Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report

Location: Hot Springs, VA Accident Number: ERA24FA136

Date & Time: March 10, 2024, 14:52 Local Registration: N1125A

ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES

Aircraft: Injuries: 5 Fatal
1125 WESTWIND ASTRA

Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On March 10, 2024, about 1452 eastern daylight time, an Israel Aircraft Industries 1125
Westwind Astra airplane, N1125A, was involved in an accident at the Ingalls Field Airport
(HSP), Hot Springs, Virginia. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and three passengers
were fatally injured. The airplane was operated by SkyJet Elite under the provisions of Title 14
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight.
According to a representative of the operator, the flight crew itinerary for the day was for the
pilots to fly fromFort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, to HSP. The passengers planned to attend a conference in Hot Springs, while the flight
crew were scheduled to continue to Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. According
to the operator’s trip itinerary, both flights were non-revenue 14 CFR Part 91 flights.
According to preliminary Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control audio
recordings and automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) flight track data, the
flight departed FLL about 1246 and proceeded on course to HSP. About 1430, the flight crew
checked in with Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). At that time, the
airplane was about 60 miles south of HSP, at flight level 210 (21,000 ft). The controller
instructed the flight crew to advise when they had the current weather and NOTAM information
at HSP, and to advise of which instrument approach they wanted to utilize. The flight crew
acknowledged the instruction.
About 1432, the controller queried the flight crew again about which approach they wanted to
conduct at HSP, and if they had the current weather and NOTAMs at the airport. The flight
crew responded that they had received the weather conditions at HSP airport, but the
information was about an hour old, and they further advised they wanted to fly the ILS
approach to runway 25. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to AHLER intersection,

Page 1 of 5 ERA24FA136
This information is preliminary and subject to change.
which was an initial fix for the ILS approach to runway 25, located about 10 miles northeast of
the airport.
About 1433 to 1439, the controller provided 5° to 10° right of course headings as the flight
continued to AHLER intersection. The controller also instructed the flight crew to confirm they
had the current weather and NOTAMs at HSP.
About 1441, the flight crew advised they had the current weather and NOTAMs. About 1444,
the flight crew requested to descend from 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to 6,000 ft msl. The
controller responded by clearing the flight direct to AHLER intersection for the ILS runway 25
approach and to cross AHLER at or above 6,100 ft msl. The flight crew read back the clearance
and requested radar vectors for the approach, but subsequently followed up that they were
proceeding direct to AHLER and cleared for the approach.
About 1447, the flight crew advised that they would cancel their IFR (instrument flight rules)
flight plan once on the ground at HSP with the flight service station. The controller advised that
they could still contact the controller while on the ground, and they could cancel the flight plan
directly with him. Subsequently, the controller advised that there was no traffic observed
between their position and the airport and to switch to the common traffic advisory frequency
(CTAF). The flight crew readback the instruction and no further radio communications were
recorded between the controller and the flight crew.
According to an HSP airport staff member who was monitoring the CTAF, shortly before the
accident he heard two radio calls from an airplane announcing that they were conducting an
approach to land on runway 25. Shortly thereafter, he heard the airplane’s impact with terrain
and turned to see smoke rising from the approach end of runway 25.
The airplane’s ADS-B flight track revealed that the airplane proceeded about 15 miles northeast
of the airport to conduct the ILS approach to runway 25, commencing the approach at the
AHLER intersection. The airplane’s altitude descended along the final approach course to
runway 25. The final recorded ADS-B position was about 200 ft from the initial impact point
with terrain. Figure 1 provides an overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the
final 45 seconds of flight track data.

Page 2 of 5 ERA24FA136
This information is preliminary and subject to change.
 Figure 1: Overview of the airport environment, accident site, and the final 45 seconds of flight track data.

The wreckage debris path was oriented on a 250° to 255° magnetic heading and spanned
about 150 ft from the initial impact point to the main wreckage. The initial impact point
coincided with several trees that were located along a down sloping ravine about 300 ft from
the runway threshold. The wreckage was heavily fragmented and was thermally damaged
during a postimpact fire.
All primary flight control surfaces and major portions of the airplane were located at the
accident site. The right main landing gear was the only major portion of the airplane to have
been located next to runway 25; it was located about 315 ft forward of the fuselage and about
10 ft to the right of the runway edge.
Flight control continuity could not be established from the cockpit to the flight controls due to
the extensive impact damage, however; continuity was observed at the flight control surfaces
that remained partially intact. The configuration of the airplane at the time of impact was
assessed to be landing gear down and flaps set to 40° as measured by actuator and jackscrew
positions. The left wing outboard spoiler was observed retracted and its actuator position
corresponded to a retracted position. The right wing spoilers were not identifiable due to the
impact and thermal damage. The impact and thermal damage sustained to the cockpit
prevented any data collection of instrument readings or switch positions.
Both engines were located in the debris field with heavy impact and thermal damage observed.
The left engine had separated into two pieces and the right engine remained mostly intact.
Both engine spinners exhibited varying degrees of rotational scoring signatures. Both engine

Page 3 of 5 ERA24FA136
This information is preliminary and subject to change.
fan blade sections exhibited leading edge tearing, gouging, and battering damage, and several
fan blades were observed to be bent opposite the direction of engine rotation.
Review of the Aviation Routine Weather Reports (METARs) at the airport found two reports
issued, with one issued about 20 minutes before the accident and another report issued a few
minutes after the accident. At 1435, the wind was 270° at 21 knots, gusting to 31 knots,
visibility was 10 statute miles, and no ceiling was reported. At 1455, the wind was 280° at 19
knots, gusting to 38 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles, and scattered clouds were reported
2,000 ft above ground level (agl), broken clouds 2,400 ft agl, and an overcast ceiling at 4,500 ft
agl.
According to FAA airman and operator records, the pilot in command (PIC) held an airline
transport pilot certificate and held a PIC type rating in the accident airplane that was issued on
January 28, 2024. The PIC was issued a first-class medical certificate on December 19, 2023,
the application for which reported 13,655 total flight hours. According to an operator’s
electronic pilot logbook, a total of 65 hours, of which 55 hours were PIC hours, had been
logged in the accident airplane make and model. The PIC also held the position of Chief Pilot
for the operator.
The second in command (SIC) held a commercial pilot certificate, with airplane single, multi-
engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The SIC was issued a first-class medical
certificate on April 4, 2023. He was issued a SIC type rating in the accident airplane on
November 20, 2023. According to an operator’s electronic pilot logbook, he had logged a total
of 1,068 flight hours, of which 136 hours were in the accident airplane make and model as SIC.
The airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was located in the debris and was forwarded to the
National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorder’s Laboratory in Washington, DC. The
wreckage was retained for further examination.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: ISRAEL AIRCRAFT Registration: N1125A
INDUSTRIES
Model/Series: 1125 WESTWIND ASTRA Aircraft Category: Airplane
NO SERIES
Amateur Built:
Operator: On file Operating Certificate(s) On-demand air taxi (135)
Held:
Operator Designator Code:

Page 4 of 5 ERA24FA136
This information is preliminary and subject to change.
 Meteorological Information and Flight Plan
Conditions at Accident Site: VMC Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: HSP,3793 ft msl Observation Time: 14:55 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles Temperature/Dew Point: -2°C /-8°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 2000 ft AGL Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 19 knots / 38 knots, 280°
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 2400 ft AGL Visibility: 10 miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.65 inches Hg Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Departure Point: Fort Lauderdale, FL (FLL) Destination: Hot Springs, VA (HSP)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 3 Fatal Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries: N/A Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 5 Fatal Latitude, Longitude: 37.955627,-79.825144

Administrative Information
Investigator In Charge (IIC):
Additional Participating Persons:
Investigation Class:
Note:
Gerhardt, Adam
Jay Venable; FAA/FSDO; Richmond, VA
Boas Grossman; Aircraft Safety Investigation Authority Israel (AIAI); Ben Gurion Airport, OF
Keith Candline ; Gulfstream Aerospace; Savannah, GA
David Studtmann; Honeywell Aerospace; Phoenix, AZ
Class 3

Page 5 of 5 ERA24FA136
This information is preliminary and subject to change.