Declining Surat

Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City: The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots
of 1795
Author(s): Lakshmi Subramanian
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), pp. 205-237
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312154
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Modern Asian Studies, 19, 2 (1985), pp. 205-237. Printed in Great Britain.
Capitaland Crowdin a DecliningAsian Port

City: TheAnglo-BaniaOrderand the Surat
Riots of 1795
LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN
Visva Bharati University,Santiniketan
SURAT, the waning port city of the departed Great Mughals, was rocked
by riots on 6 August 1795. The lower orders of the Muslim population
fell upon the shops and houses of the Bania residents of the city, looting
grain, demolishing the images of their gods and tearing up their account
books. This was the response of a collapsing social order to the thrust of a
highly adaptive banking and trading group which had adroitly allied
itself to the rising English power on the West Coast of India. A
combination of circumstances in the half century following 1750 had
resulted in the formation of a mercantile and political order dis-
tinguished by the mutually beneficial cooperation of the English East
India Company and the Bania bankers and merchants of Surat and
Bombay. The violent protest by the Muslims against the new order
served only to reaffirm the significance of the Anglo-Bania alliance as the
central fact in the unfolding political and commercial situation on the
West Coast. The once powerful Mughal ruling 6lite and the once
wealthy Muslim shipping magnates' were no longer in a position to offer
much resistance to the English East India Company and its Bania allies.
Likewise the popular Muslim disaffection failed to shake by violence the
foundations of the emerging Anglo-Bania order. An analysis of the
August riots in Surat would afford the historian a unique opportunity to
assess the nature and impact of the new order on the West Coast and to
understand the crumbling social structure of a traditional port city-the
composition of its lower orders and its burgher groups and their
1
For a study of the expansion of Surat's overseas trade in the late 17th and early I8th
centuries and of the strength and influence of her merchant groups, see Ashin Das
Gupta's recent monograph on Surat entitled Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat
1700-1750 (Wiesbaden, 1979).
oo26-749X/85/0804-o206$o2.oo ? 1985 Cambridge University Press
205
206 LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN
responses to the major changes that were taking place in the political
and trading structure of Surat in the second half of the eighteenth
century.
The Anglo-Bania Order and the Castle Revolution of 1759
A brief explanation of the term Bania and the Anglo-Bania order is first
called for before investigating the components in its formation in the
period under review. Contemporary European documentation which
makes frequent reference to the term Bania suggests a community of
Hindu and Jaina merchants engaged in trade and banking, brokerage
and money-lending. The term essentially seems to have indicated an
occupational category, drawing in a cluster of Hindu and Jaina castes
specializing in commercial activity. While certain typical Bania castes,
such as the ShrimaliJainas and the Kapol Banias, predominated within
this occupational category, it is essential to bear in mind that a Brahman
trader could be occupationally speaking a Bania on whose behalf the
Bania Mahajan could and did make representations to the political
authorities. Arjunjee Nath Tarwady, one of Surat's most influential
bankers, and Adit Ram Bhatt, also a banker of repute, were Brahmans.
The Bania Mahajan, as we shall see, took up the cudgels for the latter
when his belongings were stolen by a Muslim fakir, the event which set
off the riots of 1795. The Bania community of Surat was organized in
two bodies, the Bania Mahajan and the Shroff Mahajan, each led by a
Seth who spoke for his own organization and for all the 'Mahajans'. The
two bodies sprang into action during the riots, acting in close concert
and speaking for the entire community of Hindu and Jaina traders
(referred to as 'Mahajans' in the contemporaneous document).2
The Bania community had been traditionally associated with trade
and commercial activity and had by virtue of their commercial linkages
come to occupy an important position in the trading and financial
system of Surat. They participated in the city's overseas commerce, in
the trade to the Gulfs and to Bengal, freighting their wares on available
shipping.3 But though they figured as exporters of textiles to the Gulfs
2 Public Department Diary of the Bombay Government (henceforth referred to as
P.D.D.) No. I I4A of 1795, pp. 109-20, petition of LackmandasJagannathdas, Seth of
the Banias and WarnasidasJaidas, Seth of Shroffs for themselves and all the Mahajans,
dated 22 August 1795.
3 Both Prof. N. K. Sinha and P. J. Marshall have referred to the Surat Banias' trade
with Bengal. They exported raw cotton and piece goods in exchange for Bengal raw silk.
It was on Bengal's raw silk that the Ahmedabad silk industry depended. See N. K.
CAPITAL AND CROWD IN A DECLINING ASIAN PORT 207
and raw cotton to Bengal, they did not own ships themselves. They were
primarily shore-based merchants and their strength lay in procurement.
They virtually monopolized the business of brokerage and consequently
an exporting merchant or trading company could ill afford to function
without their assistance. The Bania contractors in Surat city worked
through a line of intermediaries who were in touch with the primary
producers. The intermediaries, or subcontractors as they are referred to
in our evidence, were also Banias. They procured from the artisans the
manufactured goods, especially textiles, which sustained Surat's export
trade.4 In the supply trade of raw cotton, too, the Banias occupied a
critical place as contractors and subcontractors. They dominated the
city's retail trade and as shopkeepers traded in an impressive range of
goods from grain to jewellery.5 Besides, the community was also
prominent as bankers (schroffs) and moneylenders in the city.6 They
had traditionally controlled the money market by virtue of their ability
to assay coins. This enabled them to fix the rates of exchange between
different currencies. As bankers they were indispensable to the mer-
chants who relied on them for loans. Shroffs fixed the price of money and
in times of scarcity imposed a Batta or discount besides the usual interest
for the use of ready money. Marine Insurance, too, was in their hands.
Even more important was their ability to transfer money by a bill of
exchange, called the Hundi, between two reasonably large Indian towns
and even to overseas ports like Mokha.7 Besides sustaining overseas
trade, they also served as bankers to the citizens of Surat--the wealthy
and the needy--and accepted their deposits in safe keeping. We have an
interesting reference in 1795 to Bania widows depositing their savings
and property in the hands of the Bania bankers. This was done
Sinha, The EconomicHistory of Bengal Vol. I (Calcutta, 1965), p. 125; and P. J. Marshall,
East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the EighteenthCentury(Oxford, I1976), pp. 59,
77.
4 In 1793 the Bombay Government ordered the Surat factors to appoint a committee
to investigate the workings of the investment system. Their report was read on 18 March
1794 by the Bombay Council. According to the findings of the committee, the principal
Bania contractor employed a number of Bania merchants serving as subcontractors.
There were also Bohra and Parsi subcontractors. The latter controlled several weavers
and it was only through the subcontractors, that services of the weavers could be
collected. See Commercial Department Diary of the Bombay Government (henceforth
referred to as C.D.D.) no. 9 of 1794, PP. 132ff.
5 P.D.D. No. I14 of 1795, PP. 109-120. The petition presented by the Bania Mahajan
on 22 August 1795 sets out clearly the functions of the Bania community of Surat city.
6 See Irfan Habib, 'Banking in Mughal India', in Tapan Raychaudhuri (ed.),
Contributionsto Indian EconomicHistory, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1960), for a general description.
7 Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, pp. 85-6.
presumably to forestall family disputes regarding property.8 This range

of functions had enabled the Bania shroff and merchant to occupy a
central position in the city's commercial structure.
So much for a delineation of the Bania's multifarious activities. This
group, like the other merchant groups of the city, had to counter the
crisis of the eighteenth century. The crisis they faced was the collapse of
the Mughal political system in the city and of the traditional trade of
Surat to the Gulfs.9 This was followed by the growing political power
and pretensions of the English East India Company sustained by the
steady expansion of British private interests in the country trade of Asia
and the growing importance of Bombay.1'0 Two factors of vital
consequence facilitated a process of recovery for the Banias. One was
their access to liquid cash and control over the credit market. The other
factor was the acute shortage of funds faced by the English East India
Company authorities in Bombay, which made reliance on the financial
assistance of the shroffs inevitable. Both these factors enabled the Bania
merchants to readjust to the crisis better than other groups. The
successful cooperation of the Banias with the English East India
Company resulted in the emergence of a new order which we refer to as
the Anglo-Bania order. The order as noted earlier was characterized by
the growing ascendancy of the English India Company authorities
along the West Coast and the close cooperation extended by the Bania
community to the former. The overt establishment of the new order may
be dated from the revolution at the Surat Castle in 1759, but the Castle
Revolution itself was the outcome of a longer history of cooperation
between the British and the Banias on the West Coast.
The actual working out of the new order, and the factors leading to its
emergence, may now be investigated. Broadly speaking, the impetus
behind the process came from the changes that occurred in the existing
political and trading order of the West Coast in the second half of the
eighteenth century. The period was one of crucial change for the region.
The significant political developments in the period were the collapse of
the Mughal political system along the coast and in Surat city and its
replacement by the gradual political ascendancy of the English East
India Company. The expansion of Maratha political power along the
8 P.D.D. No. I I4A of

p795, pp. 109-20. See also Selections of the Bombay Govt
(Misc.) No. 87 of 1795 (henceforth Selection No. 87), pp. 25-6, Nawab's letter to the
Chief at Surat, undated. The Nawab complained that the Banias were often reluctant to
lend to the poor.
9 Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat.
o10Holden Furber, Bombay Presidencyin the Mid-Eighteenth Century(New York, 1965).
Konkan in and after the 1I730s1 was also an important development but
its implications in terms of the establishment of a new political or
commercial order were less tangible on the coast. The existing trading
order of the West Coast was likewise subject to major alterations. In the
first place, there was a long-term decline in Surat's trade to the Gulfs
caused by declining demand conditions in the consuming markets. The
Surat merchants also faced the pressures of political decline in the first
decades of the eighteenth century, as a result of which communication
and transportation facilities became disrupted. This in turn meant that
merchants could no longer depend on the hinterland markets for supply
of exports. To this was added the extortion of the Governors of Surat
who were hard pressed for funds and who therefore turned to the
merchants for financial contributions. The expansion of British private
trade in the i72os and 30os made things more difficult for the
merchants-Muslim shipowners in particular. The net outcome of all
these factors was thus a drastic fall in the value ofSurat's total trade from
Rs 16 million in 1699 to Rs 4 million in 1740o.12 The following decades
made no difference to the level of commercial activity of the West Coast
except for the fact that Bombay began to participate more positively in
the region's trade. Further, the successful efforts of the English East
India Company and British private interests to control what little
remained of the region's freight trade was an additional source of
pressure to the local merchants- particularly the Muslim shipowning
merchants. The 178os saw the slow expansion in Bombay's trade with
China. This was the second crucial development affecting the trading
order of the West Coast-its implications more favourable to local
commercial society.13 Thus it was with two sets of changes in the existing
trading system that the local mercantile groups had to contend. The
Bania, as we shall see presently, came out of the confrontation with a
degree of success that was not unimpressive.
11 For an account of the Maratha expeditions ofBassein, see V. G. Dighe, Peshwa Baji
Rao I and Maratha Expansion (Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay,
12 Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, pp. 18-19.
1944).
13 Bombay's customs from the China Trade increased to Rs 2? lakhs between 1787
and 1789 which placed the value of the trade between Rs 4 and 5 million. This increased
nearly twofold by the end of the century and even further at the turn of the next century.
See P.D.D. No. 94A of I789, pp. 50-3, letter from cotton merchants read at the council
meeting of the Bombay Government of 3 February 1789. In 1790 the Bombay merchants
informed the Council that their trade was yielding to the Company a revenue equal to
all customs on the other trade of the port. Nearly Ioo,ooo bales of cotton were being
exported every year and for purchase of which no less than Rs 40 lakhs were annually
employed. See P.D.D. No. 96 of 1790, p. 2 13, petition of the Bombay merchants read in
the council meeting of 23 March 1790. Also P.D.D. No. 104 of I793, PP. I52ff.
20IO LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN
The antecedents of the Surat Banias' association with the English East
India Company, as a means to salvage and safeguard their position and
possession against the cupidity of the city's Muslim administration, went
back to 173o-32-the years of the noted revolt of the Surat merchants.
The Muslim administration in Surat was extremely hard pressed for
funds from the 173os following the Maratha incursions against, and
their occupation of, the Athavisi or 28 parganas (from where Surat city
drew her revenues, or at least a sizable portion of it). Having to share a
part of their dwindling resources with the Maratha invaders of the
province and with expenses mounting, the city Governors, unsure of the
length of their tenure, turned to the wealthy merchants of the city for
'help'. Sohrab Ali who became Mutsaddi or Governor perfected the art
of plunder of the city merchants whose rebellion in 1730-32 resulted in
the Governor's dismissal.'4 During these crucial years, when the
merchants were feeling their way about and choosing new patrons, the
Bania community led by Seth Laldas decided to involve the English
Council at Surat in the protest movement of the city merchants led by
Mulla Mohammed Ali.15
The city merchants came to realize by the 1740osthat their options for
solid reliable allies were limited. Basically they had three options before
them. There was the local Muslim administration itself-merchants
could choose to support either the men in power or their rivals who
coveted power. Secondly there was the English East India Company
authorities with their headquarters at Bombay who seemed to entertain
ideas of acquiring political authority in the city. Thirdly there was the
Dutch East India Company in Surat who also had vague and undefined
political ambitions of strengthening their position and stabilizing their
trade. The growing control of the English East India Company over the
city's carrying trade to the Gulfs made them irrevocable rivals of
Muslim ship-owning merchants of the city--the Chellabis in particular.
Naturally the latter preferred to pin their hopes on the ruling
administration in the decades following the merchant revolt of 1732.
The city's Bania merchants on the other hand were not expected to feel
the same way and as events indicated, they preferred to strengthen their
association with the English East India Company. Some of the
prominent Parsee merchants like Munchur Cursetjee preferred to align
with the Dutch East India Company and their faction.
The assumption of power by Teg Bakht Khan as Nawab in 1733
marked the beginnings of the rule of the independent Governors in
14 Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Crisis at Surat 1730o-52', Bengal Past and PresentLXXXVI,
Pt II, No. 162 (July-December 1967). 15 Ibid.
CAPITAL AND CROWD IN A DECLINING ASIAN PORT 2II
Surat. He shared power with the Qiladar or Commander of the

castle--Begler Khan. Other important subordinate officials in this
period were the Naib (Ghulam Khan), Kotwal and Bakshi. In addition
there was the Sidi, admiral of the Imperial fleet, who collected a salary
(Tankha) from the revenues of Surat for services rendered. The judicial
machinery was fairly elaborate with separate courts to discuss and
mediate on various categories of disputes. There was the Durbar adalat
under the Nawab's brother, Meer Nasiruddin Khan, where complaints
were registered by citizens who could afford to pay a number of fees to
the various officials concerned. The Kazaif Kazoree was under the
Nawab himself, the Kazayya Sakar Bakshi under the Bakshi. Disputes
among the lower orders were settled by the Faujdari Kutcheri, also
called the Tana Chaurasee. In addition there was the Amini and the
office of Chabootia Kotwal which was entrusted with the task of
enforcing order in the suburbs. Whenever a riot or disturbance occurred
in a particular quarter, the chowkidars on duty were expected to report
the matter to the daroga of the Amini who thereupon undertook the
investigation of the facts of the matter. Once the facts were ascertained,
the culprits were carried to the Amin who decided the punishment. The
Amin was also entrusted with the charge of making and retaining
arrangements for armed protection to citizens in the chaklas or localities
and the points of intersection of principal streets. Each suburb was
allotted a guard of three men from the Faujdari Tana for detection of
thieves. This system of law and order deteriorated in the course of the
second half of the eighteenth century following the changes that
attended the Castle Revolution of 1759. The increasing weakness of the
ruling Nawabs, the insubordination of their officials and the division of
authority in the city, undermined the foundations of the civic order.'6
The rivalry between the Nawab and the Sidi, and the incursions of the
Marathas in the district, rendered political conditions extremely
disturbed in the city. Introduction of new duties on trade and the
arrangements with the Marathas did not stabilize the situation. The
English East India Company decided to try their luck and made a bid
for control of the Imperial fleet but without success."7 In the 1740os they
16 Gazetteer Vol. II Surat and Broach (henceforth referredas
of theBombayPresidency,
G.B.P.) 1877, ed. J. M. Campbell, pp. I 6-I7. Also see Surat Factory Diary (S.F.D.)
No. 692 of 1797, p. 360, pp. 376ff, consultation meeting of the Surat Council of 13
December 1797. A committee of enquiry was instituted by the E.E.I.C. to consider the
possibility of introducing a regular adalat for Surat. The committee presented their
findings on the existing system of law and order in the city.
17 Ibid., pp 117-I9. The Gaekwad stationed his officer known as the Choutea to
receive the collections due to him from the Nawab.
felt emboldened to interfere in succession disputes raging in the city

between Safdar Khan (successor of Teg Bakht Khan in I747), and
Meah Achan, his rival.'" They also began taking up the cause of
individual merchants who were victimized by the Government. The
latter strategy proved effective in the i750s and made a favourable
impression on a section of the city's mercantile community-that is, the
Banias, who, in i759, led by their spokesman, Jagannathdas Laldas,
invited the English East India Company to assume control of Surat
Castle. The Castle Revolution of I'759 was preceded by a long
confrontation between the English East India Company and the ruling
Government over the issue of'protected merchants', the details of which
need not concern us. Suffice it here to say that the former were largely
successful in persuading the Government to leave the merchants
alone.19 The possibility of the Maratha power in the region intervening
in the city's political affairs strengthened the resolve of the Banias, in
I759, to approach the English Chief at Surat to take possession of Surat
Castle and assume greater political power in the city.
The English for their part were unhappy at the signs of cooperation
between the Sidi, the Dutch and their broker, Munchur Cursetjee. On
ii January 1759, the English Chief at Surat wrote to the Bombay
Council urging them to take decisive action against the Sidi who as
Qjladar was in charge of the Surat Castle. Spencer assured the Council
that the city's Bania community had promised their help to neutralize
the anticipated opposition from the ruling dlite and the Chellabis.20
Bombay, sensing the opportunity, sanctioned his plan. The campaign
was a success and the English East India Company secured possession of
the Castle. A treaty was signed with Meah Achan who retained his
position as Nawab.21 He became subordinate to the authority of his new
18isIbid., p. 123.
19 Lakshmi Subramanian, 'Bombay and the West Coast in the 1740's', Indian Economic
and Social History Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (April-June 1981), pp. 208-9. In 1754, for
instance, we have the case ofJayaram Navaram, a protected merchant being harassed
by the ruling administration led by Safdar Khan and Sidi Masud. Jayaram was,
however, released thanks to the efforts of the Surat factors. See P.D.D. No. 27A of 1754,
pp. 207-8; No. 27B of I754, pp. 209ff, council meeting of 2 July 1754 of the Bombay
Government; p 217, letter from Surat dated 26 June 1754 to the Bombay Government;
p. 220, letter from Surat dated 7 July 1754; PP. 224-5, letter from Surat received by the
Bombay Government Council on 25 July I754; PP. 274-5, council meeting of the
Bombay Government of 3 September 1754; PP- 292-3, letters from Surat dated I4-15
September I754 to the Bombay Council.
20 P.D.D. No. 321 of 1759, pp. letter from John Spencer to Richard
99-io2,
Bourchier, Governor of Bombay, dated II January
21 S.F.D. No. I4(I) of I759, pp. 222ff, consultation i759.
meeting of the Surat Council 3
March 1759-
English Qiladars who decided all matters of succession. The right to

judge disputes remained in the hands of the Nawab, but the city
merchants under protection of the English Company had no longer any
reason to fear the active oppressions of the ruling administration. The
English Company also appropriated for themselves the right to mediate
in all disputes with the European East India Companies and the
Maratha officers in the districts.22 The Banias had reason to be pleased
with the development, and in fact immediately after the Castle
campaign of 1759, the Bania Mahajan volunteered to defray the
expenses incurred by the Company authorities. An extra duty of I per
cent on all trade was introduced with the consent of the merchants.23
Given the diversification of their functions and the fact that they were
not shipowners themselves, the Banias were in a better position to adjust
to the changing situation. The Bania merchants who had previously
used the vessels of the Muslim shipowners now opted for English
shipping. In fact, even earlier in the first decades of the eighteenth
century they had been extensive users of English shipping in their trade
with Bengal. Available documents suggest that after having made this
switch over, the Gujarati Banias continued with their ventures in West
Asia. They continued to supply goods to the overseas traders, to finance
purchases at Mokha, and to receive bills of exchange and treasure
consignments from their correspondents in Mokha. In fact the Surat
money market was critically dependent on Gulf silver.24 Control over
the bullion inflow from the Gulfs assured their mastery over the money
market in the city.
The connection with Bengal, so important for the Gujarati Bania
shroffs and merchants, was maintained from both Bombay and Surat
and available documents indicate the importance of the Bengal-Bom-
bay trade. Imports from Bengal accounted for the largest share in
22 In February 1763 the Bombay Council intervened on behalf of Meer Cutbudeen

who ascended the throne as Nawab. See P.D.D. No. 40 of I 763, p. 154, letter from Surat
dated I March 1763 to the Bombay Council; pp. I55ff, council meeting of the Bombay
Government of 7 March The Surat diaries are replete with references to the
I754.
English East India Company's relations with the Maratha officers stationed in Surat
district. See S.F.D. Nos 660 of 1772, 672 of 1780 and 678 of 1786.
23 P.D.D. No. I4A of 1795, P. petition of the Bania Mahajan dated 22 August
iio,
1795.
24 The Surat factors often made note of this fact in their correspondence with the
Bombay Government. See P.D.D. No. 39 of 1762, p. 443, letter from Surat dated 7
August 1762 to the Bombay Government. See also No. 55 of 1770o, pp. 416-17, letter
from Surat dated I2 July 177o to the Bombay Council; also No. 64 of 1773, P. 147, letter
from Surat dated 8 September i773 to the Bombay Council.
Bombay's custom revenue, these averaging Rs 6 lakhs per annum.25

Secondly, as contract merchants for the English East India Company,
they were no longer obliged to suffer the constraints that had earlier
been imposed on them by the ruling Muslim Government. This did not
mean, however, that they found it necessary to conform to all directives
imposed on them by the English. The latter often found it difficult to
persuade the merchants to honour contractual obligations. The exis-
tence of other consumers meant that they had other lines of business, in
addition to the Company's, open before them. The English tried very
hard to bring them under control and found it a frustrating business. Of
more fundamental consequence was the fact that their control over
credit remained unimpaired. Circumstances converged to elevate their
services as bankers to a position of decisive importance and enabled
them to emerge as a significant commercial group in Western India.
British Arms and Bania Finance
The English East India Company, as we have noted, was principally

instrumental in engineering the changes that had occurred in the
existing trading and political system of the West Coast. Very soon,
however, it became obvious that to extend their power they had to rely
on the financial assistance of the Banias. This necessity stemmed from
the poverty of the Bombay Government in the second half of the
eighteenth century. The Bombay Government had no land revenue to
speak of and revenues from customs were inconsiderable. The expenses
of the government despite severe economy measures mounted. The
solution to the problem seemed to lie in extensive borrowing from the
local credit market of Surat-the Company authorities undertaking to
25 Custom figures available in the public department diaries of the Bombay

Government bring out this fact clearly. The following table is reconstructed on the basis
of this evidence.
Customs Value of Customs Value of
Year collected imports Year collected imports
I755/56 Rs I4920 Rs 2.4 lakhs appr. I763/64 Rs 21847 Rs 3 lakhs appr.
1756/57 9470 1.5 ,, ,, 1764/65 73912 I million 2 lakhs
1757/58 26300 4 ,, ,, 1765/66 41i54 6.8 lakhs
1758/59 25400 2 ,, ,, I766/67 32360 5.2 lakhs
I759/60 25500 4 ,, ,, 1767/68 69169 I million I lakh
1760/61 8740 1.4 ,, , 1768/69 59929 9 lakhs
I761/62 I6550 2.5 ,, ,, I769/7o 38291 5 lakhs
I762/63 26403 4.4
.
pay back at existing rates of interest. The other method was for the
Bengal Government to remit their surplus revenue (which after the
acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in I765 was
considerable) to Surat through the Bania banking houses of Murshida-
bad and Surat. Both these expedients meant extensive utilization of the
services of the Surat shroffs and represented new business to the latter.
They realized the central position they occupied in the overall financial
operations of the English East India Company.
The remittance operations from Fort William worked in the following
manner. The Bengal Government after having made sure of the precise
requirements of the Bombay settlement, consigned sums to the Bania
bankers of Murshidabad and bought their bills drawn on their Surat
correspondents in favour of the Surat Council. The shroffs at Surat
encashed the bills without delay. The Surat Council followed this up by
remitting the sums realized once again through bills bought from the
Surat shroffs on their correspondents or agents at Bombay. As a result,
credit links were expanded from Surat to Bombay. Interestingly
enough, while the business of remittance from Bengal to Surat was
monopolized by a certain group of big banking houses (Arjunjee Nath
Tarwadi, Atmaram Jagjeevandas, Itcharam Jagjeevandas, Tapidas
Laldas), the business of remitting sums to Bombay was handled by
several small shroffs.26 In addition, the Surat factors were often directed
by the Bombay Council to approach the shroffs to buy the Company's
bills on Bengal. In this the factors were not particularly successful. The
shroffs operated until the 80s in conditions of specie scarcity and were
therefore unable to raise considerable sums. The exchange rates at
which they were willing to negotiate were also unfavourable for the
Company authorities who were unable to make a dent on the situation.
It was in the I 760s that the financial crisis of the Bombay Government
began to make itself felt. In 1761-62, the Surat factors were directed to
raise nearly Rs 6 lakhs for Bengal Bills but the task proved impossible.
The shroffs complained of delay in payment in Bengal and of problems
they faced in the city owing to shortage of specie. If was with
considerable difficulty that the factors were able to negotiate at all.27
26 S.F.D. No. 672 of I78o, p. I 7. Eleven Bills of Exchange were sent by the Surat
factors to the Bombay Council for half a lakh of rupees in September 1780. Also see
S.F.D. No. 673 of 1781, pp. 224, 237-8, 259. Also No. 674 of 1782, pp. I I8-20, 129, 167,
199-200.
27 S.F.D. No. 15(II) of 1759-61, p. 267, letter from Bombay received by the Surat
Council on 28 February I761. The factors were asked to make five lakhs of rupees
immediately available. Bombay was presently notified that Rs 1.75 lakhs had been
raised. See P.D.D. No. 37(II) of 1761, p. 334, letter from Surat dated 3 April 1761I to the
After 1765, remittances from Fort William became an easier method of

securing ready cash, and in 1768 loans from Bengal Bills and remittances
from Fort William amounted to nearly Rs 13 lakhs.28 In the following
years the requirements of the Bombay Government increased and
averaged around Rs 12 and 14 lakhs per year.29 Remittances answered
these requirements for the most part. Raising of money for Bengal Bills
at an unfavourable exchange rate also continued. As the Board put it in
their meeting of I I January 1774, 'We lament the necessity that obliged
them to draw at so disadvantageous an exchange but the distress the
Company's affairs continue to be in for want of specie will not permit us
to revoke our orders.'30 The shroffs with their loans and bills became a
critical source of support to the Bombay Government enabling them to
maintain their civil, commercial and military establishments.
In the the credit needs of the Bombay Government expanded
178os
even further. Remittances for nearly Rs I6-20 lakhs had to be arranged
from Fort William. These were used in financing the Company's
Investment and also in financing the Anglo-Maratha War (I 775-82).
The houses of Gopaldas Harkisandas, Manohardas Dwarkadas and
Gopaldas Manohardas handled the enormous remittances of Fort
William in I781-82, all of which were essentially to be utilized by the
armed forces. From this date onwards, the Banaras banking house of
Gopaldas Manohardas with its branch firms in Bengal and Surat took
over the task of remitting the surplus funds from Banaras to Surat. The
house of Gopaldas Manohardas emerged as the exclusive banker and
financier of the Bengal and Bombay Governments. From 1789 the
system of entering into a contract with the house's agent in Bombay,
Nagindas Golabdas, for the annual supply of Rs 40 lakhs to the
Bombay Council; p. 381, council meeting of the Bombay Government I May 1761;
S.F.D. No. 15(II) of 1759-61, p. 323, letter signed to Bombay on Io May I1761; also see p.
332, letter signed to Bombay I2 June 1761 notifying them of transactions made with
shroffs for Rs 50,000. On I6 June negotiations for an additional sum of Rs 400ooowere
successful, see pp. 333ff.
28 P.D.D. No. 501 of 1768, pp. 1-2, letter to Surat dated I January 1768. The Bombay
Council directed the factors to negotiate for Bengal Bills for Rs 2 lakhs. Also p. i oo, letter
from Bengal dated 30 November 1767 promising the Bombay Government a remittance
ofRs 5 lakhs. Also see No. 5 I of I1768,p. 268, letter from Surat dated 4 December
P.D.D. indicating that they (Surat factors) expected to raise Rs 5
1768 to the Bombay Council
lakh and so on. See p. 271, council meeting of the Bombay Government of 9 December
1768. The Surat factors were asked to negotiate for one more lakh.
29 P.D.D. No. 55 of 1770, pp. 88-9, council meeting of the Bombay Government of 2
February 770o. The Accountant General mentioned in the meeting that the govern-
ment would require at least Rs 12 lakhs for the following year.
30 P.D.D. No. 65A of 1774, P. I7, council meeting of the Bombay Government of I I
January 1774.
Government in lieu of Bills on Bengal came into extensive use.31 The
agent himself borrowed from the local credit market to make his
monthly payments to the Bombay Government. Thus the Bombay
Government came to rely upon the banking and lending facilities of the
Bania shroffs for its survival and political projects. The Banias
themselves had no reason to feel dissatisfied with the situation. The
benefits of English protection were reaffirmed by the critical depen-
dence upon their services by the authorities. Their strength was such as
to enable them to dictate to the English the exchange rates at which the
Bengal revenue surpluses were to be remitted to Bombay and the rates of
interest at which credit was to be mobilized in Surat.
The 78os witnessed further changes in the trade of the West Coast.
The expansion of the China trade of the Bombay merchants from
1783-84 onwards was a turning point for the region. The principal
export item was raw cotton which was extensively grown in Gujarat.
The merchants trading in the commodity entered into contracts with
the Bania merchants of Bombay to be provided with cotton consign-
ments from Gujarat. This system of contracts benefited the Bania
merchants and under-contractors or petty dealers of the commodity.
We have instances on record of the Company's contractors accusing the
under-contractors of making unfair profits by providing low quality
cotton.
The financial requirements of the Bombay merchants further streng-
thened the position of the Bania merchants and shroffs. Conditions of
specie scarcity in Bombay, the fact that the circulating medium of
Bombay was not acceptable outside city limits, combined with the fact
that the merchants did not have access to immediate cash at all times of
the year, meant that they had to depend on the services of the Bombay
and Surat shroffs. As ready cash was not available or accessible to the
merchants and since rates of exchange between different currencies in
circulation (between the Bombay rupee and Surat/Broach/Jambuser/
Baroda Rupees) varied, the merchants had perforce to depend on the
shroff's paper. The shroffs, long familiar with currency differences, were
in a position to fix the exchange rate between two different coins and
issue bills accordingly to the merchant. The latter preferred to strike a
bargain with the shroff and persuade him to give bills for a fixed sum to
be paid at Surat or elsewhere, rather than run the risk of uncertainty of
what he might sell the debased currency of Bombay for.32 That the
3' P.D.D. No. 95 of 1789, p. 64, letter addressed to Surat by the Bombay Council on 6
August 1789; also pp. 175ff.
32 Returns and statements of External and Internal Commerce of the Bombay
Bombay merchants were vitally dependent upon these bills of the Surat
Bania shroffs is, as already emphasized, clear from the available
documents. From the 8os the bills were in great demand as, indeed, the
Surat shroffs pointed out on the occasion of the riots in The
I795.33
enhanced demand for such bills immensely augmented the net profits of
the shroffs.
II
Thus circumstances in the second half of the century combined to give

the Bania merchant and shroff a position of central importance in the
trade and financial system of the West Coast. In Surat as in Bombay
they came to occupy a position of considerable importance and their
position in the new order that the Company's political ascendancy had
brought about was particularly galling to members of the Muslim ruling
61ite which had by this time lost all semblance of power. It was also
galling to the lower orders whose communal prejudices were whetted by
the instigation of their religious leaders. The reaction to the Bania
ascendancy became more explosive over time, and finally found
expression in the Surat riots of 1795.
This is not to suggest that the riots were an entirely novel expression of
protest in response to the immediate context-that is to say, the
ascendancy of the Banias in Surat city. It would be worth while to
mention here that the fundamental antagonism between the Banias and
the Muslims had a historical background, erupting spasmodically
whenever provoked by circumstances. The riots in Gujarat inthe earlier
half of the eighteenth century show that the tension pre-dated the
development of the Anglo-Bania order. A pre-existing tension surfaced
in a new situation when the Muslim artisans fell upon the Bania bankers
of Surat in 1795. In this connection mention may be made of an earlier
riot in another Gujarat town in which, too, the Bania bankers were the
victims of the Muslim artisans.34 In 1713 Ahmedabad city experienced
a serious communal riot that lasted for two days. The immediate
occasion for the riot was provided by the offensive attitude assumed by
some Bania shroffs of the Jauhariwada towards the locality's Muslim
Government 1802. This report contains an exhaustive report on the 'want of sufficiently
circulating medium to answer the accumulated demands of an extensive commerce'.
33 P.D.D. No. II4A of I795, petition of the Bania Mahajan to the Surat Council,
dated 22 August I795.
34 Ali Muhammed Khan, Mirat-i-Ahmadi (Persian Text), Vol. I (Bombay), pp.
427-34. Translation from the text was made by Dr Iqtidar Alam Khan.
inhabitants during the Holi festival which was celebrated with unchar-
acteristic abandon by the otherwise staid Banias. Revelry and merry-
making degenerated into offensive social behaviour when Hari Ram,
manager of Madan Gopal Sarraf's establishment, caught hold of a
Muslim passerby and humiliated him by throwing at him colour, dust
and mud. The victim, enraged at his defilement at the hands of the
infidels, immediately got in touch with Mohammed Ali, the Waiz or
preacher, an influential religious dignitary, and informed him of the
morning's episode. Mohammed Ali was properly indignant and
summoned the city's Muslim population to the Jama Masjid (main
mosque). Muslims of all categories-preachers and artisans alike and
Sunnis as well as Bohras-congregated at the Masjid. The Bohra
delegation was led by their leader Mulla Abdul Aziz. A decision was
taken to march en masse to the Jauhariwada to take revenge on the
Hindus. A crowd formed-tempers ran high, with the more voluble
shouting 'Din Din'. An attempt was made to involve the Qazi,
Khairullah Khan, in the protest march but in vain. The crowd,
dismissing this act of prudence as cowardice, went ahead with their
plans. The anger was directed against all the sarrafs of the neighbour-
hood-their houses were attacked and in the general scuffle Abdul Aziz,
the head of the Bohra merchants, had still time to sort out his personal
differences with Kapur Chand Bahnai, the Nagarseth of Ahmedabad.
Both Bahnai and Abdul Aziz took vantage positions on opposite
housetops and pelted each other with stones. Bahnai turned out to be
more resourceful than Abdul Aziz and persuaded the unemployed
Muslim soldiers to assume defence of the locality. The soldiers, pleased
with the prospect of some earnings, had no compunction about lending
their assistance against their own brethren. Reprisals were organized
against the Muslim localities. The intervention of the administration
came two days later by which time the riot had subsided. In 1795
however, the riot followed a slightly different course; it was more violent
in view of the pressing material conditions of the Muslin lower orders.
The Structure of the Muslim Community in Surat
The violent response to the Bania ascendancy in 1795 has to be studied

in the context of Surat's population and social order in the period under
review. We do not have accurate population estimates for the city, but
from contemporary observations and later data it may be surmised that
the city's population was regularly between three and four lakhs.35 The
Hindus constituted three-fourths of the population with the Muslims
constituting a sizeable minority. The Banias were probably the most
influential Hindu community residing in the city-their social influence
firmly based on their extensive commercial activity. Other Hindu
groups included the Brahmans engaged in agriculture in the outlying
districts, and the Khatris and Kambhis engaged in weaving and
manufacturing activity. Elements making up the city's Muslim popula-
tion were equally diverse. The Bohras, who figured as traders, were a
minority. Broadly speaking four groups could be distinguished among
the main body of Sunnis.
There was first of all the decaying Muslim ruling dlite-successors of
the old Mughal artistocracy deeply riven by contending factions. The
Nawab and his entourage-his associates and rivals with no effective
authority to speak of, intensely jealous of the ascendancy of the English
East India Company and of their Bania allies-constituted one distinct
section of the city's Muslim population. Their immediate supporters-
that is to say, their subordinates and armed retainers, who were at the
same time in physical charge of maintaining law and order in the
city-came next. They were the sepoys of the Muslim administration-
the city's police force. Although available evidence does not say much
about the castes and sub-castes from which they were drawn, two
important facts do emerge. In the first place, it seems quite clear that
they had links with the Muslim artisan castes of the city and were in a
position to maintain a working relationship with the former. This is clear
as we read of visits made by some sepoys of the Bakshi to the artisan
quarters of the city on the eve of the August riots, preparing them for a
confrontation with the Banias. Secondly, there seems to have been a
Habshi section within the Muslim militia. The Habshi, too, played a
part in the disturbances of August 1795. In the later eighteenth century
it would appear that the Habshis had taken over effective control of the
Nawab's armed forces and were recognized as an entity to be reckoned
with. They came to constitute an important group in the Imperial Court
and exercised considerable influence on the ruling Nawabs, a develop-
ment which invited the apprehensions of the E.E.I.C. authorities.36
a" Selection No. 87 of 1795, 'Surat Riots' p. 4. The Committee of Enquiry set up to
investigate the antecedents of the August riots, estimated the population ofSurat around
three lakhs. Also see G.B.P. Vol. II, pp. 47-50, I34ff. See Abraham Parsons, Travels in
Asia and Africa (London, I808).
36 Selection No. 87 of I795, 'Surat Riots' pp. 46fffor report of the enquiry committee.
The Committee observed that the Nawab's slaves commanded the whole armed force
'... they are stout hardy Africans, greedy of riches and very improper men to be
CAPITAL AND CROWD IN A DECLINING ASIAN PORT 22I
TABLE I
The Structureof the Weaving Occupationin Surat, 1795 (looms employedin the manufactureof
piecegoodsand the weaving castes working on them)
No. of looms Caste and Religion

in Surat city Piecegoods items manufactured of weavers
4086 Necanees, large, small, coarse. Momna, Bora and Bhandaree

Tapseils, large and small. (all Muslim castes)
Salottee, Chandard Madowjee,
Chelloes blue i and 9 vees,
Bejutapauts (blue).
1365 Neganepauts of 4 kinds, Khatri caste of Hindus
Bejutapauts (red),
Chelloes Red of i i vees,
Chadar Turmallee,
Chowrangee Gurgum, Cadia.
849 Puchoree, Putkahs, Doria of Bora & Musalman
sorts, Turbans, Salloes caste
Seylas, Dhotia.
2298 Sarees, Obotiah, Durreib Khatri caste of Hindus
1265 Musroo of different kinds Khumbee caste of Hindus
2614 Silk goods: Elacha, Bhurbee, Parsee
Kumbroo, Soosee.
535 Kincobs.
1491 Puchodie, Putkahs, H'kerchiefs, Parsee
Baftas, Dootias, Dupattas.
171 Hembroos Koombee caste of Hindus
135 Pattahs, Chadar with silk Koombees & Muslims
borders.
I5 Dupattahs with gold/silver Koombees & Muslims
borders, potkahs, gold silver
threads.
462 Dorraya, Saree Koombee
391 Baftas, Salloes (white), Seylas, Malwee & Pancholee caste
Dungaree, Potcahs coarse, of Hindus and Deerabs
Dootiah.
Total looms: 15,777

Source: Report of the committee (William Loper and D. C. Ramsey) on the outlines of textile
manufacture dated 24 December 1795, Commercial Department Diary, No. 12 of 1796, pp. I7ff.
Thirdly, there were the Muslim artisan and labouring castes of the
city-referred to as Bhandarees, Boongars and Mushalchees--living in
the suburbs and weaving on the city's numerous looms for their
livelihood. A host of sub-castes specializing in particular goods made up
the Mohammedan weaving population of Surat (see Table I). Finally,
entrusted with the powers they are left to exercise over a multitude of poor Hindus whom
they have been taught to despise.' Also see S.F.D. No. 692 of 1797, PP. 370ff, a
Committee Report on the existing systems of justice in Surat.
there was the crowd of begging fakirs and mendicants and the more
respectable Syeds or heads of mosques who provided the religious
leadership of the lower orders. The Syeds presided over the mosques
situated in various localities of the city, maintained registers of those
Muslims attached to their particular masjid (mosque), kept in touch
with the ruling Muslim d1iteand above all preached to the needy.37 The
immigrant fakirs had a leader called the Mukkaddam who looked after
their interests.
All the four Muslim groups, distinguished above, were by omission or
commission involved in the communal riot that erupted on 6 August
1795. Religion was a binding force, its vitality in the life of the
community deriving from an established tradition of annual pilgrimages
from Surat to Mecca which the Mughals had patronized at one time,
and which the Muslim merchants had for long pursued simultaneously
with their annual overseas trading operations. The decline of Muslim
shipping and the English ascendancy on the Surat-Gulf run created
difficulties not merely for traders but also for pilgrims. It seems to have
been an established custom among the Muslim merchants in Surat to
finance the haj of their poorer brethren. Once the English mastered the
Surat-Mokha voyages, they put an end to these free pilgrimages.
Interestingly enough, this was a point which was raised in a petition
signed by 66 Muslim merchants in 1770. Headed by three Syeds--Syed
Faujmul Abideen, Syed Ali been Idrus and Syed Abdul Rahim--they
insisted that the Surat Council take immediate measures to put the
freight traffic on its old basis. Their petition combined the specific
mercantile grievances of the Muslim traders regarding the enhanced
charges of freight, respondentia and interest with the more general
sentiments of the Muslim community regarding the haj, a matter on
which different groups of Muslims felt equally strongly. The petition
contained signatures by Patani Bohra pedlars, merchants of Turkish
origin, members of the ruling Muslim dlite, some Arabs, and--of
course--the Syeds.38 The Syeds who headed the protest were recog-
nized as the topmost community among the Muslims. Zealous upholders
of the Islamic socio-cultural system, they figured prominently as clergy
(ulama) and interpreters of Muslim law (muftis). They enjoyed the
patronage of the wealthy on account of their lineage traced back to the
37 S.F.D. No. 687 of I795, P. 433, petition of the Surat Mahajan. The Mahajan
pointed out that in every district of the city, there was a Masjid presided over by a Syed
who maintained a very regular register of all their communities.
38 P.D.D. No. 56 of 1770, pp. 67-71I, consultation meeting of the Bombay Council of
16 September I770 to discuss the petition presented by the merchants.
Prophet.39 What was more, they had strong connections with the caste
organizations of the lower orders of the Muslim population. Usually the
caste organization of a lower artisan community was strong enough to
run a mosque, manage a madrasa and pacify quarrels.40
Although we do not have adequate evidence to reconstruct in detail
the process of interaction between the city's Muslim population and its
Bania residents, a few leads strongly suggest the growing alienation and
resentment on the part of the Syeds and their followers against the
successful commercial elements, notably the Banias and, to a lesser
extent, the Parsees. The Muslim weavers lived in poverty and were deep
in debt to the Bania contractors and moneylenders. They could thus
hardly be expected to entertain goodwill towards the Banias. The whole
production process which depended critically on the advances funnelled
through Bania subcontractors made the weaving communities depen-
dent on the Banias for their livelihood. Under the contract system of the
Company's investment, the Company's contracting broker would
employ, say, 300 town merchants-principally Banias-whose occupa-
tion was to retain in their constant employ groups of weavers at Surat.
Since the Company did not interfere in the relations between these
subcontractors and their weavers, the Banias had unhampered coercive
authority over the weavers who a regular subsistence by
,found
acknowledging subordination to a master who paid them regularly for
work as it came from the loom. We have on record the impressions of the
British commercial resident at Surat about the pressures on the Surat
weavers dependent on the meagre advances offered by the Bania
contract merchants:
They obtain their goods at the cheapest practicable rate and then use every art
and deception to get them passed in part of their engagements. Some means has
to be devised of breaking the claims these intermediate agents have upon
weavers from the debts they one and all are involved in advances made to him
at different times. Under the unfair manner in which the weaver thus situated
now receivespayment for his labour, years will not make him liquidate the debt
that has accumulated. The Bania makes his engagements, receiveshis advances
from the contractor or the resident-he readvances that money to the weavers
stipulating for a profit of sometimes two annas per piece, sometimes four for
himself and frequently under pretence of its having proved inferior to the
Master in the warehouse debits him in account a further sum thus leaving the
weaver barely enough to subsistupon much less to repay any part of the sum he
is indebted to him.41
39 S. C. Mishra, Muslim Communitiesin Gujarat (New York, i964), p. 137.
40 Ibid., p. 143.
41 C.D.D. No. 1802, pp. 1281ff, minute of Commercial Resident regarding detaching
of weavers from their intermediate agents; C.D.D. No. 9 of 1794-
The Banias also held in their hands the retail trade of the city, so that
the dependence of the poorer Muslims on their rich Bania neighbours
ranged from loans and advances to necessaries of life. The lower orders
were at the mercy of the city's Bania community, a fact that could hardly
foster cordial relations between the two groups. The quality of their
communal life further helped foster among the poor Muslims a
consciousness of common identity. Daily congregations at mosques were
important features in the communal life of the deprived local classes. In
addition there were periodic community dinners among the Muslim
artisan castes which served as outlets for both religious propaganda and
public revelry. The community dinners were generally speaking riotous
affairs--about 300ooo-4000 men (reference is made to the Boongar
subcaste) assembled, dined and made merry. The participants, who
made their own contributions, enjoyed the support and patronage of the
Syeds.42
It is important to note in this connection that the success of the Banias
offended both the 'notable' and the 'lowly'. It does not necessarily follow
that the Banias acted insolently and, by their actions, provoked the city's
Muslim population to violent action. Stray and suspect evidence
indicates that in some exclusively Bania localities the Muslims were
harassed. In 1795 Haji Ghulam Moiyeen, a Muslim resident of the
Kelapeeth Chaklo informed the Company authorities that his cousin
who functioned as Muazzin in the Hossainee Masjid, complained of the
hostility of the Hindu residents. Punah Allah, a fakir who belonged to
the same masjid, also alleged that the Banias often abused the Muslims
and insulted them.43 But there is no evidence of a generally overbearing
conduct on the part of the Banias. What seems more likely is that the
commercial success of the Banias, and the fact that they dominated the
city's economic life and were in a position of control, brought home to
both the Muslim lower orders and the decaying &lite their own
increasing vulnerability in an age of material crisis. Tension was
inevitable under the circumstances.
The residential patterns in the city and the organization of the
communal life of the Muslim lower orders may be briefly mentioned
here. This will enable us to understand better how the latter were in fact
mobilized for the riot of 6 August 1795, and how lines of contact were
maintained between the mosques, the durbar and the suburbs. The city
42 S.F.D. No. 688 of 1795, pp. 12-13, representation of the Nawab of Surat II
September I795.
43 Selection No. 87 of 1795, PP.137ff, evidence of Haji Ghulam Moiyum, p. 143,
evidence of Punah Allah.
proper consisted of the area enclosed by the line of the inner wall and
consisted of fourteen divisions called Chaklas or Wards. These Wards
housed the dwellings of the well-to-do inhabitants of the city including
the members of the ruling Muslim administration. The Chokbazar
Chaklo, for instance, contained the Castle, the Daria Mahal or residence
of the Bakshi and the houses of the well-to-do Banias. The Mulla Chaklo
contained the Nawab's palace, important mosques and the dwellings of
the rich bankers of the city. The Kelapeeth Chaklo was almost
exclusively a banker's quarter. In other Chaklos like the Gopipura
Chaklo and the Bhagatalav Chaklo poor Musalmans also lived.44
Beyond the inner wall lay Surat's suburbs, where the Muslim lower
orders lived. Most suburbs like the Medharpura, Rampura, Haidar-
pura, Syedpura, Haripura, Navapura and Indarpura were mixed
suburbs with a poor Muslim population co-existing with Hindu
artisans, weavers and cultivators.45 Each locality appears to have had a
mosque presided over by Syeds who maintained detailed registers of
their congregations. These Syeds seem to have organized regular
meetings with their followers-most of them being poor Muslim weavers
and handicraftsmen. They maintained links with the other Syeds of the
city. We come across the names of Syed Ismail and Syed Abdul Wali
who were heads of the mosque in Chokbazar Chaklo and Syed
Shurufuddin who headed the mosque in Rampura.46 Meetings at
mosques and conversations with the Syeds seem to have been a regular
feature in the communal life of the Muslim lower orders. The latter also
appear to have met regularly over a month for community dinners for
which compulsory contributions from members of the community in
question were taken.47 The impression that emerges from a careful
study of available evidence is that of a fairly tight communal
organization among the lower castes with a strong hierarchy of religious
leadership to whom they were bound. Each masjid had also its muazzin
or crier who at dawn led the prayer. The daily rounds at the mosque
presumably provided a source of relief for the lower orders whose
material life was characterized by uncertainty and abject poverty.
Religious zeal, occasionally accompanied by aggressive social behaviour
towards the infidels, was the natural response of the Muslim artisan
communities to their living conditions. It is more than likely that in
44 G.B.P. Vol. II, pp. 302ff.
45 Ibid., pp. 309ff.
46 P.D.D. No. 15A of 1795, pp. i I Iff, evidence of Syed Abdul Wali presented before
the Committee of Enquiry.
4 S.F.D. No. 688 of 1795, PP. 12-13, meeting of the Nawab's deputy with the Chief
on II September 1795.
those localities where the Banias were dominant, the mosques were the
focal points of popular Muslim unrest. Sensible of the lurking violence,
the Banias feared the activities of the Syeds and their flocks. Given the
nature and course of the riot that erupted on 6 August 1795, it would not
be far fetched to surmise that anxiety had hardened the attitude of the
Banias towards these community activities, thereby further aggravating
the social tension in the city.
The Collapse of the Civic Order
To sum up, circumstances had so converged as to alienate the Muslim

population in the city from the Bania inhabitants. The political changes
following the Castle Revolution of 1759, the changes in the commercial
structure of the city, and the success of the Banias had served to
antagonize all sections of the city's Muslim population. Tension and
simmering discontent lay dormant, waiting for a tangible occasion to
surface. The problem of maintaining law and order in the city
complicated the situation even further. The collapse of the political
order had its inevitable repercussion on the city's social fabric.
Institutional arrangements for the maintenance of law and order broke
down and protection of citizens came largely to be determined by the
patronage they enjoyed of the ruling authorities concerned. Power and
authority was divided and the citizens exercised their discretion in
accepting the protection of the English East India Company, the
Nawab or the Bakshi as the case might be. After I759 the Nawab's
judicial authority was severely circumscribed and, taking advantage of
his incompetence, his officials arrogated to themselves considerable
authority which they invariably abused. The ruling Nawab (Moyen-ul
Deen Khan), to quote a contemporary report, was 'neither loved by his
relations nor feared by his dependants' and it was only logical to expect
his subordinates to override his authority. The Bakshi made himself
conspicuous by his encroachments on the Nawab's authority, a fact that
invited the attention of the Company authorities since the 1770os. 'A fiery
and turbulent character' he 'awed' rather than 'advised' the Nawab.
His followers were encouraged to maintain private armed forces in the
city which vitiated the existing urban order. Contemporary reports refer
to the assumption of the royal insignia by upstarts and adventurers who
disturbed the peace in the town. The Habshi dependants of the
Nawab-the Sidi clan-similarly arrogated to themselves powers of
arbitration and authority and came to dominate the city administra-
tion-particularly its judicial machinery at critical points. They were

eminently unfit for implementing the charge they were assigned with.
The abolition of the office of the Naib in 1777, which in effect meant
disbanding the police force that maintained order in the suburbs, had
further disastrous consequences. All restraints on movements of for-
eigners, on carrying arms, vanished. The Muskat Arabs who descended
on the city from the 179os onwards in pursuit of wealth went around
fully armed and dabbled in local politics. More and more, the lower
orders in the city were left free to take the law into their own hands.
Fakirs-poor, needy and turbulent-took up residence in the slums and
suburbs of the city. Notable among them was a group of Bengali Fakirs
who attached themselves to the local mosques and instigated communal
feelings among the city's poor Muslim population. The immigrant fakirs
had their own leader-the Mukaddam-who was not amenable to the
administration, as the Nawab himself confessed in I795. The picture
that emerges is of a collapsing urban order in which neither person nor
property was safe from the potential unrest and violence of the city's
lower orders.48
Street fighting and scuffles became frequent and it was clear that the
city's Muslim crowd was poised on the brink ofviolence. In fact, in I788,
an innocuous quarrel between two Parsees and a Muslim assumed
serious proportions overnight, with the Syeds taking up the banner of
religion and with the footloose elements in the lower echelons of the
Muslim administration taking up the cause of the Muslims against the
Parsees without ascertaining the rights of the matter. The suppression of
the riot did not put an end to the antagonism that the city's Muslim
population felt.49 The Banias themselves were only too aware of the
undercurrents and the implications of the community meetings at the
mosques. On 6 August 1795, the simmering tension finally burst into an
open confrontation. As the Chief of the Surat Council put it on record,
an alarming tumult arosein the city by the Mohammedans under pretence of a
religious grievance, erecting one of their Jhandas or sacred flags assembling
behind it, and afterwards plundering the house of several of the principal
48 Selection No. 87 of
1795. See pp. 46fffor observations of the enquiry committee on
the breakdown of law and order in the city. Also see S.F.D. No. 692 of 1797, p. 377,
report of the Committee set up by the English East India Company on the feasibility of
introducing a court of adalat in Surat city. The committee described the various
arrangements in use and the abuses that had crept into their functioning.
49 S.F.D. No. 680 of I788, p. 465, consultation meeting of the Surat Council of 3
December I 788. Also see pp. 424if, report of the committee of enquiry appointed on 6
Nov. 1788 to investigate the Parsi Riots.
Hindus-Shroffs and Banias as likewise the bazar; but subsided on appearance

of part of the garrison troops sent by the Chief to assist those of the Nawab.50
Rioting in the city: 4 to 6 August
The antecedents of this violent outbreak went back to the night of 4

August I795, when a Muslim fakir (A muazzin of the Hussainee
Mosque)s1 was caught attempting to break into Adit Ram Bhat's
residence at the Hing Pole in the Kelapeeth Chaklo. Adit Ram Bhat was
a wealthy banker with well-established connections with the Gaekwad,
with the durbar and with the English Council at Surat. At the dead of
night, Bhat and his son Khusalchand were awakened by the activities of
a thief, a Muslim fakir of Bengali origin, trying to rob the banker's
effects. The thief's accomplice, who was also a Bengali fakir by the name
of Haji Ghulam Mohammed, waited below on the street but made his
getaway as soon as he realized that his partner in crime had been caught
by the inmates of the house. Adit Ram and his son were, however,
successful in catching the fleeing muazzin in one of the ruined mosques
of the locality, where he had attempted to take shelter. Word spread
around in the locality-the Muslims were quick to feel outraged at
Bhat's action, while the Banias were both furious at the incident and
apprehensive of its consequences. The former clamoured for release of
the thief Muhammed Reza Bengalee, but the Banias led by Adit Ram
Bhat stood firm. The thief was kept under detention.52
At the break of dawn, 5 August 1795, Khusalchand hurried to the
durbar, to seek redress from the authorities. Clearly he, like his father
and other members of the Bania community, was not prepared to
dismiss the night's incident as one of petty thieving. Meanwhile the
associates of the muazzin and other Muslim residents of the locality got
in touch with Syed Ismail and Abdul Wali to use their contact with the
durbar and secure release of the prisoner. Accordingly at about 6 in the
morning the Bakshi sent his principal servant Abdur Rahim and officers
to secure the release of the thief, by force if necessary. The Banias who
were guarding the thief informed Abdur Rahim that they would not
release the thief before Khusalchand arrived and before they got some
word from the English Council. Abdur Rahim was properly enraged at
o50S.F.D. No. 687 of I795, p. 357.
s' Selection No. 87 of 1795, P. 43, report of the committee of enquiry to the Chief and
Council.
52 P.D.D. No. I I5A of 1795, PP. 99ff, evidence of Khusalchand before the committee
of enquiry set up by the Surat Council on 22 September 1795. Also see pp. I Ioff for
evidence of Parmanand Shamdas.
this attitude and, to quote Gulab Moolchand, one of the witnesses, he

exclaimed: 'Why do you warn me in the Chief's name--are not we the
government and of ancient times? Your Chief is of yesterday'. A clearer
expression of the ruling Muslim d1ite's resentment against the new
political situation could not have been made.53 After this parley, the
thief was released and taken to the Daria Mahal. Khusalchand,
detained at the durbar, was informed of this development. Aware that
the situation was taking a turn for the worse, he sent word to his father
about his detention at the durbar and advised him to get in touch with
the English Chief immediately. This was done and what followed was an
examination of the thief before the English Chief who ordered Mirza
Jan, the Ameen, to be present. Others on attendance were Khusal-
chand, the Bakshi, Abdur Rahim and a few others. The culprit on
interrogation came up with an absurd story. He said that he had been
sleeping in the mosque and was suddenly awakened by the cry of thief.
Curiosity brought him to Adit Ram's house where the inmates for no
reason in particular struck him on the head with a bamboo.54 The
audience did not believe a word of this story, but for the moment there
seemed to be nothing to be done. The Chief ordered for a more through
examination of the affair and told the Nawab to be on the alert.
Adit Ram Bhat was far from happy with the way the affair was
proceeding. He approached the Nawab and requested him to grant him
adequate military protection.55 The request indicated his apprehen-
sions of a confrontation with the city's Muslim rabble. He was not
over-reacting-all his neighbours felt the same way and in fact
represented to Mirza Jan in the evening (5 August I795) that the
Muslims of the locality had assembled near the mosque, making
preparations for a showdown.56 The reason for the rally was to express
their outrage at the detention of the thief in the durbar. Associates of
Muhammed Reza Bengalee, the accused, had even earlier got in touch
with the city's Syeds and the call for vengeance had been already given.
The Bhandarees, a weaving caste, seem to have been the first to
mobilize, and by the evening a vengeful crowd had actually gathered.57
53 Selection No. 87 of 1795, pp. 8iff, evidence of Gulab Moolchand before the
committee of enquiry.
54 P.D.D. No. I 15A of 1795, PP. 99ff, evidence ofKhusalchand; p. Ioo, declaration of
Muhammed Reza Bengalee. Also see pp. 96ff for comments of the English Chief on the
Nawab's letter, undated.
55 Ibid., pp. 99ff, Khusalchand's evidence before the committee of enquiry.
56 Ibid., pp. I Ioff, evidence of Parmanand Shamdas.
57 Selection No. 87 of 1795, PP. I43ff, evidence ofPunah Allah (a Bengalee belonging
to the Fatty Masjid and nephew to the accused) before the committee of enquiry.
The crowd found a leader in Syed Shurfuddin, a young and energetic

zealot who presided over the mosque in Rampura. Harangued by the
young preacher, they resolved to come out next day on a militant
religious procession.58
Every Bania in the Hing Pole at the Kelapeeth had reason to feel
panic at the prospect of the procession. The mounting tension could
explode at any moment. The Banias were threatened with plunder and
loot as the mood built up for the morrow's jihad. One witness to these
warnings was Dulab Shamdas who lived in the Hing Pole outside the
mosque where the thief had attempted to take refuge on the night of the
robbery. Dulab overheard Muslims of his locality threatening the
Banias with dire consequences.59 Purushottam Hijaramal, another
Bania resident, also heard angry mutterings from the locality's Muslim
population who were reported to have said: 'We will beat you, we will
cut your heads offtonight',60 or words to that effect. The Bakshi's sepoys
scouring the locality were even more direct in their threats and were
reported to have ordered the Bania sugar dealers to take good care or
run the risk of incurring their master's wrath. Khusal Gopal, one of the
victims, quoted the sepoys: 'You sugar dealers make the Bhat under-
stand what he ought to do--if he does not release the man-the Bakshi
will flog every sugar dealer here and the Bhat also'.61
The threats were carried into effect next morning. On 6 August, the
city experienced one of the most serious riots that it had known in recent
times. Infuriated by Adit Ram's precipitate action against the Muslim
fakir, and confident of the support of the Muslim administration, the
city's Muslim population felt that the moment had come to strike. For
years they had been discontented and, on the Nawab's own testimony,
had got progressively more out of hand. As he pleaded in his evidence,
they were now impossible to control.62 Spurred by their Syeds, they had
become a social force to contend with-extremely sensitive to any issue
that related to their faith.63 The detention of the fakir played on pent up
feelings and all their prejudices surfaced. News of the robbery and the
detention had spread swiftly to all quarters of the city by the previous
evening and the Mohammedan residents were ready by the morning to
take out the procession. The widespread preparations were evident in
the fact that the first procession was taken out from the young Syed's
58 P.D.D. No. I I5A of I795, P. 112, evidence of Syed Abdul Wali.
59 Ibid., pp. I I3ff, evidence of Dulah Shamdas.
60 Ibid., evidence of Purushottam Hiraramal.
61 Ibid., evidence of Kushal Gopal.
62 Ibid., p. 88, observations of the enquiry committee.
63 Selection No. 87 of 1795, PP. the Nawab's letter to the Chief undated.
52ff,
CAPITAL AND CROWD IN A DECLINING ASIAN PORT 231I
mosque in the Rampura suburb which was quite a distance from both
the Kelapeeth (the original scene of crime) and the Chowk Bazar (the
central bazar area). As the Banias had feared, the procession became a
riot.
Rampura, as noted earlier, was an important mixed suburb which lay
outside the inner wall of the city proper. It was a crowded suburb,
populous and inhabited by Muslim weavers and cultivators. The
Rampura mosque-a dilapidated one--was the headquarters of Syed
Shurufuddin who had under him a considerable following of Muslim
weavers and artisans. Equipping themselves with crude implements
hatchets, wood axes and stones, with banners and a green jhanda
(reportedly Syed Shurufuddin's flag with his specific colours)-the
crowd began its march to the city proper, looting and plundering on the
way.64 Every Muslim was exhorted to take up, if he wished to remain a
true believer, the struggle against the infidels. The clarion call of the
'Chehar Yaree' ('The Four Friends') indicated that this was predomin-
antly a Sunni artisan crowd. If the Bohra traders also joined the crowd,
there is no documentary mention of the fact. Hysteria and elation
marked the attitude of the procession leaders--slogans such as 'Thanks
for God's mercy and success to the faith' were raised.65 The leaders
threaded their way to Sultanpura and Syedpura. Soldiers of the Bakshi
and other residents of the area joined the procession. The cry of Islam in
danger rent the air. The Bania shops just below the Bakshi's dwelling
were looted and plundered.66 The crowd assembled in front of the
Bakshi's house, hoisted the green flag and plundered the Bania shops
without hindrance from the authorities. Soon after, the crowd seems to
have split into the separate movements: one leading to the Bazar
area--Chokbazar Chaklo, the other movement concentrating on the
Kelapeeth Chaklo, the well-to-do Bania quarter.67 The Castle Bazar
which was Company property was also plundered.68 Calyandas
Lackimdas, a Bania shopkeeper who sat in his shop near the Castle
parade, saw the procession led by an old Syed towards the durbar.69
Shops and shopkeepers were attacked on sight as the locality's Muslim
residents took up arms.
64 P.D.D. No. I I5A of 1795, pp. report of the committee of enquiry dated 22
80ff,
September 1795. Also see pp. I 12ff for evidence of Syed Shurufuddin.
65 Selection No. 87 of 1795, P. 42, report of the enquiry committee on the Surat Riot.
66 P.D.D. No. I I5A of 1795, PP. 83-7.
67 P.D.D. No. I I4A of 1795, 49-52, letter received by the Bombay Council from
PP-
Surat dated 8 August 1795.
68 P.D.D. No. I I5A of 1795, pp. 83ff, report of the enquiry committee.
69 Ibid., pp. I I2ff, evidence of Syed Shurufuddin.
The Rampura flank led by Syed Shurufuddin directed the attack on

the Kelapeeth Chaklo which was probably the worst hit. Here feelings
ran high and the frenzied violence of the rioters came into full play.
Nearly fifteen houses were attacked--the rioters pelting the inmates
with stones and in some cases breaking in.70 One house they broke open
was that of Sevakram Shamdas, an important Bania banker and a
neighbour ofAdit Ram Bhat. The rioters plundered and rifled the house
of everything, stripped women naked, took their clothes and tore off
ornaments from their noses and ears."71Shopkeepers stood petrified as
they watched their shops being looted and their account books getting
mutilated. Bhana Laldas, a Bania assistant to a shopkeeper, was injured
trying to ward off an attack by the rioters. The rioters plundered his
house and tore off his earring for the sake of a pearl that was attached to
it. They also tore his wife's ornaments from her neck.72 Maunds of sugar
were seized by the crowd from Bahay Bhat Gopaljee's shop.73 Tarwady
RupshankarJaishankar was beaten up by ten to fifteen angry men but
he escaped with his life.'74 Kushal Gopal, another resident of the
Kelapeeth Chaklo, was robbed of his valuables and annual stock of
grain.75 Mayaram Narsingdas sustained severe injuries from the attacks
of a Habshi sepoy, a 'fat lusty man' who had earlier in the morning
brandished his sword before him when he was at the counter.76 A
free-for-all ensued and there seemed no respite 'for hours. The attack
continued till noon. Gulabchand Moolchand, in his report, mentioned
that the crowd blindly broke into houses and shops with axes and
mindlessly plundered and looted whatever they came across. His
household god was damaged, his women were not molested but their
jewellery was violently seized.77 Temples were razed to the ground,
images of Hindu gods demolished.78 The procession once again split up
with one section proceeding to the Burhanpur gate where there was a
row of Bania shops. These, too, were looted and damaged before the
energy of the rioters wore out. It was then that the riot lost momentum.
At this point, the Company's forces swung into action and in the
70 Ibid., pp. I off, evidence of Parmanand Shamdas.

71 Selection No. 87 of 1795, p. 79, evidence of Sevakram before the enquiry
committee.
72 Ibid., p. 80, evidence of Bhana Laldas before the enquiry committee.
73 P.D.D. No. I5A of 795, pp. I I2ff, evidence ofBahay Bhat Gopaljee.
74 Ibid., evidence of Tarwady Rupshankar Jaishankar.
75 Ibid., evidence of Kushal Gopal.
76 Ibid., evidence of Mayaram Narsingdas.
77 Selection No. 87 of 1795, p. 84, evidence of Gulabchand Moolchand.
78 Ibid., Also see P.D.D. No. I 15A of 1795 for evidence of Gosain Sambooji.
encounter that followed the rioters were affectively subdued.79 By noon,
the riot had ended. The city wore a desolate look in the afternoon. The
worst fears of the Banias had come to pass. As a mark of protest, the
shopkeepers pulled down their shutters, putting a stop to all commercial
transactions. The Bania Mahajan issued a warrant to all shopkeepers to
keep their establishments closed.8s An unnatural quiet, a growing sense
of unease, and shops on strike were the only signs to indicate the
forenoon's plunder.
The Bania counter-action
The implications of the Mahajan's decision were not lost on the Muslim
administration. Disruption in the city's retail trade meant that the
population faced the prospect of starvation. The Nawab, panic stricken,
protested and the very next day persuaded the English Chief to
intervene on his behalf and direct the Banias to keep their shops open.8'
The latter were in no mood to oblige the Nawab. On the contrary, they
insisted on the English authorities giving them a written guarantee of
protection of their personal property without which they were not
prepared to carry on their business transactions. They refused to expose
their property any more to devastation by the Muslim crowd. It was
upon much persuasion that the Banias after nearly a week consented to
keep their shops open.82
The Company authorities appreciated the fears of the Bania
community upon whose cooperation their own welfare hinged. The
situation for them was far from being satisfactory. Their investment
supplies were likely to be delayed--more seriously their banker's agent
confessed that it was now out of his power to pay the Company the
stipulated sum of Rs 3 lakhs because of the disruption of all business in
the city.83 The authorities decided to take concrete steps once the report
from the Committee of Enquiry which they instituted to look into the
riots came out. The entire money and credit market was on the point of
79 P.D.D. No. I4A of 1795, PP. 52ff, letter from Surat dated 8 August and received
by the Bombay Council on I9 August 1795.
S.F.D. No. 687 of 1795, the Nawab's Roca or Memorandum to the English
80
P- 359,
Chief, dated 7 August 1795.
81 Ibid., p. 359.
82 Ibid., p. 357, the Bania Mahajan's meeting with the English Chief 7 August 1795;
pp. 366-8, consultation meeting of 13 August 1795 of the Surat Council.
83 Ibid., p. 31 I, representation from agent of Manohardas Dwarkadas, dated 13
August 1795.
being paralysed, and understandably they panicked. A letter of

assurance was forwarded to the Seth of the Bania Mahajan.
We W. G. Farmer, Chief for affairs of the British nation and Governor of the
Mughal's Castle and fleet do hereby engage and promise that their past
grievances shall be submitted to the Presidentand Council at Bombay and any
representationthey may have to make in writing passedforward to them for his
consideration. We also solemnly assure you that for the present no exertion in
our power shall be wanting for protection of their persons and property in
common with the rest of the inhabitants who since the acquisition of the Castle
have been deemed virtually under protection of the Company although the
administration and police of the city have been committed wholly to the
Nawab.84
The Bania Mahajan took their cue and a week after this assurance
came up with a lengthy petition to the Company authorities. It set out,
in remarkable detail and clarity, the importance of their position in the
city's trade and financial system, the extent of the Company's reliance
on them and the vital nature of the Anglo-Bania cooperation. They
provided financial assistance to the Company and traders, ran the shops
in the city, lent money to one and all and kept the weaving population
under their control by the system of advances. The Mahajan drew
attention to the fact that the bankers' account books had been damaged
by their rioters. This act of spoliation threatened the very foundations of
the credit system on which depended the trade of the West Coast. Both
Government and merchant relied on the credit of the shroffs and if this
were impaired, traders would be forced to function under serious
constraints. The following extract of the Mahajan's petition made this
point inelegantly but forcefully nonetheless.
The entire belief that property is perfectly secure in the house of a shroffforms
what is called his credit which more than actual money is the great instrument
of his dealing and the great source of his profits those who come to trade in this
city either bring Bills on the shroffs or lodge the produce of their goods with
them during their stay from many different parts of India and particularly the
Maratha country, large sums were deposited with the shroffsat Surat. Equally
with the view of being safe, the little savings from those who do not trade are
lodged with shroffs, portions of widows in the Bania caste. For all these sums
deposited, no receipts are given. The books of the shroffs and opinion of their
faith and substance are the total dependence of the people who deal with
them-from this it is clear how much their credit depends on belief of their
effectual protection by the government they live under. We are very concerned
that the plunderers of Adit Ram shroff destroyed the accounts of his shop, on
which the ascertainment of property of others wholly depends, from whence it
84 S.F.D. No. 687 of 1795, P. 374, the Surat Council's letter to the Mahajan, dated 14
August 1795.
may be inferred that on alarm of this tumult and knowledge of this
circumstance, there may be a general demand on all shroffs for foreign
accounts, that their credit in this place will not be amply restored until they
were visibly under the protection of the English Government.85
The message was unambiguous. Without their cooperation, the
English East India Company and the Bombay merchants would be hard
pressed for funds and this was a truth which could not be ignored by
either party. The Banias made it clear that if cooperation was to
continue, the English East India Company would have to take greater
care in looking after their interests. They charged that the Company
had neglected their duty as Qiladar and drew their attention to the fact
that public revenue had been raised by them in 1759 for the precise
purpose of maintaining a police force in the city. They urged the
Company to station a disciplined force in the city for the upkeep of
which a proportion from the city's revenues could be deployed.86
The Nawab of Surat decided now to intervene. Anxious to salvage
what remained of his political authority, he protested against the
Mahajan's petition which he said was baseless in its accusations. In two
consecutive letters that he addressed to the English Chief, he put the
blame squarely on the Banias whom he accused of needlessly provoking
the Muslims. The Nawab alleged that the mahajans were not helpful to
the poor and that they lent money only to those who were in a position to
repay the loans with interest. He further alleged that they wilfully
declared bankruptcy thereby engrossing the deposits of several needy
citizens. Under the circumstances, the Nawab argued, it was quite
possible for the Banias to invent anystory which would bring them some
material gain.87
The Surat Council considered the petition as well as the Nawab's
letters carefully. It became clear to them that the establishment of a
military force was indispensable for the maintenance of public order.
The establishment of such a force was, however, expected to create
minor problems relating to available resources. Although a marginal
increase in taxes was possible, any new measure involved a change in
revenue administration, the responsibility of which the Company was
not prepared to shoulder. At the same time the Maratha officers had to
85 P.D.D. No. I I4A of 1795, pp. I I4-I5, petition of the Bania Mahajan, dated 22
August 1795.
86 S.F.D. No. 687 of 1795, PP. 424-37, petition of LakmandasJagannathdas Seth of
Banias and Waranasidas Jaidas, Seth of shroffs for themselves and for all the Mahajans,
dated 22 August 1795.
87 Selection No. 87 of 1795, PP. 24ff, the Nawab's letter to the Chief, undated. Also see
P.D.D. No. I 15A of 1795, PP. 64-5, 67-72 and 96-7.
be reassured that the Company were not intent on self aggrandize-

ment.88
The long awaited Committee report reached the Surat Council on 25
September I795. The Surat Council had appointed John Spencer,
Edward Galley, Alexander Ramsay and John Hector Cherry to
investigate the antecedents of the August riots and find out who its
principal instigators had been. These gentlemen questioned several
individuals-victims, Syeds, officials of the administration-before
drawing up their report. Their report absolved the Nawab of all blame
although his lackadaisical attitude was criticized. They were also of the
opinion that the Bakshi was not directly involved and that the riot was
due entirely to the uncontrollable state of the Muslim crowd which was
hypersensitive to any issue that related to their faith. They recom-
mended the establishment of an effective military force to tackle the
problem of lawlessness and indiscipline.89
The Bombay Council were duly informed of these developments.
Surprisingly enough, they came up with a lukewarm response and
suggested that the Nawab take better care of the city and appoint men of
distinction and reputation to important offices. These commands were
duly noted.90 The Nawab promised to do his best. In this anxiety to
please the English East India Company authorities he withheld
permission in September i795 to the Boongars, a low caste Muslim
weaving group, to meet and dine together, lest they become turbulent
especially as they had been principally concerned in the August riots. He
also promised to remove the Habshis from the judicial machinery and
provided an armed force for the protection of every locality.9' So the
riots ended. The Banias succeeded in calling attention to the problems of
law and order in the city-problems which had threatened tojeopardize
their position in the existing commercial system. They had come to
accept the advantages and necessity of English protection and were
determined to retain it. As Tarwady Shankar observed before the
Commitee of Enquiry, 'I have seen Banaras, the people are all happy
there under the English government. Nowhere have I seen such a thing
88 S.F.D. No. 687 of I795, PP. 394-5, consultation meeting of 29 August 1795 of the
Surat Council.
89 P.D.D. No. I I5A of 1795 PP. 53-61, report of the enquiry committee read by the
Surat Council on 25 September 1795.
90 Ibid., pp. 262-3, consultation meeting of I I December I795 of the Surat Council.
91 S.F.D. No. 688 of 1795, PP. 12-13, meeting of the Nawab's deputy with the Chief
on I I September 1795. Also No. 689 of 1796, pp. 164-5, the Nawab's letter to the Chief
of Surat read on II February 1796.
happen where you English are.'92 On the other hand, the chances of the
riot assuming significant dimensions or recurring in the near future were
not many, considering that the movement did not have a concrete set of
objectives to sustain its momentum. The absence ofa charter ofdemands
showed how unorganized and inarticulate this protest was. Throughout
the disturbance, the rioters were unable to present a petition or to voice
specific grievances. Even the cry of Islam in danger did not assume the
proportions of a revivalist crusade. An old order was disintegrating--a
new economic and commercial system taking its place but without the
support of a new political and civic order behind it. The changing
political order was unable to offer the security the commercial groups
needed, and also to contain the social resentment that the recent
changes had given rise to. The riots were thus part of an inchoate
popular response to the process of transition from one system to another.
Thus it was that the confrontation between Bania capital and the
Muslim crowd, for three days in the rainy season of 1795, appeared to be
entirely inconsequential: the ineffective protest of a dying century
unable to generate the forces of a genuine social revolution from within
the collapsed old order. The crowd was to melt at once and the capital to
migrate soon. In fact the migration of the Banias and Parsees to Bombay
had already gathered momentum in the 178os. Bombay promised to
provide the civic environment that the Surat Banias had long been
pressing the British to establish in their own town. As capital migrated
from Surat, the artisan and labouring groups of the town diminished in
number as well. Neither the rioters nor their victims were destined to
push their brief confrontation to any dramatic conclusion.
92 P.D.D. No. I I5A of I795, P. 6i, report of the enquiry committee and declaration of
Tarwady Shankar.

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Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port City: The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots

Capitaland Crowdin a DecliningAsian Port

Visva Bharati University,Santiniketan

The Anglo-Bania Order and the Castle Revolution of 1759

presumably to forestall family disputes regarding property.8 This range

8 P.D.D. No. I I4A of

Surat. He shared power with the Qiladar or Commander of the

felt emboldened to interfere in succession disputes raging in the city

English Qiladars who decided all matters of succession. The right to

22 In February 1763 the Bombay Council intervened on behalf of Meer Cutbudeen

Bombay's custom revenue, these averaging Rs 6 lakhs per annum.25

British Arms and Bania Finance

The English East India Company, as we have noted, was principally

25 Custom figures available in the public department diaries of the Bombay

After 1765, remittances from Fort William became an easier method of

Thus circumstances in the second half of the century combined to give

The Structure of the Muslim Community in Surat

The violent response to the Bania ascendancy in 1795 has to be studied

No. of looms Caste and Religion

4086 Necanees, large, small, coarse. Momna, Bora and Bhandaree

Total looms: 15,777

The Collapse of the Civic Order

To sum up, circumstances had so converged as to alienate the Muslim

tion-particularly its judicial machinery at critical points. They were

Hindus-Shroffs and Banias as likewise the bazar; but subsided on appearance

Rioting in the city: 4 to 6 August

The antecedents of this violent outbreak went back to the night of 4

this attitude and, to quote Gulab Moolchand, one of the witnesses, he

The crowd found a leader in Syed Shurfuddin, a young and energetic

The Rampura flank led by Syed Shurufuddin directed the attack on

70 Ibid., pp. I off, evidence of Parmanand Shamdas.

The Bania counter-action

being paralysed, and understandably they panicked. A letter of

be reassured that the Company were not intent on self aggrandize-

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