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Identity formation in the Russian

Cossack revival
a
Barbara Skinner
a
Georgetown University ,
Published online: 06 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Barbara Skinner (1994) Identity formation in the Russian Cossack revival,
Europe-Asia Studies, 46:6, 1017-1037, DOI: 10.1080/09668139408412214

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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 46, No. 6, 1994, 1017-1037

Identity Formation in the Russian

Cossack Revival

BARBARA SKINNER

COSSACKS, THE FIERCE WARRIORS ON HORSEBACK who ruthlessly pushed back the
Russian frontier in the name of the tsars, seemingly passed into history with the rise
of the communist regime and the modern Soviet army. Recent years, however, have
witnessed a sudden and dramatic resurrection of the Cossacks as a distinct group and
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social force in the former Soviet Union. As Gorbachev presided over a crumbling
Soviet empire, descendants of the Cossacks began to shake the dust off their
grandfathers' uniforms and to proselytize for a renewed kazachestvo, or Cossackdom,
with its historic role of 'defending the Fatherland'.
With a programme that is nationalistic at a basic level, today's Cossack revival
movement is an interesting case study for the overall emergence of nationalist
movements in all areas of the former Soviet Union. Significantly, the Cossacks base
their programme and identity on a revival of their historical traditions in the context
of the current period of social change. This article explores, first, the major elements
at work in the process of modern Cossack identity formation and revival, and, second,
the unifying ideals for the revival movement. It focuses solely on the Russian
Cossacks, or those who are loyal to the modern Russian state, including those living
beyond the boundaries of Russia in other former Soviet republics. The observations
presented are based on an analysis of current Russian Cossack publications and
personal interviews with members of the Cossack revival movement in various areas
of Russia.

Background
The Cossacks arose as distinct warrior clans on the southern Muscovy and Polish-
Lithuanian frontiers during the period of Mongol rule and were gradually absorbed
into state service under a succession of Russian tsars. With the task of guarding the
Russian empire's expanding southern border, the Cossacks eventually comprised 11
armies, or voiska, that spread east to the Pacific Ocean. As the borders were tamed,
the Cossacks were integrated into Russia's regular military service, but, known for
their fierce loyalty to the tsar, they were used as special shock forces to put down
revolutionary activity. Under the tsars, the Cossacks maintained the three characteris-
tics that distinguished them from other social groups in the Russian empire: (1)
tax-free land ownership, (2) their own local self-administration and (3) obligatory
military service for all male Cossacks.
 1018 BARBARA SKINNER

Bolshevik rule brought an end to the Cossacks as a separate group and the
beginning of an era of repression against those who identified themselves as
'Cossack'. In 1920 the Cossacks were stripped of their special military roles and
social privileges. Traditional Cossack settlements—especially in the Don and Kuban
regions—suffered famine, mass arrests and deportations during Stalin's collectivisa-
tion drive, which broke up or destroyed whole Cossack communities. Until Gor-
bachev's policy of perestroika, Cossacks remained a repressed group, legally unable
to admit to their roots, study their history, or wear traditional uniforms except in
state-approved folk ensembles. Only briefly during World War II were the Cossacks
temporarily revived as exemplary patriotic fighters to conduct daring raids against the
Germans—with horses and sabres versus tanks and machine-guns. The uniforms were
quickly hidden again after the war, when Stalin's new terror was unleashed.

The revival
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With the era of glasnost', descendants of Cossacks began in the late 1980s to form
their own history clubs, which soon blossomed into full-fledged Cossack organisa-
tions pursuing a revival of social and cultural Cossack traditions. The year 1990 saw
such organisations springing up at all levels: stanitsa (town), city, region, okrug,
oblast' and voisko, or territorial army (based on the pre-1917 delineations).1 The first
Russian national Cossack organisation was also instituted in June 1990: the Soyuz
kazakov (Union of Cossacks), which presently claims at least 2 million active
members. One year later, in July 1991, the Soyuz kazach'ikh Voisk Rossii (Union of
Cossack Armies of Russia)2 formed an oppositional national organisation, countering
the reputed communist orientation of the Soyuz kazakov with a more democratically
oriented ideology. The common goal of these organisations has been the 'rehabili-
tation' of Cossackdom in military, social and cultural terms.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 gave Cossacks in the Russian
Federation new legitimacy. Cossacks began more openly to view their revival as vital
to redefining Russian national interests and redefining the very identity of the new
Russia. In the words of Georgii Kokun'ko, one of the primary mentors of the SKVR
in Moscow,
Cossack rejuvenation is an integral part of the overall rejuvenation of Russia. We are also
the only national group in Russia that does not want to break off from Russia. We stand
strongly for the territorial integrity of Russia.3
In early 1992 Cossacks captured national Russian attention as several thousand
travelled to the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova to fight with the Russian and
Ukrainian population of this area for independence from Moldovan rule. Their active
military involvement in the bloody conflict finally made the Russian government
begin to take the Cossack demands for rehabilitation seriously. In summer 1992
President El'tsin and the Russian parliament issued decrees to implement the
'rehabilitation' of the Cossacks as a 'cultural-ethnic community' {kul'turno-etnich-
eskaya obshchnost') with stated rights to land-use, military service and self-adminis-
tration.4 Government mechanisms to carry out these rights in practice, however, have
been slow in coming, especially given the political stand-off and elections of 1993.
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1019

In the meantime, Cossacks have become a significant social, cultural and paramil-
itary force in modern Russia. Russian Cossacks claim to be from 2 to 10 million
strong and are widely spread throughout the territory of Russia and the former Soviet
Union. All Cossack organisations have established their own local self-administration
structures, have a strong ally in the Russian Orthodox Church, and have active and
extensive commercial and trade structures throughout Russia. As a paramilitary force,
Cossacks have already participated as mercenaries or volunteers not only in Moldova,
but in Abkhazia and on the Serbian side in the conflict in Bosnia. They have also
created their own vigilante-type patrols along Russia's new borders and in city streets.
Furthermore, Russian Cossacks living among Russian-speaking populations beyond
the borders of the Russian Federation, especially in Kazakhstan and the North
Caucasus, are threatening the use of force in the case of discrimination against the
Russian population in these areas. Given their size, distribution, social and economic
activity, and military capacity and volatility, the Cossacks are potentially an important
contingent in Russia today.
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Cossack revival: processes of identity formation

The two major ways in which modern-day Cossacks have shaped and reinforced their
current identity have been through (1) reviewing historical materials and reviving
Cossack history studies, and (2) reviving the traditional Cossack social and cultural
way of life in as many manifestations as possible. In this way, the current movement
has remained firmly tied to the Cossack past.
At a basic level, the Cossack revival movement originated from the efforts of
Cossack descendants interested in learning more about Cossack history and traditions.
As the policy of glasnost' allowed access to and publication of long-restricted
historical materials and thus enabled peoples repressed under Stalin to discover the
truth about their 20th century persecution, Cossack descendants began to meet in
'military-historical clubs' to share their knowledge of Cossack history, traditions and
repression under Soviet rule. These clubs became the nucleus for future Cossack
organisations. For example, Ataman Vladimir Gromov of the Kuban'skaya Rada, a
history professor at Krasnodar University, began in 1989 to give lectures on Cossack
history at a military club in Krasnodar, which a year later became the Kuban'skii
kazachii klub, the forerunner of the current Kuban'skaya Rada (the largest. Kuban
Cossack organisation).5 Georgii Kokun'ko in Moscow confirms that the Moskovskoe
zemlyachestvo (one of the leading Moscow Cossack organisations), which he has led
since 1990, also began as regular meetings of those with Cossack ancestry interested
in collecting Cossack folklore, history and memoirs.6 These clubs promoted the
Cossack revival by reviving Cossack traditions and rituals, as well as producing
publications that addressed both Cossack history and current developments in the
Cossack movement.

Resurrecting traditions and rituals

By reviving practices common before 1917, Cossacks not only reinforce ties to their
history and their cultural past, but they emphasise their identity as a special group that
 1020 BARBARA SKINNER

is distinct from other elements of modern Russian society. Pre-revolutionary memoirs

and histories have been consulted to verify the details of Cossack rites and rituals.7
Reintroducing their traditions has promoted pride in their 'unique' heritage.
The most obvious Cossack custom reintroduced today is that of wearing the
traditional military dress of the pre-revolutionary Cossack voiska. Cossacks outside
the traditional voiska homelands wear the dress of the voisko from which their
ancestors descended. For example, in Moscow and St Petersburg, Cossacks in the
same stanitsa or organisation can be seen wearing a mixture of Don, Kuban' and
various Siberian uniforms. Tailors have been employed in the cities now boasting
Cossack populations to reproduce to the appropriate width of the braid and stripes
exact replicas of the uniforms used under the tsars.8 Although the cost of these
uniforms is exorbitant and even prohibitive to some Cossacks during the current
difficult economic times, every true Cossack is expected to own a uniform and to
wear it during assemblies and other formal occasions.9 A contemporary Cossack in
full uniform also carries a traditional Cossack sabre, or shashka, at his side and the
short Cossack whip, or nagaika. Local artisans have revived the traditional methods
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for producing these sabres and whips as well. Additionally, Cossacks have reinstated
the pre-revolutionary Cossack system of ranking—khorunzhii, sotnik, esaul (under-
lieutenant, lieutenant, captain)—the symbols for which are displayed on the uniform.
Each member Cossack moves through a system of promotions according to his duties
and accomplishments in the stanitsa to which he belongs.
Swearing a ceremonial oath to the Fatherland and Cossackdom—the rite of
induction into the brotherhood of Cossackdom—is requisite to become a full member
of a Cossack organisation. Each organisation has its own oath, but all of them
revive—often word for word—the text of Cossack oaths in use up to the time of the
Civil War, with lofty clauses dedicating the new members to a life based on
allegiance to country and Cossack values. The oath-taking ceremony is generally
conducted by an Orthodox priest in a church, concluding with each new member
kissing the Gospel and the Cross.
The krug—an assembly of the male members of a Cossack organisation (women
are allowed to watch but not participate)—has been revived as the key administrative
structure of Cossack organisations. It is held in any available space, with an icon and
candles lit in a front corner of the room or area. Traditional rules on how a krug was
conducted in pre-revolutionary times are being followed to the letter, including
customary phrases used, the position of the colour guard, the seating of the elders and
priest at the front, the bows made before speaking, etc.10 Institutional krugi elect the
local Cossack administration, including the Ataman, Council of Elders, and the
ataman's assistants in various capacities—usually including those managing econ-
omic, military training, cultural and juridical duties. After this, a krug meets for any
necessary re-elections or decision making on issues affecting day-to-day affairs of the
local Cossack population. On a higher level, the Sovet atamanov is in effect a krug
for the leaders of regional or national Cossack organisations, at which important
documents and decisions affecting the Cossack movement are discussed.
Horsemanship and military training for Cossack youth was another tradition
restored relatively early in the revival movement not only in stanitsy in the traditional
Cossack areas, but also in non-traditional areas with large Cossack populations, such
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1021

as St Petersburg and Samara. At first, the military-history clubs sponsored summer

camps in which Cossack young people (including girls) could learn horsemanship and
military skills." Cossacks today are trying to live up to the reputation of skilled
horsemen that their ancestors earned; in the words of the famous Don Cossack ataman
and emigre writer Pavel Krasnov, '[Cossacks], as all foreigners recognised who had
seen them in times of peace, were unique in the world, inimitable and incomparable
master horsemen. They were natural horsemen'.12 Remastering equestrian skills,
Cossacks recognise, is not necessary for modern warfare, yet again this is another
attempt to revive those aspects of traditional Cossackdom that instil pride in their
heritage.
The heroic funeral for Cossacks who died in battle was revived for those Cossacks
killed while participating in the fighting in the Pridnestrov'e region of Moldova in
1992. For the well-known Kuban Cossack Aleksandr Berlizov of Krasnodar, who was
killed in June 1992 in Dubossary, the following Cossack funeral ceremony was given:
At 12:00 noon, according to Cossack custom, the casket was carried outside and slowly—to
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the melody of a funeral lament—his casket was hand-carried along the city's main street,
Krasnaya. Before the casket a cross was carried, and behind the cross a portrait of the fallen
Cossack. Behind the casket his horse was led, and behind the horse, hundreds and hundreds
of wreaths.13

The practice of awarding crosses of honour has also been revived, including the cross
awarded 'For Defence of Pridnestrov'e' to all those who went there to fight.14
The most controversial Cossack custom revived is punishment by public whipping
for Cossacks who have shamed their community by their behaviour. One contempor-
ary Cossack code of honour states:
If a Cossack does anything to offend Cossackdom, he must be sentenced by the Honour
Court to physical punishment—public whipping with a nagaika.15
Cases involving this kind of punishment have been reported in various Cossack
communities. In one case, a resident of the Anapa stanitsa in Krasnodar krai received
'twenty lashes' on his bared back for molesting an under-aged girl. A Cossack skhod
(general meeting of all residents including women) of the stanitsa ordered the young
man's family to be exiled from the town for one week. The nagaika used to punish
the young man was then presented by the ataman of the stanitsa to the ataman of the
Kuban'skaya Rada as 'a symbol of the revival of Cossack custom'.16 The event of the
first three Cossacks to be publically whipped in Samara was referred to as 'the
Cossack absolution of sins'.17 Certain Cossack groups (such as the SKVR) have,
however, protested against such archaic public punishment as 'legal nihilism and
infantilism'.18
Other rituals, such as blessing and consecrating new sabres and daggers, blessing
young army recruits as they leave home, and special wedding celebrations have also
been revived. Except for the disagreement about public whipping, all Cossacks seem
to uphold the revival of most customs and rituals as a means to reinforce their historic
roots and sense of cultural distinctiveness.
The Cossack revival of traditional customs is in part also a reaction to the current
explosion of Western culture and influence. Even when not in uniform, Ataman Boris
 1022 BARBARA SKINNER

Almazov of Nevskaya stanitsa prefers the loose shirts and leggings reminiscent of
pre-revolutionary times to jeans, and he condemns revealing mini-skirts for women as
fundamentally contradictory to traditional Slavic modesty.19 Cossacks listen to and
practice their traditional folk songs and openly criticise Western-style rock and pop
music. They blame increased crime on materialistic Western influence. There is often
more than just a hint of anti-Western sentiment involved in scorning social behaviour
and fashions influenced by the West. Almazov blames 'the infection from the West'
for a loss of spiritual values in Russia in general and for 'turning Russians into
[cultural] zombies'.20 In this regard, Cossacks to some degree share the anti-Western
sentiment of Russian national patriotic groups, although the Cossacks are generally
more pro-Slavic than anti-Western or anti-Semitic and avoid political association with
extremist groups.

Cossack publications and sources

Once the Cossack movement had a solid membership, newspapers became a crucial
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element in reinforcing modern Cossack identity. Cossack organisations from the

largest central organisation in Moscow and from traditional areas such as the Don,
Kuban' and Terek began printing newspapers in 1990. The years 1991 and 1992 saw
a virtual explosion of regional Cossack newspapers, the total number of which one
Moscow sociologist claimed to be 68.21 Inflation has taken its toll and slowed the
publication of these newspapers in late 1992 and 1993, but the total number continues
to grow. Most importantly, these newspapers report on Cossack events, assemblies,
concerns and basic news of the development of the Cossack movement at regional
and national levels. In addition, they publish numerous communications with Cossack
organisations in different regions of the former Soviet Union and even with emigre
communities abroad, which contributes to uniting the revival movement.
Significantly, these newspapers also present many varied articles relating to Cossack
history, which reinforce the major historical themes at work in current Cossack
identity.
The historical information used in current Cossack publications is drawn from both
emigre and pre-revolutionary historical literature, as well as now accessible archival
materials. For example, a recent issue of the Ural Cossack newspaper Kazachii vestnik
published a small excerpt from Ural'sk Cossack emigre Leonid Masyanov's book
GibeV Ural'skogo kazach'ego voiska,22 a large excerpt about the Pugachev revolt
from Ural'skoe kazach'e voisko by A. Ryabinin, published in 1866 (St Petersburg),
and a long article on the history of one Cossack family, 'Slovo o pradede—iz istorii
odnoi kazach'ei sem'i', which cites archival documents from the Central State
Military History Archive.23
Visual and oral sources have also been consulted. All Cossack newspapers have
prominently displayed historical photographs of families, individuals and Cossack
towns as they looked before the revolution as verification of a special Cossack
identity and heritage which the Soviet regime tried to erase. In addition, reconstruct-
ing local Cossack history has involved relying heavily on oral traditions, since about
half of local historical manuscripts were lost in the 1920s, and regional documents
were burned when churches were destroyed.24
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1023

Cossack newspapers have been used not only to disseminate historical information
but as a means of collecting historical information as well, especially on a regional
level. For example, the newspaper Kazachii Terek published a request for copies of
old photographs and documents that people may have in family archives to help
reconstruct the regional history.25 The same newspaper also announced a competition
for the best researcher of the history of any stanitsa26, apparently to encourage such
research. When a letter to the central newspaper Kazach'i vedomosti from an
86-year-old Cossack requested someone to come to him to record what he remem-
bered of Cossack participation and lifestyle during World War I and the Civil War (as
told by his grandfather and father), the editor responded with an urgent request for
someone to talk to this old man while he was still alive.27 In other words, history has
been garnered at a grassroots level to fill in the gaps created by the fires and
repression under Soviet rule.
Naturally, these Cossack publications present a very biased view, but the bias helps
to promote current Cossack identity and goals among those active or interested in the
revival movement. Generally, the newspapers glorify Cossack history and applaud the
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meetings, speeches and deeds of contemporary Cossack communities and their

leaders. They argue against any negative press coverage on the Cossack revival and
extol the virtues of Cossack values and honour. The tone captured in the published
writings and speeches by Cossack leaders is defiant, grandiose, exuberant and proud.
Cossack history is popularised and generalised, especially in speeches made by
contemporary leaders, repeating formulae that perpetuate a positive contemporary
Cossack identity.28
Attempts on a more official level are also being made to encourage the general
study of Cossack history. In 1991 Krasnodar University announced that it would
create a 'Cossack' department for the study of Cossack history, traditions and
customs.29 Other areas with active Cossack organisations are opening similar depart-
ments or programmes in local universities.30 Furthermore, after the official 'rehabili-
tation' of the Cossacks in 1992, Russian public libraries have been able to catalogue
books under the heading 'Kazachii' history, culture etc.31
The Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology (IEA) of the Russian Academy of
Sciences has published two analyses of the current Cossack revival and one com-
pendium of historical documents on the Don Cossack situation during the Russian
Civil War.32 The IEA has also created its own Consultative Council on Problems of
Russian Cossack Revival, which includes three historians who are publishing current
studies of Cossack history in various academic and popular publications.33 Generally,
though, both the regional and national scholars studying the subject are themselves
involved in the Cossack movement and tend to present sympathetic views of the
revival movement and Cossack history. In fact, four out of the seven IEA Consulta-
tive Council members are not only active in Cossack organisations but have
leadership positions in the revival movement.
Overall, in reconstructing their past, Cossacks have had the opportunity to pick and
choose those aspects of their history which are useful to the coherence and viability
of the revival movement. Two trends predominate. First, negative historical stereo-
types are aggressively contradicted (such as the Cossack role in putting down
revolutionary activity under the tsars) and unfavourable facts are ignored in an effort
 1024 BARBARA SKINNER

to present Cossackdom in as positive a light as possible. Second, and very important

for the cohesion of the Cossack revival movement, the cultural and historical
differences between Cossacks from different regions have been minimised. Cossack
publications generalise and oversimplify history to obscure the differences in the
histories of the various voiska as expressed in pre-revolutionary Russian historical
literature and promote the idea of one united Cossack entity. The subtle differences
between Cossacks influenced by differing geographical factors and their mixture with
a variety of non-Slavic peoples remain largely unexplored.34 Whereas pre-revolution-
ary Russian histories indicate that regional (voisko) identities predominated among the
Cossacks, modern-day Cossacks play down regional identities to stress those charac-
teristics that are common for Cossacks of all regions. In this way, a modern 'myth'
of Cossack unity has been promoted.
Generally, current Cossack publications have focused on the following major
historical themes: the role of Cossacks in Russian history, the traditional Cossack way
of life and the suffering of the 20th century Cossacks. Accordingly, virtually every
local or regional Cossack newspaper has published excerpts from archival, pre-revol-
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utionary and/or emigre sources on the history of the local voisko or Cossack
community that stress the military service record of the Cossacks from that area. A
number of ethnographical articles on the Cossack way of life in pre-revolutionary and
more ancient times have been published.35 And, significantly, every newspaper has
published memoirs or recent studies on the repression of the Cossacks under Soviet
rule that present the Cossacks as victims to cruel and bloody Bolshevik policies.

Elements of Cossack identity in contemporary context

The three basic historical themes explored in modern-day Cossack publications have
generated the three primary aspects of Cossack identity promoted in the current
Cossack revival: military service to the Russian state, traditional Cossack social
values and victimisation under Soviet rule. These aspects have been instrumental in
guiding the revival movement and defining its programme.

Service to state
Russian Cossacks stress the element of military service to the Russian state as a
crucial part of their identity and take pride in their historical role in building up and
defending imperial Russia. Some Cossack scholars claim that Cossack military
service dates back to the famous Kulikovo battle in 1380—the first notable Russian
victory over the Tatar enemies—proving that Cossacks have offered military service
to Russia since the very beginning of a consolidated Russian state (Muscovy).36
Accordingly, articles covering general Cossack history have applauded the tradition
of Cossack military service to the Russian state. There have even been articles on the
traditional Cossack ranking system, demonstrating the rewards of honourable ser-
vice.37 Further idealising the merits of service, historians have described the Cossacks
as 'the knighthood [rytsarstvo] that guarded the border'.38
Cossack publications have promoted past Cossack military service to the Russian
state as a uniting factor that cuts across any regional differences. For example, the
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1025

local Ural'sk Cossack newspaper published a Boevaya letopis' of the Ural Cossacks
describing 400 years of service to the Russian Fatherland that involved much sacrifice
and patriotic loyalty.39 Likewise, Transbaikal Cossacks published a history based on
archival documents that described the Cossack role in settling and guarding Russia's
southern borders in East Siberia from the 17th century to the end of World War II.
Here also emphasis was placed on both the sacrifices the Cossacks made in settling
the area and their 'patriotic' and 'heroic' defence of Russia throughout their history.40
The historical focus for all regions is on the role Cossacks played in expanding and
defending the Russian empire. Current Russian Cossack writings say little about
Cossack history before they began their service to the Russian state or about the loss
of certain freedoms upon entering the tsar's service. Neither is mention made of
Cossacks serving as security forces to put down revolutionary activities in the late
19th and early 20th century. The historical ideal perpetuated today perceives Cossacks
in the role of defender—not persecutor—of the Russian people.
In this way, current Cossack publications reflect profound pride in the Cossack
contribution to Russia's historical rise to an imperial power. The first official
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document released by the institutional Grand Assembly of the Soyuz kazakov in July
1990 proclaimed: 'We were always guards of the Russian borderlands, preservers
(khraniteli) of our native land ... Our history reflects the history of the entire
country'.41 Two years later, at the Sovet atamanov Soyuza kazakov in April 1992, the
same theme was further elaborated:

Everything for which Russia was great, with its lands from the Dniester to the Kurile Islands,
its powerful economy, splendid culture, military glory—all that until recent times made the
world consider us a great power—this is the merit of the multi-national Russian narod. Much
of this, Cossacks, was achieved by our ancestors, by their blood, sweat and intellect.42

The myth of Cossack contribution to Russia is also promoted, or perhaps even more
so, in those areas beyond Russia's borders today that are inhabited by Cossacks.
Cossack descendants living in areas of Kazakhstan east of the Ural (Yaik) River owe
their presence there to their ancestors' military service in the Siberian and Semirech'e
voiska to guard Russia's borders and interests in its new colonial territory in Central
Asia. The Cossacks there also pride themselves on this past service, and with the rise
of Central Asian nationalist movements today, Cossack pride has become a defiant
rallying point for their movement. In the words of Pavlodar Ataman Vladimir
Mikheev:

When they start calling me kolonizator, immigrant, okupant, I say "I'm proud of my
ancestors, the colonisers—I'm proud of Ermak and the great heroic feats of the Cossacks in
conquering this territory".43

Cossacks from all regions view service to Russia as their indelible right. The Don
Cossack assembly in late 1990 proclaimed:
We stood, stand, and will stand on the fact that Cossacks did serve and again will serve the
Fatherland. We are not given another path. Our only privilege is to serve the Motherland,
and if need be—to be the first to die for her. No one can take this away from us.44
 1026 BARBARA SKINNER

This historical ideal of service to Russia encourages a sense of duty towards the state
that is a matter of honour.
Cossacks today affirm their duty, honour and loyalty to country by taking an oath
of allegiance when they join a Cossack organisation. These oaths are very closely
based on the pre-revolutionary oaths taken by Cossacks. Though the exact words of
the oath vary from place to place, a common ingredient in every oath is loyalty to the
homeland—the Otechestvo (Fatherland) or Rodina (Motherland). For those joining
the Kuban'skaya Rada, the pledge of loyalty is simple: '... to be a faithful son of my
Great Motherland Russia' .45 Nevskaya stanitsa in St. Petersburg uses a more elaborate
oath, with the following words concerning allegiance to the Fatherland:
I swear faithfully to serve God, the Fatherland and Cossackdom. I swear to be a defender
of the Faith and the Fatherland.
... I swear continually to be ready for battle to defend the inviolability of the borders of the
Fatherland and the honour of Russia, and to defend her without forsaking [my] life.46
The oath serves as a common uniting factor for all Cossacks, regardless of their
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ancestry or political and religious differences. Patriarch Aleksii II, in denouncing the
political divisions among the Cossacks, saw the oath—in particular, allegiance to the
Fatherland—as a force that took precedence over petty political disputes among the
Cossacks. In the Patriarch's words, 'the only ideology for Cossacks was and remains
service to the homeland, as it is stated in the oath of the Cossacks'.47
Cossack loyalty to the Russian state carries with it a messianic purpose. Simply put
in a poem about remembering the glory of Cossack ancestors, Evgenii Yudin writes:
'Poka kazachestvo zhivet—Zhit' budet matushka RossiyaF.48 Part of Cossack al-
legiance to the Fatherland, then, is the belief that Russia cannot survive as well or at
all without Cossacks in their historical role of defending Russia's interests. Cossacks
view themselves as a vanguard for the rejuvenation of Russia. The Ataman Council
of the Soyuz kazakov in January 1993 described kazachestvo as follows:
Striving towards one goal—serving the Fatherland, it [kazachestvo] is an effective force,
capable of rallying citizens to restore and strengthen the Russian state.49
Such impassioned calls to rejuvenate Russia are very common in the Cossack press
and publications. More than simple allegiance, there is a mixture of pride, honour and
sense of duty in helping Russia to stand strong again, both militarily and culturally.
This perceived role in modern Russia's future is an important source of legitimation
for the current Cossack movement.

Traditional social values

Idealising attributes of traditional Cossack society, Cossacks praise the inherent
'moral values' and 'democracy' of pre-revolutionary Cossack social structures, as
well as 'tolerance' towards other ethnic groups and religious faiths.

Moral values. In his guidelines for the Cossack revival movement, Boris Almazov
points to a moral value system that overrides any other qualification for being a
Cossack, including blood rights or nationality:
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1027

... There exists a moral ideal, to which everyone must strive who is born a Cossack ... And,
if not a Cossack by birth, one can become a Cossack! That is, with a life worthy of the ideal,
one can earn the right to enter Cossackdom! And with this right, it was never demanded that
one renounce his nationality! Upon becoming a Cossack, one remained a Kalmyk, an
Ossetian, Yakut, or Buryat!50

For example, the editors of the central Cossack newspaper Kazach'i vedomosti
responded to a letter from 'a simple Russian Orthodox person'—a 20-year-old army
recruit, who expressed a sincere desire to join the Cossack ranks even though he was
not of Cossack descent—with Almazov's words that Cossack blood alone was
insufficient to be a true Cossack—that 'state of mind' (sostoyanie dukha) was more
important. The young man was instructed to accept Cossack values and responsibili-
ties 'in his heart' and to ask to be recruited into his local Cossack organisation.51
To all appearances, this policy places no limitations on who may join the Cossack
movement. However, the expected rules of behaviour create their own limitations.
The same issue of this newspaper criticises the notorious Russian nationalist extremist
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Fedor Moskalenko for gratuitously calling himself a 'Cossack' and 'ataman' of the
so-called Cossack Army Union 'Rus'. The Council of Elders of the Soyuz kazakov
ordered Moskalenko's 'Cossack' organisation to be disbanded and Moskalenko's
uniform and rank to be taken away for disruptive behaviour 'incompatible' with
Cossack norms and for conducting his organisation 'without observing Cossack
traditions and working against them'.52
According to Almazov, 'everyone entering the ranks of any Cossack organisation
or identifying himself as a Cossack should follow the primary principles of Cossack
moral values'.53 These principles are based on basic Christian values and standards of
behaviour, such as respect for all fellow men, kindness, law-abiding conduct, mercy
towards ones enemies etc. Further, in a section titled 'Cossack Rights and Obliga-
tions', Almazov addresses the responsibility of every Cossack to meet the require-
ments of basic behavioural guidelines. These are presented as a kind of pact among
all members of Cossackdom reinforcing a sense of collective responsibility, in which
'the humiliation of one Cossack is the humiliation of all'.54 Almazov indicates the
critical bonding element of these behavioural rules:

A Cossack is obligated continually to carry high his Cossack honour, to preserve the dignity
of Cossackdom, its customs and traditions. He shall continually follow Christian command-
ments to love close ones, be law-abiding, tolerant of other faiths, hard-working and
peace-loving.
And the most harsh punishment for a Cossack is to exclude him from Cossack society.55

Members of the alternative national Cossack organisation, SKVR, agree with Almazov
on the importance of high behavioural standards and on the practice of excluding
those who do not abide by these rules.56
As part of their oath of allegiance, Cossacks vow to abide by the behavioural
standards set before them and live in a manner worthy of Cossackdom. Of course
what is vowed is an ideal, but the nature of the ideal is supported by Cossacks of all
backgrounds. The Nevskaya stanitsa oath affirms:
 1028 BARBARA SKINNER

I swear, observing the Cossack custom, to be courageous, honourable and disciplined,

unquestioningly fulfilling the requirements of the Charter and the decisions of the Krug .,.
I swear to apply all my strength in order to become and continually to be, as long as it is
in my strength, a Cossack in good standing (ispravnyi kazak): a capable warrior, protector
of the weak and deprived, an assiduous worker and a good family man.57
The Nevskaya stanitsa oath presents an almost mediaeval sense of obligation to abide
by the pact and live according to the rules of Cossackdom:
If I by intention or neglect violate the sanctity of the oath of allegiance to Cossackdom, may
God's punishment strike me, may my brother Cossacks expel me from their ranks, and may
my name be committed to oblivion.58
Curiously, although advocating New Testament, Christian values, the dramatic
punishments for breaking the pact as presented in this oath are much more represen-
tative of an Old Testament mentality.
Confirming the importance of behavioural ideals, several contemporary Cossack
codes of honour have been published; service to country and adherence to the moral
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values which Cossackdom represents are the two highest obligations listed in these
codes. They also stress strict adherence to discipline in fulfilling external obligations,
as well as internal discipline in controlling one's actions.59 Cossacks pride themselves
on their ability to obey orders unquestioningly, their deference to their leaders and
senior members, and knowing when to speak and when to be silent, as part of their
culture. They have, since their revival, stressed that they are the 'most organised part
of the narod'.60
The July 1990 institutional Grand Assembly of the Sovet kazakov endorsed the
following address to all Cossacks, which was repeated in many local Cossack
newspapers:
Brother Cossacks! ... We want to preserve the best [aspects] of our ancestors ... Train your
children and grandchildren in the good traditions of Cossackdom: respect for elders, love for
the native land, hard work, moral family virtue, loyal service to the Fatherland. We call on
you to guard these values from the destructive influence of mass culture.61
In the words of Ataman Martynov of the Soyuz kazakov, 'History is giving us the
chance to become worthy of our ancestors'.62
Always, the ideal of 'the best' Cossack behaviour presented today appears blind to
any of 'the worst' traditions. Negative Cossack behaviour and customs are not even
mentioned. The most striking example of such oversight is reference to the literary
Cossack figure Taras Bul'ba in only a positive light. In the words of a priest speaking
on the merits of traditional Cossack faith and moral values,
Remember Taras Bul'ba. A cross stood in first place there. And next to the cross,
conscience, honour, and everything else, and the cross united all this and made the people
steadfast, courageous, honourable and capable of self-sacrifice.63
In Gogol's novel Taras Bul'ba the most memorable characteristics of the hero are not
his faith and conscience, but his bloodthirsty lust for war, his murdering his own son,
and his abusive treatment towards Jews. These negative characteristics appear to be
ignored by Cossacks today.
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1029

Religious/ethnic tolerance. Cossack newspapers have quoted the pre-revolutionary

Cossack politician and emigre Vasilii Kharlamov's short history of Cossackdom
which states that historically 'Cossacks were deeply devoted to their Orthodox
Christian faith, but they were also distinguished by their complete tolerance of other
faiths'.64 In the troubled homelands of the Terek Cossacks in the North Caucasus,
where tensions run high versus Ingush and Chechen nationalists, a local Cossack
newspaper defined a Cossack as a 'person who has long been able to find common
ground with his neighbour'.65
As part of an effort to redefine their identity in a way that would promote the
current revival, Cossacks have on an official level consistently and emphatically
negated the historical stereotype that Cossacks are not tolerant of others, and the
'myth' that Cossacks are a 'reactionary' force against minorities and revolutionaries.
In laying out the 'Basic Directives' for the programme to rejuvenate Russian
Cossackdom, the first directive on 'political rehabilitation' includes the goal to
'renounce the stereotypical representation of Cossackdom as a reactionary force'.66
The Cossacks claim that promoting this stereotype has been part of the overall
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programme of Soviet repression against Cossacks. The first assembly of the Don
Cossacks in November 1990 made the following statement against accusations of
'historical intolerance':

Such rumours attempt, on the one hand, with the myth that has been pounded into our heads
about 'Cossackdom's reactionary nature', to depict the Cossack as a cruel villain with a
whip, and not as an enduring peasant labourer and defender of Russia, and, on the other
hand, ... to distort the goals and purpose of the Cossack revival ...67

Concerning modern-day rumours about Cossack intention to persecute other national-

ities in the traditional Don Cossack region, this assembly emphasised that 'Cossacks
do not plan any persecution whatsoever'.68
In reality, however, tolerance is not especially evident among present-day Cos-
sacks. Cossacks have actively protested against the increase in non-Russian migrants
and refugees to Cossack lands in the Kuban' and Stavropol' areas. On grounds of
infringement on Cossack land and housing rights, Kuban' Cossacks have been
actively opposing the settlement of refugees—especially those of Turkish and Arme-
nian descent—in Krasnodar krai. For example, in November 1992 some Cossacks
organised a 'pogrom' against Armenian refugees (who have come to Krasnodar krai
to escape the war in Abkhazia) living in dormitories, and some families were forced
to leave.69 The same phenomenon was reported in Stavropol' krai, where in one small
town Cossacks presented local Armenians with an ultimatum either to leave in 72
hours or be thrown out.70 Further south, after Ataman Aleksandr Podkolzin and four
other Terek Cossacks of the Sunzhe region were killed by Ingush nationalists in April
1991, inter-nationality relations in North Caucasian Cossack regions have been
extremely tense. Cossacks in Kazakhstan have provoked the ire of Kazakh nationalist
groups, and Kazakh/Cossack relations are deteriorating. Ataman Mikheev of
Pavlodar speaks of preparing for a war against the Kazakhs in northern areas of
Kazakhstan.71
 1030 BARBARA SKINNER

Democratic society. Another primary social value promoted in the Cossack revival is
their touted 'democratic' tradition. For this, Russian Cossacks reach back to their
Zaporozhian Cossack roots—the first group to institute the traditional 'democratic'
Cossack practices of elected leadership. Cossacks today take great pride in this
heritage. The 'Obrashchenie' from the institutional Grand Assembly of the Soyuz
kazakov formalised the ideal of Cossack 'democracy':

Cossackdom has ... developed over the centuries of its difficult existence democratic forms
of self-administration, which have for us inestimable value.72

A member of the Council of Elders of the Ussuniskoe voisko published the following
as part of a historical retrospect on several contemporary issues:

Only our enemies can maintain that Cossacks were a vagrant thieving band on the borders
of the Russian state. Cossacks have long had democratic rule with all three attributes of
democratic power—legislative, executive and judiciary.73'
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These descriptions idealise Cossack administrative structures as incorporating

civilised, modern democratic practices which are extolled as one of the Cossack
characteristics that can help to 'rejuvenate' Russia today. As democracy became a key
word under Gorbachev, especially with the elections to the Congress of People's
Deputies in 1989 and 1990, the Cossacks have painted their historical 'democracy' as
compatible with contemporary society, including inherited respect for human and civil
rights.
Modern-day Cossacks have ignored documented accounts on the actual rough
nature of their traditional methods of rule that incorporated unlimited authority vested
in the ataman and harsh disciplinary measures. Pre-revolutionary eye-witness ac-
counts describe the traditional Cossack assembly as one that lacked signs of a
civilised, 'democratic' nature in contemporary terms:

Conclusions were not reached by voting in any formal sense but, as in the pre-revolutionary
Russian village council, the sense of the meeting was conveyed by general tumult, by the
relative volume of the jeers or acclamations. This was the general will at work, or the law
of who shouts loudest.

On judiciary powers:

The rules were as vague and traditional as the punishments were primitive and harsh.... A
favourite method of execution, often reserved especially for traitors, was to bundle the
condemned man into a sack, weighted down with stones or sand, and to toss him into the
river. On the [Zaporozhian] Sich, a murderer would be tied to the corpse of his victim and
buried alive with him ... The 'law' was often enforced by the lynch-mob.

On ataman rule or executive power:

Gradually Cossack atamans ... came to rule the assembly more and more. An ataman made
his decisions in consultation with an inner cabinet of elders and only consulted the rank and
file afterwards in circumstances that enabled them merely to say 'yes' or 'no' to questions
which were often framed in such a way as to produce the answer he required.... Decision
making came to be vested effectively in the few rather than the many; a sort of oligarchy
came to replace the original democracy of Cossackdom.74
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1031

The descriptions here—with the exception of the extreme types of punishment

exercised in earlier centuries—are not untrue of Cossack self-government in practice
today. Unruly assemblies governed by dictatorial atamans and lynch-mob law
enforcement are not uncommon. Nevertheless, in theory, Cossack 'democracy'
continues to be idealised as a worthy heritage.
Overall, the operative word for the Cossack promotion of traditional social values
is 'ideals'. In reality, despite oaths, codes of honour and impassioned speeches during
Cossack assemblies, these behavioural rules and social ideals are continually violated.
Although Cossack codes of honour encourage respect towards existing laws, there
have been a number of cases reported during which Cossacks have taken the law into
their own hands and behaved in a manner disregarding the Christian values which
they have sworn to follow. In January 1992 some Don Cossacks from Rostov beat up
the editor of the regional newspaper for its critical reporting on Cossacks.75 In areas
as far apart as Noril'sk in the Arctic north, Sayanogorsk in Siberia, and the traditional
Cossack homelands along the Don and Kuban', Cossacks have pressured Azerbaijani
and other Caucasian fruit and vegetable vendors to lower their prices to the point
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where they sold at a loss so that the poor could afford the produce.76
Both Soyuz kazakov and SKVR have a reputation for accumulating among their
ranks 'criminal' elements that show disrespect for local or federal laws. One reporter
noted that 'at assemblies we attended in the summer of 1992 at least a third of the
attendance consisted of backward and immature youngsters, clearly anxious to prove
their virility in the manner of paramilitary movements everywhere'.77 The SKVR
ataman for the Kuban' region, Evgenii Nagai, was arrested when some of his
Cossacks attempted to confiscate weapons from a local militsiya station.78 The Rostov
region recently saw additional accusations of illegal storage of arms by the Cos-
sacks.79 There were reports that the atamans themselves engaged in heavy drinking
and brawls in Moscow when they were attending the Ataman Council of Soyuz
kazakov in January 1993.
Usually, disruptive Cossack behaviour appears to involve overextension of their
loyalty to Russia. Their Robin Hood-type behaviour, including actions against other
nationalities, is carried out in fact in the name of defending the Russian population.
On a larger scale, Cossacks have regularly conducted ad hoc border patrol and
customs checks on travellers over the new Russian border in the North Caucasus,
deciding for themselves what is legal and confiscating according to their own
definition of what is not legal—all in the name of protecting Russian interests.80 In
the ultimate expression of loyalty, Cossacks created their own military priorities as
thousands of Cossacks went to war in the Dniester region of Moldova in 1992 to
defend the local Russian population there.81 Acting in defiance of Russia's official
policies concerning the Bosnia-Serbia conflict, estimated thousands of Cossacks again
have taken up the duty of defending their 'Slavic brothers', the Serbs, in the firm
conviction that their action is the proper one for Russia.82 In the name of loyalty, the
Cossacks are making their own rules.

Modern-day victimisation (genocide)

The third major theme in modern Cossack identity is that of 'genocide' and continued
 1032 BARBARA SKINNER

persecution of Cossacks. Whereas the historical ideals of state service and social
values were already prevalent among Cossacks in pre-revolutionary times, the myth
of persecution is a 20th century phenomenon. This theme had already been estab-
lished among emigre Cossack communities and secretly simmered under Soviet
censorship and prohibitions. As glasnost' released the long pent-up truths of per-
secution of virtually every national group in the Soviet Union, Cossacks also began
publishing their history of persecution under Soviet rule. Based on the historical fact
of Bolshevik repression under Lenin and Stalin, the Cossacks have used this myth as
a basis for their rehabilitation demands.
The key document on Bolshevik persecution tactics against Cossacks—a Russian
Communist Party directive signed by Yakob Sverdlov on 24 January 1919—was first
published in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1989, 6. Many Cossack newspapers reprinted the
directive, which includes the following orders:

It is necessary, considering the experience of a year of civil war with Cossackdom, to

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recognise as the only correct policy the most ruthless fight against all of the leaders of
Cossackdom by [their] universal extermination. No compromises and no half-measures
whatsoever shall be allowed. Therefore it is necessary:
... To conduct ruthless mass terror against all Cossacks who have directly or indirectly
participated in the fight against Soviet power.... It is necessary to take all measures that will
guarantee against any attempts from their side towards any new actions against Soviet
power.83

Such measures included confiscating Cossack wheat and other agricultural products,
'equalising' their land holdings with those of non-Cossacks, carrying out complete
disarmament, and shooting those who did not comply. Cossacks today commemorate
the anniversary of the day this directive was signed with a memorial Orthodox funeral
service.
This decree marked the beginning of the official policy referred to today as
raskazachivanie (de-Cossackisation).84 After the terror and mass executions during
the Civil War, Cossacks suffered mass deportations and starvation during collectivisa-
tion, especially in their traditional homelands in southern Russia and the North
Caucasus. Some scholars have estimated that 70% of the Cossack population was
destroyed under the communist regime.85 The Cossack revival movement immediately
highlighted documentation of Soviet anti-Cossack policies and termed this policy
'genocide'. In response, programmes drawn up for Cossack organisations (in 1990)
presented 'rehabilitation' as the first priority.86
It is not surprising that the Cossacks, like other national groups in the former Soviet
Union, have focused on policies directed against them as a group by the Soviet
regime. What is surprising is their continued use of the word 'genocide' and portrayal
of themselves as a victimised, persecuted group to this day. After five Terek
Cossacks, including the local ataman of the Sunzhe region (then part of Checheno-In-
gushetia), were killed by Ingush nationalists in April 1991,87 talk of modern-day
'genocide' against Cossacks began in earnest. Ataman Martynov of the Soyuz
kazakov, in his commemoration of the organisations's first anniversary in 1991, stated
that despite the inclusion of Cossacks into the RSFSR law on the rehabilitation of
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1033

repressed peoples, 'the tragedy of raskazachivanie and neo-genocide against the

Cossacks continues'.88
Accordingly, Cossack newspapers have highlighted any recent events that could be
termed discriminatory against Cossacks. Most cases of anti-Cossack policies that have
lately been referred to as 'genocide' have occurred in areas beyond the current
boundaries of the Russian Federation. The Sunzhe event mentioned above began a
series of clashes with Ingush and Chechen nationals in the Terek Cossack region. A
document released by Soyuz kazakov leaders in February 1992 stated that Sunzhe was
experiencing 'direct encouragement of racial discrimination and chauvinism, a policy
directed at pushing the Cossack population from its historic lands'. The same
document declared that Cossacks who, in 1957, helped rehabilitated Chechens and
Ingush to settle in the traditionally Cossack Naursk and Shelkovsk regions, were now
forced to leave these regions. In 1991 about 500 Cossack families left this area, as
well as 'about half of the population of Sunzhe, with an 'analogous situation' in
Dagestan and Karachaevo-Cherkesiya. 'This phenomenon', the document states, 'is
called genocide—which is the most severe crime against a people with the goal of its
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physical and moral destruction'.89

Russian Cossacks beyond the borders of the Russian Federation view themselves
as victims of three major acts in the 20th century: the terror and repression under
Bolshevik and Soviet rule, the redesignation of borders to exclude their areas from
Russia, and current discriminatory actions on the part of nationalist movements of the
titular nationalities against Russians and Slavs in general and Cossacks in particular.
They share the first tragedy with Cossacks residing within the Russian Federation.
The second and third tragedies are theirs alone. The Cossack population within Russia
has made very forceful protests against these policies and has overwhelmingly
supported the demands for retribution made by Cossacks residing in these areas. All
Russian Cossacks have taken up the cause of their 'brothers' residing beyond Russia's
borders, and they share in the feelings of victimisation.
The situation in Kazakhstan has received the most coverage in Cossack newspa-
pers. Complaints first centered on the border changes made in 1920, when former
oblasti of southern Russia became part of the Kirghiz ASSR (which became the
Kazakh SSR in 1936). Russian Cossacks from all areas of the former Soviet Union
have depicted this action as a gross violation of human rights. Following Solzheni-
tsyn's 1990 proclamation that this border change was arbitrary and senseless and his
expression of sympathy with the Ural Cossacks' desire to be part of Russia again, the
Ural Cossacks have declared that the 1920 border change 'tore Ural'skaya oblasf
from Russia against the will of the people'.90 They have made demands to annul the
1920 territorial change and to ensure rights for the Russian-speaking population in
Kazakhstan at the highest government levels. The Siberian Cossacks have also
proclaimed themselves victims of this arbitrary border change and as early as August
1990 addressed complaints about human rights violations to the Supreme Soviets of
the USSR, RSFSR and Kazakhstan, claiming 'a significant part of the Siberian
Cossacks have become foreigners on the lands of their ancestors'.91
Lately, complaints about the border changes have dimmed against recent expres-
sions of violent anti-Cossack sentiments on the part of Kazakh nationalists and
Kazakh official policies in general. Earlier, the extreme nationalist sentiments of the
 1034 BARBARA SKINNER

Kazakh groups Alash and Azat worried the Cossacks, as well as the impediments and
delays by Kazakh officials against the registration of Cossack organisations in
Kazakhstan.92 After inflamed Kazakh protests during the Ural (Yaik) Cossack cel-
ebration of the 400th anniversary of their formation in September 1991, the newspa-
per of the Ural Cossacks, Kazachii vestnik, for months afterwards published
inflammatory articles condemning the behaviour of Kazakh nationalists of the
extremist group Azat who disturbed the Cossack celebration. Expressions of support
and sympathy from Cossack communities throughout Russia for the 'persecuted'
Cossacks in Kazakhstan continually poured in to the Ural'sk newspaper.93
Cossacks trying to cross the Kazakhstan border to go to the 401st Ural'sk Cossack
anniversary celebration in September 1992 were stopped by special armed Kazakh
security forces, who would not allow the Cossacks to cross. This again was held up
as an example of official discrimination and violation of basic human rights.94
Furthermore, all over northern Kazakhstan place names have been Kazakh-ised,
especially those towns first settled by Cossacks (for example, Ural'sk is now officially
'Oral', Semipalatinsk is 'Semei', Ust'-Kamenogorsk is 'Oskemen'). In spring 1992
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the statue of Ermak in the town of Ermak near Pavlodar was toppled by Kazakh
extremists.95 These actions have also been condemned in Cossack publications.
In this way, the myth of persecution and 'genocide' against Cossacks has not died
with the fall of the Soviet Union. Recent patterns of 'persecution' against Cossacks,
especially in the North Caucasus and Kazakhstan, have been widely publicised in the
Cossack press and used as another illustration of the continuation of raskazachivanie.
As such, the troubles of Russian Cossacks in the blizhnee zarubezh'e (former Soviet
republics) are another rallying point for the cause of Russian Cossacks as a whole.

Conclusion
Although the Cossacks generally affirm their commitment to a democratic future for
Russia, including fundamental economic reforms, their basic identity is so etched in
historical ideals that it presents inherent dangers. The three tenets of contemporary
Russian Cossack identity—duty to country, traditional social values and 20th-century
persecution—yield loyalty, pride and demands for rehabilitation that too nearly verge
on a volatile combination of blind loyalty, self-righteousness and a defensive posture
against any act perceived to be discriminatory. This combination could be explosive
in the event of major social unrest in Russia. In the words of Aleksandr Peshkov, a
Cossack commander in Krasnodar who fought in Pridnestrov'e: 'Wherever Russian
blood is spilled, I will go to fight'.96
Overall, the process of identity creation in the current Russian Cossack movement
has involved a very strong idealisation of past Cossack identity that does not willingly
tolerate the diversity of modern society. As with other nationalist movements in
Russia today, the nationalistic sentiment and Orthodox values with which Cossacks
firmly identify themselves are strengthened against the backdrop of the current
Westernisation of society and culture and the accompanying demoralisation and
impoverishment of the population. Critical of the decadence and hardship reforms
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1035

have so far wrought, this is a group that would much prefer in many ways to move
back in time rather than face the demands of pulling Russia into the 21st century.

Georgetown University
1
T h e revival movement split early between the Ukrainian Cossacks, or those who hold Ukraine
to be the 'Fatherland', and the Russian Cossacks w h o are loyal to Russia. Modern-day Ukrainian
Cossacks repudiate the 1654 Zaporozhian Cossack oath of allegiance to the Russian tsar and are loyal
only to Ukraine. Russian Cossacks, to whom the focus of this article is limited, are distinct in their
loyalty to the Russian state and in their pride in past service to Russia.
Referred to later as SKVR. In 1993 this organisation changed its name to Soyuz kazach'ikh
Voisk Rossii i Zarubezh'ya (Union of Cossack Armies of Russia and Abroad) to include Cossacks
beyond Russia's borders. Note that a number of current Cossack organisations and publications are
using the pre-1917 spelling.
3
Personal interview, Moscow, January 1993. His words are echoed in virtually every Russian
Cossack publication.
4
Ukaz N o . 6 3 2 of the President of the Russian Federation, ' O merakh p o realizatsii Zakona
Rossiiskoi Federatsii " O reabilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov" v otnoshenii kazachestva', 15 June
1992, and Ukaz N o . 3321-1 of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, ' O reabilitatsii
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kazachestva', 16 July 1992.

5
Personal interview, Krasnodar, January 1993.
6
Personal interview, Moscow, January 1993. Yurii Erugin from Samara also attested to the
same phenomenon there.
Evident especially in t w o small booklets under the title Slava Tebe Gospodi, chto my—
kazaki!—Pamyatka, (St Petersburg, 1992) by Boris Almazov, Ataman of the largest Cossack
organisation in St Petersburg, the Nevskaya stanitsa. Cossacks refer to these booklets as the 'bible'
for the revival movement. Almazov describes the rules of traditional Cossack life, from the proper
procedure on holding a krug and electing an ataman to traditional Cossack haircuts, dress, the order
for seating the family at table etc.
8
In St Petersburg, tailors from the Lenfilm studio have been employed, according to Nevskaya
stanitsa members.
9
During m y visit to a local krug in Vyselki, Krasnodar krai, some Cossacks in attendence were
derided for not yet owning a uniform.
10
According to the rules laid out in Almazov's Pamyatka, 1, pp. 3 0 - 3 3 . I noticed that these
rules were strictly followed when I visited the krug in Vyselki in January 1993, as well as during a
national Sovet atamanov of the Soyuz kazakov on 3 0 January 1993.
11
See Donskoi kazak, 3 , 3 November 1990, p . 10.
12
Kazachii krug—Al'manakh, Special issue, 1, Part 1, 1991, p . 67.
13
Kazach'i vedomosti, 1992, 3 , p . 1.
14
Ibid., p . 7.
15
Kazachii vestnik (Samara), 4, November 1992, p . 3.
16
Kazak (1st Don okrug), 2, 23 February 1991, p . 1.
17
Kazachii vestnik (Samara), 5, December 1992, p . 7.
18
Stanitsa, 3 , April 1992, p. 4.
19
Personal interview, St Petersburg, January 1993.
20
Personal interview, St Petersburg, January 1993. His views recall the 19th-century Pan-Slavist
Nikolai Danilovsky's appeal 'to eradicate the cancer of imitativeness and the servile attitude towards
the West, which through unfavourable conditions has eaten its way into the Slav body and soul", as
cited in Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (1982).
21
Tat'yana Tabolina, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnology
and Anthropology, w h o collects a n d catalogues all Cossack publications, cited this figure in a
personal interview with her in February 1993.
22
Published in New York in 1963 and reprinted at more length in Kazachii krug—al'manakh,
l.Part 1, 1991, pp. 4-64.
23
Kazachii vestnik (Ural'sk), 8, September 1991, pp. 4, 5, 7.
24
From personal interview with Aleksandr Kudryashov, historian for the Samarskoe kazach'e
zemlyachestvo, Samara, January 1993.
25
Kazachii Terek, 2, December 1990, p. 2.
26
Kazachii Terek, 1, 1991, p. 2.
27
'Zapishite, poka zhiv!', Kazach'i vedomosti, 2, November 1990, p. 7.
 1036 BARBARA SKINNER
28
Reprints of detailed pre-revolutionary histories of the various voiska have also been issued
(such as F. A . Shcherbina's two-volume Istoriya kuban'skago kazach'yago voiska, originally
published in 1913, n o w for sale in Krasnodar). Such serious works, however, are published in limited
numbers and are very dense reading. T h e average Cossack activist more often reads the newspapers
that provide more basic and simplified information.
29 Kazach'i vedomosti, 3, June 1991, p . 2.
30
This has been noted not only in other traditional Cossack areas, such as Rostov-na-Donu and
Stavropol', but also in non-traditional areas with large Cossack organisations, such as Samara. In
particular, there are plans at Samara University for a study programme called 'History of the Volga
and Ural Cossacks', with open evening lectures devoted to the same subject. (Personal interview with
Yurii Erugin, chief of communications for the Samara Cossack organisation, Samara, January 1993.)
31
Personal interview, January 1993, with Dmitrii Korolov, responsible for cataloguing Cossack
books at the Russian National Library, St Petersburg.
32
Kazaki Rossii (Proshloe, nastoyashchee, budushchee) (Moscow, IEA, 1992); S. K. Sagnaeva,
'Rossiiskoe kazachestvo', Document 28, Series A: International Relations in the Contemporary
World; and Kazaki Rossii. Kniga 2: Donskoe kazachestvo v grazhdanskoi voine (Sbornik dokumentov,
1918-1919 gg.), Part 1 (Moscow, 1993).
33
For list of Council members see Kazaki Rossii, 1992, p . 7.
34
Areas with large non-Slavic Cossack elements (such as the Kalmyk Cossacks in the Don
Cossack ranks) have instead published articles stressing their ability to work together well with these
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other ethnic groups.

35
For example, the same issue of Kuban'skie kazach'i vedomosti, 4, May 1991, published both
'Kakie oni byli, kazaki?' (p. 12), about Cossack dress and habits from the 16th—18th centuries, and
'Kazaki i zemlya' (p. 13), which describes the Cossack 'ideology' on land rights from the 15th
century.
36 See, for example, Yurii Aver'yanov, 'Schast'e byt' kazakom', Nash sovremennik, 1992, 3,
p. 138.
37
For example, 'Khorunzhii, sotnik, esaul ...', Kuban'skie kazach'i vedomosti, 4, May 1991,
p. 11.
38
For example, Kuban'skie kazach'i vedomosti. Special issue, 11 October 1990, p. 6.
35
Kazachii vestnik, 10, November 1991, pp. 4-5.
40
'Zabaikal'skoe kazachestvo i okhrana granitsy', Kazachii karaul (Chita), 2, 9 February 1991,
pp. 4-5.
41 'Obrashchenie Uchreditel'nogo Bol'shogo kruga Soyuza kazakov', Kazach'i vedomosti, 2,
November 1990, p. 3.
42
' K kazakam velikoi Rossii', Kazach'i vedomosti, 3, 1992, p . 1 (emphasis mine).
43
Personal interview at the Sovet atamanov Soyuza kazakov, 31 January 1993.
44
Donskoe slovo, 15 December 1990, p . 2.
45
'Forma torzhestvennogo obeshchaniya (klyatvy) kazaka (1918)', Utverzhdeno Pravleniem
Kuban'skoi kazach'ei Rady, 15 November 1990.
46
'Klyatva kazaka', St Petersburg, 1992.
47
'Patriarkh vseya Rusi Aleksii II blagoslovil Soyuz kazach'ikh Voisk Rossii', Stanitsa, 1 ,
December 1992, p . 2.
48
Kazachii vestnik (Samara), 3, October 1992, p . 1.
49
'Zayavlenie Soveta atamanov Soyuza kazakov', 30 January 1993.
50
Almazov, Slava Tebe Gospodi, chto my—kazaki!—Pamyatka, 1, 1992, p . 2 3 .
51
'Khochu vstupit' v kazach'e voisko', Kazach'i vedomosti, 5 - 6 , 1992-93, p . 10.
52
'Ostorozhno: samozvanets!', Kazach'i vedomosti, 5 - 6 , 1992-93, p . 11.
53
Almazov, p . 2 4 .
54
Almazov, p . 2 7 .
55
Almazov, p . 2 8 .
56
This is particularly evident in Kokun'ko's article 'Kazaki-razboiniki, ili chto m y vozrozh-
daem?', Stanitsa, 2, March 1992, p . 2.
57
'Klyatva kazaka', St. Petersburg, 1992.
58
Ibid.
59
F o r example, 'Kodeks chesti i pravila povedeniya kazaka', Kazach'i vedomosti, 4, 1992, p . 8,
which places restrictions on smoking, drinking, etc., while encouraging personal health and hard
work, and 'Kodeks chesti kazaka', Donskie voiskovye vedomosti, 1990, which states, 'Distsiplina—
vtoraya m a t ' kazaku!'.
60 See, for example, 'Obrashchenie' of the institutional Bol'shoi krug of Soyuz kazakov, July
1990, published in Kazach'i vedomosti, 2, November 1990, p . 3 .
 THE RUSSIAN COSSACK REVIVAL 1037
61
Kazach'i vedomosti, 2, November 1990, p. 3.
62
Kazach'i vedomosti, 3, June 1991, p. 1.
63
Archimandrite Aleksandr from Vladikavkaz, as quoted in Kazach'i vedomosti, Special issue,
June 1990, p . 3.
64
Kazachii Terek, 2, December 1990, p. 2.
65
Kazaki Sunzhi, January 1991, p. 2.
66
Kuban'skie kazach'i vedomosti, 2, 29 November 1990, p. 8.
67
Donskoe slovo, 15 December 1990, p. 4.
68
Ibid.
69
Personal interview with Mikhail Savva, deputy head of the Department of Nationality Issues
and Inter-nationality Relations of the Krasnodar krai government, January 1993.
70
'Whip-wielding Cossacks Pose as Latter-Day Robin Hoods', The Daily Telegraph, 31 July
1992, p. 10.
71
Personal interview, January 1993. Some of his words included: 'We're speaking of survival,
and when dealing with survival, you can't limit your methods ... If w e must kill women and children,
we will ...'
72
Kazach'i vedomosti, 2, November 1990, p . 3.
73
Kazach'i vedomosti, 3, 1992, p . 7.
74
Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970) p p . 3 7 - 4 0 .
Sources: German 19th century eye-witness account of Cossack administrative and juridical practices:
E. Lassota. Tagebuch des Erich Lassota von Steblau (Halle, 1866), as well as Russian pre-revolution-
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ary sources compiled in V. I. Kuznetsov (ed), Istorya Dona s drevneishikh vremen do Velikoi
Oktyabr'skoi Sotsial'noi Revolyutsii (Rostov-na-Donu, 1965).
75
'Russia: the Cossack Revival', The World Today, 49, 1, January 1993, p . 3 .
76
Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1992.
77
'Russia: the Cossack Revival', p . 3 .
78
Stanitsa, 8, February 1993, p . 2.
79
B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 March 1993.
80
'Russia: the Cossack Revival', p . 3 ; Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 September 1992, p p . 1, 3 ;
personal interview with Georgii Kokun'ko, January 1993.
81
'Moldova: Ghost Town on the Frontiers of Hate', The Guardian, 27 June 1992, gave the
highest estimate of 3 000 Cossack participants in this conflict.
82
Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, 7 March 1993, estimated that 2 0 0 0 Cossacks were
fighting with the Serbs in Bosnia, as reported by B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 March 1993.
83
Kazaki Sunzhi, January 1991, p . 2.
84
T h e Kuban' Cossacks, however, have documented that mass executions had become a policy
in their area by 1918. See 'Kazachestvo nado unichtozhit' pogolovno ...', Kuban'skie kazach'i
vedomosti, 2, 2 9 November 1990, p . 3.
85
Kazaki Rossii, 1992, p . 92.
86
See for example Kazachii Terek, 2, December 1990, p . 1.
87
The best account of this episode can be found on the front page of Groznenskii kazak, 1, May
1991.
88
Kazach'i vedomosti, 3, June 1991, p . 1.
89
'Zayavlenie o diskriminatsii kazach'ego naseleniya', Kazach'i vedomosti, 2, 1992, p . 3.
90
'Proekt obrashcheniya Bol'shogo Ural'skogo kazach'ego kruga k grazhdanam goroda i
oblasti', Stanitsa, 1, January 1992, p . 5.
91
'Inostrantsy na zemle predkov?', Yaitskaya volya, December 1990, p . 5.
92
Ibid., p p . 1, 5.
93
See especially Kazachii vestnik, 10, p. 2 and 11, p. 1.
94
Kazachii vestnik (Samara), 3, October 1992, p. 2; 4, November 1992, pp. 1-2.
95
'Ermak Timofeevich popal na svalku', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 March 1993.
96
Personal interview, Krasnodar, January 1993.