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    Descartes Defended On JSTOR

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    Reza Sadeghi
    The document is an abstract for a journal article that defends Descartes' view that "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo sum). The abstract argues that this view is both logically sound and justified given plausible conceptions of consciousness, subjects of consciousness, and first-person experiences. It also addresses objections to Descartes' "second Cogito" regarding the unity of thinking, willing, and imagining in a single subject. The journal is the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, published by Oxford University Press.

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    Descartes Defended On JSTOR

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    Reza Sadeghi
    6 views1 page
    The document is an abstract for a journal article that defends Descartes' view that "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo sum). The abstract argues that this view is both logically sound and justified given plausible conceptions of consciousness, subjects of consciousness, and first-person experiences. It also addresses objections to Descartes' "second Cogito" regarding the unity of thinking, willing, and imagining in a single subject. The journal is the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, published by Oxford University Press.

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    The document is an abstract for a journal article that defends Descartes' view that "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo sum). The abstract argues that this view is both logically sound and justified given plausible conceptions of consciousness, subjects of consciousness, and first-person experiences. It also addresses objections to Descartes' "second Cogito" regarding the unity of thinking, willing, and imagining in a single subject. The journal is the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, published by Oxford University Press.

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    6 views1 page

    Descartes Defended On JSTOR

    Uploaded by

    Reza Sadeghi
    The document is an abstract for a journal article that defends Descartes' view that "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo sum). The abstract argues that this view is both logically sound and justified given plausible conceptions of consciousness, subjects of consciousness, and first-person experiences. It also addresses objections to Descartes' "second Cogito" regarding the unity of thinking, willing, and imagining in a single subject. The journal is the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, published by Oxford University Press.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    JOURNAL ARTICLE

    Descartes Defended
    Christopher Peacocke

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,


    Supplementary Volumes
    Vol. 86 (2012), pp. 109-125 (17 pages)
    Published By: Oxford University Press

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/41501714

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    COGITOERGOSUM
    CHRISTOPHERPEACOCKEANDJOHNCAMPBELL

    I-CHRISTOPHERPEACOCKE

    DESCARTESDEFENDED

    Drawinguponaconceptionofthemetaphysicsofconsciousstatesandof
    first-personcontent,wecanarguethatDescartes'stransition'Cogitoergo
    sum'isbothsoundandoneheisentitledtomake.Wecannevertheless
    formulateaversionofLichtenberg'sobjectionthatcanstillberaisedafter
    BernardWilliams'sdiscussion.IarguethatthisformofLichtenberg'sre-
    vengecanalsobeundermined.Indoingsoithelpstocomparethemeta-
    physicsofsubjects,worldsandtimes.Theargumentsalsoapplyto
    Descartes's'secondCogito',thatitisoneandthesamesubjectthatthinks,
    wills,imagines.

    Iwillargueforthesoundnessandtheepistemicinterestofthesever-
    alvarietiesoftheCogitothatarefoundinDescartes.Iwillnotun-
    Preview
    dertakethequixoticenterpriseofdefendingthefullrangeof
    Cartesiandoctrinesonthesematters,suchastheutterindependence
    ofthementalfromthephysical,ortheprimaryfoundationalroleof
    theCogitoinsomeproposedreconstructionofhumanknowledge.
    ButIdobelievethatthesoundnessandepistemicinterestofthe
    Cogitofollowsfromplausibleconceptionsofconsciousness,the
    subjectofconsciousness,andthenatureoffirst-personcontent.
    TheconceptionsonwhichIwillbedrawingarethoseoutlinedin
    mypaper'SubjectsandConsciousness'(Peacocke2012).Since
    spaceissotight,Istatethetwomainthesesofthatpositionbaldly.
    First,thenatureofconsciousmentalstatesandevents,andthe
    natureofsubjectsofconsciousness,areinterdependent.Theexplica-
    tionofthenatureofeachinvolvesessentialreferencetotheother.
    Second,thefirst-personconceptisindividuatedbythiscondition:
    thatinanyeventofthinkinginwhichitfeatures,itreferstothesub-
    jectwhoproducesthatthinking,thatis,toitsagent.
    Weneedalittlestagesetting,andsomereactivationofourmemo-
    riesofwhatDescartesactuallysaid.Herearesomeofthepassages
    inwhichDescartesformulatestheCogito.IntheDiscourseonthe
    Method,hewrites:
    ©2012THEARISTOTELIANSOCIETY
    ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietySupplementaryVolumeLXXXVI
    doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00210.x

    Abstract

    Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics


    of conscious states and of first-person
    content, we can argue that Descartes's
    transition 'Cogito ergo sum' is both sound and
    one he is entitled to make. We can
    nevertheless formulate a version of
    Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised
    after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue
    that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can
    also be undermined. In doing so it helps to
    compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds
    and times. The arguments also apply to
    Descartes's 'second Cogito', that it is one and
    the same subject that thinks, wills, imagines.

    Journal Information

    The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,


    Supplementary Volumes contain the Symposia
    to be read at the Annual Joint Session of the
    Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association
    each year.

    Publisher Information

    Oxford University Press is a department of the


    University of Oxford. It furthers the University's
    objective of excellence in research,
    scholarship, and education by publishing
    worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university
    press with the widest global presence. It
    currently publishes more than 6,000 new
    publications a year, has offices in around fifty
    countries, and employs more than 5,500
    people worldwide. It has become familiar to
    millions through a diverse publishing program
    that includes scholarly works in all academic
    disciplines, bibles, music, school and college
    textbooks, business books, dictionaries and
    reference books, and academic journals.

    Rights & Usage

    This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.


    For terms and use, please refer to our Terms
    and Conditions
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
    Supplementary Volumes © 2012 The
    Aristotelian Society

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