Chapter 1

Safety Management System

I. Airlines Safety Management Program

Safety Management System in the Airlines (flight operators must carry out incident management
by carrying out several programs consisting of:
a. Internal safety reporting system (ISRS)
b. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
c. Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FLQA)
d. Mean of Advising Management
e. Trend Monitoring.
f. Setting of safety goals
g. Risk Management Program
h. Information feedback to employees

A. Internal Safety Reporting System (ISRS)

The airline has a reporting system as part of the Incident Management System (Incident
Management System) that allows employees to report unsafe conditions in a timely manner and
to report any incidents that occur on their flights.

The company leadership in the field of aviation safety (General Manager of Flight Safety) is
required to develop and maintain a reporting system related to aviation safety activities.
Referring to CASR 830, it is stated that in cases of serious incidents and accidents that are
reported to Komite Nasional Kecelakaan Transportasi (KNKT) or the National Transportation
Safety Committee (NTSC), airline representatives in the area where the incident occurred can be
appointed as observers, as NTSC investigators.

In the case of incidents at airlines, the flight operator must report to the Directorate General of
Civil Aviation (DGCA) and then investigate the causes of an incident and will not be used for
disciplinary action. Furthermore, the Corporate Safety Committee or the Safety Committee at
the company will call by reviewing each incident or analyzing the possible potential hazards that
could occur in the future and make recommendations for corrective actions to prevent the same
incident from happening again.

B. Trip Report
The procedure for making a Trip Report is regulated in the Company Operation Manual (COM)
or Basic Operation Manual (BOM) for each airline. Each aircraft is equipped with the manual
document which is kept in the Navigational Bag. In the Navbag there are also several forms
including a trip report that can be used by pilots or crew in carrying out flying assignments.

The Trip Report is addressed to the Flight Safety Division or the Aviation Safety Division of the
airline. Furthermore, after the report has been studied, it is submitted to the Directorate
General of Civil Aviation using Form 830 or to other relevant authorities, if necessary to do.

C. Operation hazard Report

By understanding that there will always be hazards, both real and potential, associated with the
operation of any aircraft. In general, the risk factors consist of:
 1. Technical factors,
2. Operational factors or
3. The human factor

Therefore, the goal of any Safety Management System is to address, control and manage
operational risks. This is achieved by careful recording and monitoring of safety-related events
for adverse events by prioritizing attention and efforts to avoid the risk of recurrence of similar
events in the form of incidents that can lead to aircraft accidents.

The Operations Hazard Report Procedure stipulated in the ISRS Operations hazard report is a
non-punitive report. This reporting system provides a means for individuals who witness any
action or operation in terms of efforts to maintain flight safety, directly or indirectly.

The Operations Hazard Report will then be submitted to the Aviation Safety Division of the
intended airline, so it is hoped that this will improve the quality of the company's safety profile.

D. Line Operations Safety Audit

This audit is in the form of an examination conducted on:
 Crew attitudes and behavior that have the potential to endanger flights (crew behavior)
 Crew management system, and
 Validate the effects of the crew regarding the ability of crew initiation related to flight safety
(in the form of Crew Management system / CRM training)

Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) is a formal process that requires experts and observers who
are highly trained in:
 to get on the jump-seat
 flight schedule arrangement
 operational complexity, and
 flight crew performance.
LOSA observations will be conducted every five years.

E. Flight Operations Quality Assessment (FOQA)

This Flight Operations Quality Assurance serves as a monitor to improve operational safety and
flight performance. This process includes:
1. Acquisition,
In the form of measurement and analysis of flight data to identify, determine possible
causes and correct the process of events that are dangerous and can potentially lead to
deviations from the normal process of aviation safety operations.
2. Capabilities
The capability in question is the ability to better understand flight operations by tracking the
incident process and investigating circumstances related to minor incidents.
3. Detection
Namely detecting weaknesses before causing a major incident to develop into a worse thing
as well as prevention efforts by carrying out training or development activities in flight
operation procedures.
 FOQA involves capturing and analyzing flight data to determine whether the pilot and his
aircraft systems deviate from normal operations. In addition, FOQA also identifies trends in
events that lead to hazardous conditions and analyzes actions to correct existing problems.

FOQA uses a Quick Access Record (Quick Access Record) to record flight data to a removable
device in the form of a removeable optical disk and can also delete data from the aircraft.
These data include parameters that must be collected in the Disk of Flight Data Recorder,
and other parameters

F. Advice
The cooperation between the Safety Committee and the Joint Safety Board provides advice to
company management to enable timely action to be taken on important events.
In urgent cases, meetings between the Safety Committee and the Joint Safety Board explain to
the company the problems that have occurred and recommend corrective actions. The Safety
Division will timely and regularly submit aviation safety reports to airline management.

G. Trend Monitoring
Aviation Safety will maintain a database of all accident, incident and hazard occurrence data to
enable monitoring of trends to take place. This trend will be reviewed at each Safety Committee
meeting with the Joint Safety Board to produce an agreement which will then be used as a
reference for setting the expected Aviation Safety Goals.

Aviation Safety Lead will collect and monitor national and international incident/accident data
on similar aircraft engaged in similar operations, procedures for monitoring trends are set out in
the Internal Safety Reporting System.

H. Aviation Safety Program (Aviation Safety Program)

The Aviation Safety Division develops and maintains aviation in a sustainable manner in the form
of an aviation safety program (ASP) to detect, analyze and mitigate any risks that pose a threat
to the safety of flight operations.

The Aviation Safety Program refers to CASR 121 which consists of eight elements:
1. Airline Management Plan
2. Aviation Safety Officer Qualifications
3. Responsibilities of Aviation Safety Officers
4. Aviation Safety Officer Training
5. Incident Management
6. Safety Committee
7. Emergency Response Plan
8. Safety Communication and Education

Safety Program details with Safety issues and any sensitive information that could compromise
safety are published in this section of the manual, the company's operating manual and the
aviation safety manual.

I. Safety Committee (Safety Committee

 Airlines are required to form a Safety Committee capable of representing all divisions of the
airline's ground and aviation and in the case of companies with multiple bases, supervision must
also cover these bases.
1. Responsibility
The Committee's responsibility is to monitor all areas of operations, identify safety problems
and deficiencies, and make recommendations for corrective action to senior management
where applicable.
2. Members
Committee members will be selected to ensure representation of all operations
departments within the organization and in matters relating to program safety, will report to
CASO or a person designated by CASO, regardless of their functional department.
3. Meeting
The committee will meet regularly (at least twice a year) as determined by the chair of the
committee. Special meetings for urgent matters can be called by each member of the
Committee. Committee members may also attend other meetings for the purpose of
presenting safety committee reports.
4. Minutes
Summary Minutes of Committee meetings should provide a record of agendas, decisions
and corrective actions taken where possible. Mandatory circulation schedule of minutes of
all regular and extraordinary meetings, based on need to know, will be developed for the
whole company and document the minutes of the community, will be kept in the
appropriate place or places available to every employee of the company.

II. Investigation Check List Fact

The following check - list contains question to assist the Air Safety Investigator to establish the facts
of the incident / accident happen. The list is by no means exhaustive and should be used as guide.
Determining the facts;
WHO:
 Was injured?
 Saw or heard the incident / accident?
 Was working with the injured?
 Had instructed and / or assigned the job to the injured?
 Else was involved?
 Has information on events prior to the incident / accident?

WHAT:
 Is the injury?
 Is the damaged or loss?
 Was the injured doing?
 Had the injured been instructed to do?
 Tools were being used?
 Machinery / plants / equipment / vehicle was in use?
 Previous similar accidents or near misses (incident) have occurred?
 Action had been taken to prevent a recurrence?
 Did the injured and any witnesses see or hear?
 Procedures or safety rules were violated?
 Safe system of work, permits to work, isolation procedures were there?
  Training had been given?
 Communication system was in use?

WHEN:
 Did the accident occur?
 Did the damage become evident?
 Did the injured start the job?
 Was an explanation of the hazard associated with the task given?
 Did the supervisor last see the injured?
 Was something observed to be wrong?

WHY:
 Did the injury occur?
 Did communication fail?
 Was training not given?
 Were the unsafe conditions permitted?
 Was the hazard not evaluated?
 Was personal protective equipment not used?
 Was there no safe system of work, permit to work or isolation procedure operating?
 Were specific safety instruction not given?
 Was the injured where he/ she was?
 Was the supervisor not consulted when things started to go wrong?
 Was the supervisor not there at the time?

WHERE:
 Did the incident / accident occurs?
 Did the damage occur?
 Was the supervisor at the time?
 Were the witnesses at the time?

HOW:
 Did the injury occur?
 Could the incident / accident has been avoided?
 Could the injury have been avoided?
 Could the supervisor have prevented the incident / accident?
 Could better design help?

III. Risk Management

Risk Management is the identification, analysis and elimination, and/or mitigation to an acceptable
level of risks that threaten the capabilities of the airlines.
The objective aims at a balanced allocation of resources to address all risks and viable risk control
and mitigation.
The identification and risk management is a continuity process during any activities by motivate all
the employees of airlines to be proactive in identification any hazards or risks at least in their
workplace.
A. Risk Management Process
The risk Management process is decided into 5 steps:
1. Identify hazard
2. Assess the hazard
3. Identify the defense
4. Assess the defense
5. Conclusion action to be taken.

In identifying the hazards we can get the data source from

 the merpati employees
 any person who makes the report/information by formal form or Short Message
Service(SMS) broadcast
 jump to the site by doing observation, inspection, auditing, desk top analysis.

Hazard report in Merpati Safety Management System has 2(two) types:

 Open report
 Confidential report
The typical of the confidential report type is the reporter identity is legally covered by the
request from the reporter or assessment from the SMS manager. All the data input will be
assessed carefully to prevent from any “black report” (personal or division).

All the report will be classified into some categories:

1. location
2. severity
3. probability
4. potential hazard
5. Aircraft type
6. flight phase
 7. flight effect
8. Environment/ additional effect

Chapter 2
Accident Incident Investigation

The aims of the investigation are:

 real condition
 Provide an overview or conclusion of the observed events
 Determine the cause of the case
 Immediately provide recommendations and take preventive steps so that similar incidents do
not occur.

The results of the investigation are not used as a basis for blaming a person or group of people or certain
parties. With the flow of investigations outlined in a sequential manner, it will be meaningful for each
party to understand the causes of the existing cases and self-direction for each party for improvement.

The investigation contains:

 Accurate analysis (accurate analysis) on relevant factors and developed immediately and not
delayed.
 A complete description of the actual incident including the human factor (the human factor
involved).
 The information provided to the Air Safety Investigator is useful for developing
recommendations (recommendations), so as to produce recommendations for preventive
actions (effective preventive measures).

The results of this investigation can provide benefits in the short term to determine the party or person
who can be seen as responsible.

Legal references on accidents – incident investigations:

ICAO Appendix 13 – Investigation of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents
ICAO Doc 9756 AN/965 – Aircraft Accident Reporting and Incident Investigation Manual Part IV
CASR Part 121 – Certification and Operational Requirements : Domestic Airline, Flag and Additional
AC Circular Advisory 120 – 01 Aircarrier Safety Management Systems

I. Accidents
Accident is actually happening which start from people getting on an airplane, going through the
process of flying to getting off the airplane after the plane has landed and parked, where:
a. The person is injured or seriously injured by:
 Being in an airplane
 Direct contact from any part of the aircraft
 Direct exposure to jet engine jets or blowing of propellers
  The cause of the injury was due to the passenger's disease condition so that accident was not
meant in an accident
b. Aircraft have:
 structural damage or failure that adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or
flight characteristics of the aircraft; and
 will usually require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for
engine failure or damage, where the damage is limited to the engine, engine cover or
accessories; or for limited damage to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings,
small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
 the plane is lost or completely inaccessible
 An aircraft is considered missing when an official search has been conducted and the
wreckage has not been found.

II. Incidents
An event, other than an accident, related to the operation of an aircraft which affects or may affect
the safe operation.
1. Fatal injury
Fatal injury Or a fatal injury statistically classified as an injury resulting in death within 30 (thirty)
days from the date of the accident.
2. Serious injury
Serius injury or a serious injury suffered by a person as a result of an accident and who:
a. Requires hospitalization for more than 48 (forty eight) hours from 7 (seven) days from the
date the injury was received; or
b. Causes fractures (except simple fractures of the fingers, toes or nose); or
c. Involves lacerations that cause heavy bleeding, damage to nerves, muscles or tendons; or
d. Causes injury to internal organs; or
e. Resulting in second or third degree burns, or burns that affect more than 5 (five) % of the
body surface; or
f. There has been a verified exposure to an infectious substance or radiation injury.
The aim of the Investigation is to determine the facts, conditions and circumstances relating to an
incident or accident so that conclusions about the causes or contributing causes can be drawn and
measures can be taken to prevent recurrence with a systemic approach.

The final report on aircraft incident and accident investigation is the basis for initiating the necessary
safety measures to prevent further incidents and accidents from similar causes, so that appropriate
actions can be taken by the relevant and authorized units and/or regulators. body.

III. Investigator Minimum Qualifications

Investigative team assigned by General Manager Incident Management (DVI). The investigation team
must understand the company's safety program, basic knowledge of investigations, human factors
principles and accident analysis concepts, which are basically held by the company's Safety Specialist
and/or Safety Analyst.

Investigators within the company must have the qualifications shown to have followed;
a. Company Aviation Safety Officer (CASO),
b. Safety Management System
c. Safety Investigation Course,
d. Safety Specialist Course
 Investigators at airline companies can also assign their authorized personnel in aircraft investigation
activities together with the Komite Nasional Kecelakaan Transportasi (KNKT) or National
Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC).
Investigators must hold and maintain their current immunizations. In some countries (USA, Australia,
Singapore, etc) holders of a Bloodborne Pathogen Certificate are required to enter the accident
scene.

The crisisi team declare to make Operational Control Center (OCC), after received report of accident
and incident as the Management Coordinator. When the Investigation Team is the first team
dispatched to a Crisis Location (Airplane Accident, Bomb Threat, etc), they take turns to liaise with
local authorities to investigate the cause of the accident and offer all possible assistance to keep the
OCC fully informed. from the situation.
Detailed procedures and Investigation team requirements are specified in the ERP Manual.

IV. Investigation method

The analytical methods used in the investigation are:
1. Threat and Error Management (TEM)
TEM to identify dangerous events both threats and errors, the interview session used the Flight
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) technique in the company operation manual. Aviation Operations
Quality Audit (FOQA) analysis. These methods are usually used in combination to find
organizational failures rather than individual failures after incidents or accidents.

Chapter 3
Case study KNKT final Report

History of Flight
On 28 December 2014, an Airbus A320-216 aircraft registered as PK-AXC was being operated by PT.
Indonesia Air Asia on a scheduled flight from Juanda International Airport Surabaya, Indonesia to Changi
International Airport, Singapore. The aircraft departed at 0535 LT (2235 UTC1, 27 December 2014) and
was cruising at 32,000 feet (FL320) via ATS (Air Traffic Services) route Mike 635 (M635).
The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as
Pilot Flying (PF).

The totals of 162 persons were on board this flight consisted of two pilots, four flight attendants
and 156 passengers including one company engineer
The sequence of events retrieved from both of Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder
(CVR) were as follows:
2231 UTC, the aircraft started to taxi.
2235 UTC, the aircraft took off.

2249 UTC, the flight reached cruising altitude of 32000 feet (Flight Level 320).

At 2257 UTC, the PF asked for anti-ice ON and the flight attendant announced to the passengers to
return to their seat and fasten the seat belt due to weather condition and possibility of turbulence.

At 2300 UTC, the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) amber advisory AUTO FLT RUD TRV
LIM 1 appeared. The PF asked “ECAM action”.

At 2301 UTC, FDR recorded failure on both Rudder Travel Limiter Units and triggered a chime and
master caution light. The ECAM message showed “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS” (Auto Flight Rudder
Travel Limiter System). The PIC read and performed the ECAM action of AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS to
set Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) 1 and 2 push-buttons on the overhead panel to OFF then to ON
one by one. Both Rudder Travel Limiter Units returned to function normally.

At 2304 UTC, the PM requested to the Ujung Pandang Upper West2 controller to deviate 15 miles left of
track for weather avoidance and was approved by the controller. The aircraft then flew on a heading of
310°.

At 2306UTC, the SIC conducted cruise crew briefing including in the case of one engine inoperative or
emergency descent and that Semarang Airport would be the alternate airport.

At 2309 UTC, the FDR recorded the second failure on both Rudder Travel Limiter Units and triggered a
chime and master caution light. The pilots repeated the ECAM action and both Rudder Travel Limiter
Units returned to function normally.

At 2311 UTC, the pilot contacted the Jakarta Upper Control3 controller and informed that the flight
turned to the left off the M635 to avoid weather. The information was acknowledged and identified on
the radar screen by the Jakarta Radar controller. The Jakarta Radar controller instructed the pilot to
report when clear of the weather.

At 2312 UTC, the pilot requested for a higher level to FL 380 when possible and the Jakarta Radar
controller asked the pilot to standby.

At 2313:41 UTC, the single chime sounded and the amber ECAM message “AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS”
was displayed. This was the third failure on both Rudder Travel Limiter Units on this flight. The pilots
performed the ECAM actions and the system returned to function normally.

At 2315:36 UTC, the fourth failure on both Rudder Travel Limiter Units and triggered ECAM message
“AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS”, chime and master caution light.

At 2316 UTC, the Jakarta Radar controller issued a clearance to the pilot to climb to FL 340 but was not
replied by the pilot. The Jakarta Radar controller then called the pilot for several times but was not
replied.
At 2316:27 UTC, the fifth Master Caution which was triggered by FAC 1 FAULT followed by FDR signature
of alteration 4of parameters of components controlled by FAC 1 such as RTLU 1, Windshear Detection 1
and Rudder Travel Limiter Actuator 1.
At 2316:44 UTC, the sixth Master Caution triggered by AUTO FLT FAC 1 + 2 FAULT and followed by FDR
signature of alteration of parameters of components controlled by FAC 2 such as RTLU 2, Windshear
Detection 2 and Rudder Travel Limiter Actuator 2. The Auto Pilot (A/P) and the Auto-thrust (A/THR)
disengaged. Flight control law reverted from Normal Law to Alternate Law. The aircraft started to roll to
the left up to 54° angle of bank.
Nine seconds after the autopilot disengaged, the right side-stick activated. The aircraft roll angle
reduced to 9° left and then rolled back to 53° left. The input on the right side-stick was mostly pitch up
and the aircraft climbed up to approximately 38,000 feet with a climb rate of up to 11,000 feet per
minute.

At 2317:18 UTC, the stall warning activated and at 2317:22 UTC stopped for 1 second then continued
until the end of recording.
The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds and at 2317:15 UTC another input for 2
seconds, then since 2317:29 UTC the input continued until the end of the recording.
The right side stick input was mostly at maximum pitch up until the end of recording.
The lowest ISIS speed recorded was 55 knots. The ISIS speed recorded fluctuated at an average of 140
knots until the end of the recording.

At 2317:41 UTC the aircraft reached the highest ISIS altitude of 38,500 feet and the largest roll angle of
104° to the left. The aircraft then lost altitude with a descent rate of up to 20,000 feet per minute.
At approximately 29,000 feet the aircraft attitude was wings level with pitch and roll angles of
approximately zero with the airspeed varied between 100 and 160 knots. The Angle of Attack (AOA)5
was almost constant at approximately 40° up and the stall warning continued until the end of recording.
The aircraft then lost altitude with an average rate of 12,000 feet per minute until the end of the
recording.

At 2318 UTC, the aircraft disappeared from the Jakarta Radar controller screen. The aircraft last position
according to the Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcasting (ADS-B) radar was on coordinate
3°36‟48.36”S - 109°41‟50.47”E and the aircraft altitude was approximately 24,000 feet.
The last data recorded by FDR was at 2320:35 UTC with ISIS airspeed of 132 kts, pitch 20° up, AOA 50°
up, roll 8° to left, the rate of descent 8400 ft/minute and the radio altitude was 118 feet. No emergency
message was transmitted by the crew.

Chapter 4
Takeoff Performance
This is the example of flight performance analysis
 Chapter 5
Allowed Load

There are many factors that lead to efficient and safe operation of aircraft. Among these vital factors are
proper weights and balance control. The maximum allowable weight for an aircraft is determined by
design considerations.

The manufacturer provides the aircraft operator with the empty weight of the aircraft and the location
of its empty weight center of gravity (EWCG) at the time the certified aircraft leaves the factory.
However, the maximum operational weight may be less than the maximum allowable weight due to
such considerations as high-density altitude or high-drag field conditions caused by wet grass or water
on the runway.

The maximum operational weight may also be limited by the departure or arrival airport's runway
length.

I. Manufacturer's design weight limitation.

The maximum allowable weight for an aircraft is determined by design considerations by the
aircraft's manufacturer. However, the maximum operational weight may be less than the maximum
allowable weight due to such considerations as high-density altitude or high-drag field conditions
caused by wet grass or water on the runway.

The maximum operational weight may also be limited by the departure or arrival airport's runway
length. The structural weight limits are based on aircraft maximum structural capability and define
the envelope for the CG charts.
Aircraft structural weight capability is established during aircraft design and certification.

A. Maximum design taxi weight or Maximum Taxi weight (MDTW or MTW)

The maximum design taxi weight or maximum design ramp weight (MDRW) is the maximum
certificated design weight for aircraft ground maneuvers as limited by aircraft strength and
airworthiness requirements.

The difference between the maximum taxi/ramp weight and the maximum take-off weight
(maximum taxi fuel allowance) depends on the size of the aircraft, the number of engines, APU
operation, and engines/APU fuel consumption, and is typically assumed for 10 to 15 minutes
allowance of taxi and run-up operations.
B. Maximum design takeoff weight (MDTOW or MTOW)
The maximum design takeoff weight is the maximum certificated design weight for takeoff run
as limited by aircraft strength and airworthiness requirements. Maximum Design Takeoff
Weight = Maximum Design Taxi Weight – design taxi fuel

MDTOW = MDTW - DTX

C. Maximum design landing weight (MDLW or MLW)

The Maximum design landing weight is the maximum certificated design weight for landing
limited by aircraft strength and airworthiness requirements. It generally depends on the landing
gear strength or the landing impact loads on certain parts of the wing structure.

MDLW < MDTOW < MDTW

D. Maximum design zero-fuel weight (MDZFW)

The maximum design zero-fuel weight is the maximum certificated design weight of the aircraft
less all usable fuel and other specified usable agents as limited by aircraft wing strength and
airworthiness requirements.
It is the maximum weight permitted before usable fuel and other specified usable fluids are
loaded in specified sections of the airplane.

The weight difference between the MDTOW and the MDZFW may be utilized only for the
addition of fuel. Some of the problems caused by overloading an aircraft are:
c. The aircraft will need a higher takeoff speed, which results in a longer takeoff run.
d. Both the rate and angle of climb will be reduced
e. The service ceiling will be lowered.
f. The cruising speed will be reduced.
g. The cruising range will be shortened.
h. Maneuverability will be decreased.
i. A longer landing roll will be required because the landing speed will be higher.
j. Excessive loads will be imposed on the structure, especially the landing gear.

E. Aircraft Gross Weight

The aircraft gross weight is the total aircraft weight at any moment during the flight or ground
operation The aircraft gross weight decreases during flight due to fuel and oil consumption. The
aircraft gross weight may also vary during flight due to payload dropping or in-flight refueling.
F. Manufacturer's empty weight (MEW)
The aircraft weight includes:
k. Airframe structure with all moving mechanical parts (fuselage, wings, flaps, gear, rudder,
nacelle).
l. Power generation system (APU, main engines, power plant)
m. Systems (electrical, hydraulics, pneumatic, fuel flow system, instrument, navigation, air
conditioning, anti-ice, fixed furnishing)
n. Fixed equipment and services considered an integral part of the aircraft
o. Fixed ballast
p. Closed system fluids
q. Unused fuel only for small aircraft
 This weight does not include:
 Fuel
 Oil, potable water
 Payload (Cargo, passenger, luggage)
 Removable equipment
 Customer specific installations or operator items

G. Operational Empty Weight (OEW)

The MEW and the operator's items are summed up to the Operational Empty Weight (OEW).
The OEW is usually fixed for a specific aircraft and only gets changed during maintenance or
operational changes. OEW is the empty weight that is used in the flight simulator or the usual
planning software. The operator's items are:
r. fluids necessary for aircraft operation (engine oil and coolant, water, unusable fuel)
s. the water for galleys and lavatories
t. aircraft documentation
u. passenger seats (and the life vests)
v. galley structure
w. catering emergency equipment
x. aircraft crew and their luggage.
y. standard items necessary for full operation

H. Actual Zero Fuel Weight (AZFW)

If we add the payload to the empty plane weight, we get the Actual Zero Fuel Weight (AZFW).
The payload includes:
z. the passengers weight (the standard weights used defined by ICAO respectively)
aa.the passengers luggage's weight
bb. the cargo weight
cc. The assumed weights vary around some kg / lbs. depending on the number of seats
available on the aircraft.
dd. a male passenger (incl. cabin luggage) weighs around 82kg (181 lbs.)
ee.a female passenger around 67kg (148 lbs.)
ff. a child around 50kg (110lbs.)
gg.an infant 16kg (35 lbs.).
These are statistical values but otherwise one would need to weigh every single passenger
during check in to get his exact weight. Additional payload consists of baggage and cargo (such
as mail or goods).

I. Actual Gross Weight (AGW)

In addition to the actual zero fuel weight, we add the fuel required for the flight and we get
the Actual Gross Weight (AGW).
At that time, you should have calculated your total fuel for this flight. The actual gross weight is
the weight of aircraft ready for departure at the gate before push-back and start-up.
1 U.S. 1 Imp.
type 1 Litre
Gallon Gallon
Aviation Gas 1.58 lb. 6.0 lb. 7.20 lb.
JP-4 1.76 lb. 6.6 lb. 8.01 lb.
Kerosene 1.85 lb. 7.0 lb. 8.39 lb.
Oil 1.95 lb. 7.5 lb. 8.5 lb.
 Note 1 kg = 2.20462262185 lbs
The total fuel shall include:
 Taxi-out fuel (at departure airfield)
 Trip fuel
 Holding
 Re-routing expectation
 Regulation needs depending on your route arrival airfield
 Fuel to join alternate airfield
 Taxi-in fuel at destination,
 Final reserve

J. Take-off weight
Fuel burn during taxi operation to the departure runway reduces the gross weight. At the
holding point, we have the Actual Take-off Weight (ATOW) which is used for take-off
performance calculation. The gross weight varies during flight. Fuel and oil consumption
reduces the gross weight. Additionally it may vary during flight due to inflight refuelling or
payload dropping.

K. Maximum design takeoff weight (MDTOW)

The maximum takeoff weight (also known as the maximum brake-release weight) is the
maximum weight authorized at brake release for takeoff, or at the start of the takeoff roll. The
maximum takeoff weight is always less than the maximum taxi/ramp weight to allow for fuel
burned during taxi by the engines and the APU.

In operation, the maximum weight for takeoff may be limited to values less than the maximum
takeoff weight due to aircraft performance, environmental conditions, airfield characteristics
(takeoff field length, altitude), maximum tire speed and brake.

At this weight, the subsequent addition of fuel will not result in the aircraft design strength
being exceeded. The weight difference between the MTOW and the MZFW may be utilized only
for the addition of fuel.

L. Landing weight
With the calculation of fuel consumption during flight, we can calculate the Estimated Landing
Weight (ELW) which is used for landing performance calculation at the destination.
Approaching your destination you use your current gross weight to determine the final
approach speed. The gross weight now is the Actual Landing Weight (ALW).
Of course before landing, you never land without any fuel in reserve.
The regulation is strict about fuel calculation for commercial air transportation including
reserve fuel. Except in specific situations like re-routing, multiple holding, landing at alternate
or technical problems, at landing, the aircraft shall still have the expected reserve fuel if there
was no extra consumption.
Graphical summary of operational weight
Example
Now we will get started and calculate an example (we operate an Airbus A319):
Manufacturer's Empty Weight (MEW) 36,779 kg
+ Operator's Items + 5,205 kg
= Operational Empty Weight (OEW) = 41,981 kg
 + load + 13,529 kg
= Actual Zero Fuel Weight (AZFW) = 55,510 kg
+ Fuel + 13,239 kg
= Actual Gross Weight (AGW) = 68,749 kg
- Taxi Fuel - 100 kg
= Actual Take-Off Weight (ATOW) = 68,649 kg
Fuel consumption -10,900 kg
= Actual Landing Weight (ALW) = 57,749 kg

M. Allowed load
Allowed load or load capacity is calculated using diagram as follow

Example
Aircraft with Dry Operating weight is 43,560 kg.
Maximum takeoff weight 74,650 kg
Maximum zero fuel weight 65,450 kg
Maximum landing weight 71,240 kg
Aircraft filling fuel as block fuel 13,000 kg
Fuel burn of the flight to destination as trip fuel 4.300 kg
Fuel burn of the aircraft moved from apron to runway 250 kg
Load
Passenger 134 adult 12 children and 5 infant
Baggage 2,450 kg
Cargo 1,700 kg
Calculate the aircraft load capacity
Can all of load be loaded in this flight, why?
Answer
1. Fill the Dry Operating weight value, like this
DOW = 43,560 kg

2. Fill the Block fuel and taxi fuel, like this

Block fuel = 13,000 kg
Taxi fuel = 250 kg
And then
DOW + Block fuel – taxi fuel = 43.560 + 13.000 - 250 = 56.310 kg

3. Fill the Maximum Takeoff weight and the Allowed weight for takeoff
 Maximum takeoff weight = MTOW = 74,650 kg
The Allowed weight for takeoff = maximum takeoff weight
The Allowed weight for takeoff = 74,650 kg

4. Fill the Maximum zero fuel weight, takeoff fuel and the Allowed weight for zero fuel
Maximum zero fuel weight = MZFW = 65,450 kg
Takeoff fuel = Block fuel – taxi fuel
Takeoff fuel = Block fuel – taxi fuel
Block fuel = 13,000 kg
Taxi fuel = 250 kg
And then
Takeoff fuel = 13,000 – 250 = 12,750 kg
Allowed weight for zero fuel = MZFW + takeoff fuel
Allowed weight for zero fuel = 65,450 + 12,750 = 78.200 kg
5. Fill the Maximum landing weight, trip fuel and the Allowed weight for landing
Maximum landing weight = MLDW = 71,240 kg
Trip fuel 4,300 kg
Allowed weight for landing = MLDW + trip fuel
Allowed weight for landing = 71,240 + 4,300 = 75,540 kg
6. Fill the Lowest of 3 allowed weight above
Allowed weight for takeoff 74,650 kg
Allowed weight for zero fuel 78,200 kg
Allowed weight for landing 75,540 kg
So the lowest value of 3 above is Allowed weight for takeoff = 74,650 kg

7. Fill the Load capacity

Lowest of 3 allowed load weight above 74,650 kg
Operating weight 56,310 kg
Load capacity = Lowest of 3 allowed load weight above - Operating weight
Load capacity = 74,650 - 56,310 = 18,340 kg
 Data of load is
Passenger 134 adult 12 children and 5 infant
Baggage 2,450 kg
Cargo 1,700 kg
So make calculation like this

All off load can be loaded due to load capacity > Total load

Chapter 6
Dangerous Goods Regulation

Dangerous Goods are also known as Hazardous material, Restricted articles or Dangerous Cargo.
Acceptance of Dangerous Goods must be in accordance with all provosions of the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations.
Dangerous Goods are articles or substance which are capable or posing a significant risk to health, safety
or to property when transport by air.
There are possibilities that cargo declared as general cargo mau contain hazardous articcles there are
not apparent such articles may also be found in baggage. It must be obserce carefully when accepting
following articles, which may contain hazardous materials :
hh. Aircraft on the ground (AOG) spares and its equipment
ii. Automobile parts
jj. Breathing apparatus
kk. Camping equipment
ll. Chemicals
mm. Cryoganic liquid
nn. Dental apparatus
oo. Diving equipment
pp. Drilling and mining equipment
qq. Vapor shipper
rr. Electrical equipment
ss. Electrically powered apparatus
tt. Film crew or media equipment
uu. Frozen embryos, friut and vagatbles
vv. Fuels and fuel control units
ww. Hot air balloons
xx. Laboratory testing equipment
 yy. Magnet or other items of similar material
zz. Medicals supplies
aaa. Pharmaceuticals
bbb. Refrigerators
ccc. Swimming pool chemicals
ddd. Vaccines
eee. Ect

I. IATA Dangerous Good Regulations

IATA Dangerous Good Regulations which are issued annually. All staff accpeting freight must be
fully conversant with the contents and their arrangement. If the shippers maintains that an articles
is not dangerous and accepting office not is in doubt , the shipper must be asked to provide a
signed statement declaring that the articles is not restricted.
If the shippers has difficulty in classifying a substance or articles or if the accepting office doubt the
validity of the shippers statement, a rulling must be obtained from an official authority before the
shipment can be accepted.

II. Aircraft supplies

Under section IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations do not apply to the following:
1. Aircraft parts equipment and supplies (other than fuel) carried by or required aboard a board to
the aircraft for its operation including:
fff. Fire extinguisher
ggg. Cylinders containing compressed gases
hhh. Aerosol dispensers
iii. Hydraulic accumulators
jjj. Non-sailable batteries
kkk. First aid kits
lll. Signaling devices
mmm. Serviceable aircraft tires
2. Alcoholic beverage, perfumes, colognes safety matches and liquefied gas lighters carried aboard a
passenger aircraft by the airlines for use safe on the aircraft during flight.
3. Dry ice intended for use in food and beverage service aboard the aircraft.

III. Dangerous in baggage

Dangerous goods must be packed in the quantities and type of packaging specified in IATA
Regulations. The effect of altitude, pressure and temperature changes can lead to leakage of
contents particularly
In case of liquid and gases unless the general packaging requirement published as regulation that
have complied with IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.

Dangerous goods must not be carried in or as passenger or crew check or carry-on baggage, except
as provided table s bellow (IATA Dangerous Good regulations).

The appropriate hazard and handling labels in figure below must be affixed to every package
containing dangerous goods.
..
 ,,,,

Chapter 7
Aviation Security

I. Screening and Searching

A. Purpose of screening and searching
Purpose of the screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage is to detect or identity of
weapons explosive or other dangerous devices which may be use to commit acts of unlawful
interference.

B. Standard of screening and searching for passenger

1. The screening checkpoint should be relatively effortless for passenger and should take at
least amount of time possible.
Elderly and physically disabled passengers should be given priority through the screening
checkpoint.
It should be verified in some way that the disabled passengers are genuinely disabled and
are not using a handicap as a ploy to smuggle weapons inside the sterile area.
Elderly and physically disabled passengers must be subjected to the screening process in
some form (Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) or hand search).
2. Passengers who are blind or unable to walk should not be processed through a WTMD.
These disabled passengers should be scanned by hand and/or HHMD
3. Seeing Eye dogs for blind passenger should be screened with an HHMD and/or by hand.
These dogs are very obedient and should not mind being screened if the owner has been
made aware what is necessary for the dog to do and commanded his/her dog
appropriately.
4. Infants under the age of 2 should be held by a parent/guardian and thus processed through
the WTMD. Baby carriages should be screened using Electronic Trace Detection (ETD)
equipment, if available.
Able-bodied infants over 2 years of age are assumed to be able to walk and should be
treated as adult passengers. Search of infants must always be conducted with either a
parent or guardian present.
5. As passengers progress through the waiting line leading to the screening checkpoint, signs
should be posted instructing them about the screening process as well as prohibited items.
This eliminates unnecessary delays and increases the level of passenger acceptance of the
screening procedures.
6. Before entering the security screening area, a security staff member shall verify that the
boarding pass and passport are valid. In some States, for domestic flights, a photo ID is a
valid piece of identification.
 The security staff member will also encourage the passenger to remove all loose articles
from his/her pockets as well as all jackets and hats to limit delays at the screening
checkpoint.
7. The passenger shall then be directed to a screening checkpoint.
8. All carry-on shall be place on the conveyor belt of the X-ray machine.
9. A staff member shall ask the passenger to remove all electronic items and place them in a
bin provided to them. At this point, all jackets and hats shall also be removed and placed in
the bin.
Carry-on bags will also be placed in a bin. To prevent theft of carry-on baggage in the case
of a secondary screening, a tag with a number corresponding to the bin(s) will be handed to
the passenger.
As far as possible, all carry-on belonging to one passenger should be placed in a single bin
to favor flow of passenger.
10. As the passenger's carry-on goes through the X-ray machine, the passenger shall go through
the WTMD. If the WTMD is triggered, a passenger searcher shall ask the passenger if all of
his/her pockets are empty.
A person who sets off the first WTMD can be sent back to remove more items, provided this
does not block the traffic flow.
If traffic flow is likely to be impeded, the passenger can be directed to a second WTMD
offset from the main path through the point. That person can then be cleared without
disruption to the rest of the traffic. If the alarm is triggered again a secondary screening will
be necessary.
11. There should also be a continuous random secondary search of passengers who do not
trigger the alarm. Random selection should be genuinely random and not concentrated
during off-peak hours.
12. The passenger needing a secondary check should have his/her carry-on baggage removed
from the conveyor belt by checkpoint staff and left behind the conveyor belt. Following the
secondary screening, the passenger can redeem his/her bag.
13. Passengers requiring secondary screening should be “wanded” by a HHMD. To improve the
efficiency of the secondary search, the screener's hand should always follow the HHMD to
feel if the person is carrying any objects. Screeners cannot assume that the HHMD is
triggered only by an innocent object worn by the passenger.
They should make sure that no offensive item lies behind or next to the object triggering
the HHMD. If the metal detectors keep being triggered, a hand search will be necessary.
Secondary searches should be performed by persons of the same gender as the passenger.
Before a secondary search can be performed, screeners should ask for consent by the
passenger. Refusing a secondary search will deny the passenger access to the aircraft.
14. Hand searches should be performed by a security staff member of the same gender as the
passenger. Although necessary, a hand search can seem invasive to the passenger,
therefore courtesy is very important.
15. Hand searches should be complemented with Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) inspection.
Moreover, a continuous random check by ETD of cleared bags should be performed at each
screening station. Depending on the threat level, available equipment and manpower a
carrier should consider tracing bags inside and out. Again, randomness has to be genuine
throughout the hours of operation of the airport and not concentrated at off-peak times.
16. Cabin restricted items are found during a hand search the security staff should hand them
over to an air carrier employee who will load them into the cargo hold before which they
 will be identified appropriately according to IATA Passenger Services Conference Resolution
1750.
17. Any prohibited items and prohibited dangerous goods should be confiscated by the security
staff. They should be handled and disposed of in accordance with national legislation. The
airport security officer should ensure that an accurate record is maintained of all such
items.
18. Once passengers have left the screening area, they should be remain in a sterile area.
Anybody who leaves

C. Method of Searching.
Method of Hand searches of an individual's person should be carried out as follows:
1. The person being searched should face the searcher.
2. When the person is carrying a coat, book, newspaper or other items, these should be
searched and as far as possible X-rayed, set aside, and returned only after the person has
been searched.
3. Male personnel should search male persons; female persons should be searched by female
personnel.
4. The search is to consist of an examination of the body and clothing by running the hands
over the body and clothing, in a systematic fashion, back and front and should include:
a. a physical examination of headgear and a physical or visual examination of hair
b. physical examination of outer clothing (coat, jacket etc) in the order: back, collar, lapels,
shoulders, pockets (externally & internally), arms.
c. a physical examination of tie, waistcoat, blouse/shirt, sweater, cardigan, etc., including
pockets.
d. a physical examination of trousers/skirts in the order: waistband, pockets, turn-ups,
hemlines.
e. a physical examination of shoes and boots, special attention being paid to high heels and
platform shoes, if necessary using a hand-held metal detector (HHMD) or passing
through X-ray equipment.
f. a visual examination to detect unusual or suspicious fat, bulges, etc. which should be
further examined.
g. special attention should be paid to the armpit, breasts, crotch, waistband areas, covered
legs, ankles and footwear

D. Details of Screening Equipment

All screening checkpoints should have the following screening equipment:
1. Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMDs).
They should be adequately calibrated to avoid too many false-positives yet be able to detect
potentially dangerous metal objects. WTMDs should be tested regularly. Prior to installation
it should be verified that there are no structural components that could interfere with the
screening equipment.

2. Hand-Held Metal Detector (HHMD).

For secondary screening of passengers who have triggered the alarm at the WTMD.

3. Security Staff.
For hand searches of carry-on baggage when there is doubt about the contents and for hand
searches of passengers when they trigger both WTMDs and HHMDs.
 For all pieces of equipment, if possible, brand name and model number should not be visible to
the public and passengers. Strengths and weaknesses of screening equipment are readily
available. It can be easy for potential perpetrators to find a way to elude the equipment used by
a certain airport if the name and model are visible.

E. Aircraft protection
Security procedures shall be applied:
1. All personnel who service the aircraft must be carefully selected and supervised.
2. Staff working on the aircraft or in the vicinity must be issued with distinctive identification.
3. Servicing staff and their equipment must be searched. Access times, names and staff
numbers shall be recorded.
4. After the aircraft has been serviced and tested it must be thoroughly search, both internally
and externally then guarded.
5. Samples of fuel and oil shall be taken and then retained until the flight has been completed

F. Baggage Security.
Security procedures shall be applied:
1. If there is a Baggage Master attached to the staff of the VIP he should supply a list of hold
baggage to be carried by each member of the group.
2. Each piece should be clearly labeled and numbered.
3. Passenger and baggage reconciliation must be properly implemented.
4. All hold baggage, including crew baggage, should be screened prior to loading, if facilities
are available at the pick up point the baggage can be screened at this location and escorted
to the aircraft.

G. Catering Security
Security procedures shall be applied:
1. Catering items should be searched, sealed and escorted to the aircraft.
2. Cabin crew to further check catering items being loaded.
3. Sample to be taken of drinking water, which should then be retained until completion of the
flight.

H. Passengers and cabin baggage security.

Security procedures shall be applied:
1. Ground staff to check boarding documents and passports of passengers.
2. Cabin crew to check boarding document
3. Passengers and cabin baggage to be screened prior to boarding
4. The screening of the VIP and certain members of the group will depend upon status and
Government requirements.
5. The passenger list might be required by local law enforcement agencies.

I. Cargo, Mail and Company Stores Security.

Security procedures shall be applied:
1. All such items should be screened prior to boarding.
2. The threat assessment might not permit cargo and mail to be carried on that particular
flight;
 3. Cargo management must be advised in advance when cargo and mail are not carried, as
alternative arrangements will need.

II. Passenger identification check.

A. Behavior Passenger Risk Assessment
Airlines shall ensure when a passenger is checking in at the ticket counter or gate, the staff
agent shall look for the following characteristics:
1. Nervous or disoriented;
2. Overly aggressive or co-operative;
3. Passive, avert gaze, aloof.

Check-in or gate, agent’s staff shall also look for the following characteristics, which may require
further questioning:
1. A passenger with no baggage, too little or excessive baggage for the duration of the trip;
2. A passenger claiming not to have key(s) or unable to open luggage if required;
3. Name on baggage does not match name on ticket/passport;
4. Unusual or illogical routing;
5. One-way ticket (exceptions would be permanent residents returning home);
6. A passenger unsuitably attired or not at ease for the class of travel;
7. Arriving at check-in or boarding gate at the last minute;
8. A passenger rushing the staff to complete procedures; i) Having someone else checking-in
for them;
9. The passenger should speak the language of the country issuing the passport or of the
country in which they claim residency;
10. The passenger should have other identification documents or cards in the same name;
11. Make sure the passenger can accurately recall the full name, date and place of birth

Check-in or gate agent’s staff shall look for the following signs of previous travel:
a. Entry and exit stamps; b) Recently-issued visas;
b. Two passports or conflicting documents with conflicting information; d) Baggage tags;
c. Clothing:
 Appropriate for the occasion (business, pleasure, stated occupation, etc.)
 Matching the climate of the destination
 Matching the styles in the country of origin or destination
 The clothing should fit the passenger adequately; it should be his/her own.