2022 Legal Edge Forecast Political-Law

POLITICAL LAW
from the doctrines and cases cited

during the lecture of Vice Dean Victoria V. Loanzon
Oct. 22, 2022
The political question doctrine is “no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review” under the expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of justice not only “to settle actual case
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Council of Teachers
and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education,
882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
Requisites Before the Supreme Court (SC) May Exercise its Power of Judicial Review.
The Court’s power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of constitutional violation
or grave abuse of discretion. The following requisites must first be complied with before the
Court may exercise its power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance;
(3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case. Of these four, the most important are the first two
requisites, and thus will be the focus of the following discussion. Council of Teachers and Staff
of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA
471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had been
accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action.
An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues
through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
“ripeness,” and a question is ripe when the act being challenged has a direct effect on the
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individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may
interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No.
216930 October 9, 2018
Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.
In constitutional cases, which are often brought through public actions and the relief prayed for
is likely to affect other persons, nontraditional plaintiffs have been given standing by this Court
provided specific requirements have been met. When suing as a concerned citizen, the person
complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In the case of taxpayers, they are allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. On the other hand, legislators have standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and
are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which infringe upon their
legislative prerogatives. An organization, asserting the rights of its members, may also be granted
standing by the Court. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9,
2018
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a
bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries
of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also
as to its due enactment. The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration
that “[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the [Judiciary] to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, [as in the
instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.” Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled

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bill doctrine. Claims that the required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not
been obtained, that irregularities attended the passage of the law, that the tenor of the bill
approved in Congress was different from that signed by the President, that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill, and even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to
the President contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously” inserted by the conference
committee, had all failed to convince the Court to look beyond the four corners of the enrolled
copy of the bill. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
(CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power,

the Supreme Court (SC) has adopted two (2) tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it. The policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth
therein. The sufficient standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is
to be implemented. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
Under the two (2) tests (completeness test and sufficient standard test), the K to 12 Law, read
and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains
sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the Department of Education (DepEd),
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA).
Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in
all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to
the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor
does not make said law incomplete. The purpose of permissible delegation to administrative
agencies is for the latter to “implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by ‘filling in’ the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.” With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature has
found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed to be experts in the

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particular fields assigned to them, the authority to provide direct and efficacious solutions to
these problems. This is effected by the promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the
K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in
coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights relevant to
implementation of the K to 12 Law. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October
9, 2018
Department Order (DO) No. 31 is an administrative regulation addressed to Department of

Education (DepEd) personnel providing for general guidelines on the implementation of a new
curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic education.
Petitioners’ arguments lack factual and legal bases. DO No. 31 did not add two (2) years to basic
education nor did it impose additional obligations to parents and children. DO No. 31 is an
administrative regulation addressed to DepEd personnel providing for general guidelines on the
implementation of a new curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic
education. DO No. 31 was issued in accordance with the DepEd’s mandate to establish and
maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of
national development, formulate, plan, implement, and coordinate and ensure access to,
promote equity in, and improve the quality of basic education; and pursuant to the Secretary’s
authority to formulate and promulgate national educational policies, under existing laws.
Moreover, more than a year prior to adoption of DO No. 31, and contrary to petitioners’
assertions, DepEd conducted regional consultations and focus group discussions, participated in
by students, parents, teachers and administrators, government representatives, and
representatives from private schools and private sector, to elicit opinions, thoughts and
suggestions about the K to 12 basic education. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
216930 October 9, 2018
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, including the rules and
guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties are not required
to be published.
There is also no merit in petitioners’ claim that publication is necessary for DO No. 31 to be
effective. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, including the rules and
guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties are not required to
be published. At any rate, the Court notes that DO No. 31 was already forwarded to the University

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of the Philippines Law Center for filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and took effect pursuant to said provisions. Council of Teachers and Staff of
Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA
471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
Police power is defined broadly as the State’s authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
This all-comprehensive definition provides ample room for the State to meet the exigencies of
the times depending on the conditions and circumstances. As the Court eruditely explained in
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 (1991), (Basco): The concept of
police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the “state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.” (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA
386). Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra). It finds no specific
Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with
the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty.
It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the state “to govern its citizens.” (Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-
protection and is most aptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” (Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.”
(Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of the winds of change. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October
9, 2018

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The State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education and the general
welfare of the people.
From the legislative history of the Philippine education system as detailed above, one can easily
discern that the enactment of education laws, including the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten
Education Act, their respective implementing rules and regulations and the issuances of the
government agencies, are an exercise of the State’s police power. The State has an interest in
prescribing regulations to promote the education and the general welfare of the people. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “[t]here is no doubt as
to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.” Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882
SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The grounds for nullity must be clear beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for the Court to nullify
the assailed laws, petitioners must clearly establish that the constitutional provisions they cite
bestow upon them demandable and enforceable rights and that such rights clash against the
State’s exercise of its police power under the K to 12 Law. To be sure, the Court’s role is to balance
the State’s exercise of its police power as against the rights of petitioners. The Court’s
pronouncement in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377 (2000), (Lantion) instructs: x x x
The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a “fundamental
postulate of constitutional law.” The approach requires that we “take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.”
These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one
hand, and the government’s promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on
the other. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines

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As defined, “a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.” Only self-executing
provisions of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to
causes of action in court.
This balancing of interest approach has been applied in this jurisdiction in Lantion in determining
whether there was a violation of the private respondent’s right to due process when he was not
furnished a copy of the request for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country’s
commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to extradite to the United States of America
persons who were charged with the violation of some of its laws. The Court held in Lantion that
at the stage of the extradition, it was only at an evaluation stage; thus there was yet no
requirement that he be given notice of the proceedings. At that stage, the balance was tilted in
favor of the interest of the State in helping suppress crime by facilitating the extradition of
persons covered by treaties entered into by the government. It is with these standards and
framework that the Court examines whether the enactments of the Kindergarten Education Act,
the K to 12 Law and their implementing rules and regulations, were valid exercises of the State’s
police power to regulate education. In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions
of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of
action in court. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine first whether the constitutional
provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they are, is there a conflict between
these rights and the State’s police power to regulate education? If a conflict does exist, do the
rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State? Council of Teachers and Staff of
471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
The Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law and its related issuances cannot be nullified
based solely on petitioners’ bare allegations that they violate general provisions of the
Constitution which are mere directives addressed to the executive and legislative departments.
Petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law and/or any of its related issuances contravene or
violate any of their rights under the foregoing constitutional provisions because these provisions
simply state a policy that may be “used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.” They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights. In other words, the Kindergarten Education Act, the K
to 12 Law and its related issuances cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners’ bare
allegations that they violate general provisions of the Constitution which are mere directives
addressed to the executive and legislative departments. If these directives are unheeded, the

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remedy does not lie with the courts, but with the power of the electorate in casting their votes.
As held in Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997): “The reasons for denying a cause of action to
an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations
of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade ‘into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy-making.”’ Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
2018
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution when
it made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making
elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not change
this as, in fact, they affirmed it.
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution when it
made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making
elementary education compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not change this
as, in fact, they affirmed it. As may be gleaned from the outlined history of education laws in the
Philippines, the definition of basic education was expanded by the legislature through the
enactment of different laws, consistent with the State’s exercise of police power. In BP Blg. 232,
the elementary and secondary education were considered to be the stage where basic education
is provided. Subsequently, in R.A. No. 9155, the inclusion of elementary and high school
education as part of basic education was affirmed. The legislature, through the Kindergarten
Education Act, further amended the definition of basic education to include kindergarten.
Thereafter, the legislature expanded basic education to include an additional two (2) years of
senior high school. Thus, by then, basic education comprised of thirteen (13) years, divided into
one (1) year of kindergarten, six (6) years of elementary education, and six (6) years of secondary
education — which was divided into four (4) years of junior high school and two (2) years of
senior high school. The Constitution did not curtail the legislature’s power to determine the
extent of basic education. It only provided a minimum standard: that elementary education be
compulsory. By no means did the Constitution foreclose the possibility that the legislature
provides beyond the minimum set by the Constitution. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges
and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R.
No. 216930 October 9, 2018

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Absent any showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-executing right or any international
law, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to 12
Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress.
There is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that would show that the State is prohibited from making
kindergarten and high school compulsory. The UDHR provided a minimum standard for States to
follow. Congress complied with this minimum standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the minimum
by making kindergarten and high school compulsory. This action of Congress is, in turn, consistent
with Article 41 of the CRC which provides that “[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect
any provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and which
may be contained in: (a) [t]he law of a State party; or (b) [i]nternational law in force for that
State.’’ The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the Congress sought to realize
the right to education of its citizens. It is indeed laudable that Congress went beyond the
minimum standards and provided mechanisms so that its citizens are able to obtain not just
elementary education but also kindergarten and high school. Absent any showing of a violation
of any Constitutional self-executing right or any international law, the Court cannot question the
desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of
Congress. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied because only those
currently enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took effect and future students will be subject to
the K to 12 Basic Education Curriculum and the additional two (2) years of senior high school.
Students who already graduated from high school under the old curriculum are not required by
the K to 12 Law to complete the additional two (2) years of senior high school.
More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4) years of high school
education. Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become
the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be
absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of
future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the rights of
students under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not absolute. These are subject to limitations
prescribed by law and regulations. In fact, while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that students
have the right to continue their course up to graduation, Section 20 of the same law does not
restrict elementary and high school education to only six (6) and four (4) years. Even R.A. No.
9155 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, which was enacted under the 1987
Philippine Constitution, does not specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In
other words, BP Blg. 232 or R.A. No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the

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duration of elementary and high school education. In adding two (2) years of secondary
education to students who have not yet graduated from high school, Congress was merely
exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in imposing reasonable regulations for the
control and duration of basic education, in compliance with its constitutional duty to promote
quality education for all. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
2018
The Supreme Court (SC), in its previous decisions, has defined academic freedom for the
individual member of the academe as “the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in
his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors
without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments.”
Without question, petitioners, who are faculty members in HEIs, indeed possess the academic
freedom granted by Constitution. This Court, in its previous decisions, has defined academic
freedom for the individual member of the academe as “the right of a faculty member to pursue
his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions
are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic,
or academic establishments.” Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
2018
The Supreme Court (SC) was of the view that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and
culture are all non-self-executing, which includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and
Section 18 on access to cultural opportunities.
In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 824 SCRA 327 (2017), the Court held that Section 15 on
arts and culture of Article XIV is not self-executory because Congress passed laws dealing with
the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. The Court was of the view that all
sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-executing, which includes
Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural opportunities. The
Court in Basco also ruled that Section 17, Article II on giving priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-
self-executing. Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional provisions are only policies

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that may be “used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.” The Court reiterates that they do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
216930 October 9, 2018
Valid classifications require real and substantial differences to justify the variance of treatment
between the classes.
The MSHS students did not offer any substantial basis for the Court to create a valid classification
between them and the rest of the high school students in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the
equal protection clause would, in fact, be violated if the assailed law treated the MSHS students
differently from the rest of the high school students in the country. To be clear, the Court is not
saying that petitioners are not gifted, contrary to their claims. The Court is merely saying that the
K to 12 Law was not infirm in treating all high school students equally. The MSHS students are,
after all, high school students just like all the other students who are, and will be, subjected to
the revised curriculum. The Court agrees with these petitioners to the extent of their claim that
they have the right granted by Article 3(3) and (6) of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, to education commensurate with their abilities. However, the Court
disagrees that the said right granted by the Child and Youth Welfare Code was violated when the
revised curriculum under the K to 12 Law was applied to them. It bears repeating that the law is
being merely applied to the whole segment of the population to which petitioners belong.
Further, the basic education under the K to 12 was intended to meet the basic learning needs of
the students and it is broad enough to cover alternative learning systems for out-of-school
learners and those with special needs. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities
of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) vs. Secretary of Education, 882 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 216930
October 9, 2018
As the Supreme Court (SC) already held in Basco, “Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV
of the 1987 [Philippine] Constitution x x x are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.”
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is a non-self-executing provision of the
Constitution. Again, as the Court already held in Basco, “Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article
XIV of the 1987 [Philippine] Constitution x x x are merely statements of principles and policies.
As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to

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clearly define and effectuate such principles.” The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by the
Legislature to bring the said guiding principle to life. The question of what is ‘relevant to the
needs of the people and society’ is, in turn, within the sole purview of legislative wisdom in which
the Court cannot intervene. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the
2018
When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative
power.
Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them
within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. Council of Teachers and Staff of
471, G.R. No. 216930 October 9, 2018
The Supreme Court (SC), despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or
propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two (2) grounds:
(1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion.
The courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary,
in the determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom,
merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion. For having failed
to show any of the above in the passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the

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petitioners’ remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches
of the government. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
As a rule, the Supreme Court (SC) may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. In International Service
for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines),
798 SCRA 250 (2016), the court held: An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents
a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for
the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
There are recognized exceptions to the rule; thus, the Court has seen fit to decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The present
case falls within the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, the following factors must be
present: (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party would be subjected to the same action. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to promulgate rules and regulations to
enforce and implement elections laws is enshrined in the Constitution.
The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement
elections laws is enshrined in the Constitution, which provides: Section 6, Article IX-A: Section 6.
Each Commission En Banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Section 2, Article IX-C: Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise

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the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The COMELEC’s power
to issue rules and regulations was reiterated in BP 881: Article VII. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.—In addition to the
powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for
the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall: x x x x (c) Promulgate rules
and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is
required to enforce and administer x x x. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881 and Republic Act (RA) No. 7166, it is unlawful for any
person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the
election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Contrary to PADPAO’s position, the Constitution and the cited laws specifically empower the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations implementing the so-called Gun Ban during election
period. Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise
licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Section 35 of RA 7166 also uses
the mandatory word “shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations
to implement the law. To be sure, the COMELEC’s authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement Section 32 of RA 7166 has jurisprudential imprimatur. In Orceo v. COMELEC, 616
SCRA 684 (2010), the Court upheld the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) inclusion of
airguns and airsoft guns in the definition of firearm under COMELEC Resolution No. 8714.
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7
Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October
3, 2017
In Republic Act (RA) No. 5487, it is the Philippine National Police (PNP) that exercises general
supervision over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies.
It has the exclusive authority to regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate security
and protective agencies. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does not encroach upon this
authority of the PNP to regulate Private Security Agencies (PSAs) — as it merely regulates the

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bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and all other
persons, during election period.
PADPAO’s insistence that the power to issue rules and regulations in relation to the operation of
PSAs belongs exclusively to the PNP is specious. In RA 5487, it is the PNP that exercises general
supervision over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. It
has the exclusive authority to regulate and to issue the required licenses to operate security and
protective agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority of the PNP to regulate
PSAs — as it merely regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly
weapons by PSAs and all other persons, during election period. Notably, the language of RA 5487
and its implementing rules is not so restrictive as to prohibit other government agencies from
imposing additional restrictions relating to the conduct of business by PSAs and PSSPs under
special circumstances. In this case, the special circumstance is the election period. The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that historically, Philippine elections have been marred by
violence and unnecessary bloodshed and additional guidelines must be put in place to eliminate,
or at least, lessen the threat. Whether or not the Gun Ban has been an effective deterrent is a
different matter, which is beyond the Court’s domain. Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
Republic Act (RA) No. 5487 is not a blanket authority on Private Security Agencies (PSAs) to
carry firearms. Even if they are licensed as a security agency, they must still apply for license to
own and possess a firearm as required under RA No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act.
The wording of Section 261 of BP 881 and Section 32 of RA 7166 also provides that the said
provisions apply to any and all persons. Thus, PADPAO cannot claim any exception as a PSA under
the cloak of RA 5487. Moreover, the license to operate as a PSA and the right to possess and carry
firearms do not confer an absolute right on the private licensee, as this is still subject to
regulation. In Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 (2004), the Court upheld the validity of the
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence
issued by the PNP, which revoked all permits to carry firearms outside of residence and imposed
additional requirements and restrictions thereto. As to the nature of the right to bear arms, the
Court ruled: The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence are
constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and
in harmony with these constitutional duties. Lastly, RA 5487 is not a blanket authority on PSAs to
carry firearms. Even if they are licensed as a security agency, they must still apply for license to
own and possess a firearm as required under RA 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and

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Ammunition Regulation Act. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency

Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA
524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary.
The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Classification, to be reasonable, must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
Resolution No. 10015 applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public
officers. Rule III thereof contains a comprehensive list of persons required to obtain written
authority from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to bear, carry, and transport firearms
outside his place or residence or business.
Aside from PSAs and PSSPs, the regulation applies even to the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vice President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals and Judges of lower courts, members of the Philippine
National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and to cashiers and disbursing officers or
persons who by the nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually
carry large sums of money or valuables, among others. Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017

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Majority of the persons listed are public officers who include high-ranking officials, law
enforcement officers, members of the armed forces, and other government officials providing
security services to officials of the Philippine government or foreign diplomatic corps. Cashiers,
disbursement officers, similar persons with the same nature of work, and Private Security
Agencies (PSAs) do not fall under the same category.
As correctly put by the COMELEC, through the OSG, there is substantial distinction between and
among the persons listed therein. Majority of the persons listed are public officers who include
high-ranking officials, law enforcement officers, members of the armed forces, and other
government officials providing security services to officials of the Philippine government or
foreign diplomatic corps. Cashiers, disbursement officers, similar persons with the same nature
of work, and PSAs do not fall under the same category. They are not public officers, law
enforcement officers, and neither are they providing security services in relation to public office.
The inclusion of cashiers and disbursement officers is due to the necessity for them to safeguard
the significant sums of money or valuables in their possession. PSSPs/PSAs are included due to
the nature of their private business, which is to provide security services to their clients.
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7
Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October
3, 2017
The imposition of the license fee is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to regulate the
bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms during the election period.
The imposition of the license fee is germane to the purpose of the law, which is to regulate the
bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms during the election period. It is not limited to
existing conditions only as it applies similarly to cashiers, disbursing officers, PSSPs, and PSAs
during election period. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators
(PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R.
No. 223505 October 3, 2017
The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties.
As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, petitioner’s claim cannot be countenanced. The
non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in application to
laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing

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the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a
contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. In this case, PSAs’ contracts
with their clients are not affected in any manner by the requirement of having to obtain from the
COMELEC’s written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside of their residence or
place of work and in public places, during election period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such
authority. Lastly, the filing fee of fifty pesos (P50.00) per security guard can hardly be said to be
exorbitant. It is a reasonable charge for the issuance of the permit to private individuals. Besides,
petitioner did not present any evidence to prove its allegation that the amounts collected are
exorbitant or unreasonable. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA
524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
Under Section 261(s) of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, the punishable act is the bearing of arms
outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the election period and not the
failure of the head or responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior written
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) approval.
Petitioner’s reliance on Rimando v. COMELEC, 600 SCRA 591 (2001) is hollow, if not totally
pointless. In said case, Rimando was the president and general manager of a security agency. The
COMELEC had issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against Rimando
for violation of Section 261(s) of BP 881. It was alleged that Rimando was guilty of an election
offense as he unlawfully allowed his security guards to guard private residences in Santa Rosa
Homes Subdivision in Laguna, using firearms, knowing fully well that they had no prior written
authority from the COMELEC as required under then COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, in relation
to the Gun Ban during election period from January 2, 2001 until June 13, 2001. The Court ruled
in favor of Rimando stating that under Section 261(s) of BP 881, the punishable act is the bearing
of arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the election period and not
the failure of the head or responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior written
COMELEC’s approval. There is likewise nothing in RA 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere
failure to secure written authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such
failure to secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative acts, such as the
bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during the election period. Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 841 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 223505 October 3, 2017
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Section 6, Article IX-A thereof expressly grants each Constitutional Commission En Banc to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices.
The Constitution is quick to add, however, that such rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
The power of the Commission En Banc to promulgate the Resolution is sanctioned by the 1987
Constitution. Section 6, Article IX-A thereof expressly grants each Constitutional Commission En
Banc to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices. The Constitution is quick to add, however, that such rules shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Petitioners argue, however, that the Resolution is in violation of
Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution because it was not promulgated by the En Banc
consisting of the Chairman and two Commissioners, but by only two sitting members, the Acting
Chairman and one Commissioner. Petitioners also posit that the Resolution diminishes a party’s
substantive right to due process because it requires payment of filing fees as a condition
precedent to the Commission’s giving of due course to his or her appeal. These contentions are
incorrect. Department of Foreign Affairs vs. Commission on Audit, 941 SCRA 343, G.R. No.
194530. July 7, 2020
It is not necessary that the entire complement of the Commission be present or sitting on the
bench in order to constitute a Commission sitting En Banc.
The requirement that a matter must be acted upon by the En Banc of a body or tribunal has been
interpreted to mean that it reaches a decision as a collegial body, and not necessarily, as an entire
body. In Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Teves, 682 SCRA 397 (2012), the Court had interpreted the
provisions in the Securities Regulation Code, which state that only the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) En Banc can adopt rules and regulations and can issue opinions, to mean that
any opinion of individual Commissioners or SEC legal officers does not constitute a rule or
regulation of the SEC and is ultra vires. Similarly, in FASAP v. PAL, 858 SCRA 359 (2018), the Court
held that whether it is sitting En Banc or in division, it acts as a collegial body. By virtue of the
collegiality, even the Chief Justice alone cannot promulgate or issue any decision or order. Thus,
Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution is so worded so as to impress that the promulgated
rules concerning pleadings and practice before the Commission or before any of its offices are
arrived at on the basis of collegial decisions and not by only one member of the Commission
Proper. This essence of collegiality in the Commission is not lost even if only two members
thereof have resolved to promulgate procedural rules. It is not necessary that the entire
complement of the Commission be present or sitting on the bench in order to constitute a
Commission sitting En Banc. Department of Foreign Affairs vs. Commission on Audit, 941 SCRA
343, G.R. No. 194530. July 7, 2020

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The composition of the Constitutional Commissions regularly comes down to only two (2) at
some point by virtue of the Constitution’s design of a system of rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the Commission membership.
It is well to note that, in fact, the composition of the Constitutional Commissions regularly comes
down to only two at some point by virtue of the Constitution’s design of a system of rotational
plan or the staggering of terms in the Commission membership. Under this system, the
appointment of Commission members subsequent to the original set appointed after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution shall occur every two years. The system has assured that the
Commissions are never a composition of one, but are, at the very least, always consisting of two
members. This, to the mind of the Court, only goes to show that the situation of a two-member
Commission is an expected outcome and it is fair to assume that the Constitution would therefore
sanction an act of a two-member Commission as an act of the En Banc. To suggest otherwise that
there is no En Banc if one of the positions is unfilled would be tantamount to paralyzing the
Commissions. This is not a logical intendment of the Constitution. Department of Foreign Affairs
vs. Commission on Audit, 941 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 194530. July 7, 2020
The Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit (COA), including the assailed Resolution
herein, was promulgated in the exercise of the Commission’s rulemaking power granted by the
Constitution.
This is no different from the Court’s own rulemaking power and its promulgation of the Rules of
Court in the exercise thereof, which Rules has never been viewed as a devaluation of a litigant’s
due process rights. The assailed Resolution recognizes its similarity with the Rules of Court,
holding in one of its whereas clauses that “the imposition and collection of filing fees is part and
parcel of the rules on pleadings and practice even under the Rules of Court to cover partially the
quasi-judicial cost of services to be rendered.” Department of Foreign Affairs vs. Commission on
Audit, 941 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 194530. July 7, 2020
A disallowance is defined as the disapproval in audit of a transaction, particularly a

disbursement, either in whole or in part.
The assailed Resolution provides that an appeal from a notice of disallowance may be filed by the
appellant subject to the payment of filing fees. A disallowance is defined as the disapproval in
audit of a transaction, particularly a disbursement, either in whole or in part. If numerous notices
of disallowances were issued against a government official, this only means that there were
different transactions involved. These transactions could be of varying nature, could have been

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made from different allowances or funds, or could have been disbursed on different periods.
These transactions could have also been disallowed for various reasons, such as for being
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant. Thus, a government official may be slapped with
different notices of disallowance as an accountable officer under the law. The consolidation of
his or her appeals for these disallowances in one single appeal remains an available option,
provided that the observance of the reglementary periods for each notice of disallowance would
allow it, and more so if he or she has a similar argument or defense in all disallowances. This is a
reasonable and viable practice which is akin to a joinder of causes of action in ordinary civil
actions. After all, invariably, the ultimate prayer in every disallowance is to be relieved of liability.
Department of Foreign Affairs vs. Commission on Audit, 941 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 194530. July 7,
2020
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The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of expropriation, is the inherent
right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation.
The right of eminent domain has been described as ‘“the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government’ that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method
‘in nature of a compulsory sale to the State.’” The right of eminent domain is an ultimate right of
the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. The exercise of this power, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights. Hence, it is considered to be one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. Because the right of eminent domain is a power inherent in
sovereignty, it is a power which need not be granted by any fundamental law. Hence, Article III,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation” is not a grant, but only a limitation of the State’s power
to expropriate. PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
The expropriation of property consists of two (2) stages.
The first stage is concerned with “the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved

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in the suit.” The second stage is concerned with “the determination by the court of ‘the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is done by the court with the assistance
of not more than three (3) commissioners.” PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains primarily to the

legislature.
It has been held that, as an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains
primarily to the legislature. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government. The power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may delegate the
exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities.
According to eminent constitutionalist and one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., “[t]he authority of the legislature to delegate the right of eminent domain
to private entities operating public utilities has never been questioned.” PNOC Alternative Fuels
Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936
September 4, 2019
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and other persons and
entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a delegated power.
In fact, even as to municipal corporations, it has been held that they can exercise the right of
eminent domain only if some law exists conferring the power upon them. Hence, with the right
of eminent domain not being an inherent power for private corporations, whose right to
expropriate is granted by mere legislative fiat, the delegate’s exercise of the right of eminent
domain is restrictively limited to the confines of the delegating law. The scope of this delegated
legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. PNOC Alternative Fuels
Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936
September 4, 2019

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Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. Respondent
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) is allowed to exercise the right of eminent
domain only with respect to private property.
Upon a simple perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, it states in no equivocal terms that “[t]he
Grantee (referring to respondent NGCP) may acquire such private property as is actually
necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted[.]” The Court
has previously held that under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo
est (speech is the index of intention) “rests on the valid presumption that the words employed
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently.” Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity.
Respondent NGCP is allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only with respect to private
property. Therefore, this unequivocal provision of the law must be given its literal meaning and
applied without any other interpretation. PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
The delegated power to exercise the right of eminent domain may only be exercised in strict
compliance within the terms of the delegating law.
The determination of the validity of the assailed Order of Expropriation does not stop with the
identification of the subject property as patrimonial property. As previously discussed at length,
the delegated power to exercise the right of eminent domain may only be exercised in strict
compliance within the terms of the delegating law. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, respondent
NGCP’s right to expropriate must be “reasonably necessary for the construction, expansion, and
efficient maintenance and operation of the transmission system and grid and the efficient
operation and maintenance of the subtransmission systems.” The said provision likewise states
that “[respondent NGCP] may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the
realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted[.]” Even without the foregoing
provision of the law, considering that the expropriation is done, not directly, but by another
government agency or a municipal corporation, and by virtue of an authorizing statute which
does not specify the property to be taken, jurisprudence holds that the courts may look into the
necessity of the taking. PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines, 918 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 224936 September 4, 2019
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Just compensation is defined as the fair and full equivalent of the loss incurred by the affected
owner.
More specifically: x x x [J]ust compensation in expropriation cases is defined “as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly
stressed that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used
to modify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.” Republic vs. Bunsay,
927 SCRA 415, G.R. No. 205473 December 10, 2019
Since just compensation requires that real, substantial, full and ample equivalent be given for
the property taken, the loss incurred by the affected owner necessarily includes all incidental
costs to facilitate the transfer of the expropriated property to the expropriating authority,
including the capital gains tax (CGT), other taxes and fees due on the forced sale.
To recall, Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court mandates that “in no case shall x x x the owner
be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.” Since just compensation requires that
real, substantial, full and ample equivalent be given for the property taken, the loss incurred by
the affected owner necessarily includes all incidental costs to facilitate the transfer of the
expropriated property to the expropriating authority, including the CGT, other taxes and fees due
on the forced sale. These costs must be taken into consideration in determining just
compensation in the same way these costs are factored into the selling price of real property in
an arm’s length transaction. Notably, the value of the expropriated property, as declared by the
affected owner, and the current selling price of similar lands are factors listed under Section 5 of
RA 8974. Republic vs. Bunsay, 927 SCRA 415, G.R. No. 205473 December 10, 2019
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — one (1) of two (2) provisions in the Bill of Rights
preserving the citizens’ right to privacy — protects every citizen’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
It preserves, in essence, the right of the people “to be let alone” vis-à-vis the far-reaching and
encompassing powers of the State, with respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects. It
thus ensures protection of the individual from arbitrary searches and arrests initiated and

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perpetrated by the State. The rationale for the right, particularly of the right to be secure in one’s
home, was explained in the early case of US. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381 (1904), where the Court
elucidated: The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual
rights declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into
the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants. The privacy of the home —
the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the
companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the king, except in the rare
cases — has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights
to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right of
absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with
majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut
the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that
privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most
humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to
all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its
weather-beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its owner’s will; none of the forces dare
to cross the threshold even the humblest tenement without its owner’s consent. “A man’s house
is his castle,” has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His protection
therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain, as well
as in other countries. People vs. Gabiosa, Sr., 930 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 248395 January 29, 2020
A warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
it must be issued upon “probable cause”; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by
the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Despite the sanctity that the Constitution accords a person’s abode, however, it still recognizes
that there may be circumstances when State-sanctioned intrusion to someone’s home may be
justified, and as a consequence, also reasonable. This is also why the right only protects the
individual against unreasonable searches or seizures — because while State-sanctioned
intrusion is, as a general rule, unreasonable, the Constitution itself lays down the main exception
on when it becomes reasonable: when the State obtains a warrant from a judge who issues the
same on the basis of probable cause. Thus, the fundamental protection given by the search and
seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be issued upon “probable cause;” (2) probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the

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witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. At the heart of these requisites, however, is that
the intrusion on a citizen’s privacy — whether it be in his own person or in his house-must be
based on probable cause determined personally by the judge. In other words, the magistrate
authorizing the State-sanctioned intrusion must therefore himself or herself be personally
satisfied that there is probable cause to disturb the person’s privacy. People vs. Gabiosa, Sr., 930
SCRA 601, G.R. No. 248395 January 29, 2020
There is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is
sufficient to establish probable cause.
The CA, in invalidating the search warrant subject of this case, focused on a word used by the
Constitution — “and” — and then ruled that it was the intent of the Constitution that both the
applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined by the judge before
any warrant may be issued. As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither
supported by jurisprudence, nor by the spirit which animates the right. As early as 1937, in the
case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937), the Court explained that
ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause
exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of
them is sufficient to establish probable cause. People vs. Gabiosa, Sr., 930 SCRA 601, G.R. No.
248395 January 29, 2020
If, despite the use of “and,” the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as
long as probable cause was established, then the Supreme Court (SC) does not see any reason
why the converse — the judge examined the witness only and not the applicant — would not
be valid as well.
Again, the purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence,
it is immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant
only, or the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial
consideration here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the
particular individual’s privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing undue
importance on the Constitution’s use of the word “and” instead of “or” or “and/or.” In addition,
it would be a fruitless exercise to insist that the judge should have examined the complainant as
well when, as here, he admittedly did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances that
constitute the probable cause. Based on the affidavit submitted, it was Police Officer 1 Rodolfo
M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola) and his “Action Agent” who had personal knowledge of the

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circumstances as they were the ones who conducted the surveillance and test buy. Even if, for
instance, Judge Balagot examined the complainant, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero
(P/Supt Ajero), he would have obtained nothing from the latter because of his lack of personal
knowledge. P/Supt Ajero was the complainant only because he was the Officer-in-Charge of the
Kidapawan City Police Station, but it was never alleged that he participated in any of the prior
surveillance conducted. People vs. Gabiosa, Sr., 930 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 248395 January 29, 2020
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, then his
findings deserve great weight.
The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the
facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. As the Court explained in the case of
People v. Choi, 497 SCRA 57 (2006): The searching questions propounded to the applicant and
the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast
rule governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-
forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own
inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. The questions should not merely be
repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the
witnesses. If the judge fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse
of discretion is committed. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application
of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires
a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause
is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. The entirety of the
questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be considered by the judge.
People vs. Gabiosa, Sr., 930 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 248395 January 29, 2020
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As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when
a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through
the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
particularly described.
In the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is “at the top of the
hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property,
x x x for the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of
the right against unreasonable search and seizure.” The right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation
conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant after it has
determined the existence of probable cause through the personal examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described. Because of the
sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and
is strictly construed against the government. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045
June 16, 2020
There are instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant,
taking into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.”
The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search
of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop-and-frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June
16, 2020

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According to jurisprudence, “warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of
the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.”
In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA
considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. According to
jurisprudence, “warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of
the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited
to visual inspection.” On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only
when “the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an]
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.” People vs. Sapla , 938
SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual’s right

against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light
therein without opening the car’s doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive
warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, “such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.” People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No.
244045 June 16, 2020

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A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be.
Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable
cause that enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search
warrant? The answer is a resounding no. The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that
in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, “law enforcers cannot act solely on the
basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be.
It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion.” People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
The search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the pointing finger of the
informant was “a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure.”
In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court in Aruta held that “it was only
when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier
of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.”
Hence, the Court held that the search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the
pointing finger of the informant was “a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure.” Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed (Cogaed), 731
SCRA 427 (2014), which likewise involved a search conducted through a checkpoint put up after
an “unidentified civilian informer” shared information to the authorities that a person would be
transporting marijuana. In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that
justified a warrantless search, the Court, through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,
astutely explained that in cases finding sufficient probable cause for the conduct of warrantless
searches, “the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a
man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative
of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs.” However, the Court reasoned that the case of
the accused was different because “he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or
carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed was ‘suspicious.’” People vs. Sapla
, 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020

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Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.
In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen, held that the accused was a “mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit
any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge
that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.” The Court correctly explained
that “law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in
the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.” People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA
127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
The Supreme Court (SC) emphasized that there should be the “presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity.”
The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient
to incite a genuine reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained
that “no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime.” The Court emphasized that there should be the “presence of more
than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity.” In the said case, as in the instant case, the accused was just a
passenger carrying his bag. “There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover,
such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-
appellant was in possession of marijuana.” Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People
v. Yanson (Yanson), 912 SCRA 1 (2019), that a solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause that
warrants the conduct of a warrantless intrusive search and seizure. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA
127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
In prior cases wherein the Supreme Court (SC) validated warrantless searches and seizures on
the basis of tipped information, the seizures and arrests were not merely and exclusively based
on the initial tips.
In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, the Court held that,
in determining whether there is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive
warrantless searches of a moving vehicle, “bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause

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does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the
existence of ‘a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.’” The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated
warrantless searches and seizures on the basis of tipped information, “the seizures and arrests
were not merely and exclusively based on the initial tips. Rather, they were prompted by other
attendant circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was
progressively heightened by other factors, such as the accused’s failure to produce identifying
documents, papers pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of suspicious
behavior upon being approached.” In such cases, the finding of probable cause was premised “on
more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence of initial tips and a
myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable cause.” However, the case of
Yanson was markedly different from these other cases. Just as in the instant case, the police
officers proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip. People vs.
Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants
cannot produce probable cause, the Supreme Court (SC) held that [e]xclusive reliance on
information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable cause.
In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot
produce probable cause, the Court held that “[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by
informants goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched.” As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson,
“[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the floodgates to unfounded
searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants.” People vs. Sapla , 938
SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
In Saluday, the Supreme Court (SC) laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable
search of a bus while in transit.
In Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus
while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be
discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety;
and (4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that

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no evidence was planted against the accused. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045
June 16, 2020
The Supreme Court (SC) clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that
information received by the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that
information received by the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,
tracing its origins to the 1990 cases of People v. Tangliben (Tangliben), 184 SCRA 220, and People
v. Maspil, Jr. (Maspil, Jr.), 188 SCRA 751. Several of the cases following this line of jurisprudence
also heavily rely on the 1992 case of People v. Bagista (Bagista), 214 SCRA 63. It is high time for a
reexamination of this divergent line of jurisprudence. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No.
244045 June 16, 2020
The Supreme Court (SC) now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive
reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search — which include both
long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence — should be the prevailing and controlling
line of jurisprudence.
It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future age. For Justice
Padilla’s Dissenting Opinion, such age has come. This holding, which is reflected in the recent tide
of jurisprudence, must now fully find the light of day as it is more in line with the basic
constitutional precept that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental
law, hovering above the articles on governmental power. The Court’s holding that tipped
information, on its own, cannot engender probable cause is guided by the principle that the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein
any allowable transgression of such right is subject to the most stringent of scrutiny. Hence,
considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine
that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that
permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search — which
include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence — should be the prevailing and
controlling line of jurisprudence. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020

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It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Supreme Court (SC) were to allow intrusive
warrantless searches and seizures on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.
It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless
searches and seizures on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips. Any person can easily
hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated information to the police.
Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate
another by simply giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to invasively search
the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a bogus tip. On the side of the
authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the infiltration of a citizen’s
vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw intelligence
was received, even if there really was no such information received or if the information received
was fabricated. Simply stated, the citizen’s sanctified and heavily-protected right against
unreasonable search and seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures will be rendered hollow and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such
erosion of the Bill of Rights. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
Information coming from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police officers
undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably produce
probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search.
What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the part of
the police to conduct an intrusive search is the fact that the information regarding the description
of the person alleged to be transporting illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with
green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed merely through a text message
from a completely anonymous person. The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this
stranger gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether
the information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous
text message, without giving any second thought, the police accepted the unverified information
as gospel truth and immediately proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure,
information coming from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police officers
undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably produce probable
cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No.
244045 June 16, 2020

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The Supreme Court (SC) has explained that stop-and-frisk searches refer to ‘the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband.’ Thus, the allowable scope of a ‘stop-and-frisk’ search is limited to a ‘protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.’
The Court has explained that stop-and-frisk searches refer to ‘the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.’ Thus, the
allowable scope of a “‘stop-and-frisk’ search is limited to a ‘protective search of outer clothing
for weapons.’” The search conducted by the authorities on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond
a protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband. Moreover, while it was clarified
by the Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997), that probable cause is not
required to conduct stop-and-frisk searches, “mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a ‘stop-
and-frisk.’ A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.”
In Comprado, Cogaed, and Veridiano, the Court has held that mere reliance on information
relayed by an informant does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police to conduct a
warrantless search and seizure. In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court has held that
information from an informant is mere suspicion that does not validate a stop-and-frisk search.
People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a
person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures if the following requisites are present: 1. It must appear that the rights
exist; 2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and 3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Considering that a warrantless
search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that “[t]he fundamental law
and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid
waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to
a search does not amount to permission thereto.” Hence, even in cases where the accused
voluntarily handed her bag or the chairs containing marijuana to the arresting officer, the Court
has held there was no valid consent to the search. People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No.
244045 June 16, 2020

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Known as the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures is deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Known as the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
of such unreasonable searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.”
People vs. Sapla , 938 SCRA 127, G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to each citizen by
our fundamental charter.
In this case, no less than petitioner Valmores’ right to religious freedom is being threatened by
respondents’ failure to accommodate his case. In this regard, when confronted with a potential
infringement of fundamental rights, the Court will not hesitate, as it now does, to overlook
procedural lapses in order to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher demands of
substantial justice. The Court is also aware of petitioner Valmores’ plea for the expedient
resolution of his case, as he has yet to enroll in the MSU-College of Medicine and continue with
his studies. Plainly enough, to require petitioner Valmores to hold his education in abeyance in
the meantime that he is made to comply with the rule on hierarchy of courts would be unduly
burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-sensitive endeavor, where premium is
placed not only on its completion, but also on the timeliness of its achievement. Inevitably, justice
in this case must take the form of a prompt and immediate disposition if complete relief is to be
accorded. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and survives
civilizations.
In the Philippines, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions were crafted in full acknowledgment
of the contributions of religion to the country through the enactment of various benevolent

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provisions. In its present incarnation, our fundamental law, by “imploring the aid of Almighty
God,” makes manifest the State’s respect and recognition of the collective spirituality of the
Filipino. Such recognition is embodied in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution: SEC. 5. No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
The Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to act based
on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of others and
in the interest of public welfare.
In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom
to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights
of others and in the interest of public welfare. Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and
has permeated into every sphere of human undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a
limited extent, has come under the regulatory power of the State. In 2010, the CHED
institutionalized the framework for operationalizing Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
vis-à-vis the academic freedom of higher education institutions (HEIs), pursuant to its statutory
power to formulate policies, priorities, and programs on higher education in both public and
private HEIs. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in
case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed
upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student’s religious obligations takes precedence over his
academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to
exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities
interfere with their religious obligations. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453
July 19, 2017

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The Supreme Court (SC) has, on many occasions, ruled that institutions of higher learning are
bound to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue,
barring any violation of school rules by the students concerned.
The importance of education cannot be overstated. The Court has, on many occasions, ruled that
institutions of higher learning are bound to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue, barring any violation of school rules by the students concerned. In
erudite fashion, the Court, in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 443 SCRA
56 (2004), discussed: Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine
who is “better educated” than another. Nevertheless, a student’s grades are an accepted
approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study.
The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate
pass to employment opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a
prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills
for a particular profession or trade. Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition
fees, satisfaction of the set academic standards, completion of academic requirements and
observance of school rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing their
“completion” of the course enrolled in. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453
July 19, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) held that the expulsion of the affected students based on their religious
beliefs would run against the State’s duty to protect and promote the right of all its citizens to
quality education and to make such education accessible to all.
In the landmark case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA
256 (1993), the Court gave weight to the religious convictions of students who were members of
Jehovah’s Witnesses that refused to participate in their school’s flag ceremony. Therein, the
Court held that the expulsion of the affected students based on their religious beliefs would run
against the State’s duty to protect and promote the right of all its citizens to quality education
and to make such education accessible to all. Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No.
217453 July 19, 2017
That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand,
for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general rule, and compromise, the exception.
The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual beliefs and proscribes
government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when public

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safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College
of Medicine, respondents herein were duty-bound to protect and preserve petitioner Valmores’
religious freedom. Even worse, respondents suggest that the “sacrifices” of other students of the
common faith justified their refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment. This is
non-sequitur. Respondents brush aside petitioner Valmores’ religious beliefs as if it were subject
of compromise; one man’s convictions and another man’s transgressions are theirs alone to bear.
That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand,
for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general rule, and compromise, the exception.
Valmores vs. Achacoso, 831 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 217453 July 19, 2017
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
For the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have
commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation.
Despite the ponente’s reservations as regards the conclusion reached in Cagang “that for the
purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced
from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary
investigation,” the ponente respects that Cagang is the standing doctrine. Thus, for purposes of
computing the length of delay in the present case, the Cagang guidelines will be followed, and
the case against Javier and Tumamao would be deemed initiated only upon the filing of the
complaint, or on April 27, 2011. Javier and Tumamao were given the opportunity to be heard,
and were therefore able to file their counter-affidavits on November 15, 2011 and November 22,
2011, respectively. After these dates, it appears from the record that the case had become
dormant until December 5, 2016 when the Ombudsman approved the resolution finding
probable cause against Javier and Tumamao. There is thus an unexplained delay of five years
from the time the counter-affidavits were filed to the termination of the preliminary investigation
through the approval of the Ombudsman’s resolution finding probable cause. Javier vs.
Sandiganbayan, 937 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 237997 June 10, 2020

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It is well to point out that the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the “steady stream
of cases that reach their office” despite the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) recognition of such reality.
At this juncture, it is well to point out that the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the
“steady stream of cases that reach their office” despite the Court’s recognition of such reality.
The Court understands the reality of clogged dockets — from which it suffers as well — and
recognizes the current inevitability of institutional delays. However, “steady stream of cases” and
“clogged dockets” are not talismanic phrases that may be invoked at whim to magically justify
each and every case of long delays in the disposition of cases. Like all other facts that courts take
into consideration in each case, the “steady stream of cases” should still be subject to proof as
to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy
disposition of cases as a fundamental right. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, 937 SCRA 367, G.R. No.
237997 June 10, 2020
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is, in any case, vested with jurisdiction to review the decision
of the appointing authority.
While no decision on the appeals was ever rendered by Gov. Cerilles, it would be unjust to require
Respondents to first await an issuance before elevating the matter to the CSC, given Gov. Cerilles’
delay in resolving the same. In such case, an appointing authority could easily eliminate all
opportunities of appeal by the aggrieved employees by mere inaction. It is well-settled that
procedural rules must not be applied with unreasonable rigidity if substantial rights stand to be
marginalized; here, no less than Respondents’ means of livelihood are at stake. Proceeding
therefrom, the Court cannot therefore ascribe any fault to the CSCRO in resolving the appeals of
Respondents due to Gov. Cerilles’ refusal to act, especially since the CSC is, in any case, vested
with jurisdiction to review the decision of the appointing authority. Cerilles vs. Civil Service
Commission, 846 SCRA 15, G.R. No. 180845 November 22, 2017

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As an exercise of political discretion, the appointing authority is afforded a wide latitude in the
selection of personnel in his department or agency and seldom questioned, the same being a
matter of wisdom and personal preference. In certain occasions, however, the selection of the
appointing authority is subject to review by respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) as the
central personnel agency of the Government.
Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act. As an exercise of political discretion,
the appointing authority is afforded a wide latitude in the selection of personnel in his
department or agency and seldom questioned, the same being a matter of wisdom and personal
preference. In certain occasions, however, the selection of the appointing authority is subject to
review by respondent CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government. In this regard,
while there appears to be a conflict between the two interests, i.e., the discretion of the
appointing authority and the reviewing authority of the CSC, this issue is hardly a novel one.
Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission, 846 SCRA 15, G.R. No. 180845 November 22, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the only function of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is
merely to ascertain whether the appointee possesses the minimum requirements under the
law; if it is so, then the CSC has no choice but to attest to such appointment.
In countless occasions, the Court has ruled that the only function of the CSC is merely to ascertain
whether the appointee possesses the minimum requirements under the law; if it is so, then the
CSC has no choice but to attest to such appointment. The Court recalls its ruling in Lapinid v. Civil
Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106 (1991), citing Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327
(1986), wherein the CSC was faulted for revoking an appointment on the ground that another
candidate scored a higher grade based on comparative evaluation sheets. Cerilles vs. Civil Service
Commission, 846 SCRA 15, G.R. No. 180845 November 22, 2017
In instances of reorganization, there is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing

authority when the Civil Service Commission (CSC) revokes an appointment on the ground that
the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. In such instance, the CSC is not actually
directing the appointment of another but simply ordering the reinstatement of the illegally
removed employee.
This is not the first time that the Court has grappled with this issue. As early as Gayatao v. Civil
Service Commission, 210 SCRA 183 (1992), which is analogous to this case, the Court already
ruled that in instances of reorganization, there is no encroachment on the discretion of the
appointing authority when the CSC revokes an appointment on the ground that the removal of

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the employee was done in bad faith. In such instance, the CSC is not actually directing the
appointment of another but simply ordering the reinstatement of the illegally removed
employee. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission, 846 SCRA 15, G.R. No. 180845 November 22,
2017
To successfully impugn the validity of a reorganization — and correspondingly demand for

reinstatement or reappointment — the aggrieved officer or employee has the burden to prove
the existence of bad faith.
Good faith is always presumed. Thus, to successfully impugn the validity of a reorganization —
and correspondingly demand for reinstatement or reappointment — the aggrieved officer or
employee has the burden to prove the existence of bad faith. In Cotiangco v. The Province of
Biliran, 659 SCRA 177 (2011), which involved the reorganization of the Province of Biliran, the
Court upheld the validity of the reorganization due to the failure of the aggrieved employees to
adduce evidence showing bad faith, as provided in Section 2 of RA 6656. On the other hand, in
the case of Pan v. Peña, 579 SCRA 314 (2009), the Court found that the reorganization of the
Municipality of Goa was tainted with bad faith based on its appreciation of circumstances
indicative of an intent to circumvent the security of tenure of the employees. The Court therein
upheld the invalidation of the subject appointments notwithstanding the claim that there was a
reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission,
846 SCRA 15, G.R. No. 180845 November 22, 2017
In the case of Pan v. Peña, 579 SCRA 314 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) once again found that
the appointment of new employees despite the availability of permanent officers and
employees indicated that there was no bona fide reorganization by the appointing authority.
The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656, as Section 4 thereof
instructs that: Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given
preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to
their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next
lower in rank. No new employees shall be taken until all permanent officers and employees have
been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary
qualification requirement, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent
appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be
filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature. x x x In the case of respondent Peña, petitioner claims that the position of waterworks
supervisor had been abolished during the reorganization. Yet, petitioner appointed an officer-in-

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charge in 1999 for its waterworks operations even after a supposed new staffing pattern had
been effected in 1998. Notably, this position of waterworks supervisor does not appear in the
new staffing pattern of the LGU. Apparently, the Municipality of Goa never intended to do away
with such position wholly and permanently as it appointed another person to act as officer-in-
charge vested with similar functions. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission, 846 SCRA 15, G.R. No.
180845 November 22, 2017
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
The duty of the Ombudsman as the “protector of the people” should not be marred by
overzealousness at the expense of public officers.
A public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. In order to protect this Constitutional mandate, the
Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of the people, criminal
and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as well as private
persons in conspiracy with the former. Specifically for administrative cases, it is empowered to
impose penalties in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. Nevertheless, the
duty of the Ombudsman as the “protector of the people” should not be marred by
overzealousness at the expense of public officers. This is especially true in instances where the
supreme penalty of dismissal from service may be imposed. Here, records show that Lukban has
been a public servant for 33 years with an unblemished service record. In his more than three
decades of service, he has never been charged or accused of any misconduct nor has he been
found guilty of any administrative or criminal offense. That the penalty of dismissal would not
only mean his separation from service but would also entail the forfeiture of his retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from holding public office should have impelled the
Ombudsman to be more judicious in imputing liability. Lukban vs. Carpio-Morales , 932 SCRA
174, G.R. No. 238563 February 12, 2020
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x

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Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713 vests upon heads of executive departments the
authority to ensure faithful compliance with the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) requirement. However, it does not strip the Ombudsman of its sole power to investigate
and prosecute, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person, any public official or employee
for acts or omissions which appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The Court’s ruling in Carabeo v. Sandiganbayan, 643 SCRA 603 (2011), is instructive: True, Section
10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate incomplete
or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate’s attention to such
omission and give him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an internal office
matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular
subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. Its power to
investigate and prosecute erring government officials cannot be made dependent on the prior
action of another office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its constitutionally guarded
independence. (Emphasis supplied) The fact that Leovigildo had not been previously placed
under a BOC sanctioned investigation does not make the Ombudsman’s acts void or premature,
as the latter’s power to investigate and prosecute him on account of discrepancies in his SALNs
stands independent of the power of the Commissioner of Customs to ensure compliance with
the SALN requirement within the BOC. De Castro vs. Field Investigation Office, Office of the
Ombudsman, 825 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 192723 June 5, 2017
Before a foreign trip taken by a public officer can be considered as proof of unexplained wealth,
it shall be first necessary to establish that the cost thereof is, in fact, manifestly
disproportionate to the latter’s lawful income.
Thus, in Pleyto v. PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, 538 SCRA 534 (2007), the
Court refused to consider the foreign trips alleged to have been taken by respondent therein as
proof of unexplained wealth for failure of the complainant therein to establish that the cost of
these trips were beyond the former’s capacity to pay. De Castro vs. Field Investigation Office,
Office of the Ombudsman, 825 SCRA 351, G.R. No. 192723 June 5, 2017

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The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees be, at all times, accountable to
the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives.
Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its officers and
employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees be, at all times,
accountable to the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act
with patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust; it must be treated
as a privilege rather than a right, and rest firmly upon one’s sense of service rather than
entitlement. De Castro vs. Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, 825 SCRA 351,
G.R. No. 192723 June 5, 2017
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right, but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
“[W]here an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right, but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The
question, thus, posed is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections,
913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
The Supreme Court (SC) finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given
the “evident clash of the parties’ legal claims” as to whether the questioned provision infringe
upon the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression of the petitioner, as well as all the
Filipinos overseas.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the “evident clash of the parties’ legal claims” as to whether the
questioned provision infringe upon the constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of expression of the
petitioner, as well as all the Filipinos overseas. Petitioner’s allegations and arguments presented
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion which necessarily obliges the Court to take
cognizance of the case and resolve the paramount constitutional issue raised. The case is likewise

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ripe for adjudication considering that the questioned provision continues to be in effect until the
Court issued the TRO above cited, enjoining its implementation. While it may be true that
petitioner failed to particularly allege the details of her claimed direct injury, the petition has
clearly and sufficiently alleged the existence of an immediate or threatened injury sustained and
being sustained by her, as well as all the overseas Filipinos, on their exercise of free speech by
the continuing implementation of the challenged provision. A judicial review of the case
presented is, thus, undeniably warranted. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA
515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic

government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive
economic freedom or other liberties.
In no equivocal terms did the fundamental law of the land prohibit the abridgement of the
freedom of expression. Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Constitution expressly states: No law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. A
fundamental part of this cherished freedom is the right to participate in electoral processes,
which includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to express one’s preference for a
candidate or the right to influence others to vote or otherwise not vote for a particular candidate.
This Court has always recognized that these expressions are basic and fundamental rights in a
democratic polity as they are means to assure individual self--fulfillment, to attain the truth, to
secure participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and to maintain the
balance between stability and change. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515,
G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
Nothing is more settled than that any law or regulation must not run counter to the
Constitution as it is the basic law to which all laws must conform.
Rightfully so, since time immemorial, “[i]t has been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom [of expression] calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.” In
the recent case of 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v. COMELEC, 755 SCRA 441 (2015), the
Court En Banc pronounced that any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to
vote for or against a candidate — a protected expression — carries with it a heavy presumption
of invalidity. To be sure, this rather potent deviation from our conventional adherence to the
presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by legislative acts is not without basis. Nothing is more

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settled than that any law or regulation must not run counter to the Constitution as it is the basic
law to which all laws must conform. Thus, while admittedly, these rights, no matter how
sacrosanct, are not absolute and may be regulated like any other right, in every case where a
limitation is placed on their exercise, the judiciary is called to examine the effects of the
challenged governmental action considering that our Constitution emphatically mandates that
no law shall be passed abridging free speech and expression. Simply put, a law or statute
regulating or restricting free speech and expression is an outright departure from the express
mandate of the Constitution against the enactment of laws abridging free speech and expression,
warranting, thus, the presumption against its validity. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections,
913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
A facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.
Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the
ground of overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction. Under the overbreadth
doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms. Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights. On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is noteworthy, however, that facial invalidation
of laws is generally disfavored as it results to entirely striking down the challenged law or statute
on the ground that they may be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It disregards the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution in judicial review, and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts, deviating, thus, from the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication. Hence, an on-its-face invalidation of the law has consistently been
considered as a “manifestly strong medicine” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort.” The
allowance of a review of a law or statute on its face in free speech cases is justified, however, by
the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705
August 14, 2019

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Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the

following theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which were used in
early Philippine case laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule, which was generally adhered
to in more recent cases and (c) the balancing of interests test, which was also recognized in our
jurisprudence.
In the landmark case of Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), the Court laid down a more
detailed approach in dealing with free speech regulations. Its approach was premised on the
rational consideration that “the determination x x x of whether there is an impermissible
restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case,
including the nature of the restraint.” Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515,
G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
Section 36.8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9189, as amended by RA No. 10590, is an impermissible
content-neutral regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech clause under
Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The paramount consideration in the analysis of the challenged provision, therefore, is the nature
of the restraint on protected speech, whether it is content-based or otherwise, content-neutral.
As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present
danger rule, while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. Section
36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, is an impermissible content-neutral
regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech clause under Section 4, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one’s exercise of right
to campaign or disseminate campaign-related information. Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Undoubtedly, the prohibition under the questioned legislative act
restrains speech or expression, in the form of engagement in partisan political activities, before
they are spoken or made. The restraint, however, partakes of a content-neutral regulation as it
merely involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression, specifically the time and place to
exercise the same. It does not, in any manner, affect or target the actual content of the message.
It is not concerned with the words used, the perspective expressed, the message relayed, or the
speaker’s views. More specifically, the prohibition does not seek to regulate the exercise of the
right to campaign on the basis of the particular message it conveys. It does not, in any manner,
target the actual content of the message. It is easily understandable that the restriction was not
adopted because of the government’s disagreement with the message the subject speech or
expression relays. There was no intention on the part of the government to make any distinction
based on the speaker’s perspectives in the implementation of the regulation. Simply put,
regardless of the content of the campaign message or the idea it seeks to convey, whether it is

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for or, otherwise against a certain candidate, the prohibition was intended to be applied during
the voting period abroad. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No.
223705 August 14, 2019
The particular law or regulation must be judiciously examined on what it actually intends to
regulate to properly determine whether it amounts to a content-neutral or content-based
regulation as contemplated under our jurisprudential laws.
The fact that the questioned regulation applies only to political speech or election-related speech
does not, by itself, make it a content-based regulation. It is too obvious to state that every law or
regulation would apply to a particular type of speech such as commercial speech or political
speech. It does not follow, however, that these regulations affect or target the content of the
speech or expression to easily and sweepingly identify it as a content-based regulation. Instead,
the particular law or regulation must be judiciously examined on what it actually intends to
regulate to properly determine whether it amounts to a content-neutral or content-based
regulation as contemplated under our jurisprudential laws. To rule otherwise would result to the
absurd interpretation that every law or regulation relating to a particular speech is a content-
based regulation. Such perspective would then unjustifiably disregard the well-established
jurisprudential distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations. To be sure,
not all regulations against political speech are content- based. Several regulations on this type of
speech had been declared content -neutral by this Court in previous cases. In National Press Club
v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992), the Court ruled that while the questioned provision
therein preventing the sale or donation of print space or airtime for political advertisement
during the campaign period — of course, limits the right of speech and access to mass media, it
does not authorize intervention with the content of the political advertisements, which every
candidate is free to present within their respective COMELEC time and space. In the case of 1-
United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v. COMELEC, 755 SCRA 441 (2015), above cited, the
questioned prohibition on posting election campaign materials in public utility vehicles was
classified as a content-neutral regulation by the Court, albeit declared an invalid one for not
passing the intermediate test. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R.
No. 223705 August 14, 2019
Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the same against the intermediate
test.
Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the same against the intermediate
test, viz.: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers

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POLITICAL LAW
Oct. 22, 2022
an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) such governmental interest is unrelated

to the suppression of the free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on the alleged
freedom of expression is no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental
interest. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14,
2019
In the judicial review of laws or statutes, especially those that impose a restriction on the
exercise of protected expression, it is important that we look not only at the legislative intent
or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction when
implemented.
The restriction must not be broad and should only be narrowly-tailored to achieve the purpose.
It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to make speech. As
stated, the prohibition is aimed at ensuring the conduct of honest and orderly elections to uphold
the credibility of the ballots. Indeed, these are necessary and commendable goals of any
democratic society. However, no matter how noble these aims may be, they cannot be attained
by sacrificing the fundamental right of expression when such aim can be more narrowly pursued
by not encroaching on protected speech merely because of the apprehension that such speech
creates the danger of the evils sought to be prevented. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on
Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
Indeed, an overbroad law that “chills one into silence” should be invalidated on its face.
It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that a facial invalidation of the questioned
statute is warranted to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that comes from its
overbreadth as any person may simply restrain himself from speaking or engaging in any partisan
political activity anywhere in order to avoid being charged of an electoral offense. Indeed, an
overbroad law that “chills one into silence” should be invalidated on its face. Neither was there
any provision in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the challenged law which clearly
qualifies the application of the questioned prohibition within our jurisdiction and to candidates
only. COMELEC’s Resolution No. 9843 or the IRR of R.A. No. 9189, as amended, which should
have provided for well-defined and narrowly-tailored standards to guide our executive officials
on how to implement the law, as well as to guide the public on how to comply with it, failed to
do so. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14,
2019

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POLITICAL LAW
Oct. 22, 2022
Section 36.8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as it does
not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application, which
produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and expression, and ultimately,
resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protected freedoms.
By banning partisan political activities or campaigning even during the campaign period within
embassies, consulates, and other foreign service establishments, regardless of whether it applies
only to candidates or whether the prohibition extends to private persons, it goes beyond the
objective of maintaining order during the voting period and ensuring a credible election. To be
sure, there can be no legally acceptable justification, whether measured against the strictest
scrutiny or the most lenient review, to absolutely or unqualifiedly disallow one to campaign
within our jurisdiction during the campaign period. Most certainly, thus, the challenged
provision, whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes a restriction on free speech that is
greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest it aims to achieve.
Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as it does not provide
for well-defined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling
effect on the exercise of free speech and expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary
invasion of the area of protected freedoms. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA
515, G.R. No. 223705 August 14, 2019
The Supreme Court (SC) declares Section 36.8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9189, as amended by RA
No. 10590, unconstitutional for violating Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
This Court declares Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, unconstitutional
for violating Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. To be clear, this Court does not
discount the fact that our leaders, chosen to maneuver this nation’s political ventures, are put in
position through an electoral process and as such, the government is constitutionally mandated
to ensure sound, free, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the same being indispensable in
our democratic society. In our goal to achieve such peaceful and credible democratic process,
however, we cannot likewise disparage the most exalted freedom of expression, which is
undeniably recognized as the bedrock of every democratic society, it being an “indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom.” After all, the conduct of elections is premised
upon every democratic citizen’s right to participate in the conduct of public affairs and social and
political decision-making through the exercise of the freedom of expression. A restraint on such
a vital constitutional right through an overbroad statute cannot, thus, be countenanced and given
judicial imprimatur. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Commission on Elections, 913 SCRA 515, G.R. No. 223705
August 14, 2019

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POLITICAL LAW

from the doctrines and cases cited

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Enrolled Bill Doctrine

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In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power,

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Ammunition Regulation Act. Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency

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A disallowance is defined as the disapproval in audit of a transaction, particularly a

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The expropriation of property consists of two (2) stages.

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As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains primarily to the

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In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual’s right

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A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be.

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Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional

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In instances of reorganization, there is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing

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