BATTISTA MONDIN

Philosophical Anthropology
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MAN : AN IMPOSSIBLE PROJECT ?

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LIFE

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Man (the baby, the boy, the adult, the woman, the aged person)
is a highly dynamic being. Even if it is true that a certain
dynamism is present everywhere in
- the sky as on the earth,
and on our planet (not only in the animal"and vegetable world,
but also in the mineral one)
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that man is a
- it is still i'

a
which is
world.
The dynamism of man is manifold: biological, emotive, logical;
technological, cultural, social, economic, political, religious, etc.
There is only one way to discover who man i$ to enter into the
the way that passes through
the his action. From action. from the
and level of his actions, we will be able to reascend
towards the being which is their source, and to infer the greatness,
the quality, the level, the nobility, and the possibility of man's
being.
Of trll the fornrs of hunran nclion. the ntost elenrentar.v and
fundamental one, and the one which at the same time emerges as
the most complex and rich wit,h content, is life. For man's being,
dr.
Iife is essential: it is an activity that cannot be interrupted
wi'fhout putting in crisis
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owp being.
- indeed, without destroying - his
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Given the primary, primordial, fundamental character which
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 life has with respect to other human activities, it is logical that
f our study of human action begin from an examination of the
phenomenon of life.
I The study of this phenomenon takes on a special interest for
nran, because on his solution depends au or nis own welt-
anschauung
- that is, his own inrage of the world, his own way
of seeing things on the philosophical, ethicar, rerigious, politicai,
cultural, and educational levels. In fact, to conceive life in a
mechanicalistic way (as a fruit of chance or necessity), or in h
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vitalistic way (as an originary* form which proceeds from the
world of the spirit), also means to impose individual existence
according to ethical and religious canons that are diametrically
opposite. For this, the study of rife can hardly be conducted.in a
cold, detatched, dispassionate way. The stakes of the game ard
too high!
l. Vitaltsm or mechanicism?
What is life?
This interrogative has always occurred to the human mind, but
a definitive and unequivocal response has still not been reached.
Scholars of every era have been divided into two opposing groups:
some have considered life as an absolutely originary phen-ome.,on,
irreducible to matter. This is the vitalist group. othlrs have seen
Iile as a derived phenomenon, which finas in matter all the
sufficient reasons for its appearance. This is the mechanicalist
group.
a) Vitalism * Durirg all of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and
for a good deai of the modern eru, the general tend"ency of
philosophers and scientists was that of considering life
as a
singular, originary phenomenon, irreducible to matt-er: that it
traces its origins to the One, the Nous, the Logos, God, an angelic
Intelligence, the spirit. some authors (for example, Aristotle)
considered life a primary phenomenon: one of the primary
and
' The words'originating'or'original'might be the more appropriate words
grammatically, but neither substitute truly conveys the meaning.
All three
could be correct.
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immutable forms of things'. To this primordial form was commonly
given the name "vital principle". According to Barthez, one of
the most convincing defenders of vitalism in the eighteenth
century (when mechanicism had already begun to spread in
Europe), the vital principle of man "is the cause which produces
all the phenomena of life in the human body. The name of this
cause is absolutely indifferent and can be chosen to one's own
liking. On my part, I prefer the ndme impetum fatbns (to enormin,
in Greek), which was already used by Hippocrates"r.
The principal reasons that lhe vita-lists present to sustain their
thesis are the following:
- Irreductbtlity of liuing organisms to macltines - In the
Iiving organism are found phenomena of self-c_onstruction, self-
conservalion, self-regulation, ancl seli-repair which entirely do not
exisi in machin€s. "In the case of the machine, the construction is
extraneous the ingenuity oiihb mechanic; conservation \
requrres the constant surveillance and vigilance of t,he mechanic,
and there is noted a certain point where certain complicated
machines can be completely lost for lack of attent,ion and
surveillance. As for regulation and repair, machines likewise
suppose the periodic if,tg1yen_liSn of human action. There are
doublless devices of self-regulation, but what we have here is
anolher machine added by man lo lhe first. The construction of
servoorganisms or of automatic eleclronic instruments alters the
rapporl of man to machine wibhout altering its sense"2.
- T'he different behnu iaur of machirws and of liu ing organis ms -,
Machines function, even perfectly, only in ideal conditions: when,
everything is in place. The living organism, insleacl, possesses an
enormous capacity of adaptation. "The machine, produced from
a calculation, verifies the norms of the calculation, rational norms
' 'fhe word'thing'ma.v sound woef ully inappropriate to the reader.,Objects'
can be substituted, as well as'beings', although both have lheir own
equivalents in the author's original language.
l. l). ,J. Barthcz, llouueuu.t dldrttents rle lu st'it,nce dt, f iromme (Nerv
I'jlt,rnr-.nts ol the Scien(.c ol Man), Paris l7?8.
2..Ci. Oanguilhern, Lo connuissunct t!c lu t,te ('l'h,., Krrorvletlge ol Lile),
.
\iiirr. I)aris lt)61), p. 116.
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of identity, constancy, and prediction, while the Iiving organisms

disciple of Galileo, distinguished hin,self , a moderate genius who
act according to a certain entpiricisnr. t,ife is experience - that
was recognized by Newton himself as being one of ihe precursors
is, improvisation, utilization of circumstances: it is an attempt in
of the theory of universal gravitation. Borelli observed that the
all senses of the word"3.
animal body is a well-contrived machine, with its levers (bones),
- Machines are inuentions of man, ltfe ts not - Man inven[s
machines imilating the living organisms, without ever succeeding
its pump (heart), its bellows (lungs), etc.
in having the former obtain the perfection of the latter. Therefore,
The analogy between living organisms and machines, in
particular the clock, lvas also ploposed by Descartes and Leibniz
the machine is posterior to the living organism from the historical
and enjoyed enormous fortune until'our Eimes. Yet, with the
and onlological point of view. First was life, and then came the
progress of science there were advanced new and more ingenious
machine. Therefore, life can neither be extracted from nor reduced
mechanistic theories. Today bhe most followed theory is that of
to the machine. On the other hand, "if man is nothing other than
molecular biology: it considers life as a particularly cornplex
a machine, and of the same nature, then why so many forces on
disposition of a certain t.ype of molecule.
the part of man to reduce the anima-l to machine?"a.
Thc- arguments that the mechanicists present most often in
The continual reuitalization of uitalism
- - Notwithstanding
support of their thesis are the following:
the continual discoveries even the most recent and spectacular --
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of biology, vitalism, far from disappearing, continues to revive - Vitalism does not haue proofs in its fauour, but only
itself. After t,he t,riunrphs of positivisnr - which seenred Lo superstitions and prcjudices - As the English imagine to
forever liquidate the pretexts of vitalism - the latter returned themselves that their casties are full of invisible spirits, so the
an<i blossomed thanks to the works of Bergson, Dilthey, James, vitalist supposes that Iiving organisms are inhabited by some
Scheler, and Heidegger, and acquired new prestige after the spirit. Vitalism devises concealed and mysterious forces which
failures of Neopositivism (which had rried to demolish vitalism no scientific documentation can verify. "Exact knowledge is the
anew), thanks to the studies of Teilhard de Chardin, Polanyi, enemy of vitalism"s.

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Servier, Canguilhem, Roux, Sermonti, and many other sci-
entists.
- Vitalbm is the uictim of anthropomorphism * "Vitalism
interferes in our study of life, because we are living beings and
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feel ourselves involved as an object in the study. The dissolution
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b) Mechanicism - Starting in the seventeenth century, the
triurnphs bf mathematics and scientists induced first some of vitalism is a continuation of the Copernican revolution, which
philosophers (Descartes and Gassendi) and bhen a great many started to eliminate the anthropomorphism of the study of the
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scientists to abandon vitalism and substitute it with a mechanistic heavens; subsequently, from the study of the physica_l world was
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int€rpretation of life, applying to biology either models of classical eliminated, little by little, that type of anthropomorphism which
l, mechanics or those of physical science in generaL. The enthusiasm consists in the considering as priveleged the place in which we
for Galilean mechanics inspired the current of "Iatromechanicists": operate; now, we speak of abandoning the idea that the sphere of
they searched to individuale in the living organisms, and in their the living in which we operate is privileged. Positively, what is
parts, systems analogous to those machines. The Iatromechanicists spoken of is to alfirm and adopt in an always higher way thal
then were the first "mechanicists", and the only ones to which the great principle of the indifference of nature"6.
name exactly applies. Among them John Alphonso Borelli, a
5. F. Crick, Of Molecules ttnd Men, Universit.y of Washington Press,
ll. Ibid., p. 118.
Seartle 1966, p. ix.
a. Ibid., p. 87 .
6. D. Insolera, Introduction to F. Crick, [Jominie nrolzcole, tr. it., Zanichelli,
Bologna 1970, p. 44 (Italian edition of Of Molecules and Menl.
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 - Vitaltsm is an ideological couer for determined religious
concepts and certain political systems
of the ideological superstructure of the- Vitalism makes up part
bourgeois world, and
serves to sustain and defend the interests of the capitalist class.
As the result of the tlVo groups of argumentation which we
have listed, the dispute between the mechanicists and the vitalists
is eminently a drgpJgg between two.different approaches to
reality : the scientific-experimental and the philosophical-eiperien-
tial ones. The former, with respect to the canons of the natural
sciences, recognizes as real only that which is susceptible to
experimental verification and objective determination ( therefore,
only that which is physical, material, sensible, quantifiable); it
fixes cerbain schemes of comprehensibility and remains unsatisfied
as long as things do not coincide with them, and therefore refuses
to recognize as real that which does not adapt itself with these
schemes. Instead, the second approach does not ha,ve these
presumptions
- indeed, it refuses to impose any scheme on
things, and wishes to be absolutely open, disposed to encounter
things, accept them, and recognize them for what they are, even
if what is spoken of is obscure, mysterious, impalpable, and
"unverifiable" data.
If we bake this into account - that is to say, that vitalism and
mechanicism are first and above all two different approaches,
and therefore two different points of view of things, and that,
therefore, they are not necessarily iwo positions that are conflicting
and incompatible with each other, as is commonly believed
then it is legitimate to conclude that the same scholar has the
- determined political systems, then this also holds for mechanicism.
possibility of being a mechanicist (when he adopts the scientific
approach) and a vitalist (when he assumes the philosophical
approach and researches a more exhaustive and satisfactorv
explanation of the phenomenon of life).
The encounter between vitalism and mechanicism, which the
vitalists consider possible, is still realizable, provided that the
arguments adopted by the mechanicists against vitalism are
unfounded. But is this really so?
The first argument does not hold up: that is, the one which
states that vitalism has no proofs in its favour, but only
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superstitions. In effect, to recognize that within the living being
there is something singular which makes it living is not completely
a superstition, not an arbitrary invention of the fantasy, but
rather absolutely obvious data. It is very much true that when
that something (called soul, spirit, Atman, or in some other way)
disappears, the whole edifice of the living being collapses' The
nngtist, invent spirits when the castles sway or collapse' The'
vitalists do the opposite: they admit the "spirit" because when it
collapses, the whole castle of the living being falls to pieces'
The second argument is even less valid: the one that states
that vitalism is a consequence of anthropomorphism and that it
is destined to reach the same end as egocentrism. vitalism is not
a question of the privileges of the human race, but a question of
truth. Geocentrism (which also could have implied a good dose of
anthropocentrism) had to cede its place to heliocentrism when it
was discovered that the former was wrong, and we took into
account that it was not the sun that revolved around the earth,
but the other way around, with the earth revolving around the
sun. In turn, vitalism is constrained to cede its place to mechanicism
only when the truth will be proved that life proceeds from matter
and not vice versa, and that the living being is at the service of
the material world, rather than the other way around. But, it is
exactly this proof that is lacking, and everyone understands that
what is spoken of here is an impossible, absurd proof.
As for the third argument, it can be comfortably turned against
mechanicism: if the ideological structures are always covers for
In effect, the Marxists profess mechanicism to secure an ideological
cover only for Communism in a copiously more flagrant and open
way than the capitalists; it also fulfills the same function at the
service of the bourgeois world, as Max Scheler acutely revealed:
"The new biological mechanicism", writes Scheler, "sinks its
deepest roots into a utilitarian morals;the Darwinian theory of
the survival of that which is'adapted'and'useful'(for which the
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organ would be a useful instrument), along with its Malthusian
premise by which the sketch of organic life would be insufficient,
as well as other theories of this type, are basically nothing more
than a projection, into the sphere of organic nature, of determined
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values and plebian preoccupations. The fact that ail the organic
processes of growth and development would not have,
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realm of individual and general evolution, the positive force of
prime causes, but would exclusively be the epiphenomena of
processes which conserye that which isaccidentally useful;
along
with the completely negative activity of elimination via selection:
all this is the theoretic consequence of this basic concept of
organic nature, frorn which Darwin worked, and rvhich
a concept
was the result neither of his excellent observations nor of his
demonstrations, but rather of an implicit a priori. In bhe man of
this new type, the will to porfr constitutes the primum mot)ens,
by which the world, configuring itself as the condition before it,,
is considered together with life in an entirely mechanistic manner.
After which bhe new human type, guided by instincts which
urged him on to death notwithstanding his flourishing aspects,
opted for that which is dead and caicurable and theifore less
fearful, rather than for what is living and imponderable, and that
is therefore a tension towards the 'improbable', as Auerbach
safely defined life; after having become skeptical not only befor"
audacity, courage, will to power and conquer, but even before the
availability to sacrifice and, that is, to goodness and generous
and disinterested love; after all this, how could this new human
type conceive of life, if not according to th'e definition of spencer?
And, that is, as an adaptation, as a limited case that is particulJy
complex and calculable according to the principlu" of -e-
chanics?"7
Having ascertained the compatibility of the scientific approach
to life with the philosophical one, and given that the latter wishes
nothing more than to realize a more profopnd examination of the
same phenomenon, we, being philosophers, to discover what life
is in itself and to know what it means for man to be alive, must
first of all apply science so as to diligentry and lovingly coliect as
much as it has succeeded in ascertaining about the phenomenon
of life; only later, basing ourselves on the results acquired by
science, do we begin the philosophical reflection o" if,i"
fno
IlorTlenon.
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?' M. Scheler, I'a posiziorw deil'urmo nel cosmo (Man's place in Nature),
lli tr. it., Fabbri, Milan 19?0, pp. 121 _128.
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2. Scientific information on life
trre From the scientific point of view, life is a singular organization
of matber. Accbrding to what has been definitively ascertained
by molecular biology, the living substance distinguishes itself
from the non-living one l:y virtue of a differeni and much more
complex way of molecular structuralization: the non-living (or
inorganic)substance is composed of extremely simple molecules;
thus, for example, a molecule of water is formed by only one atom
of oxygen and two of hydrogen. Instead, the living (or organic)
substance is composed of extremely organized and complex
rnolecules.
The molecules of lhe Iiving substances are 997o formed by the
association of atoms belonging bo the four fundamental elements:
carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. The results of their
associations are represented by organic constituents, which take
the name of carbohydrates, fats, proteins, and nucleic acids.
Every one of these fulfills, in the harmonious ccluilibrium of the
vital cycle, a very specific task. The carbohydrates and fats are
theprincipal sottrces of lhc ce'll's e'nergl'.'l'he union or synthesis
of the molecules of the organic substance takes place by virtue of
the stimulus and guidance of a particular type of protein: lhe
enzymes. We are speaking of very complex chemical moiecules,
which every cell produces according to substances which it must
disintegrate or synthesize. 'lhe enzyme can be considered as a
true and individual chemical laboratory which takes certain
substances and elaborates them according to a certain programme;
its power of action is notable indeed. For example, only one
molecule of certain lipates (or rather of the preferred enzymes for
the disintegration of the fats) is able to develop five million
molecules of fat in one minute, at zero temperature.
As far as the nucleic acids are concerned, bo them belongs the
task of conserving and transmitting the genetic code' The acid
which exercises this function is called DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). The molecules of this acid accumulate in the relevant
number in all the cells of all living beings: in t,he rat, for example,
every cell has enough molecules of DNA to form a cord 70
centimetres long; in man, every ceil has enough DNA to form a
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 cord about two metres long. If, then, we take the molecules
of int'o accounl thai
DNA of all the cells of our, body, they would reach a length have here is only a modesi discovery' if we take
comparable to Lhe diamerer of the solar system. so, the o.,".y humun cell contains 46 chromosomes and ihal in every
morecJe, than 150'000 genesl and' moreover'
of DNA have the capacity to register a great many functions. single chromosome exisl no less
For
example, "using the molecules of DNA contained in a
single
we'call lo mind that the gene synthesized b1' the American
genetic material.of the
sperm cell, we would fill up about five hundred large books, scholars contains 77 nucleotldes, while the
ariof
them different"e. humancellhasaroundthreebiliion(evenifa]larenotfunctional).
Another
The coffers which contain the interminable files of deoxy- But, ihis is already an important and significanb siep'
is the one realizecl by some schola.rs of the
ribonucleic acid molecules are the nuclear .t.o-oro*;.. important discovery
1l,", Rockefeller University of New York' thai is' the laboraiory
form a chain whose links are constituted by genes * ti,ut
ir, Uy the enzyme prevlous
the molecules which function as depositories of hereditary creation of lhe enzym e ibonucl,eosis, which is
io ln" splitting of ribonucleic acid' which' as we know' isthe
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characteristics, whether of the individual or of the species.
DNA to transfer
and genes, therefore, mark the stable confines between chemical molecule which serves as a messenger
the various out when a cell reproduces
species of living beings, and between the living and
non-living
g""",i. code, a code which is carried composed
itself . The chemical edifice of the
"ribonucleic cnzyme" is
lejnBs. For example, the DNA of the frog is richer in gehetic and it is also bhe smallest
information than the DNA of the earthwo.-. Th" egg of tf,e of a twisLed chain of l2'1 arnino acicls'
frog, has a chain of ten thousand
the embryo of the frog, the frog in any stage of it, il""fop*"nt, u.rry-u known by man. The largesL
is always more evolved than the earthwo.ri, bu"uu." Iinks.
it i";;;;,
made up of cells which contain the DNA of a frog
una ii-," These original discoveries nlust noL -!'et create the illusion that
DNA of an earthworm. "ot we ar.e close lo a creation of life in s1'nthesis.
"lVhat emerges quite
clearly is that the cell is a very conrplicated object' and that it will
. The smallest living organism is the cell. The studies of the past
lew years have mostly put in evidence that the cell bc exiremely difficult for us to synthesiz.c it fronr scratch. It will
is a small Iife in thc stricl sense On
world, extremely compiex and ordered, much more so nol bc casl' for us, Lherefore, lo creale
lhan anv bit of the mechanism' and
biologists of past years were able [o suppose. 1,o the _ic.os.opi.. the other hancl, when wc cxatnine
structures which were arready known, such as the nucre.us sec irow il is made and how it works, Lhere seems to be no
ancl from
chromosomes, the electron microscope has added more diff iculty in principle in s-vnihesizing it ourselves' sbarting
minute
structures such as the ribosomes, DNA, and others. rathel simple chemical malerials"e'
But, in these last few years, nuclear biology has taken gigantic iris and slill more has been ascer[ained by molecular biology
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steps, not only on th-e order of a more p.""i"u t rro*tuag"eiiCne concerning lhe Iiving substance. But does this suffice lo explain
in stabilizing
cell, but also in the field of its partiar ieconstruction.
we read what life ist Certainty nob. Science has succeeded
frequently in journals or reviews about the reproduction only what maierial conditions (certain conditions ) are necessary,
of this of Iife realizes ibself in the physical
or that part of the cell, and already one can speak of because ihe phenomenon
the eventua.l affair. This would be tantamount
production of the life in which man takes part. world. But, Iife is a whole different
Among the most
recent discoveries, we call to mind that of an artificiJ
g"nu u.,d
to saying that the Divine comedy is simply the result of tt ree
l{o:oT: which were synthesized in a laboratory by somelcholars canticlcs, each composed of 33 songs (for exactitude, the Inferno
of the [Jniversity of Madison, in Wisconsin. Ceriainly, has 34 ), while every song contains a sei of 40 lriplets, and every
*nui *"
triplet three lines of eleven syllables. Life does not completely
.:
ti. Crick, op. cil., p. l')f).
9. Crick, oP. cit., PP. iti-37
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resolve itself in a singularly complex morecular

structure, even it To know what life is in itself, we go on, therefore, into an
is true, as science has ascertained, that it is present interrogation of philosophy.
only *f,"."
there is an extremely complex molecular structure.
Science neither knows, nor can it know, what life
is. Today, 3. Phibsophical d.eepening of the phenomenon of life.
this has been admitted by these same scientists. we refer,
among
them, to Joseph Sermonti, an Italian biologist of world What is life from the philosophical point of view?
fame. In
L'a.nirna scientiftca (The scientific soul) Sermonti writes
the Here the interrogative does not yet deal (and it is worthwhile
following: "The definition of life as a DNA-protein complex
must to specify this) on life, so rich, complex, and marvellous that it is
not persuade us into a red,c:tionist tenrptation. In nn,,r.,.o
r,." already manifested in the dimplest Iiving beings. In effect, it is
the properties, the functions, and the forms of life sufficient to take a look at a flower or a microbe to establish how
deducible from
their fundamental structure, from the termini which define the phenomenon of Iife radically detatches these beings from the
life.
Similar attempts at reduction were, in effect, adopted, inorganic ones. That which takes place already in a flower or a
with some
not very successful results. To us it seems, as strange as
it may microbe is an eloquent epiphany of the phenomenon of life, and it
appear, that exactly this molecular prime has puf
biolog.y in suffices to study these beings atientively to gather that which
crisis, at the same time when it would reiresent its most
specticular characterizes life in itself.
conquest. Many biologists have forgotten zoology, botany, For a first approach to the phenomenon of life, we can compare
g".ruG,
and physiology, convinced that DNA explain, u"".yif,fr*, a non-living and living being, as for example a block of marble
,fr"t,
the organism does everything by summing up the instruitions with a dog.
contained in its DNA, thal to know the virus is to know The block of marbld is inert, stable, without reactions, without
biology,
and all the rest is excessive. They have forgobten that riri.,g changes, does not grow and does not diminish, and, if not exposed
beings exist in reality and not oniy in models. DNA does to external influences, it does not become ruined or crumbled. On
not
explain either ontogenetic dif ferentiabion or the diversif
icationof the contrary, the dog moves, ingesis other substances and
living beings, or mental processes. Specifying the basic theme, assimilates them, develops, generates other dogs and multiples,
the essential constant, biology today tinds-itseti uiiro"ii"g, reacts to light, noise, and to contaot with other bodies, barks,
somewhat intact, the problem of the living beings,
complexity. After the molecular revelation, biJlogy "r.inty
u"i gets angry, bites . . . becomes ill, and dies. This very summarized
presented with the necessity of fecovering and
i" ioJuv phenomenology shows that living and non-living beings have
.eiovating its essentially different properties, and that by confronting them we
objects and its special modality of investigation. The
necessity can derive a certain idea of life.
presenls itself to restabilize the connection
between tne ruuorato.v Life characterizes itself as:
and nature, not to affront the particular after th. g;;;;i-;h;
dhe power of growing, taking the material of the surrounding
concrete after the abstragt; but, because the plurality
of1xp.""rior,, -
environment and reorganizing it according to the structure of an
the uari.atian, is the fundamental modality of tfru tirrirrg.;;;t;;,
as it is in the musical world. we must learn again organic substance;
to apfreciate
the great ordered variety of the instrument,
multitude of harmony which arises from these-d
th" co*pored - irritability, or the power of responding to external stimuli;
living being;;lo. - the power to reproduce itself according to the individual
species (cfr. Crick, op. cit., p. 64;J. H. Rush, L'origine de lauie
ri
10. G. Sermonti, L,antma scientfrco (The Scientific Soul), (The Origin of Life), Payot, Paris 1959, p. 12).
l)ino, Rome
1982, pp. 152-158. Given that growing, reproducing, and irritability are forms of
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 movement, philosophers generally define life as a species of
movement. Rush says t,hat "the essence of life is change, the
process, the continual activiLy" (op. cit., p. l6). Asimov makes
Iife consist of "the capaciiy t.o discharge a force". "Even the
vegetable world", says Asimov, "discharges a.series of forces
- another, because it is an organized being which allows different
when a flower opens ibself, when a bud extends itself higher
towards the light, or when a root creeps into the earth in search of
water. No stone, no object deprived of life di'scharges'that force
which even the simplest form of life requires. This, at least,
I Thqretgre, Iife is essentially movement. But, if this is known,
suggests to us experience, and we will be able to starb with the
assumption that the difference between'life' and'not life' consists
ih this cgp=qcicy bo discharge a force. We will be able to, then,
define dea*1 as a loss of this capacity" (I. Asimov, La uita e
l'erto'gi1t (l;i tt,anrl I.)nerg.1,), tr. it.. Zanichelli. Bologne l!l?0, p.a ).
According to St. Thomas, "nomen vitae sumitur ad signifi-
candum substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere
seipsam" (The name of life is given to a substance to which self-
movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation,
belong naturally)(S. Theol, I, 18, 2). According to Nietzsche life
is an "ascension", and "uninterrupted becoming": according to
Bergson it is an "exceptional impulse" to which he assigns the
name "vital impulse".
Yet, the movement which characterizes life is not just any
movement, but has quite precise properties. As for its origin, the
movement of life is spontaneous that is, it does not come from
-
the outsitlc. [rut flonr w,ithin (it is a ntotLts ab intrinsetoi. But,
it is not totally spont,aneous: vital action is not an absolute start
from all points of view; it depends, on the contrary, on many
externa-l factors, conditions, and causes. Nevertheless, these
factors, these external causes, would not suffice to produce
movement if the being were not already alive.
As for its conclusive point, its terminus, vitat movement is
immanent (it is a mouere seipsum). This is intended in opposition
to transitive action, which takes place in a patient different from
the agent. In immanent action, the agent acts on itself it is the
terminus of its action. But, we must observe anew that this
-
immanence is not absolute. As soon as there is a change, movement,
we find ourselves opposite a fundamental metaphysical principle:
38
I ,,:l ,
quidquid mouetur ab alio mouetur (all that is moved has corne to
be moved by a third). But how carr we safeguard this principle
when we speak of a living being? The solution, according to
Aristotle, is the followin$: in the living being one part moves
organs; but, if we treat this always as parts of one and the same
being, in a way which considers its totality, ittrecomes seen that
its action and its movement remains in the subject.
and if this ii iied-ted as a movement that is not externally, but
internally, caused, it is easy to understand how this movement is
not explicable if it does not recognize the existence of an intrinsic
principle, an internal source which produces it. To this interior
principle of vital manifestations, from the remotest times,
philosophers aud common men have given the name of soull1.
According to St. Thomas (but on this point, he did nothing
more than repeat the teaching of Aristotle and many other Greek
ancl Christian philosophers, in particular bhose of his teacher
Albert the Great), "It is manifest that not every principle of vital
action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle
of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments
of the soul: but it is Lhe ftrst prtnciple of ltfe, which we call bhe soul'
Now, though a body may be a principle of life, as ihe heart is a
principle ol life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the
iirst principle of life, For it is clear that to be a first principle of
Iife, or to be a iiving lhing, does not belong to a body as such;
since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or
a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living
thing or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is '
actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its
act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life' is not a
body, but thg aqt of a body" lS.'l'heol. I, 75, 1).
Therefore, the soul is the ultimate principle of vital movemeni.
Still, liven that there are profoundly different vital movements
11. I'lt.vrnologically this terlll ll)cans botir tuinr.l (unt:ntrts in (lrr:r-'k ) or
separated front the bloctdllanaima in Greek)(cf r' Cassiocloro, Deanimal''/ '
41.
39
,., .:1
 i'1,
in plants, animals, and man, it seems legitimate to distinguish
three principal types of souls: sensitive, vegetative, and intellective,
as havedone the greater number of philosophers. We find a clear
testimonial of this division in St. Thomas. He says that the
reason for the division into three souls "lies in the fact that the
souls are distinguished according to the different ways in which
the vital operations surpass the operations of corporeal things:
the bodies, in fact, are inferior to the soul and serve it as rnatter or
as an instrument. There is, therefore, an operation of the soul
which so transcends corporeal reality that it does not have the
Ieast need of a material organ to express it. And, this is the
operation of the rational souL There is another operation of the
soul, inferior to the preceding one, which expresses itself through
a material organ, although not through a corporeal reality. This
is the operation of the sensitiue soul , . . The lowest, then, among
I
the operations of the soul is the one which takes place through a
corporeal organ and in virtue of cerbain physicai qualities. Still,
even it can surpass the operation of material reality, because the
movements of the bodies are originated by an extrinsic movement:
this is an aspect common to all operations of the soul; because
every animated being moves itself in some way. Thus the operation
of the vegetatiue soul presents itself" lDe anima II, 4).
4. The origin of life
.dlso insofar as concerns the origin of life, we maintain our
distinction between the scientificial discourse and the philosophical
one: only in this case, we prefer to reverse the order of treatment
and to start with the philosophical rather than the scientific
discourse.
Philosophically, the problem of life's origin does not present
any prominent difficulties.
We have ascertained that life has the soul as its ultimate
principle. Now, even though we have not explored th-e ultimate
nature of this principle and.its origin, one thing is clear: it cannot
have its origin at the bottom, from matter, because if made
thus, it would not include itself, because only one part (and not
lr,r
all ) of matter is endowed with soul. There is a need, then, to admit
.j
,f
i
i
that the soul finds its origin from above, through the action of an
intelligent being. Recent discoveries seem to confirm this
hypothesis. That man succeeds in synthesizing life constitutes
an argument not against, but in favour of the thesis that the soul
arises through the action of an intelligent being: man is, in fact,
an inbelligent being!
The modality followed by this intelligent being to give origin
to life (whether by direct or indirect creation, by evolution through
prograrnmatic intervention, or through spontaneous generation ),
remains a questionable and debatable matter, on which the last
word has not been spoken.
Things complicate themselves, notably, instead, when we enter
into the scientific field. Here the problem of life's origrn is, today,
more open than ever, and it seems that there are no prospects for
its ultimate resolution. Crick, Nobel Prize winner in medicine,
informs us that the real difficulty lies in the fact that "the
experimental evidence showing what happened has long ago
disappeared. All we are left with is a certain arnount of frozen
history in the organisms as we see them today. This is going to
make it sciehtifically very difficult, because it is inevitable that
there will be more theories than there are facts to disprove them.
I can foresee that the subject, instead of developing in a proper
scientific way, will become almost theological. Various schools
will arise, with different theories, each of which will be vigorously
supported, but there may well be insufficient facts to enable us to
choose between them. Scientists working in this area will have to
show a certain amount of restraint in putting forward ideas, and
rather more effort than usual in looking for evidence, if the
subject is not to hopelessly get bogged down in a morass of
unproved theories"12.
To the problem of life's origrn scientists (but not only scientists )
have given many solutions, which, yet, can be reduced to four
fundamental types: 1) direct creation on the part of God;
2) evolution according to a plan stabilized by God; 3)spontaneous
generation; 4) generation or evolution by pure chance.
t2. Crick, op, tcit.,, p.7O.
4I
 The.first solution, direct creation on the part of God, is typical
of the mythical mentality, but has also been supported by many
past scientists (including Darwin, who attributed to the direct
action of God the origin of four or five Iiving prototypes ), and has
been vigorously restated also by some contemporary scientists,
in particular by Servier.
The second solution, that of spontaneous generation, was
introduced at the beginning of the modern era, unexpectedly
conquering the entire scientific world, including thinkers the
likes of Descartes and-{qytgn. This solution states that life
traces its origin from the spontaneous transformation of inert
matter into living matter. When this theory was postulated,
theologians did not raise decisive objections, arriving at the
observation, with the Jesuit father John Tumberville Needham,
that spontaneous generation is not necessarily in contrast with
Genesis. That which was said in this text, in fact, is that God
ordered the ear[h and the water to being to light plants and
animals; it is not, then, a heresy to think that such a process be
never interrupted, but continue perenially without pause.
The attack on the theory of spontaneous generation was started
l
through the works of these same men of science, who, in the
seventeenth century, started to put this theory into discussion
and make it the object of ever-more decisive attacks. The first
blow came from the Italian scientist Francesco Redi, who
demonstrated that not eveil from meat, placed under a protective
net (fine enough to repel flies) are worns generated when the
meat degenerates. Yet, he observed that the flies settled in great
numbers on the fine net and deposited their small white eggs
there. This simple experience convinced Redi that the so-called
spontaneous generation of small worrns does not happen, except
through an error of observation. The subsequent experiments of
the abbot spallanzani and Louis Pasteur led to the same conclusion.
so, the thesis of spontaneous generation was definitively aban-
doned.
In this century the theory of generation of life from matter by
chance has been proposed and reproposed by various scientists.
In brief, this theory states that through a casual combination of
chemical elements the first living cell formed itself; a genetic
42
|;
code formed by a series of DNA molecules was immediately
stabitized for it, a code which has definitively sealed the transmission
of life. But how has the distinction occurred between all rhe Iiving
beings that we are acquainted with? This must have occurred
purely by chance. "Through a long series of generations and
,"t""iio.,r, one molecule of DNA, which at the beginning could
say so many things, has ended up being associated with a given
,y.t"- of molecules, which altogether construct the cell of the
o'rgurrir* called by us an ant: now, that DNA always reproduced
it;lf identically, always associated itself with the same molecules,
and found itseif always in the cell of the ant and never in others.
Therefore, we say that it is the DNA of the ant"13'
al Origin of ltfe bY chance
The most decisive defender of the origin of life by chance is the
French biologist Jqg-o-ue-s- |fgnod. ln the famous essay /l caso e
In necesstttt: saggto'iii lttoi'i'o1ta naturale della btologia contempo'
ranea \Chan"" u.,d Necessity: essay of natural philosophy of
contemporary biology)1a, he maintains that life and the whole
order of living beings must find their origin in pure chance. There '
exists no "plan" in nature, no "intentionality". To admit "plal-s",
13. lnsolera, op. cit., P.'12,
1a.1.r.it.,Mondadori,Milanl9?0.withthelawof..chance.necessity'.,
Monod in[ended to supply a rigorously scientific explanation to the theory
of evolution which for Darwin was regulated simpty by the Iaw of
"varialion'
selection... other than that of Monod, there are Lwo other inleresting
versions of the theory of evolution: that of P. Teilhard de Chardin' which
explains evolution with the law of "complexity.consciousness" lcfr. The
Phenontenonof lvlan, tr. it ,l-larper Bros , Ncw York 1959' p 6U)iand' that
of F-rancois Jacob, who explains evolution with the Iau' of brrcolage. livolution,
according to this author, instearl ol operating as an engineering or as
chancc, operates as a bricoleut', "whicl-r clocs not know exactly what thing
was produced, but which rec()vers all that hc finds around him' tht'most
strarrge and diflerent things, pieces 0f string or wood, old cardboard whkh
could cventually furnish with material: in sum, a bricoleur who utiliiLes all
tlrat he lras at hand to make of it sorr]e usef ulobjcct" (F'. Jacob, Eu<tluzione t
bricolu5le(Evolutionand'bricolage')'tr it,Einautli,'l'urin 19?8'p l7) For
a critical analysis of Jacob s theory, clr santi L0 Giudice,
"Paradosso e non'
scnso nelle evoluzione riveduta" (Paradox and Nonsense in Revisionist
Evolution l, in Teoresi ('lheoretics)' 1979, pp ?5- I to' in particular 1r' till'
43
 I i,
)
"projects", "directions" in nature shows a primitive, animistic,
superstitious mentality. whoever is on the side of science (provided
that they have the bl-ind faith in science that Monod has ) rejects
, not only all.the religi6us concepts that maintain Iaws orientld to
reaching deternrined loals, but also all the philosophical systenrs
which do not explain-living beings only with ,.pure chance,'.
According to,Monod, life had it_s orign by pure chance, when
the first DNA fcirmed itself
- that is.the iirst code of a living
being. DNA has the power to aiways and definitively freeze the
structure of this being (from this comes the necessity of the
being). But, chance does not intervene only at the beginning of
life, but also in the subsequent processes. In fact, still according
to Monod, in the first DNA (as in the later DNA), errors can
.occur, and the individuals which are affected by this error, if
acquiring an advantage with respect to those which are not
modified, multiply more easily and finally supplant the others.
I The errors, by chance, multiply, and the selection chooses. And
thus, through "error in error", favoured and propagated by
selection, states Monod, are constituted all the livinglorms, with
all their complex tissues, apparati, and organs, including the
superior manifestations of man, such as intelligen"", .o.,r.i"nc"
and will.
It is natural, recognizes Monod, that this concept would
disconcert many contemporaries, who are accustomea to admitting
something transcendent and to give a sense to life in rapport witL
this transcendent
- and, in relation to it, to stabilize ivalues".
Rut, these contemporaries must become accustomed to "considering
the universe as being of a forbidding solitude, deprived of every
objmtive value" (p. 136). Monod finishes by stating: ,,The ancient
alliance is broken; man finally knows of being only in the indifferent
immensity of the Universe, in which he is immersed by chance.
His duty, like his destiny, is not written in any place" (p. 14g).
t What is there to say about so radical a theory? Of it are
I debatable both the thesis that life and the order of living beings
had origin by chance, diid the principle of the ,.obieciivity of
l
Nature" which is the platform of these theses.
Here is the thesis: "Only chance is the origin of every novelty,
I
of every creation of the biosphere. pure chance, only chancl,
l,'
44
i
il,
,1,
,I
nbsolute (but blind) freedor"rr, is al the root itself of the prodigious
edifice of evolution: today, this central notion of biology is no
longer one among many possibitities (or at least conceivable)
thal are hypotheiized - it is the only one compatible with
reality, thoone which observation and experience demonstrates"
(Monod, Il caso e la necessitti (Chance and Necessity)' tr' it"
Mondadori, Milan 1970, P. 96).
Now, this thesis is not completely shared by a great many
scientists, who likewise speak in the name of experience and
science. Besides, it is a thesis that we cannot share, for two
reasons: (i)because to take refuge in chance to explain something
is nothing more than to refuse to give an explanation' As in the
case of tf,e question: "who broke this glass?", wSen I respond
that it is broten by chance. (b)Secondly, it is absurd that from
chance - that is, from irrationality - the rational has ils origin.
But, in evolution we have the appearance of a rational being:
man.
Even the principle on which Monod founds his theory - "The
cornerstone of the scientific methed is the postulate of the
objectivity of nature, lhat is to say, the systematic rejection of
through
considering the possibility of reaching a'true'knowledge,
any interpretation of phenomena in terms of final causes; that is,
;p.ojecis' " libid., p. 29) is an absolutely reductive principle,
of -
wh-ich precludes the possibility of grasping the "sense" and the
intentilna[ty of anything; and, it is ultimately in contradiction
with the behaviour of Monod himself, who, likewise being a
creature of chance and of necessity, nevertheless in his research
of the origin of life aiso proposes its objectives, and doubtless
searches for the sense of this marvellous adventurels'
b\ Origin of life bY creation
Notwithstanding the immense successes and the enormous
favour which the Darwinian explanation of life's ori$n by evolution
15. For other critiques of J. Monod, cfr' M Oraison' Il caso e ln uita
(Chance ancl Life), tr. it., SEI,'lurin ll)?11 V Marcozzi' Caso e finalitd
V'l'onini' La uita e la ragione
l Chance antl linalit-v ), Massimo, Milan l976;
(l,ife and Reason), Bulzoni, Rome 1973'
45
 f"
I

has enjoyed (in its somewhat varying versions), neverbheless, t

without imagining for only an instant that this point of departure
from one century to the next, the traditional explanation of life's could be false, and that perhaps an inverse proposition could
I
origin by creation has not yet been surpassed. Indeed, the number better explain the facts"l7.
of scientists and philosophers who support this explanation
I

l
t "Never, in the present state of our knowledge, has life been
grows from day to day before our very €/esr6. Recently, an
able to be borne of matter, in the laboratory, while, on the
I

authentic political movement has been formed in the united states

which defends the cause of creation against that of evolution,
taking recourse in means that are, in truth, not always
democratic.
one of the most authoritative defenders of the thesis of creation
is the French scientist Jean servier. He vigorously contests all
the arguments which attempt to prove evolution, saying that
they do not have any value. "If, now and again',, writes SJrvier,
"scholars think of being able to produce life in uirro, they only
prolong for one or two centuries the old theory of spontaneou's
generation. The rriruses that they wish to produce in acrystallizer
are the direct descendants of the mice which, according to
l
contrary,.we can currently establish that matter can be borne of
Iife"18.
From the preceding considerations, Servier traces the following
I conclusion: "Humanity is for animality what life is for matter: a
new state. If the passage from life into matter seems possible,
and if man can sometimes border on animality, nothing permits
us to uphold the inverse process from matter to life, from animal
l ending with man, passing materially from the inferior to the
t superior level" (i. Servier, L'uomo e l'inuisibtle (Mm and the
I Invisible), tr. it., Borla, Turin 1967, p. 28)'
]
"Nothing in nature demonstrates to us a continual evolution
similar to river following its course, from the inorganic to the

philosophers of the sixteenth century, would form themseJves

through the contact of a dirty shirb with a heap of seeds that is, organic, from the organic to the organized, from the organized to
of illusion. Not even the synthesis of protein will - the conscious. We distinguish parallel levels which have doubtless
!!ve the key to among themselves relations which for the moment escape ex-
the mystery of reproduction. Biologists, to explain their faillre,
state that the chemical synthesis of life was poss.ible, in an I perience. The relations between man and ape are as numerous as
t' ..
indefinitely distant moment of time ,,the youthtf thd earth,, _ the differences. Nothing permits us to make one of them disappear
lr
t:
I
which is not possible to recreate -in the laboratory, and that for the benefit of the other".
l therefore cannot be verified. Basically, this is equivalent to a t "Perhaps there is a spiritual passage between life, matter, and
t',
I
i paraphrasing of the first verses of Genesis: ,,The Spirit of God man. Perhaps man can help the animal on the spiritual level, just
tl
hovered over the water". But what need is there, then; to speak of as aII men believe in being helped by individual. These are
Iikewise acts of faith which do not risk being repudiated by
il

t' research, science, and proofs?

!"
i "The physical-chemical ends are illusory: they remain partial sensible expelience, since they do not look to sensible experience
f and poorly disguise our ignorance in appraising the o.rly t*" for support" (ibid., pp. 29-30).
I
unknown of the equation: Life, which no system can resolve in One theory which follows the middle road between the concept
I
terms of matter, notwithstanding many centuries of research. of the origin of life by the direct creation on the parb of God, and
"we have confirnred a prtori that nratter was the origin of life, the opposite, that of its origin by pure chance or by spontaneous
generation, is that professed by various Christian authors: it
16. Cfr. M. Scheler,..'Ientativi per uria filosofia di vita,'(Attempts For
a
in La p<-tstzione d"eil'uonto nel cosnto (Man,s place in
Pl-rilosophy of Life), l?. J. Servier, L'uonto e l'inuisibile (Man and the Invisible), tr. it., Borla,
Nature), tr. ir., Fabbri, Mitan l9?0, pp. 123.156; C. Sermon.ti, Le 'I'urin i9r;?, pp. lti- 1?,
forme
deLln uita (The Forms of Life), Armando, Rome 19g1.
i8. Ibid., p. 19.
,l
46 47

t
 states that life has origin by programmed euoLution.. it wishes to
say that evolution realizes itself according to a program prestabilized
by God, and that God has stabilized that fiom tlr" for""" which
:
matter was originally was gifted with, life developed from matter
in a certain moment.
Fhilosophically, this thesis seems acceptable, in that it respects
the principle that every effect has a proporbionate cause: and,
God here is indubitably the one who intervenes with immediate
or indirect action.
But, the scientist can also have good reasons for remaining
open to the explanation of life,s origin through a divinely
programmed evolution. In the first place, the absurdity
of the
pretext of materialism of having everything derive automatically
from matter; secondly, the presence of that marvellous order
which is resplendent everywhere, but above all in the rearm of
life. "Therefore, it is scientifically reasonable to imagine that
even the birth of the living beings occurred from inanimale matter,
if it is done according to the complete principles of the organic
order' This, therefore, constitutes a particular difficulti for
materialism, which admits so much value for 'evolution,, of
matter by itself, giving rise through evolution by itself something
of the logically more general (the order of t-he organic) from
something which is particular (the order of inorganic).hhe evasion
of materialism
- dialectics! - sounds no more persuasive than
the story of the baron of Mtinchhausen,
who craimed to have
pulled himself, by himself, out of the mud: the inherent contradiction
in matter moves matter towards new forms, from the inorganic
to the organic. The natural sciences wilr know in more detait att
the time the organic order, and therefore the becoming in the
organic order; yet, from now it can be said that the rise o-f lif", u.
a-lso its development, is subject to an admirable order ( . . .).
In
the organic sphere, the order always excites our marvel: it suffices
to see a bee on a flower. Yet, in fact, this order is no less admirable
in the atomic field; it is only not so patent. The order is always a
miracle: a miracle, only for the fact that it exists,,re.
19. G. Ludwig, sctenza della rwtum e visione cristiann der mond.or Science
of Nature and a christian vision of the world 1, tr. it., Massimo, Milan 19g2.
l,'
'i 48
5. Human life
Man is a living being. This is an incontrovertible fact which we
have taken as proper from the first pages of the present chapter.
Indeed, man is the living being by definition, as an epitome itself .
In effect, while there are so many things that we classify as
living, there is, for us, not one rvhich we consider so full of life as
man. On the other hand, we know ttrat do deprive man of life and
to destroy his being are one and the same thing. This means that
man is essentially alive: life makes up a parb of his essence.
Therefore, to understand man, it is necessary to understand
what life is.
But the study of life in general which we have done up to now
does not seem to shed much light on the human being. Philosophy
has told us only that man is gifted with an interior, self'producing
and self-maintaining, particularly rich, varied, and intense
movement.
In general, we have gathered with favour the information
which science has come to accumulate about the phenomenon of
life, in the measure in which it is presented to us as secure and
definitive. If we have refuted certain scientific explanations, we
have done so only because they were psuedo-explanations. Thus,
when some scientists tell us that life has its origin by chance, we
cannot agree with them, because this is not giving a solution to
the problem, but a closing of the eyes and a refusal to see.
Therefore, if we wish to understand man through the window
of life, we cannot content ourselves with still'very-incomplete
information that has been given us by science, and not even
that small and lean data that philosophy has offered us up to
now.
To grasp man through the window of life, we must not take
into consideration life in general - that is, the qualities that life
clothes every living being in, from the nrollusc to ntan - but we
must examine life as such. It is human life that characterizes
man, and it is therefore from this life that we need to depart if we
wish to have an authentic comprehension of his being.
Homo uiuens neatly detatches himself from other beings by
the type of life which characterizes him, a life conscious of
49
 himself' "Man is the.riving being separated
from life by science
and trying to rejoin life through1cience,,20. before risking a response to this difficult question. But, one
The life of man is specifically different from result is certain: the ultinrate nreaning of life can be treated
, that of animars neither from the base, nor from the past, because life always
and of plants. ordinary language demonstrates
this consciousness points towards the heights and the future.
'when one says that a man lives the
life of a beast. ptato a""t*".
that to assign pleasure as the end to human rife is to reduce Another result of what we have been saying is that life, this
man
to a nrollusc. extraordinary phenomenon, is demonstrable of man's own being
Human life distinguishes itself from that of animars only if it is taken into consideration in all its richness and
by the complexity, that life which is manifested by the individual person
spiritual level which it obtains and by the sociar dimen'sions
which it'reaches: for this reason one speaks or (in this boy, this child, this labourer, this engineer, this farmer,
.piJtruiiir", etc.), a richness and complexity tending to go beyond all the
,l ' intellectual life, affective life, sociaLliL, political life, etc.
confines which have been imposed by the socio'cultural environment
Moreover, humaa life distinguishes itself by the
new attitude in which he develops.
that man possesses when confronted by rife. Nian puts
tohi-seu Human life, somehow arranged from a precise genetic code
the problem of life, appraises the beauiy of life,
desires to beiter which prescribes the minimum conditions so that it can realize
his form of rife, and tends to transceni the limits
time in which his Iife is confined. lle can have the "irp"". ""a itself, nevertheless constantly displaces the confines indicated
by the DNA of homo uiuens. More than an already-finished
a burning ""ri"pi
perfect life, arrd it is of this life bhat he feels "r "
I

Man is the master of his own life, and can in l;;;;;r"

tasci;;". reality, life is for man completely a possibility of exploring,
i control, direct, and perfect it. discovering, and realizing. The life of man is a life that tends
Finally, human rife characterizes itserf by stupendous towards the eternal and towards hyperspace, which discharges
richness every force to scorn the chains of space and time. But, is there a
it
and variety. Animals, even the most evolvld ones,
way which allows man to reach such ambitious levels of life? Or
same things: eat, drink, proliferate . . . and "f*"v,lrlfr"
they iways d"li;ru are they not, instead, Ievels outside his reach, fantastic mirages?
same things in the same way with extreme monotony.
men have an extremely varied life: they sleep,
Instead, Eternal and hyperspatial life: is it a pure myth, an impossible
but th"; J;;ir;"" possibility, or is it also an effective possibility for man?
the capacity to resist rest for days and day, i,
cure oirr""".riiy; This is the great question, already enunciated in the Introduction
they eat and drink, but they also avail themselves
of the greJest to this essay, and which will return insistently in all the following
variety of food and drink, and in the most varied
ways; they chapters of the phenomenological section; until, in the metaphysical
entertain themselves while changing their own pastirir;;
tinually; they study, work, think, pJy, etc.
;;r- section, we finally decide to confront man directly, to attempt to
In conclusion, human life is of a sort that reaches try to find a conclusive response for this question.
very erevated
spiritual levels, levels. that man always seeks to
gaze is always directed forward. Thereiore,
.""prr.. fii,
li,
can only be grasped, by discovering the goA
his true.d;iii;-;"
to *fri"fr- il''i.
il," directed. what is the firral goal of huiran hf;? It
ll' is stil tol earry
to discover this; there are many other things
l,' to study about man
I

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li 20. Cunguilhem, op. cit., p. g6
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lr 50
51
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