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Electricity Trading in Energy Market Integration A
Electricity Trading in Energy Market Integration A
Electricity Trading in Energy Market Integration A
Review
Electricity Trading in Energy Market Integration: A
Theoretical Review
Muhumuza Ezra Rubanda 1 , Livingstone Senyonga 1 , Mohammed Ngoma 2 and Muyiwa S. Adaramola 2, *
1 Faculty of Economics, Energy and Management Science, Makerere University Business School (MUBS),
Plot 21A Portbell Road, Nakawa, Kampala P.O. Box 1337, Uganda
2 Faculty of Environmental Sciences and Natural Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences (NMBU), Høgskoleveien 12, 1433 Ås, Norway
* Correspondence: muyiwa.adaramola@nmbu.no; Tel.: +47-9769-0282
Abstract: This paper surveys theory and practice on how a larger and integrated energy market can
propel electricity trading through economies of scale. We make a systematic presentation of theories
and methods used by various scholars to generate knowledge on integrated electricity markets. We
discuss paradigms, concepts, and practices emanating from the complex topic of a unified electricity
market with an intent to identify gaps. We conclude that electricity trading in EMI has a propensity
to drive both economic integration and sustainable energy access; that crafting ways and means for
integrating cross-border systems without sacrificing the local economy could make the idea of EMI
more palatable to partner countries; and that adoption of ex ante studies that are non-data oriented
could improve the design of upcoming regional electricity markets.
Keywords: energy market integration (EMI); price convergence (PC); energy trade gaming
1. Introduction
In its early stages, the power generation industry was geared towards serving the
needs of industrial manufacturers. Economies of scale began to drive the sector, with pri-
Citation: Rubanda, M.E.; Senyonga, vately owned and vertically integrated electric utility companies co-existing. With demand
L.; Ngoma, M.; Adaramola, M.S. for power increasing, operators (public and private) grew in number and size to better
Electricity Trading in Energy Market serve the needs of manufacturers, urban settlements, and public service institutions [1]. In
Integration: A Theoretical Review. the contemporary world, electricity is a basic requirement for any community’s social and
Energies 2023, 16, 103. https:// economic wellbeing [2].
doi.org/10.3390/en16010103 The transformation ushered in new managerial concerns, with the need to regulate the
market, promote competition [3], raise resources for investment, achieve universal access
Academic Editor:
Dimitrios Katsaprakakis
to energy needs, and redesign energy market institutional frameworks.
The IEA report [4], sets out energy sector objectives that include boosting access, in-
Received: 21 October 2022 creasing uptake, improving reliability, and raising positive impacts of the electricity sector.
Revised: 24 November 2022 To realize these objectives, Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies [5] proposed the following five
Accepted: 24 November 2022 policy considerations to guide energy sector planning: (1) recognize that electrification is
Published: 22 December 2022 a long-term investment and a necessary input for economic transformation; (2) address
demand constraints at all stages of the electrification process; (3) target and promote produc-
tive use of electricity to raise household income and ability to pay; (4) prioritize reliability
Copyright: © 2022 by the authors.
such that access rates alone are not the sole measure of progress; (5) coordinate regional
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. markets to take advantage of complementarities for trade as a means to energy security.
This article is an open access article This paper concerns itself with the fifth policy proposal by addressing the fundamental
distributed under the terms and question of how an effective regional electricity market can be established.
conditions of the Creative Commons Different scholars have focused on energy markets operating in various parts of the
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// world. Furthermore, various theories and paradigms have been formed surrounding the
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ rationale, constraints, and achievements of energy market integration. In practice, different
4.0/). models apply in different localities, and the period of existence affects the evolution
processes of integrating markets differently. While the available theoretical and practical
literature provides a diversity of knowledge, it presents some navigational challenges for
scholars attempting to study upcoming energy markets, since there is no agreed-upon
‘blueprint’ for design, process, or application of a regional electricity market.
The geographical scope of the present work focuses on the East Africa region energy
market integration, which, according to a preliminary scan of the literature, is envisaged to
provide a solution to the region’s problem of electricity supply–demand disequilibrium.
However, since the East Africa Community energy market integration is an upcoming
market, there is no obvious entry point for coherent investigation into whether it can solve
the region’s energy challenges. Therefore, there is a need to synthesize the literature to
identify the relative variables that define the topic of electricity trading in a regional market,
to examine how regional electricity trading is viewed by scholars, and to understand the
methodologies used. The argument in this paper is that electricity trading is a sustainable
rationale for energy market integration. We employ systematic document analysis to
identify the theoretical reasoning about electricity trading in an integrated energy market
that could inform prospective studies on EAC—the East Africa Community (EAC), which
is an economic bloc for seven countries: Burundi, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda [6].
The rest of the paper is organized into sections—methodology in Section 2, discussion
of results in Section 3, while Section 4 synthesizes conclusions on the topic.
2. Methodology
2.1. Systematic Review and Key Research Questions of the Paper
A systematic review method extracts and interprets data from published studies on the
topic and analyzes and summarizes interpretations of findings into logical conclusions [7].
The choice of the method is based on the need to establish the state of existing knowledge.
The main research questions addressed in this paper are:
RQ1. What are the ongoing debates on the topic of electricity trading in a regional market?
RQ2. What theories describe electricity trading in a regional energy market?
RQ3. What are the key concepts and practices documented by previous studies on the topic
of electricity trading in an integrated electricity market?
RQ4. What research methods have been used in studies on electricity trading in an inte-
grated energy market?
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Review
Review strategy
strategy on
on debates
debates and
and paradigms.
paradigms.
Figure 2.
2. Review strategy
strategy on
on theories
theories relating
relating to
to electricity
electricity trading in
in EMI.
Figure Review electricity trading
trading in EMI.
EMI.
Figure 3. Review strategy on concepts and practices used in integrated electricity markets.
Figure 3. Review strategy on concepts and practices used in integrated electricity
electricity markets.
markets.
Energies 2022, 16,
Energies 2023, 15, 103
x FOR PEER REVIEW 55of
of 29
31
Scientific methodologies on
electricity trading in
Figure 4. Review strategy of the various methods used in electricity trade in integrated market stud-
Figure 4. Review strategy of the various methods used in electricity trade in integrated market studies.
ies.
2.6. Quality Assessment and Data Extraction
2.5. Identification and Selection of Review Studies
Objective and subjective evaluation criteria were applied to assess and determine the
A comprehensive
quality of the studies and literature
reports.search was done
The quality using
criteria a general–specific
included synthesis.
the theoretical We
basis and
started with identification of 213 potential records that were subjected to first
relevance of the research, research methodology and design, reliability of data sources, stage screen-
ing for
and duplication
quality and title Both
of the analysis. relatedness. At this
qualitative andlevel, 109 records
quantitative datawere eliminated.
related In the
to the research
second stage,
questions abstracts,
of this review executive summaries,
were systematically and conclusions of the remaining 104 doc-
analyzed.
uments were perused and assessed for the inclusion and exclusion criteria presented in
3. Results
Section 2.2and Discussion
using the strategy demonstrated in Section 2.4. Subsequently, full-text evalua-
tion was
The conducted
key findings onfrom
66 records that informed
our review this systematic
of the literature review.
are presented under four themes:
debates and perspectives, theories and paradigms, concepts and practices, and method-
2.6. Quality
ological Assessment and Data Extraction
triangulation.
Objective and subjective evaluation criteria were applied to assess and determine the
3.1. Debates and Perspectives
quality of the studies and reports. The quality criteria included the theoretical basis and
Debates
relevance about
of the electricity
research, as a utility
research come from
methodology perspectives
and on whether
design, reliability it is sources,
of data a public
good or a market good. The ‘public good’ view holds that electricity is a basic
and quality of the analysis. Both qualitative and quantitative data related to the research requirement
for any community,
questions as itwere
of this review can improve living analyzed.
systematically standards via provision of health education
and mobility services [2]. According to [8,9], electricity is evolving from being more of a
public good
3. Results to Discussion
and more of a market good. This is because supply inelasticity associated with
public good provision has made it difficult to meet the vast elastic demand for electricity
The key findings from our review of the literature are presented under four themes:
in the developing world. Electricity is now coded in the international system of trading
debates and perspectives, theories and paradigms, concepts and practices, and methodo-
and is analyzed by development indices. However, the electricity market is complicated. It
logical triangulation.
includes lengthy debates about market regulation versus deregulation, monopolies versus
competition, and who should be responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution
3.1. Debates and Perspectives
of power.
Debates
In about electricity
this section, we explore as athe
utility comeabout
debates from the
perspectives on whethertrading
topic of electricity it is a public
in an
good or a market good. The ‘public good’ view holds that electricity
integrated energy market. The debate about whether economic rationale lies with theis a basic requirement
for any community,
domestic market or theas it can improve
regional marketliving standardsenergy
for sustainable via provision
supply of health
seems education
to have been
and mobility
settled by strongservices [2]. According
affirmation to [8–9],
for a wider electricity
regional market. is Table
evolving from being
1 presents more ofofa
a summary
publicon
views good to more
possible of aand
costs market good.
benefits This is because
of energy supply inelasticity associated with
market integration.
public good provision has made it difficult to meet the vast elastic demand for electricity
in the developing world. Electricity is now coded in the international system of trading
and is analyzed by development indices. However, the electricity market is complicated.
It includes lengthy debates about market regulation versus deregulation, monopolies ver-
sus competition, and who should be responsible for generation, transmission, and distri-
bution of power.
Energies 2023, 16, 103 6 of 31
Benefits Costs/Constraints
Opening domestic markets to participation in regional markets can take the form
of bi-lateral or multi-lateral trading with neighbors, but without necessarily integrating
these markets under common rules. This review finds some associative merit to lateral
trading in respect to direct decision-making on infrastructure outlay, no costs to regional
regulatory authority, and relatively more revenue to the exporting country; however, there
is evidence that lateral electricity trading has higher economic costs and risks compared to
an integrated energy market [9]. The unsettled debate is on which approach delivers an
effective integrated energy market. Two philosophical views, still in existence, are briefly
highlighted as follows.
3.1.1. ‘The Bigger the Better’ versus ‘the More Manageable the Better’ Debate
Regional energy policy is wide and complex. It considers market management, en-
ergy production, regional trade, and the cautious strategy of minimizing exploration and
production of hydrocarbons [19].
The emergence of an integrated energy market approach to solving energy security
challenges has been associated with a couple of other benefits, including economies of scale,
cost reduction, and efficient allocation of a region’s resources [1]. However, a fundamental
question arises to the effect of ‘What size of integrated energy market is right to optimize
sustainable integration benefits?’ Several viewpoints have been put forth by different
scholars in an attempt to answer this question. The common angle involves proponents
of trade economics and managerial economics. The trade economics viewpoint (such
as [10]) suggests that EMI should adhere to the logical principle of ‘the bigger the better’.
This view underscores the importance of economies of scale in driving integration. It is
held that once markets are functional, economies of scale will always smooth out possible
constraints reactively [10]. On the other hand, managerial economics (such as [20]) espouses
a cost argument whose logic is similar to ‘biting off what one can chew’. According to
the managerial economics viewpoint, territorial growth ought to be synonymous with the
required investment for interconnectivity, system control, and review of domestic policies
to harmonize at the EMI level. Therefore, economies of scale can only be harnessed after
such investments have been efficiently utilized. This perspective adheres to a step-wise
Energies 2023, 16, 103 7 of 31
approach that starts with bi-lateral connections, through to sub-pools, and then regional
pools as the logical roadmap to arriving at an effective EMI.
While we appreciate the merits of both arguments, further interests tilt towards the
managerial perspective and therefore we chose to study the East Africa Community Power
Pool (EACPP)—member states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and
Uganda—as a sub-pool for the greater Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP), whose countries
are Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, (DRC), Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Libya. This choice allows us to underscore how the existence
of a general common market has enhanced electricity trading in the East Africa community.
The fact that EACPP has an existing regional cooperation framework under EAC presents
an opportunity for it to be better managed and rationalizes the scope of the overall study,
of which this paper is a part.
which countries must invest. This view accounts for trade treatment (negotiations) and
how to address market imperfections.
Overall, trade theories underpin two important aspects of electricity trading, namely
trade pattern and trade implications. Whereas trade policy concerns itself with mechanisms
to increase terms of trade as a sufficient condition, it must address market management
to ensure positive implication to welfare as a necessary condition. Deducing from these
theories, aspects of protectionism, industrial policy, and reciprocal treatment are reactionary
behaviors to trade implications for a given country. Therefore, trade arrangements such as
bilateral and regional blocs are a practice of market conditioning for productive trade.
The electricity price theory advanced by [40] provides the basis for spot electricity pric-
ing design. The principle of spot pricing assumes that the hourly spot price is determined
by the total demand by location, generation availability, and costs, including purchases
from other utilities, transmission/distribution network availability, and losses. The hourly
spot price is given by the marginal cost:
δ
βk ( t ) βk ( t ) = [θ] (1)
δkt
where βk(t) is hourly spot price for kth customer at time t (USD/kWh); δkt is demand of
kth customer hour t (kWh), subject to constraints such as energy balance, generation limits,
energy flows and losses, and line flow limits; and is the total cost of providing energy to
all consumers now and in future. Much as spot price is criticized for being based on social
welfare maximization promoted by classical economics [41], it remains important for the
operation and planning of electricity. The theory brings out some important variables for
this study, including installed capacity, transmission losses, operating system efficiency,
electricity price, and total demand.
Component Description
Integration of technical facilities for various partner states (zones) into a single complex for
Technical Integration
generation, transmission, and distribution of energy.
Technological Integration Combination of individual technological systems into a single technological chain.
Functional Integration Working towards a unified set of goals, criteria, and procedure harmonization.
Organizational Integration Interaction of various participants and their concerted actions towards their goal achievement.
Information Integration Creation and maintenance of a single integrated information base of energy metasystems.
In the integration process, the market management function is charged with facilitat-
ing fundamental policy reform, preconditioning the establishment a of regional energy
market [54]. The shift from domestic load factor constraints to regional power pool con-
straints is indeed a complex change that needs cautious management. The development
of a power pool allows electric utilities to exchange power or transfer (wheel) power to
another utility in either wholesale or retail transactions. Therefore, national policy has to
commit to managing competition in wholesale markets.
Common
Power Operator Case Study Principal Function
Abbreviation
Table 7. Cont.
Common
Power Operator Case Study Principal Function
Abbreviation
The formation of RTOs could increase efficiency in wholesale markets and lower
end-use prices to consumers. RTOs are the facilitators of supply and demand of electricity
in EMI. They buy electricity from Load Serving Entities (LSE) that generate and sell to
end users. Independent System Operators (ISOs) promote competition in the wholesale
electricity market by widening supply options. The Federal Energy Regulation Commission
(FERC) describes four characteristics for an RTO to provide economically efficient and
reliable services: independence from market participants, appropriate scope of operations
and regional configuration, possession of operational authority for all transmission facil-
ities under the RTO’s control, and exclusive authority to maintain short-term reliability.
However, efficient operation of RTOs is not guaranteed. Their susceptibility to market
manipulation cannot be negated to zero.
It is prudent for EMI to have Market Monitors (MMs) charged with observing and
reporting whether market rules and tariffs are achieving customer benefits in a competitive
environment. Regardless of the nomenclature and geographical area of application for
any of the market management apparatus, this paper underscores three observations on
power systems: First, the measure of success for electricity transmission management
systems is largely pegged on how incrementally a given system facilitates competitive
energy market growth. Second, the system must be constraint solving. The energy needs
are dynamic while supply is inelastic. A system is more relevant when it is able to solve
existing challenges. Third, the effectiveness of either system lies in its ability to balance the
source-end power flows in real time.
The key takeaway that this review derives from the literature is that regulatory deci-
sions can best be evaluated ex post facto ([47,56]). Since regulators normally operate under
varying rules and objectives, regulating the energy market is susceptible to subjectivity
biases. Therefore, regional market governance authorities must strive to control such biases
as a cause of regulatory inefficiency.
Table 9. Cont.
tZ=t1( )
0 < t1 < n
∑ ( H0 + H1 + . . . + Hk ) − D dt > ∑ DDi ;
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k
(2)
t =0 allx all x
i↔j (3)
(3) Regional market absorption capacity should be greater than or equal to the regional
power supply in order to exploit economies of scale.
∑ all x PSi
= R t=t (5)
1
t =0 {∑ allx ( H0 + H1 + . . . + Hk ) } dt
Energies 2023, 16, 103 18 of 31
tZ=t1( )
Regional power supply = ∑ ( H0 + H1 + . . . + Hk ) − DD dt (6)
t =0 allx
tZ=t1( )
∑ all x PSi
∴ R t=t ≥ ∑ ( H0 + H1 + . . . + Hk ) − DD dt (7)
t =0
1
{∑ allx ( H0 + H1 + . . . + Hk ) } dt t =0 allx
(4) The maximum power transfer capacity for the regional distribution network should
be equal to or greater than the maximum power transfer capacity of the regional
transmission line.
The sufficient condition for a regional power pool is that for sustainable bloc trade to
occur, the total country benefit of operating in a regional energy market must be greater
than its accruable benefit of acting alone. (Sustainable regional electricity trade occurs
when the rationale for the power pool is beyond the arrangements of a political regime and
beyond the idea to hedge market supply shocks; it is purely premised on marginal cost of a
local supply.
t = ti
Bene f it o f operating = ∑ [( R + XR) − (C + XC)] (9)
t =0
t = ti
Accruable bene f it o f acting alone = ∑ [( R) − (C)] (10)
t =0
t = ti t = ti
∴ ∑ [( R + XR) − (C + XC)] ≥ ∑ [( R) − (C)] (11)
t =0 t =0
The accruable benefits are dependent on the design and operations of the model
applied in the region as shown in Table 10.
surplus burden on the side of the generating country or the shortage burden on the side of
consuming country—since the hypothetical spontaneous market equilibrium is realistically
remote in the electricity market [64]. The possibility of financing regional infrastructure
through pooled resources regardless of the where a partner state lies on the burden con-
tinuum is not elucidated in the literature. Therefore, should these contributions be equal
or scaled using a given weighted index? Should the scope of TSO be scaled up beyond
cross-border exchanges to allow them to invest in infrastructure? Could there be a new
model where private companies can be attracted to invest in this infrastructure and then
lease out to TSOs?
The distribution energy resource (DER) owners model proposed by [1] seems to work
better at a level below TSOs in the vertical electricity distribution chain. Should this cost be
reflected in current price such that current consumption subsidizes future consumption?
This would imply that the marginal cost pricing principle that drives regional trading would
crowd out. The International Energy Agency [4] proposes that regional infrastructure be
financed through cost-sharing on a ‘beneficiary pays’ principle, where costs are shared in
proportion to each party’s received benefits. This method falls short on quantifying non-
monetary costs and benefits. Ref. [9] advocate for a ‘project of common interest’ approach to
accelerate integration processes and solve funding constraints, but this still has adaptability
challenges because of lack of equal incidence of wants.
How much a country benefits from cross-border infrastructure and ultimately from
EMI is largely a function of absorption efficiency and market size. Absorption efficiency is
the rate at which demand grows per unit of electricity generated (ss/dd = 1).
LMP = f (cost o f energy + congestion cost + transmission cost + ancillary service cost + administrative charge). (12)
If there are no transmission constraints, then LMP is expected to be very similar across
the EMI.
whereas the single price system may be applicable in a monetary union as elaborated
by [46], it faces challenges of tariff and exchange rate barriers in trade regimes preceding
perfect monetary union stages of economic integration.
1
limE yi,t + k − y j,t + k
n→∞
=0 (15)
It
where It represents the information set available at that time. If yi,t + k − y j,t + k equals
1 in even periods, the observed series will fail to converge, even though the sample mean
of differences is equal to zero. Thus, if a de-meanded series of yi,t + k − y j,t + k contains
either a zero mean or follows stochastic patterns, then the convergence between the series
will be ignored. Relatedly, Telestar & Yasar (2020) used a conventional augmented Dickey–
Fuller technique to conduct a linear unit root test.
0 p
∆yt =αyt−1 + xt σ ∑i=1 βi ∆yt−i +et (16)
0
where ∆ indicates the difference operator; xt is a vector of optional exogenous repressors,
which may consist of a constant or constants and trend; α, β, y are coefficients intended to
be estimated; and et is assumed the be white noise.
The null hypothesis of the unit root test is (H0; α = 0) against the alternative if stationary
processes (H1; α < 0) can be tested by using t-statistics for α as
ά
tα = (17)
s.e.(ά)
Table 12. A short review of the methods used in studies on power pool infrastructure.
Table 13. A short review of the methods used in studies on electricity prices in EMI.
in an integrated market: market governance, power pool, and price convergence. This
section highlights some of the key takeaways from the review and conclusive remarks on
the study objectives that guided this work.
i. Electricity trading in EMI has a propensity to drive both economic integration and
sustainable energy access. Over 150 countries across the globe are already engaged
in some form of cross-border electricity pooling for power security and trade. The
number is projected to increase as the demand for reliable and clean energy increases.
Due to supply inelasticity associated with public good provision, electricity is evolving
from being more of a public good to more of a market good as an alternate means
to meet the vast elastic demand for electricity in the developing world. Electricity is
now coded in the international system of trading and is analyzed by development
indices. With the increasing demand for electricity, energy market integration in
part offers a practicable solution to energy security shocks. Subsequently, electricity
trading is now a critical driver for decision-making in terms of investment financing,
infrastructure design, and structuring of trade regimes. We therefore conclude that
studies on electricity trading in energy market integration—especially on how to
make regional markets effective—is topical and relevant.
ii. The line between cross-border electricity for energy security and cross-border elec-
tricity for trade benefits is blurred in theory, but clear in practice. The theoretical
review offers extensive rationale for the integration of electricity markets through
economies of scale. The debate on domestic vs. integrated markets has indeed timed
out. However, a review of the literature on the evolution of existing EMIs in Europe
and the USA, and of implementation processes in upcoming markets in Africa and
Asia, indicates that the willingness to sign power pool agreements is not keeping
pace with actual fulfillment of the embedded commitments. The practical realities
associated with tradeoffs to integrating markets is a key challenge. Much as energy
security objectives and energy trade objectives re-enforce each other, they may not
necessarily constitute a ‘twin’ goal to most countries in terms of time and burden.
There are more bilateral and multilateral than unified cross-border arrangements.
Energy security seems to be more practically adoptable than economic needs. The
illusion that bilateral interconnections and multilateral arrangements are prerequisite
steps for market integration could not be substantiated in the reviewed literature.
We suggest that crafting ways and means for how to integrate cross-border systems
without sacrificing the local economy, could make the idea of EMI more palatable to
partner countries and therein reignite their commitments.
iii. Competitive market design promotes effective market governance and price mecha-
nisms but seems to be inadequate for appropriating large infrastructure investments
for EMI. To leverage the developmental value of integrating electricity markets, elec-
tricity reforms that would size up sub-regional cooperation and electricity exchange
alone are not enough. Changes in wider institutional arrangements that would en-
hance a resilient, competitive private sector are important for sustained trade. The
integrated market design incentivizes competition for marginal cost pricing, which
allocates regional resources efficiently. Each of the federating partners has to under-
take policy, institutional, and regulatory metamorphosis to allow effective adoption
of regional systems that will run the trade transactions. The measure of success for
these systems is based on how incrementally they facilitate competitive energy market
growth and solve constraints. The effectiveness of the EMI market management sys-
tem lies in its ability to balance the source–end power flows in real time. However, the
question about the best investment model for financing regional power pool infrastruc-
ture for generation, cross-border transmission, and intra-partner distribution network
is still unanswered. The three models suggested in the literature to supplement a
market approach—public- private partnerships; ‘beneficiary pays’ principle; and
‘project of common interest’—still have adaptation and implementation constraints.
Energies 2023, 16, 103 28 of 31
iv. Ex ante studies could improve the design of upcoming regional markets. Most studies
on EMI, because they are data oriented, are ex post facto in nature. Ex ante and early
process studies based on other methods such as game theory, predictive heuristics, and
a Lagrangian approach may offer contextual descriptions of the integrating market in
lieu of design decisions.
Since the scope of this study was the global energy market in which market integration
has been adopted, the study faced biased selectivity challenges. The need to capture
both the historical and current facts about the frequently changing global energy market
rendered the review rather more complex than expected. Overall, the synthesis provides
a foundation for our subsequent papers on the effect of governance on market efficiency,
harmonization of tariff recourse policies, and electricity price convergence in East Africa.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, M.E.R. and L.S.; methodology, M.E.R.; formal analysis,
M.E.R.; investigation, M.E.R.; resources, M.E.R.; L.S.; M.N. and M.S.A.; data curation, M.E.R.; writing—
original draft preparation, M.E.R.; writing—review and editing, L.S.; M.N. and M.S.A.; supervision,
L.S.; M.N. and M.S.A. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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