001). He goes on to justify the struggle by arguing that:

Resource control is a basic economic theory grounded in the fact that land, labour, capital and
entrepreneurship are factors of production. (Adam Smith, an early economist, outlined these in the
Wealth of Nations) the principal factors of production are land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship.
Just as the price of labour is wages, capital has interest, entrepreneurship is driven by profit while rent
and royalties are rewards for land-onwership. Rent is a return for the use of the original and
indestructible properties of the soil. Whoever own a land expects some form of compensation from
those hiring this very important factor of production (Dafinone, 2001).
In addition, the Deputy leader of the South-South Peoples Conference (SSOPEC) Chief Edwin Clarke
stated that “resource control doesn't mean that we want to own all the resources found in our area. All
we are saying is that we want to be involved; we should not be excluded either in the exploration or
exploitation, whatever it may be. We want our children to be employed in the oil companies. Is that not
what we are asking for? We want our people to be contractors, to lift oil, to lift crude oil, why should
other people who don't belong to the South-South qualify to lift oil when we the owners don't lift oil?
We want to be involved in the sale and marketing, exploration and everything about oil resources”
(Clarke, 2003). This conceptualization seem to fit very well into the Nigerian politics, where sharing the
'National Cake' has remained the major preoccupation of the ruling class. Indeed, Elder Clarke reduced
the meaning of resource control to the crude simplicity of getting Niger Delta people involved in
cornering oil contracts, employment in oil companies and getting licenses to lift oil. That's all. This is
basically a very poor opportunistic view of resource control, which did not deviate fundamentally from
the usual pattern of bread and butter politics for which the Nigerian elites are better known for. From
the foregoing therefore, it is not in doubt that resource control is simply a struggle to get the producers
of mineral resources directly and substantially involved in the exploitation of their minerals. It is a
struggle to end the alienation of host communities, in the decisions as to how the mineral resources on
their land will be exploited and utilized.

However, the struggle for resource control is not a new development. Arbitrary adjustments of
modalities for sharing oil windfalls in the country, which was mostly seen as unjust and unacceptable by
the South-South region that has oil resource in commercial quantities, was a major issue that fuelled the
contest for resource control. The oil boom of 1970s, which suddenly placed oil as the major foreign
exchange earner in Nigeria, led to the abandonment of the derivation principle as a basis for revenue
allocation in the country (Semenitari, 2002). Further, Decree No. 13 of 1970 dramatically changed the
formula and made population and equality of states the major consideration in revenue allocation. Later
Decree No. 9 of 1971 gave 100 percent of off-shore mining rents and royalties to the federal
government. Altogether, a final blow on derivation came through the budget broadcast of General
Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, when he said “As from 1st of April, 1975, all portions of customs
and excise duties formerly payable to the state Governors on the basis of derivation would be payable
to the Distributable Pool Account (DPA), the percentage of the royalties to the state Governors would be
reduced from 45 to 20 percent and the federal government will surrender its entire share of both on-
shore and off-shore royalties into the Distributable Pool Account” (cited in Nwokoh and Edemodu,
2002).

This sudden de-emphasis on the derivation principle was explained by Keith Panter-Brick in the Book
'Soldiers and oil' that “once the revenue from oil became dominant, the principle of derivation had
obviously to be abandoned, so as to avoid a blatant disparity in the revenues of oil producing states
(Rivers and Midwest) and those of the rest of the country” (Panter, 1978). Some other analysts believe
strongly that the main reason why the derivation principle was jettisoned was because none of the
three main tribes in the country has oil deposits in commercial quantities. Thus, Nwokoh and Edumodu
(2002) argue that “as oil became the mainstream of the economy and given its absence in any significant
quantity in any three dominant ethnic groups, the power elite of the three tribes consigned the principle
of derivation to history books”. This means that, had oil been discovered in large quantities in the
territories of the major ethnic cleavages, the allocation formula would have naturally been skewed in
favour of derivation. Besides, even if today oil resource is discovered in very large quantities in the
north, definitely the present formula would change. In trying to make sure that the federal government
and not the states control oil resources in Nigeria, the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria entrusted the control of mineral resource to the exclusive control of the federal government.
Section 42(3) instructed that:

The entire property in and control of all mineral oil and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria
or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the exclusive zone of Nigeria shall vest in the government
of the federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.

This development rather oiled the persistent struggle for resource control. Part of the outcome was the
emergence of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) during the Babangida regime.
The Ogonis drew up the Ogoni Bill of Rights, copies of which were said to be sent to Babangida and
members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The Ogonis demanded through the Bill, a level of political
autonomy that would allow them use Ogoni's economic resources for the development of Ogoni land.
They equally demanded the protection of their environment and representation in all national
institutions. Of course needless to say that those demands were completely overlooked by the
government. However, the activities of MOSOP, and such other less visible militant groups in the Niger
Delta, ignited a lot of awareness about the degradation of the environment in oil producing areas, the
inequity and injustice in the revenue allocation formula, and the deplorable state of the golden goose
(oil producing areas).

The Babangida government later responded to the Ogoni's aspirations and agitations by creating the Oil
Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) to facilitate the development of the
area. Particularly, a 3 percent derivation principle was granted to OMPADEC. Disappointedly, the
Babangida solution was largely unsuccessful and did not really reduce the agitations of the Niger Delta
people for resource control. For one thing, the Commission could not substantially develop or improve
the lots of Niger Deltans, as corruption was the main name of the commission (Ikejiani-Clark, 2007).

Subsequently, various efforts were geared towards assuaging the plights of the oil rich zone. Mainly, the
target has always been to reconstruct the derivation principle, to quell the fire and brimstone normally
predicted to befall the country by mongers and champions of resource control. The table below is a
comprehensive outlook of the several adjustments made on revenue allocation in the country.
A Summary of Revenue Allocation Formulas Adopted in Nigeria
Source: Adapted from Aluko, January 26, 2005.

Incidentally, the 999 Constitution raised the percentage of derivation principle from the hitherto 3% to
13%. According to section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution:

The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, shall
table before the National Assemble proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and
in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles
especially those of population, equality of States, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well
as population density: provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any
approved formula as being not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation
Account directly from any natural resources.

This never assuaged the tension, though. Okolie (2009:83) maintained that despite the amendments in
revenue allocation formula, oil producing states are still expressing dissatisfaction at the present
arrangement. Not only that, scholars and political commentators had questioned the rationale for the
central government to retain disproportionate share of the revenue and called for restricting of the
federation to give greater autonomy to constituent states. This reality has heralded robust debates and
agitations for greater resource control in the federation. Several calls and bills ranging from the
increment of the derivation principle from 13% to 25%, and an absolute control of the Exclusive
Economic Zones by immediate locals have also been introduced by elite groups in the south-south
geopolitical zone to this effect (Obi, 2004:101). While we do not intend to join the debate proper, it is
pertinent to underscore the thrust and tilt of the reactions of the ruling class from other parts of the
country towards the fiscal federalism debate.
Thus, after their second meeting in Enugu State in January 10, 2001, hosted by former Governor Dr.
Chimaroke Nnamani, the 17 Southern Governors issued a 17 point communiqué that called for resource
control and derivation, as the most acceptable basis for revenue generation and allocation in Nigeria.
Their contention was rooted on the premise of tackling and resolving the burning issues of Nigeria's
continued nationhood (The Guardian, January 12, 2001). Later, at a subsequent meeting in Benin, on the
26th and 27th of March, 2001, Dr. Nnamani once again restated: “I said to you that if democracy
survives in Nigeria, nothing can stop the inalienable right of the sons and daughters of the Niger Delta to
control their resources. I said to you that if democracy prevails in our land, Nigeria will be restructured
to respect and reflect through physical and fiscal federalism” (The Guardian, April 7, 2002).

One observation here though, is that resource control is inadvertently but apparently likened to
democracy. That is to show the level of understanding of the philosophy of resource control. On the
other hand, Obi (2004:103) noted that not minding the predominant views of opinion leaders in the
northern Nigeria, who held that resource control will in the long run benefit the north, others see those
embarking on the struggle as mischief makers who are wont to dismember the nation. For instance, the
then Kano State Deputy Governor, Dr. Abdulahi Gauduje, who was one of the first northern leaders to
react to the issue, stated that the type of derivation principle being advocated by the Southerners would
quickly kill and strangulate most states in the north, especially Kano, if accepted and implemented (The
Guardian, July 2, 2001). In corroboration, Governor of Gombe state, Alhaji Abubakar Habu Hashidu,
venting this logic had declared that “The territorial waters belong to the 36 states and the 774 local
government areas of the country. Without which there will be no water. And without the country, the
states will not be in existence (The Guardian, April 7, 2002). In a follow up, thereafter, the Northern
states filled statements of defense suit at the Supreme Court, aligning themselves with the position of
the Federal Government, that oil revenue from offshore exploration should be deemed to belong to the
Nigerian state and should therefore be exempted from the derivation formula. And ever since, the
debate has progressively continued, not only in verbal contention, but through the means of naked
force, militancy, terrorism and anticipated war.

THE POLITICS OF MILITANCY AND AMNESTY IN NIGER DELTA

It is well known that state repression and violence have been a prominent strategy deployed most often
by both military and civilian regimes in quelling uprisings in Niger Delta. Such repressive acts often
involve the drafting of mobile police and armed forces to the region, with the mandate to put such
uprisings under control and facilitate the smooth operations of the oil companies operating in the
region. Specific instances of state violent repression against oil communities include: Egbena Crisis
(1989-991); Oburu violence (1989); Umuechem massacre (October 31,1990); Bonny Ijugba Square
tragedy (July 21, 1992); Egi-Obaji mayhem (February 19, 1994); Tai-Biara (Ogoni) massacre allegedly
instigated by Wilbrose, a company that services Shell BP (1994); Ubima tragedy (1995); Odi massacre
(1999) etc. (Eteng, 1996:140; Ovwasa, 1999:94; Raji, 1998:116).

It is pertinent to note that the human lives lost and millions of naira worth of properties damaged in
these military combat is uncountable. Particularly, 2 war ships and over 10 armoured tanks were
deployed by the government against the peoples of Kaiama town, headquarters of Kolokuma/Opokuma
Local Government Area of Bayelsa State and Opia and Ikenya Communities, both in Warri North Local
Government Area of Delta State. During this inhumane exercise, soldiers burnt homes, killed over 50
innocent lives, including the traditional rulers of Kaiama and Opia towns, and wounded over 300
persons nearly beyond medical repairs (The Guardian, January 13, 1999).

It is on record however, that the former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, had in November 1999 visited
the extractive community of Odi in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government of Bayelsa State with fire and
brimstone, after they had killed 12 policemen in a communal conflict. In this raid alone, over two
thousand deaths were recorded, many more missing, thousands forced to flee and virtually no house
was left standing in Odi (Ibeanu, 2008:27). Obasanjo also established the Joint Task Force (JTF), in 2003,
following the ethnic clashes between the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo of Warri. Also government forces,
commanded by Brigadier Gen. Zakariah Yuduma, in an operation codenamed 'Flash 3' deployed
helicopter, gunship and an amphibious platoon to attack Asari Dokubo's hometown of Buguma, leading
to innumerable casualties in both sides. Sequel to the kidnap of ten oil officials (6 Philippians and 4
Nigerians) by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the JTF had in May 2009
engaged in an indiscriminate aerial bombardment of the Niger Delta region, mainly in the Baramati
community in Warri, where over 100 lives were reportedly lost and thousands of people displaced (BBC,
Focus On Africa, May 15, 2009; Dorcheveller Radio, May 20, 2009). The Federal Government has spent a
lot of money for security in Niger Delta, especially in funding the JTF, other than sustainable
development initiative. For instance, in 2008, the Federal Government budgeted about N400 billion for
security of the region while about N50 billion was budgeted for the Niger Delta Ministry.

Inversely, the predominant input of excessive military action as a feedback mechanism to the Niger
Delta debacle has rather yielded to more serious security crisis in Nigeria. It triggered, yet, stiff agitation
and militancy in Niger Delta and made it to become much more lethal in recent times. Reacting to the
drawback and overall failure of the military approach to quell the crisis in Niger Delta, Ikejiani-Clark
(2007:16) stated:

It is a known fact that the protracted struggle in the Niger Delta has shown that military action is not a
viable option for dealing with underdevelopment and ecological /environmental problems and
restoration of peace in the area. Hence it is perplexing why in the 2008 national budget, the sum of
N444.6 billion was allocated to security in the Niger Delta without looking at other sectors (social and
infrastructural development) that would promote peace.

According to Ibeanu (2008:24) the almost automatic response of state officials to this contradiction of
securities is not to seek consensus and negotiate common grounds, instead it is to unleash state
violence through militarism. He further noted that:

State violence clearly illustrates the continuing tendency of the people in power to privatize the
instrumentalities of the state in this case using them to pursue the private interests of the state officials
and petrobusiness. In effect, although conflicts in the Delta involve social groups, this is only an illusion
because actually it is the violence unleashed by a privatized state that is the cause of conflict.
In spite of the intensive securitization of the Niger Delta, the threat posed by militant activities in the
area has continued to appear in geometric dimension. Virtually, all oil majors have been hit by the
upsurge of violence in the Niger Delta. The Trans-Niger Delta pipeline, a network of heavy-duty pipelines
meant to transverse to the northern part of the country through the Niger Delta has also been
suspended (Newswatch, April 18. 2004). The Henry Okah led Movement for the Emancipation of Niger
Delta (MEND), kidnapped 10 oil officials (6 Philippians and 4 Nigerians), on May, 2009 (Dorcheveller
Radio, May 5, 2009; 7:13am).

MEND has succeeded in shutting off approximately 711,000 barrels per day of Nigeria's daily output of
2.5 million barrels per day, nearly 25 percent of her total oil exports (ISN Security Watch, July 11, 2007).
According to records, about one thousand people lost their lives in 2008 and another 300 persons
including foreign oil workers were taken hostage (Newswatch, May 4, 2009:14). This militant group had
claimed responsibility for attacks that had killed nearly 50 members of the nation's security agencies,
including a deadly attack on Shell Benisede flow station in January, 2006, that badly damaged the oil
facilities and left fourteen soldiers and two civilian contractors dead (International Crisis Group,
2006b:1).

On Sunday, July 12, 2009, MEND attacked the Atlas Cove Jetty in Lagos, using two heavy caliber machine
guns and gun boats loaded with a total of eighteen (18) experienced Commandos who subdued naval
resistance, and succeeded in killing over 4 naval officers (Vanguard, July 15, 2009). On the 15th of March
2010, MEND detonated two bombs which were mounted in two cars stationed at about 200 metres
away from the Government House Annex, Warri, Delta State, venue of a two-day post amnesty dialogue
by Vanguard Newspapers, killing three innocent lives (Vanguard, March 16, 2010). It is therefore very
necessary for us to now take a summary look at the various activities of the militant groups in the Niger
Delta, which have largely contributed to insecurity in the country.

ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS MILITANT GROUPS OPERATING IN NIGER DELTA FROM JANUARY 2006-JULY
2009.
 Date Incident Location Casualty
Jan. 11, Attack on Royal Dutch/shell's Offshore field 4 foreign
2006 oil facilities Rivers State workers
kidnaped
Jan. 11, Explosion on major crude oil Forcados, Delta -
2006 pipeline operated by
Royal Dutch/Shell
Jan. 15, Royal Dutch/Shell facilities Port Harcourt 17 soldiers
2006 was attacked by MEND killed
May 10, An executive with US based Port Harcourt 1 death
2006 oil company, Baker Hughes occurred
was shot and killed
June 2, A Norwegian offshore rig Port Harcourt 16 crew
2006 was attacked members
kidnaped
Aug. 21, C lash between M END and Bayelsa 10 MEND
2006 security agencies fighters killed
Sept. 12, Militants attacked Chevron Delta 1 worker
2006 offshore oil field killed
Oct. 2, M EN D fighters attack offshore 10 soldiers
2006 N igerian soldiers patrol killed
boat
Oct. 2, A Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell Port Harcourt Some officials
2006 convoy was attacked wounded
Oct. 3, Western oil workers taken 7 Western oil
2006 Bayelsa
hostage w o r k e r s
Taken hostage
Oct. 4, Nigerian soldiers stormed a
2006 militant camp Rivers 9 soldiers were
killed
Nov. 22, Clash between Nigerian soldiers Rivers 1 soldier died
2006 and some militants When soldiers
stormed a militant camp to rescue
Kidnapped oil workers
4 foreign oil
Dec. 7, Kidnap of foreign oil workers Rivers
workers
2006
Kidnapped
Dec. 21, Obagi pumping station attacked Delta 3 guards killed
2006
Jan. 16, Militants attacked an oil vessel Bonny Island,
2007 near Bonny Island Rivers -
March 4, M ajor spill at a pipeline feeding Rivers -
2007 the Bonny export terminal
due to sabotage
S ix expatriate w orkers from an Funiwa, Delta 6 oil workers
May 1, offshore facility ow ned
2007 kidnaped
by Chevron w ere seized
May 3, M E N D f ig h te r s se iz e d e ig h t R iv e r s 8 f o r e ig n o il
2007 f o r e ig n o il w o r k e r s f r o m a n w o r k e r s H e ld
o ff sh o r e v e sse l h o sta g e
May 4, Saipan site was attacked causing O k o n o / O k p o h Several oil workers
2007 shuts in production Wounded
May 7, Protests caused Chevron to shut Abiteye, -
2007 down the Abiteye flow station Delta State
that feeds Escravos export terminal
May 8, Three major oil pipelines (one in Brass/Akasa, -
2007 Brass and two In the Akasa area) Bayelsa State
run by Agip were attacked
May 10, Protesters occupied the Bomu
2007 Bomu,
pipeline system Causing Shell Rivers -
shut-in production feeding Bonny
Light export route
May 16, Gunmen attacked the country home
2007 Ogbia, -
of the Vice President(now President Bayelsa
Goodluck Jonathan)
May 28, rotests at Bom u pipeline system
P Bomu,
2007 m ade S hell to S hut-in production
through its N em be Creek trunk Rivers -
June 14, Gunmen stormed the Ogainbiri 24 workers
2007 flow station operated by Eni Ogainbiri, taken
Petroleum Delta hostage
June 18, Militants overran the Chevron-Eni Port 30 innocent
2007 Abiteye flow station causing shut
Harcourt citizens died
-in crude oil production in the attack
Aug. 3, Militants attacked Port Harcourt
2007 city destroying some public Port Harcourt30 innocent
citizens died
properties such as the NNPC mega
filling station and radio station in the attack
Sept. 20, Gunmen claiming to be MEND S o u t h e r n 11 persons
2007 kidnapped 11 Members of the Ondo State kidnapped
ruling PDP
Oct. 20, MEND attacked a Columbian
2007 oil worker - 1 death
Oct. 26, Six oil workers attacked Six oil
2007 workers
kidnapped
Oct. 30, Naval warship, NNS Obula, Offshore,
2007 deployed to rescue the EA Field River
belonging to Shell was attacked
 Jul. 24/26
Foreign oil workers attacked and Rivers
, 2008 kidnapped
July 28, Two major attacks on Shell oil pipe-
2008 lines
Aug. 8, Militants attacked Ondo State Oil Ileje, Ondo
2008 Producing Development
Commission (OSOPADEC)
and 4 others
Aug. 12, Militants destroyed oil gas pipeline Rivers
2008 in Rivers State
Aug. 19, Oil pipeline destroyed in Delta State Delta
2008
Aug. 24, Oil vessel at Bonny Island, Rivers Rivers
2008 hijacked
Aug. 30, Militants and security forces clashed Rivers
2008
Sep.13-15, Kula oil platform operated by Rivers
2008 Chevron and A lakri, and flow station
operated by Shell w ere attacked
July 12, MEND attacked Atlas Cove Jetty Lagos 4 Naval
2009 with caliber machine guns officers

Source: November 2008 Report of Technical Committee on Niger Delta ( See also Newswatch, May 4,
2009, Vol. 49 No. 18; Vanguard, July 15, 2009)

In fact, these threats have immediate impact on Nigeria's oil production. By 2005, Nigeria's oil output
has been cut by one quarter by the militant's activities, from about 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per
day to roughly 1.2 million barrels per day. When the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
invaded Port Harcourt in September, 2004, about 500 lives were lost. Agip, an Italian oil firm, whose
presence in the region is also prominent, had hurriedly shut its 28,000 barrels of crude oil per day facility
due to the 'Operation Locus Feast' declared by the NDPVF boss, Alhaji Asari Dokubo (Onuoha,
2008:290).
Shell, the largest oil producer in Nigeria, which used to produce more than half of a daily output of 1.5
million barrels per day, has shut down more than 50 percent of its land and shallow water oil production
due to increasing militant attacks (Scroll, February 11, 2008). Consequent upon this low oil output, Shell
opted for massive restructuring, which would save her cost, by retrenching over 2000 of her total
workforce, as militants had repeatedly attacked her onshore oil production facilities since February,
2006 (The Nation, Feb.14, 2008). In terms of financial loss, by 2006, the losses had risen to over half a
million barrels per day. This, coupled with the oil crisis in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, has led to an
upward swing in the price of crude oil in the world market (Times, May 22, 2006:20; Thisday, July 14,
2006). By 2008, as oil prices rose in the international market, the losses and the cost of the Niger Delta
militancy became glaring. The theft was estimated at about $4 billion yearly (The News, Vol.23, 2004;
Scroll, Feb.11, 2008). Specifically, Nigeria has lost over N53 billion to petroleum pipeline vandalization
alone between 2006 and 2007 (The Guardian, Feb.16, 2008:3). In fact, the November 2008 Report of the
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, revealed that the country has lost about N8.84 trillion or $61.6
billion to oil theft and sabotage in the volatile region between 2006 and 2008. In 2006 alone, the total
cost of oil loss per barrel due to the activities of the militants was N2.45 trillion or $27.2 billion, while an
additional N283 billion or $1.9 billion was lost to oil bunkering. In 2008, Nigeria lost an estimated
revenue of about N2.97 trillion or $20.7 billion to attacks on oil installations, resulting in shutdowns and
spillages in the first nine months of 2008 (Newswatch, 2009:12).

The Amnesty Method

In the light of this reality, there have been well over three successful arms collection exercises in Nigeria,
in an effort to mop up illegal weapons that floods the country. The main aim was to compensate the
militants through financial inducements, in order to dissuade them from fomenting crisis and distorting
the progress of oil exploration in Niger Delta, of which returns virtually feed the whole nation. The
following table provides thorough information of the history and other important details on amnesty in
Nigeria
ILLEGAL WEAPONS COLLECTED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMES (1999-
2009)

Year No . o f Illeg a l Participants Coordinating Destruction

Wea po ns Body Exercise
Surrendered
July 2001 428 riffles Ijaw Youths and National buried at sea
494 imported many cult gro- Committee
pistols ups located in
287 local pistols Niger Delta
48 dane guns
Jan. 2002/ 1,902 assorted Niger Delta National
June 2003 firearms cult groups Committee not destroyed
13,271 rounds
of ammunition
2004 1000 guns (AK- FG Committe not destroyed
47s and SA. NDPVF and (chaired by
Vz 58s) NDV Peter Odili)
2007 Not successful MEND Rivers State
Govt. -
2009 Over 10,000 Over 1,000 Niger Amnesty
weapons- 2,760 Delta militants implementa- not destroyed
assorted guns, (ungrouped) tion Commi
287, 445 ammu ttee
nition of different
caliber, 18 gun-
boats, 763 dyna-
mites, 1,090 dyn-
amite caps, 3, 155
magazines, eight
rocket launchers
and several dyna-
mite cables, bullet
proof jackets and
jack-knives

Sources: Compiled from Asuni, J.B. (2009); International Alert (2003);

Ginifer, J. and Ismail, O. (2005)

One thing that agitates the mind from these futile exercises is the billions of naira squandered in the
process. The last amnesty exercise alone cost the federal government a whooping sum, well over 98
billion (Vanguard, July 6, 2011). And that has not been all successful. In as much as we are not totally
against this cash consolation, one bad aspect of this reward, however, is that it only strengthens the gun
purchasing ability of the militants. Those who hitherto worked as apprentices may be economically
empowered to resume self enterprises and start purchasing more illegal weapons themselves. Even
those who are non militants may be enticed to join the groups in order to benefit as well at the
appropriate time. Besides this, the whole exercise tends to encourage disobedience to law and
discourage observance of the law, most especially when the non militants are carefully excluded from
this 'illegal arms for money politics'. But more to the already stated is the fact that after this
magnanimous amnesty is being granted, there tends to evolve many other split groups that seeks for
recognition. And for this, they usually begin by asserting more lethal attacks. Before it is known, another
amnesty bell would ring. In short, the whole exercise goes on and on in this cyclic trend. It looks like an
apprenticeship, and once the amnesty pardon is granted, people get settled. This holds true for the
genesis of most of the dreaded militants groups of today including the notorious Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) as was confirmed by Asuni (2009).

By a simple understanding, amnesty means forgiveness of offences and bestowment of unmerited

freedom and 'favours' to offenders of the state. But in another sense, it can as well imply freedom from
the law, in order to perpetrate more harm, as it has become. But for how long will militants/armed
groups live in criminality so that amnesty will abound? The table above suggests that the amnesty thing
has become a regular schedule. It is quite apparent that virtually all the amnesty programmes held in
this country have after an ad-hoc period collapsed. One is not awed, even, as the Federal Government
lacked the political will for addressing the socio-economic challenges, especially of infrastructural
architecture, of environment, which faces Niger Delta. Therefore, in applying ornamental measures, the
Federal Government has only achieved a simplistic and ephemeralistic détente in all the exercises. More
disturbingly, high level government officials are not only involved in oil bunkering business (Lubeck,
Watts, and Lipschutz, 2007), but have protected and backed armed militias to enable them to continue
operating without interference by security forces. This high powered encumbrance further preempts
any anticipated headway.

By and large, we strongly maintain that amnesty exercises without genuine effort put forward by the
federal government towards alleviating poverty, building empowering infrastructures and resuscitating
environmental collapse in Niger Delta, will always fail after a short period of detente.
REFERENCES

1. Adesina O. C. (2000) Revenue Allocation Commissions and Contradictions in Nigeria's Federalism

in Kunle Amuwo et al (ed), Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan Spectrum Books
Limited.

2. Akinwalere D. (2001) Reject the New Revenue Allocation in Sunday Guardian September
23,2001.

3. Anyanwu J.C. (1993) Monetary Economics: Theory Policy & Institution. Onitsha, Hybrid
Publishers Ltd.

4. Ayu I. (1994) Reflections on Federalism and National Assembly Politics ii Nigeria: In J. Isawa
Elaigwu, Logams P.C. and Galadima H.S. ( Federalism and Nation Building in Nigeria: The challenges of
the 21* | Century; Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations.

5. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Federal Government Pn Lagos.

6. Dare L. O. (1979) Perspectives on Federalism in Akinyemi A. B., Cole P.1 Ofonago W. (Eds)
Readings on Federalism Lagos, Nigeria Instituted] International Affairs.

7. David R. (1967) "The Federal Principle Reconsidered" in Wildauski American Federalism in

Perspective Boston Little Brown.

8. Etzioni Amitai (1965) Political Unification: A Comparative Study of leaders and Forces. N. Y. Rine
hart and Winston

9. Friedrich C. (1968) Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice N. Y. Pracgar

10. Graham J.F, (1964):" Fiscal Adjustment in a Federal Country" in R. Robertson (eds) Inter
Governmental Fiscal Relationships Toronto Canada Tax Foundation.
11. Jinadu L. A. (1979) "A Note on the Theory of Federalism" in Akinyemi, et al op cit.

12. Livingston W.S. (1968) "A Note on the Nature of "Federalism" in Meekinson (ed) Canadian
Federalism Myth or Reality, Methuen.

13. Obi C. I. (2000) "The Impact of oil on Nigeria's Revenue Allocation: Problems and Prospects for
National Reconstruction" in Kunle Anuwo, et al (eds)

14. Olalokun F. A. (1979) "Nigerian Federal Finances: Issues and Choices". In Akinyemi A.B. Etal
(eds) op cit.

15. Osisioma B. C. (1996) "Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: The Search for a
viable fonnula" in Journal of Management Sciences Vol. I. No. I Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awfca.

16. WheareK. C. (1943), Federal Government New York Oxford University Press.

NEWSPAPERS

The Guardian, Monday, September 10,2001

The Guardian, Tuesday, September, 11,2001

The Guardian, Sunday, September 23,2001

The Guardian, Saturday, April 6,2002

The Guardian, Sunday, April 7,2002

References

Aluko, M.E. (2005) “Derivation, Resource Control and the NPRC Joining the Debate”.
www.dawodu,com/aluko/resource control/ 121.234htm.
Asuni, J.B. (2009) Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations.

Dafinone, David (2001) “Resource Control: The Economic & Political Dimension”. The Guardian, April 8.

Edwin, Clarke (2003) “Why Obasanjo may not get South-South Votes”. TheSun, April 19.

Eteng, L.A. (1996). Minority Rights Under Nigeria's Federal Structure. Proceedings of the Conference On
Constitutions and Federalism, Held at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. 23-25 April.

Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal
Government Press.

Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal
Government Press.

Ginifer, J. and Ismail, O. (2005) Armed Violence and Poverty in Nigeria: Mini case study for the Armed
Violence and Poverty Initiative. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security.

Ibeanu, O. (2008). Affluence and Affliction: The Niger Delta as a Critique of Political Science In Nigeria.
27th Inaugural Lecture of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Delivered on February 20.

Ikejiani-Clark, M. (2007) “Nigeria: Oil, Internal Threats and Vulnerability”. In Journal of International
Politics and Development Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, July-December.

International Alert (2003) “Small Arms Control in Nigeria” in West African Series, No.5

International Crisis Group (2006b) “Nigeria: Want in The Midst of Plenty” in ICG Africa Report, No.113,
July.

Lubeck, P., Watts, M., and Lipschutz, R. (2007) “Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the
'Securing' of Nigerian Democracy” in International Policy Report, No. 2. Washington, DC: February.

Nwohoh, C. and Edemodu, A. (2002) “The Struggle for Resource Control”. The Guardian, April 7.

Obi, E.A. and Obikeze, S.O. (eds.) (2004) Federalism and National Integration in Nigeria. Onitsha:
Bookpoint Ltd.

Okolie, A.M. (2009) “Fiscal Federalism and Conduct of Nigeria's External Relations, 1960-2009” in
Nigerian Journal of Politics and Administration, Vol. 2, No. 1, January.
Onuoha, J. (2008). Beyond Diplomacy: Contemporary Issues in International Relations, Nsukka: Great AP
Express Publishers Ltd.

Ovwasa, L. (1999) “Oil and the Minority Question”. In H. A. Saliu (ed). Isuess In Contemporary Political
Economy of Nigeria, Ilorin: Sally and Associates.

Panter, Keith (1978) Brick Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria. London: Frankcass.

Raji, W. (1998) “Oil Resources, Hegemony Politics and the Struggle for Re-inventing Past-Colonial
Nigeria” in N. Abdul-Rasheed (ed). Ogoni's Agonies: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Crisis in Nigeria, Trenton, NJ:
Africa world Press Incorporation.

Semenitari, Ibim (2002) “A Presidents Albatross”. Tell, December 20.

Technical Committee on Niger Delta (2008) November 2008 Report of Technical Committee on Niger
Delta. Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria.

News items/Newspers

BBC, Focus On Africa, May 15, 2009

Dorcheveller Radio, May 20, 2009

ISN Security Watch, July 11, 2007

Newswatch, April 18, 2004

Newswatch, May 4, 2009, Vol. 49 No. 18

The Guardian, April 7, 2002

The Guardian, July 2, 2001

The Guardian, January 15, 1999

The Guardian, Feb.16, 2008

The Nation, Feb.14, 2008

The News, Vol.23, 2004

Scroll, Feb.11, 2008

Scroll, February 11, 2008

ThisDay, July 14, 2006

Times, May 22, 2006:20

Vanguard, July 15, 2009

Vanguard, July 6, 2011

Vanguard, March 16, 2010

Vanguard, July 15, 2009

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE POLITICS OF POPULATION CENSUS IN NIGERIA

The issue of determining the population of Nigeria has been a very contentious issue since the
attainment of political independence in 1960. The reason for this is not far-fetched. People believe that
population is a political weapon. The higher the number, the more government amenities an area will
stand to attract. Higher population figures lend credence among other reasons to the demand for more
seats in parliament, more local governments and more states for a particular tribe or region. It therefore
becomes expedient for people to inflate the figures of their regions and deflate that of others. These are
simply the reasons behind the tension that has continually accompanied Nigeria's attempt to answer the
simple question of "How many are we?" through a population census.

The first population census in Nigeria took place in 1952/53. The exercise which was carried out by the
colonial masters was conducted between May 1952 and August 1953, and put the population of the
country at 31.5 million people. The breakdown is as follows:

REGIONS POPULATION

NORTH 16,840,000

WEST 6,087,000
EAST 7,218,000

LAGOS (CAPITAL TERRITORY) 272,000

Source: J. C Caldwell and C. Okonjo (1969)

Though the census went down in history as the first real organized attempt to determine the population
of Nigeria, it still had one major problem that brought its validity into question. The problem had to do
with the fact that the regions were not counted simultaneously. Thus, the Eastern region was counted
almost one year after the North and six months after the West. The time difference was enough for a
change in the population distribution as people had ample time to migrate from one region to another.
This problem was however vitiated by the fact that, to a greater extent Nigerians did not over politicize
the census as future ones. Thus, the issue of inflating figures to gain political advantage was by then, not
in vogue.

THE 1962 CENSUS

Following the attainment of political independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders felt the need to have a new
population census. Consequently, a census was scheduled for 1962. The exercise which lasted for more
than one week started on may 13 1962. About 50,000 enumerators were employed, while the cost of
the exercise was put at N3 million.

The delay in producing the preliminary figures led to considerable anxiety, agitation, and suspicion. Most
unfortunately, the expatriate Federal Census Officer who was in charge of the exercise, Mr. J. J, Warren
himself questioned the authenticity of the figures gotten from some areas especially the Eastern region.
According to him, "the figures for five divisions, Awka, Brass, Degema, Eket and Opobo which showed a
120 percent increase in population can certainly be rejected out of hand" (Ojiako, 1981). The federal
Minister of Economic Development, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, said that though census officers in the various
regions had been instructed to forward summaries of the various regions to the federal Census Officer,
so that the preliminary figures would be published by August, it was only the Eastern region that had
submitted their total figures by July, while the North equally submitted most of the figures. That of the
West was submitted on November 2nd, 1962.

The Minister advised that due to the notable inconsistencies in some parts of Eastern region, a complete
re-enumeration of most divisions of the region will be necessary. As expected, the Eastern region
reacted, saying it feels maligned by the statements of both the Minister and the Census Officer. The
NCNC members in the parliament (the party in control of the East) passed a resolution expressing their
lack of confidence in the Minister and equally demanded the sack and deportation of the expatriate
federal Census Officer, Mr. Warren.
The political bickering brought about by the census led the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa
and the three regional Premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief S.L. Akintola and Dr. M.I. Okpara, for the North,
West and Eastern Regions respectively to announce after their meeting on February 10, 1963 that the
census figures of 1962 has been cancelled. It was also agreed that the Prime Minister would "take the
issue directly under his control" while the Premiers would be in charge of the census in their various
regions.

THE 1963 CENSUS

In preparing for the 1963 census, efforts were made to avoid the pitfalls that marred the previous one
held in 1962 which subsequently led to its cancellation.

First there was a reduction in the duration of the enumeration. Four days were mapped out for the
exercise. This was meant to minimize the incidence of migration of people from a location where they
have been counted to another, thereby, leading to double-counting.

There was also the exchange of enumerators among the regions in order to make sure that there were
no irregularities as witnessed in the previous census.

Another precautionary measure against inflation of figures was the insistence that counting should be at
sight. The previous exercise where Moslem women in purdah were not counted was stopped. Women
enumerators were employed from other regions to help in counting women in purdah.

Finally the Federal Census Officer must be a Nigerian, while the United Nations Advisory Team was also
involved.

Most unfortunately, despite all the precautionary measures put in place to avoid a repeat of the
shameful act of 1962, the 1963 census was a total failure.

The results of the census were announced on the 24th of February 1964 as follows;

REGIONS POPULATION

NORTH 29,777,986

EAST 12,388,646
WEST 10,278,500

MIDWEST 2,533,337

LAGOS (CAPITAL TERRITORY) 675,000

TOTAL 55,653,821

Source: J.C Caldwell and C. Okonjo (l981)

As expected, controversy trailed the announcement of the interim report. The then Premier of the
Eastern Region, Dr. Michael Okpara, announced on February 28 that his government completely rejects
the results on the grounds that "with inflation of such astronomical proportions, the figures obtained
taken as a whole are worse than useless". He was particular about the Northern Region, which the
census showed had more population than the other regions (including Lagos) put together. The Premier
of the newly created Mid-Western Region Chief Dennis Osadebe equally rejected the census results. The
Action Group (which has been dislodged in the West by Akintola's NNDP) also rejected the figures.
However the figures were accepted by both the NPC and the NNDP.

So many other groups and individuals in Nigeria lent their voices to the census result which they felt was
highly manipulated. Students of the University of Ibadan not content with just calling on the
government to cancel the figures set out for Lagos in lorries; they were however stopped on the way by
the Police using tear-gas. The students of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, also organized a
demonstration as a reaction to the manipulation of the census. Thus, Nigeria's second attempt to
answer the simple question "How many are we?" Failed.

THE 1991 CENSUS

The Babangida administration conducted a population censes in 1991. The organ in charge of the
exercise, the National Population Commission was chaired by Alhaji Shehu Musa. 'Census 91' took place
on November 27, 28 and 29, 1991. The census figures were announced on March 19, 1992 and put the
population of Nigeria at 88,992,201.

As expected the report elicited some comments from many Nigerians. The figures made a mess of the
previous assumption that Nigeria was a country of 120 million people. Below is the breakdown of the
figures;
POPULATION OF NIGERIA BY STATE, SEX AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, 1991

S ta te M a le % F em a le % T o ta l %
Abia 1,125,999 1.3 1,212,488 1.4 2,338,487 2.6
Adamawa 1,050,791 1.2 1,051,262 1.2 2,102,053 2.4
Akwa-Ibom 1,167,829 1.3 1,241,784 1.4 2,409,613 2.7
Anambra 1,374,671 1.5 1,421,804 1.6 2,796,475 3.1
Bauchi 2,192,423 2.5 2,158,584 2.4 4,351,007 4.9
Benue 1,368,965 1.5 1,384,112 1.6 2,753,077 3.1
Borno 1,296,111 1.5 1,239,892 1.4 2,536,003 2.8
C/River 958,136 1.1 955,161 1.1 1,911,297 2.1
Delta 1,271,932 1.4 1,318,559 1.5 2,590,491 2.9
Edo 1,085,156 1.2 1,086,849 1.2 2,172,005 2.4
Enugu 1,475,648 1.7 1,678,732 1.9 3,154,380 3.5
Imo 1,166,448 1.3 1,319,187 1.5 2,485,635 2.8
Jigawa 1,455,780 1.6 1,419,754 1.6 2,875,525 3.2
Kaduna 2,041,141 2.3 1,894,477 2.1 3,935,618 4.4
Kano 2,958,736 3.3 2,851,734 3.2 5,810,470 6.5
Katsina 1,860,658 2.1 1,892,475 2.1 3,753,133 4.2
Kebbi 1,035,723 1.2 1,032,767 1.2 2,068,490 2.3
Kogi 1,039,484 1.2 1,108,272 1.2 2,147,756 2.4
Kwara 773,182 0.9 775,230 0.9 1,548,412 1.7
Lagos 3,010,604 3.4 2,714,512 3.1 5,725,116 6.4
Niger 1,252,466 1.4 1,169,115 1.3 2,421,581 2.7
Ogun 1,147,746 1.3 1,185,980 1.3 2,333,726 2.6
Ondo 1,881,884 2.1 1,903,454 2.1 3,785,338 4.3
Osun 1,043,126 1.2 1,115,017 1.3 2,158,143 2.4
Oyo 1,711,482 1.9 1,741,292 2 3,452,720 3.9
Plateau 1,657,209 1.9 1,655,203 1.9 3,312,412 3.7
Rivers 2,239,558 2.5 2,069,999 2.3 4,309,557 4.8
Sokoto 2,208,874 2.5 2,261,302 2.5 4,470,176 5
Taraba 759,872 0.9 752,291 0.8 1,512,163 1.7
Yobe 714,729 0.8 684,958 0.8 1,399,687 1.6
FCT, Abuja 205,299 0.2 166,357 0.2 371,674 0.4
Total 44,529,608 50 44,462,612 50 88,992,201 100

Source: National Population Commission (1991).

A breakdown of the figures according to the six Geo-political zones still shows that the Northern Region
is more populous than the South, an issue which has attracted so much criticisms and acrimony in the
past censuses. The breakdown according to geopolitical zones is as follows;

ZONE STATES POPULATION

NORTHEAST Jigawa, Kano, Kastina, Kebbi 27,095,415

Sokoto, Bauchi. Kaduna

NORTH WEST Borno, Yobe 5,190,468

NORTHERN MINORITIES Taraba, Adamawa, Benue

(MIDDLE BELT) Kogi, Plateau, Niger, Abuja 14,628, 825

SOUTH WEST Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, 19,168,110

Oyo, Kwara

SOUTHEAST (Core East) Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Imo 10,712,675

SOUTHERN MINORITIES Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, 12,939,426

Edo, Cross River

Part of the opposition to the census figures according to Cole (1992) was hinged on the fact that the
growth in the population of some states compared to previous census' figures is surprising, since other
states barely recorded any growth. This is more so when population growth under the same political
and climatic conditions ought to be more evenly spread.

Fasehun (1992) summarized the reservations about the census under the following points;

a. Nigeria is the only nation on earth in which men outnumber women. In all other countries of the
world, without exception, female population is higher by at least 1 percent.

b. This is even more applicable in our own situation in that our male population was recently
depleted by our civil war, by brain drain and women tend to live longer than men;
C. Nigeria is the only country on earth in which the wet coastal area is sparsely populated and the
Sahel hinter land very heavily populated;

d. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high economic activity, as obtained in the Southern
part of the country, is not associated with high population density;

e. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high level urbanization is not associated with thick
population;

f. Nigeria is the only nation on earth where high level of water consumption, high level of
electricity consumption, high level of school enrollment are not functions of population density.

Though the census was not rejected, it was quite clear that it was not generally acceptable. In fact what
actually embarrassed the government was the notion that we have more males in Nigeria than females
which is quite unnatural and unusual. Hence, not even the government uses the census figures. In
conclusion therefore, the 1991 census like its predecessors was actually manipulated to vindicate the
notion or contentious belief that the north is more populous than the south. Nothing can be farther
from the truth since the Sahel region can never and has never been more populated than the coastal or
forest region. Nigeria can't be different.

THE 2006 CENSUS

Indeed, the Nigerian constitution provides for population census for every 10 years. This is primarily for
socio-economic development of the country and for apportioning of members of the Senate, House of
Representatives, State Houses of Assembly and Local Government Legislature. As we have seen,
however, the last census of population took place in the country in 1991. Following this tradition, the
head count of 2006 was first due in 2001, but this was shifted to 2002 and later to 2005, ostensibly
because of the 2003 general elections. But rather than conducting it in 2005, it was later shifted and
scheduled between 21 and 25 March, 2006. This development certainly showed that personal interests,
of trying to consolidate power in 2001, and of creating ample time to make impeccable arrangements
that will see to his reinstatement in office in 2003, could not allow Obasanjo to achieve the census
exercise as at when due. These incessant shifts notwithstanding, former President Obasanjo inaugurated
the National Population Commission in November 2001, with the major mandate of conducting a
reliable, accurate and credible census for the country.

In pursuance of a reliable and credible census, the Commission designed its methodology and
incorporated new techniques and the most modern technology for conducting the census. Thus for the
first time, the 2006 census employed the use of Geographical Positioning System (GPS) and Satellite
imageries to carve out geo referenced Enumeration Area Maps, OMR/ICR/OCR machine readable forms
to record information, Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) to read fingerprints and
detect multiple counting, as well as Geographic Information System (GIS) used to store the 2006 census
result (Obasanjo, 2006).
However, an important challenge faced by the census body was how to incorporate the 6 newly created
states, including Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Gombe, Nasarawa and Zamfara, which were lastly carved out by
General Ibrahim Babangida, shortly before he stepped aside from office in August 1993. Therefore, with
the integration of these newly created states, the 2006 population stood at 140,003,542. This showed
that the country grew from its population of 88,992,201 in 1991 to 140,003,542 in 2006 portraying a
difference of 51,011,341. This difference also corresponds with the reality of the annual growth rate of
the Nigerian population, which steadies at 3 percent, approximately at the rate of 3,400,757 (additional
persons) each year. This being the case, we must however point out that it is totally abnormal for a
country's annual population growth rate to be anything above 1.5 percent. Since this has not been the
case with Nigeria, the important question therefore becomes; to what extent are these rising population
figures relevant or correspond to the periodic adjustment of the number of government structures (new
states, local governments, and enhanced legislative representations), social facilities, infrastructural
development etc. Again, how has the government coped in empowering and creating more job
opportunities for these teeming 51,011,341 new entrants into the biology of the nation, since the past
15 years? Let us now take a comprehensive look at the breakdown of the 2006 census.

POPULATION OF NIGERIA BY STATE, SEX AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, 2006

S ta te M a le % F em a le % T o ta l %
Abia 1,125,999 1.3 1,212,488 1.4 2,338,487 2.6
Adamawa 1,050,791 1.2 1,051,262 1.2 2,102,053 2.4
Akwa-Ibom 1,167,829 1.3 1,241,784 1.4 2,409,613 2.7
Anambra 1,374,671 1.5 1,421,804 1.6 2,796,475 3.1
Bauchi 2,192,423 2.5 2,158,584 2.4 4,351,007 4.9
Benue 1,368,965 1.5 1,384,112 1.6 2,753,077 3.1
Borno 1,296,111 1.5 1,239,892 1.4 2,536,003 2.8
C/River 958,136 1.1 955,161 1.1 1,911,297 2.1
Delta 1,271,932 1.4 1,318,559 1.5 2,590,491 2.9
Edo 1,085,156 1.2 1,086,849 1.2 2,172,005 2.4
Enugu 1,475,648 1.7 1,678,732 1.9 3,154,380 3.5
Imo 1,166,448 1.3 1,319,187 1.5 2,485,635 2.8
Jigawa 1,455,780 1.6 1,419,754 1.6 2,875,525 3.2
Kaduna 2,041,141 2.3 1,894,477 2.1 3,935,618 4.4
Kano 2,958,736 3.3 2,851,734 3.2 5,810,470 6.5
Katsina 1,860,658 2.1 1,892,475 2.1 3,753,133 4.2
Kebbi 1,035,723 1.2 1,032,767 1.2 2,068,490 2.3
Kogi 1,039,484 1.2 1,108,272 1.2 2,147,756 2.4
Kwara 773,182 0.9 775,230 0.9 1,548,412 1.7
Lagos 3,010,604 3.4 2,714,512 3.1 5,725,116 6.4
Niger 1,252,466 1.4 1,169,115 1.3 2,421,581 2.7
Ogun 1,147,746 1.3 1,185,980 1.3 2,333,726 2.6
Ondo 1,881,884 2.1 1,903,454 2.1 3,785,338 4.3
Osun 1,043,126 1.2 1,115,017 1.3 2,158,143 2.4
Oyo 1,711,482 1.9 1,741,292 2 3,452,720 3.9
Plateau 1,657,209 1.9 1,655,203 1.9 3,312,412 3.7
Rivers 2,239,558 2.5 2,069,999 2.3 4,309,557 4.8
Sokoto 2,208,874 2.5 2,261,302 2.5 4,470,176 5
Taraba 759,872 0.9 752,291 0.8 1,512,163 1.7
Yobe 714,729 0.8 684,958 0.8 1,399,687 1.6
FCT, Abuja 205,299 0.2 166,357 0.2 371,674 0.4
Total 44,529,608 50 44,462,612 50 88,992,201 100
Source: National Population Commission (2006).

Presenting the result of the 2006 census to the President, the Chairman of the National Population
Commission Chairman, Alhaji Samaila Makama, assured the nation that the census was conducted with
considerable transparency and confidentiality. Declaring the result formally, President Obasanjo stated
on January 9, 2007, that Nigeria's provisional population as at March 2006 stood at 140,003,542.
Remarkably, the features of the result released by the population commission did not deviate
significantly from the features of the 1991 result. First, the Northern population tremendously
surpassed that of the population of Southern Nigeria. Second, one wonders why the number of men in
the country again surpassed that of the women in a terrifying manner, as was the case with the previous
census in the country. As can be discerned from the table above, the 2006 census shows that men were
higher than women with the difference of 3,416,176 compared with the difference of 66,996 in 1991.
These differences represent an average of 1 percent distribution in favour of the population of men in
the country. More importantly, unlike the 1991 count, when the number of men were higher in only
about 14 states, though higher enough to dominate the total number of women in the entire country
i.e. Bauchi, Borno, Cross River, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, Lagos, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba, Yobe
and FCT, with women dominating in the rest of the 17 states; the case of 2006 census was entirely
different. This time around, number of men was higher in virtually all the states of the federation, while
the number of women appears higher in only four states i.e. Ebonyi, Enugu, Kebbi and Ogun.

This result erroneously shows that either that the number of women are fast depleting higher than men
or that males are mostly born these days. Beyond that, this odd reality has some attendant political
implications. With this figure, one can confidently argue that the open-mouthed call for affirmative
action or gender equity in politics, employment and other activities of the country is indirectly a call for
'gender inequity', or for marginalization and under-representation of the male folks, who are assumedly
(actually) greater in number than the females. On a very lighter note, with the way these figures are
appearing, it means that in few years to come, too many men will be scrambling for few ladies. This may
unavoidably result to a serious increase in bride price. If this happens, then few men may marry after all,
and few children conceived. Perhaps, this may thereafter serve as self-regulatory mechanism for
controlling the rising population.

Third, another falsehood that played itself again in the 2006 census was the underestimation of the
Lagos state population. Adele (2009) observed that hell was let loose with the announcement of the
2006 census, with contentious captions in Nigerian Dailies such as: '…It is tinted with political
permutations' (The Guardian , January 12, 2007), 'Delay in release gave room for manipulation' (The
Guardian, January 12, 2007), 'Census 2006: matters arising' (The Guardian, January 15, 2007), 'Lagos'
and the fallacies in national census figures' (The Punch, February 6, 2007). The list was endless. All point
to the fact that the census was a ridiculous exercise. Particularly, the Lagos state count was generally
seen as absolutely underestimated. The former Lagos State Governor, Senator Ahmed Tinubu,
expressed his displeasure at a book presentation, entitled 'Errors, Miscalculations and Omissions: The
Falsification of the Lagos Census Figures'. Tinubu had stated, “
We can afford a recount throughout the country. We want a recount in Lagos State. This is the height of
corruption. Falsifying census figures just to please some people. No amount of adjustment done to the
figure can make it right. The figure is totally rejected. We have enough support and funding from the
United Nations and the European Union. So let's have a recount” (Tinubu, 2007).

As a matter of fact, the controversy revolves around the population of both Kano and Lagos states. The
figures presented above show that Kano had about 9,383,682 people, while Lagos had only 9,013,634.
This means that Kano is the most populated state in the country. For this reason, Adele had noted that
the figure released for Lagos by the National Population Commission did not correlate with any available
social parameters such as birth rate, number of houses and physical structures in a given area, vehicular
density, children immunization, waste generation, school population and the cosmopolitan nature of the
state, through which population can be determined. In fact, the number of children immunized in Lagos
state in 2004 was about 3,289,560; in 2005 it was 3,219,676; while in 2006 it was 3,186,195. Besides, the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimated a figure of about 16 million for Lagos state based on the
result of children immunized from 2000 to 2006. Lagos as at the 2006 census was having about 26,000
Enumeration Areas, and going by the National Population Commission (NPC) manual indicating that 500
- 1000 people should reside per Enumeration Area in an urban city/state. Therewith, following an
average of these figures which stands at 750 people per Enumeration Area, the population of Lagos
state should be about 19,500,000 i.e. (750 x 26,000) (The Punch, February 6, 2007). More so, Adele
further notes that the figure released by the NPC for Lagos state which stood at 9,013, 534 is actually far
less from what the total number of the residents should be. And as the data gotten from a similar census
conducted by Lagos state itself hints, the Lagos population should stand within the circumference of
17,552,942.

Nevertheless, as has always been the case, the census was neither rejected by the government nor
recounted for Lagos state. The true answer to the question “how many are we?” still remains.
REFERENCES

1. Adele, B.J. (2009) “Falsification of population census data in a heterogeneous Nigerian state: The
fourth republic example” in African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 3 (8), pp.
311-319.

2. Caldwell J.C (1969) The demographic situation in Caldwell J.C.& Okonjo C. (Eds) The population
of tropical Africa New York Columbia University Press.

3. Ekanem 1.1. (1992) The 1963 Nigerian census : A critical appraisal. Benin City, Ethiope Publishing
Corporation.

4. Obasanjo O (2006) Census is indispensable to the nations quest of sustainable development. See
The Guardian, March, 21.
5. Okeibunor J. C. (1995) Issues and politics of population census in Nigeria: A sociological analysis
of the problems of counting Nigerians in Okanya D. O. (Ed) Great issues in Nigerian government &
politics Enugu, Mary dan Printing Company.

6. Okonjo C., "A Preliminary medium estimate of the 1962 midyear population of Nigeria", in
Caldwell J. C. and Okonjo C., (eds), op cit.

7. Tinubu, B.A (2007) The falsification of Lagos census figures. Being the Test of a Report by the
Lagos State Government. See The Punch, February 6.

8. Udoh R. K. (1969) "Population & politics in Nigeria" in Caldweil J. C. & Okonjo C. (Eds), The
population of tropical Africa. New York Columbia University Press.

NEWSPAPERS

1. The Guardian, Friday, March 27, 1992

2. The Guardian, Monday, March 23, 1992 P.60

3. The Guardian, Monday, March 23, 1992 P.I

4. The Guardian, Morj4ay, March 23, 1992

5. The Guardian, Sunday, April 5, 1992

6. The Guardian, January 12, 2007

7. The Guardian, January 15, 2007

8. The Punch, February 6, 2007

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY AND WESTERN CAPITALISM

In this section, we are going to look at the process of incorporating the Nigerian economy into the web
of international capitalist framework. Ake (1981) has identified three factors as being responsible for
this incorporation. They are;

1. Monetization of the economy.

2. Imperialism of colonial trade.

3. Metropolitan investment and infrastructure development.

MONETIZATION

Monetization means the pervasiveness of money as a medium of exchange in an economy. In pre-

colonial Nigeria, many objects like cowries, manillas, salt, iron, copper etc. had served as mediums of
exchange. With the colonial penetration, a convenient and invertible currency had to be introduced in
order to overcome the glaring inadequacies the pre-colonial currencies. The British introduced a new
currency - the pounds. However, for the new currency to take hold of the economy, the pre-colonial
currencies had to be destroyed. They were eventually "annihilated by depreciation and displacement"
the next stage after introducing the new currency was monetization -making the currency pervasive in
the economy. This was done through many methods. The first was to encourage wage labour mainly by
force, by introducing taxes which must be paid with the new currency. Since those who were not
subsistent farmers had no means of getting the new currency, they had no choice than to take up paid
employment. Also some Nigerian merchants that were unfortunate to find themselves in areas where
they were competing with European Merchants, eventually found themselves ruined at last. Since their
businesses were destroyed by Europeans through competition, they had no choice than to take up paid
employment. The next aspect of the monetization process was the introduction of the modern credit
system by the establishment of Banks. It was through the monetization of the Nigerian economy, that it
was tied to the international capitalist economy. The currency was tied to that of Britain. "The monetary
system not only helped to create a capitalist economy, but also a capitalist economy structurally
dependent on foreign economies" (Ake 1981).

THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE

The role of trade in integrating the Nigerian economy into the international capitalist system was very
profound. It should be understood that trade provided the first contact between Europe and Nigeria.
Later colonialism strengthened this tie. As has been pointed out earlier, the monetization of the African
economy was for the purpose of facilitating trade in the colony. In Nigeria, colonialism changed the
system of trade between the Europeans and local people. Prior to colonialism, Europeans were content
with staying at the coast, while some Nigerian middlemen brought what they needed for them. These
were essentially raw materials which were exchanged with finished goods from Europe. Incidentally
with colonialism, the Europeans started penetrating the interior thereby displacing the middlemen, who
economically were among the first victims of the system.

The European's now basking in their new role as colonial masters started developing an interest in
primary production in order to guarantee a continuous flow of raw materials. On this phenomenon Ake
argued that;

Extending primary production and developing new sources of raw materials meant extending the
capitalist mode of production. It also meant the extension of capitalist social relations, the extension of
agrarian capitalism, the proletarianization of some peasants and the rudimentary development of a local
bourgeoisie. In these ways trade promoted the integration of African economies into the world capitalist
system.

The major effects of this integration was that it created for all practical purposes an interdependence
based on complementarity between the economies of the colony and metropole. In this
complementarity, the law of comparative advantage was employed. The colony therefore specialized in
the area where it has a comparative advantage over the metropole while the metropole specialized in
areas where it has comparative advantage. Thus, the colony specialized in primary products while the
metropole specialized in secondary products- manufactured goods. Presently, this system has not
changed as Nigeria still depends heavily on the west for most of it needs in terms Of finished products.

METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

For the metropole to exploit the colony effectively there must be some level of investment in at least
the primary sector and also some little infrastructural development in areas like transport and
communication. These investments helped in some ways in integrating the economy of the colony into
the international capitalist economy. For sure, the investments in primary production reinforced the
complementarity of both economies and created a situation of dependence. The investment in
infrastructure led to the disarticulation of the Nigerian economy. All the major roads and railways led to
the coast, with the effect that the Nigerian economy was not in any way integrated. This was not
surprising, because all the cash crops that were produced were not used in the country, instead they
were meant for western industries. The economies of the three regions were like self-contained
economies without any effective linkages. This had a very negative effect on the future political
development of the country. The political class that emerged from colonialism was regionally based and
was always having the notion that their regions were self-reliant. Little wonder, they found it convenient
at any little opportunity to threaten succession.

The three major cash crops corresponded with the three regions. Groundnut, cocoa and palm oil were
derived from the North, the West and the East respectively. Because the infrastructural development
that took place under colonialism was meant to help the metropole exploit the colony, the
developments in the various regions reflected this tendency. There was no attempt at national
development. After independence in 1960, the political class that inherited power was a class of inept,
corrupt and tribal war lords who could not alter in any fundamental way the colonial structures. Today,
over fifty years after independence there is still no railway linking the east and west, the colonial
masters did not construct one owing to the fact that it was not necessary in their exploitative mission.

While looking at this, one has no doubt that the duty of nation-building and economic development
would have been quite easier if from the onset the Nigerian economy was effectively linked. If the
products from the North were needed in factories in the East and West and vice-versa, definitely the
story would have been different as we would have had a real national bourgeoisie, as opposed to the
present ethnic chauvinists who are now in power. Quite unfortunately too, oil which is now the major
income earner for the country has not really tried in integrating the economy because it is heavily
externally oriented both in the technology for its operations and use (oil exports still remain the main
foreign exchange earner for Nigeria).

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

The Nigerian economy is really an underdeveloped and dependent one. At the time of political
independence in 1960, the economy was almost an agrarian one. Agriculture contributed about 63.4%
to the GDP, while over 80% of the population was equally engaged in agriculture. Also over 85 percent
of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings came from the export of agricultural produce which covered farm
produce, wood and livestock products.

By 1970, the economy had witnessed some structural changes. First, the population engaged in
agriculture has fallen to about 60%, its contribution to GDP was 39.9%. Ten years later, by 1980
agriculture had maintained its downward slide on all fronts. It stood at less than 25% of GDP and about
4.5% of our export earnings. The relative weak position of agriculture in Nigeria's economy after
independence was as a result of the prominence of oil in our national life. Thus, minerals mostly
petroleum rose from less than one percent of GDP in 1960 to around 14.6 percent in 1970 and jumped
to about 27 percent by 1979. Since more than 75 percent of federal governments revenues and more
than 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings come from petroleum, Nigeria is thus a mineral
dependent economy.

Okowa (1994) has listed the key features of the Nigerian economy thus;

1. Dependence on foreign technology

2. Mono-cultural dependence on crude oil

3. Dependence on the foreign sector for raw materials and spares

4. Inadequate supply of skilled labour

5. Low productivity and low per capital income

6. Underdeveloped agricultural sector

7. High rate of unemployment

8. In-egalitarian distribution of income and wealth

9. High rates of inflation and interest rates

10. Excessive government involvement in the economy

11. Heavy external debt burden

12. Poor attitude to work, particularly in the public sector.

13. Systemic corruption.

We will now take a brief look at these features.

DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY

Dependence on foreign technology is the lot of most undeveloped economies. In fact it can be said that
this is one of the characteristics of their underdevelopment. Apparently, this condition arises due to the
lack of capacity to adapt nature to suit the people. It is therefore implied that the first step by any nation
that wants to develop its economy is to develop the capacity of its people towards confronting the
environment (technology).

Unfortunately, in the case of Nigeria, no real or conscious attempt was made towards technological
development until the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85 (Okowa, l989). Our industrialization
policy followed the path of import substitution. It concentrated on consumer goods. Capital goods were
not given priority. Till date, less than 20% of the locally made goods are capital goods, the rest are
consumer goods. The major industries that would have acted as a push to our industrialization like the
Iron and Steel Industry, the Petrol-chemical and Machine Parts industries are still underdeveloped. The
end result is that the industrial sector imports virtually all industrial machinery and spares.

MONO-CULTURAL DEPENDENCE ON CRUDE OIL

As has already been pointed out elsewhere in this study, crude oil contributes less than 1% to the
country's GDP at independence but by 1979 it was already contributing 27 percent. From 1973 till date,
oil still accounts for almost 90 percent of the country's external earnings. The effect of this over
dependence on oil is quite apparent. It means that the country's economy is very fragile since it still
depends almost solely on oil revenue. Therefore anything that affects oil prices negatively would equally
impact negatively on the Nigerian economy. It equally shows that agriculture that used to account for
about 85% of our foreign exchange earnings has almost collapsed due to neglect. The feeble attempts
by government to promote non-oil exports have not really yielded much dividend, while the oil sector is
still fully dominated by foreign companies.

DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES FOR RAW MATERIALS AND MACHINERY

As we stated above the country adopted the import substitution method of industrialization. While
establishing these industries, little thought was given to the type of raw materials they will need. In
some cases where the raw materials for a particular product was available locally, it was found out that
the type of machines or production mechanisms in our factories could not use these materials. It
therefore meant that the industries can only operate on imported raw materials. It follows, therefore,
that Nigerian industrialization cannot in the end result in any meaningful reduction in imports. The
promise held out by the manufacturers at each stage was illusory: the Nigerian industries have
continuously consumed more imports than they have saved; what is worse, they have become so import
dependent that any decline in foreign resources leads at once not to a resort to domestic substitutes but
to reduction in capacity utilization.

Secondly, the investment in industry has been overtly costly in terms of factory buildings, machinery and
equipment and even expatriate workers. Over capitalized and so import dependent, Nigerian
industrialization did not and could not, if it was to make profits, generate the promised absorption of
the large numbers of young men and women being disgorged regularly from the farms and schools.

Finally, industrialization that is not supported by a local civil engineering industry for the design,
fabrication and manufacture of equipment, spares and tools cannot for long remain self reliant. The lack
of a Nigerian engineering base has made it difficult for Nigeria to produce and transform her raw
intermediate materials as inputs for the manufacture of final products (Okigbo, 1987).

INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SKILLED LABOUR

For a country to record an appreciable level of development it must be interested in people. The reason
for this is that development is human centered. Development at the individual level could be seen in
terms of substantial intellectual and physical skills possessed and applied by individuals within a social
setting for the ultimate good of the state (Oddih, 1995). It also implies man's increasing capacity for
dealing with the environment through the laws of nature i.e science and technology, and the manner in
which work is organized to ensure maximum production and distribution of social goods and services
(Oddih, 1995). Unfortunately Nigerian leaders have failed to comprehend the role of man in
development. They have not paid enough attention to manpower development. Consequently they
have had to treat universities as if they were mercantile houses to be created and dispersed such that
each of them could display every commodity; none of them now seems capable to expand rapidly
enough in any direction to achieve outstanding excellence in chosen fields. All of them have had to face
simultaneously the same critical shortage of resources. Everyone was looking for an easy solution;
rationing and zoning of admissions, multiplication of institutions, corruption and lowering of standards
of admissions of institutions, politicization of appointments, and promotions, of teaching and of
certification (Okigbo, 1987). What is the result like? We now have Computer Engineers that never saw
simple tools in school! English graduates that can't write letters and management science graduates that
can't define management not to talk about knowing how to manage anything well.

The few well trained Nigerians have responded to the un-conducive working environment by voting with
their legs. They have all left the country through what we refer to as brain drain. The question remains,
who will develop the country's technology? Every year our universities and polytechnics pump out
thousands of Engineers but for any kilometer of road we want to construct, expatriates are fully in
charge. Truly there is a problem with our manpower development strategy.

LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND LOW PER CAPITA INCOME

The per capital income of Nigeria today is well below 500 dollars making it one of the poorest countries
in the world today. This low per capital is indicative of low productivity, In fact it is the political
Economist Dr. Pat Utomi who once said that the problem of Nigeria is lack of production. Very many
Nigerians are not involved in any real productive activity. The wealthiest Nigerians are the least
productive. Most of them are indeed parasites.

For those who took the risk of getting involved in manufacturing, it has been a tale of woes. The
environment has been most un-conducive. With the low income of the people they have been unable to
make real demand. The manufacturing sectors major problem remain the poor basic infrastructure,
weak demand, high cost of credit, and near absence of intermediate raw materials base such as the
governments steel and petrol chemical industries were to provide (Umaru Mutallab FBN Annual Reports
& Accounts 1999/2000). Though capacity utilization remains about 32% unsold inventory is still high.

UNDERDEVELOPED AGRICULTURE

The role of Agriculture in transforming both the social and economic framework of an economy cannot
be over-emphasized. It is a source of food and raw materials for the industrial sector. It is also essential
for expansion of employment opportunity, for reduction of poverty and improvement of income
distribution, for speeding up industrialization and easing the pressure on balance of payment (Nwankwo
1981 Quoted in Anyanwu 1993).

In 1960, the year of independence. Agriculture was the main stay of the economy. However the
discovery of oil shifted emphasis from this all important sector. The 1970's came with the feeling of
affluence, all eyes got riveted on the oil sector. There was money to be made for little or no effort.
Agriculture required such massive expenditure of physical effort on the part of the farmers that the
farms soon got abandoned. The external resources looked so buoyant from petro-dollars that the
foreign exchange earnings from farm produce looked like a pittance compared to petroleum earnings.
Simultaneously, the country's rapid expansion of schools and colleges and universities, the expansion of
administrations, the huge public works undertaken soaked up large numbers from the rural areas into
semi-skilled urban wage labour; those who could not get direct wage employment; employed
themselves in merchandise trading. The blight had set in and efforts at reversing that trend have
remained relatively unsuccessful, (Okigbo 1987).

These efforts like the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) the Green Revolution etc have not really been
able to modernize inputs from what it was in the 60's. With an increasing population and an expanding
industrial base that needed the products as raw materials, Nigeria has been witnessing a food crises for
decades now. The country has remained a net food importer. This has been happening despite the
billions of naira that successive governments have sunk into the sector.

These resources were apparently wasted for as Okigbo (1987) said, the planning of agriculture and the
programmes developed from the plans seemed condemned by the ultimate judgement that they were
irrelevant to the life and needs of the farmers. They responded mostly to the needs of businessmen,
middlemen and agents in agriculture; suppliers of mechanical equipment- tractors, harvesters, etc,
stocks of chemicals and mechanical equipment were purchased by the authorities and legitimately
counted as investment in agriculture; but whether they were applied, how they were applied and how
effectively they served were of little interest to those who spent the resources. With the
underdeveloped nature of Agriculture in Nigeria the sector cannot feed the nation despite employing
more than 60% of the country's work force.

HIGH RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

At present, the government puts the rate of unemployment at about 18%. This is an understatement for
as Okigbo (1993) argued that after making adjustments for those who "for any reason did not seek work
which represent about 7.3% of the labour force, and the exclusion of those between 55 and 65 years of
age who in most cases are still active and quite employable but are excluded and unemployed, the rate
of the unemployed will be about 28% of the labour force. Also if the rate of the underemployed which
seems to be greater is considered, the picture becomes quite grim. Now in the rural areas, the situation
is even worse, where the youth too educated to go to the farm and work, yet not educated enough or
not well connected enough to acquire urban paid employment, constitute an ever enlarging army of
trouble makers, petty criminals and political thugs (Okowa 1994).

The problem of unemployment is one which the government has not really taken a serious step at
solving; instead, various programmes meant to tackle the scourge have remained avenues for siphoning
and looting the treasury. Nobody seems to be linking the high crime rate in the country to the rate of
unemployment. The government is bent on combating violent crimes by spending millions on
ammunition and vehicles for various anti-crime patrols scattered all over the country. What we may
need to aske, is whether the fight against armed robbery can ever be won, when the environment is
daily been made conductive for robbery.

Also the fact that about a quarter of the active population is either unemployed or underemployed has a
direct affect on aggregate demand in the country. These millions of unemployed Nigerians are
effectively cut-off from the market since they lack the ability to make effective demand. Little wonder
then that the manufacturers are complaining of unsold inventory.

For now the problem is still being ameliorated by the traditional extended family system, but with the
gradual collapse of the system due mainly to westernization and economic hardship, the unemployed
are in for a real rough and harsher time ahead.
EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH

It is widely accepted in a capitalist society that inequality is natural. Capitalism as a system is built on
inequality. However, despite this acceptance of inequality, it is also known that extreme polarization of
wealth in any society is unfair and even dangerous. Governments therefore fashion a lot of policies to
help reduce the level of inequalities in society. Thus the progressive tax system is very popular all over
the world as a mechanism for reducing inequality. In Nigeria, the government in-the past seemed to
have recognized the need for an acceptable level of equity in sharing societal resources. Thus, the
Second National Development Plan 1970-74 has as one of its five principal national objectives to
maintain "a just and egalitarian society" while the aim of the plan was among others to "reduce
inequalities in inter-personal incomes and promote balanced development among the various
communities in the different geographic areas of the country" (Second National Development Plan).

Despite the objective of the development plan and other measures introduced by the government, the
level of inequality has terribly increased. In fact wealth is highly polarized in the country. We now have a
tiny cabal of extremely wealthy Nigerians on one side and a mass of poor people on the other side with
nothing in-between. The middle class that used to act as a buffer between the two has been destroyed
by the Structural Adjustment Programme (we will still look at this programme later in the study). In the
absence of a social security system, the poor are left to their fate, which are hunger, homelessness and
death. They stay by and watch a few Nigerians corner the entire wealth of the country. Breaking the
poverty cycle has been a very difficult task for the poor in Nigeria. Thus, it is a sad reality that most
people who were born poor in Nigeria that eventually conquered poverty, were those who engaged in
one crime or the other. Drug trafficking, embezzlement, fraud, advance fee fraud (419) etc are about
some of the easiest ways of conquering poverty in the country today. It appears that about 80% of
Nigeria's wealth is owned by less than 3% of the population. The next 10% is owned by another 15% of
the population while the last of the country's wealth is owned by the remaining 82% of the population
(Cookey, 2000).

The problem of inequality in Nigeria also has a geographical dimension. Urban / rural dichotomies in
terms of facilities also show in income levels and opportunities for self advancement. While majority of
Nigerians are poor, on average the rural dwellers are poorer, without any opportunity for bettering their
lives, except migrating to the urban areas where they constitute the army of the unemployed, societal
drops out and are faced with high chance of turning to crime and probably violent ones for survival.

Sadly enough the government doesn't seem to have a solution to this problem. The Poverty Alleviation
Programme introduced during the Obasanjo government was not capable of tackling the problem in a
meaningful and conclusive manner. There are serious fears that like previous programmes it may end up
an avenue for a few rich men to steal more millions for themselves, a sort of wealth elevation
programme for the wealth and poverty elevation for the poor.
HIGH RATES OF INFLATION

The problem of inflation is characteristic of most Third World economies. That of Nigeria has been really
very chronic. Between 1960 to 1985, the general price level rose ninefold, food prices rose over twelve
fold, clothing eleven fold and transport six fold. Breaking this down shows that in the period 1960-66,
the general price level rose on the average by less than 3% per annum, between 1971-1979 saw the rate
jump, on the average to 20.7% per annum, while it remained at 20.1% on the average for the period
1980-84 (Okigbo, l987).

The major sources of this inflationary spiral were the rapid growth of money supply occasioned by
increased revenue from petroleum, the increased salaries and wages that accompanied the Udoji
Commission (1974) and the profligate expansion of public expenditure as a result of the heavy
borrowing at home and abroad. Between 1980-84, the minimum wage legislation also added to the
spiral- The serious decrease in foreign exchange earnings from oil owing to the glut, affected seriously
the capacity to import- consumer goods, and capital goods needed for local manufacture. The
progressive depreciation of the naira and the increasing prices of equipment and raw materials would
be reflected in the prices of local manufactured products for the manufacturers to make profit. The
utter neglect of Agriculture in the oil boom period caused serious food shortages thereby pushing up
food prices by an average of 23.8% per annum in 1975-79 and by 24.4% per annum between 1980 and
1984.

The massive devaluation of the naira in 1986 as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
added a rather serious dimension to the inflationary spiral. By raising import prices within a year to over
four times the level in december 1985, a cost push dimension was added to what was before 1985, a
demand push inflation. Raw materials, intermediate products, spares and equipment, which are all
imported, have by 1988, rose more than eight fold the cost of import - dependent local production so
that the final price of finished goods have become unaffordable (Okigbo, 1987). The inflation rate kept
rising till it hit an all time high of 72.8 in 1995. Strict fiscal control measures adopted by the government
coupled with growing consumer resistance gradually reduced the rate to about 12.2% in May 1999
when the military handed over power to a democratically elected government. By february 2002 it has
crashed to about 3.9% which is its lowest level in the last two decades (FBN Annual reports 2002).

EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY

From Independence in 1960 the government has been playing a key role in the economy. This role was
informed by the need to provide social infrastructure, invest in areas that were necessary for the
nation's economic development but were too capital intensive for the private sector and to also
maintain an indigenous control of the economy. The above imperatives and more, made successive
governments at all levels to get involved in economic activities. The result has not been quite salutary as
these enterprises have acted as a heavy drain on the economy through corrupt and inefficient practices
which have remained their modus operandi.

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo aptly captured the extent and position of government investment
when he said;

It is estimated that successive Nigerian governments have invested up to 800 billion naira in public
owned enterprises. Annual returns on this high investment have been well below 10 percent. These
inefficiencies and in many cases high losses, are charged against the treasury. With declining revenue
and escalating demand for effective and affordable social service, the general public has stepped up its
yearnings for state-owned enterprises to become efficient (Obasanjo, 1999).

It is based on the negative impact of this involvement that the government embarked on the
privatization programme in order to;

Concentrate resources on their core functions and responsibilities, while enforcing the "rules of the
game "so that the markets can work efficiently with provision of adequate security and basic services
like education, health and environmental protection (Obasanjo, 1999).

Whether the programme will succeed in creating a "Synergy between a leaner and more efficient
government and a vitalized, efficient and service oriented private sector" (Obasanjo 1999) is yet to be
seen.

HEAVY EXTERNAL DEBT BURDEN

“The most incapacitating constraint against Nigeria's economic recovery and indeed a veritable threat to
our new found democracy is the external debt overhang". The above statement by Vice President Atiku
Abubakar portrays vividly the problem of Nigeria's external debt which is put about $30 billion. The
Nigerian debt problem started when the military government of Olusegun Obasanjo took the first set of
foreign loans. The Shagari government that succeeded it went on a borrowing spree which increased the
debt which was hitherto less than $2billion to $14.6 billion. The past four military regimes of Buhari,
Babangida, Abacha and Abubakar raised the debt to its present level. The intriguing thing about the debt
is that nobody actually knows what the nation owed. While the World Bank put the debt at $37 billion,
the Federal government insists it is $28 billion. All attempts made by the government in the past to
reduce the debt have not actually yielded much dividend. The Debt Conversion Programme (DCP)
introduced by the Babangida regime redeemed only $825 million from the debt.
While the debt is not the main problem, what has constituted a major headache to the country is debt
servicing. Between 1994 and March 1999, Nigeria spent as high as 40% of its foreign exchange earning in
debt servicing. The present government was compelled to pay $1.6 billion as principal sum and debt
servicing in its first year in office. It is due to thise huge amount that is used in servicing debts that has
resulted in Nigeria being one of the 41 poorest countries in the world and one of the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC). With about 40% of foreign exchange earnings spent on debt servicing little is now
left to provide basic amenities for the people. The burden is really excruciating.

POOR ATTITUDE TO WORK, PARTICULARLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Nigeria has been described as a country where nobody and nothing works. The level of indolence in the
public sector is overwhelming. People are not ready to put in their best. The overall result is that the
level of productivity in the country is abysmally low. This poor attitude to work by Nigerians has made
national utilities inefficient. Perhaps the prevailing situation in the country where the richest people
seem to be those who cannot be described as really hardworking contributed to people's perception of
hard work. It is believed that career advancement and subsequently economic and social elevation do
not depend on how hard you work but on whom you know or where you come from. In summary, we
would say that mediocrity, nepotism and quota system have all combined to entrench bad work ethics
in Nigerians.

SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION

Okowa (1989) defines systemic corruption as; “a situation in which corruption has been institutionalized
and raised to the level of a structural parameter. It has become part of the culture of society.”

The problem is so pervasive that no sector of the society is free from it. It has become part of the
Nigerian culture and expectedly Nigeria's problem. According to Akpakpan (1994:130);

The problem is so deep-rooted and widespread in our society that many people now tend to accept it as
a norm. You are expected to do it and people lobby for offices/posts mainly to have opportunity to do it.
The stealing of public funds by whatever means had the effect of intensifying the society's socio-
economic problem.

Let us further assess the problem by looking at the editorial of defunct Sunray Newspapers on the
Subject;

Corruption has eaten so deep into Nigeria's economy and politics that it threatens the entire edifice. The
craze for wealth and the flagrant disregard for established processes as well as for values of labour and
just rewards are mere symptoms of the monster. At the Federal, State and Local Government Levels,
and in nearly every crevice of the private sector corruption has been embedded. We need not say more.

MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND NIGERIA'S DEVELOPMENT

Multinational corporations are giant private business companies with global organizational
characteristics flowing from parent countries to subsidiaries in host countries ( Muller & Burnet, 1974).
They can equally be defined as "those companies having production facilities in many lands, having
access to capital worldwide and having a global-outlook among their managements (The Wall Street
Journal, 1972).

Following the abolition of slave trade by the British by the mid 19th century, legitimate trade increased
rapidly. Between 1830 and 1850 legitimate trade had increased by 87 percent. With the growth of
legitimate trade, the European merchants [started penetrating the interiors which they hitherto
neglected preferring instead to [remain at the coast, while allowing African middlemen a lee way to
operate.

This growth also increased competition among European firms, especially, French and German
companies. It was at this time that the man known as George Taubman Goldie, who is regarded as "the
founder of Modern Nigeria" arrived on the scene. Goldie being aware of the dangers of foreign
competition on British companies talked their directors into accepting his proposal to unite these
companies into one strong monopoly that can withstand all opposition. Thus, all major British
companies trading on the Niger welded into the United African Company in 1879, all ships, stores and
staff was pooled. In 1882, the National African Company was formed with a view to receiving a charter,
though the British Government refused at first to contemplate such a move. Secondly he tried to
persuade the French companies to join with his own. When they refused, he undertook a drastic price
war against them, using most of his personal fortune and undercutting their prices by as much as 25
percent. He forced them out of business in 1884 (Crowder 1962). Though he was refused a charter, the
British Government conceded him the right to make treaties with local chiefs. By 1884, he had
concluded 37 treaties. It was based on these treaties that Britain was able to lay claim to the area
around the Niger at the Berlin Conference. In 1886, the Niger Company was granted the Royal Charter
which she has been refused before.

Though the Charter forbade the "company to set up or grant a monopoly of trade", the Royal Niger
Company was attacked by others on the grounds that "it was using its political authority to secure a
monopoly of commerce (Crowder, 1962).

In anticipation of full colonial rule by 1900, the Charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked by the
British government.The withdrawal of the charter, paved the way for other companies to operate in the
country as a level playing ground was provided for foreign companies. The major companies then were
the United Africa Company (UAC), John Holt, Patterson Zochonis (PZ), Societe Commercial de I'Quest
African (CFAO), K. Cheleeram, G, B. Olivant (GBO), and the Swiss Union Trading Company (UTC), among
others. The banking industry was also firmly in the hands of foreign companies because at this stage
there were no indigenous banks. The bank of British West Africa and the Barclays bank (D.C and O) were
dominant.

The monopoly position of expatriate firms in Nigeria posed an almost insurmountable barrier to
Nigerians desirous of entering the import-export business which until the dawn of political
independence was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Ekekwe, 1986). Given the self-interest of the
expatriate firms to maintain their monopoly and the unwillingness of the state to transact business with
any of the Nigerian enterprises, it is little wonder that the latter could not develop.

The foreign firms, through their Association of West African Merchants (AWAM), not only influenced
government policies, but also were able to control the price and supply of commodities. The colonial
state relied for advice almost wholly on the foreign firms and at least with reference to stockfish, these
firms did control the price and supply through an agreement between themselves (Baner, 1954).

The monopolistic tendencies of the foreign firms did not allow Nigerian enterprises to grow. Instead of
the colonial government, which doesn't encourage monopolies at home to discourage these tendencies
in Nigeria, it found it convenient to collaborate with them. To buttress this point, Ekekwe (1986) asserts
that;

The colonial state itself was no more interested than the foreign firms in assisting the Nigerians to
participate effectively in the colonial administration or to compete effectively with the foreign firms. For
example, the state transacted most of its business with the large expatriate firms. The monopoly it
imposed after 1947 on the purchasing and marketing of agricultural products was in effect, a
mechanism by which it delivered the economic future not only of the evolving entrepreneurs but also
that of the entire producing population into the hands of the expatriate firms. It was these firms who
became the buying agents for the West African Produce Control Board, and subsequently the marketing
boards.

We have gone this length to show the origin of foreign enterprises in Nigeria. What we have tried to
show, is that the colonial state was actively involved in promoting foreign firms to the detriment of local
ones, thereby making the Nigerian economy to be dominated by foreigners.

Let us now look at the place of these multinationals in the Nigerian political economy. There is
considerable debate and controversies about the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the socio-
economic development of Nigeria. In this debate and controversies two broad groups exist. While one
group says that the MNCs are agents of development as they bring into their host countries
technological knowhow and ideas about efficiency in resources usage and the huge capital needed to
place the economy on the part of growth and development.

On the other hand, the other group insists that the MNCs are so domineering, too profit-oriented that
their hegemonism lies in effective control on indigenous capacity to develop autonomous political and
economic will and initiative to exercise effective control on natural, economic and human resources.
This group believes that the developed countries used the MNCs to underdevelop and not to develop
the host economies (Akpuru-Aja, 1998).

Let us now take a look at the arguments in favour of MNCs.

1. Net Capital Inflow: MNCs are seen as bringing into their host countries a lot of foreign capital
which is needed for economic growth. Due to the weak economies of the underdeveloped countries,
they lack the capital needed for industrial growth, the MNCs help these countries by bringing in this
much needed capital. It is noted that in these economies, most if not all large scale enterprises are
MNCs, which invariably means that without the MNCs these economies will be devoid of large scale
business due to paucity of capital.

In Nigeria today, most of the enterprises that can really be classified as large-scale are multi-
nationals. It has become almost a rule that they are leaders in all the sub-sectors where they exist.
Though some of these areas are highly lucrative, Nigerian entrepreneurs lack the capital to go it alone,
so they have no choice than to involve foreigners who have the capital and are ever ready to invest
provided their investment and profits are assured.

2. Employment Opportunities: Multinational corporations through their activities create a lot of

employment opportunities for citizens of their host countries. In Nigeria today, though there is no exact
record of the number of people employed by the MNCs, there is no doubt that the number is quite
appreciable. It therefore follows that the multinationals have contributed towards reducing the level of
unemployment in Nigeria. Extending the argument farther means that without the MNCs, all those they
employ will add to the ever increasing army of the unemployed. This is indeed frightening.

3. Technological Transfer: The Multinationals through creating job opportunities and the
techniques they apply in production, have in some noticeable cases been agents of technological
transfer to their host countries. The citizens of the countries who work for the MNCs are trained on the
use of these technologies thereby equipping them with the requisite skill to kick start the technological
growth of the countries. In Nigeria, the MNCs have over the years spent so much on training their
employees, and always keeping them attuned to the current changes in technology.
4. Economic Development :It is argued that the activities of the MNCs lead to economic
development. By creating employment, increasing industrial activities, stimulating technological growth
and contributing to the Gross Domestic product of their host countries they are contributing to
economic development. In Nigeria, the operations of the multinationals have contributed to the
country's GDP, since they are clearly in control of the organized private sector.

5. Promotion Of Economic Interdependence: Multinational corporations by nature of their

structure and operations create a complex web of interdependencies among various nations of the
world. Thus, developed nations of the world have one form of investment or the other in Nigeria today
through their MNCs, thereby linking their economies to the Nigerian economy. Nigerians are therefore
opportuned to enjoy certain products that they cannot produce. The economic interdependence also
makes countries to take more interest in the affairs of others as it reinforces collaborative tendencies
than discord and tension.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST MNCs

Arguments against MNCs, according to Aja (I998), are as follows;

1. Transfer of Technology: It has been argued that MNCs do not really constitute agents of transfer
of technology because they are very jealous of their technology as an instrument of reproducing capital
and global economic influence. Although they have engaged a good number of personnel in host
countries, they are so mindful that they do not adequately expose those trainees to skill acquisition very
sufficient to enable them develop autonomous technology capacity. In few cases, where technology is
said to be transferred, there is usually the problem of obsolete or inappropriate transfer of technology.

2. Environmental Pollution: Pollution is a health hazard. It can take the form of industrial sewage,
spillage, toxic waste and gaseous effect. For instance, if we take the activities of MNCs in the Nigerian oil
sector, the issues of environmental pollution become illustrative. Oil spillages continue to pollute
streams, arable economic lands, crops and even air. Another concern is that gas flaring has had a
significant side effect on the inhabitants of the local communities. In Rivers, Imo and Delta states of
Nigeria, environmental depletion and pollution occasioned by the ill-regulated activities of oil companies
have been a source of tension and conflict.

3. Repatriation of Salaries and Profits: Care should be taken in discussing repatriation of salaries
and profits as a negative behaviour of MNCs. The fact of the matter is that host countries do not have
standing law against the repatriation of salaries and profits. What the host countries do is to agree on a
definite percentage of salaries and profit to be repatriated. In practice, however, what is habitual of
MNCs is to repatriate over and above the agreed percentage. Even though MNCs indulge in very smart
business practices, much of what they repatriate abroad illegally depends on how effective the control
machinery of host government is. In Nigeria there has been little or no control.
4. Lack of Interest in Local Investment: MNCs are said to be indifferent to local economic
development. They hardly invest salaries and profits in host countries. Instead, they are in the attitude
of draining scarce financial resources of host countries to further their selfish economic interests. They
are seen readily by host banks as more creditworthy. No wonder MNCs are referred to as agents of
capital flight. They hardly support in a significant way local economic development in education,
vocational training, medicare and road development. Take the case of Shell, for instance, it began
operation in Nigeria in 1937 but established only a programme of assistance in 1980. For 43 years of
acute exploitation of Nigeria's resources, Shell is just beginning to reappraise her contributions towards
Nigeria's national development.

5. Over-Invoicing: They over-invoice imported capital goods and under-invoice export raw
materials. Thus, MNCs make highly abnormal, super-profits on their host countries because of sharp
business malpractice.

6. Intervention in Host Country's Polities: Chilean government under El Salvado in 1973 was
overthrown by the help of ITT. In Nigeria, it was alleged that some oil MNCs had a hand in overthrowing
General Murtala Mohammed in 1976. They have also been involved in similar tendencies in Nicaragua,
Cuba, Haiti, Libya, Iraq, and Panama. MNCs are also ready instruments of parent countries to achieve
any desired political and economic goals, be it economic assistance or economic sanction.

7. Evasion of Taxes: The activities of MNCs are shrouded in secrecy. This explains their
unwillingness to disclose or declare the real profits made annually to host countries. Consequently, it is
difficult to allocate appropriate value of tax that is commensurate with their income. This is even more
difficult since developing countries have weak bureaucracies to effectively monitor and control the
MNCs.

8. Capacity of Superior Capital, Technology and Market Ideology of MNCs: These tend more to
undermine the growth and development of local initiatives, entrepreneurship and innovation.
Moreover, their advertising technique is so powerful that it creates an unusual foreign taste among local
people. In Africa, people tend to spend more in drinking coca-cola than drinking water. Together, MNCs'
activities are a mixed blessing. They are both facilitators of development and underdevelopment in host
countries.

THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (SAP) IN NIGERIA

Following sustained mismanagement of the Nigerian Economy by successive governments, the country
became purely mono-cultural with over 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings coming from
petroleum. The dependence on petroleum made the country's economy very vulnerable as it depended
on the vagaries of the volatile oil market. The oil glut of the late 7O's, that followed the oil boom,
exposed the lack of planning that has characterized the management of the economy. By 1978, the
down turn in the economy resulted in a 6.7 percent fall in Gross Domestic Product. Unfortunately, the
civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari that came to power in 1979 was too profligate and
intensified the mismanagement of the economy thus worsening the poor state of the country. The
austerity measures introduced by the government did not in any way help matters.

The country's economic problems manifested serious balance of payment deficits, high rates of
unemployment, high inflationary rate, serious food shortages etc. As a temporary relief the Shagari
government applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for a three-year extended facility loan of
$2.4 billion. The government was still negotiating for the loan when it was overthrown by the Buhari led
military junta. It was however under Babangida who sacked the Buhari government that the loan was
highly publicized due to the national debate over the conditionalities attached to it.

Nigerians roundly rejected the loan and it's conditionalities. However, the recovery programmes
introduced by the government showed that the government smuggled them in through the back door.
This is because the main elements of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were the same as the
conditionalities attached to the IMF loan which Nigerians collectively rejected.

THE OBJECTIVES OF SAP

1. To restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence
on the oil sector and on imports;

2. To achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability over the period;

3. To lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary growth; and

4. To reduce the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, improve that
sector's efficiency and enhance the growth potential of the private sector (Anyanwu, 1993).

SAP had as its major, elements the following:

a. Strengthening of demand management policies;

b. Adoption of measures to stimulate domestic production and broaden the supply base of the
economy;

c. Adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy through the establishment of a second-tier foreign
market;

d. Rationalization and restructuring of the tariff regime in order to aid the promotion of industrial
diversification;

e. Progressive trade and payments liberalization;

f. Reduction of complex administrative controls and fostering reliance on market forces;

g. Adoption of appropriate pricing policies for public enterprises and;

h. Rationalization and commercialization/privatization of public sector enterprises.

In order to achieve the main objectives of SAP, government adopted some measures, some of which
were quite novel to Nigerians. They included;

1. The Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market: This is a market established by the government for
buying and selling foreign exchange at market determined rates.

2. Privatization and Commercialization: This implies the outright sale of government-owned

enterprises to private individuals in terms of privatization and the operation of government enterprises
as profit-making ventures that, charge market prices for their operations in the commercialization.

3. Removal of Subsidies: This entails the withdrawal of government subsidies on essential goods
especially petroleum products and fertilizers.

4. Trade Liberalization: This is the removal of all restrictions like tariffs, Import quotas etc, that
hinder free trade in Nigeria.

5. Interest Rates Deregulation: The abolition of all controls on interest rates.

An appraisal of the Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria usually pitches the government and the
people on opposite sides. While the government and its apologists say SAP was successful, most
Nigerians insist the programme was a disaster.

According to Anyanwu (1995) the said benefits of SAP were;

a. Restructuring of production and consumption to discourage imports.

b. Rising domestic prices of import continued to penalize import-intensive production and

discourage the consumption of imported goods and services.

c. Increasing numbers of establishments formerly dependent on imported raw materials are now
compelled to utilize local raw materials-increased local raw materials sourcing.

d. Consumers continue to shift from food imports to domestic production of food staples.

e. Balanced export competitiveness.

f. Reversal of the perverse phenomenon of rural-urban drift.

g. Easier access to foreign exchange and its fair distribution to the productive sectors of the
economy.

h. Drastic reduction in mal-practices; such as over-invoicing, diversion of import shipments,

fraudulent diversion of official exchange to the parallel market etc.

i. Increases cost consciousness and more rational conduct on the part of economic agents.

j. Enhanced efficiency in resources allocation.

k. Fostering maintenance culture.

l. Gradual restoration of international credit worthiness and confidence in Nigeria, thus,

facilitating debt rescheduling negotiations.

m. Growth of non-oil exports.

The Cost of the Programme Were:

a. Higher inflation - induced by SFEM/FEM/IFEM.

b. Higher costs of living and reduced standard of living.

c. Higher cost of credit arising from interest rates deregulation and credit squeeze.

d. Retrenchment and increased social problems.

e. Large naira depreciation -inconsistent with the real rates in terms of other currencies.

f. Increased incidence of importation of finished goods, some of it of doubtful utility, arising from
trade liberalization.

g. Some business failures due to import dependence, over-exposure etc.

h. Worsened income distribution hence rising income gap between the rich and the poor.

i. Underutilization of installed capacity in industries.

j. Rising unemployment.

k. Balance of payment pressures.

i. Higher external loans (Anyanwu, 1995)

That the Structural Adjustment Programme failed in Nigeria is no longer in doubt because most of the
objectives it set for itself were not achieved.
In the first place, the programme was not indigenously fashioned. Rather, it was an imposition of the
World Bank /IMF which incidentally became the standard recipe for all Third World countries that had
economic problems. In fashioning the programme, the peculiarities of the Nigerian society were not
really taken into consideration. It need not be stressed that a programme that ignores the eccentricities
of local conditions is bound to fail.

SAP was supposed to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy, however it refused
to recognize the fact that outside oil, the country does not have a real productive base, to put it
differently, there was really no structure in the first place to either restructure or adjust. This partly
explains why despite all the incentives that the programme tried to give to local producers nothing
tangible really happened. One thought what the government ought to have done was to start from the
scratch to build up the productive sector which is really non-existent. This would have been possible if
the infrastructural back-up like telecommunications, good roads, and reliable electricity supply are
provided. While also vital industries like petro-chemicals, Iron and steel and machine tools plants are
fully established to act as the backbone of the industrial sector. All these were neglected while the
government relied on rhetorics to restructure the economy. No wonder it failed.

Another intriguing aspect of SAP was that the government said it was interested in stimulating local
production while at the same time removing import restrictions. Why it never occurred to policy makers
that Nigerian industries would not be able to compete with foreign ones that enjoy numerous
advantages over local ones is surprising. Any country that is desirous of developing its local industries
must fashion out policies to protect them from foreign competition. SAP failed to do this. Instead it
encouraged dumping thereby killing the few surviving industries it pledged to protect.

Another problem with SAP was that it was an attempt by the western powers to turn Third World
countries into capitalist economies over night without necessarily saying so. Little wonder that SAP
forced the government to withdraw subsidies in many sectors, privatize most government enterprises,
and enthrone the market mechanism as the major determinant of production. While not opposed to
capitalism as a system, we believe it is a system that should be allowed to evolve on its own and not
forced on society. Since the society was not yet ready for the full blow capitalism that SAP wanted, the
structure of society was not able to support it and it failed almost completely.

REFERENCES

1. Ake C. (1981) A Political economy of Africa. London, Longman.

2. Ake C. (1985) "Indigenization; Problems of transformation in a neocolonial economy" in Ake C.
(Ed) political economy of Nigeria, London, Longman.

3. Akpakpan E. B. (1994) How to save the naira and Nigeria. Abak, Belpot (Nig.) Co.

4. Akpuru-Aja A. (1998) The fundamentals of modern political economy & international economic
relations.

5. Anyanwu J. C. (1993) Monetary economics: Theory policy and institutions. Onitsha, Hybrid
Publishers Ltd.

6. Anyanwu J. C. et al (1997) The structure of the Nigerian economy (1960 -1967). Onitsha, Joanee
Publishers.

7. Ayo E. J. (1988) Development planning in Nigeria. Ibadan, University Press Limited.

8. Cookey A.E. (2000) Other economies and ours: A comparative approach. Onitsha, Abbot Books
Ltd.

9. Crowder M. (1962) The story of Nigeria. London, Faber & Faber Ltd.

10. Ekekwe E. (1986) Class and state in Nigeria. London, Longman.

11. Ihonvbere J. (Ed) (1985) Political economy of African economy and crisis of underdevelopment.
Lagos, JAD.

12. Obasanjo O. (1999) Imperative of privatization. Abuja, National Council on Privatization.

13. Okigbo P.N.C. (1987) Management of the Nigerian economy: Essays in the public philosophy of
development (I960 -1980) Vol. 1. Enugu, Forth Dimension Publishers Ltd.

14. Okigbo P.N.C. (1993) The Nigerian economy essays in the public Philosophy of development Vol.
IV. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers Ltd.

15. Okowa W. J. (1997) Oil, systemic corruption, abdulstic capitalism and Nigerian development
policy. Port-Harcourt, Paragraphics.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE STATE AND PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA

Introduction

The world no doubt is moving towards capitalism. Any nation not moving towards this direction is seen
as either not developing or even retrogressing. A capitalist economy is a free market economy. It is an
economy that allows most economic decisions to be guided by the twin forces of demand and supply.
These 'almighty' forces, control the decisions of how, when, where and what to produce in an economy.
They frown on government intervention in the economy, hence, they believe that the government that
intervenes least, governs best.

Capitalism is a system in which the augmentation of value is the essence of production. It is a society
where people live to produce as opposed to one in which people produce to live. Competition is the soul
of capitalism and man is always in motion. In trying to beat his opponent he becomes more efficient,
thereby increasing the rate and volume of production in the society. This system gives great impetus to
the development of science and technology.

In economics, it is believed that production is not complete until what is produced gets to the final
consumer. The process through which the goods produced in an economy get to the people depends on
the system of exchange in that society. In a capitalist society, the system of exchange is based on the
market mechanism. This system operates on the principles of anonymity and impersonality. Man is seen
as a 'homo economicus' stripped of all emotive and social attributes. He is simply on his own. Markets
remain undoubtedly the most efficient mechanism for distribution. Thus, they are seen as making for
allocative efficiency. Markets naturally respond to those who can make an effective demand. It
understands only one language: Money. It therefore follows that those who do not have money are
automatically excluded from the market and the fruits of social production. Ironically, this group is the
ones who based on previous deprivation are in most need of these goods, but who are denied them
because of their economic disability.

It is in attempts to cushion the harsh effects of the market on this group, who incidentally are
apparently in the majority, that governments usually intervene in a free market economy through
subsidies, ownership of strategic and essential industries, nationalizations and price controls etc. Thus,
saving the majority from the tyranny of the minority. While this has not been enough to protect the
poor from the harsh effects of the market mechanism, it has in some cases made the vital difference
between life and death for the economically oppressed.

Government's intervention has proved to be economically inefficient and indeed very wasteful. In
Nigeria, most government owned industries and establishments remain citadels of corruption, studies in
inefficiency and consequently a heavy drain on the economy. As a means of curbing this menace, the
Brettonwoods institutions (IMF & World Bank) have advocated the twin policies of privatisation and
commercialization. Incidentally, Nigeria has fully adopted this policy and is embarking on it with frenzy.

This study will focus on some salient but underplayed issues in the privatisation process. It is our
intention to show that the programme is fraught with many faulty and self-serving assumptions. These
assumptions which act as the rationale for privatisation help to obscure the real reasons for the poor
performance of public corporations in Nigeria.

The thesis of our study therefore is that public corporations are inefficient, not because they are owned
by the government, but because of environmental factors, the chief of which is corruption and our
attitude to public utilities; and that the programmes are basically to the benefit of the bourgeoisie class.

Our study is divided into four parts. In the first part we will try to explain what that state is and show
how the Nigerian state got deeply involved in the economy. The second part will look at the rationale for
privatisation. In the third part we will try to pose some fundamental and moral questions regarding
privatisation in Nigeria while in the fourth and final part we will summarise and proffer some solutions
on how to make our corporations perform, which we see as an alternative to privatisation.

THE STATE

The centrality of the state in the privatisation programme calls for a proper understanding of what the
state is, for us to understand its role in the exercise. Unfortunately, this is not going to be an easy
exercise, for as Ake (1985) argues, the nuances and the analytical difficulties of the generic concept of
the state have made it a difficult subject to study. It was due to the frustrations associated with trying to
conceptualize the state that led David Easton (1960) to argue that the concept should be abandoned for
something better. While Leon Duguit (1970) proclaimed that the "state is dead”.

However, despite the theoretical jungle in which the concept has found itself it still remains quite
relevant in the absence of something better in political analysis. We will therefore try to narrow our
conceptualization to be very useful as an explanatory variable.

Bourgeois scholars define the state essentially as a neutral institution that superintends over society.
Thus, Stein (1928) asserts that "the state stands above and apart from the factors of society and
enforces the just claims of peace and unity transcending to members". While Cassese (1986) sees the
state as "a legal person separated from society". To Jackson and Roseberg (1985), it is "a political
constitution of sufficient organised authority and power to govern a defined territory and its population
and to remain independent of other states". Onuoha (1989) believes that the foundations of the
bourgeois conception of the state is neutrality and objectivity hence the belief that the state is a neutral,
impartial and unbiased umpire mediating and moderating inter-group struggles within the society.
To Marxist scholars, the state despite its seemingly autonomy, is the instrument of the dominant class in
society. Thus, Miliband (1969) argues that the state;

is not a thing ...it does not as such exist. What the state stands for is a number of particular institutions
which together constitute its reality, which interact as part of what may be called the state system.

To Ake (1985) the state represents;

a specific modality of class domination, one in which class domination is mediated by commodity
exchange, so that the system of institutional mechanism is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling
class and even the society and appears as an objective force standing alongside society.

In trying to compare the bourgeoisie and marxist conceptualizations of the state, it is not very difficult to
choose the marxist as representing reality even though it may equally have some short comings. It looks
quite deceptive to argue that the state is neutral and objective because a study of all the modes of
production have always shown that the dominant class in every mode is usually the dominant political
class. Thus, in the feudal mode, the lords were always in power, this also applies to the capitalist mode.
The reason for this is that for the economically dominant class to maintain their domination they need
to be in control of the political system. Ake (1981) puts it succinctly when he argued that:

Those who are economically privileged tend to be interested in preserving the existing social order; and
those who are disadvantaged by the social order, particularly its distribution of wealth, have a strong
interest in changing the social order, particularly its distribution of wealth. In this way the economic
structure sets the general trend of political interests and political alignments.

Unfortunately in Africa, Nigeria inclusive, as we are going to prove later, the state has been used by the
petit-bourgeoisie that inherited power at independence for creating a material base for themselves so
that they will as expected, be both politically and economically dominant. In explaining the post-colonial
state, Miliband (1977) states that "the state is here the source of economic power as well as an
instrument of it; the state is a major means of production".

Therefore, while the state in both developed and undeveloped capitalist societies remains an
instrument of domination by the dominant class, the difference remains that while in the developed
ones the state is not usually directly involved in capital accumulation. Rather, it is content with
maintaining what Offe (1975) calls "conditions for accumulation". While in the post-colonial state, the
state is expected to have a more particularistic interference in the economy than is customary in the
metropole (Mcphee, 1971).
More concretely Laugdon says that;

Certainly the state has a general function in all class societies - the maintaining of cohesion and
domination; but it would appear to have a rather particular function in the periphery economies, that of
managing the meshing of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. And that further function
makes the colonial and post-colonial state more central in the direct process of surplus appropriation
and capital accumulation than in advanced capitalist economies.

The privatisation programme therefore, just like the indigenization programme of the 70s, is geared
towards the surplus appropriation by the dominant class in Nigeria. It is therefore a process of primitive
accumulation. It is in line with the practice of capitalists to employ the state apparatus in capital
accumulation. It is really unfortunate that the state has been a willing and ready tool in this regard for as
Ohai (1983) noted that "the role of the state has therefore been to enable groups which have acquired
control over the state apparatus to establish an economic base for themselves''.

This fact becomes very clear, whenever we ask ourselves who the major beneficiaries of the programme
are. Or better still, who are the new owners of privatized enterprises?

THE NIGERIAN STATE AND THE ECONOMY

At independence, the nationalists that took over the reins of government from the colonialists decided
to intervene in the economy in order to empower themselves economically and to also place
themselves in a position to control the economy. This marked state involvement in the production and
distribution of goods and services. Ake (1981) opines that:

It would appear that state capitalism arises primarily out of the desire of the national petit-bourgeosie
which inherited political power from the colonizers to create an economic base for its political power.
The national bourgeoisies which came to office in the wake of the independence movement soon found
that they had very little control of the economy. But they also understood that political power offered
opportunities for economic power, and that the opportunities inherent in their political power were the
best and perhaps only way they had of creating an economic base for their political power. And they did
not hesitate to use these opportunities. Essentially, what they did was to extend the economic role of
the state as widely and rapidly as possible. They set up state enterprises with public funds and
sometimes in partnership with private investors.

Outside the desire to control the economy, the Nigerian government like most governments in Africa
got involved in economic activities because:

In the 1950s and up to early 1970s, the dominant paradigm was that markets failed to work efficiently in
less developed countries (LDCs). The emphasis was the need for active government intervention in
economic activity to offset market failure. This led to the expansion of public enterprises, after
independence and widespread adoption of economic planning, supported actively by international
agencies. It was felt that African countries could rely on state-owned enterprises given the limited
number of local private enterprises (Myong, 1997).

Setting up state enterprises did not solve the problem. The economy was still under foreign control.
Another strategy has to be fashioned. Nationalization was introduced. The reason behind the
nationalization programme was not different from that of creating state owned enterprises. As Ake
(1981) asserts further:

To all appearances these nationalizations reflect the desire for local control of the economy. They also
reflect the desire of the national petit-bourgeoisie which has come to power in the wake of the
independence movement to create a material base for its political power. These nationalizations offered
a particularly effective way of creating an economic base and for increasing their control of the economy
in the shortest possible time. By nationalizing, members of the petit-bourgeoisie brought more and
more aspects of the economic sphere and more and more wealth under their political control, and so
they were more able to control the process of accumulation to their own benefit.

In realization of the above, the Nigerian government in 1972 promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Act. This Act which was popularly referred to as the Indignisation Act was later revised in
1977. It contained two schedules which were later changed to three. Schedule I contained activities
reserved exclusively for Nigerians. Schedule II listed enterprises where Nigerians were allowed at least
60 percent participation, while schedule III comprised enterprises that allowed for 40 percent Nigerian
participation. In furtherance of this programme, the federal government acquired between 40 to 60
percent shares in foreign enterprises like banks and oil companies.

The federal government established the Nigerian Bank, for Commerce and industry (NBCI) in 1973
mainly to help Nigerians buy shares in indigenized enterprises. That the programme did not succeed as
envisaged is no longer in contention. The then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo had on 29
June, 1976, asserted that the exercise recorded a shocking performance, while it was found out that in
many cases, Nigerian front men were given directorships. Some even condescended very low by buying
shares on behalf of foreigners. Consequently those that benefitted from the programme were the
strategically placed or wealthy Nigerians.

The government haven gotten a strong hold on the economy through its various industries and
enterprises became faced with a big problem. The problem of management. The fact that the
government has not been a good businessman stared everybody in the face. Most public enterprises
have proved to be citadels of corruption, studies in inefficiency and a net drain on the economy.
As a solution to the problems of these enterprises the government in 1988 through Decree No. 25 set up
the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC). The Committee was charged
with the task of privatizing and commercializing some select government enterprises.

Its duties were;

a. Advising on the capital restructuring needs of enterprises to be privatized or commercialized

under the Act, in order to ensure good reception in the Stock Exchange market for those to be privatized
as well as to facilitate good management and independent access to the capital market.

b. Carrying out all activities required for the successful public issues of shares of the enterprises to
be privatized including the appointment of issuing houses, stockbrokers, solicitors, trustees, accountants
and other experts to the issues.

C. Approaching through the appointed issuing houses, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for a fair price for each issue;

d. Advising the federal government, after consultation with the S.E.C and the Nigerian Stock
Exchange (N.S.E) on the allotment pattern for the sale of the shares of the enterprises concerned in
accordance with the Act;

e. Overseeing the actual sale of shares of the enterprises concerned by the issuing houses in
accordance with the guidelines approved by the federal government;

f. Submitting to the federal government for approval from time to time, proposals on the sale of
government shares in such designated enterprises with a view to ensuring a fair price and even spread
in the ownership of the shares;

g. Ensuring the success of the privatization and commercialization exercise, taking into account the
need for balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreign interests in accordance with the
relevant laws of Nigeria;

h. Ensuring the updating of the accounts of all commercialized enterprises with a view to assuring
financial discipline;

i. Other functions the President may assign to the committee from time to time.

It was believed that if successfully completed the exercise will promote greater efficiency and higher
productivity in the public enterprises by granting them both financial and management autonomy.

The Act contained two schedules of enterprises. The first schedule contained those to be fully or
partially privatized. The second schedule contained enterprises that were slated for full or partial
commercialization. The first schedule had a total of one hundred and ten (110) enterprises while the
second had thirty-five (35).
The TCPC worked for about 6 years before it was replaced with the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) in
1994. That the TCPC did not succeed in its duties is public knowledge, for as Madaki (1999) noted;

The impact of the exercise on the economy remains minimal, as there have been no significant returns
to government from the sale of its holdings, and no meaningful improvement in the management of the
privatized enterprises.

The reasons for the failure of the TCPC ranged from a lack of clear focus, improper implementation,
poor strategy, low investor knowledge, fragmented shareholding structure, politicization, composition
of the TCPC and lopsided policy implementation (Madaki, 1999).

It was against the background of the failure of both the TCPC and the BPE that the Obasanjo
government decided to continue on the programme, with the promise that it will definitely get it right
this time around. The Obasanjo government embarked on the privatization programme with ecstatic
fervour believing it is the only tonic that can revamp the Nigerian economy. In rationalizing the
programme, President Olusegun Obasanjo stated that;

Privatization permits governments to concentrate resources on their core functions and responsibilities,
while enforcing the "rules of the game”, so that the market can work efficiently with provision of
adequate security and basic infrastructure, as well as ensuring access to key services like education,
health and environmental protection. The objective is to assist in restructuring the public sector in a
manner that will affect a new synergy between a leaner and more efficient government and a
revitalized, efficient and service-oriented private sector.

The above rationale looks lofty and commendable especially in view of the fact that public enterprises
have been a net drain on the economy. As the President said;

It is estimated that successive Nigerian governments have invested up to 800 billion Naira in public
owned enterprises. Annual returns on this huge investment have been well below 10 percent. These
inefficiencies and, in many cases high losses, are charged against the public treasury. With declining
revenue and escalating demand for effective and affordable social services, the general public has
stepped up its yearning for state-owned enterprises to become more efficient.

He further asserted that these enterprises suffer from;

…fundamental problems of defective capital structure, excessive bureaucratic control or intervention,
inappropriate technology, gross incompetence and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling
complacency which monopoly engenders.

We would definitely thank the President for his frank assessment, but we must also add that he did not
tell us something new. We are therefore going to look at the moral questions about privatization
starting from the reasons, for the poor performance of our public corporations. We are looking at these
questions because of the need to make us ponder a little and think about our past, and present while
hoping for a better future. It is necessary, that while embarking on wholesale privatization of
government enterprises, we should remember that there is no automatic assurance that the private
sector will perform better for as the ECA noted:

Government interventions in Africa have so far been discredited, not because there is an effective
alternative in the form of an efficient market mechanism but because of inefficient management, poor
results and misallocation of resources (Killick, 1991, p.6, quoting ECA document cited in Nyong, 1997).

RATIONALE FOR PRIVATIZATION

Privatization according to Cap 369, laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1990) is "the relinquishment
of all or part of the equity and other interest held by the federal government or its agencies in
enterprises whether wholly or partly owned by it".

Harvey & Henig (1997) see it;

…to include any initiative that increases the role of the market in areas previously considered the
province of the state (national or local). This includes not only the sale of state assets, but deregulation
and contracting out of public services to private providers.

Privatization simply means the divestment of government shares in enterprises thereby allowing the
ownership, management and control to be in private hands. Why then will the government want to
divest from its companies? There are many varied reasons for this. They include;

1. Inefficiency of Government Enterprises: Over the years, government enterprises have become
so inefficient, as epitomized by the epileptic services they render to the public. This is in spite of the fact
that the government has and still continues to pump in a lot of money into them. Instead of improving,
most of them seem to be retrogressing. Acting as drain pipes on the economy without making any
meaningful contribution to our economic development via service delivery, the government decided to
transfer them to private hands that have over the years proved to better managers in order to reduce
wastage.

2 Economic Recession: The Nigerian economy has been in a very poor state for quite some time
now. The level of unemployment is simply unacceptable, the excruciating" foreign debt, food crises,
poor infrastructure etc, are all evidences of the economic decay which the nation has found itself in.
Apparently, the economy can no longer sustain the level of wastages associated with public enterprises.
Also as a step to get out of this malaise, a solution has to be found on how to reduce wastes.
Privatization is one of such solutions.

3. Structural Adjustment: Following the downturn in the Nigerian economy in the early eighties,
the government of Ahaji Shehu Shagari started the austerity measures which were aimed at bringing
about a reduction in government expenditure and imports. These measures did not achieve much
before the government was booted out of office by the military which also continued the search for
policy measures that will revive the economy. In 1986, the Babangida government introduced the World
Bank/IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Incidentally, SAP had as one of its policy
measures; rationalizing the extent of public sector participation in the economy through a programme
of privatization and commercialization of those enterprises (Osagie, 1992).

4. Development Fad: As stated much earlier in the study, the entire world is moving towards
capitalism. Capitalism is a market society where the economic decisions of what, where and how to
produce are left for the market forces. This system frowns at state ownership of the means of
production. Nigeria is not left out of this global development fad, which seemed to have chosen
capitalism as the best and quick means to development. Therefore, the present privatization
programme can be situated within the ambit of international capitalist development.

5. Restructuring The Economy: Anyanwu (1993) argues that privatization will help restructure the
Nigerian economy, reallocate public fund to efficient users, create a self-sustaining culture, attract
foreign investors, while goods and services will reflect real values.

PRIVATIZATION: THE MORAL QUESTIONS

Now that we know that our public corporations have not been able to perform their statutory roles, the
first question that comes to mind is, what has the government on its part done to curb these problems
especially mismanagement and corruption? The answer is simple. Almost nothing. Over the years, we
have seen people, who plundered these corporations and parastatals go scot-free. Hardly were they
punished. In some cases some of them even receive national honours apparently for their
'contributions' to our national growth and development. Most of those who have been given national
honours by successive Presidents were former and present heads of inefficient government parastatals
and public office holders who took part in looting our economy. In extreme cases where the government
wants to show its displeasure with some corrupt public officials, it merely removes them from their
positions without any serious attempt at punishing them or recovering what they have looted from
them. What this attitude has engendered is a situation where these corporations are seen as positions
for self-enrichment. People therefore struggle to get to top positions in order to take their own turn at
looting. We have therefore cultivated a 'chop and go' attitude towards our public corporations.

The government has also as a way of encouraging corrupt officials, been appointing them into other
positions. The various administrations in Nigeria have found it very convenient recycling corrupt
officials. The process of rehabilitating those who have mismanaged our public enterprises will not in any
way discourage people from corrupt practices. The point been made here, is that public enterprises did
not perform abysmally in Nigeria because they are publicly owned. Rather, they performed that way
because the government that owned them has never really been interested in making them perform. To
those in government, these enterprises are seen as avenues for rewarding the 'boys' and are therefore
not bothered when their resources are plundered leading to their rendering very epileptic services to
the citizenry.

Arising from the above, is the often over-stressed argument that the main reason for privatizing these
public enterprises is because they failed. Since they have failed, the only alternative is to privatize them.
The government sees this reason as the main rationale for privatization in Nigeria.

Now, we may want to know how people came to this conclusion that these enterprises have failed.
Apparently, the epileptic nature of the services they render is clearly an evidence that they have failed.
It is obvious that once an organization fails to render the service for which society legitimizes its
existence or fails to achieve to a considerable extent its set objectives that the organization has failed.
This is the parameter that is being used to judge public enterprises, which led to the conclusion that
they have failed.

Quite unlike the majority, we seriously disagree that these enterprises have failed. Ironically, it is the
government which is accusing these parastatals of failure that has failed. To start with, what is the duty
of the government in a state if not to guarantee the happiness of a greater majority of the people in its
territory? It is therefore in the pursuit of this goal that governments create agencies and parastatals that
with provide essential services that will make life more meaningful for the people. Now in creating these
agencies, the government designs the structure, funds them and appoints virtually all the officials.

Government ministries also supervise their activities. In a nutshell, they are under the control of the
government. It therefore smacks of irresponsibility on the part of government to distance itself from
them whenever they fail in their duties. After all, whenever they perform well, the government in power
accepts full responsibility and counts it as its success story. In this instance, there is no division between
them and the government. The reverse is the case whenever they are found wanting in their duties.
The point becomes clearer when we look at it from the argument of President Obasanjo on the
problems of state enterprises. He said they “suffer from defective capital structure, excessive
bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross incompetence and
mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency which monopoly engenders". The basic
question remains who caused these problems or created the fertile ground where the problems
germinated? It is clearly the government. If therefore, the argument that any public entity that has
failed should be privatized is tenable, then we ought to start from the institution that has recorded the
worst failure in our history, which is the government. Since privatization is the only tonic for our ailing
economy, maybe we should also recommend it for our political realm that is almost terminally ill.

In concluding this factor, it is our contention that these enterprises have not failed, but are rather
suffering from the mortal injuries which our inept political leadership has inflicted on them over the
years. It is therefore our opinion that once the political leadership is right, the leadership of these
enterprises will be right, for a right political leadership will not tolerate corruption, mismanagement,
nepotism and abysmal neglect which are the major causes of the problems that these enterprises are
facing. Granted that state owned enterprises can never match privately owned ones in terms of
efficiency, but state enterprises can perform and have in fact actually performed. In Nigeria we know
that NEPA, P & T, Nigeria Airways, and many other corporations have really performed to a reasonable
level in the past.

We may therefore want to ask when and how did the good performance stop and who were
responsible? And how were they punished for betraying our collective dreams and aspirations? Until
these questions are answered, the argument that the failure of public enterprises is the main reason for
privatization would remain suspect.

Even the belief that privatization will lead to more efficiency has been faulted by Aharoni (1991), when
he argued that there is no guarantee that a change of ownership would make managers more
accountable to their owners. One might argue that the presence of private shareholders would alter
manager's incentives, but where the enterprise is a monopoly, the problem of asymmetrical access to
information is likely to persist, irrespective of ownership. Moreover, the threat that a government
minister can exercise against a public monopoly, weak though it may be, is likely to be stronger than the
threat of stockholders in a private monopoly. Nor need the managers of private monopolies worry
about takeover bids. The capital market in most developing countries is in its infancy and takeover bids
are almost nonexistent. Though private enterprises have high market power, it is not evident that
privatization will achieve the goal of improved efficiency.

The next question we are seeking an answer to is, who are the main beneficiaries of the programme. In
answer to this question, the National Council on Privatization says, that "the shares will be sold to
everybody, both to;
Nigerians and foreigners, as co-owners of the companies, the Act guiding the programme makes sure
that no single person can own more than I % of the shares in any of the companies. Arrangement is on
to make sure that Nigerians from all sectors-private/civil servants, traders, students etc, utilize the
opportunity by getting money from their banks" (N.C.P, 1999).

How good it will be if this is true. The truth of the matter is that rich Nigerians can always buy more than
1% shares in the privatized companies. This they can do using proxies or outright ghost names, after all
there is no way the N.C.P can know whether the names are real or imaginary given the fact that there is
no national identity card or any document containing the names of all living Nigerians. Even when the
government ensures that Nigerians from all sectors have the opportunity to buy shares, it is quite
apparent that the great majority of the people cannot afford to buy, given their state of
impoverishment. It doesn't need to be stressed that it is only those who are at least a bit comfortable
that think about such luxuries as buying shares. When people have not met their basic necessities,
buying shares will be the last thing on their minds. The issue of getting money from their banks is sheer
sophistry. How many percent of the people have bank accounts? For those that have, how easy will it be
for them to secure loans? Even if they can secure these loans easily, is it economically wise to use a bank
loan with its attendant high interest rates to buy shares in privatized companies? The answers to these
questions simply show that the programme is meant to transfer these public utilities to wealthy
Nigerians since poor Nigerians who are clearly in the majority cannot due to their economic disability
take part in it.

Now that, we have established that the programme is simply for wealthy Nigerians, the next thing is to
look at how they acquired the money which they are going to use in buying these public enterprises. It is
no secret, that most of the richest Nigerians today are people who have either occupied government
positions, or their business cohorts, the so called contractors. The fact is that most of these people
made their monies by looting the public treasury. The implication of this is that the money they are
going to use in buying government companies is the same money stolen from the government.
Extending this reasoning further implies that these companies are being given to them absolutely free,
since the money they will pay actually belongs to the government. If somebody pays you for your
property with money he stole from you, it simply means he got the properly free. This in essence is the
irony of the Nigerian privatization programme.

We may not be surprised if the same person that runs down a particular government company now
comes back to buy that same company with the funds looted from it. The government has created
enough room for this to happen through what is called 'core group or strategic investor'. The N.C.P
defines this as;

A Nigerian or foreign company which has the managerial ability and technical capacity to bring in new
ideas on how to operate the privatized companies profitably and also have enough money to buy up to
40% (percent) shares in the company and makes sure it can compete with other operators successfully
by managing the company well (N.C.P, 1999:4).
It doesn't take much for somebody who is interested in a public enterprise to float a company, get some
competent people on the board and appear as a core investor. When it gets difficult, a few palms may
be greased and the deal is done. This fear becomes the more genuine when we remember that it is very
difficult to ascertain the real owners of a company in Nigeria due mainly to the level of official
corruption and the absence of a reliable data. What it takes to float a company in Nigeria is simply to
obtain the company registration form from the Corporate Affairs Commission, pay the appropriate fees
plus unofficial fees to hasten the process and then fill in the names and particulars of the promoters of
the company. No effort is made to ascertain the authenticity of the information given in the form. It is
therefore not impossible that most of the names given in the form may be fictitious thereby obscuring
the real owners.

In some cases, some fast Nigerians, can go outside the country, to get a few foreigners with an off-shore
company, give them money to buy majority shares in a public company in the guise of a strategic/core
foreign investor. While Nigerians are rejoicing that some foreign investments are coming into the
country, they would not know that what they are seeing are Nigerians in white skin, buying Nigerian
companies with money looted from Nigeria.

The importance of good management in the performance of an enterprise needs no introduction. So the
next question that comes to mind is who are going to manage these privatized enterprises? Are they
going to be a new crop of Nigerians apparently from the moon, or the same people who mismanaged
public enterprises? The issue of management is very important, because, if a band of rogue investors
pose as core investors and take over 40% of a privatized company, and become effectively in control of
that company since the other 60% is owned by thousands of people scattered all over the country, they
can decide to milk the company dry as they've been used to doing with government agencies without
any strong opposition. What therefore is the guarantee that the poor masses who are been told to
deprive themselves of basic necessities in order to invest in privatized enterprises will have their
investments protected? Or is it not natural that the Nigerian political/business elites who have been so
used to stealing from the public coffers and who incidentally are taking over the privatized enterprises
will extend their thieving hands there? Unless, there is a solid assurance that these elites having stolen
themselves into national prominence are now 'born again' and will not turn into kleptomaniacs, it is
quite suicidal to invest in any privatized company that is going to be controlled by these same people.

This leads to the question of the morality of starting this programme at the period when most Nigerians
are impoverished. Is it not an attempt to further alienate the poor from the wealth of the nation thereby
condemning them to perpetual poverty and a life of penury and squalor? The first time, the Nigerian
government embarked on the privatization exercise in the early seventies through the indigenization
programme; the Easterners that were terribly impoverished by the civil war were effectively excluded
thereby giving the programme an ethnic character. The ones that followed also had a class character
since it was only those that belong to the upper class that took part. We look at the programme as
having a class character because it is a programme fashioned out by the elite, and that will have the elite
as its main beneficiary. For as Ekekwe (1986) posited;
Class action is historical. However it is not only when all the class members participate that an action
qualifies to be called a class action. Individuals and small groups who belong to particular classes can,
and do act for their classes.

Okigbo (1993) believes "the government and businessmen have joined in propagating a false basis for a
course of action that is only partly economic but mostly political". He therefore argues that since the
programme is a serious ideological matter, its justification should be based, more on stronger
ideological principles then the current grounds of economic financial efficiency.

Privatization is premised on the fact that, businesses should be left for those who are better qualified to
handle them, which is the private sector, while the government concentrates on its core duty of
governance. Governance in this sense entails lawmaking, law implementation and adjudication.
Government's involvement in business, takes the form of regulation. It does this through its agencies. In
a contest where the referee is grossly incompetent, biased or both, certainly a fair result will not be
expected. Presently, the performance of most government regulatory agencies leaves much to be
desired. They are citadels of corruption, studies in inefficiency and an obvious threat to operation of
business. Their reckless and callous attitudes to their duties have impacted negatively on the economy.
Now, that the government is privatizing, the role of these agencies in the economy will become very
prominent.

According to Anyanwu (1993), government regulates business in order to among other things "achieve
public policy objectives of financial stability, high economic growth, stable prices, full employment,
levels of output and equilibrium, balance of payments position". It therefore becomes quite clear that
these objectives will never be achieved unless the agencies involved are strengthened to be able to
perform their roles very well. For now the governments interest is to auction off public agencies, no
much thought has been given to the vital question of regulation. Or better still can the government
regulatory agencies cope with the increased burden that privatization will engender? This is because,
privatization without adequate regulatory agencies and measures will mean allowing the laissez-faire
attitude pervade the economy and thus may lead to economic disorder and chaos. Businessmen are
driven by the pursuit of profit, and in doing so; they employ both ethical and unethical means. It is only
the strong arm of the law that acts as a restraint on their activities thereby protecting the people,
business and society in general. Now that these agencies are still grossly incompetent in Nigeria,
privatization may not bear much dividend in the country for according to Olsen (1999) "societies cannot
realize the potential of a market economy unless they have institutions that protect rights to private
property and to contract enforcement. Without such institutions, the gains from privatization are
uncertain".

This brings us to the issue of the police and judiciary. How far has the government gone in reorganizing
both institutions to be better suited for a real capitalist society which Nigeria is turning into through the
privatization policy? Capitalism can never thrive in a society where there is no security of lives and
property. The judicial system is in a mess. Those seeking legal redress may wait for years or in some
cases decades before their cases are decided. It is this ugly scenario that makes us ask whether these
institutions are ready for privatization or whether the government is putting the cart before the horse.

One fear that has been recurring is the fact that privatization may turn a public monopoly like NEPA into
a private monopoly. Though the government has kept reassuring the people that it will take adequate
steps to avert such an occurrence,but the truth is that nobody seem to trust them. Most things that
government has done in this country ended up being badly done, so what is the guarantee that this will
be different?

The level of official corruption in Nigeria, raises the question of transparency in executing the
programme in order to make sure that the same group will not hijack a particular sector through
different companies and become a monopoly. In the event of government agencies discovering this
phenomenon can they resist the lure of graft at least in the public interest? Will they not as usual
cooperate with the 'evil men' and mortgage our future to a monopolistic cabal? This fear needs to be
assuaged.

In the same vein, can the Nigerian government fight cartels or trusts that may emerge in the after math
of privatization? Are there strong anti-trust laws in our statutes to check this natural trend among big
companies? The verbal assurances from government officials aren't just enough, after all who trusts
anybody in government in Nigeria anymore? More so, when most of the promises, made by government
in terms of fighting corruption, improving power supply, poverty alleviation etc. have not been fulfilled,
how then do we believe it when it promises transparency in the privatization exercise?

Privatization invariably leads to restructuring of the affected enterprises. This apparently leads to mass
retrenchment of staff. Most of the privatized agencies in Nigeria have embarked on this trend. It is quite
appalling that the new management of these enterprises have not given much thought to the fate of
those they are laying-off. In many cases, the retrenched staff is not given anything, while in some cases,
their severance pay is just a pittance. Shamefully, the government has not considered it, its
responsibility to make sure that such workers are treated well. In an economy characterized by an
abominable high rate of unemployment, these workers are almost condemned to a life of anguish since
it is certain they will not get other jobs simply because the jobs are just not there. One thinks that while
looking at the gains of privatisation the government should equally be interested in how to cushion its
harsh effects on the people. Curiously, the address by the President, Olusegun Obasanjo on the
inauguration of the National Council on Privatisation, which outlined the rationale for, gains of and
modalities for the programme was silent on this, showing that whatever happens to this group of
Nigerians is not the concern of government. This is simply inhuman and regrettable.

Finally, the question that really makes one sick about the programme is WHAT HAVE THE ELITES LOST?
The elites were the ones that looted our public corporations and agencies, they were the ones that
perpetuated all sorts of practices that led to the virtual collapse of these corporations and agencies, now
they are the ones who are acquiring them through the privatistion process with monies looted from the
public treasury. Tell us, what have-they really, lost? Absolutely nothing. Instead, they have gained
everything; it is simply a case of 'ALL PLUS NO MINUS'.

CONCLUSION

While looking at the privatisation exercise, in Nigeria, it may have seemed that we were completely
against the programme. NO. All we've tried to do is simply to raise some pertinent moral questions, so
that we don't embark on a mindless pursuit of disposing our common wealth to a few hands. A little
more work needs to be done. Believing that the best way to solve our economic problems is just
through privatisation is being too simplistic, mentally lazy or even dishonest. If we believe that
privatisation is the only solution for any agency that is not performing well, them we ought to start from
the mother of inefficiency, which is the government itself. We know that the federal, state and local
governments are grossly inefficient, but we have not thought about privatising them.

If we want our economy and by extension our society to work, we must start a serious and determined
fight against corruption. We must be interesting in changing our moral values. For we all know that the
basic problem with Nigeria today is corruption. Once we conquer corruption, our public agencies will
definitely function very well, for in the past they did function very well. NEPA worked, Nigeria Airways
worked why can't they work now? Let's attack the problem from the root. If we conquer the monster
called corruption, we can still decide to privatise some public agencies, in the public interest, if such will
make for greater efficiency and better service for the people, It is only when the exercise is transparent,
that it will serve the public good, or else we may wake up one morning to find out, that virtually
everything in Nigeria is owned by a tiny cabal of fortune hunters. Then

Nigeria will be reduced to 'All Baba' (government) and 'forty thieves' (rogue investors).
REFERENCES

1. Aharoni Y. (1995) "Measuring the success of privatization" in Ravi R. & Raymond Vernon (eds)
Privatisation and state owned enterprises

2. Ake (1981) A Political economy of Africa. London, Longman.

3. Ake C. (ed) (1985) Political economy of Nigeria. London, Longman

4. Ake C (1978) Revolutionary pressures in Africa. London, Zed Press.Allan M. (1986) The economic
revolution in British West Africa 2nd ed. London, Frank Cass.

5. Ameh M. (1999) ''Privatization: A blueprint for successful implementation in Nigeria'' In

Lawyers Bi-annual, Lagos, Head Research and Development.

6. Cap 369 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990.

7. Cassese S. (1981) "The rise and decline of the notion of State" in International Political Science
Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 April 1986.

8. Claus O. (1975) The theory of the capitalist state and problem of policy formation" in Lindberg L,
Et al stress and contradiction in modern capitalism, Lexington, Lexington Books.

9. Col. Leys (1976) The over-developed post-colonial state: Re-evaluation," Review of Africa
Political Economy.

10. David E. (1960) The political system: An inquiry into state of political science. New York, Alfred A,
Knopf.

11. Duguit L. (1970) Law in modern state. New York, Fertig.

12. Eghosa O. (1994) "The IMF and the World Bank in Nigeria's economic recovery" In E. Osagie
(eds), Structural adjustment programme in the Nigerian economy. Kuru, National Institute of Policy and
Strategic Studies.

13. Ekekwe E. (l986) Class and state in Nigeria. London, Longman.

14. Ghai Y.P. (1998) "Executive control over public enterprises in Africa" In R.O. Geddy (ed)
Government and public enterprises. London, Frank Cass.
15. Harvey B.F. & Jeffrey R.H. (1997) "Privatization and political theory" Journal of International
Affairs, No. 2. The Trustee of Columbia University in the City of New Yora

16. N.C.P. (1999) 'What you should know about privatization. The National Council on Privatisation
document, Abuja. July 1999.

17. N.C.P. (1999) Imperatives of privatization. The national council on privatization document,
Abuja. July 1999.

18. N.C.P. (I999) "The enabling legislation" The national council on privatisation document, Abuja.
July 1999.

19. Okigbo P.N.C. (1993) Issues in Nigerian philosophy of development Vol. 4 Enugu Forth
Dimension Publishers.

20. Olson M. (1999) In Ameh Madaki op cit.

21. Onuoha J. (1989) "What is the state?" Unpublished Seminar, UNN. 1989.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

In this chapter we are going to look at Nigeria's relationship with the outside world, since this equally
forms part of her politics from independence till date. We will however, start with a little bit of the
underlying principles and concepts of foreign policy. The essence of this is to help the reader appreciate
the intricacies that are involved in foreign policy making and implementation.

Nation states are the dominant actors in international relations. Though they act and react to a lot of
issues at different times, these actions and reactions are not haphazard. This is why it is possible to
decipher a definite pattern of behaviour in the relationship among states. It is the guiding principle that
determines the actions of states in the international arena that is referred to as foreign policy.

DEFINITION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy like other concepts in political science is subject to different definitions. For the benefit of
this study we will look at some of these definitions. Karl Deutsch (1954) sees foreign policy as;

'the search for the preservation of a country's independence and security, the pursuit and protection of
its economic interest.”

To Modelski (1962) it is;

“the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for
adjusting their own activities to the international environment". According to Holsti (1968), foreign
policy refers to “the actions of a state towards the external environment and the conditions usually
domestic under which these actions are formulated".
Yet it is still defined as;

"a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interest" (Hartman)

Rodee (1957) sees foreign policy as involving

“the formulation and implementation of a group of principle's which shape the behaviour pattern of a
state -while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests.”

In his own view Joseph Frankel (1968) feels the subject matter can be defined as

“consisting of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relationship between one
state and another.”

Finally, Nnoli (1978) defines it as

“a nation's reaction to the external environment involving the organization of both domestic and
external relations.”

It is in place here to make a few comments about the definitions above. We must point out that not all
international contacts and relations can be really associated with foreign policy. This is because foreign
policy covers only such activities which are sponsored supported or are known by the government. It is
therefore clear that actions which are international in character but which are conducted without the
knowledge of the government cannot be classified under foreign policy.

Another point to stress here is that most authors assume that the foreign policy of states emanate from
the domestic scene. This notion does not take into cognizance the place or position of weak, dependent
or satellite nations that lack the capacity for autonomous actions due to their dependent status. For
these countries, their foreign policy actions emanate abroad, and are controlled by external forces over
which they have little or no control.

THE OBJECTIVES OF FOREIGN POLICY

According to Chandra (1982) the objectives of a nation's foreign policy are:

1. Maintaining the integrity of the state.

2. Promoting its economic interest.

3. Providing for national security

4. Protecting national prestige and developing national power.

5. Maintaining world order.

COMPONENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is a product of many factors and forces. Some of these factors and forces are natural,
while some are man-made. Also while some are permanent others are temporary. It is the sum total of
these that are referred to in this study as the components of foreign policy. They are mainly the factors
conditioning the foreign policy of states. According to Rodee (1957), in devising its foreign policy, a
nation must consider certain basic facts of its existence. This frame of reference includes its geographic
situation, population potential, economic endowment and ideological environment.

Brecher (1972) in his own summation outlined geography, external, and global environment,
personalities (Elite images), economic and military position, and public opinion as the major
components of foreign policy.

Rosenau (1976) differed a bit in his own components. He listed size, geography, economic development,
culture and history, great power structure alliances, technology, social structure, moods of opinion,
political accountability, governmental structure, and situational factors (both external and internal).

We will now look at some of these factors.

a. Geographical Situation: The geographical characteristics of size, topography, shape and climate
are important factors. A state with a sizeable territory, good climate, natural defence boundaries, arable
land for food production and a shape which is compact and easier to defend is seen as possessing the
necessary power potential that allows such a state to prosecute an independent foreign policy.

Also the geographical location of a country automatically determines its defence policies.
Countries that have aggressive and troublesome neighbours must have a policy of how to contain them
either through arms build-up or through military alliances. In the days of white domination in South
Africa, all Southern African countries were seen as frontline states and their Foreign policies were
conditioned by the presences of South Africa in the sub-region. A country li.ke Israel that is surrounded
by hostile Arab-neighours would always have a foreign policy that is aimed at containing Arab
aggressiveness. It therefore follows that the geographical location of a country to a very large extent
influences her foreign policy.
b. Economic Endowment Factors: In defining foreign policy, Karl Deutsch (1954) included the
pursuit and protection of a country's economic interest. This goes to show the place of economic
considerations in foreign policy. Nations must of necessity engage in trade with other nations in order to
sell what they have in abundance and buy what they need but do not have at all or in abundance. In
their relations with other countries, all states try to reflect their economic interests. This also accounts
for the numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties that various states sign in order to further their
economic interest.

The ability of any state to pursue its foreign policy successfully also depends on its economic
position. The developed countries because of their developed economies have been able to pursue their
foreign policies quite successfully while the poor nations have not been able to record as much success.
In the days of the oil boom, Nigeria with its enormous resources was able to pursue its policy of
decolonization of Africa by supporting the liberation movements in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia etc.
Countries are also wont to have more interest in countries or regions where they derive more economic
resources from. For instance the American interest in the gulf region is not because of its love for the
Arabs but simply because of its interest in oil and its desire to protect American companies operating in
the region. It is therefore very apparent that economic considerations play a paramount role in the
shaping of a country's foreign policy.

c. Population: Though a very populous nation does not automatically translate to a strong nation,
population is a factor in the strength of nations. A nation's population helps in her military might
because a nation with a very small population may not have enough solders to turn it into a strong
nation. A country's population is a very important factor in its rating and status abroad. A country like
China became a world power not so much because of its military might than its population. Nigeria
today due to her population is seen as the giant of Africa. It is believed that populous nations like
Nigeria, if very well managed can easily become great because if the human potentials in such countries
are tapped, it will help her become great despite her numerous domestic problems. Since countries
regard populous nations as forces to reckon with, due to its numerous potentials, this affects a nations
foreign policy formulation.

d. Military Power: The military strength of a nation to a large extent influences its foreign policy.
Countries that are militarily strong often adopt aggressive postures on issues they feel strongly about.
This is because they know they can match their tough stance with action. Just like Morgenthau (1948)
stated, that the dynamic force which moulds international relations is to be found in the states drive for
power. Power is also a means for serving national interest. Nations that are militarily strong most often
believe that in international politics might is right. All their policies are framed in such a way that when
persuasion fails, power comes in handy to help them actualize their goals.

e. The Decision Making Process: Foreign policy like domestic policies is a product of various
processes. The elite who make these policies are human beings who have their individual preferences,
world views and emotions. The decisions which they make to a large extent mirror their personalities.
Like Frankel (1968) said "Policy choices flow inexorably from the composite images of competing elites
within the political systems." It is therefore very difficult to divorce the personality of a leader from the
policies of his government. We therefore make bold to say that the world view and personality of the
leaders play a very prominent role in determining the foreign policy of their countries A nations foreign
policy is made to reflect the personal preferences of the leaders. The Afro nationalist zeal of Murtala
Muhammed reflected greatly in his decolonization stance in Africa. Babangida's idea of a great Nigeria
informed his economic diplomacy and Nigerians big brother role in Africa, while Abacha's criminality
reflected in his "Area Boy Diplomacy”.

f. Public Opinion: Public opinion as a factor in foreign policy is particularly important in democratic
countries where the government cannot go against the grain of public opinion. On major issues,
organized pressure groups can galvanize public opinion to favour their own interest and force the
government into choosing policies that they prefer. In Nigeria, the easiest example of how pressure
groups can affect foreign policy is the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact of the First Republic which was
completely denounced by Nigerian students and other pressure groups. The rejection of this policy by
the students, and these groups forced the Balewa government to abrogate it.

In their own classification, Padelford and Lincoln (1976) have divided the determining factors of foreign
policy into two broad categories; subjective and situational. While subjective factors cover national
interest, the situational factors cover the international environment.

The subjective factors are;

(a) internal factors

(b) psychological factors

(c) internal public opinion

(d) policy makers

(e) proposed policy.

The situational factors are;

(i) international organization

(ii) world public opinion

(iii) reaction of other states.

Let us briefly look at each of these factors.

a. Internal Factors: The internal factors are problems associated with preservation, security and
welfare of the state, the size, geography, population and the economic needs of the state. Since all
states have these problems or concerns but at varying degrees, its impact on the foreign policies of
different states vary. However, it is an established fact that these factors are taken into consideration
when formulating foreign policy.

b. Psychological Factors: This Include elite images, attitude, values, beliefs, experiences, ideologies
and analogies shared collectively by the people of a nation and which invariably affects the foreign
policy decision of that nation.

c. Public Opinion: The opinion of the generality of the people in a nation affects government
policies, foreign policy inclusive. We have already shown above how public opinion can affect foreign
policy making,,

D. Importance Of Decision Makers: “Foreign policy to an extent is a reflection of the fundamental

instincts of those who make it". The above statement clearly illustrates the point being made here. How
the policy makers interpret what the national interest is and their perception of international issues
would definitely affect their foreign policy decision. This explains the policy shifts that characterize
changes in government and thus changes in decision makers.

e. Situational Factors: Situational factors are divided into two; Internal and External situation. The
internal factors include the capability of a nation and its power position. The external factors are three;
They are:

(1) World organizations creating static international environment

(2) World public opinion creating dynamic international environment.

(3) Reaction of friendly states about the foreign policy of a country.

1. International organization: In this category, we have organizations like the United Nations that
are concerned with maintaining world peace. Their interest is merely maintaining the status quo.

2. World Public Opinion: World public opinion is dynamic. It is constantly changing and
nations try through their actions not to go against it. Despite the strength of a country, it tries all it can
not to act in ways contrary to world opinion. It therefore goes without saying that world public opinion
is one of the factors that shapes a country's foreign policy.
3. Reaction of Related States: It is axiomatic to state that every country in the world has some
friendly countries whose opinions and views on issues it values. In pursuing a particular foreign policy,
the reaction of such countries may deter a nation from continuing with an action, because in most cases
countries do not want to hurt their allies who may be very useful in one way or the other in future.

In conclusion, all these factors listed above affect or influence a country's foreign policy.

It is therefore safe to say that the foreign policy of any nation is the result of many factors some of
which are natural and others man-made.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY

The twin concept of national interest and foreign policy are at the root of the study of international
relations. It is believed that countries engage in international politics in order to further or protect their
national interest. The totality of the actions, means and processes though which the national interest of
a state are pursued constitutes that states foreign policy.

NATIONAL INTEREST

National interest is the starting point in foreign policy making. It's origin in the study of international
relations is traceable to political realism. Its interpretation has however remained ambiguous. We would
therefore look at the definition of the concept from the standpoints of many scholars and statesmen.
According to Padelford et al (1976) 'national interests are centered on core values of the society, which
include the welfare of the nation, the security of its political belief, national way of life, territorial
integrity and its self preservation".

Morgenthau (1948) sees national interest as aimed "at promoting national image, prestige and respect
both at home and abroad". According to him, national interest is determined by the political traditions
and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. He insists that the main
requirement of a nation state is to protect its physical, political and cultural identity against
encroachments by other nation-states.

A.T. Mahan (in Beard 1934) sees national interest as self interest. He states that "self interest is not only
a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy... It is vain to expect governments to act
continuously on any other grounds than national interest... They have no right to do so being agents not
principals". Due to his belief in the principle of national interest, Lord Palmerston (in
Frankel,1970)asserted that "we have no eternal allies and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are
eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow".
Over the years, national interest has been defined in various ways to the extent, that virtually all a
nation does in the international arena are now seen as constituting its national interest. However,
Chandra (1982) has identified what constitutes the core of national interest.

The first is national security, political independence and territorial integrity, and the second is the
promotion of the economic interest of the nation. Other components of the national interest may
include the promotion of world peace. One important fact to note about national interest is that while
articulating it's national interest, a nation must be careful not to infringe on the rights of other nations
as this will definitely lead to international disputes.

Also it is usual to see the interest of those in government as the national interest. This is wrong, since
the interest of the government in some cases run counter to the interest of the state. History abounds
with cases of leaders who have been accused of compromising the interest of the state in an attempt to
protect the interest of their governments.

National interest is therefore eternal, since all nations deserve self preservation. The national interest of
a nation is articulated and pursued through the instrument of foreign policy.

THE DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

We will now look at determinants of Nigerian foreign policy. By the determinants, we mean the factors
or forces which have shaped and continue to shape the foreign policy orientation of the country from
independence till date. It must be pointed out that identifying the determinants of Nigerian foreign
policy is not a very easy activity. The reason for this is not farfetched. Like Austin (1972) have said
studying the foreign policies of African states is almost a doubtful exercise because according to him
they were born only yesterday. While not agreeing completely with him, Aluko (1981) still believes that
it is a problem for some obvious reasons.

The first point is that it has not been quite possible for most of them to build up any tradition, or an
established pattern of foreign behaviour. This is quite applicable to Nigeria. Secondly the gap between
executive declarations and actions is quite enormous. However, historical analyses of Nigeria's foreign
policy show that both internal and external factors have played some considerable roles in determining
its policies. We will now attempt to look at some of these factors starting with the internal.

INTERNAL FACTORS:

1. Nigeria's Colonial History: This is one of the most important determinants of Nigeria's foreign
policy. We make this assertion believing it to be true due to the fact that the colonial history of the
country has affected to a very large extent its relationship with the outside world. At independence in
1960 Balewas' government was clearly pro-west despite its declaration of a non-aligned foreign policy.
The anti-East posture of the Balewa regime lasted until after the civil war when the Soviet Union gained
a foothold in Nigeria.

In Africa, Nigeria has come to have more ties with the Anglophone countries who share a
common colonial heritage with her. Some writers have asserted that the colonial history of any country
is the major determinant of its foreign policy. Thus, Okumu (1971) asserted quite conclusively that the
foreign relations of any African State are functions of its colonial history. Institutions like WAEC are still
remnants of its colonial history. Though Nigeria has a lot of bilateral treaties with both countries of the
West and Eastern Blocs, it has remained more tied to the West than to the East due to its capitalist
orientation which in any case is part of its colonial heritage.

2 The Economy: Aluko (1981) has identified four means through which African countries (Nigeria
inclusive) have been trying to improve their economies through their foreign policies. They are:
maintaining close relationships with key industrial nations, promoting inter-African economic co-
operation, the formation of customs unions and through bilateral trade pacts. Though all these attempts
have not really brought about the much desired economic development, they have remained the major
motivating factors in our foreign policy.

Also the economic fortunes of the country have always influenced the pace or tempo of its
foreign adventures. The oil boom of the 70's helped her in the de-colonialization struggles of the period,
hosting of FESTAC 77 and its big brother role in Africa. The Gulf windfall helped Babangida in his
ECOMOG adventure. The point been made here is that since pursuing a vibrant foreign policy is
expensive, Nigeria's external activities seem to fluctuate with its economic fortunes.

3. The Nature And Character Of The Government In Power: The duty of fashioning out the foreign
policy of the country falls on the government. It is quite true that in Nigeria, like most other developing
countries power has always been personalized, to the extent, that whatever a regime does, is more or
less a reflection of the man who occupies the seat of the President. Foreign policy actions are not
immune from this personalization of power and its even one of the areas where it manifests most. The
field of foreign affairs is often regarded as the special preserve of the president (Coleman, 1963).
Nigeria's external relations from independence till date can be said to have reflected to a very large
extent the character of her leaders. Thus, the personal style and idiosyncrasies of our past leaders have
made a study of our foreign relations a study of regime types, since there is hardly a pattern of
behaviour. As we shall see later in this study, Nigeria's relations with its neighbours and the world at
large have always changed with its leaders. From Balewa's conservative nature, Murtala Obasanjo's
dynamism, Babangida's robustness to Abacha's criminality and thuggish nature have meant a very
serious fluctuation in our foreign policies over the years. The point been made here is that without
discounting the importance of other factors, the nature and character of our leaders is a major
determinant of our foreign policy.
4. Internal Political Dynamics: In Nigeria despite the weak civil society, some institutions have
come to influence the activities of the government though not in a very profound way. The press,
students, religious bodies and other pressure groups have come to constitute a noticeable opposition
force to the government, in the absence of an organized opposition especially during the country's long
military rule. The pressures being exerted on the government in power, moderates its foreign policy
actions. The first example that comes to mind is the 1960 Anglo-Nigerian defence pact which was
abrogated due to the opposition from Nigerian students and other bodies. The role of the press is
singled out for special mention in this regard. The press which has come to be the conscience of the
masses could not be left out in the domain of foreign policy in its critical analysis of government policies.

5. The Constitution: The constitution is a document by which any organized group is governed. It
sets the rules, regulations and conventions guiding and guarding relationships in a society. The Nigerian
constitution is a guiding document for exercising state power. The second chapter of both the 1979 and
1999 Constitutions contain the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria which any government in power is
obliged to pursue It therefore sets out the broad outlines of our foreign relations. It is therefore the duty
of the government to pilot the foreign affairs of the country within its broad policy framework. Nigeria is
also a signatory to numerous treaties which though international are automatically part of our municipal
law, once they are domesticated. These treaties also shape our foreign policy actions.

EXTERNAL FACTORS:

Like we stated earlier, the determinants of the country's foreign policy have both internal and external
dimensions. Having discussed the internal factors we now turn to the external. By external factors, we
refer to those factors which in certain ways affect the country's foreign policy from outside its borders.
In other words, these factors are external to it but also affect its foreign policy actions.

1. Geographical Location: The geographical location of a country to a large extent influences its
foreign policy. Thus, a country which has hostile neighbours has to fashion out a policy of containment
for it to survive. Fortunately for Nigeria, its neighbours are neither quarrelsome nor aggressive. Above
all, they have come to accept Nigeria as a big brother and all their relations with Nigeria have taken
almost a subservient posture. The only exception has been Cameroun, which has been having a
boundary dispute with Nigeria. The point been made here is that Nigeria's geographical position which
makes it quite free from external aggression has shaped it's foreign policy, Presently Nigeria is not
involved in the arms race because it does need it for any particular purpose. Also its position as the
biggest and most powerful country in the sub-region explains its big brother role in Africa.

2. The Civil War: The Nigeria Civil war (1967-70) is seen as an internal affair of the country and as
such may elicit some surprises on why it is included here as an external factor. The reasons however are
not too difficult to see. As Aluko (1981) has rightly observed, the civil war is the single factor that has
had the most profound influence on the country's foreign policy since independence.
 Prior to the civil war, the country's foreign policy was clearly pro-west. This was due mainly to-
the conservative nature of Balewa which also coloured his government. Ojedokun (1971) has described
his government as being "notoriously pro-British”. Gowon did not deviate much from this pro-British
orientation. Also during this period Nigeria was not really committed to African issues as evidences
abound where Balewa took opposite sides with other African leaders on world issues. However, the role
played by the OAU which gave Nigeria all the support it could muster and prevented many countries
from supporting Biafra, made the Nigerian government realize the role the organization can play in
future if strengthened. Nigeria has therefore since the end of the war been playing a big role in
strengthening the organization (now Africa Union). As already pointed out, Nigeria was clearly pro-west
before the outbreak of the war. The country was therefore disappointed with the role played by its
western allies during the war. Initially, Britain decided to be neutral at the beginning of the war and
even when it finally decided to support Nigeria, it still refused to support her with arms. America also
refused to give the Nigerian government licence to buy arms from America. Due to the disappointment
by her western allies, Nigeria had no choice than to turn to the other super power, the Soviet Union,
which immediately agreed to give her the needed arms to prosecute the war decisively. After the war,
the country's policy towards the East changed drastically as it became increasingly non-aligned.

On the other hand, the role of the apartheid regime in South Africa and Rhodesia in supporting
Biafra strengthened Nigeria's resolve to eliminate apartheid in South Africa and to the total
decolonization of Africa, thus adopting Africa as the centre piece of her foreign policy.

3. The Cold War: At independence, Nigeria found itself in a world that was clearly polarized
between the West and the East, the country along with other African states adopted a policy of non-
alignment. In other words, they choose to be neither pro-west nor pro-east, However, Balewa, due to
his conservative nature was still pro-west despite his government's declaration of the policy of non-
alignment. Since the overthrow of his government in 1966, Nigeria has clearly maintained its policy of
non-alignment, joining neither the east nor the west in their struggle for power but judging every issue
on its own merit. The country has also being a very strong member of the Non-aligned Movement. Its
policy of non-alignment was a major factor in its foreign policy consideration. However, with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Eastern bloc the policy is no-longer necessary
in a uni-polar world.

4. The Existence Of Colonialism And Apartheid In Africa: Perhaps, Nigeria has made its most
remarkable impact in its foreign policy in the area of fighting colonialism and white supremacist regimes
in Africa. It is to the credit of Nigeria that countries like Angola and Namibia are independent today. The
contribution of Nigeria to the anti-apartheid struggle can never be forgotten in a hurry. In fact, Nigeria
was so committed to the struggle that it was labeled a front-line state despite its geographical location.
The African-centered foreign policy of Nigeria is in direct conflict with colonialism and has informed
Nigeria's fight against it. It therefore goes without saying that the presence of colonialism and white
supremacist regimes in Africa has in the past conditioned Nigeria's foreign policy.
In the days of the colonial struggle in Africa, Nigeria provided a lot of bilateral assistance to freedom
fighters all over the continent. It also actively supported the OAU liberation committee both financially
and morally. Nigeria also championed the struggle for the suspension of white supremacist regimes
from international organizations like the OAU, Commonwealth of Nations, UN etc.

At home, it isolated all such regimes and never had any diplomatic or economic relations with them. All
these were done at a great cost to Nigeria, but it was a cost that was well accepted because Nigerians
believe that being the most populous black nation on earth, it must play a leading role in the
emancipation of the black man. Now that all African countries are independent, Nigeria's emphasis has
shifted to maintaining peace and working towards the economic integration of the continent.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND TREATIES;

Nigeria is a member of the world community and belongs to many international organizations like the
UNO, OAU, ECOWAS, Commonwealth etc. Its membership of these international bodies has shaped its
foreign policy, since it tries to abide by their charter. Also the country is a signatory to numerous
international treaties, which it tries to respect in both its domestic and international affairs.

Institutions of Nigeria Foreign Policy:

In every country, there are some institutions that are responsible for the formulation of its foreign
policy. In Nigeria, these institutions include the presidency, the external Affairs Ministry, the Nigeria
institute of International affairs, the legislature etc.

The Executive:

As we have pointed out, while discussing the determinants of Nigerian foreign policy, the influence of
the leadership in this regard is quite profound. It is the duty of the executive arm of government to
fashion out the foreign policy direction of the country. Under the military the Supreme Military Council,
which was changed to the Armed Forces Ruling Council and later the Provisional Ruling Council was the
main policy making body in the country. While in the past and present democratic regimes, the Federal
Executive Council has been in charge of policy making. It will therefore be quite appropriate to state that
the executive arm of government is one of the key instruments in the formulation of Nigerian foreign
policy.

The External Affairs Ministry:

Though one may argue that this Ministry is part of the executive arm and should therefore not be
treated separately; we make bold to say that since it is the government ministry charged with the
country's external affairs it merits special mention since it makes more impact than any other institution
of the state on foreign policy issues.
The Nigerian Institute Of International Affairs (NIIA): Over the years the NIIA has continued to serve as
the major government think-tank on foreign policy issues. The institute which is part of the External
Affairs Ministry has carved a niche for itself as a centre of excellence on foreign policy issues. Though
the extent to which the government relies on it depends on the particular government in power. The
institute has contributed in no small way towards shaping Nigeria foreign policy through its regular
symposia, debates and publications. The fact that the NIIA is staffed with foreign policy experts has
made it almost impossible for any Nigerian government to ignore it completely. It is therefore one of the
institutions for the formulation of Nigerian foreign policy, in appreciation of the role of the NIIA in
Nigeria foreign policy, General Babangida in 1986 said;

Permit me to state, without equivocation that the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs has, in the
past twenty-four years of its life, discharged with distinction, those national objectives entrusted to it,
and has thereby amply fulfilled the noble expectations of its founding fathers. Indeed, it is a mark of its
distinguished performance that the Institute has been acclaimed as the premier institution of its type in
Africa and one of the foremost International Affairs Research Institutions in the world... Somehow, the
history of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs achievement has become inextricably linked with
the emergence of Nigeria in world affairs generally and in Africa in particular.

The Legislature:

The legislature is the arm of government charged with the responsibility of making laws for the country.
Certainly, foreign relations are within the ambit of its duties. In the legislature (National Assembly) there
is a committee on foreign relations which foresees on behalf of the Assembly foreign policy matters. It is
the legislature that determines vital foreign policy issues that affects the core interests of the nation. For
instance, no treaty entered into by the executive is binding on the country until such is approved by the
assembly. Also Nigeria cannot go to war with another country or send its troops into a foreign country
without the consent of the national assembly. Thus far, it is clear that the legislature is an institution for
foreign policy making in Nigeria.

NIGERIA AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

The OAU was founded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 20th of May 1963. However, its formation was an
outcome of various conferences held mostly outside Africa by Pan African movements, led by Africans in
diaspora. They include Dr. Dubois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore among others. Such
conferences were held in London in 1900, Paris in 1919, London and Brussels in 1921, London in 1923,
New York 1927 and Manchester England in 1945. It was only in the last conference that African
nationalists from Africa were present. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Chief
H.O. Davies of Nigeria were all there. The conferences were geared towards spreading African
consciousness, forging and bringing African view points to the world stage. They were mainly concerned
about eradicating colonialism from Africa hence the popular phrase "Africa for Africans".
The conferences shifted to African soil when between the 15th to the 22 of April 1958, Nkrumah hosted
the first Conference of Independent African States in Ghana. Dr. Nkrumah who has just led Ghana into
Independence also chaired the conference. From the 5th to 12th December 1958 the All African Peoples
Conference was held also at Accra. This conference brought together leaders of most of the liberation
movements in Africa. The resolutions of this conference were centred on the liberation of Africa from
colonialism and oppression. The need for African unity was also highlighted.

The march to African unity was however retarded by the split into three different and often opposing
groups of African States. The groups were the Monrovia group comprising Cameroun, Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Togo, Gabon, Libya, Ethiopia, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta,
& Central African Republic. These countries were those that attended a conference in Monrovia
between 8-12 May 1961. The Casablanca group consisted of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and United
Arab Republic. For the Brazzaville group (Twelve) it was Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo (Brazzaville) Gabon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal & Upper
Volta.

The Brazzaville group of countries was seen as been extremely conservative, the Casablanca group was
classified as been radical while the Monrovia group was a group of moderates. The fragmentation of
African politics along this classification delayed and nearly frustrated the formation of the OAU. The
meeting of the Brazzaville and Monrovia groups in Lagos in 1962 led to a merger of the two groups, with
the name Union of African States and Malagasy (UAM).

It was against this background of political fragmentation, that the conference held in Addis-Ababa in
May 1963 took place. Thirty-two independent African states were in attendance. At the end it was
agreed that the groups should come together and form a single organization that would hold all African
states together. Thus, the OAU was born.

The Nigerian government was one of the architects of the OAU Charter, and there were even claims that
the Charter was drawn by the then Nigerian Attorney-General and Minister of Justice- Dr. Taslim Elias
(Aluko, 1981). The secretariat of the organization was sited in Addis-Ababa. However, Aluko (1986) has
asserted that Nigeria's role in the OAU was not quite stable as it has tended to waver depending on the
ideological persuasion of the various regimes and the economic fortunes of the country.

At the formation of the O. A.U, Nigeria was not actually in the forefront of the Pan African Movement
and only acted due to the prompting of African statesmen like Nkrumah and Sekou Toure both of Ghana
and Guinea respectively.The often complacent nature of Nigeria on African issues was described by
Imobighe (1989) as "indifferential". It was believed that it was this indifferential posture that cost
Nigeria both the secretariat and its first secretary-General which the then Nigerian Foreign Affairs
Minister Chief Jaja Wachuku was interested in (Bongo & Chukwu 1998).
The Balewa government and Ironsi's which succeeded it did not have any deliberate policy towards the
OAU. There was however a dramatic change in policy which occurred in the 70's during the Gowon
administration. Nigeria started playing a prominent part in African affairs and OAU, the reason for this
dramatic change is not farfetched. The OAU's unflinching support for Nigeria during the civil war and it's
acceptance of the Nigerian position that the war was Nigeria's internal problem hence, the argument for
non-interference was very pleasing to the Nigerian authorities. Secondly, this period was also the era of
oil boom, when Nigeria suddenly found itself with enormous wealth and in a position to finance its
foreign fantasies. It was from this period that Africa truly became the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign
policy that it started financing liberation movements all over the continent.

The Murtala-Obasanjo regime on coming to power articulated the Country's foreign policy which was in
full agreement with the OAU Charter. The policy declared the Country's policy to be;

1. The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the
world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African States
while at the same time fostering national self reliance, and rapid economic development;

2. The promotion of equality and self reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world.

3. The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of
the black man (Imobighe, 1983).

This policy thrust made Nigeria a key supporter of the OAU and all its activities. The 1979 Constitution
made it mandatory for Nigerian governments to promote "African unity, total political, economic, social
and cultural liberation of Africa and "to combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.”

The Shagari administration tried the much it could within the economic constrains of the period and his
conservative pro-western outlook to support the OAU. The Buhari regime was more pre-occupied with
the country's internal problems, but it still tried to maintain the status-quo. Babangida was very active in
the O.A.U, climaxing with the signing of the treaty of the African Economic Community in Abuja in June
1991. Under his tenure as O.A.U chairman, Abacha despite his repressive style in power and daunting
problems at home still tried to maintain strong relations with the O.A.U and its member states. It is
argued that with the near-ostracism faced by his government from western powers that he had no
choice than concentrate on Africa especially on those states where his fellow tyrants were in power.

The Abubakar regime was brief but it still maintained the Nigerian commitment to the deals of O.A.U.
Obasanjo also tried his best to take the nation to its apex position in African affairs. This is in line with
the 1999 Constitution which declared the country's foreign policy objectives to include among others;
"Promotion of African integration and support for African unity.
We shall look at how Nigeria has tried over the years to promote the main purpose of the OAU as
contained in article II.

These areas are;

1. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;

2. To coordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples
of Africa;

3. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

5. To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

PROMOTION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND SOLIDARITY

Nigeria has seen the promotion of African unity as its principal foreign policy. Over the years various
Nigerian leaders have believed that with the size and population of the country, it has no choice not only
to lead Africa but to also make sure that they are united and pursue common goals. However the style
and commitment to this goal varied from person to person.

Balewa's government was clearly pro-west and tried all it could to maintain a very cordial relationship
with the west even to the detriment of the OAU. In 1964 Nigeria opposed the OAU draft resolution on
the US-Belgian rescue operation sponsored by 32 African countries at the U.N. Security Council, because
it was anti-west. Also in 1965, Nigeria was the first African government to resent the unanimous OAU
resolution, calling on its members to sever diplomatic relations with Britain if it did not suppress the Ian
Smith rebellion in Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia) by December 1965. The point been made by the
above examples is that while Balewa was interested in promoting African unity, he never wanted
anything that will hurt his western friends.

General Gowon worked seriously for a strong OAU and a united Africa. His attitude was informed by the
OAU's role in the Nigerian civil war. He made Africa the center-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. He
equally played a key role in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).

Murtala, Gowon's successor also worked tirelessly for a united Africa. Though his aggressive, and
decisive approach to issues sometime caused divisions among Africans. For instance at the 1976 OAU
summit, Murtala's speech on the recognition of the MPLA government in Addis Ababa was seen as
inflammatory and ended up in dividing the organization. However, Obasanjo's approach was more
diplomatic and fatherly and he succeeded once again in making the OAU strong and united.
Shagari's government could not actually march the tempo of Obasanjo on African affairs and in some
cases acted in ways that was considered inimical to the good of the OAU.

The Buhari government like its predecessors was interested in African unity and solidarity. His
recognition of the government of the Polisario Western Sahara and effort to get it seated at the OAU
summit in Addis Ababa in 1984 is singled out for mention.

Babangida was very committed to the ideals of African Unity and he never stopped working for it
despite the cost to the nation. The climax of his commitment came in 1991 when as the OAU Chairman
he hosted its Summit at Abuja. Abacha despite strong opposition to his government at home and abroad
still tried to build strong African unity and solidarity if not for anything at least to have some countries
sympathetic to his government, in view of it's near ostracism by the west.

Abubakar was too brief in power to make any meaningful contribution and the Obasanjo government
once again took the issue of African unity very serious.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Nigeria's role in the OAU has been more political than economic (Aluko 1981). However, Nigeria has
tried in the area of strengthening economic cooperation in Africa through the Economic and social
commission of the OAU. It is mainly in the area of Inter-governmental economic relations that Nigeria
has made an impact in economic cooperation.

It must be remembered that Nigeria is an undeveloped dependent economy, like most other African
Countries. They are mainly producers of Primary products and as such the volume of trade among them
has been rather low. It is in the direction of increasing the volume of trade among African nations and
stimulating economic development in the region, that Nigeria's efforts on economic cooperation has
been anchored.

Nigeria's major effort at African economic cooperation has been more on the sub-region, where it
engineered the formation of ECOWAS. Nigeria is a major contributor to the African Development Bank.
In 1980 the Country hosted the OAU Economic Summit where the Lagos plan of action for self reliance in
Africa was drawn up and on June 3, 1991 African leaders at the 27th Summit of the OAU signed a treaty
establishing the African Economic community (AEC). They believed that by the year 2000, they will be
able to establish an African common market. Though this is yet to materialize, this was seen as a bold
move by African leaders headed by Nigeria towards the economic integration of the continent.
ERADICATION OF COLONIALISM AND RACISM IN AFRICA

This is perhaps an area where Nigerian foreign policy has been more effective. Though the Balewa
government was opposed to colonialism, Sir Abubakar believed that de-colonialisation should be
gradual, thus he said in 1962 that "independence should not be granted without due regard to
economic, sociological and political factors of each territory (Aluko 1981). However, the overthrow of his
government, witnessed a change in Nigeria's commitment to the elimination of colonialism in Africa.
Gowon tried the best he could in this direction, but it was the Murtala/Obasanjo regime that adopted
the goal of riding Africa of all forms of colonialism and racism as its cardinal foreign policy objective.
Thus, the regime placed all priority and emphasis on the eradication of colonialism, racial oppression
and segregation. All other policy objectives were subordinated to this all-engulfing one (Emezi & Ndoh,
1998). This regime was very militant in pursuing this goal. It gave heavy financial aid to the FRELIMO
government in Angola, the African National Congress (ANC) in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Nigeria also continued to support liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and led the campaign
for the expulsion of South Africa from the commonwealth, the UNO and other international
organizations. It also fought for the imposition of compulsory sanctions against the racist regimes.

Today colonialism has been wiped out from the continent, largely as a result of the effort of Nigeria.
What remains is the fight against neo-colonialism.

DEFENCE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF MEMBER STATES:

The issue of collective defence by African states has always being a very contentions issue in African
politics. Though Kwame Nkrumah pushed forward the idea of an African High Command during the
formative stages of the OAU, it was not accepted. Instead, the OAU set up a Defence Commission "to
promote inter-African cooperation in defence matters in accordance with the directives of the Assembly
and Council of Ministers".

It was not really surprising that Nkrumah's proposal for an African High Command failed. In the first
place, most franco-phone countries already had defence pacts with France and as such do not actually
need the High Command. Secondly, the issue of self-preservation did not allow them to see the merit of
the idea because, since most African leaders at that time were thinking of personalized rule, the idea of
a High Command may look like interference in their internal affairs especially by the bigger nations like
Nigeria.

However, in the absence of a strong mechanism for maintaining peace in the continent, Nigeria has
through the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), spearheaded peace-keeping
operations in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, The ECOMOG initiative was actually in line with the OAU Charter.
PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

"Nigeria, as a nation from independence till date has always maintained friendly relations with most
countries of the world. Nigeria has never been an aggressor in any international dispute. Presently she
belongs to many international organizations where she has been playing key roles. The country is a
signatory to many treaties, agreements and conventions and has also tried to abide by them. Nigeria has
also in furtherance of international understanding hosted many conferences like the Second Black
Festival of Art and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977, OAU, ECOWAS, Sporting fiestas etc, all these are being
done ostensibly to foster world peace and understanding.

NIGERIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The Commonwealth is an association of former British colonies. Nigeria became a member of the
association in 1960 immediately she became a sovereign nation. However, Nigeria's membership of this
body has over the years been subjected to critical appraisals arising most of the time from fallout's of
Nigeria-Britain relations. The reason for tying Nigeria's membership and participation in the
commonwealth on her relations with Britain is not far-fetched. Britain is at the head of the
Commonwealth and it will therefore be very difficult to divorce her from the association.

Nations join international organizations because it helps them to achieve their national interest. Nigeria
as a member of the Commonwealth, has tried to use it to achieve her national interest, Nigeria's
membership of the organization had in the past accorded her some trade concessions with Britain. Also
the Commonwealth scholarship programme has afforded many Nigerians the opportunity to pursue
their studies in Commonwealth countries. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation has
been of assistance to the country in the past, while members of the organization use the forum to seek
common solutions to their common problems.

Nigeria-Commonwealth relations, we must say has not been very smooth basically because like we
stated earlier, Nigeria believes it's continued stay in any organization is based on the usefulness of such
body towards it's realization of its national interest.

It therefore follows, that in times when Nigeria believes that the Commonwealth or Britain had gone
against its national interest, its relationship with the body had been very cold.

Thus, in 1978 Nigeria decided with other Commonwealth African countries, to boycott the Edmonton
Commonwealth Games in protest against New Zealand's sporting links with South Africa. This was in
defiance of the UNO ban on such links. Nigeria's relation with Britain was adversely affected during the
erstwhile Buhari regime. The regime which came on board after sacking the Shagari regime tried in vain
to extradite two of Nigeria's most wanted fugitives; Umaru Dikko and Adisa Akinloye because Britain
refused the government's request on the ground that the politicians will not be given a fair hearing in
Nigeria. Unfortunately, Nigeria's attempt to kidnap and smuggle Umaru Dikko to Lagos was botched by
Scotland Yard detectives. This led to a diplomatic row as both countries recalled their High
Commissioners.

The Babangida government normalized the relations. However, the British governments stand on
sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa became a constant cause of disagreement
between her and Nigeria and other Commonwealth countries. At the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Summit held in Nassau, Bahamas in October 1985, Nigeria along with other
Commonwealth members wanted a firm stand on sanctions against South Africa. The British
government through its Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, refused to accede to the request of
most of the members. When the issue was about tearing the summit apart, an agreement was reached
to establish a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group that would study and report back to the body on
the situation on how to solve the problem of apartheid. Nigeria objected to setting up the group on the
grounds that it was a ploy by Britain to delay action against the apartheid regime.

However, the pressure of other Commonwealth nations and the frontline states made Nigeria to change
its view and subsequently nominated Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo to serve as co-chairman of the group
with Malcom Fraser, the former Australian Prime Minister. The group after its tour and study of South
Africa recommended that sanctions were necessary against the apartheid regime. The British Prime
Minister unfortunately rejected the recommendations of the body, against her pledge in Nassau to
accept the decisions of the group. She even went ahead to castigate the group. Nigeria was deeply hurt
by the British response. It was then ready to deal a fatal blow to the Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth Games Scheduled for Edinburgh Scotland provided the forum Nigeria was looking for.
The British list for the games contained the names of two South African born athletes- Zola Budd and
Annelte Cowley. The Nigerian Foreign Affairs minister, Bolaji Akinyemi advised Gen. Babangida that
Nigeria should boycott the games. The President accepted this recommendations and Nigeria boycotted
the games thus, opening the gate for a mass boycott by other members from Africa, the Caribbean and
the Pacific.

Nigeria's image in the Commonwealth got a boost when Chief Emeka Anyaoku became its Secretary
General. However, as if the country's relationship with this body must always suffer some set-backs,
Nigeria was suspended from the body in 1996 following the hanging of ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni
kinsmen by the Abacha government. Incidentally, the hanging was carried out when a conference of the
organization was going on. Presently, Nigeria has been re-admitted into the body following the
successful democratization exercise in the country.

For some analysts, Nigeria's continued membership of the Commonwealth is useless, for according to
them, the organization is more of a spent force and the country's membership does not confer any real
advantages on her. It was in sympathy with this group that a former Director- General of the NIIA and
later External Affairs Minister Prof. Bolaji Akanyemi argued in his valedictory address to the institute in
1983 that;
Nigeria has pursued a wrong policy and that is our continued membership of the Commonwealth. If we
are asking ECOWAS countries and African countries as a whole to lessen their links with non-African
organizations, and have made this a plank of our foreign policy, how does one explain the Nigerian
attachment to the Commonwealth of Nations'... I think it would help our own argument to make it more
rational if we can get out of the Commonwealth.

Well as things are now, Nigeria is not contemplating leaving the Commonwealth in the near future.
What some policy experts are saying is that the organization should be restructured to make it more
relevant to the needs and aspirations of its members.

FROM OAU TO AU: THE POLITICS AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

The logic of contemporary globalization and neo-liberalism, particularly the rising opportunities,
challenges and even threats it poses, calls for a new strategic approach from the African continent.
There is pressing priority to achieve better national, regional and continental unification for
development. On a different page, the evolving pattern of global relations, of a unipolar world, chaired
by the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the democratic
transitions in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and in the developing world; and the
pauperization of the African continent, at a time when impressive economic records are being
maintained by other regions; were all part of the imperatives that saw to the necessary transmutation of
the 38 year Organization of African Unity (OAU) into African Union (AU) (Agubuzu, 2004:14).

More directly, certain inherent flaws, relating to underachievement, were at the root of the call to swap
the lifelong existence of OAU for AU. Like play, it came to a point that OAU was merely seen as an
organization pursuing very long-term abstracted objective of continental unity. Irrationally, undue
emphasis was placed on the principle of sovereign rights of member states, such as; the principle of
'non-interference' in internal affairs of member states; that of the respect for the territorial integrity of
each state; and for the inalienable right to independent existence. Agubuzu further noted that the
outcome of this was a diminished sense of commitment to Pan-Africanism and a retreat into micro
nationalisms. With this pursuit, consequently, national interest gained ascendency over continental
solidarity. Therefore, with a limited capacity, the OAU watched haplessly upon bad governance, lack of
rule of law, violation of human rights etc. in member states. This had fetched the defunct African body
the title of toothless bulldog. The failure of the OAU to enhance the economic wellbeing of Africa was
also a major concern. Poverty became pervasive. It was indeed a contradiction, to think of Africa, the
most richly endowed continent with natural resources becoming the most poorest in the globe, with the
majority of its people, well over 80 percent living in less than one dollar per day.

In view of these and more, the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in September
1999, was held. This was the precursor event where late Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, Leader of the Great
Al-Fatah Libyan Revolution, decided on the establishment of the African Union, in conformity with the
objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of African Economic Community treaty, which came to
force on May 1994. The main proposal put up by Muammar Gadhafi at this summit, which also
coincided with Libya's 30th Anniversary commemoration of the Al-Fatah Revolution that brought
Gadhafi himself to power, was for an absolute integration and unification of the African continent. He
suggested the dismantling of all borders; the establishment of a single army; the establishment of a
single-style Pan-African Parliament (PAP) that would constitute the apex of sovereignty of a “United
States for Africa,” under which all Heads of States and Governments would serve. In this arrangement,
hereupon, continental governance at the ministerial level would be conducted through commissions.
This was to be established for the various sectors that form the core business of governments, such as
foreign affairs, defence, health, education and welfare (Kornegay, cited in Onuoha, 2008).

Though Nigeria, under General Olusegu Obasanjo, had presented a different proposal altogether,
termed The Abuja Treaty in Sirte. Onuoha reports that in July 1979, Chief Obasanjo's African Leadership
Forum (ALF), in conjunction with the AEC and OAU promoted the Kampala Declaration, calling for the
establishment of the Conference on Stability, Security, Development and Cooperation for Africa
(CSSDCA) or the African Helsinki process. The Helsinki process was designed to better situate the OAU,
its member nations and Africa's non-governmental organizations, to critically face the security and
developmental issues in the continent. In fact, the main idea was to entrench appropriate democratic
character in African states. The CSSDCA programme suffered a serious setback with the abdication of
General Obasanjo from seat and subsequent imprisonment, but came back to limelight with the
ascension of Chief Obasanjo as the civilian President. Hence, the CSSDCA became an important issue
during the first African Ministerial Conference in Abuja, held from 8-9 May, 2000. The Abuja Treaty
recommended that OAU be modeled on the European Union (EU) against the opinion of the Libyan
Gadhafi. However, with the help of neighbourly diplomacy, countries like South Africa, Mali, Tanzania,
Ghana, and other major players rallied around Obasanjo's proposal and the unrealistic Libyan 'United
States of Africa' dream was drastically crippled. Thus, the preliminary draft treaty establishing the
African Union was prepared by legal experts and parliamentarians, who convened in Addis Ababa on 17-
20 April, 2000. Thereafter, the Ministerial Conference on the establishment of the AU and PAP, held in
Tripoli, saw to the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union.

The African Union was launched on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, by the First Assembly of Heads
of States and Government of the Union. The occasion was indeed a momentous event. In fact, the
occasion was named as the most glamourous show that ever happened in the African continent.
Further, Onuoha (2008) reports that the ceremony was witnessed by about 25,000 people made up of
Heads of States and Governments and other important dignitaries from African countries and beyond.
The Zulu warriors dressed in traditional attires, there was a parade of bare breasted Zulu maidens and
parachutists descending from the sky, all put up to entertain the ambitious guests. The late Libyan
Leader, Muammar Gadhafi, had almost stolen the show from the host when he landed in Durban with a
fleet of planes carrying about 60 armoured vehicles, several personal security details, and two good
looking camels. There was no need to remind that throughout the summit, Gadhafi was distinguished
from other African leaders. Particularly, his flowing brown robes and finely hand-embroidered gold
kente cloth, his enigmatic smiles and his tremendous attacks on the West, all drew serious attention to
him.

THE CHANGES AND CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN UNION (AU)

Certainly, the African Union Constitutive Act suggests that a major restructuring occurred, which
substantially differentiated the new body from the old. For one thing, the AU Act identified the need for
rooting democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance in Africa. The Act duly
recognized that the entrenchment of these humanistic principles was a precondition for security in the
region. Hence, enabling structures were put on ground for realizing this aim. In specific terms, Articles
17 & 18 called for Pan-African Parliament and a court of justice for settling disputes between states. This
was a major departure from the previous non-interventionist philosophy. Article 19 created financial
institutions, namely- the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment
Bank. This would go a long way to harness monetary exchanges within the region. Article 22 created the
Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), patterned in line with the world body- UNESCO, to
ensure the participation of all segments of the African society in the process of regional cooperation and
integration. Articles 23(2) formalized the imposition of sanctions on members that fail to comply with
decisions and agreements of the union. Articles 30 stipulated modalities for suspension. More
especially, governments that shall grab power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to
take part in the activities of the union. Finally, Article 33(2) warned that the provisions of the AU Act
must take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the treaty
establishing African Economic Community.

Of importance however is the birth of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is a
key programme of the African Union. It is the AU's strategic policy framework, directed towards poverty
eradication and repositioning member countries in a better form to deal competitively and favourably
with the emerging challenges of development. NEPAD is primarily anchored on globalism. The idea of
NEPAD was first presented to the leaders of G8 in a Summit in Japan, in July 2000, by three African
Presidents, namely: Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and
Bouteflika of Senagal, who were earlier mandated by the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya,
in September 1999, to engage African creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's external debt. At this
stage, the work on developing NEPAD was referred to as Millennium Partnership for African Recovery
Programme (MAP). Later, a presentation of MAP by President Obasanjo and that of OMEGA plan by
President Abdullaye Wade of Senegal, was made at the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in
Sirte from 1-2 March 2001 (Asobie, 2003). The harmonization of these efforts, owing to their
complementary purposes, later evolved into a single reality, which in part, became a core of the New
African Initiative (NAI), which was used as a working title for the purpose of OAU Summit of July 2001 in
Lusaka, Zambia, that finalized and realized African Union. The main thrust of NEPAD is to build a
sustainable symbiotic linkage between collaborative partnership amongst African governments and that
African people and its development partners around the world. The NEPAD programme is steered by the
African Heads of States and Governments. In fact, both AU and NEPAD embody the vision of a continent,
economically and politically strong, united, democratic, peaceful and rich. These are the dreams and
aspirations of African political elites, who have jointly pledged their commitment towards their
realizations.

To make things work, the Heads of States and Governments had, at the First Summit of the African
Union, held in Durban, South Africa, endorsed the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which was
to serve as the mutually agreed organ for self-monitoring by the participating member governments
(Agubuzu, 2004). The mandate of the APRM, which is the flagship of the NEPAD process, is to ensure
that the policies and practices of participating countries conform substantially to the general benchmark
of political, economic and corporate governance values agreed.

However, there are several intricate challenges facing the young African Union. One aspect of this
challenge is in the area of unity. The issue of locating the actual seat of sovereignty, that is, whether on
the member states or the union itself is a major challenge. The Constitutive Act did not only institute
certain direct legislative and juristic power to diminish state sovereignty, but also over their citizens,
much like the central government does in a federal system. The establishment of the Pan-African
Parliament, the Court of Justice and financial institutions such as the African Central Bank, the African
Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank makes one to suspect if the Union demands citizens of
member countries to submit their loyalties directly to the Union. And since this is strategically
impossible, these institutions have also, like their predecessors became potentially ineffective, in fact,
almost nonexistent. Again, there is a concern on how best AU should work out a model of relations with
various sub-regional, regional and international organizations, in response to the logic of continental
unity, globalism and development. How best would such relations be structured? Are there no serious
confusions, arbitrariness and contradictions of operations and functions in the legal instruments that
established these institutions? If so, is it possible or desirable to harmonize and synthesize these
institutions in a single unifying legal document?

The challenge of democratization, human rights issues and good governance are also very important.
There must be a system or standard for measuring compliance. The main problem here is that much of
the African states are still undemocratic. So what should constitute the standards for good governance
and human rights? What means should be used to enforce a breach of the 'standards'?. Will it be
through dialogue or outright use of force system? If force for instance, at which point? What role did AU
play in the case of Egypt, Libya, and Cote d'Ivoire democratization struggles? Indeed, it was surprising
that AU did nothing, except attending unfruitful meetings that never came out with tangible resolutions.
How do we place it, that AU stood aloof watching United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), an external sub-regional force, taking up the challenge of unseating Gadhafi? All
these issues should be critically addressed.

Much more, the AU should put overriding attention on the economy and development. Generally,
production should be emphasized over consumption; and industry over commerce. Electoral processes
must be made flawless. Security should rather be guaranteed by providing employment than mere trick
of beefing up security machineries, which in any case, does not uproot the real threats of violence and
criminality. In the meantime, one fears that AU is apparently a new wine in an old skin.

NIGERIA AND THE THIRD WORLD

Nigeria is a Third World country and by that token can be classified as a poor, weak and dependent
nation. Third World according to Michael Manley refers to;
That entire range of countries, mainly tropical, that were the scene of the great colonial explosion which
reached its crescendo in the latter part of the nineteenth and the first part of twentieth century. All
these territories stretching as they do through the Caribbean, Africa, India and the near and far East
were used as sources of raw materials and primary agricultural products destined for the great
manufacturing centres which were mainly concentrated in Europe.

Nigeria's foreign policy makers recognize the fact that the country is a Third World nation but apparently
she lacks the capacity to really help other Third World states in their numerous problems, subsequently
she has limited her scope to Africa which serves as the centre-piece of her foreign policy. Though the
country does not make pretensions to having the entire Third World as her focus, she has nevertheless
played quite some commendable roles in either forming or promoting international organizations that
promote South-South cooperation. Thus, Nigeria is a member of the Non-aligned Movement, the group
of 77, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the African Union (AU), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Belonging to these Third World organizations is a sign of the country's interest in promoting Third World
objectives in a world that is almost fully dominated by the rich nations of the West. However, it is not
everybody that believes that Nigeria presently has a Third World policy for as Mailafia (1982) asserted
that;

Many weighty treaties have been written on Nigerian foreign policy and particularly on the country's
leadership role in Africa. My own particular worry is that the Third World remains a neglected dimension
of Nigerian foreign policy. As of now, our foreign policy-makers have never articulated a clear and
coherent Third World policy.

Well, while not disagreeing with Mailafia or defending Nigeria foreign policy makers, it is apposite to
state that the present emphasis on Africa is quite in order because if we hope to project ourselves
outside the continent, we must first have a hold on Africa where we are the most populous. Also the
issue of cost has to come into play. Trying to play a leading role among the Third World is quite
expensive and our economy may not be able to shoulder such expenditure. In fact, Ukaeje (1982) has
argued that the way the country has been conducting its affairs presently makes it appear as if she is
already a great power. He argues that;

It takes only a great power with sound economic and industrial capacity for raising, equipping and
sustaining a strong military force, and even some nuclear capability to assume the role which Nigeria
continue to aspire or -assume either in Africa as a subsystem within the international system or even in
global politics.
It is in the light of the above that the establishment of the Technical Aids Corp was considered
extravagant and unmindful of the realities of our domestic economy for foreign policy remains a
reflection of domestic policy. Also, the ill-fated attempt by Bolaji Akinycmi to form a concert of medium
powers was criticized as highly ambitious and unrealistic. The prevailing belief is that Nigeria should
restrict its activities to areas that are consistent with its economic aspirations and objectives. The basic
thing it has to do as to solve its numerous domestic problems before having a continental or global
aspiration.

Its relationship with the third world should be limited to either bilateral or multilateral cooperation all in
line with the principle of South-South cooperation and not in the quest for leadership.

NIGERIA AND ECOWAS

Nigeria's role in the formation of ECOWAS can be situated within her policy toward her immediate
neighbours. According to Aluko (1981) this policy has followed four principles. The first is the sovereign
equality of all African states, the second is respect for the independence/sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of every African state, the thirty is one of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
African Countries, and the fourth is the commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting
African unity.

After the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Nigeria's foreign policy changed as Africa became the centerpiece
of her foreign policy. This was caused by the recognition of Biafra by some African countries and notably
Ivory Coast in West Africa. The use of Benin republic and Cameroon by France to supply Biafra with
ammunition was considered as a sign of Nigerians weak influence over her neighbours.

Nigeria felt there was a compelling need to alter this state of affairs. Economic integration of the sub-
region was seen as a necessary step in this direction. As Gambari (1979), has observed, "a West African
integration scheme would offer a rational outlet for external aid to African countries and provide an
institutional framework for Nigeria's leadership and the erosion of Frances political and economic
influence". Gowon himself believed that for Nigeria to be relevant in the sub-region it must impact on
the economies of countries in the sub-region. It was in the light of the above that he stated that there
was;

a new Nigeria that recognized its new role in West Africa and realized that the gigantic test of economic
and political regeneration in which (it was then) engaged would be of little avail unless it was attuned to
the requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa, particularly West Africa. ( Ojo 1990).

The then Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, Adebayo Adedeji was
also fully convinced that, a sub regional economic body like ECOWAS was needed to stimulate the
Nigerian manufacturing sector. As Asobie (1980) said, in Nigeria, once the Head of Government and the
relevant minister agreed policy is made. Thus, the second National Development Plan 1970-74
recognized the need for a West African Economic Community.

There were also some external factors that influenced Nigeria's resolve to form ECOWAS. The UN's
General Assembly's resolutions and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) independent initiatives
urging African states to form sub-regional economic bodies. By 1965, Africa had been divided into four
sub-regions for purposes of integration schemes. The West African group held several meetings
resulting in signing the Articles of Association of West African Economic Community in 1967 at Accra
Ghana. In 1968, a protocol was signed in Monrovia to establish the West Africa Regional Group
committed to the establishment of a common market. However, due to the Nigerian Civil War not much
happened thereafter.

Another factor was the E.E.C. The formation of this body set in motion in other continents the
realization for the need to form economic groupings geared towards a common market. ECOWAS which
was fully sponsored by Nigeria is West Africa's response to this global trend.

Also the push by France to make its former colonies in West Africa form an economic community union
known as CEAO, made Nigeria to hasten the formation of ECOWAS. The reason for this being that, it was
seen as part of France anti-Nigerianism which may lead to Nigeria having a lot of hostile neighbours.
Fortunately, Niger, Togo and Benin Republic felt that CEAO would not be viable without Nigeria, while
Upper Volta felt the same way especially about Ghana, Nigeria capitalized on this to hasten the
formation of ECOWAS, and thus it recruited Togo as a partner in its regional integration scheme.

Nigeria's dream was realized when on the 25th of May 1975, the organizations' Charter was signed in
Lagos by 15 countries. The organization's headquarters is in Nigeria while the headquarters of the Fund
is in Lome.

Ojo (1990) summarized Nigeria's role in ECOWAS thus:

Since the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria has continued to play the leading role as the core state, one
whose acts of commission or omission set the pace of progress for the integration scheme. It's large
share of financial contributions sustain the organization, it's investments in joint venture projects in
member-states and it's intensive and extensive diplomacy to keep the organization an on-going concern,
all attest to this fact.

It is however unfortunate that despite all the efforts at economic integration of the West African sub-
region, trade among the member states constitutes just about 10% of total trade. The reason for this is
simply because all ECOWAS countries are developing economies that are mainly producers of primary
products. Since most of them produce virtually the same thing, the level of exchange among them will
definitely be low. It is however envisaged that as their economies grow, their level of exchange will also
grow.

NIGERIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES

The policy guiding Nigeria relations with other African states is based on the same four principles guiding
her relationship with her neighbours. The only difference is that due to the existence of colonialism and
white supremacist regimes in parts of Africa a fifth principle was added. This is the total eradication of
racism and colonialism from Africa (Aluko, 1981). The five principles are in a way accommodated in the
OAU Charter. Suffice it to say here that a study of how Nigeria has tried to keep to these principles will
appear like a repetition of the study on OAU. What we have to do here is to look at the changing
patterns of Nigeria's relation with Africa. This change is mainly on the principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of other African states.

Before looking at these changes it will be in order to state that since independence Nigeria has remained
committed to the African cause as the continent has taken a prominent position in its foreign policy for
as Balewa told the Nigerian parliament on August 20, 1960;

Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as regards Africa. It
will be our aim to assist any African country to find a solution to its problems and to foster the growth of
a common understanding among all the nations, and especially among the new nations of the continent.

It was not Balewa alone among past Nigerian leaders who have emphasized the special position of Africa
in Nigeria's foreign policy. Gowon declared Africa the centerpiece of our foreign policy and went ahead
to really practicalize it through his actions. It was in line with this doctrine that he worked for the
formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Murtala Mohammed more
than his predecessors worked for African liberation. Shagari was not left out of this trend. In his first
foreign policy speech to the joint session of the National Assembly on March 8, 1980, he stated that;

Africa remains the corner stone of Nigeria foreign policy. My administration is committed to the cause
of the total liberation of Africa and the abolition of racism in all its manifestations. We shall neither relax
nor relent until all Africans and all black men are free.

However, the changing trend in the world had made it imperative for Nigeria to consider events in Africa
as essentially her problems. This new conception largely informed Nigeria's intervention in the Liberian
civil war. Nigeria's intervention in Liberia under the auspices of ECOWAS marked a watershed in the
changing dynamics of Nigeria's foreign policy.
Prior to this time, Nigeria would have under its policy of non-interference, be waiting for the United
Nations or OAU to take the initiative. Instead, she organized and led the intervention in Liberia using
ECOWAS as a cover. Outside Liberia, Nigeria has also intervened in Sierra-Leone to restore Ahmed Tejan
Kabba to power after he was ousted in a coup d'état. As a way of integrating the economies of the
continent, Nigeria initiated the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC). Nigeria has also as
a way of assisting other African countries, introduced the Technical Aids Corp. Through this scheme,
Nigeria has been exporting some of her skilled manpower to other lesser developed countries of the
continent. Though members of the Corp work in other countries, Nigeria pays their salaries. This is in
line with the country's policy of playing the role of a big brother in Africa.

THE NIGERIAN-CAMEROON BOUNDARY DISPUTE OVER BAKASSI PENINSULA

The British balkanization of Africa did not take adequate note of the various ethnic groupings living
along border lines. Therefore, the colonialists arbitrarily and subjectively apportioned dissimilar peoples
to collective lands, and similar peoples to different lands. Such indiscriminate lumping of peoples of
divergent identity at various places of their choice was what resulted to the Bakassi boundary dispute
between Nigeria and Cameroon. These two countries are historically bounded in arbitrary manner.
However, the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi dispute only achieved serious recognition after the promotion
of the Nigerian 30 months Civil War, which occurred between 1967 and 1970. The conclusion of the
hostilities had caused great human displacement. Thereafter, border issues became a major problem
between the Cameroonian gendarmes and Nigerian villages in the Bakassi area. In 1971, a joint Nigerian-
Cameroon Permanent Consultative Committee was set up for improved border redrafting and general
relations between the two bordering country, owing to certain dispersions caused by the long lasted
hostility. This attempt was however preempted by the discovery of oil resources in the area of Rio del
Rey.

In so much haste, Cameroon granted drilling rights in the disputed area to some American oil
companies. In response, Nigeria adopted a mutual diplomacy, which among others saw to the
establishment of the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Border Commission, to effectively and timely resolve the
tensions. In 1974, President Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon met with his counterpart, General Yakubu
Gowon in Kano, and after an understanding had been mutually established, they signed the Kano
Declaration. Beside the issue of creating a two-kilometer neutral corridor on either side of the border, a
major concern about this meeting was that General Gowon acceded to President Ahidjo's pressure for
the forfeiture of the contested area. The Head of State, General Gowon in the meeting with Ahidjo had
thoughtlessly signed the map submitted to him by the Federal Surveyor-General, Mr. Coker, which had
excluded the Eastern boundary. However, General Gowon could not summon adequate courage to
either present the agreement before the Supreme Military Council in Nigeria for ratification or approval.
In fact, it was a general agreement that the General, who equally regretted his actions, had acted on the
unfortunate situation that cartographers rightly or wrongly mapped the contested peninsula under
Cameroon. This was the main circumstance that marked the ultimate cession of Bakassi peninsula to
Cameroon.

Herewith, against public outcry, the Nigerian government thereafter started establishing effective
occupation, installing military forces for navigation in the oil rich area. As a challenge, the Cameroonian
gendarmes continued to fight the Nigerian soldiers. As soon as the onslaught gained prominence, the
Nigerian leadership mounted a naval base in Calabar to contain the insurgency. In March, 1994,
Cameroon filed an application against Nigeria. The International Court of Justice, afterwards, instituted
proceedings against Nigeria, relying mainly on the Kano Declaration and Maroua Declaration of June 1,
1975. Cameroon also filed an additional motion on July 16, 1994 in this regard.

THE LEGAL BATTLE

After a careful examination of the cases presented, the President of the ICJ, Gilbert Guillame of France,
on October 10, 2002 ruled the case in favour of Cameroon, but that its residents, most of who
reportedly consider themselves to be Nigerians could retain their Nigerian nationality. Though there
were serious evidences of certain similitude of ethnic groups on either side of the boundary. The Jurist
in his ruling had informed that the agreement signed on March 11, and April 12, 1913 in London, and
Obokun respectively, demarcated the boundaries of the two countries. Despite the ruling, tension
remained. This delayed the transfer of possession to Cameroon. The Presidents of the two countries met
with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in June 2006, and President Obasanjo agreed to withdraw
Nigerian troops from the area and transfer complete control within two years. Afterwards, Nigeria
formally handed control of the peninsula to Cameroon on August 14, 2006, although it remained under
Nigerian civilian control until August 2008. This was to allow the Mixed Commission to conduct a
comprehensive demarcation of villages along the border.

In fact, some well meaning Nigerians have refused to accept the transfer. First, there was a bad feeling
amongst scholars on why Nigeria did not raise a preliminary objection against the constitution of the ICJ
panel, which had a French man, Gilbert Guillame, as President presiding over the case. This was because
being a French national, Jurist Gilbert may have had certain interest in the case. Moreover, he acted
against the spirit of nemo Judex in causa sua, meaning that no man shall be a Judge over his own case,
to avoid biases of any kind. The Niger Delta militants also took the issue personal and began fighting the
Cameroonian soldiers. In November 2007, militants killed 21 Cameroonian soldiers on the peninsula. In
view of this, two weeks later, the Nigerian Senate approved a motion declaring the transfer illegal
because it had not been ratified by the National Assembly. Under intense pressure from President
Yar'Adua, the agreement was ratified and a final deal was signed in Cameroon in March 2008. Yet, the
crisis did not end. In June 2008, the Cameroonian Deputy Governor of Bakassi and his security detail
were kidnapped and murdered. By some estimates, one-third of the peninsula's population,
approximately 100,000 people, have moved to other parts of Nigeria as a result of the unsettled crisis,
which result to displacement of indigenes from time to time. Talks between Cameroon and Nigeria
began again in June 2009 over the land demarcation, which has severe implications for Cameroon's
ability to prospect for oil in the region. In the finality, of the contested Bakassi peninsula, Nigeria lost 35
villages to Cameroon, retaining only about 17 on the balance of probity of claims.

AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM INDEPENDENCE TILL DATE

A REGIME BY REGIME ANALYSIS

The Balewa Regime

Nigeria became a sovereign nation on the 1st of October 1960 and was admitted to the United Nations
on the 8th of October same year. This signaled the entry of the nation into the orbit of international
politics. Nigeria's independence was achieved through negotiations and not through violence,
consequently, she was in good terms with her erstwhile colonial master, Britain. Though Balewa stated
that "Nigeria would be non-aligned in international relations with regard to the Big power blocs, but
never neutral in matters affecting African Peoples" (Balewa 1962), he was purely conservative and
clearly pro-west. He regarded communism as evil and therefore limited his government's relations with
the Eastern bloc.

The governments declared commitment on African affairs was limited by Balewa's love for the West. He
never really wanted to hurt them even at the risk of hurting Africa. His non-aligned posture
notwithstanding, he still went ahead to sign the Anglo-Nigeria Defence pact in 1961 with Britain. Though
this pact was later abrogated in 1962 due to intense opposition at home, it still showed how pro-west he
was. Balewa supported decolonization, but preferred a constitutional and legal approach. Immediately
after independence Nigeria was confronted with the Congo crises. The crises polarized the United
Nations along East-West lines. Nigeria solidly stood behind the Western bloc on the crises. The issue got
to a stage where the Eastern bloc and their allies asked for the resignation of the Secretary-General Mr.
Dag Hammarskjoid for how he handled the crisis. Nigeria stood firmly behind the United Nations and the
Western bloc; insisting that only the United Nations presence would reduce the danger of making Africa
a battle ground for the Cold War. Nigeria strongly argued that through the neutral mediation of the
United Nations, the constitutional rulers of the new Congo Republic could be restored through a United
Nations supervised free election (Obiozor, 1994).

Also in 1962 when the former Angolan Nationalist leader Holden Robert visited Nigeria to ask for
assistance in their liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonialists, Balewa told him the only
assistance Nigeria can offer will be non-military in nature. Nigeria offered to train administrative and
medical staff for a provisional Angolan independent government. The thought of training Angolan
armed forces or police was outrightly rejected.

The above illustrations are meant to show the conservative nature of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

The Ironsi Regime

On assumption of office in January 1966, Ironsi was too occupied with handling the internal strife that
was about tearing the nation apart. He had little or no time to make any noticeable impact on the
foreign scene. Suffice it to say that he did not alter the inherited pro-western foreign policy of Nigeria
before he was swept away in the counter-coup of July 1966. However,it is to his credit that in deference
to OAU resolutions he declared white South Africans and Portueguese prohibited immigrants.He also
went ahead to ban Portuguese ships and aircrafts from entering Nigeria territory.
Gowon Regime

On coming to power in 1966, Lt. Col, (later General) Yakubu Gowon, was confronted with a serious
internal crises that resulted in the secession attempt by the Eastern Region and later a thirty month civil
war to 'Keep Nigeria one". The internal problems of the country did not allow Gowon make any
significant move in the international scene. However, the end of the war saw a remarkable change in
Nigeria's foreign policy. Two reasons account for the change.

During the war, Nigeria turned to her western friends for heavy armaments in order to prosecute the
war most decisively. To her utter dismay, they refused on the grounds that being a brotherly thing; it
should better be settled on the negotiation table instead of the battlefield. Nigeria was then forced to
look towards the Eastern bloc, but mainly the Soviet Union. Nigeria's request was granted and she was
able to get the ammunition she needed to crush the Biafran intransigence. Expectedly, after the war, the
relations between Nigeria and the Soviet Union improved greatly because she has proved to Nigeria that
she was a friend in need.

Also, Nigeria was overwhelmed by the support she got from most African countries during the war. It
was mainly this support that came under the umbrella of the OAU that kept the big powers away
considerably from the war which Nigeria maintained was her internal affair. Nigeria therefore felt that
investing in African Unity was worthwhile, hence the adoption of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's
foreign policy. Gowon was highly instrumental to the formation of the Economic Community of West
African State (ECOWAS).

Murtala/Obasanjo Regime

The Murtala/Obasanjo regime changed Nigeria's foreign policy from the conservative bent it had to a
more dynamic and pragmatic one. The regime on coming to power set up the Adebayo Commission to
review the country's foreign policy. Based on the commission's report the government outlined Nigeria's
foreign policy to be;

a. The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the
world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African states
while at the same time fostering national self reliance, and rapid economic development;

b. The promotion of equality and self reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world;

c. The promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of
the black man.

The Angola independence crisis was the major event that actually showed the pragmatic and radical
nature of Nigeria's foreign policy under Murtala Mohammed. The liberation struggle led to
factionalization in the ranks of the nationalists. The three dominant groups were the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union
for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). What actually made the factionalization more dangerous was
the interference of the super powers. While the Soviet Union backed MPLA, America backed both FNLA
and UNITA. South Africa also supported the two groups. While all the major liberation movements were
formally committed to the defeat of the Portuguese colonial army and the attainment of freedom and
independence, they also clashed with one another periodically in an attempt to expand their
operational bases (Sotumbi, 1990).

Nigeria tried all it could to make the three groups work together for the benefits of Angola. The OAU
equally favoured a government of national unity involving all the liberation movements. However, when
Angola became independent on 11 November 1975, it became apparent that the consensus
arrangement will not work as seven radical African governments have recognized the MPLA government
in Luanda. The role of Apartheid South Africa, in trying to dislodge the MPLA government in Luanda in
order to install the UNITA and FNLA, angered Nigeria. Consequently on November 25, 1975, Nigeria in a
most surprise move announced her support for the MPLA government as the legitimate government in
Angola. When the decision was announced, the world was stunned, Nigeria has abandoned its long-
standing moderate course on controversial issues by openly and vigorously taking sides with a Marxist-
oriented regime, citing South African invasion of Angola as the basis for its decision (Sotumbi, 1990).

Nigeria's dynamic foreign policy did not stop with the assassination of Murtala Mohammed on February
13, 1976. Rather Obasanjo continued along the same part, helping liberation movements, defending the
dignity of the black man and remaining non-aligned in International issues. Just like Murtala's
recognition of the MPLA government in 1975 shocked the world, Obasanjo decision to nationalize the
assets of British Petroleum in 1979 equally stunned everybody.

On 31 July 1979, the federal government announced that the Supreme Military Council had decided to
take over all the assets of the British Petroleum Company (BP) in Nigeria with effect from 1 August 1979.
The government equally announced that it would pay compensation for the assets. The action was
taken by the government as a reaction to the British government's permission to BP to start exporting
North Sea and non-embargoed oil to South Africa. Nigeria felt that the whole arrangement was a ""mere
subterfuge" to make "Nigerian oil available to the apartheid regime in Pretoria, and that the best way of
stopping Nigerian oil from reaching the enemies of Africans in South Africa was to cut BP from Nigeria
crude oil supply (Aluko, 1990). Perhaps, the BP issue, goes to show how far Nigeria could go in fighting
the apartheid regime in South Africa then.

Shagari's Regime

Shagari's government almost reversed the gains that were recorded during the Murtala/Obasanjo
administration in the area of foreign policy. He was very conservative and pro-west. Just like Balewa, his
commitment to African affairs was always limited by the desire not to hurt the west. Consequently, he
found it very convenient to work against African interest, when the west so desired. He even refused to
attend the OAU summit in Nairobi in 1981 and equally opposed Ghadafi's aspiration to head the OAU
because of America's opposition to the Libyan leader. Shagari was however committed to the
decolonization of Africa and the eradication of racial discrimination in South Africa.

Buhari/Idiagbon Regime

On assumption of office, the government of General Buhari met a battered economy and a society
riddled with corruption and indiscipline. They therefore embarked on the task of trying to halt the
economy from a further slide by introducing some modicum of decency in the society by curbing
indiscipline. However, the government did not want the enormous problems at home to stop it from
having a robust foreign policy. The government promised to have a dynamic foreign policy. Buhari
therefore like his predecessors equally continued on an Afrocentric policy. He supported the Namibian
independence struggle; was against apartheid; and like Murtala that supported MPLA in Angola, Buhari
recognized the Polisario government in Western Sahara despite opposition by some African States.

Babangida's Regime

On coming to power in 1985, Babangida decided to organize a national conference on Nigeria's foreign
policy. The government therefore announced in late 1985 that an All-Nigeria conference on foreign
policy will be held in 1986. It should be noted that prior to 1986, the country has just had only one of
such conferences. The All-Nigeria People's Conference of August 1961 was the brain-child of Dr. K. O.
Mbadiwe, the Personal Adviser on African Affairs to the Prime Minister Sir Tafawa Balewa. The 1986
conference was held at the Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic studies, Kuru, between 7 and 13 April
1986. According to the then External Affairs Minister, the essence of the conference was to attract and
cultivate a stamp of popular approval for government policies and secondly to have the advantage of an
open consultative process. (Akinyemi, 1986).

Babangida himself saw the conference as;

an opportunity to evolve a new national consciousness and consensus on the goals and objectives of our
foreign policy and thereby forge national cohesiveness and support for our foreign policy programmes
(Babangida, 1986).

Most unfortunately, most of the recommendations of the conference were never implemented.
However, Babangida's regime marked another colourful era in Nigeria's foreign relations. The main
thrust of the regime's foreign policy was economic diplomacy. Babangida was able to cultivate the
friendship of most countries of the world. Nigeria became the toast of many and in the African scene, it
was the leader. He completed the imposing ECOWAS Secretariat at Abuja. As Chairman of the 27th
Summit of the OAU held at Abuja, the 51 member countries endorsed the African Economic Community
(AEC) treaty. The Abuja Summit was also the most attended within that period. The government set up
the Technical Aids Corp Programme (TAC) to assist other poorer African countries with skilled
manpower.
One of the highest points of the Babangida diplomacy was the setting of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOMOG. He equally continued the fight against Apartheid. In fact, the visible vibrancy of the Nations
foreign policy was so noticeable that some critics argued that, the country's parlous economy was being
over-stretched, since this vibrancy was sponsored by the country, more so where the economic
programmes of the regime anchored on the structural Adjustment Programme could not revamp the
comatose economy.

Abacha's Regime

Abacha took over the reins of government from Chief Ernest Shonekan amid calls for the re-validation of
the annulled June 12 elections. Though Abacha came on the pretense of resolving the June 12 quagmire,
he felt the best way to resolve it was by killing it. Incidentally it refused to die as its proponents then
massed in a group known as the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) mounted serious opposition
to his government. Abacha reacted through harassments, detentions and assassinations, Some
members of NADECO went on forced exile abroad, from where they launched a serious propaganda war
on Abacha.

Abacha's foreign policy was more or less based on countering the negative image of his regime abroad.
After the killing of the Ogoni environmentalist Ken Saro Wiwa, Nigeria was suspended from the
Commonwealth. This coupled with limited sanctions already placed on the country by many western
nations forced Abacha to start looking for new friends. He turned to the Eastern bloc notably China. As if
trying to court the enemies of the west, Col. Ghadaffi, the Libyan leader, paid a visit to Nigeria. Probably
the West's refusal to see things from Abacha's perspective made him adopt a combative foreign policy
that made Nigeria almost a pariah state. Nigeria's image abroad had never had it so bad than in the
Abacha era. The complete lack of finesse and bully diplomacy of the Junta was unprecedented and
brought Nigeria's international standing to an all time low.

It was therefore not surprising that his death on 8 June 1998 gave as much reprieve to the international
community as it gave to Nigerians.

Abubakar Regime

Immediately Abubakar took over, his first task was to make the international community realize that his
government was completely different from Abacha's. He therefore embarked on extensive international
tours and was able to get the various countries that placed sanctions on Nigeria to lift them. His brief
stay in power was marked by a sincere transition programme that was quite different from the dubious
transitions of Babangida and Abacha which collectively lasted for about 10 years without achieving
anything except chaos and international odium for Nigeria.

Abubakar therefore has the credit of opening up Nigeria again to the outside world after the near
ostracism of the Abacha era.
NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

THE THRUST OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT OBASANJO

The return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999 improved the country's image abroad. It allowed the country
to take a more active and productive role regionally and on the global stage. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo
was already a well known statesman before he came into office in 1999 as a civilian President. As an
international figure, he was able, within a little time, to re-launch Nigeria once again into the
international orbit, as an influential voice among Third World nations. This was made possible through
Obasanjo's hijack of the foreign policy machineries. For example, to stamp his diplomatic assertiveness,
Obasanjo ensured that the Nigerian Foreign Affairs ministry with all its paraphernalia became not only a
personal instrument in the office of the President, but a personalized tool of which he effectively used
for his personal international ego massaging and aggrandizement. He undertook too many self
marketing foreign trips which attracted so much condemnation at home, visiting the United States and
European nations to restore investment flows into Nigeria. Hence, the plank of this administration's
foreign policy became shuttle diplomacy. This type of diplomacy, or mad pursuit, was a personal task
which Obasanjo took upon himself, to rummage Western countries either begging world leaders for aids
or enticing them to come and invest in Nigeria. In fact, Obasanjo was more or less hanging out with
world leaders, snapping too many pictures. However, the frequency of these trips got so bad that
“According to official sources, the President, as at mid August 2002, travelled out of the country for one
hundred and thirteen times since he took over the leadership of the country at the end of May in 1999,
and that as at June 2002, he had been out of Nigeria altogether for a period of 340 days” (Akindele,
2005). In other words, in a period of three years, the President has been out of the country for a period
of a year less two weeks. Not only that, comprehensive implementation of neoliberal economic reforms
and other sensitive advisements of the G8 countries, both political and economic, also formed an
integral component of Obasanjo's foreign policy outlook. Incidentally, the domestic environment which
was not very conducive could not make it possible for the foreign investors to grab the carrot which
Obasanjo painstakingly dangled before them.

It could not be argued, however, that Obasanjo's diplomatic overtures went without tangible
concomitant benefits to the nation. But at a very huge travelling costs to the nation's treasury. In fact, in
one of his foremost foreign marketing trips, in the 54th session of the United Nations, in September
1999, Obasanjo stated that his regime had put in place enabling policies and structures that will attract
foreign investors into Nigeria. Likewise, at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaski, President Obasanjo
marketed the AU and NEPAD brands in order to use them attract Western assistance. In view of this
commitment, the Obasanjo government in 2001 created a new Ministry of Integration and Cooperation
in Africa, headed by a Minister of Cabinet rank, to promote management of conflicts and African
integration (Ifesinachi, 2009). In July 2004, the Obasanjo Administration doled out a loan of $40 million
to Ghana, to finance Ghana's share of the joint venture of West African Gas Pipeline project, which shall
sell Nigeria's gas to neighbouring countries. Also a loan of $5 million was given to Sao Tome, to boast the
take-off of Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone. Nigeria also intensified commitment towards oil
business, supplying about 11 percent of US oil demands, about 46 percent of her daily oil produce and
expected to rise to 25 percent by 2015. Total crude oil sales to US and other western countries rose
from 278.5 million barrels, valued at N913.5 billion in 2002, to 327.8 million barrels valued at N1,361.0
billion in 2003, representing an increase of 17.7% and 49.0% respectively in volume and value terms,
with the US accounting for an average of 38.0% of total crude export.

To fully incorporate the foreign interests in the country's oil economy, the Nigerian government
established partnerships with three American companies, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil and Texaco, and also
with European Agip, Shell, Elf etc, through the NNPC, which holds an average of 57% in the joint
ventures. The government also invested in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project to the tune of $3 billion
alongside the European and American investors in 2004. In order to maximize ample external capital,
the government took advantage of the US government transparency initiative's $36 billion budgeted for
five years, from 2004 fiscal year, to strengthen institutions of governance, combat corruption, and
achieve public and private sector reforms in Africa. In addition, the government also established
partnership in the joint commission between Nigeria and China for mutually beneficial cooperation in
commerce, investments, banking, petroleum and railways in March 2001. Between 14th and 16th April
2002, Jiang Zemin, President of the Peoples Republic of China paid a state visit to Nigeria in which
Nigeria received a Chinese grant equivalent to $3 million to give impetus to the bilateral relations
agreement signed (Ifesinachi, 2009).

Impressively, the Obasanjo shuttle diplomacy fetched for Nigeria, the cancellation of over $18 billion
debt to the Paris Club and subsequently an exit route from London Club debt which was already choking
the country. But even at that, the country had, over the years, laboriously serviced these loans before
she was reluctantly, even grudgingly, counted worthy of debt forgiveness by these seeming Shylocks.
Nigeria had in the past 38 years paid about $42 billion to the Paris Club as interests and penalties on
$15.5 billion loans to Nigeria. Despite this outragous amount the country still owed the Club $31 billion,
which in any case, is due to accrue interests. Such shylocking offer is but a painful gift.

In terms of trade and investment, Nigeria also benefited favourably over US in the regime of African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Other bilateral cooperation were also initiated by this regime-
Nigeria-China, Nigeria-Britain, France, India etc. On the part of Nigeria neighbours, as we noted earlier,
the Obasanjo administration doled out a loan of $40 million to Ghana in July 2004, to finance Ghana's
share of the jointly owned West Africa Gas Pipeline project which was expected to distribute Nigerian
gas to neighbouring West African countries with substantial economic returns (Ifesinachi, 2009).
However, the high point of Obasanjo's first term in office was Nigeria's hosting of the FIFA under 17
World Cup in 1999, in which Nigerian players, nevertheless, did not fail to put the country to shame as
usual. Also, this Administration successfully hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
(CHOGM) in 2003. Needless to contemplate whether the Nigerian team did well or not. We already
know they failed as usual.

Under Obasanjo's leadership, Nigeria was proven to be a powerhouse in the region in economic and
security affairs. Without Nigeria, ECOMOG (West African Peace Monitoring Force), a security arm of
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) would be toothless, and African-led
peacekeeping missions in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone would not have been possible, either.
Nonetheless, Obasanjo battled with the headaches of several border disputes between Nigeria and
neighbours- Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Oral arguments on the land and maritime boundary
disputes, between Cameroon and Nigeria over Bakassi Peninsula were presented to the ICJ, but the
process which required drawing a new border between the two countries was marred by armed clashes
along the line. We have made detailed effort to explore the Nigeria-Cameroon border crisis elsewhere in
this work. Other disputes over maritime boundary and economic zone in the Gulf of Guinea, which
involves Equatorial Guinea, also stole attention of the regime.

At the continental level, President Obasanjo became the chairman of the African Union (AU) and played
a major role in maintaining peace and stability in the continent. He was mostly instrumental in gathering
African leaders to work towards establishing a code of conduct in economic and political reforms that
would satisfy the conditions and expectations of Western donors. At the June 2001 Group of Eight
Summit in Genoa, Italy, Obasanjo was one of the four leading African Heads of State to unveil an African
initiated plan called the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was designed to
garner aid from donors in return for African commitments to good governance. Obasanjo has led a
number of meetings on NEPAD, including the March 2002 Summit of leaders from 19 countries. Below is
what Obasanjo stated about NEPAD, in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations. The audio
speech is presented unedited:

While the AU was being established, three or four initially, and five of us later, started working on what
has now become NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa's Development]. NEPAD, of course, is not a new
organization or a new institution. NEPAD is the same as a program of the AU. AU owns NEPAD; NEPAD
does not own AU. And this is important, because some people tend to see AU NEPAD as an organization
by itself. It was very important, significant [inaudible] of AU of NEPAD, which is this thing we call African
Peer Review Mechanism [APRM]. We started this is voluntary. And we say, 'Look,' to all of our
[inaudible] in AU, 'If you are a member, you are a member.' But the APRM is voluntary because it is a
means by which we look at best of practices best practices, the best policies and we can learn from that,
also can adopt it. We can also sanction ourselves and [inaudible], because once you subject yourself to
it, you cannot be you have [inaudible] you cannot do. And already from 12, we have now gone to 23
[members] who have voluntarily [inaudible], and eight countries are now being peer reviewed. Nigeria is
one of them. Now, we do realize, whether in an AU document or in a NEPAD document, that the basis
for development for progress in Africa, is peace, security and resolution of conflict. It is important…. And
we in the constitutive act of AU, we make it clear that the AU can send AU troops African troops to any
country where the AU considers it necessary. And that would not be regarded as foreign troops. That's
new. That we decide that we have also put in the constitutive act that if you haven't come to power by
democratic process, we will not allow you to speak to those in the assembly of heads government. That
was, again, new, and we have we will have been tested on that, and we have been able to say, “Rulers,
you will not be there, you will not [inaudible] (Obasanjo's voice record: via CFR, 2004).

Beyond the question of NEPAD, which we have revisited elsewhere proper, the Obasanjo Administration
was able to keep a strategic reserve of grain of well over 150,000 pounds. In view of this, the World
Food Program, for the first time in the history of Nigeria, set up an office in the country. The World Food
Program initially bought 3,000 tons of grain from Nigeria for Chad. For this romance with the World
Food Program, Nigeria projected the production of about 250,000 tons of grain for 2004 alone, a step
ahead in the over 150,000 tons achieved in 2003; and anticipated producing, before the closure of the
administration in 2007, a strategic grain reserve of 1 million metric tons (Obasanjo in CFR Report, 2004).
NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER LATE PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA'S ADMINISTRATION

Perhaps, the best way to begin here is to mention that late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was in so
many ways an opposite of Obasanjo's personality. We may not be very interested in commenting on his
health issues, which in the first place diminished any sense of personalization of foreign policy
structures. Yar'Adua's ill health, in a way, saved the country quantum costs of unsolicited frivolous
foreign trips. Besides, the foreign policy machinery naturally deducted itself from the office of the
President, which it was hitherto arbitrarily and forcibly subjected to. This was the reason why the
foreign policy objective of the country was rightly left for the Foreign Affairs Minister- Chief Ojo
Madueke to etch.

According to the Minister, the new thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy was 'Citizenship Diplomacy'. He
described it as the diplomacy of consequences, such that if you are nice to Nigeria, Nigeria will be nice to
you. If you are hostile to Nigeria, Nigeria will be hostile to you. In essence, the era of flamboyant foreign
spending had gone. The times of banking on intangible 'gain' or 'self deception,' of playing the big
brother role in Africa was seen as wasted years. Citizenship Diplomacy therefore meant- expect Nigeria
to pay you back in your own coin, a sort of tit-for-tat or counter-strike diplomacy; meaning that, Nigeria
must take a serious corresponding action should any country violate the human dignity of her citizens
residing in their land. Here, as in physics, actions and reactions must be equal and opposite.

This philosophy became a child of necessity owing to the ill treatment meted to Nigerian citizens
abroad, in most cases, coming from countries that had or are still beneficiaries of Nigeria. Thus, the
emphasis on the citizen-centered foreign policy was all about the welfare of the Nigerian citizens
abroad, bearing in mind also that a happier citizenry home and abroad, would better project the
country's image, prestige and glory anywhere in the world. This was referred to as 'Track-Two-
Diplomacy'. Simply put, rather than relying wholly on Track I Diplomacy (i.e. work of actual diplomats at
the embassies), the Yar'Adua's government engaged the strategy of scientific exchanges, cultural
interrelationships, and international sporting events to complement official diplomacy (Omenma, 2009).

On these bases, the Yar'Adua government fought for the good of Nigerians in diaspora. Particularly, the
Administration negotiated with other countries for exchange of prisoners. Various attempts were also
made, howbeit in vain, to negotiate death sentences passed on two Nigerian citizens in Indonesia and in
Saudi Arabia. In fact, the regime made painstaking efforts and calls, even though they fell on deaf ears,
to intervene in the cases of over twenty thousand Nigerians serving merited and unmerited jail terms in
prisons across Europe and Africa (1,500, in Libya; 391 in India; 15 in Nepal; 14 in Japan; 13 in Canada; 40
in Niger Republic; 150 in Togo; 1400 in Britain etc) (see Vanguard, June 11, 2008:17). Particularly, the
House of Representatives Committee on Diaspora volubly condemned the brutal strangling to death of
Mrs Evelyn Uche Amarin by her Belgium husband, Mr Wim Vanacker. It was indeed painful that Mr.
Ikechukwu Obiakor died in Lindela Detention Camp in Johannesburg, while awaiting deportation. Much
more, well over 84 Nigerians have been killed in South Africa between January 2007 and April 2008. A
Nigerian diplomat, L.M. Wayi was equally killed, without any restraint, at the Nigerian embassy in
Prague, Czech Republic, in May 2007, by Jiri Podoski an irate victim defrauded by a Nigerian. The May
2008 xenophobic attacks on immigrants in South Africa, of which many Nigerians fell victims, was very
outstanding.

Unfortunately, apart from the purported hope that the Nigerian government was compiling list of
Nigerian victims in other to seek for compensations from the South African government, no further
concrete actions was taken or heard. On the other hand, other countries like Kenya threatened
diplomatic severance to press home their grievances. The Nigerian government made but a belated
effort to halt the execution of Mr. Samuel Iwuchukwu Okoye and Hansen Anthony Nwaolisa by the
Indonesian government in June 2008. Also, about a dozen and half Nigerian citizens, over 16 illustrious
Nigerians, were gruesomely murdered in Equatorial Guinea; while 128 others are languishing in prison
on alleged plot to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea (Eke, 2009). However, an
unfortunate incidence which fetched Nigeria a notorious place in the 'US list of 16 terrorist nations' in
early 2010 was the attempted bombing of a US plane, carrying over 240 passengers, on the 25th of
December 2009 by Mr. Farouk AbdulMutallab, a 23 year old boy who was trained as a terrorist far away
in Yemen. Later, Nigeria cried through its nose before such blacklisting was wiped off.

Again, part of the agenda of this regime was to launder the battered image of Nigeria. Therefore, the
rebrand Nigeria programme, promoted by former Minister of Information and Communications, Prof.
Dora Akunyili was introduced. The rebrand Nigeria programme became a child of necessity when it was
generally felt that the image of the country has deteriorated almost beyond repairs in the international
community. According to Prof. Dora Akunyili:

There is no doubt that this country needs change, a change in character and general orientation…
despite our struggles and not-too-good reputation, we must seize every opportunity to make a change.
Though Nigeria is a country with problems, it is also one with countless opportunities. Nigeria has many
brilliant minds and experts who can hold their own in virtually every field of endeavour… Gradually, as a
people, we are approaching a point where many feel that there can be no redemption… (cited in Daily
Sun, March 19, 2009).

Therefore, an important slogan known as “Nigeria Good People, Great Nation” was hastily packaged and
launched in 2009 in order to tell the whole world that Nigerians are not really as bad as they may think.
Also, in the regime of scientific exchanges, Nigeria and China successfully launched Nigerian satellite
(NIGCOMSAT I) into space on 27 September 2003; and (NIGCOMSAT II) in 2010. An understanding was
equally reached between the Nigerian government and the Sierra Leone government on Technical Aid
Corps (TAC) programme. Philanthropically, the Yar'Adua administration donated a cash sum of
US$500,000 as her contribution to the relief effort for the citizens of Myanmar, who were affected by
the misadventure of cyclone Nargis in May 2008. However, the donation was irresponsibly thrown out
at a time when like other countries of the world, Nigeria was facing serious economic meltdown.
Besides, was the offer in line with the spirit of Citizenship Diplomacy? What did Nigeria stand to gain and
what did she gain eventually?. Virtually nothing. If so, then, aid giving or father christmas gifts should be
left for developed countries; which are what they are, owing to their exploitative milking of Africa's
resources; to do benevolently as a little way of showing appreciation and payback.

Another important trend in the foreign relations of this regime was the bilateral security agreement
struck with western nations. In fact, having taken over as ECOWAS Chairman from President Blaise
Compaore of Burkina Faso in 2009, President Yar'Adua sought to securitize Nigeria and the continent in
general. The plan was primarily to import security from US and other willing nations to tackle the hydra-
headed issues of Gulf of Guinea militancy. Therefore, it is in this understanding that Africa Command
(AFRICOM) became an important option for Nigeria. Incidentally, the US appeared to be more willing or
desperate to help, thus, crying more than the bereaved. Though, their concern can be mostly located in
their oil interest in the delta region. Here, President Yar'Adua personally became involved, unlike other
foreign policy actions left wholesomely in the domain of the Foreign Minister to draw up and pursue. In
a visit to the White House on December 13, 2007, President Yar'Adua had hurriedly pledged to President
Bush, a holistic partnership with AFRICOM, which he believed to be a viable means towards achieving
Africa's security goals. He vowed:

I will never forget this moment… We have discussed on security issues, security with Nigeria, the Niger
Delta, the Gulf of Guinea and peace and security on the African continent. We shall partner AFRICOM to
assist not only Nigeria but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiatives. It is an
initiative to have standby force in each of the regional economic groupings in Africa (Voice of America,
December 13, 2007).

Although coming back home, President Yar'Adua had emphasized that he did not accede to the
stationing of AFRICOM base(s) in the country in his meeting with President Bush, and maintained that
his stand was in line with the earlier joint decision of the Council of State on the subject matter. The
Council of State had mutually and unanimously rejected the whole idea (Thisday, December 17, 2007;
ISN Security Watch, May 2, 2008). Otherwise, going by such unconditional pledge, President Yar'Adua,
who spoke on behalf of other African nations, appeared to have simply renewed African yoke of western
dependency, with particular regards to security concerns. Very importantly, the questions that should
come in mind here are; Has Africa not grown to adulthood as to carter for the establishment of a
standby force in each of her regional economic groupings, or must she need a godparent before it can
stand? What then is the role of AU in the continent? These security concerns demand adequate
attention and clarifications if Africa must retain her security, freedom and independence. On the other
hand, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ojo Maduekwe did not reserve his detestation of the whole idea
about AFRICOM. He maintained that African governments have the sovereign responsibility of ensuring
peace and security on the continent. While reiterating the Council of State's unanimous rejection of the
establishment of AFRICOM base in Nigeria. The Minister insisted:
Nigeria's position on AFRICOM remains that African governments have the sovereign responsibility for
maintaining of peace and security on the continent… In this regard, the need for support such as the
provision of training, funding and logistics for Africa militaries is duly acknowledged (Daily Independent,
Dec.17,2007).

The import of Maduekwe's statement are many; First, that Africa is totally responsible for ensuring
peace and security of lives and properties of her people, including safeguarding her natural resources.
Second, that any external security apparatus (such as AFRICOM) that is coming in to securitize Africa is
an encroachment and violation of her sovereign right over her region and people. Third, that AFRICOM
base(s) is not wanted anywhere in the country and if it forcibly comes, then it becomes an imposition
since it has been rejected outright. Lastly, that it is far better that the US government provide the nation
with such military support and assistance like training her military personnel, funding, provision of new
technology, military hardware and other military logistics. However, the Nigerian government, as well as
other African governments, were particularly interested in rejecting the establishment of AFRICOM
base(s) within their immediate geographic hemisphere. This is in consideration of the overall and
approximated effects of disruption or countervailing of existing security formation on ground which
AFRICOM's operations will have on the continent even when operated from Germany, its official
headquarters.

President Yar'Adua equally had the opportunity of interacting with other important western leaders.
The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was hosted by Yar'Adua on his state visit to Nigeria in June
2009. President Yar'Adua also partook in some notable world gatherings, including the 33rd G8 Summit
in Heiligendamm in 2007.

NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT GOODLUCK JONATHAN'S ADMINISTRATION

President Goodluck Jonathan inherited an economically weak country. Therefore, several efforts were
invested towards the resuscitation of Nigeria's battered economy through economic diplomacy.
Fortunately, Dr. Goodluck, as robust as he is, appeared to be an opposite of Yar'Adua, whose diplomatic
strength continued to be in doubt until his unfortunate departure. President Goodluck appointed Henry
Odein Ajumogobia as his first Foreign Affairs Minister but that did not stop him from becoming
personally involved in the business of foreign relations. He, like former President Obasanjo, has equally
embarked upon numerous foreign trips in a bid to woe foreign investors to the country. The difference
however, has been that in the case of Dr. Goodluck, his wife (the first lady) also became a crucial part of
the foreign affairs business.

In fact, Her Excellency, Mrs. Patience Jonathan, was rarely ever left out in any of the numerous trips
embarked upon by Mr. President. Apart from that, she herself had cleverly, under the canopy of Office
of the First Lady, initiated her own numerous foreign activities. And she steadily attended them every
now and then, with her retinues, featuring too many female Ministers and Advisers. It was either that
some fellow First Ladies abroad were paid unsolicited courtesy calls or that crusades for affirmative
action were unnecessarily taken to, or reminded to fellow First Ladies in Western nations. If there were
no other seemingly important issues coming forth, social campaigns against HIV/Aids, malaria, even
polio etc, became important foreign policy issues. On a different note entirely, the Vice President, Arch.
Namadi Sambo also embarked on such foreign trips, thus, contributing his own quota towards the
pursuant of Nigeria's foreign policy. This tripartite 'executive diplomacy' means additional, lots of cost to
the nation. By implication, the Foreign Minister was therefore left aloof, detached and nearly stagnant,
with little or nothing to do, except perhaps, to make certain speeches at home, which in any case, falls
within the domain of the Minister for Communications, Mr. Labaran Maku.

With such bloated diplomatic trips, it is not surprising that President Goodluck himself was at a time, in
December 2011, advised by former President Buhari to cut down such frivolous foreign trips, in
consideration of the economic realities of the nation. President Goodluck later hearkened to this call in
January 2012, when he stated in a broadcast that he has drastically reduced the number of foreign trips
to be embarked by serving government officials (NTA News, January 8, 2012).

In the course of his diplomatic missions abroad, President Goodluck attended and delivered key note
addresses in several well meaning international conferences organized by various world bodies, telling
them the problems of the country and why they must help out. Unfortunately, his efforts have not
engendered any significant impact at home. It was also in this period that the football scandal of Adamu
Musa with FIFA broke out. Meanwhile Nigeria's poor performance at the world cup made the President
to announce Nigeria's withdrawal from all international football competitions, in other to probe the
financial scam uncovered in the Nigerian team, and also reorganize thecountry's football administration.
This however, did not go down well with the world football body, who threatened sever sanctions on
the country. This compelled President Goodluck to rescind his earlier decision. Having inherited the
ECOWAS Chairmanship position from his predecessor, President Goodluck intervened in revolutionary
crisis that drove through Africa, starting from Egypt to Cote d'Ivoire, Libya etc. Nigeria equally played
host to some important regional meetings.

However, the nagging issue of insecurity which the country was faced with became an important
preoccupation of this regime both at home and abroad. Hence, even in his capacity as Acting President,
in a meeting with the members of the Black Caucus in the US Congress, at the Capitol Hill in the US
Capital City, Washington D.C., on Wednesday April 14, 2009, Dr. Goodluck complained to them that
most illegal weapons found their ways into West Africa through the supplies made by western nations
and urged the caucus to come up with a draft bill for the control of the dumping of small arms and light
weapons in Africa (NTA News, April 15, 2009: 9.11pm). Similarly, during his official visit to Canada in
June, 2010, where he was scheduled to speak at the G8 Summit on the Millennium Development Goals,
President Jonathan unequivocally denounced the developed nations for taking the lead in dumping of
small arms and light weapons in Africa, calling it one of the major causes of underdevelopment in the
continent. He told Journalists in Toronto that "The excessive dumping of small arms and light weapons
in the African continent is one of the things that disturb me most…” (Agence France Presse, June 25,
2010:2). Besides the issue of security, an important step which almost dented the face of Nigeria before
the US government was the legislation against same sex marriage by the Nigerian Senate in November
2011. Though it was a national issue, but attracted the wrought of the US government, the apostle of
same sex marriage, whose interest has always been on the removal of all sorts of restrictions on human
rights and freedom world over. Following this development, the US President Barack Obama instructed
his foreign embassies to withhold all manner of foreign assistance to Nigeria and such other 'stubborn'
and unyielding nations toeing the path of Nigeria. In response, the Nigeria's Federal Executive Council
stood firm along the decision of the National Assembly, and became very assertive on that, without any
apologies to the US. Altogether, President Goodluck Jonathan continued to dominate the foreign policy
machinery, which in any case, the impacts, we have neither seen nor felt.

CONCLUSION

In this section on Nigeria's foreign policy, we have tried to look at the various factors that have shaped
and probably continue to shape the country's foreign policy. We equally looked at the performance of
various Nigerian leaders in the realm of foreign policy.

From our study, we found out most regrettably, that Nigeria's foreign policy has not really been very
consistent. It fluctuates and takes the colour of every regime in power. It was also quite clear, that
national interest has not been the major motivating factor behind our foreign policy. Rather the
personal interests of the various leaders have taken precedence over the nation's interest. Finally, we
equally found out, that economic consideration that ought to be of paramount interest has been
relegated to the background. Instead, nebulous ideals like national prestige and dignity are seen as the
major goals to be pursued. This explains the big brother role which Nigeria has been playing in Africa
and which unfortunately has cost the nation so much without any corresponding returns.

Based on the above we wish to recommend that our foreign policy goals need to be completely
reappraised. It has to be based on tangible and realizable goals. There should be set goals and targets
and institutionalized methods for achieving them. National interest ought to be paramount while the
means of achieving it should be dynamic enough to reflect the changes in the environment. We must
have to appreciate the fact that putting the economy on a sound footing is a major task facing Nigeria
today and not trying to look big in the international scene. Any nation that cannot feed its citizens and
that cannot guarantee for them a good life can never be taken seriously in world politics.

Since foreign policy is domestic policy pursued abroad, Nigeria will never realize her dream of being a
real giant in the eyes of the world if it can't put its house in order. The internal political dynamics must
be right for the external relations to be right. Therefore, the numerous problems plaguing the nation,
and which seem to be multiplying must be solved before the country can take its rightful place among
the comity of nations.
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18. Ojedokun O. (1971) “The Anglo-Nigerian entente and its demise,” Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies, September.
19. Okoye I.K. (1993) Peaceful co-existence in international relations re-visited. Onitsha, Big Ben
Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.

20. Onyemaechi, A.E. (2009) Globalization challenges & Nigerian foreign policy: Emerging issues in
the formulation and conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. Abakaliki: WillyRose & Appleseed Publishing Coy.

21. Padelford and Lincoln (1976) The dynamics of international politics. New York, MacMillan.

22. Rodee, Anderson Christol (1957) Introduction to political science. McGraw-Hill Book Company
Inc.

23. Rosenau J. (1976) The study of foreign policy,” in Rosenau, Thompson, Boyd, World politics. New
York, The Free Press

24. Agubuzu, L.O. (2004) From the OAU to AU: The challenges of African unity and development in
the twenty-first century in NIIA lecture series, No. 83. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

25. OAU (1992) OAU charter and rules of procedure. Addis Ababa: Department of Press and
Information Service of the OAU General Secretariat. August.

26. Ajulu, R. (2002) “The African union: The Challenges of Implementation” in Global Insight, No. 17.
May.

27. Eke, O.A (2009) Globalisation challenges & Nigerian foreign policy: Emerging issues in the
formulation and conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. Abakaliki: Willyrose and Appleseed Publishing Coy.

28. Ifesinachi, K. (2007) “Monetarist diplomacy and democratization of foreign policy in Nigeria”
Journal of international politics and development studies, Vol. 3 (1) pp 119-141.

29. Ifesinachi, K. (2009) Foreign capital & monetarism in Nigeria's external economic relations.
Abakaliki: Willyrose and Appleseed Publishing Coy.

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(eds.) contemporary readings on Nigeria's external relations: Issues, perspectives and challenges.
Abakaliki: Willyrose and Appleseed Publishing Coy.

31. Agence France Presse, June 25, 2010

32. NTA News, April 15, 2009

33. Daily Independent, Dec.17, 2007

34. Daily Sun, March 19, 2009

35. Voice of America, December 13, 2007

36. Vanguard, June 11, 2008

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE OBASANJO GOVERNMENT

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired Army General and former head of state, was sworn in on the 29th of
May 1999 at an impressive ceremony at the Eagle Square Abuja as the first President of Nigeria's fourth
republic. The most ironical coincidence of the hand-over ceremony was that, General Abudusalami
Abubakar the out-going military Head of state was the Parade Commander, twenty years brfore then
(1979) when Obasanjo handed over to Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Abubakar was then a Lieutenant Colonel.

In his inaugural address, Obasanjo painted a vivid picture of the ugly state that the nation was, saying
that 'the incursion of the military into government has been a disaster for our country and for the
military in the last thirty years'. He described corruption which is a military legacy as having grown into a
'full-blown cancer' which he pledged to fight head-on, saying that in the fight "there will be no sacred
cows. Nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the breach of the law or the
perpetration of corruption and evil".

After the enthusiasm of the inauguration, how has the country fared under Obasanjo almost four years
after?

The Obasanjo presidency, which said it was not going to be business as usual, did not really deviate from
the usual way of handling government business in Nigeria. In trying to assess the performance of the
Obasanjo civilian government, a prominent pro-democracy activist and Executive Director of the Center
for Constitutional Government (CCG) Dr. Beko Ransome Kuti said "the only difference between 1999
and now (2002) is that soldiers who used to beat and manhandle us have left." Going further he said
that life has not changed for the average Nigerian in the economic sector. If you look at the various
indices of development you will discover that health, educational and agricultural progress remained
stultified and it was a bumpy task trying to move the country forward in this period.

Way back in 1999, when the President assumed office, he committed the first blunder, which most
Nigerians believe has remained his albatross. Obasanjo inaugurated a heavily blotted Federal Executive
Council that has almost 50 ministers. Incidentally, it was the same man that told Shagari way back in the
second republic that 'you don't need more than 10 ministers to run a successful government.' If the
unexplainable number is forgiven, what is terribly nauseating is the character of people he appointed
into the cabinet. Most of them were men of very questionable character; political contractors and
jobbers. Men who have in the past, in the words of Nzeogwu 'made Nigeria to look like big for nothing'.
To complement the bloated cabinet was a retinue of uncountable Special Advisers, Senior Special
Assistants, Special Assistants and numerous sundry Aids. All these made a heavy charge on the national
treasury.

Naturally, since nobody can give what he doesn't have, these men who didn't have what it takes to run
government business efficiently, couldn't help the President in delivering the goods. The 'democracy
dividends' as Nigerians now call it remained elusive.

Obasanjo's military background equally became a big hindrance to good governance during his regime.
As a retired Army General, and former Head of State who ruled the country before, he brought into
government an arrogance and in tolerance that is not suitable for democracy. As somebody who is not
used to having his actions being questioned by 'subordinates', the President always sees the legislators
as irritants. He even once referred to the members of the Lower House as ' these boys'. He has therefore
from inception tried to pocket the National Assembly through the installation of surrogates as heads of
the two houses of parliament.

In the senate, Obasanjo was instrumental to the installation of Evan Enwerem as President. He equally
influenced the choice of Salisu Buhari as Speaker. However, he was unfortunate that scandals led to the
fall of both men almost simultaneously. While Ghali Umar N'abba replaced Buhari, Chuba Okadigbo who
was initially favoured to clinch the post before Obasanjo titled the scale in favour of Enwerem, now
replaced the impeached Senate President. It was then that the main intrigues started.

Obasanjo who had never hidden his dislike of the choice of Okadigbo for that position started
clandestine moves to remove him. By Okadigbo's admission the President made nine unsuccessful
attempts to remove him before the financial scandal which was instigated by the presidency led to his
fall. He was replaced by Anyim Pius Anyim, who from the onset was the President's surrogate. By his
installation, Obasanjo succeeded in caging the Senate. The duty of checkmating the executive became
almost fully rested on the House of Representatives. Fortunately the House rose up to the situation by
keeping the President on his toes. As expected, Obasanjo made very serious moves to get the Speaker of
the House impeached but to no avail. Apart from the other negative effects of the destabilization of the
National Assembly, the most disturbing aspect is the method that was usually adopted. The 'Ghana most
go' Syndrome which is an acronym for bribery in Nigeria, was alleged to be largely employed by the
presidency in attempts to remove the various heads of the National Assembly.

The effect has been that in just two years into the life of this republic, the Senate has had three
Presidents while the current speaker of the Lower House is the second. The turn-over would have been
higher if not for the ability of the then Speaker,N'aaba to starve-off numerous threats of impeachment
allegedly influenced and financed by the executive.
In Obasanjo's inauguration speech, he stated his commitment to fight corruption, which was generally
accepted to have eaten deep into the fabric of Nigerian society. He went ahead to present the
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Investigations Commission Bill to the
National Assembly. The Bill was passed and he established the body headed by a retired judge, Justice
Mustapha Akanbi. Under Obasanjo's watch the ICPC, did not really do much in the war against
corruption. In fact, from the way the body operated , it looked like it was set up for the purpose of
witch-hunting perceived enemies of the government. While the government was claiming to fight
corruption, the monster kept growing and spreading its tentacles, it was therefore not surprising when
in 2002, an international Non-government Organization. Transparency International, on whose board
the President once served, declared Nigeria, as the most corrupt country on earth. It was a big blow to
the retired General and his crusade against corruption.

Another area where the General failed is in the area of revitalizing the country's battered infrastructure.
On assumption of office in 1999, the regime through the then Minister of Power and Steel, Chief Bola
Ige announced gleefully that by the middle of year 2000, constant power failures would belong to the
past as uninterrupted power supply would be restored. The date came and passed the promise was not
kept. Instead of improving, it even got worse. To cap it all, the entire nation was plunged into a blackout
for 72 hours in an unprecedented system collapse.

An embarrassed President apologized to the nation and re-assigned the Minister to the Justice Ministry,
where in any case, he was better suited being a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN). He made another
promise that by the end of the year (2001) Nigerians will start experiencing uninterrupted power supply.
That was not to be as the situation has not improved till Obasanjo left office in 2007,despite haven spent
an unimaginable and mind blowing sum of about 16 billion dollars, to achieve more darkness than like.

Also in the area of roads, the story was not different despite the enormous amount allegedly spent on
them, the state of the nation's roads was still pitiable. The situation was so worse that even the
President himself on a state visit to his home state (Ogun) said he was ashamed of the nation's roads.
What he didn't say was what happened to the staggering sums his administration allegedly spent on
roads.

Most government parastatals like NITEL, NIPOST, Nigeria Airways, Nigerian Ports Authority etc
continued to render epileptic services despite government's attempts at reforming them.

Another sour point of the Obasanjo government was gross insecurity of lives and property. The country
remained at the mercy of deadly hoodlums who seem to be on rampage. The more the government
tried to arrest the situation the more the problem overwhelmed them.
At the various states, the pictures seemed worse. The various state Governors ran their states as
conquered territories. Being products of long military rule, most of them didn't understand why they
must subject themselves to the principles of checks and balances by the legislature and judiciary. They
equally copied the President's style of pocketing the legislature through installation of their stooges as
Speakers and using the 'Ghana must go" method to make them look the other way when actions that
were apparently wrong were being perpetrated. In all these, the people were the losers as the expected
dividends of the hard won democracy were reserved for the few who were in government and their
cronies.

Well, this was not quite surprising because the segment of the political class that inherited power from
the military were mainly opportunists who had worked for the military. Many of them were part of the
'Abacha must stay' campaign. Being mainly political jobbers and fortune hunters they had little
considerations for the well being of the people; who they had joined their military masters in oppressing
and brutalizing. Already disconnected from the people, they could not share their aspirations and
anxieties. The other groups that equally inherited power were people who neither were purely
indifferent to military rule nor took part in chasing them away. Haven stayed aloof all these while, they
did not appreciate the weight of mass deprivation which the people suffered under kleptomaniac
military regimes. Ironically, the group that actually confronted the military under the different pro-
democracy groups was effectively shut out from the democratic government, which they fought for,
suffered and even lost some members of their clan. Apart from the South-west where a few of these
people were in government, government positions in most parts of the country were occupied by either
military apologists or people who were neither for nor against military rule. Even the number of retired
military officers in present dispensation was quite alarming. This was the tragedy of the Obasanjo
government. However, the registration of new parties which brought the number of political parties to
thirty afforded many pro-democracy activists the opportunity to take part in the political process. The
problem was that their impact was very marginal, since they confronted politicians that were already
well entrenched. Hence, trying to dislodge them was quite a herculean task especially in the context of
the type of money-politics that was in vogue in Nigeria.

On the positive side, this democratic dispensation, became a period of freedom for most Nigerians. The
gross violation of fundamental human rights that was the signpost of the military era was drastically
reduced. Indiscriminate arrests and detentions were avoided. Nigerians once again said their minds
without fear of being arrested under one decree or another.

In terms of amenities, the government at both the federal, state and local government levels provided
some social amenities for the people. However, if one looks at what was on the ground vis-a-vis the
input in terms of resources spent, it still showed that accountability was strange to government in
Nigeria.

What one may consider a novel achievement of the Obasanjo administration was the setting up of the
Human Rights investigation Panel commonly referred to as the Oputa Panel. Fashioned, like the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the Oputa Panel was able to excavate the secrets of the
various military regimes in Nigeria. Nigerians have been able through this Commission to unravel so
many mysteries of the past. The various atrocities committed in secret were laid bare before the public.
Nigerians now saw clearly that beneath the starched Khaki uniforms were sadists with bestial instincts,
who could do anything to hold on to power.

The gory tales of the torture machine of the Satanic Abacha era were told. The numerous assassinations
that were shrouded in secrecy, the various bomb explosions that rocked various parts of the country
and the 'arrangee' coups were all exposed to a shocked Nigerian populace. Soldiers of fortune, who held
the nation to ransom in the guise of fighting the ills of the civilians, saw their dark secrets exposed
thereby demystifying them.

The telecommunication sector was another sector where the Obasanjo administration scored very high.
By introducing the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) the regime increased tremendously
the country's teledensity. Though people complained of high tariff and poor services, communication
was made easier. Telephones ceased to be exclusively for the rich as it used to be.

THE JUDICIARY

The judiciary in this dispensation proved that it was the hope of the common man. Through landmark
judgements, the country's Apex Court, the Supreme Court displayed rare independence that was
applauded by most Nigerians. Once again, Nigerians sought and got redress through the courts. This was
a sharp contrast with what obtained under the military regimes when the courts were manipulated by
the government. It was not very easy in those days for the courts to give judgements that were against
the government.

The major effect of the independence of the judiciary is that if it continues Nigerians will gradually
assimilate the culture of seeking legal redress instead of using extra-judicial means to settle issues. This
will lead to a noticeable reduction in the resort to violence to settle scores as the people now have more
confidence in a courageous and independent judiciary.

THE LEGISLATURE

The legislature, most unfortunately, has been the biggest disappointment of the fourth republic. While
the judiciary seemed to have recovered from the trauma of military rule, the legislature, which in any
case was not around during the military era, seemed not to know what it's role should be in a
democratic government. The fact that the legislature is usually the first and biggest casualty of every
military intervention is not an excuse for them to allow themselves to be tossed around by the
executive. Granted that the long absence of this arm of government under the military may have led to
lack of experienced legislators in the political terrain, but how will one explain the fact that men and
women who were elected to make laws for the good governance of the country can so easily abdicate
their constitutional duties on the alter of greed.
The excuse that this time was a learning period for them is highly unfathomable because they all know
what to do in order to checkmate the executive, but the irresistible lure of 'Ghana-must-go bags' have
made them toothless bulldogs. All too often whenever the legislators raised their voices against the
executive it was usually directed at getting something for themselves. The tactics seemed too simply
pedestrian; make a little noise, probably issue threats and wait for the executive to come and settle and
the threat evaporates.

The end result of Nigerian style parliament is that the people do not take them serious and some even
tend to forget that they do exist. Even most political analysis in Nigeria tend to focus on the executive
without much attention paid to the legislature. It looks as if they have legislated themselves into
irrelevance or obscurity. From President Obasanjo down to all the state Governors, the executive
operated as if the country was still under military rule. Apart from some attempts made by the House of
Representative under Ghali Umar N'abba to challenge the executive which even led to an impeachment
notice on the President, an analysis of the fourth republic can be done without really talking about the-
legislature or they may at best come in as footnotes.

While graft was the major factor behind the non-performance of the legislature in the fourth republic,
the executive was actually at the root of this problem. Most often the executive used state funds to lure
the legislature into docility or irrelevance. When money failed to achieve the desired result of making
the legislature docile, other subtle and not too subtle measures were employed to make sure that they
succumbed to the antics of the President or Governors.

Another contributing factor to the non-performance of the legislative arm of government is the
country's long exposure to military rule. While the Governors see themselves as military or sole
administrators, the people themselves did not actually understand the role of the legislature in a
democracy. They did not understand that their representatives were answerable to them. They found it
too easy taking the problems of their localities to executive office holders. They did not really know
what the duty of the legislators should be. It didn't seem very plausible to them that public office
holders who did not perform well could be reported to the legislators for appropriate sanctions. Above
all, the existence of the power of recall did not exist in the consciousness of the people. The end result
of this high level of ignorance was that the people became shortchanged by both the executive and
legislative arms. What we had was power without responsibility and accountability.

THE CIVILIAN TRANSITION (2003)

As the election year 2003 drew nearer, most political commentators started contending with the
question; can civilians successfully organize smooth elections. The reason for this worry was simply
because there had never been a successful civilian to civilian hand-over process or transition in Nigeria.
The two previous attempts of 1964 and 1983 were grand failures that led to military interventions.
Obasanjo administration successfully organized the elections that saw to the first successful civilian
transition programme.
However, the transition programme which reinstated Obasanjo in power for the second term did not go
without some manipulations. The attempt by the President with the connivance of both the Senate
President and House Speaker to doctor the 2001 Electoral Act showed that the ruling Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) leadership was not favourably disposed to giving everybody a level playing field
in the 2003 elections. Thanks to vigilant Nigerians, the Electoral Act fraud was exposed and the clause
which the President wanted to insert that would have excluded new parties from contesting the 2003
Presidential elections was expunged from the Act.

Also the Independent National Electoral Commission's refusal to register new parties still fell into the
PDPs plans of not allowing more parties to be registered in the country before the elections. However,
following judicial intervention, the electoral body was compelled to register the new political
associations. Thus, while only three political parties contested the 1999 general elections, thirty
contested the 2003 elections.

As the elections drew near, many Nigerians felt President Obasanjo would follow the footstep of fellow
stateman Nelson Mandela in not seeking re-election. They were wrong, Obasanjo is not Mandela. He
offered himself for re-election after 'seeking the face of God'. Since all the Governors had already
started preparing for second terms in their second year in office, they all equally offered themselves for
re-election. The various states thereafter turned into theatres of war. As opposition candidates were
perfecting their strategies to capture power, the incumbents were making them realize that the various
state houses were not vacant and will not be so till 2007.

In the primaries conducted by the three older parties, all the incumbent Governors were returned apart
from Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju (PDP) of Anambra State - that was barred from contesting and Bornu
State where the incumbent Alhaji Mala Kachallah of the ANPP lost. They immediately dumped their
parties and grabbed the AD ticket. The act of returning all the incumbent Governors especially on the
part of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) raised serious moral questions on Nigeria's Democratic
experience. Despite the fact that majority of the Governors did not perform well in their first tenure, the
party had a hidden pact with them to return them. They equally deceived all party members into
believing that everybody will be given a level playing field to contest. People spent their time, money
and energy contesting for non-vacant positions. It was actually the height of deceit. As expected, most
of those that lost, left the party in anger on the grounds of injustice. Most of them found their ways into
the new parties thereby making them stronger and in better positions to challenge the 'big three' (PDP,
ANPP and AD).

In the Presidential primaries of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) held in January 2003 at Abuja, the
incumbent, President Obasanjo expectedly won a landslide victory over three other contestants.
Interestingly, Alex Ekwueme, a former Vice President in the Second Republic who contested against
Obasanjo at the Jos Convention in 1999 was again in the race. This time he was roundly beaten. While
Obasanjo polled 2642, Ekwueme got 661, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi and Chief Barnabas Gainade got 159 and
17 votes respectively. The result of the primaries was not surprising for the elections were crafted
heavily in favour of the incumbents. It would have been pure magic to beat an incumbent President or
Governor in the PDP Primaries.

The convention of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) was even more dramatic. The decision of
General Muhammad Buhari (rtd) former military dictator to join the party and to equally seek its
presidential ticket came to many as a surprise. For one, the General has always shown a clear disdain for
party politics and politicians. Since the ANPP convention took place immediately after the PDP
convention, the major consideration of the party became to select a candidate that can stand and
possibly defeat Obasanjo. That was when all the nine ANPP Governors who incidentally were from the
north decided to throw their weight behind Buhari. They were able, with the support of some
prominent Emirs in the north, to convince all other northern presidential aspirants of the party to step
down for Buhari. The southern aspirants not knowing what was happening still went ahead with their
campaigns until the eve of the convention when they were told that the party had decided to pick
Buhari as a consensus candidate. All of them refused with the exception of the deposed Senate
President, Chuba Okadigbo, who had already negotiated to be Buhari's deputy.

However, when it became too apparent to them that contesting the primaries would lead to disgraceful
failures, since the umpire has already taken sides, they all withdrew in protest, leaving the stage for
Buhari to emerge as an unopposed candidate.

In the same week, the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP)
held their conventions and returned Senator's Jim Nwobodo and Ike Nwachukwu as Presidential
Candidates of both parties respectively. Interestingly both of them decamped from the PDP.
Nwachukwu, decamped, barely weeks while Nwobodo took part in the PDP Primaries, some two days
earlier before joining UNPP. Meanwhile the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) has chosen the ex-
Baifran war lord Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu as it's consensus candidate; while fiery Lagos
Lawyer and human right activist Chief Gani Fawehinmi (SAN) has emerged as the flag bearer of the
National Conscience Party (NCP). The other parties selected their own candidates but it is quite
apparent that the struggle would be between Obasanjo and Buhari. The other contestants were fringe
players that did not really make much of a difference to the outcome of the election.

The emergence of Buhari in ANPP actually introduced a purely ethnic and religious angle to the election.
For sure, it was quite clear that Buhari was a candidate of the Caliphate. The North that allowed the
presidency to shift to the South in 1999 seemed to have regrets over that 'mistake' and was hell bent on
bringing back power to the north where it was believed it belonged, for according to Maitama Sule, a
prominent member of the northern oligarchy;

the northerners are endowed... with leadership qualities. The Yoruba man knows how to earn a living
and has diplomatic qualities. The Igbo is gifted in commerce, trade... God so created us individually for a
purpose. Others are created as kings, servants... We all need each other. If there are no followers, a king
will not exist (Cited in Ige 1994).
The kings therefore want to take back power and Buhari was seen as the right person to do it. From the
religious angle, Buhari who has shown some keen interest in Sharia was seen as a bigot. Already
Christians were using his notorious statement that Moslems should no longer vote for Christians as a
campaign weapon against him. However, the elections were skillfully organized by the INEC Chairman,
Chief. Maurice Iwu as if he had specific instruction to return Mr. President to power; and as planned,
Obasanjo 'won' massively and was proudly returned to power in a manner of “do or die affair”, and
heaven did not fall, despite alarming manipulations and threats of violence that followed

In fact, the PDP recorded a landslide victory at the poll, grabbing over 65 percent of the total votes cast
in the election. Though, about 20 political parties fielded candidates in the 2003 presidential election,
only 3 of them received up to 1 percent of the total votes cast in the contest. The table below shows the
performance of various political parties in the 2003 election.

PERFORMANCE OF PARTIES IN 2003 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Source: African Elections Database (2007)

In the national assembly elections, almost thirty political parties participated. As was the trend, PDP
recorded the highest performance, returning 77 Senators out of the 109 available seats, which
represented about 70.64% of the total votes cast. In the House of Representatives, PDP collected 223
seats, representing as much as 61% of the total votes cast. Other political parties that succeeded in
grabbing seats in the National Assembly included: AD- 6 Senatorial seats (5.50%) and 35 seats in the
House of Reps (9.72%); ANPP- 26 Senatorial seats (23.86%) and 96 seats in the House of Reps (26.66%);
APGA- only 2 seats in the House of Reps (.56%); NDP- only 1 seat in the House of Reps (0.28%); UNPP-
only 2 seats in the House of Reps (.56%) and PRP- only 1 seat in the House of Reps (0.28%) though, it
was generally agreed that the election was marred by electoral fraud. Mainly, it was because of this
reason that Professor Chinua Achebe openly rejected a national honour, a prestigious National Award of
Commander of the Order of Niger (CON), given to him by the Obasanjo's Government in 2006.

Indeed, an important economic development in the Obasanjo's administration was the reorganization of
the banking sector in 2006 by former Central Bank Governor Prof. Charles Chukwuma Soludo. The aim
was to strengthen the banks from sudden insolvency and collapse. But more importantly, the exercise
was mainly geared towards restoring the interest of the people in the banking sector which had at that
time waned tremendously. In this exercise, over 50 banks that formally existed in the country were
capitalized to the tune of 25 billion naira, leading to several mergers. At the end of the day, about 25
solid banks were left standing. Other economic policies implemented and foreign investments attracted
also reflected in the general outlook of the economy. By 2005 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
reported in its economic report of 2005 that the Nigerian economy grew by 6.7% in the year, with an
impressive overall balance of payment surplus of N1,364.8 billion or 9.2% of GDP (IMF/World Bank,
2006).

However, Obasanjo's administration can never be fully examined without looking into his tenure
elongation bid. In fact, there could not have been any other reason to give for Obasanjo's avid appetite
for power, if not that pertaining to his belief and claim that only he knows the Nigerian problems and
their solutions. Mounting signs and visible campaigns of a third-term bid by President Obasanjo became
well known by early March 2006. Senator Arthur Nzeribe, who admitted his dominant role in favour of
the bid, was particularly said to have lobbied his colleagues in the Senate to the tune of 50 million each
for them to amend the constitution in this regard. However, on 16 May 2006, after months of intense
and divisive national debate, the Senate rejected a bill which would have changed the country's
constitution to permit President Obasanjo a third term in office. By asserting the supremacy of the
constitution (with its two-term limit) over the desires of President Obasanjo and his supporters, that the
popular leader be permitted to run for a third term, the Senate's decision marked a watershed in
Nigeria's political history. This therefore gave room for the preparation of the 2007 general elections in
the country.

In the 2007 election, President Obasanjo adopted and foisted Alhaji Unaru Musa Yar'Adua on PDP, as his
presidential choice candidate for the election. As was the case in the 2003 election, the 2007 election
was marred by irregularities of divergent dimensions. As against the 20 political parties that were
represented in the 2003 presidential election, about 25 political parties contested the 2007 presidential
seat. As was expected, the PDP got more than half of the total valid votes cast in the election, scoring
about 24,638,063 out of the total valid votes of about 35,397,597 cast in the election. In fact, not more
than four political parties scored up to 1% of the total valid votes cast. Likewise, the PDP swept the polls
in the national assembly elections. Of about fifty political parties that contested for seats in the national
assembly, not more than six could secure a seat. PDP recorded almost 80% of the total votes cast in the
Senatorial elections and 73.06 % in the House of Representatives elections.

REFERENCES

IMF/World Bank (2006) IMF/World Bank AGM Annual Meetings Daily, September 20, 2006, p.4
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE LATE YAR'ADUA GOVERNMENT

President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, a former chemistry teacher, was a man of himself. Taciturn and down-
to-earth. On 1617 December 2006, Yar'Adua was chosen as the presidential candidate of the ruling PDP
for the April 2007 election, claiming 3,024 votes from party delegates to beat his closest rival, Rochas
Okorocha, who received 372 votes. Yar'Adua's success in the primary was attributed to the support of
incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo. Generally, the support he received from President Obasanjo
was that he was one of few serving governors with a spotless record, devoid of any suspicions charges
of corruption. Besides, he also belonged to the People's Democratic Movement (PDM) a powerful
political block founded by his late brother, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, who was also Obasanjo's second in
command during his military rule. Shortly after winning the nomination, Yar'Adua chose Dr Goodluck
Jonathan, the then Governor of Bayelsa State, as his running mate.

After the election, Yar'Adua proposed a government of national unity. In late June 2007, two opposition
parties, the ANPP and the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), agreed to join Yar'Adua's government. On
28 June 2007, Yar'Adua publicly made declaration of his assets, becoming the first Nigerian leader to do
so. From the declaration, he had ?856,452,892 (US$5.8 million) in asset, with about ?19 million ($0.1
million) belonging to his wife. He also had ?88,793,269.77 ($0.5 million) in liabilities. This disclosure,
which fulfilled a pre-election promise he made, was intended to set an example of transparency for
other Nigerian politicians and discourage corruption. Yar'Adua's new cabinet was sworn in on 26 July
2007. It was made up of 39 ministers, with ANPP having two slots.

However, because of his fragile looks and purported sickness, which had not been made open yet,
Yar'Adua was initially underestimated. But as time went on, he displayed an exemplary leadership,
honesty and transparency that Nigerians had not known before. In fact, everyone became very
convinced that he had good intentions for the country. However, the only thing that stood before his
reform agenda was his health. On assumption of office on May 29, 2007, President Umaru Musa
Yar'Adua met a nation with vital infrastructure such as roads, power, water etc in state of shambles,
while key sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, industry, commerce have virtually collapsed.
Hence, the late President Yar'Adua's administration rallied clear focus on the 7 point agenda. The aim
was to revamp key sectors of the economy simultaneously. Agriculture, education, health, power,
security, roads, Niger Delta, industrialization etc were all given due attention.

First of all, Yar'Adua's administration emphasized the rule of law and due process. The fight against
corruption was strengthened. The economy became totally restructured, with the changing of heads of
strategic sectors of the economy. The Central Bank Governor, Prof. Chukwuma Soludo, was substituted
with Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi in 2009. Prof. Soludo took over the leadership of the apex bank in
2004 from Chief Joseph Sanusi, who served from 1999-2004, and was instrumental to the introduction
of 1000 naira notes in 2005 during the Obasanjo administration. Though Prof. Soludo had wanted to re-
denominate the naira to the extent that 20 naira will go for a dollar, but some Northern heavyweights
who felt the policy would adversely affect their foreign businesses stood vehemently against the policy.
Shortly after the incidence, Mallam Sanusi suddenly became the preferred choice. Mr. Ogbonna Onovo
was also appointed as the Inspector General of Police in 2009, succeeding Mr. Mike Okiro who served
between 2007 and 2009.

However, one of the major challenges President Yar'Adua faced was the issue of Niger Delta. Yar'Adua's
early promises, to aggressively tackle corruption and to seek a long-overdue agreement with militia
groups in the country's oil-rich, but violence-plagued, Niger Delta region won him praise, both at home
and abroad. Niger Delta's plentiful crude oil reserves have made Nigeria Africa's largest (and the world's
eighth-largest) oil exporter. The crude oil in the Delta region contributes over 80 percent of Nigeria's
total revenue. Hence, the Yar'Adua government became very much concerned about the growing
militancy in the oil rich zone and sought a comprehensive peace agreement with the restive youths. To
negotiate with the Delta's many armed groups, Yar'Adua relied heavily on the Vice President, Dr.
Goodluck Jonathan, who is a southern Christian and a native of Bayelsa, an important oil state. After a
series of false starts and an escalation of violence, the Delta peace process gathered momentum. On
June 26, Yar'Adua announced that the government would provide Niger Delta residents with 10 percent
of the country's joint oil ventures and would create an amnesty programme for militants willing to lay
down their weapons. Those who chose to participate were to receive a state pardon, work training, and
employment assistance.

On July 12, the government signaled that it was serious about the ongoing talks by releasing a militia
leader, Mr. Henry Okah, from prison. On July 15, the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), the region's largest armed group, announced a 60-day ceasefire. In August, the amnesty went
into effect. The Yar'Adua's government promised to pardon the militants provided they renounce
militancy and submit their weapons to the Federal Government within a two months period, beginning
from August 4th October 6th 2009. After the deadline was to be followed, a more serious military action
against the unrepentant and recalcitrant ones among them, that would turn down the offer. The
Chairman of the Amnesty Implementation Programme, Vice Air Marshal Lucky Ararile, equally revealed
on August 10, 2009, that a sum total of N52 billion was earmarked for the Amnesty Programme, part of
which would be used for reorientation and training on skill acquisition. Cash prize of twenty thousand
naira (N20, 000), was also provided for each of the repentant militants for a consecutive three months
period (NTA News, July 17, 2009).

Initially, the amnesty offer was met with widespread skepticism from many of the oil-rich region's
militants. In September, MEND dismissed the amnesty offer but extended its ceasefire for 30 days,
pending further talks. Thousands of militants accepted the amnesty offer anyway. On October 25, MEND
announced that its ceasefire would continue indefinitely. However, at the eve of the expiration of the
amnesty exercise, many notable militants and their cohorts turned in. As was recorded, over 10,000
militants turned down their weapons numbering over 10,000, including AK-47s and rocket launchers and
several ammunition.
THEN PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA GOT SICK

Yar'Adua's health had been an issue from the early days of his presidency. In May 2008, he admitted
during a television interview that he suffers from a kidney ailment while denying rumors that he was
terminally ill. On November 23, 2009, just as talks with Niger Delta militants were beginning to show real
progress, Yar'Adua was suddenly flown to Saudi Arabia for emergency medical care. He was reported to
be receiving treatment for pericarditis at a King's clinic in Saudi Arabia. He was not seen in public again,
and his absence created a dangerous power vacuum in Nigeria. On December 19, MEND announced that
delays in peace negotiations resulting from Yar'Adua's absence were not acceptable - and that the group
had carried out the first attack on a pipeline since the amnesty began.

Meanwhile, on February 9, fears that a dangerous power vacuum had emerged, led the parliament- the
Senate and the House of Representatives, invoking a "Doctrine of Necessity", passed resolutions asking
the Vice President to assume the position and title of Acting President of the country. Unanimously, the
national cabinet, especially gingered by the Information Minister, Prof. Dora Akunyili, equally endorsed
Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as Acting President, pending Yar'Adua's return from Saudi Arabia. On their part,
the powerful Governors' Forum wasted no time in shifting their pro-Yar'Adua's stance and assured Dr.
Jonathan of their support. The arrangement allowed that once Yar'Adua informed both houses of
parliament in writing that he had returned from his "medical vacation," he would again resume his
duties as the country's President. Though, very few out of the Yar'Adua's cabinet did not endorse the
temporary fix. Dr. Jonathan therefore, as Acting President, quickly fired them. The Justice Minister and
Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Michael Aondoakaa, who bluntly refused to key into the new
'Act of God' was unceremoniously shown the exit door.

On February 17, few supporters of Yar'Adua that remained in the cabinet blocked a bid by Jonathan's
supporters to have Yar'Adua declared "unfit to govern". The clique later announced that a delegation
would be allowed to visit Yar'Adua in Saudi Arabia to check on his health. However, reports from Saudi
Arabia claimed that no one, including the Acting President, was allowed to see him. At this period,
Jonathan faced considerable pressure from his own 'clique' within the government to have Yar'Adua
declared medically unable to serve and be formally removed from office.

Strategically speaking, if he had removed large numbers of Yar'Adua loyalists from senior posts within
the government and military, he could have provoked a serious confrontation. On the other hand, if he
had acted only as a caretaker President, he wouldn't have been able to tackle urgent problems like the
return of violence in the Delta and chronic double-digit inflation. And if he had announced that he will
not run for President in 2011, he would have rendered himself instantly irrelevant, as the new race for
power was fast underway. Had he announced that he will run, he would have upset the delicate balance
between north and south that appears to demand four more years of a northern presidency. There was
also the risk that all this confusion would hamper and postpone the elections, creating a longer-term
power vacuum that may invite a military intervention. Meanwhile, some northern Governors warned
that Jonathan had already taken decisions of greater consequences than an interim President should
take, as it remained unclear if Yar'Adua was conscious. To ease fears of a constitutional crisis, the U.S
and British officials offered Jonathan diplomatic support. As President therefore, temporary or not, Dr.
Goodluck was empowered and encouraged by these powerful nations to take serious, but genuine,
decisions on behalf of the country.

In the interim, the National Assembly left open the possibility for Yar'adua to regain power if he
returned to the country in good health. That aside, his long absence from public life and the secrecy
surrounding his health sparked months of fierce speculation in the Nigerian media. There were also
constant tensions between his supporters and those of the Acting President. As time elapsed, Jonathan
consolidated power, setting up a brand new cabinet and his own team of Advisers. Hesitant cabinet
members were quickly ushered out, including the Minister of Petroleum who personally travelled
outside the country during the 2009 Xmas period, in defiance of Jonathan's instruction that all Ministers
must stay put to fix the problem of petroleum scarcity. With this he launched his political stoutness in
the public sphere.

Afterwards, in the wee hours of February 24 2010, President Yar'Adua returned unexpectedly to Nigeria.
Yar'Adua was quitely flown into the country in a presidential jet and arrived in a secluded area of the
presidential wing of the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport 'like a thief in the night'(Adeniyi 2011). He
was put in a new Ford E-250 intensive care ambulance and, with convoy of vehicles, driven to the
Presidential Villa, which had earlier been installed with additional life support machine for that specific
purpose. President Umaru Yar'Adua later died around 2100 local time (2000 GMT) on Wednesday May
5, 2010 evening, at the Aso Rock Presidential Villa in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. An Islamic burial took
place on 6 May in his hometown, Kastina.

REFERENCE

NTA News, July 17, 2009

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

PRESIDENT GOODLUCK JONATHAN ADMINISTRATION

The incidences that brought President Goodluck Jonathan to power were generally explained and
accepted as an 'act of God'. In other words, Dr. Jonathan was seen by most Nigerians as a God sent. His
emergence, from Bayelsa state, was also associated with the liberation of the minority groups in the
country, who have not tasted power since the creation of the country. Thus, President Jonathan had all
the support needed from Nigerians to set the country in good light. He also garnered a groundswell of
international support. Having been fully confirmed as the President of the country by the National
Assembly shortly after the demise of his boss, the new helmsman met separately with the former
Presidents of U.S. and Ghana, George Bush and John Kuffour respectively. He equally received the
former Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair. These great leaders congratulated him and assured him of
their firm support. The international community also poured out their felicitations and support over the
new administration. The few months that followed, thereafter, merely saw to the consolidation of the
new government in the country and its proper integration to the international community.

However, a major challenge that mounted was the issue of 2011 elections. Whether President Jonathan
would contest or not nearly threw the country apart. Initially, the majority of the Northerners had felt
Jonathan would relinquish the interest of contesting the election so as to allow them to have a
substitute for Yar'Adua, as they believed the late President was only serving the tenure of the 'North', an
8 year two term bargain, which was yet to expire. In this sense, the zoning policy of the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) became a national debate. There were those for and against the political
interest of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. Even though he had not openly declared his interest to vie for the
presidency, many Northerners warned and threatened fire and brimstone should he go ahead and
contest for the presidency both at the PDP primaries and in the general election. Moreover, there were
also immense concern as to if the country could achieve a successful election given the limited time.

In his political wisdom, seeing that time was fast elapsing, Dr. Goodluck adopted the 'Abacha political
strategy', instigating different political jobbers from all works of life to use the media and beg him to
contest the election. This was particularly geared towards ascertaining the level and proportionality of
support he could generate across the different parts of the country. Former Chairman, Board of Trustees
of PDP, Chief Tony Anenih and former President Olusegun Obasanjo became seriously involved, using
several available political means and tricks to sway the minds of members of the ruling party and the
general public to key into Jonathan's political ambition. When it was clear to President Jonathan that the
way has been properly paved for his smooth landing, he made public his interest to contest the 2011
elections in October 2010, under the platform of PDP. In view of this development, as received with
mixed feelings, several legal petitions were instigated and promoted against Jonathan's bid, challenging
his political ambition and rights to contest for the 2011 presidential election under the auspices of PDP.
As the political climate was charging, arrangement went underway, and fastened towards the
preparation for the general election. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan adopted the subsisting Vice President, Arch.
Namadi Sambo, as his running mate. They toured round the country, visiting each of the 36 states'
capital in their campaign schedule, which lasted for about a month.

To prepare the country's electoral body for the election, Prof. Maurice Iwu was replaced with Prof.
Attahiru Jega, a Professor of Political Science and Vice Chancellor, Bayero University, Kano. The National
Assembly was equally saddled with the task of amending the 2007 Electoral Act, in order to restructure
the playing ground to achieve a free, fair and credible election in the country. President Jonathan later
conquered his critics, in a way, and contested the PDP primary elections in January 2011. He beat the
former Vice President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, who was his major opponent. Dr. Jonathan won Atiku with
a total of 1,726 votes against 502. It was indeed surprising that President Jonathan sailed over Atiku, in
the later's home town, Adamawa state, with as much as 76 votes against 31. Mrs Jubril Sarah, the third
contestant and the only female in the race got only a vote, which was the one she cast for herself.
Howbeit, 9 votes were voided.

However, Dr. Jonathan's emergence as the PDP flag bearer divided the Northern elements, who had
unanimously supported Atiku believing he would return their mandate back. As an alternative, the
Northern leaders realigned and reposed their massive support on General Muhammadu Buhari, who
contested under the umbrella of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). Though there were a handful of
political parties that fielded candidates in the 2011 Presidential election, there were only four major
players. They include: the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the Congress for
Progressive Change (CPC) - General Muhammadu Buhari, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) Mallam
Nuhu Ribadu and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau.

The Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) intensified efforts towards the election. The election time
table was first released on 5th December 2010, to begin on February 5, 2011. After a second thought,
the time table was amended by INEC and released again on 19th December 2011, to begin on April 2,
2011. The National Assembly election was to come first, followed by the gubernatorial elections and
then the Presidential election. This resulted in INEC seeking another amendment of the Electoral Act
from the National Assembly to enable INEC to conduct all elections not later than 30 days before the
inauguration of the elected officials in May 29, as against the usual 60 days stipulated in the 2010
Electoral Act as amended.

The National Assembly was also prevailed upon to release a whooping sum of 79 billion naira for the
importation of Direct Data Capturing Machine (DDC) for the election. The National Assembly complied,
endorsing enabling laws for the release of the funds without delay before embarking on recess. Shortly
after, Prof. Jega came again with his issues, demanding the increase of the allocation to the tune of 87
billion naira. The members of the National Assembly were interrupted from their break to provide Prof.
Jega with all he possibly needed to guarantee a free, fair and credible election in the country, as he
usually says. However, it should be noted that the DDC Machine, which were subcontracted to Zinox
computers and the rest ordered directly from Japan and United States, with such huge sums of money,
never performed the task efficiently. First was that the suppliers of the computers supplied it on
piecemeal bases and there were only few of them by the time the exercise kicked-of. Again, at the initial
stage most people's fingers including that of former President Obasanjo refused to adjust to the
instructions of the DDC machine. And the machine in turn bluntly rejected their thumbprints. All these
resulted to the postponement of the registration exercise by two weeks. Unfortunately, the DDC
machine never featured in the voting period, thus, defeating the whole essence of the electronic
registration of voters. We now look at the outcome of the elections proper.

The result of the presidential election across the states, particularly among the four major contestants is
presented in the table below.

PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR PARTIES IN THE APRIL 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

State PDP CPC ACN ANPP

Abia 1,175,984 3,743 4,392 1,455
Adamawa 508,314 333,526 32,786 2,706
Akwa-Ibom 1,165,629 5,348 54,148 2,000
Anambra 1,145,169 4,223 3,437 975
Bauchi 258,404 1,315,209 16,674 8,777
Bayelsa 504,811 691 370 136
Benue 658,472 102,171 223,007 8,592
Borno 207,057 909,763 7,533 37,279
C/River 709,3821, 4,002 5,88913, 2,521
Delta 368,851 8,960 146 2,746
Ebonyi 480,592 1,025 1,102 14.296
Edo 542,242 17,759 54,242 2,174
Enugu 802,144 3,753 1,755 1,111
Ekiti 135,009 2,689 116,981 1,482
FCT 253,444 131,567 2,327 674
Gombe 290,376 495,898 3,420 5,693
Imo 1,381,357 7,591 14,821 2,520
Jigawa 491,2521, 663,9941, 17,35311, 7,676
Kaduna 190,179 334,244 278 17,301
Kano 440,665 1,624,543 42,353 526,310
Katsina 424,587 1,154,000 10,945 6.342
Kebbi 369,198 501,453 26,171 3,298
Kogi 399,816 132,201 6,516 16,491
Kwara 268,243 83,603 52,432 1,672
Lagos 1,281,688 189,983 427,203 8,941
Niger 217,289 403,015 7,893 4,882
Nasarawa 408,997 278,390 1,204 1,047
Ogun 309,177 17,654 199,555 2,969
Ondo 387,376 11,890 74,253 6,741
Osun 188,409 6,997 299,711 3,617
Oyo 484,758 92,396 252,240 7,156
Plateau 1,290,865 536,551 10,181 5,235
Rivers 1,817,762 13,182 16,382 1,449
Sokoto 309,057 540,759 20,144 5,063
Taraba 451,354 257,986 17,791 1,203
Yobe 117,128 337,537 6,069 143,179
Zamfara 238,980 624,515 17,970 46,554

Total 22,495,187 12,214,853 2,079,151 917,012

Source: NTA broadcast, April 26, 2011.

However, an important development that nearly marred the 23rd April 2011 Presidential election in
Nigeria was the Post election violence that erupted in the Northern part of the country. This was mainly
because of the emergence of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of that election, contrary to the
expectations of most Northern leaders and power seeking groups that General Buhari would emerge as
the winner. For them, their mandate was stolen and the youths were instigated to violence. In fact, most
Northern leaders, particularly those under the platform of Northern Peoples Leadership Forum (NPLF),
were aggrieved on the turn out of the zoning system debate and conclusion, which did not favour them.
They had earlier issued serious threats on the nation should Jonathan contest the election. They had
warned that “failure to deliver justice in this matter may ignite a series of events, the scope and
magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor contain. The peace, stability and unity of our country
are superior to the personal ambition of one man (The Guardian, November 14, 2010:64). Even though
most of them later joined the Goodluck team, the psychological damage of infusing their people with
the belief that the Northerners' mandate, half-run by Yar'Adua, must never be stolen away, had already
been done. This was therefore manifested in the pre and post election violence that troubled and
questioned the purity of the said 2011 elections. In a most unfortunate precedent, offensive weapons
including explosives, bombs and grenades were used by the Northern area boys to declare Armageddon
on the country. Thousands of innocent lives were lost in the process.

Over 500 persons were brutally massacred in Southern Kaduna, in the cities of Zonkwa (316 persons),
Zangon-Kataf (147 persons) and Kafanchan (83 persons) with about 25 youth corps members among the
victims; and in Kano, over 200 persons were killed, with several churches and mosques burnt; and
several others killed elsewhere in Bauchi etc; all lives lost totaling over 1000. In this incidence alone,
over 40,000 persons were displaced (Daily Champion, April 25, 2011,p.6). Therefore, there is a strong
relationship between the PDP zoning philosophy and the post election violence of April 2011.

The National Assembly election, earlier fixed on Saturday 2nd April 2011, was nevertheless the first set
of election to be taken according to the INEC time table. However, due to the unpreparedness of the
electoral body, which claimed that the voting materials ordered for the election had not all returned
from abroad before the commencement of the election, the election was begun behind schedule and
was later abruptly cancelled at the middle of the game, exactly at noon, by the INEC Chairman, Prof.
Attahiru Jega. As if that was not enough, the election was entirely shifted to the next weekend on
Saturday 9th April 2011.

In the Senate elections, INEC returned about 92 seats (not marred by electoral malpractice) out of the
109 seats that were contested. PDP cleared about 71 seats, representing about 77.39 percent of all the
votes cast in the election. The ACN followed the lead with 18 seats, representing about 19.62 percent.
ANPP was able to return 7 seats, which showed about 7.63 percent. CPC cornered only 7 Senatorial
seats, representing about 6.54 percent. Labour Party got 4 seats, indicating only 4.36 percent, while
APGA and DPP had only 1 seat each, showing about 1.09 percent respectively. In the House of
Representatives, PDP claimed up to 170 seats. ACN had 70 seats, while CPC got 30 seats. For ANPP, it
was only 23 seats. Labour Party won only 10 seats. All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) and ACCORD
Party returned six candidates each in the House of Representatives.
On the other hand, most of the available Governorship election results across the states, released by the
INEC, which we were able to gather shows as follows.

APRIL 2011 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION RESULT.

 State Winner Party Votes Runner up/votes
Abia Theodore Orji PDP 641,158 APGA - 49,421
Akwa-Ibom Godswill Akpabio PDP 957,585 ACN - 163,449
Bauchi Isa Yuguda PDP 791,503 -
Benue Gabriel Suswam PDP 568,069 ACN - 453,548
Borno Kashim Shettima ANPP 531,147 PDP - 450,140
Delta Emmanuel Uduagha PDP - -
Ebonyi Martin Elechi PDP 287,217 ANPP -125,248
Enugu Sullivan Chime PDP 596,481 LP - 30,135
Gombe Ibrahim Dankwambo PDP 596,481 CPC - 91,781
Imo Rochas Okorocha APGA 336,859 PDP -
Jigawa Sule Lamido PDP 679,307 ACN - 343,177
Kaduna Ibrahim Nyaku PDP - -
Kano Rabio Kwankwaso PDP 1,153,045 -
Katsina Ibrahim Shema PDP 1,027,912 CPC - 55,569
Kebbi Saudi Dakingari PDP 559,424 -
Kogi - - - -
Kwara Abdulfatah Ahmed PDP 254,969 ACN -
Lagos Babatunde Fashola ACN 1,509,113 152,580
Nasarawa Tanko Al-Makura CPC 324,862 PDP -
Niger Babangida Aliyu PDP 491,670 300,450
Ogun Ibikunle Amosun ACN 377,487 PDP -
Ondo - - - 320,632
Osun - - - CPC -
Oyo Isiaka Ajimobi ACN 420,852 207,503
Plateau Jonah Jang PDP - PDP
Rivers Chibuike Amechi PDP 1,178,529 188,698
Sokoto - - - -
Taraba Danbaba Suntai PDP - -
Yobe Ibrahim Gaidam ANPP 436,998 PDP -
Zamfara Abdulaziz Abubakar ANPP 525,927 387,132

Source: NTA broadcast, April 28, 2011:6.45 pm; Thisday, Champion, April 28, 2011:1

Besides electoral matters, President Goodluck Jonathan had a major challenge in his administration. This
had to do with the issue of security of lives and properties of the people. Unlike the previous
administrations that battled with the knotty issue of Niger Delta militancy, Jonathan's major security
challenge was the problem of Boko Haram. The Islamic Boko Haram sect represents an Islamic
fundamentalist group, who are ideological anti-western education and principles. This group which has
been operating in the Northern part of the country since the inception of democracy in 1999, employs
the means of bomb detonations in public places to exert their influence. Some of the important places
they have attacked include: the National Force Headquaters, on June 16, 2011; the United Nations
House Abuja, on the 26 August 2011; several INEC offices, several churches/mosques, police stations,
public parks etc. Needless to say that many important lives, including that of security workers, have
been lost in these bomb attacks. In fact, the razing down of the home of security itself means that the
country was no longer safe. More pathetic was the bombing of UN building, as over 10 U.S. citizens fell
victim of the attack. With that, the UN Deputy Secretary General had to come down to Nigeria
immediately.

However, it was hard for President Jonathan to stem the tide. Though a major reorganization took place
in the security paraphernalia, with the installment of Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, as the Chief of Army Staff
and Mr. Hafeez Ringim, as the Inspector General of Police, this nevertheless, failed to guarantee the
safety of lives and properties of Nigerians. In simple truth, people continued to go about their daily
businesses in fear, as no one knew who would be and where the next victim would come from.
However, President Jonathan himself believed that the security operators were on top of the situation,
even when bombs continued to explode indiscriminately, here and there, at an average of two bombs
per week. Dr. Jonathan rather became optimistic that with the scheduled monthly meeting of security
chiefs which he facilitated, comprising of defense and police chiefs in West African countries, that cross
border crime, which was linked to the activities of Boko Haram, would be brought under substantial
control. Empty plans of strengthening immigration, customs and security outfits in the country, and the
acquisition of more helicopters to patrol the borders were nervously made; even though none was
matched with immediate action, or better still, they were reserved in human skulls and white sheet of
papers; all hanging upon elusive thoughts that an end to the lingering security crisis in the country was
no longer far away (see Jonathan's speech on, The Guardian, September 26, 2011).

On the opposite, and in contrast to the 'being on top of the situation' of Jonathan and his security chiefs,
the average security man on the street who faces these challenge in his daily job, believed that the
police has never been on top of the situation at any time, whatsoever. While commenting on the rising
incidence of killing of police men in the country, a police officer had this to say:

Our lives are no longer safe in the performance of our lawful duties. Whether it is the broad day light or
at night, you have to be praying to God to save your life as you put on the uniform and set out for work.
Being a police man has become a danger in itself, because apart from the fact that you are not loved by
the members of the society, the Boko Haram and armed robbers are waiting for you out there to put
you out of circulation. The worst part is that we do not even have the required weapons to confront
them. And our men are dying like chicken everyday in large numbers. It is a sad development (Daily Sun,
December 8, 2011:7).

Of a truth the activities of Boko Haram had taken its toll on the Nigerian Police force. According to the
data gathered on death benefits paid by various insurance firms to families of the deceased at the Force
Headquaters, Abuja; as much as 602 police officers and men were killed in just 5 months in the country,
between May and September 2011. The details are as follows: May 156; June 143; August 122;
September 119 and November 62 (Daily Sun, December 8, 2011,p.7).
The economic situation has not been a bed of roses, either. Jobs were elusive in the country. Inflation
was rising and the real sector not growing at all. At a point, Nigerians and the nation's global
development partners became very dismayed, that rather than a coherent stimulus plan, the
government had adopted at best tepid and disconnected palliatives that have failed to address the
structural defects in the nation's economy. Indeed, the economy has performed abysmally low.
According to the statistics released by the National Bureau of Statistics on the performance of the
economy in 2011, published in the Editorial of The Punch, December 5, 2011, the real Gross Domestic
Product grew at a lackluster rate of 7.4 percent in the third quarter of 2011, compared to 7.86 percent
in the corresponding period in 2010. Inflation annoyingly rose to 10.5 percent in October compared to
10.3 percent in September.

The figures became more alarming in the area of unemployment which the Statistician-General of the
Federation, Yemi Kale, put at 23.9 percent in October 2011, up from 21.1 percent in 2010 and 19.7
percent in 2009. This translates to an additional 1.8 million army of unemployed persons between
December 2010 and June 2011, made up of new entrants into the labour market (mostly graduates) and
previously employed people who lost their jobs during the period. More worrisome, according to Kale, is
that “…unemployment was highest among the youth aged 15-24 years (37.7 percent) and 25-44 (22.4
percent); and was higher in the rural areas.” The Ministry of Labour and Productivity confirmed that
about 48 million Nigerians of working age were unemployed, while the Central Bank of Nigeria stated
that 41 percent of the country's university and polytechnic graduates were jobless.

Domestic debt also rose dramatically, hitting $5.32 billion in September 2011. This represents an
increase of 25.77 percent over the $4.23 billion recorded a year earlier, with Federal Government bonds
accounting for $3.36 billion or 63.11 percent, according to the Debt Management Office headed by
Abraham Nwankwo. The bleak picture showed no signs of brightening soon. Developments in the
foreign exchange and money markets were also tiresome and very discouraging. In fact, with the selling
out of three banks in the country namely: Bank PHB, Afribank and Sterling Bank, many Nigerians lost
quantum of shares, monies, in the banks. The panic generated rather forced the stock market
operations downwards. The CBN also endorsed a further devaluation of the naira that allowed the
national currency to float between N150 and N160 to one US dollar, up from between N145 and N155
to $1, as was the case previously. This signaled the continued failure of monetary policies to firm up the
naira, reduce interest rates and curtail inflation. In 2011 alone, the apex bank raised its benchmark
lending rate (Monetary Policy Rate) for six times in a futile bid to control money supply and prevailing
interest rates. Bank lending rates ranged from 20 percent to as high as 28 percent. These excessive rates
crippled businesses, especially agriculture, mining and manufacturing (the productive sectors), which
typically employ large numbers of people, while lenders prefered lending to traders and importers who
employ very few. Further discouraging savings and investments, banks offered only paltry interest rates
on savings at between 0.01 percent and 3 percent.

In view of these economic woes, the government of Jonathan became more inclined towards the
adoption and implementation of certain anti-public interest policies to fix the economy. Tragically, the
economy rather kept insensitive to the ad hoc treatments. Unfriendly World bank policies of
deregulation were embraced by this administration whose economic team was steered by the Economic
and Finance Minister, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iwuala, even when the World Bank President Christiane Laggard
had asked governments to always seek pro-people policies in their governance.
However, Jonathan initially appeared to be very sensitive to workers plight in the country. After a series
of debates, the country's minimum wage bill was passed by the National Assembly, raising the minimum
wage from 7,500 to 18,000 naira. Inversely, and unknowingly to the workers, this largesse was
significantly associated with the administration's unwavering plot, and later mulish stance, on removal
of oil subsidy in 2012. As a new year gift, Nigerians were woefully and miserably welcomed into the year
with the removal of subsidy on Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), otherwise known as petrol, on the 1st of
January 2012, by Jonathan's government. By taking away its oil subvention, the pump price of petrol,
which was previously sold at 65 naira per liter, dramatically rose to 145 naira per liter. The government
of the day had claimed that they wanted to use the proceeds to refurbish the countries 3 major
refineries, sited at Warri, Port Harcourt and Kaduna. The underlying motive, being to block and
strangulate the criminal activities of a purported 'cabal' that lift crude oil for refining, in their privately
owned refineries, in neigbouring countries. With this painful development, the Nigerian Labour Congress
(NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) were compelled by reason to embark on an indefinite strike
action, pending the outcome of a negotiation to be reached between the union and the government.

The Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was also billed for unbundling/outright privatization in
2012. This would result in terrifying high tariffs. The same experiment would also, as programmed, be
performed on NIPOST. Tangible plans were equally afoot to reintroduce the toll gates in the country in
2012. All these were western induced economic ploys. They will likely pauperize and diminish low
income Nigerians.

Unfortunately, the country had budgeted about 4.7 trillion naira for year 2012 of which a quarter was to
be funded through loans from foreign countries including India and China. Yet, over one hundred billion
has been earmarked by the administration for the state house expenditures (offices of the President and
Vice President) alone (Daily Sun, December 21, 2011).

REFERENCES

1. Ake C. (1996) Is Africa Democratising? CASS Monograph No. 5. Lagos: Malthouse Press.

2. Ake C. (2001) Democracy & Development in Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

3. Maier K. (2000) This House Has Fallen, Nigeria In Crisis. London: Penguim
4. Nnoli O. (1994) Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa the Intervening Variables. CASS Occasional
Monograph No. 4, Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

NEWSPAPERS

1. Vanguard Wednesday May 29, 2002

2. Vanguard Thursday May 30, 2002

3. The Guardian April 7, 2002

4. The Guardian November 5, 2002

5. The Guardian Sunday March 31, 2002

REFERENCE

Daily Champion, April 25, 2011

Daily Sun, December 21, 2011

The Guardian, September 26, 2011

\The Punch, December 5, 2011

NTA broadcast, April 28, 2011

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

WOMEN AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA

Decision making both in the home and political terrain has always been viewed as the exclusive preserve
of men. The general thinking, of stereotype, is that women are weaker vessels with an inconsequential
contribution to development, and therefore should be exempted from partaking in governance. This
practice has mostly been strengthened by various religious teachings operating in the country, which
strictly instructed the women to be subordinated to their husbands. Divergent cultural beliefs, which
wholesomely locate the place of women in the kitchen, or at least abhor women from actively
participating in certain public events, are equally part of the key issues bothering on women
participation or representation in politics. In fact, most African societies' cultures and certain inherent
orientations hardly see any reason why the girl child should acquire western education in the first place.
They are mostly considered as essential and exclusive part of their husbands assets, and as such, money
should not be wasted on them. Thus, women are generally socialized and talked into being home-
makers, to be caring and completely submissive. In some cases, they are unnecessarily reminded of their
female nature, of weakness and vulnerability to face certain challenges of life.

However, various efforts have been put in place towards entrenching a non- discriminatory world, which
allows for equal gender representation in politics and other aspects of life. Hereto, the issue of women
participation in politics was generally thought as a measure that will promote global and national peace,
development and democracy. We therefore move ahead to discuss some of these important
contributions towards mainstreaming gender equality and other affirmative action for greater women
participation in politics.

POSITIVE ATTEMPTS TOWARDS WOMEN INCLUSIVENESS IN POLITICS

There have been serious efforts geared towards increasing women's participation in governance. This is
because it has been widely acknowledged that women empowerment, protection and development is
central to human existence and national development. Consequently, gender imbalance in the past
decades has received tremendous attention, both at the global and local levels. Serious calls and legal
instruments have, thereafter, been consciously put up in this regard. Particularly, the Fourth World
Conference on Women, known as Beijing Declaration, was a major global attempt in balancing gender
imbalance across nations. The Beijing Conference, reportedly the largest international meeting ever
convened under the United Nations auspices, with some 17,000 people registered, came up from
September 4-15, 1995 in Beijing, China, in commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of
the United Nations. The idea was to advance the goals of equality, development and peace for all
women everywhere in the interest of humanity.
The Conference noted that “Equality between women and men is a matter of human rights and a
condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality,
development and peace” (UN, 2005). Thus, the Conference resulted to a Platform for Action which
called for, among other things, at least 30% representation of women in national governments, of which
the representatives of 189 UN member countries (including Nigeria) unanimously adopted. This
declaration was built on consensus and progress made at previous UN conferences and summits on
women,such as: Women Empowerment in Nairobi in 1985; Children Rights in New York in 1990;
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992; Human Rights in Vienna in 1993; Population
and Development in Cairo in 1994 and Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995.

Some other important global inputs were the Millennium Development Goals, as agreed in Canada in
the year 2000, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on Women's Rights, which Nigeria
domesticated in 2004; and the ten year review of the Beijing Platform for Action (Beijing+10). Along this
line, the Nigerian Government established the National Council for Women in 1990, which later became
the Ministry of Women Affairs in 1995. Also, the National Gender Policy (NGP) was adopted in 2006,
though fully launched in June, 2007, with the intent of building a non-gender selective state. The NGP,
among other submissions, recommended at least 35% female representation in the politics of Nigeria.
This was indeed, an ambitious target that surpasses that of the Beijing Declaration. These efforts have
therefore ensured greater involvement of women in politics. Let us briefly examine the situation in
Nigeria proper.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF WOMEN IN POST-COLONIAL NIGERIA

Frankly, the issue is not whether women are being excluded from politics, but rather, to what extent
they are being included in politics. This is because women have never been totally dissociated from
partisan politics. In fact, women actively participated in the post-colonial governance of Nigeria. For
instance, in the Southern Nigeria, women already had franchise by 1960. Precisely, in 1960, Mrs.
Wuraola Esan from Western Nigeria became the first female member of the Federal Parliament. In
1961, Chief (Mrs.) Margret Ekpo contested elections in Aba North constituency, under the National
Council of Nigeria Citizen (NCNC) platform and won, becoming a member of the Eastern Nigeria House
of Assembly until 1966. Mrs. Janet N. Mokelu and Miss Ekpo A. Young also contested elections, won and
became members of the Eastern House of Assembly. It was only in the Northern Nigeria that women
were intentionally denied franchise even after independence,and this, mainly based on cultural
sentimentality. Thus, prominent female politicians in the North, such as Hajia Qambo Sawaba were not
allowed to participate in the electoral process. This continued until after return to civil rule in 1979
when Northern women were opened up, and given franchise.

During this period also, more progress were recorded. A few Nigerian women won elections into the
House of Representatives at the National level. Some of these women were Mrs. J.C. Eze of the Nigerian
People's Party (NPP) who represented Uzo uwani Constituency in the former Anambra State, Mrs. V.O.
Nneji, also of NPP who represented Isu Constituency and Mrs. Abiola Babatope of the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN) who represented Mushin Central II of Lagos State. Though, only few women won elections
in various Houses of Assembly during the Second Republic. In this period, only two women were
appointed Federal Ministers. They were Chief (Mrs.) Janet Akinrinade, who was the Minister for Internal
Affairs and Mrs. Adenike Ebun Oyagbola, appointed Minister for National Planning. Mrs. Francesca
Yetunde Emmanuel was the then only female Permanent Secretary. She first served in the Federal
Ministry of Establishment and later Federal Ministry of Health. A number of women were also appointed
as Commissioners in their various states.

In 1983, Mrs. Franca Afegbua became the only woman to be elected into the Senate. Also, some women
contested and won elections into the local government councils during this period. With the return of
military rule in the country in December 1983, the first formal quota system was introduced by the
federal government seeking the appointment of women in each of the state Executive Councils. All the
states complied with this directive. Some states even had two or three female members. However, in
the early 1990s, two women were appointed Deputy Governors. These were Alhaja Latifat Okunu of
Lagos State and Mrs. Pamela Sadauki of Kaduna State. Though there was no female Minister during this
period. There was also no female member of the defunct Supreme Military Council or the later Armed
Forces Ruling Council. In the 1990 elections into Local governments heralding the Third Republic, very
few women emerged as Councilors and only one female, Chief (Mrs.) Titilayo Ajanaku, emerged as
Chairperson of a local council in the West. Thereupon, only two women emerged as Deputy Governors,
namely; Alhaja Sinatu Ojikutu of Lagos State and Mrs. Cecilia Ekpenyong of Cross River state. In the
Senatorial election held in 1992, Mrs. Kofo Buchnor Akerele was the only woman who won a seat in the
Senate. Very few women won elections into the House of Representatives. One of these few was Chief
(Mrs.) Florence Ita Giwa, who won election into Calabar Constituency under the platform of National
Republican Convention (NRC). Amongst the members of the Transitional Council appointed by President
Babangida in January 1993, only two were women, namely; Mrs. Emily Aik-imhokuede and Mrs. Laraba
Dagash (Minister of Health and Human Resources).

In the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan, two female Ministers were appointed
into the Cabinet. General Abacha had a number of female Ministers at various times in his Cabinet.
Some of them were; Chief Mrs Onikepo Akande, Ambassador Judith Attah and Prof. Miriam Ikejiani-
Clark, who became the then Minister of State for Federal Capital Territory in 1995. During the military
era of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, beginning from June 9, 1998; there were two women in the
Federal Executive Council, Chief Mrs Onikepo Akande (Minister for Commerce) and Dr. Laraba Gambo
Abdullahi (Minister of Women Affairs). However, the situation has long changed to the advantage of
women inclusiveness in politics since the advent of democracy.

WOMEN IN NIGERIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The advent of democracy, which marked the beginning of Nigeria's Fourth Republic and commenced in
May 29, 1999, contributed immensely to greater participation of women in politics. However, this did
not translate to overwhelming success and inclusiveness of women in the political terrain of the country,
even though more women gained appointive positions. In the elections that saw to democratic
governance in Nigeria, few women emerged at Chairpersons of local government councils. A handful of
women also won elections as councilors. There was however, no female Governor throughout the
federation. Only Lagos state produced a female Deputy Governor in the person of Senator Bucknor
Akerele. In the National Assembly, there were only but three women in the Senate, namely; Chief (Mrs.)
Florence Ita Giwa, representing Cross River South Senatorial District, Mrs. Stella Omu from Delta State
and Hajiya Khairat Abdul-Razaq (now Hajiya Gwadabe) representing the Federal Capital Territory. There
were only twelve women in the House of Representatives. They include: Barrister Iquo Minimah, Mrs.
Patience Ogbodo, Lola Abiola Edewor, Patricia Etteh, Dorcas Odujinrin, J.F. Adeyemi, Binta Garba Koji,
Gbenni Saraki, Florence Aya, Linda Ikpeazu, Temi Harrinman and Mercy Almona Isei.

By statistical distribution, in the National Assembly elections held in 1999, for the 109 senatorial seats
contested, only 3 women successfully emerged as Senators. They came from Cross River state, Delta
state and FCT. Likewise, of the 360 seats available in the House of Representatives, as few as 12 women
won, against 348 men. It was not hard to believe, thence, that about 28 states never turned out any
female representative.

In the State House of Assembly elections held in 1999, with about 960 seats being contested, only about
21 women emerged against 939 men that successfully won. It was even so bad that as much as 20
states, including the FCT failed to produce any female member. At the Local Government Council level,
for about 774 Chairmanship seats contested, only about 7 women emerged against 767 men that
successfully won. About 31 states also failed to produce any single female as Chairperson; it was only
Imo state that managed to turn out 2 females. Others like Benue, Kaduna, Katsina, Osun and FCT had
one each. Also, at the ward level, for as much as 6,612 Councillorship seats available, men cornered
about 6,532 leaving only about 80 seats for women. States like Kwara, Akwa Ibom and Kogi successfully
produced 11, 9 and 8 female councilors, while others like Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Enugu, Jigawa,
Kano, Kebbi, Ogun, Plateau, Rivers, Taraba seemed not to be at home with the women empowerment
philosophy, as they failed to produce any female councilor, even though population of women are
particularly higher in some of these states, especially in Anambra, Bayelsa and Enugu.

Thenceforth, in 2003 when another democratic election was held in the country, the story was not much
different. For instance, four females emerged as Senators against 105 males, with states like Anambra,
Edo, Kwara and Ogun having one each. This though, was just but a one step ahead of what women had
in 1999. In the Federal House of Representatives, women won 22 seats, while men grabbed as much as
338 seats. Even at that, as much as 23 states still did not produce any female representative. For the
State House of Assembly elections, it was 933 men against 34 women. Adamawa, Bayelsa, Cross River,
Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Nassarawa, Yobe, Zamfara and FCT did not still see the need of
involving women in law making at their various states. At the Council level, only about 14 females
successfully became Chairpersons. This share was indeed a pittance when compared to 760 men that
won Chairmanship positions across the country. About 27 states also failed to realize a female as
Chairperson in their respective states. In fact, for as much as 8,968 councillorship seats competed, the
score sheet turned out to be 8,698 against 270 in favour of males. Still at that, Anambra, Bayelsa,
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Ogun, Plateau, Sokoto Zamfara and the FCT still could not find
sufficient reason to have anything to do with women involvement in local politics.

The 2007 elections seemed to be a success story. Men claimed about 100 Senatorial seats, leaving only 9
slots for women to grapple with. Impressively, all the 'A' states, that is; Abia, Adamawa, Akwa-Ibom and
Anambra, allowed women to clinch one senatorial slot each. Other states that equally gave women
chance to participate were Imo, Jigawa, Nassarawa, Niger and Ogun. In the Federal House of
Representatives, men had up to 332 while women achieved only 28 representations across the country.
Women had no chance at all in about 18 states, including the FCT. In the House of Assembly elections, it
was 913 against 53, in favour of men as usual. As much as 11 states including the FCT had no female
representation. At the local council elections, women were able to gather a whole lot of 164
councillorship seats. Even at that, men still conquered overwhelmingly, having up to 1,576 seats to their
advantage.

In any case, there was a positive change in the 2011 general elections, though. But things did not totally
turn out in favour of women, especially at the federal level. Of course, no one ever expected things to
change overnight, but for women to lose out substantially was a source of worry. In the Senate for
instance, out of the 109 seats, only 6 women made it. This was a slack against the recorded 9 seats in
2003. Those states that saw to the emergence of female senators were Abia- Central (Nkechi J.
Nwaogu/PDP); Akwa-Ibom- South (Mrs. Helen U. Esuene/PDP); Imo- East (Mrs. Christiana N.O.
Anyanwu/APGA); Kaduna- South (Nenadi Usman/PDP); Lagos- Central (Mrs. H.E. Oluremi Tinubu/ACN)
and Taraba- North (Aisha Jummai/PDP).

For the Federal House of Representatives, only 14 women successful won, out of the available 360 seats.
They emerged as follows: Abia Bende (Nnenna Elendu Ukaeje/PDP); Abia Isuikwuato/umu-nnochi
(Nkiruka Onyejeoche/PDP); Adamawa Yola North/Yola South/Girei (Aishatu Dahiru Ahmed/PDP);
Anambra Njikoka/Dunukofia/Anaocha (Uche Lilian Ekwunife/APGA); Cross River Ogoja/Yala (Rose Okoji
Oko/PDP); Cross River Calabar Municipal/Odukpani (Nkoyo Esu Toyo/PDP); Enugu Igbo-Etiti/Uzo-Uwani
(Princess Mrs. Stella U.O.); Osun Ayedaade/Irewole/Isokan (Mrs. Ayo Omidiran); Oyo Ibadan North
East/Ibadan South East (Simiat D. Adeleke/ACCORD); Rivers Port Harcourt II (Mrs. Nsiegbe B. Ibiba/PDP)
and Yobe Damaturu/Gujba/Gulani/Tarmuwa (Hon. Khadija W. Bukar Abba/ANPP). However, this figure
was again a retrogression from what women had (about 22 seats) in 2007.

It should be noted however, that women have equally suffered the same fate in appointive or non-
elective positions. President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration saw to the inclusiveness of greater
number of women in ministerial positions, though. In his first tenure in which there were about 41
Ministerial positions, about six women made the list. Among them were; Mrs. Kema Chikwe (Aviation),
Mrs. Dupe Adelaja (Defence/State), Madam Adamu Ciroma (Finance/State), Dr. (Mrs.) Amina Ndalono
(Health/State), Dr (Mrs.) Bekky Ketebu-Igwe (Solid Minerals/State), Mrs. Pauline Tallen (Science and
Technology/State), Mrs. Aishat Ismali (Women Affairs and Development); With Chief (Mrs.) Titilaya
Ajanaku as Special Adviser to the President on Women Affairs. Also, after a Ministerial reshuffle in 2006,
the Obasanjo Administration had Oby Ezekwesili (Education), Nenadi USman (Finance), Ngozi Okonjo
Iweala (Foreign Affairs),Maryam Ciroma (Women and Youth), Helen Esuene (Health/State), Grace
Egbuche (Special Duties) and Salome Jakande (Water Resources/State). Even though this administration
involved women in governance, their positions mostly appeared secondary, as majority all of them got
appointed as Ministers of State.
In the Yar'Adua/ Goodluck Jonathan led government, more women got appointed. Some women that
featured include; Ruquayyatu A. Rufa'i (Education), Mrs. Yabawa Lawan Wali (Finance/State), Mrs.
Sulamatu Suleiman (Foreign Affairs/State II), Josephine Tapgun (Commerce and Industry/State), Iyom
Josephine Anenih (Women Affairs), Deziani Allison-Madueke (CON) (Petroleum), Fidelia Njeze (Aviation),
Jumoke Akinjide (FCT/State), Okonjo Iweala (Finance), Stella Odua Ogiemwonyi (Aviation), Hajia Zainab
Ibrahim Kuchi (Niger Delta Affairs/State), Mrs. Viola Onwuliri (Foreign Affairs/State), Hajia Zainab Maina
(Women Affairs), Erelu Olusola Obada (Defence/State) and Ama Pepple (Land and Housing). In the
Jonathan's new Special Advisers list for 2011 were; Mrs. Sarah Jibril (Ethics and Value), Senator Joy
Emodi (National Assembly Maters), Mrs. Sarah Akuben Pane (Social Development) and Mrs. Asma'u
Abdulkadir (Gender Issues). Considerably, the Jonathan's Administration, mainly the Office of the First
lady, claims that the 35% affirmative action has been achieved in Nigeria. Yet, we do not know what
mathematics or logic upon which such presumption was hinged upon. Taken like that, one still observes
that the location of the said women in the ministerial distribution table remains at the lower ebb. Thus,
something close to gender equity has been achieved, while gender equality has remained elusive. This
may never likely change. Perhaps, God made it so.

THE WAY FORWARD

Generally, one important observation to note from the foregoing is that all the various mouth makings,
legislations and policies for affirmative action, in this democratic dispensation have not tangibly
translated into acceptable increase in women participation in politics. For instance, only about 3%
increase in women representation in considerable positions occurred in 1999, 4% in 2003 and 6% in
2007. It was so bad that in the 1999 elections, no female vied for Presidential and Governorship
elections. In the 36 states of the federation, only one female, Mrs. Dame Virgy Etiaba, got her way to be
Deputy Governor, and later, out of circumstance, had the privilege of becoming the First female
Governor in the country, which she was later removed by the court which declared Mr Peter Obi's
impeachment null and void. With this declaration, her ascendancy to this position was assumed not to
have existed, thus Nigeria's struggle for the first female state Governor continues. Mrs Patricia Ette that
managed to grab the Speakership position in the Federal House of Representatives, the first woman to
get there, was humiliated out after a short while. In this period also, only one female became a Speaker
in all the 36 state Houses of Assembly. In fact, throughout President Obasanjo's administration, women
only had 9 percentage representations in appointive positions. There were only 7 female Ministers, out
of about 41 slots, in the Goodluck Jonathan administration. There was no female Governor. Only 6
women made it as Deputy Governors. In all, the composition of women in both the Federal and State
legislatures has never reached 10%. This scenario is the same in terms of political appointments at both
federal and state levels.

The problem, as it seems, is that either consciously or unconsciously Nigerian generally are facilitating
greater women exclusion from the politics of the country. Normally, we are very aware of some
inherent primordial challenges faced by women in this regard. Traditional, religious, and
human/biological issues which hitherto hinder women from venturing into full time politics, have at
least, been conquered to some extent by women. However, the government, the political parties and
the women themselves are the current encumbrances. One wonders as to Why have governments, at
both federal and state levels failed to implement a 35% women representation, at least in their
respective cabinets? Why must the political parties be bent on charging exorbitant nomination fees that
scare women away? And why must women themselves, since they are usually more in voting numbers,
refuse to encourage/vote for their fellow women? These are some of the important questions that
agitate the mind. In the last election, of April 2011, Mrs. Sarah Jibril, the only female contestant, only
secured one vote (the one she put for herself) in the PDP presidential primary election. Notably, she had
vied for the Presidential seat thrice. In all, coming out as a failure, a discouragement and
disappointment to women with clear political ambitions. We nevertheless admire her bravery. But more
thanks to President Jonathan, who wiped her tears with a Special Adviser portfolio.

The truth though is that nobody, no single legislation stops women from contesting elective positions.
And it will become a gender offence, a discrimination against men, to now implement, as some
presently clamour, such affirmative action that would exclusively debar men, or reserve some elective
slots for only women in political parties. Such will indeed, undermine the objective of democracy.
However, the gender imbalance in favour of men can hardly be corrected by men. The women must rise
to the challenges. Firstly, to affirmatively manipulate their husbands and children, their political parties
and the government of the day, towards creating more opportunities and enabling grounds for them in
the realm of politics. They themselves also should use their advantageous massive voting
power/numerical strength to make the difference. It will continue to be a sad story for the women,
however, if they continue to collect 'appreciations' 'tip offs' and other financial inducements from male
contestants to sabotage their general interests, only to come back at the end of the day to cry
subjugation.

REFERENCES
Akindutire, A.F., and Aigbohkebdo, I.B. (2011). Women education and its relative importance on national
development: A study of Ekpoma, Edo State Nigeria. in Proceedings of 16th annual conference of
anthropological and sociological association of Nigeria (ASAN). Ilorin: ASAN.

Federal Ministry of Justice (2008). Nigeria 3rd periodic country report: 2005-2008 on the
implementation of African charter on human and peoples rights in Nigeria. Abuja: Federal Ministry of
Justice.

National Bureau of Statistics (2008). Annual abstract of statistics. Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The United Nations (1985). The Nairobi forward looking strategies for the advancement of women. July
15-26. Nairobi, Kenya.

The United Nations (2005). Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Beijing platform for
action. report of the Secretary General E/CN/6/2000T'C/2.

Warren, S. (1992). Gender and environment. Canada: Agatham Foundation.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

CULTURE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Nigeria as it is presently constituted is made up of more than 350 ethnic groups and what we have done
in the earlier chapters was to articulate the culture of Nigerians before the coming of Europeans. We
have equally seen how our people culturally resisted and reacted against foreign culture and domination
in the form of emergence of nationalism which led to the achievement of independence.

By contact with foreign culture, the culture of a people can assimilate certain elements of that culture.
This process is known as acculturization. Acculturization has taken place in the culture of many people.
Nigeria is not an exception in this. Islamic and oriental culture had been deeply assimilated in strong
centres of Islam in northern parts of Nigeria. But Nigerian culture has successfully resisted Western
culture, although it has assimilated certain western elements. At this point, we may pause and ask the
question what is culture?

WHAT IS CULTURE?

Culture has no common accepted definition, rather it is used in various ways with different meanings.
Otite and Ogionwo (1979) believe that culture can be used either in colloquial or scientific terms. In
colloquial terms, culture or cultural is used to state that someone has or does not have good manners or
behaviour. For instance, we say that one is not cultured or has no culture. That is that such a person is
unrefined.

In scientific usage, culture is often defined in blanket terms as the total way of life of a people. More
specifically, culture is defined as a complex whole of man's acquisition of knowledge, morals, belief, art
customs, technology etc. which are shared and transmitted from generation to generation.

Olatunbosun ( )says that culture means advanced development of human powers, intellectually,
physically and spiritually by training and experience. The evidences of a people's culture are expressed
in arts, music, law, literature, social and political institutions, regions and science. Historians often use
the word culture and civil-society to mean the same thing.

The definition of culture stresses that it is not a personal item. Culture is used with reference to a
society or a group of societies. Culture does not die with the death of an individual or a group of
individuals. The culture of a people may vanish only when such people vanish under such mishaps as
earthquakes. Even here, there is the possibility that a people may be dug up at some date by
archaeologists and the buried culture of the society reconstructed.

Our definition of culture indicates that it has both material and non-material aspects and is acquired by
every member of a society. Material culture relates to overt or explicit aspect of culture and means the
products of industry, technology, art etc. That is, every visible or concrete acquisition of man in society;
artefact such as bridges, pots, cutlasses, hoes, houses, cooking utensils, handicrafts, etc. These are
directly observable as the cultural products of any society. The material aspects of culture thus consist
of the objects which people have learned to make and use to satisfy their needs in society,

The non-material aspects of culture consist of the knowledge, philosophy, morals, motivation, language,
attitudes, values etc., shared and transmitted in a society. These are sometimes referred to as the covert
or implicit aspects of culture and are acquired by members of a society. They are not tangible or visible
but they are manifested through the psychological state and behaviour of a people.

Both of these aspects of culture-material and non-material go together as the culture of a people. They
are fundamental in the analysis of the cultural pattern that is the general mode of conduct, the
systematic and integrated content of behaviour which is characteristic of a society. Because of this, it is
possible to predict or anticipate the behaviour of members of a given culture.

In essence, every person who is a member of a society or every society in the world has culture. Ideally,
no one culture is better than another, to say so would be a value judgement that is political. Because
culture is as an abstraction it is impossible to say even in scientific terms that one culture is richer than
another, the richness and comparability of such cultural elements as language, morality, system of ideas,
philosophy etc, are obviously impossible to measure.

Cultural accumulation which is a process by which trait or elements are added to a particular culture
helps in culture growth. The increase in the total member of items or traits in a culture is possible
through inventions or discoveries by members of the society or through diffusion.
The process of cultural accumulation and of cultural evolution is fraught with change. Culture is not
static. It has continuous growth and is therefore ever changing through the acquisition of more cultural
traits and the process of borrowing. The introduction of a cultural element may mean the introduction
of an initial conflict. But such conflicts often later disappear as the new cultural trait becomes accepted.
However, it is not in every case that new traits are accepted. A new cultural element can be rejected by
a society and also there can be continuity or discontinuity in the culture of a people. Cultural change,
sometimes referred to as cultural dynamics occurs when the culture of a people is modified through
time.

It has already been noted that we cannot abstract a people's culture from what they do or say, and from
their behaviour in society. In other words, a people's culture is shown through their behaviour and
manifested in their artefacts and art forms. What we can observe is the behaviour of people and their
techniques and of constructing material artefacts. Similarly, dancing is not culture itself; it is one form in
what culture manifests itself. Human behaviour, speeches, dances, songs etc are important in a study
only because of the light they shed into the way people are trained and brought up to live in a particular
society. What we referred to earlier as material and non-material aspects of culture including carvings,
paintings, dress, philosophy etc, represent the end products of a culture at a particular moment in time.
In this sense, civilization is a manifestation or an instance of culture.

Culture functions as a mechanism of adaptation to a particular environment. In the process both the
society and its culture change and improve on their ability to conquer and use the environmental
resources. Changes in culture are thus caused by several factors: ecological changes, culture contact
leading to the availability of alternative elements, innovations, processes of cultural transmission from
generation to generation (no exact pattern is transmitted between generations), and the dynamic
process involved in the interaction between society and its culture.

Culture therefore is not a "thing” but an abstraction, a process, and an instrument. It is not static but is
stable; it changes in response to society's needs and to ecological demands as evidenced in the manner
of dress, hairstyles, dances, patterns of behaviour, etc, in different societies and between centuries.

Cole (1997) says culture is focused on assumptions that are on implicit behaviour rather than on explicit
or overt behaviour. He stresses that culture is learned as a result of experience and suggests that it can
be changed if we know the dynamics of the learning process. Cole's explanation is based on Schein's
definition of culture as ...a pattern of basic assumptions -invented, discovered or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration -that has
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore to be taught to new members as the correct
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

In other words, we have been able to arrive at the point when we can now conclude that Nigerians had
culture before the Europeans arrived. It was as a result of this culture that Nigerians were able to
recognize that they were being oppressed, humiliated, exploited and suppressed by Britain. On the
strength of this recognition, they started to struggle for liberty and self-rule.

NIGERIAN CULTURE

Nigeria is a multi-lingual society. Bamgbose suggests that there are about 400 different languages in the
country and with the exception of the three major languages, Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, each occupies a
very restricted area. As a result, many Nigerians encounter a different language just twenty miles
outside their communal homeland. For instance, these languages could be identified; Yoruba, Edo, Igbo,
Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, Hausa, Kanuri, Nupe, Tiv. Igala, Uhrobo, Itsekiri, Ogoni to mention but a few. These
languages form what could be regarded as nationalities.

Some of the cultural differences that identified these nationalities prior to the emergence of colonialism
are treated hereunder. First was religion. Most part of Nigeria worshiped the supreme being through
various means. However, Islam was introduced into Northern Nigeria about five hundred yeas ago. Its
effect on the population was greatly intensified and its area of dominance expanded after 1804 when
the Fulani religious leaders in the town of Sokoto waged a holy war that brought most of Hausa land
under the orthodox Islamic leadership of the Sultan of Sokoto. In the South, on the other hand, only a
portion of Yoruba land came under Islamic influence. The rest remained animist. During the colonial
period many of the Southern states embraced Christianity.

Religion purports to provide divine answers to the ways people should behave in life. Religion assumes a
tremendous importance in shaping the life, ways and thought patterns of human groups. Every society
develops ethos or a collective understanding of the nature of things and of man's relationship to man
and his surroundings. These ethoses provide the basic guidelines for the definition of the rights, ditties,
obligations and responsibilities of members of these societies and their institutions. It defines the
fundamental structures, systems and channels and interaction for the members, as well as the belief
systems which embody the internalized values that in part, propel action. Unfortunately, religion in
Nigeria since the amalgamation in 1914 has been a source of tension, animosity and hostility due to
fanaticism that has been engendered in the process of relationship with members of other religious
groups.

Another cultural distinction among the different groups in Nigeria was the political authority especially
before colonial rule. The pre-colonial Hausa Fulani political system was organized around the emirate
ruled by a monarch, the Emir. The emirate was a vassal state in the Sokoto Empire. Its ruler was
appointed by the Sultan of Sokoto, the Spiritual and temporal head of the empire.

Most officers carried with them fiefs or geographical areas under an officer who collected taxes from
these areas, part of which he transmitted to the Emir while keeping the rest to himself. The structure of
authority was a vertical-hierarchy of ranked officials extending from the least powerful to the Emir and
then to the Sultan. Commands flowed from the top downwards while loyalty and obedience flowed in
the opposite direction. It was in the interest of the official to cultivate and retain the favour of the Emir
through frequent demonstrations of loyalty and obedience. The authority relations were despotic in
character emphasizing relations of power, and dependence between subordinates and their superiors.
The authority itself was stratified. At the top were the hereditary Fulani nobility who were favoured for
office particularly the ruling dynasties. Slaves occupied the lowest rung of the social ladder. In the
middle were freemen usually occupationally ranked in this order; the mallams and wealthy traders were
at the top, cloth workers, silversmiths, commission agents and farmers in the middle and the butchers,
tanners, eulogists, hunters and blacksmiths at the bottom. A man's fate was not entirely determined by
blood. Social mobility was possible through becoming the obedient client or loyal follower of the
privileged. High office led to personal enrichment. Thus, authority roles were a source, not only of
immense prestige, loyalty and respect but also the most important means of acquiring wealth and status
overshadowing other alternatives.

Obviously, this structure of authority put a high premium and deference to authority, loyalty, obedience
and sensitivity to the interest, opinions, views and demands of one's superiors. It strongly favoured
qualities of servility, respect for authority, allegiance to the powerful and submissiveness. Such a system
frowned on the self-assertiveness of the individual. Success in an independent, occupational and other
non-ascriptive roles, or individual initiative and self-instigated actions towards goals not sanctioned by
one's superiors was negatively evaluated or at best irrelevant. The first and foremost social commitment
was loyalty to the Emir. This allegiance was demonstrated by gifts, obedience, and sometimes
prostration before his presence as well as by the prompt execution of his orders and wishes. It was a
grave sin to fail to discharge duties assigned by one's superior.

On the contrary, the pre-colonial Igbo authority structure was highly diffuse. It lacked any political
centralization. With few exceptions, decision-making in an Igbo society was performed not by a single
leader but by a council of elders which was highly responsive to the popular will. In fact the polity was
republican in character. There was virtually no rigid stratification of individuals by blood or occupation.
Age grade, titled societies, and other universalistic criteria provided the basis for social status and
influence in the society.

Deference to authority was very low. Wealth conferred authority and social status. A man gained
prestige and power by accumulating the food stuff required to join title societies and perform other
ceremonies. The societies were open to all freemen. Social mobility, wealth and power were
independent of performance in authority roles. Therefore, loyalty and obedience to superiors, so
important in Hausa-Fulani society was virtually unknown in Igbo land. In a general sense, obedience and
respect were accorded only to the elders. Authoritative individuals were significant as objects of
emulation rather than as recipients of loyalty and obedience. Self assertiveness and individual initiative
were highly valued.

Thus, Igbo society looked down on people who accepted superiors, depended on them, or relied on
them for their progress. Subservience and unquestioning obedience signifies weakness and a lack of
masculinity. It placed premium instead on occupational skill, enterprise and initiative. The man who was
respected, powerful and influential was the one who was sufficiently self-motivated to work hard and to
successfully compete with and challenge the power and wealth of his superiors. His success was
basically self-made rather than attained through climbing the socio-economic and political apron strings
of his superiors.

The Yoruba authority structure tended to strike a balance between the opposite extremes represented
by the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo systems. It was hierarchical in form but not authoritarian in consent.
Command did not flow down from the king to the ranks of obedient officials. On the contrary, power
was widely dispersed among partly self-governing units. However, the Yoruba Oba was a divine king
whose prestige and ritual status far exceeded his political power. In fact, as a result of this divinity, he
rarely ventured outside his palace. In spite of this religious aura which surrounded him, one or more
councils of state, consisting of hereditary chiefs and representatives of major territorial groups in the
kingdom were the main decision making organs. While the Hausa emir could only he de posed by his
overlord, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Yoruba Oba can be deposed and ordered to commit suicide by his
council. The latter then appointed a successor from a large pool of members of several royal lineages
who could inherit the throne. Obedience to him was not total and loyalty was not unquestioning.

Although the Yoruba Oba was lavishly provided for economically, chieftaincy in Yoruba land did not
involve fief holding. Access to personal wealth by the rulers was limited. They could not use their
political position to exploit the kingdom's resources for their personal enrichment. In fact, through trade
and other activities, a commoner could make himself wealthier than a chief. Membership of the Ogboni
title society and the opportunity to take chieftaincy titles by the wealthy commoners accorded political
power and prestige to men of proven occupational achievements rather than those with acceptable
ascriptive credentials. Thus, the Yoruba Oba and the officials had much less control over their subjects
than the Hausa-Fulani Emir. Hereditary privileges and duties lived side by side with opportunities for
individual initiative and self-assertion. At the same time an individual could attain high status and
prestige by royal favours, For example, the Oba's favourite slaves and eunuchs could be raised by him to
positions of greater importance and affluence than those of titled men in the society.

There was also the issue of social behaviour. The Hausa pattern idealized disciplined behaviour guided
by respect for the collective arrangement of the social order and with due regard for the sensibilities of
all in the society. Anarchic and selfish aggressive behaviour especially when it was dictated by the
pursuit of wealth and other economic interests was rejected. Faithfulness to and solidarity with others
were cherished ideals. An excessively independent spirit was frowned upon. The Hausa man who
displayed energetic and industrious qualities was not necessarily admired. The Hausa status system was
politically oriented as political office led to wealth.

In contrast the Ibo pattern of social behaviour idealized egalitarian, selfish and anarchic pursuits, with
due respect, of course, to age and tradition. It emphasized the independence of the will leading to the
amassing of wealth. The struggle for wealth was the central dominant feature of social life. It was
characterized by fierce individualistic struggle. The energetic and industrious person, who achieved
wealth and therefore fame through his occupation was admired. He was expected to sufficiently
motivate others in his accumulation of wealth. Status mobility was essentially determined by economic
performance clearly united to political office.

Among the Yoruba, however, the prevalent pattern combined elements from both the Hausa and Ibo
features. Social relations were determined by both political and economic motives. Emphasis on
occupational excellence and attainment was politically recognized. Premium was also placed on political
clientage in the royal court and in military adventures. Although hereditary restrictions were much
greater among the Yoruba than the Ibo, it was much less than among the Hausa. Generally, the Yoruba
enjoyed greater opportunities of social mobility than the Hausa. Social incentives inclined towards both
the authoritarian political virtues of subservience and obedience and me occupational ideals of diligence
and individualism. But the Hausa was more authoritarian and the Ibo system more individualistic.

The above was the situation in Nigeria before the Europeans conquered and occupied Nigeria
introducing some of its foreign culture on Nigerians.

CULTURAL LINKS IN NIGERIA

Notwithstanding the above issues which tend to create the impression that Nigerians had nothing in
common, we can still observe some cultural links among Nigerians. All the component parts of Nigeria
have some aspects of cultural links in music, dance and artistic work, there are some areas of link.
Among the Hausa's, Yoruba's Edos, Ibos, Efiks, Nupes and many other tribal groups, the art of carving
and casting is very identical. Iron smelting which was probably practiced in Nigeria as far back as 900 BC
in the Nok area and the famous terra cotta sculpture and naturalistic might well be the direct ancestors
of the world famous terra cottas.

Radio carbon dating confirmed that the terracottas of the Nok culture belonged to some Africans who
lived and flourished in that region of Nigeria between 900 BC and 200 AD. The Ife, Benin and Igbo-Ukwu
identical bronzes are based upon cire per due lost waxi. Some collections of Bronzes found at Jebba in
kwara State seem to forge link between the Benin and Nupe Kingdoms. Wood carvings from the prolific
Yoruba carvers- veranda posts gelede masks, egungu and epa masks, Ibeji or twin figures; Shango bowls
aud staffs as well as Ife divination trays are identical to the carvings found east of the Niger among the
Ibos, Ibibios, and Ijaws.

The type of instruments used in making music has some connecting links among Nigerian states. The
Yorubas and the people of the Northern States used tension drum which seldom feature among the
Edos and the people of the Eastern States. The use of xylophones, although rare among the Yorubas and
the people of the Northern states, Polyphonic singing prevails among the Ibos. The use of tension drum
would appear to support the theory of the Far Eastern origin of the Yoruba and the Hausa/Fulani and
this they share with the Islamised people living along the northern belt of West Africa. Music in all parts
of Nigeria was for entertainment, encouragement, sympathy and for teaching moral values. Initially
music and dancing were not meant to attract monetary reward but with the coming of the Europeans,
all affairs of life became monetized. But one point was certain, the culture of all the peoples of Nigeria
was made rich by music and dances. There was music for all moods and occasions. The type of music
and songs depended on the event or occasion.

In spite of these areas of common identity, Nigerian society has been tormented by language problem,
Language has been one of the most significant areas of difference among Nigerians. Language is a
means of communication among humankind. Therefore, it is the essential precursor of social interaction
and behaviour. Without such a symbolic medium of communication shared by individuals, frustration,
stress, anxiety, lack of trust and insecurity will characterize social interaction. The situation is
complicated or worsened when such a lack of communication takes place in an atmosphere of intense
socio-economic competition and communal exclusiveness. Language is the vehicle that expresses
culture. Music, dances, songs, religion and rituals are made meaningful through the power of language.
Diversities were exploited by the colonial masters to entrench divide and rule strategies in the country.
Fortunately, with western education, Nigerians have come to acquire the second language - English -
which has now assumed the position of lingua-franca or national language. With English language,
Nigerians can now communicate among themselves without the problem of misinterpretation.

We must also observe that most parts of Nigeria have festivals which are essential for cultural
manifestations. In most cases, festivals mark different periods of the year particularly as regards the
farming season. They are used to mark the end of a farming season or the beginning of one. Festivals are
usually periods for merriment, entertainment, excitement, relaxation, recreation and rest. It also
enables the people to take stock of the past years activities in form of reflection and prepares them for
the task ahead. Essentially, loved ones, relations and members of communities are often involved in
these festivals. For example, we have Arugungu festival (fishing festival) in Sokoto, Oro festival in Oyo,
and new Yam festival in Ibo land to mention but a few. In each case the language of the people helps to
convey the relevance and symbolic nature of the occasion.

CULTURE CONTACT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

As a result of contacts and interactions among Nigerian's, their different cultures/pattern have been
affected.

We have noted that there are cultural differences in the various parts that make up Nigeria. If we take
religion for instance, we shall observe the existence of Islamism in the North and Christianity in most
parts of the Southern States. Whatever religion, for many years, the traditional image of the woman was
that of a wife and mother and her sacred duty was to serve the man. Society frowned on girls working
while waiting to get married and, once married, they must keep to the duties of a wife and mother. The
working woman was associated with promiscuity and indecorous behaviour. Education of women was
considered unimportant since girls did not normally pay back in full measure the investment in them
during their childhood from the funds of the extended family system.
Nowadays, however, the traditional role and image of the Nigerian women is changing fast. This change
is due mainly to cultural contact which has much impact in education, growth of cities, migration and
accelerated change in the country's economy.

Another area of cultural contact that has brought tremendous social change could be cited in the sphere
of education. Education in the Western sense came to Africa with the advent of the Europeans: the
traders, the missionaries and the administrators. There can be little doubt, that all the three groups of
Europeans came to Africa determined to induce the African (sometimes by force, sometimes by cash
rewards) to direct his energies towards new forms of productive labour. The company agent wanted a
regular supply of products for export - groundnuts, cotton, cocoa, coffee, rubber, palm oil and palm
kernels, timber and the rest. The mining companies needed labour for the production of tin, gold,
diamond and other minerals. The administrative officers knew that African energies should not be
wasted on other matters but be directed towards such work so as to earn the money for taxes which the
imperial administration needed to pay for its own existence. By so doing the African needed to earn
money to pay his taxes and to buy the new cloth, bicycles and corrugated iron sheet for roofing. All
these arose as a result of culture contact.

The colonial period also computed the existing traditional forms of government in a number of ways.
Different colonial administrations saw the traditional authority of the king in different and often
conflicting ways. Some believe that it was the sanctity of tradition that created the kings' claim to
obedience and for that reason it was felt the traditional ruler was the ideal instrument for moulding
African societies in the form civilization demanded and this reasoning made indirect rule in the British
territories an inevitability. However, they failed to see in the working of the traditional African kingship
institution the fact that the services rendered by the subjects were not given in a one sided submission
to supernatural power but in return for rights of fundamental importance i.e. the reciprocal relationship
in African society.

There were also the changes in values and attitudes. All societies have values, conceptions or standards
by which things are compared and approved or disapproved, desirable or undesirable, more or less
correct, more or less honourable etc. Feelings ideas, actions, objects, persons, goals and means may be
evaluated. Some values are culture wide. In Nigeria, for example, husbands are expected to provide for
food, clothing, protection and shelter for their families. A husband who does not do that is judged as
'mean' or 'bad'. Obedience to and respect for elders and preference for large number of children are
examples of cultural wide values in this country. But interaction and contacts with local and foreign
cultures have tended to bring about changes in the society. These changes have both positive and
negative effects. It is the duty of the citizens to channel these social changes in such a manner that they
should be beneficial to the interest of the large members of the society. It is well-known that Nigeria has
rich and diverse cultures, as well as large numbers of experts and talented citizens necessary for the
rapid development of the nation into an African and world power. If we are able to harness these
cultural diversities and profit from our social contacts and interactions we shall rise to understand that
there is much to be proud of being a Nigerian with its rich cultural heritage. This pride can only be
attained when we realize that these differences could be a source of strength rather than a curse.
If we explain that Nigeria is by far the largest and wealthiest of the former British African Dominions
with an area of 339, 169 square miles, with a population of 120 million which is a sixth of Africa's
population, and can contain Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Switzerland and
Italy within its territory. If we also realize that Nigeria is nearly four times the size of Great Britain, and
its population equal to that of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Libya and
Sudan combined or three times that of South Africa we will then appreciate that we can build a true
giant by understanding, tolerance and dynamic leadership.

CULTURE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Culture being the totality of the life of the people could be exploited for national development. Although
in Nigeria we have tended to emphasize issues that tend to divide us,' but we can start to explore our
cultural diversities and galvanize them in a manner that would be relevant for our national
development. Our rich cultural heritage could be expanded to pull Nigerians together in order to build a
united strong and dynamic nation.

If we take music, songs and dances, for example, these could be harmonized in such a way that
messages that would relate lo national growth and development could be put in songs. Our past heroes
and heroines could be immortalized through the use of songs. Their efforts, activities and performances
in building a united Nigeria should be put in songs. This will help to ginger the younger generation to
aspire to be like the past heroes who fought for the oneness of this country.

The country should equally organize cultural festivals during which the various groups that make up
Nigeria should present troupes. This could be a source of revenue for the country and a means of
bringing together diverse interests of the country. It would also he a source of engineering the tourism
potential of the country. The temperature, soil and resources of the country are diverse enough to give
Nigeria economic self sufficiency and the varieties in her tribal culture constitute a wealth of social
experience that can be transformed into strength. The cheerfulness and generosity of the Nigerian
people have impressed foreign visitors and Nigerians can join hands to expand and extend these cultural
traits which endear us to people in such a way that they could profit the country. There is no doubt that
alien rule ruins and, stultifies the people and encourages traits in them that only lead to degeneration,
while its gross exploitation and oppression results in the distortion of human personality and
degeneration.

The Nigerian culture no matter the tribe or the ethnic group should encourage affability in the citizens.
An affable person is the one who is not difficult to approach or talk to because of his polite and friendly
being. He is down-to-earth. Nigerian culture inculcates the respect for elders and imbues the spirit of
benevolence and charity. Nigerians were noted for being their brother's keepers prior to the advent of
the British. In this case, the charity we cultivate should be love that is not influenced by selfish motives.
It is the kind of disposition to do for another any good, in your power.
In most parts of Nigeria, courtesy and enthusiasm were recognized virtues in the cultural setting of all
tribes. If we should revert to those cultural virtues, Nigerians will be re-invigorated to contribute to the
growth of this country. We need courage to be honest the courage to resist temptation, the courage to
speak the truth, the courage to be what we really are, the courage to live honestly within our own
means, not dishonestly upon the means of others. Today the get rich quick syndrome seems to be the
order of the day in Nigeria. Nobody cares how people make their money. The culture of corruption
fraudulence, swindling, bribery and armed robbery has been entrenched in the land. It will therefore
take great courage to curb this dangerous cankerworm.

If one has a modest consciousness of his own worth and a sincere desire to be good to others, he must
necessarily display true dignity in his manner and bearing to all others. Dignity is the outward expression
of one who has a just appreciation of life and its possibilities. If we reignite the culture of enthusiasm of
strong and endearing capacity for and be impelled by irresistible determination to survive and progress,
Nigeria will be a better place for all of us. We should have the attributes of emotional control. So that
irrespective of our creed and ethnic background we should have empathy. Others are, gentleness,
veracity, honour, justice, kindness, love, loyalty, modest humility, patience, prudence, punctuality,
sincerity, tolerance, virtue and cordiality. There is no doubt that the years we passed under colonialism
made us to abandon some of these inherent African values and virtues. But it is time we cultivated these
attributes. If we must exist as one indivisible Nigeria, we must start now to nurture these attributes. We
were not known for aggression, hostility, greed, selfishness and avarice. These were cultivated in us by
colonial experiences. We should start now to show some sense of initiative, cooperation and think more
of what we shall contribute to build our society rather than what will benefit our selfish interests. It is by
so doing that our culture could be enriched and we grow to become a true giant of Africa.

CITIZENSHIP TRAINING AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF NIGERIAN PEOPLE

In this section, we shall treat the following topics:

a. Who is a citizen?

b. How is citizenship acquired?

c. What are the Rights of citizens?

d. What are the obligations of citizens?

e. What are the duties of citizens?

f. What are the problems of Nigerian citizens?

g. How do we build good Nigerian citizens?

The essence of this section is to intimate the leader with the benefits, duties and obligations to the
Nigerian citizens as we aspire to build a vibrant nation state.
Who Is A Citizen?

A citizen is any person who enjoys full legal and political rights of a state. It is membership of an
individual of a country either by naturalization or by birth. Such membership confers on the individual
certain rights and privileges as well as imposing on the individual duties and obligations to the state.

The concept of citizenship is a child of the 19th century, born when the concept of nation state was
created. This period and early 20th century witnessed the gradual extension of citizenship from a
privileged few to all members of the emergent nation-states. Today, all citizens have come to be seen as
individuals possessing equal rights and having equal status and interests, executing duties in the nation
state.

Significance Of Citizenship

The importance of being a citizen of a country could be understood and appreciated when we observe
that:

i. All non-citizens of a country are aliens and aliens in a state have limited rights such as being
unable to hold public and elective offices while citizens have political rights.

ii. In principle, citizens have rights and duties largely unqualified while that of non-citizen are
qualified and the scope of their obligations is limited.

iii. A citizen cannot have rights revoked but non-citizen has revocable rights.

iv. A citizen cannot be deported from his country while a non-citizen can be deported.

v. A citizen of a country sees his country as his permanent home while the alien sees the country
as a temporary residence.

vi. A citizen owes full allegiance to his country and is legally bound to defend his country.

vii. The citizen is guaranteed his rights, privileges as contained in the constitution.

HOW IS CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED?

There are many ways of becoming a citizen of a country. These will be explained beginning with
citizenship by birth.

1. Citizenship by birth

a. The Nigerian constitution chapter ill section 25 states that every person born in Nigeria before
the date of independence, either of whose parents or any whose grandparents belong or belonged to
a community indigenous to Nigeria.
b. Every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence either of whose parents or any of
whose grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria and

c. Every person born outside Nigeria either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria. The
significance of citizenship by birth is that the person does not swear to an oath before becoming a
citizen. In some countries, for instance, the USA once a person is born within the borders of the country,
the person automatically becomes a citizen by birth irrespective of the status of the parents or
grandparents.

2. Citizenship by Registration

A person can also become a citizen of Nigeria by registration. By this the person has to satisfy
the President that:

a. He is a person of good character.

b. He has shown a clear intention of his desire to be domiciled in Nigeria.

c. He has taken the Oath of Allegiance. Citizenship by registration applies to;

i. Any woman who is or has been married to a citizen of Nigeria or

ii. Every person of full age and capacity born outside Nigeria any of whose grandparents is a citizen
of Nigeria.

Section 28 of the 1999 constitution states that a person shall forfeit forthwith his Nigerian
citizenship if, not being a citizen of Nigeria by birth, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality
of a country other than Nigeria, of which he is not a citizen by birth.

3 Citizenship by naturalization

Citizenship by naturalization takes place when a citizen of one country wishes to acquire the
citizenship of another country. Any person who is qualified should satisfy the following conditions in the
case of Nigeria.

A The person is a person of full age and capacity i.e. not less than 21 years.

b. He is a person of good character

C. He has shown a clear intention of his desire to be domiciled in Nigeria.

d. He is in the opinion of the Governor of the state where he is or he proposes to be resident,

acceptable to the local community in which he is to live permanently and he has been assimilated into
the way of life of Nigerians in that part of the Federation.

e He is a person who has made or is capable of making useful contribution to the advancement,
progress and well being of Nigeria.
f. He has resided in Nigeria continuously for a period of fifteen years or;

g. He has resided in Nigeria continuously for a period of twelve months, and during the period of
twenty years immediately preceding that period of twelve months has resided in Nigeria for periods
amounting in the aggregate to not less than fifteen years.

h. The applicant must have sufficient knowledge of the country's lingua-franca.

i. The applicant must be acceptable to the local government where he hopes to settle when
allowed to naturalize.

When the above conditions are fulfilled, the person should apply to the Federal Government of
Nigeria through the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a certificate of naturalization. If the person is given
approval then the applicant must take an oath of allegiance.

4. Citizenship by Blood ties or descent:

Under this, citizenship is extended to a child born in a country if the parents or grandparents
were originally citizens of the state. This is known as a native by birth or descent.

5. Citizenship by Honorary Award:

This type of citizenship is acquired when the government of a particular country decides to
confer on an important personality the citizenship of that country due to his or her distinguished
contributions either to the progress of that country or to humanity in general. Some individuals that
have received honorary citizenship are Miriam Makeba, a citizen of South Africa but awarded Nigerian,
Ghanaian and Guinean citizenship. This award was made to her because of her contribution towards
opposing Apartheid in her country. South Africa. Nelson Mandela has equally received citizenship of
many countries by this method.

IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CITIZENSHIP:

Broadly speaking, citizenship types do not attract equal rights and value for citizens. Citizenship by birth
or descent has greater value and status than the one acquired by naturalization, registration or
honourary award.

a. A citizen by birth enjoys full political, economic and social rights in the state unless he/she
renounces his citizenship. For instance a citizen by birth can be Head of State, General Officer
Commanding the Army, Minister of External Affairs but a citizen by naturalization or other means cannot
aspire to such positions. This is because he cannot be trusted so much.

b. Nigerian Constitution 1999 Section 30 has it that the President may deprive a person, other than
a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth or by registration of his citizenship, if he is satisfied that such
a person has, within a period of seven years after becoming naturalized been sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than three years.
c. The President shall deprive a person other than a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by birth, of
his citizenship if he is satisfied from the records of proceedings of a court of law or other tribunal, or
after due inquiry in accordance with regulations made by him, that-

a. The person has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal towards the federal Republic of
Nigeria; or

b. The person has during any war in which Nigeria was engaged unlawfully traded with the enemy
or been engaged in or association with any business that was in the opinion of the President carried on
in such a manner as to assist the enemy of Nigeria in that war or unlawfully communicated with such
enemy to the detriment of the interests of Nigeria.

The above shows that the position of the citizen by birth cannot be subjected to the above clauses. If a
citizen by birth commits any offence against the state, he is either imprisoned or executed. Because the
citizen has no other home, he cannot be denied his citizenship except by outright elimination or
imprisonment.

DEMERITS OF CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATIOn

1. He takes oath of allegiance to be loyal and be of good behaviour to the country.

2. It is a form of contract which may be terminated if he does not abide by his promise or the oath.

3. He is expected to have lived a specified number of years and attained minimum number of age
before he applies to become a citizen of the country.

4. A citizen by naturalization owes greater obligation to the state than the citizen by birth.

5. His privileges may be withdrawn if he fails to keep to the obligations he swore to uphold.

WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

When we defined a citizen we stated that he is one who enjoys Ml legal and. political rights in a state.
We shall here articulate some of those rights enjoyed by citizens. These include:

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

i. The right to life, security and privacy

Ii. The right to education, peaceful assembly and association

iii. Freedom of religion/conscience

iv. Freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex, tribe or religion.

v. The right to some measure of economic well-being and a good standard of living

POLITICAL RIGHTS

i. The right to vote and be voted for

ii. Access to public office in the political system.

CIVIL RIGHTS

i. Freedom of movement and action

ii. Freedom of speech and expression

iii. Freedom of conscience and thought

iv. Freedom of religion

v. The right to property and justice.

The rights of citizens arc now articulated in what is now known as Fundamental Human Rights.
Fundamental rights can be explained as those inalienable rights and privileges enjoyed by the citizens of
a given state which are usually stated in the constitution of the country. The fundamental human rights
are included in the Universal Declarations of Human Rights approved by the United Nations
Organization (UNO) in 1948 by its General Assembly. In ail written constitutions these rights are set out
in a chapter to the constitution. Its limits are also specified by the constitution. The constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Chapter IV is reserved for fundamental Rights. These rights are:

1. Right to life and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life save in execution of a sentence
of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria.

2 Right to dignity of human person and accordingly no person shall be subject to torture or to
inhuman and degrading treatment, no person shall be held in slavery or servitude; no person shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour.

3. Right to personal liberty.

4. Right to fair hearing

5. Right to private and family life

6. Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

7. Right to freedom of expression and the press.

8. Right to peaceful assembly and association.

9. Right to freedom of movement.

10. Right to freedom from discrimination.

11. Right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria

12. No disability or deprivation on the basis of birth, sex, religion.

Section 44 of the Constitution states that No movable property or any interest in an immovable property
shall be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in any such proper shall be
acquired compulsorily in any part of Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by
law.

For each of these rights, the constitution has specified the limitations. For instance, on the issue of
compulsory service, the constitution exempts such compulsory national service which forms part of the
education and training of citizens of Nigeria as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

REASONS FOR ENTRENCHING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION

i It makes for easy reference

ii. It prevents dictatorship by limiting the powers of the rulers.

iii. It ensures constitutional protection of citizen's rights.

iv. It enables citizens to seek redress for violation of their rights in law courts.

v. It enables member countries to comply with the UNO's directive on human rights.

LIMITATIONS TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

We have already noted that the constitution contains limits to these rights. In other words, no human
right is without restraint, to make individuals absolutely free. For example a court or a tribunal may
exclude from its proceedings persons other than the parties thereto or their legal practitioners in the
interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare of persons who have not
attained the ace of eighteen years. In most cases the court and other constitutionally approved bodies
are given the authority to interfere with the right of citizens and their actions are not challenged any
other place. Generally, one's rights stop where another person's right starts. For instance one's right to
personal liberty could be deprived for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the
order of a court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such
extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence. Liberty of persons
suffering from infectious or contagious disease persons of unsound mind, persons addicted to drugs or
alcohol or vagrants, for the purpose of their care in treatment or the protection of the community, these
persons could have their liberty curbed.
DUTIES OF CITIZENS

Nothing goes for nothing. For the state to provide its citizens with these rights entails that there are
responsibilities expected from them for the general good of all. These duties are legal obligations of the
citizens which if not performed could lead to punishment or sanctions from the state. Section 24 of the
1999 Constitution states that, it shall be the duty of every citizen to:

a. Abide by the constitution, respect its ideals and its institutions, the National Flag, the National
Anthem, the National Pledge and legitimate authorities.

b. Help to enhance the power, prestige and good name of Nigeria, and defend Nigeria and render
such national services as may be required.

c. Respect the dignity of other citizens and the rights and legitimate interests of others and live in
unity and harmony and in the spirit of common brotherhood;

d. Make positive and useful contribution to the advancement, progress and well-being of the
community where he resides;

e. Render assistance to appropriate and lawful agencies in the maintenance of law and order and

f. Declare his income honestly to appropriate and lawful agencies and pay his tax promptly.

We must stress that if these duties are exercised by citizens it will lead to effective functioning of the
state as well as harmonious relationship between the individual and the social groups within the state.

OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENS

In addition to the duties that citizens should perform for the well being of the state, there are also some
obligations that citizens should perform for the development of the state. The difference between
obligation and duties is that the individual must obey and carry out his duties and non-performance of
those duties attracts sanctions and legal actions from the state, whereas obligations may not attract
coercive actions if they are not obeyed. Service, spirit of adherence to these obligations will make an
ordered society that is progressive and the members satisfied. These obligations include:

i. Exercise of voting rights

ii. Protection and care for public property.

iii. Respect or loyalty to the national symbols

iv. Respect for elders

v. Respect for the Chief Executives

vi. Co-operation with others.

vii. Respect for the extended family system

viii. Payment of dowry and bride price.

ix. Hospitality to visitors.

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