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 Family Ownership and Firm Performance:
Evidence from the French Stock Market

Marcel Corstjens
Unilever Chaired Professor of Marketing

Katrina D. Maxwell
Senior Research Fellow

and

Ludo Van der Heyden

Solvay Chaired Professor for Technological Innovation

INSEAD
Boulevard de Constance
Fontainebleau Cedex 77305
France

This version: December 13th 2004

© INSEAD. This paper was first presented at CEPR/ECGI/INSEAD/NBER/

University of Alberta joint conference on The Evolution of Corporate Governance
and Family Firms, hosted by INSEAD on January 30th & 31st 2004 in Fontainebleau.
The authors thank Bernard Dumas, Pierre Hillion, Massimo Massa, Eric Nowak, and
Theo Vermaelen for their constructive comments on previous versions of the paper.
They also express their gratitude to the INSEAD Initiative for Family Enterprise, the
Tetrapak Research grant to INSEAD, and INSEAD’s R&D department for financial
support.
Abstract

The objective of our research is to compare the relative economic performance of

French publicly quoted family-owned and non-family-owned firms during the period
1993-2002.
Most of the firm performance results in the literature have been obtained for the US, a
market where common law prevails and investor protection is high. The literature
provides growing evidence that family firms in the US have over the last decade
outperformed non-family firms, both on accounting (ROA) and stock market (Tobin’s
Q) measures. In addition, the last decade could be described as particularly turbulent
from an economic viewpoint. The decade can therefore be regarded as particularly
challenging for family firms, often regarded as excessively conservative.
Recent studies have singled out the French stock market as differing substantially
from the US market: a civil law regime, low investor and creditor protection, judicial
and accounting systems which are regarded as less efficient than those prevailing in
the US, and also regarded (pre-Enron) as relatively more corrupt. Family firms also
are more prevalent amongst the largest quoted firms in the French stock market.
Using state-of-the-art financial methodology, we find strong statistical evidence that
family-owned firms did outperform non-family firms on the French stock market in
terms of total shareholder return over the time period 1993-2002. We find that French
family-owned firms have a significantly higher return on assets (and a higher return
on equity) than non-family firms, and that the differential is higher than that found in
the US. The persistence of this effect does, however, suggest that the investors in this
stock market appear to have an unwarranted and continued bias against family firms
relative to non-family firms. Indeed, higher ROA performance should not necessarily
lead to higher market performance, as the market could anticipate this systematic
differential in firm performance through pricing. The difference in Tobin’s Q
between French family and non-family firms is not as pronounced as in the US.

Our results indicate that these differences in performance are not due to the firms’
industrial classification, financial policies or other business characteristics.
Differences in ownership characteristics appear as one remaining explanation. Our
conclusion is that families, eager to maintain their control over their firms (and not to
diffuse it), actually govern their firms with a higher effective cost of capital than their
non-family counterparts, resulting in higher ROA performance .
Finally, it is interesting note whether the stock market performance differential
exhibited in the paper will subsist over the coming decade, or be arbitraged away. If
the market considers family firms to be more risky, and continues to do so, the
differential should be expected to persist.

2
1 Introduction
Increasing attention has been given over the last few years to the performance of
family firms relative to that of their non-family counterparts (e.g. Miller, 2004).
Academic contributions to this debate have been increasing lately, though remains
relatively scarce. One major and recent contribution is the study of Anderson and
Reeb (2003) who show that US family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of
both accounting and market value (Tobin’s Q) performance. This has been followed
by the dissertation work of Fahlenbrach (2003) who focused particularly on the excess
performance of founder-CEO firms.
No analogous rigorous financial research has been undertaken in Europe. It should
immediately be underlined that rigorous financial research on European markets
remains a challenge: obtaining data comparable in quality to that available to US
researchers is tedious, and at times, outright difficult.
France is a particularly interesting country to study family firms and their
performance. French firms operate in a very different economic , political and legal
environment .
Murphy (2004) describes how various historical factors have, over the last 300 years,
contributed to a weak French capital and banking structure. Because of the slow
development of the financial sector, French firms were forced to rely largely on self-
financing for their development for many years.
Furthermore, following World War II, a certain number of major industrial sectors
(like steel and energy) were largely nationalized. The most recent nationalization
occurred in 1982. It was due to the socialist government of President Mittérand.
Successive French governments have since carried out several waves of
privatizations, which are ongoing at this date.
Moreover, in their study on investor protection and corporate governance, La Porta et
al. (2000) positioned France as nearly at the other extreme from the US and the UK.
They classified countries according to legal regime. They argued that civil code
countries were typically weaker than common law countries on investor and creditor
protection. In addition, using various metrics, they rated French civil code countries
as relatively weaker too as far as accounting standards, legal enforcement (the data
here concerned 1980-83), and corruptive practices in government (the data leading to
the assessment concerned the period 1982-95, thus definitely pre-Enron) . The
French stock market is very different from the US stock market. To these authors, it
therefore should come as no surprise that the level of block-holding in France is
considerably higher than that prevalent in the US, where ownership is more diffused
due to a better environment for enforcing minority shareholding.
On top of these differences in market conditions, French family firms have some
unique characteristics. In the past, family firms represented the large majority of firms
on the French stock market – and to this day, the influence of families remains
predominant (see Blondel, Rowell, and Van der Heyden, 2002). In addition,of the top
ten performing European companies in a Newsweek study by Miller (2004), five are
French [Sanofi-Sythelabo, TF1, L’Oreal, LVMH and PPR] and 80 percent of these
[Sanofi-Synthélabo excepted] are family firms.
We therefore found it worthwhile to re-examine the debate on the relative
performance of family firms in a country that is quite different in terms of socio-

3
economic and socio-political structure than that prevailing in the US where such
rigorous studies were first performed. If family firms could indeed be shown to
perform better both in the US and France, this would certainly indicate that family-
owned firms showed a remarkable degree of resilience in financial performance under
quite different legal , political, and economic regimes. This motivates the principal
question examined in this paper: how does the economic performance of French
family firms compare to that of non-family firms for the most recent decade, 1993-
2002?
A review of the theoretical literature quickly yields the conclusion that the relative
performance of family firms is an essentially empirical question, as there are valid
reasons on both sides of the argument. One can argue that family firms should
outperform non-family firms because family firms avoid managerial expropriation
(Demsetz, 1985). Family firms have longer investment horizons which render their
investments more efficient, but also allow them to make investments firms with
shorter horizons would not make (Stein, 1988 & 1989; James, 1999). This increased
commitment to the business – as evidenced in investment strategies – will galvanize
employees and managers alike around improved performance and commitment to the
firm. Longer investment horizons makes family firms less reactive to short term
pressures, events and fads. Their implementation of a longer-term vision will avoid
the costs of a continuous sequence of short-run changes, many of which are
necessitated by rather random perturbations in the stock market, and not to lasting
changes in the fundamental economics of the firm. Finally, families in poorly
performing firms (or anticipating poor performance) are more likely to sell their
shares and leave the company; in addition, families have a better knowledge of the
company’s core competencies and limits as they have been longer with the firm
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Family firms may therefore present a better form of
corporate governance in the sense that managers and owners, but also suppliers (e.g.
of capital) are more aligned, and have greater trust in and commitment to each other
(for the importance on trust and commitment on performance, see, e.g., Kim &
Mauborgne, 1997). Their relationships are less affected by principal-agent
inefficiencies because they have identifiable (as opposed to diffuse) ownership; they
know each other well, making breach of trust or of commitment more costly
(including emotionally).
On the other hand, one can argue that family firms should be outperformed by non-
family firms because families exchange profits for private rents (Fama and Jensen,
1983), firm growth, technical innovation, firm survival (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997),
and special dividends (DeAngelo, 2000). Families prefer stability and capital
preservation to profitable projects (Demsetz, 1983). Family firms are too anchored in
the past and as a result resistant to change in the face of turbulent, even chaotic
market conditions. In other words, they suffer from costly inertia. Family firms
prefer independence and control over growth and performance – hence they sub-
optimize performance in favor of independence and control. Moreover, family firms,
in particular older family firms, work with a restricted labor pool, and are subject to
managerial entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). In addition, they are less likely
to be able to retain excellent talent that they might have been able to attract. Their
professional talent may thus be of lower average quality than that available to non-
family firms.
Solid arguments existing on both sides of the argument, the question of performance
of family firms vs non-family firms is thus essentially an empirical question. In their

4
recent study on the subject, Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that US family firms
outperform non-family firms in terms of accounting (ROA) and firm value (Tobin’s
Q) measures. This study was followed by that of Fahlenbrach (2004) who identified
excess returns of founder-CEO firms on the US stock market.
The superior performance of family firms on the French stock market had been
mentioned in the professional financial community [see the website of the French
stock broker firm Oddo , and also the UBS analyst report by Tibi et al.(2003)].
However, this claimed excess performance had not been studied rigorously thus far.
We apply the four factor market evaluation technique of Gompers et al. (2003). This
allows us to compare two portfolios (family vs non-family) controlling for market
risk, firm size, glamour (vs value), and momentum. These are, in the finance
literature, the factors best explaining the market performance of stocks. A major part
of our study consisted in constructing the last two factors for the French stock market.
Using this state-of-the-art methodology, and additionally controlling for industry
affiliation, we found that French family firms significantly outperform non-family
firms in terms of total shareholder return, as well as in terms of accounting criteria
(ROA especially, but also ROE). We also found that younger family firms outperform
older family firms in terms of accounting measures. Contrary to the US results,
French family firms’ market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q, are not
significantly different from that of non-family firms. The French stock market
therefore does not appear to attribute different valuations to family and non-family
firms – erroneously so, as our results indicate.
Our study of excess relative performance of the family firm portfolio versus the non-
family does appear to reveal an anomaly in that the French stock market, for the
period under examination (1993-2002), significantly undervalued family firms
relatively to their non-family counterparts. Having identified this abnormality, one
should – as a recent UBS report (Tibi et al, 2003) has hypothesized - expect this
premium to disappear over time. However, an alternate explanation might be that the
market assigns a specific risk to family firms, consistent with sustained higher
expected returns.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our sample
and contains our operational definition of family ownership. We first present a simple
accounting and firm value performance analysis in Section 3. Section 4 describes our
in-depth stock market performance analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Data Sample and Ownership Classification

We undertook our study on the French stock market - or Société de Bourse Française
(SBF) - over the 9-year period 1993-2002. The SBF250 is an official index of the
French stock market, consisting of approximately 250 stocks that are judged to be
representative of the French stock market. The SBF250 contains the SBF120 (and
also the CAC40) which are the 120 (and 40) highest capitalization stocks on the
exchange. To this, a committee of experts adds another 130 stocks that, joined to the
stocks of the SBF120, form a representative sample of the stocks traded on the first
and second markets in France.
In December 1993, the SBF250 actually consisted of equities from 248 companies.
The median (average) stock in this portfolio had a market value, averaged over this

5
time period, of 726.3 million Euros (2,889.6 million Euros), the range going from
52.8 million Euros to 51,297.3 million Euros.
Indicative of substantial economic change during the period examined, only 124 of
our original 248 equities were still quoted on the stock exchange by the end of 2002.
This means that exactly half of the stocks were de-listed during this 9-year period. A
stock can be de-listed for various reasons, not all of which are negative. For example,
a company could have declared bankruptcy, it could have merged with another
company, it could have been taken over, or it could have decided to buy back all of its
shares and return to private status.
[Table 1 here]
As can be further seen in Table 1, family-owned firms are slightly less likely to have
de-listed: 47.5% of family-owned firms de-listed over this period, as compared to
57% of non family-owned firms. However, these observed differences are not
statistically significant (and hence could be due to chance fluctuations). A further six
companies quoted over the 1993-2002 period changed ownership type: 2 companies
moved from family to non-family ownership [Castorama Dubois and Unibail
Holding], while 4 non-family companies became family-owned [ CS Communications
& Systems, IDI, Vallourec and Aventis]. For our analyses we split the companies into
two portfolios, family-owned firms and non family-owned firms, based on their
ownership at the end of 1993.
We follow Blondel, Rowell and Van der Heyden (2002) to determine whether a firm
appearing in the SBF250 is family or non-family owned. An important characteristic
of this classification is that it was developed independently from any performance
concerns that are the object of this paper. A family firm, according to the
methodology used by Blondel et al. (2002) is a company where one or several
individuals or families are ultimate owners and represent the largest block of shares.
The owning family is not required to be descendants of the firm’s founder(s). Non-
family owned firms are those firms in which no individual, set of individuals, family
or sets of families can be identified as the ultimate owner. Our definition of family
ownership is stricter than the definition used by Anderson and Reeb (2003) in their
recent study of the S&P500. They define a firm as family-owned if founding family
members own shares in the firm or founding family members are present on the
board. Ownership data was obtained from DAFSALiens (the most common database
on French companies), annual company reports, and company websites.
One particularity of French firms, as opposed to US firms, is their complex chain of
ownership. When ownership was not direct, ultimate ownership was tracked by going
up the ownership chain. We considered that we had found an identifiable owner when
the stake of the owner(s) at each step in the ownership chain was at least 10% of
equity. Families like control and thus typically had shareholding (and especially
voting power) that most often substantially exceeded 10%. The resulting
classification can be found in Appendix 1 and is generally regarded non-controversial.
An interesting observation is that family-owned firms are typically less common in
sectors that require a lot of capital. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows that
family-owned firms are more predominant in the services and cyclical consumer
goods industries. Most non-family firms operate in the financial sector, which

6
includes banks, real estate, and insurance companies. These differences are
statistically significant1. In our performance study, we control for industry effects.
[Figure 1 here]
Turning to performance data, our initial sample consisted of the 248 equities quoted in
the SBF250 in December 1993. We were unable to obtain total return index data for
two non-family firms [Spie Batignolles and Segic]. Thus our analyses were
undertaken on the remaining 246 equities, which, as mentioned above, comprised 120
family firms and 126 non-family firms in 1993. We obtained monthly return data for
equities traded on the French stock market from December 1993 through December
2002 from Datastream. This was also our source for the French risk free rate and
industrial classification data.
We were unable to use Datastream as a source for accounting data because this
database does not keep historic accounting data for de-listed companies. Thus
financial information was obtained in the first instance from the Compustat Global
Industrial/Commercial and the Compustat Global Financial databases. We then
completed the data by hand, when possible, using the Thomson One Banker database,
the 1998 Diane database, the DAFSA des Sociétés books – in that order. Firm age
was obtained from the INSEE database, the Diane database and company websites.
Care was taken to ensure that companies matched across sources using ISIN, SIREN
and SEDOL codes. We also verified the comparability of each variable across
databases. Using this methodology, we were able to find partial data for all 246
companies. We found complete annual accounting data for 92% of our sample,
representing 1677 firm-years and 227 firms.

3 Analysis of Accounting and Firm Value Performance

3.1 Basic Performance Measures
We start our analysis by comparing two basic corporate performance measures.
Accounting performance is measured by return on assets (ROA) while firm value is
measured by Tobin’s Q. Return on Assets (ROA) is net income2 divided by total
assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets.
We follow Adams et al. (2003) and approximate the market value of assets by the sum
of the book value of assets plus the market value of the common stock minus the book
value of the common stock.
3.2 Control Variables and Summary Statistics
Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we use several control variables in our analysis
to control for industry and firm characteristics. Firm size is the natural log of the book
value of assets. We control for debt in the capital structure by dividing long-term debt
by assets. Firm age is the natural log of the number of years since the firm’s creation.
Firm risk is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns for the prior 60
months. Due to a lack of R&D expenditure data in our sample, we control for growth
opportunities using the book-to-market ratio (Fahlenbrach, 2003).

1
Pearson chi-square test (pr = 0.0001)
2
Net Income is DATA32 in the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial database and DATA400 in
the Compustat Global Financial database. It is defined as income after the deduction of all expenses
but before extraordinary items and provisions for dividends.

7
Table 2 reports means, medians, standard deviations, and maximum and minimum
values for key financial variables in our sample. These statistics were calculated by
taking the time-series average for each firm, and then averaging across firms. The
average firm in our sample is approximately 45 years old. Return volatility, 9 percent,
is low compared with US stocks over a similar time-period. Anderson and Reeb
(2003) report a return volatility of 28 percent (2003), and Fahlenbrach (2003) a return
volatility of 50 percent. This may be because their samples included NASDAQ
stocks, while our sample consists of the largest publicly listed companies on the
French first and second markets.
[Table 2 here]
3.3 Univariate Performance Analysis
The median (average) ROA amongst the firms in our sample averaged out over our
period of observation is 2.50 % (2.38 %). This is approximately half of the median
(average) ROA of Anderson and Reeb’s US sample, equal to 4.61 % (5.16 %). The
median (mean) value of ROE (based on net income) is 8.38 % (8.39 %). The median
(mean) value of Tobin’s Q is 1.14 (1.34). This value is similar to the 1.20 (1.41)
median (average) value reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003).
The large difference between means and medians for many variables in our sample
indicates that the data is not normally distributed. For example, the very high mean
value of total assets is due to twelve financial institutions with total assets greater than
100 billion Euros. Because most performance measures have extreme observations,
we follow Barber and Lyon (1996) and use the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum
test to test the equality of the median values of firm characteristics and firm
performance between family and non-family firms.
Table 3 shows the medians of firm characteristics and performance for family and
non-family firms. Regarding firm characteristics, we find little difference between
family and non-family firms. Family firms do not appear to use debt differently than
non-family firms. There is also no significant difference in total assets, firm age,
market value, net sales, common equity, book-to-market ratio, and return volatility.
The only statistically significant difference lies in the assets to sales ratio. Family
firms have a median assets to sales ratio of 1.13, which is less than half that of non-
family firms, 2.56.
Regarding firm performance, we find that family firms have significantly higher ROA
and ROE. Since the ratio of ROE over ROA is not significantly different; the driver
of family firms’ superior performance must be asset management, rather than
financial policy. Our results indicate that family firms made their assets earn higher
net returns.
[Table 3 here]
With respect to firm valuation, we do not find any significant difference in Tobin’s Q
between family and non-family firms in our univariate analysis. Market valuation of
the family and non-family portfolios is not significantly different, at least over the
entire period examined. On a yearly basis, the median family firm Tobin’s Q equals
or exceeds the median non-family firm Tobin’s Q for every single year (figure 2).

8
However, this difference is only statistically significant for the period 1996-1999 at
the 10% level. The French market appears not to attribute significantly different
valuations to family and non-family firms, contrary to what Anderson and Reeb
(2003) observe for the US market.
[Figure 2 here]

3.4 Multivariate Performance Analysis

In this section, we aim to explain the difference in accounting performance and firm
valuation of family and non-family firms. We follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and
use a two-way fixed effect model for our regression analysis. The fixed effects are
dummy variables for each year of our sample, and dummy variables for each industry.
More specifically:

Equation 1: Firm Performance = d0 + d1 (Family Firm) + d2-6 (Control Variables)

+ d7-16 (Industry) + d17-26 (Year) + e
where:

Firm Performance = ROA or Tobin’s Q

Family Firm = binary variable that equals one when the firm is family-
owned, and zero otherwise.
Control Variables = book-to-market ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities)
long-term debt / assets (measuring debt in capital structure)
return volatility (measuring firm risk)
natural log of total assets (for firm size)
natural log of firm age ( for firm age)
Industry = dummy variable that equals 1.0 for each industry code
Year = dummy variable that equals 1.0 for each year.

Standard errors are corrected using the Huber White Sandwich estimator and firm
level clustering. The results are presented in Table 4.
[Table 4 here]
Looking at the ROA model in column 1, we find some evidence that family firms
perform better than non-family firms. The coefficient estimate on family firms is
positive and statistically significant at the 6% level. Our model suggests that family
firms have a return on assets value approximately 2.2 percentage points higher than
non-family firms, after adjusting for all control variables. Given a sample average
ROA of 2.38 %, family firms in our sample return 92% more than non-family firms.
This is considerably higher than the 14% higher ROA found by Anderson & Reeb in
their analysis on US stocks.

Following Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Fahlenbrach(2003), we verify if the better
performance we observe in family-owned firms is due to the younger firms. This
hypothesis emanates from the literature which suggests that founding family members
bring unique, value-adding skills to a firm, but with an effect decreasing with the
firm’s age. We categorize as younger those family firms in the first quartile of age in
our sample of firms. This amounts to firm that are at most 30 years old. The results

9
are shown in column 2 of Table 4. We find that both younger and older family firms
have a significant and positive association with ROA. In addition, the coefficient on
younger family firms is twice the coefficient on older family firms, confirming that
younger family firms do have higher ROAs.
We posit that the reason for the favorable ROA performance by family firms is rooted
in a financial constraint particular to these firms. Families like independence and
control. This “family intent” translates into a desire to protect and maintain the
family’s control over the firm. The family’s ability to finance growth is then more
limited, typically having to come from retained earnings or divestments . Indeed,
capital increases through equity diffusion would therefore induce additional influence
over the firm by non-family capital suppliers. Of course, if the expected returns are
sufficient, families will remove this self-imposed constraint. The preference for
continued independence thus amounts to have families govern their firms with an
effective cost of capital that is higher than that faced by non-family firms. As a result,
family firms will invest in industries that are not too asset intensive. In addition, in a
given sector, family firms will aim to have lower asset intensity than non-family
firms, and will demand a higher return from their investments in new projects. In
other words, they will stop investing in additional assets earlier than is the case for
non-family firms. This hypothesis is supported by our finding that the assets over
sales ratio for family firms is less than half that of non-family firms. In addition,
Table 5 shows that the assets over sales ratio for industries in which family firms are
the majority are smaller.
[Table 5 here]
When examining the effect of control variables, we find further evidence for our
hypothesis concerning families’ concern with asset intensity. We find that ROA is
significantly negatively related to debt usage and total assets. Contrary to the finding
of US researchers, we find no significant relationship between ROA and book/market
value, return volatility and firm age.
Results for Tobin’s Q are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. In column 3, we
find no significant difference in Tobin’s Q for French family firms, after adjusting for
the control variables. As family firms have lower long term debt ratios and lower
total assets, including these two control variables may explain the non-significant
negative coefficient of family firms in the Tobin’s Q analysis. In column 4, we
differentiate between younger and older family firms. We find that older family firms
have a borderline significant negative relationship to Tobin’s Q, suggesting that older
family firms are valued lower than younger family firms and non-family firms.
Regarding the control variables, we find that Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively
related to debt usage and total assets. We also find a borderline significant inverse
relationship with return volatility.

4 Analysis of Stock Market Performance

In our introduction we presented arguments both in favor and against the relative
performance of family firms versus that of non-family firms. Both types of arguments
contribute to shape the stock market’s expectations about such firms, and hence their
stock price. But what do stock market investors actually believe? It is not a priori
clear if investors consider family ownership when making investment decisions, or if
they do, on what side they place their bets. In fact, if we examine market values, it
appears that investors do not appear to pay attention to this characteristic.

10
In this section, we seek to determine if it was beneficial, neutral or detrimental for
investors to buy shares in family firms, as opposed to shares in non-family firms, over
the time period 1993-2002. To do this, we analyzed the total shareholder return of
two portfolios, family-owned firms and non-family firms, using three different
methodologies: a buy and hold investment strategy, an annual buy and hold
investment strategy, and a time series analysis of excess returns. The latter is the
most complete test to date for examining differences in returns amongst portfolios.

4.1 Buy and Hold Investment Strategy

In this investment strategy, we simulate what would have happened if we had invested
an equal amount of money in the two portfolios at the end of 1993 and held onto our
investment for nine consecutive years. When a stock was de-listed, its value was
equally divided and reinvested in the listed equities remaining at the end of the month.
We use equally-weighted portfolios as we are interested in the average performance
of companies – and not in the performance of value-weighted portfolios.
We found that 100 Euros invested in an equally-weighted portfolio of French family
firms at the end of 1993 would have grown to 281 Euros by the end of 2002 (see
Figure 3). A similar investment in the non-family portfolio would have grown to 183
Euros. Therefore, over this 9-year time period, the family portfolio outperformed the
non-family portfolio by approximately 54%. This result is significant at the 1%
level.3
[Figure 3 here]

4.2 Annual Buy and Hold Investment Strategy

Here we simulate what would have happened annually if we had invested an equal
sum of money in our two portfolios. We can consider this a more dynamic buy and
hold strategy. At the end of each year, the investment is sold and the portfolio is
again reinvested (at zero investment cost) in the remaining stocks of each portfolio
and again in equal parts. When a stock is de-listed, its value is equally divided and
reinvested in the remaining stocks quoted at the beginning of the next month.
Figure 4 shows the yearly total shareholder return for each portfolio. We can see that
the family firm portfolio had a higher return than the non-family firm portfolio for six
of the nine years. We also tested the equality of mean yearly growth of equities
quoted during each entire year using a t-test4. Family firms performed significantly
better at the 1% level in 1994, 1996 and 2002, and significantly better at the 5% level
in 1998 and 1999. Non-family firms performed significantly better at the 1% level
only in 1997. This analysis seems to suggest that French family firms get out of the
starting blocks faster when the stock market revitalizes and do equally well in a
downturn .
[Figure 4 here]

3
Medians tested using Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Cumulative non-family firm
performance was significantly worse at the end of every year.
4
Welch’s formula was used to calculate the degrees of freedom in the t-test as the variances were not
equal.

11
4.3 Time Series Analysis of Excess in Total Shareholder Return
Following standard finance theory (Carhart, 1997) four important characteristics
might explain why French family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of total
shareholder returns. This four factor model allows a method of performance
attribution, where the estimated intercept coefficient (α) is the abnormal return in
excess of what could have been achieved by passive investment in the four factors:
Equation 2: Rt = a + b1 (RMRFt) + b2 (SMBt) + b3 (HMLt) + b4 (UMDt) + et .
In the above equation, Rt is the excess return to some asset in month t, RMRFt is the
month t value-weighted market return minus the risk free rate, SMBt and HMLt are
the two Fama and French size and book-to-market factors, while UMDt is Carhart’s
momentum factor, again in period t.
A recent application of this four-factor model of Carhart is due to Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2003). These authors examine the effect of governance practices on equity
prices. They construct a governance index (G) as a proxy for shareholder rights and
look at the potential relationship between their governance index and the returns of
1500 large US firms during the 1990s. At both extremes of governance (comparing
the G≤5 with G≥15 portfolios – but deleting the stocks with intermediate values of G),
they construct two portfolios, labeled Democracy (strongest shareholder rights) and
Dictatorship (weakest shareholder rights). They then use the four-factor performance
attribution model and examine whether a statistically significant α factor can be
identified when examining the excess returns of the stocks in the portfolios. They do
find a non-zero α. Their Democracy portfolio thus outperforms their Dictatorship
portfolio by an average of 8.5 % annually, thus providing a persuasive argument in
favor of shareholder rights.
We use the performance-attribution methodology of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003) to examine any potential difference between family firm and non-family firm
portfolios. We calculated SMB, HML, and UMD for the French market using the
definitions of Rouwenhorst (1999). We used a portfolio of 399 French equities to
compute the value-weighted market return, SMB, HML and UMD. These 399 equities
resulted from the union of the December 2002 Datastream French Market portfolio
and our 1993 SBF 250 sample.
As can be seen in Table 6, when we consider the average monthly excess return of the
family firm portfolio, the various factors introduced in our performance model are
statistically significant in explaining performance. Thus, when the total market return
improves, when small stocks outperform large stocks and when value stocks
outperform growth stocks, the family firm portfolio also does better. The performance
of the family firm portfolio appears not to be affected by momentum.
A positive and statistically significant alpha implies that the family firm portfolio
outperformed the market. Here, alpha is positive 0.39 with borderline significance of
6.7 %. The adjusted R-squared of this model is 0.79 ,underlining the strength of the
four-factor model.
[Table 6 here]
When we look at the average monthly excess return of the non-family portfolio,we
observe that when the total market return improves, when small stocks outperform
large stocks and when value stocks outperform growth stocks, the non-family
portfolio also does better. However, when the prior best performing stocks do better

12
than the prior worse performing stocks, the non-family portfolio underperforms. The
α factor is negative and not significant, i.e. the non-family portfolio performs in line
with the market. The adjusted R-squared of this model is 0.89.
The most interesting result arises when we consider the difference in the average
monthly return of the family firm and the non-family firm portfolio. When we apply
our performance model to evaluate this difference in returns, α is 0.43 and significant
at the 4.9 % level, i.e. the family firm portfolio outperformed the non-family portfolio
on a risk-adjusted, size-adjusted, value-adjusted, and momentum-adjusted basis. The
family firm portfolio return is 0.43 base points per month higher than the non-family
portfolio. The coefficients of RMRF, SMB, HML and UMD are not significantly
different from zero, which strengthens the result. The family firm portfolio and the
non-family portfolio have similar behaviors when it comes to the four basic
characteristics. For example, when small stocks outperform large stocks, both the
family firm portfolio and the non-family portfolio do better.
We were also concerned that the very different industrial classifications of family and
non-family firms could have an impact on our results. Thus we re-estimated our four-
factor model using industry adjusted returns. We calculated a time series of industry
adjusted returns by subtracting the monthly mean industry return from the raw returns
of our sample. We found even stronger results using this methodology. The α factor
remains similar to its previous value, is 0.46 but is now even more significant, namely
at the 0.7% level (Table 7). This means that the family firm portfolio
outperformed the non-family portfolio on a risk-adjusted, size-adjusted, value-
adjusted, momentum-adjusted, and industry-adjusted basis.
[Table 7 here]

5 Summary and Conclusions

In this study we analyzed how the stock market performance of the larger quoted
French family firms compared to quoted French non-family firms over the most
recent decade, 1993-2002.
First, we examined the performance of family firms and non-family firms in terms of
the traditional accounting measures ROA and ROE. We find that French family firms
did significantly better than non-family firms in terms of both ROA and ROE. Since
the ratio of ROA/ROE isn’t significantly different for family and non-family firms,
the driver of the family firm’s superior performance lies in a superior ROA: our
results suggest that family firms made their assets work harder. We posit that the
reason for this favorable result for family firms is due to a governance constraint that
is peculiar to family firms. To protect the family’s control of the firm, family firms
operate with higher perceived costs of capital. The perceived cost of attracting capital
is higher for French family firms because additional capital would imply additional
influence over the firm by non-family capital suppliers. Therefore, family firms will
invest less in assets than non-family firms, and will show a higher profit ratio from
those more restricted assets.
Next, we studied the performance of family firms and non-family firms in terms of
firm valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Our results show that there was no
significant difference in Tobin’s Q for French family and non-family firms over the
entire time period. The French stock market did not appear to attribute different value
to family vs non-family firms.

13
Finally, we examined the question as to whether it was beneficial, neutral or
detrimental for investors in the stock market to buy shares in French family firms, as
opposed to shares in French non-family firms, over a long-term period. Our state-of-
the-art empirical analysis shows that family firms quoted on the French stock market
outperformed non-family firms during the time period 1993-2002. The superior
performance of family firms is apparent even after accounting for the volatility of the
family firm and non-family firm returns relative to the total market returns, the value
versus growth effect, the firm size effect, the momentum effect and the industry
effect. This is a strong result and a surprising one.
We appear to either have found an inefficiency in the French stock market, or have
shown that investors in the French stock market find investments in French family
firms riskier than investments in French non-family firms. Finally, it could also be
that these investors may have been holding expectations about non-family firms that
were too optimistic compared to their expectations about family firms. The
established performance differential may also have been the result of a combination of
these three arguments. Expectations about performance or estimations about risk can
be revised, leading the differential to decrease, or disappear altogether.

Overall, our results for France taken together with recent results from the US indicate
the robustness and the strength of the relative financial performance of family versus
non-family firms. The fact that in two very different economic, political and legal
environments family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of a number of
traditional performance indicators , provides further support for the family as a viable
form of company governance.
Following our results we suggest two immediate avenues for future research .
First, in the case France, is the observed stock market outperformance of family firms
just the market price for the perceived additional family firm specific risk or is it an
inefficiency in the French stock market pricing?
Second, although we now have supporting evidence for US and France, it would be
interesting to verify the family firm supremacy in other countries (eg Germany and
UK) ,with their own social, political and legal specificities. Such an analysis would
then be instrumental in making generalizations about the financial performance of
family versus non-family firms.

14
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Relationship between Founder-CEOs and Firm Performance”, The Evolution
of Corporate Governance and Family Firms, A
CEPR/ECGI/INSEAD/NBER/University of Alberta joint conference,
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Anderson, Ronald C. and David M. Reeb (2003),”Founding-Family Ownership and
Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance, 58,
(June), 1301-1328.
Barber, Brad M. and John D. Lyon (1996), “Detecting Abnormal Operating
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Blondel, Christine, Nick Rowell and Ludo Van der Heyden (2002), “Prevalence of
Patrimonial Firms on Paris Stock Exchange: Analysis of the Top 250
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Carhart, Mark M. (1997), “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,” The Journal
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Cremer,K. Martijn and Vinaj Nair (2003), “Governance Mechanisms and Equity
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DeAngelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo (2000),” Controlling stockholders and the
disciplinary role of corporate payout policy, Journal of Financial Economics
56, 153-207.
Demsetz , Harold (1983),” The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm”,
Journal of Law and Economics 25, 375-390.
Demsetz ,Harold and Kenneth Lehn (1985) ,”The structure of corporate ownership:
Causes and consequences” ,Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177.
Fahlenbrach, Rudiger (2003), “Founder-CEOs and Stock Market Performance”,
Working Paper, Wharton School.
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French (1993), “Common Risk Factors in the
Returns on Stocks and Bonds,” The Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 5-56.
Fama, Eugene and Michael Jensen(1983), “Seperation of ownership and
control”,Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Gomez-Mejia,Luis, Manuel Nunez-Nickel and Isabel Guitierrez (2001), “The role of
family ties in agency contracts”, Academy of Management Journal 44, 81-95.
Marcel to add
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick (2003), “Corporate Governance and
Equity Prices,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (February), 107-153.
James,Harvey (1999), “Owner as manager, extended horizon and family firm”,
International Journal of Economics and Business 6 ,41-56.
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan and Sheridan Titman (1993), “Returns to Buying Winners and
Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency,” The Journal of
Finance, (March), 65-91.

15
Kim, W.Chan., and Renée A.Mauborgne (1997). Fair Process: Managing in the
Knowledge Economy, Harvard Business Review, (July-August), p.65-75.

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

(2000), ”Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 58, (October/November), 3-28.
Merton, Robert C. (1973), “An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model”,
Econometrics, 41, (September), 867-887.
Miller, Karen L. (2004), “Best of the Best,” Newsweek, (April 12, 2004), 43-47.
Murphy, Antoin E. (2004), “Corporate Ownership in France – The Importance of
History”, The Evolution of Corporate Governance and Family Firms, A
CEPR/ECGI/INSEAD/NBER/University of Alberta joint conference,
Fontainebleau, France.
Rouwenhorst, K. Geert (1999), “Local Return Factors and Turnover in Emerging
Stock Markets,” The Journal of Finance, LIV, (August), 1439-1464.
Schleifer,Andrei and Robert Vishny (1997),”A survey of corporate governance”,
Journal of Finance 52,737-783.
Stein ,Jeremy(1988),”Takeover threats and managerial myopia”, Journal of Political
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Stein,Jeremy(1989) ,” Efficient Capital Markets,inefficient firms: A model of myopic
corporate behavior” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 655-669.
Tibi, P., A. Barker, and S. Henry (2003), French Strategy, UBS Investment Research
Report, London (UK).

16
Table 1: Number of SBF250 equities listed in 1993 and still listed in 2002 by
ownership type (with survival percentage relative to 1993 list)

Ownership type Listed in 1993 Listed in 2002

Family firms 120 63 (52.5%)
Non-Family firms 128 55 (43.0%)
Ownership type changed
during time period 6
Total 248 124 (50.0%)

Figure 1: Industry breakdown of family and non-family firms at end 1993

Cy c lic al Serv ic es

Financ ials

Cy c lic al Cons umer Goods

General Indus tries

Bas ic Indus tries

Non-Cy c lic al Cons umer Goods

Non-Cy c lic al Serv ic es

Utilities

Inf ormation Tec hnology

Res ourc es

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Nu mb e r o f F irms

F am ily F irm s Non-F am ily F irm s

17
 Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Full Sample
This table provides summary statistics of the data used in our analysis. Data for these
statistics are calculated by taking the time-series average over the 1993-2002 period
for each firm listed on the SBF250 in December 1993, and then averaging across
firms.

Standard
Mean Median Deviation Max. Min.
Firm Characteristics
LT Debt / Total Assets (%) 14.93 12.52 13.82 75.37 0
Total Assets (million Euros) 13734.81 1543.23 47716.31 453646.9 78.70
Firm Age (years) 45.33 40.00 30.09 164.5 4.5
Market Value (million Euros) 2889.60 726.03 6455.94 51297.31 52.83
Net Sales (million Euros) 4523.69 1224.49 8591.45 59184.47 0
Common Equity (million Euros) 1393.64 477.18 2653.52 17903.87 -161.52
Book / Market 1.01 0.70 3.05 43.79 -3.18
Return Volatility (%) 9.02 8.79 2.96 40.19 3.53
Total Assets / Net Sales 11.12 1.42 54.49 652.24 0.27

Firm Performance
Return on Assets (Net Income) (%) 2.38 2.50 5.31 13.54 -39.58
Return on Equity (Net Income) (%) 8.39 8.38 27.80 333.90 -173.21
ROE / ROA 5.21 2.88 13.47 60.63 -142.46
Tobin’s Q 1.34 1.14 0.66 7.07 0.41

Table 3: Difference of Median Tests

This table presents difference of medians tests between family and non-family firms.
Medians are the cross-sectional medians of firm time-series averages. * Indicates
significance at the one percent (***), five percent (**) and ten percent (*) levels,
based on the non-parametric Wilcoxon test.

Family Non-Family z-statistic

Firms Firms
Number of Firms 120 126
LT Debt / Total Assets (%) 11.70 13.19 1.56
Total Assets (millions Euros) 1335.98 1620.91 1.49
Firm Age (years) 40.25 39.75 0.88
Market Value (millions Euros) 751.15 602.25 0.42
Net Sales (millions Euros) 1208.25 1311.37 0.23
Common Equity (millions Euros) 470.41 486.44 1.05
Book / Market 0.70 0.70 0.67
Return Volatility (%) 8.82 8.44 0.58
Total Assets / Net Sales 1.13 2.57 3.47***

Return on Assets (Net Income) (%) 3.03 2.13 3.91***

Return on Equity (Net Income) (%) 9.54 7.38 2.86***
ROE / ROA 2.79 3.01 1.25
Tobin’s Q 1.14 1.15 0.57

18
 Table 4: ROA, Tobin’s Q and Family Ownership
This table reports results of two-way fixed effects regression models of firm
performance on family ownership and control variables. ROA denotes Return on
Assets, measured as net income divided by total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the
market value of assets to the book value of assets. Our proxy for the market value of
assets is the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of the common
stock less the book value of the common stock. Family Firm is a binary variable that
equals one when the firm is family-owned. Younger Family Firm equals one when
firm age is less than or equal to 30 years and the firm is family-owned5. Older Family
Firm equals one when the firm age is greater than 30 years and the firm is family-
owned. Our proxy for Book/Market is the book value of common stock divided by
market value of common stock. LT Debt/Total Assets is the book value of long-term
debt divided by total assets. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly
stock returns for the previous 60 months. Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of total
assets. Ln(Firm Age) is the natural log of the number of years since the firm was
created. All regressions include dummy variables for the Level 3 Datastream industry
codes and for each year of the sample period. The standard errors are corrected using
the Huber White Sandwich estimator and firm level clustering. t-values are in
parentheses. * Indicates significance at the one percent (***), five percent (**) and
ten percent (*) levels.

ROA Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.066 * 0.050 1.862*** 1.574 ***
(1.86) (1.17) (4.15) (2.82)
Family Firm 0.022 * -0.199
(1.87) (1.55)
Younger Family Firm 0.034 * 0.029
(Age <= 30 years) (1.80) (0.18)
Older Family Firm 0.017 * -0.292 *
(Age > 30 years) (1.80) (1.66)
Book/Market -0.000 -0.000
(0.25) (0.30)
LT Debt/Total Assets -0.073 *** -0.072 *** -0.587 *** -0.578 ***
(3.19) (3.14) (3.08) (3.00)
Return Volatility -0.286 -0.286 -1.302 * -1.30
(1.58) (1.56) (1.68) (1.64)
Ln (Total Assets) -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.082 ** -0.085 **
(1.65) (1.79) (2.04) (2.01)
Ln (Firm Age) 0.003 0.008 0.086 0.173
(0.63) (0.87) (0.53) (0.83)

5
We follow Anderson & Reeb and categorize young family firms as those in the first quartile of age in
our sample of firms.

19
 Table 5: Median Total Assets / Net Sales by Industry

Assets / Sales % Family

Industry All Firms
Non-Cyclical Services (8) 0.51 100.0 %
Cyclical Consumer Goods (20) 0.93 85.0 %
Cyclical Services (47) 0.91 66.0 %
General Industries (23) 1.26 60.9 %
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods (18) 1.02 55.6 %
Basic Industries (27) 1.06 37.0 %
Utilities (3) 2.01 33.3 %
Financials (70) 8.94 27.1 %
Information Technology (6) 1.00 16.7 %
Resources (6) 1.01 0.0 %
OVERALL (228 firms) 1.42 48.7 %
The number of firms in each industry sector appears in parentheses

Figure 2: Yearly median Tobin’s Q from 1993-2002

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Family Firms Non-Family Firms

Figure 3: Monthly cumulative indices – all companies listed in 1993 SBF250

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Family Firm Index Non-Family Firm Index

20
Figure 4: Yearly total shareholder return – all companies listed in 1993 SBF250

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Family Firms Non-Family Firms

Table 6: Performance-attribution regression results

a RMRF SMB HML UMD

Family – Non-Family 0.43 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.02
(0.049) (0.146) (0.805) (0.264) (0.597)
Family 0.39 0.79 0.32 0.14 -0.05
(0.067) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.018) (0.147)
Non-Family -0.04 0.86 0.30 0.21 -0.06
(0.794) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.008)
The significance level is in parentheses.

Table 7: Industry-adjusted performance-attribution regression results

a RMRF SMB HML UMD

Family – Non-Family 0.46 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.00
(0.007) (0.001) (0.358) (0.664) (0.991)
Family -0.13 -0.13 -0.22 0.10 -0.01
(0.253) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.592)
Non-Family -0.59 -0.00 -0.17 0.12 -0.01
(0.0001) (0.911) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.507)
The significance level is in parentheses.

21
Appendix 1: List of the 1993 SBF 250 companies with ownership classification

nf ACCOR
family ACMER
family AGACHE
nf AGF-ASR.GL.DE FRN.
nf AIR LIQUIDE
family BOLLORE INVEST. (EX ALBATROS INVEST.)
nf ALCATEL (EX ALCATEL ALSTHOM)
nf ALCATEL CABLE
family ALSPI
nf ANF
nf AVENIR HAVAS MEDIA
nf AXA
nf BAIL INVESTI.
family BAINS MER MONACO
nf BANCAIRE (CIE.)
family BAZAR DE L' HTL.VILLE
family BIC
family BIDERMANN INTL
nf BNP PARIBAS (EX BNP)
family BOLLORE
family BON MARCHE
family BONGRAIN
family BOUYGUES
nf BULL (EX MACHINES BULL)
family BURELLE
family BUT SA
family CAMBODGE (CIE DU)
nf CANAL +
family CAP GEMINI
family UNIBEL ( EX CARBONIQUE)
nf CARDIF
family CARNAUDMETALBOX
family CARREFOUR
family CASINO GUICHARD-P
family CASTORAMA DUBOIS
nf CCF
family CEDEST
nf CEGEP
family CENTENAIRE-BLANZY
nf CEP COMM.
family CERUS-EUROP.REUN.
nf CETELEM
nf CFJPE
nf CGEA GL.ENTREP.AUTOS.
family CGIP
nf CGP PACK.
family CHARGEURS
family CHRISTIAN DIOR
family CIMENTS FRANC. 'B'
family CLARINS
nf CLUB MEDITERRANEE
family COLAS
family COMPT. MODERNES
nf CPR PARIS.REESCOMPTE
nf CRCAM PARIS ET IDF
nf DEXIA France (EX CREDIT LCL FRANCE)
nf CR.FONC.FRANCE 'B' (EX CFF)
nf CREDIT LYONN.CI
nf NATEXIS (EX CREDIT NATIONAL)
nf CS COMMUNICATIONS & SYSTEMS (EX CS CIE SIGNAUX)
family SOMFY INTERNATIONAL (EX DAMART)
nf DANONE
family DASSAULT AVIATION
family DASSAULT ELECTQ.
nf DEGREMONT
family DEVANLAY
family DFRP
nf DMC
family DOCKS DE France
family DYNACTION
nf EAU ET FORCE
nf VIVENDI UNIVERSAL (EX EAUX (GLE DES))

22
family ECCO
family ADECCO TRAV. TEMPO (EX ECCO TRAV.TEMPO.)
nf EIFFAGE
nf ELF AQUITAINE
family ELYSEE INV. SA.
nf EMGP
nf ERIDANIA BEGHIN SAY
nf ESSILOR INTL.
nf ESSO
family ETEX
family EURAZEO (EX EURAFRANCE)
nf EURO DISNEY SCA
family LAGARDARE ACTIVE BROADCASTING (EX EUROPE 1)
nf EUROTUNNEL UNT.FF
family FACOM SA (EX STRAFOR FACOM)
family FAURECIA (EX BERTRAND FAURE)
family FFP FONC.FINC.PARTS.
family HACHETTE FILIP. MED. (EX FILIPACCHI MEDIAS)
family FIMALAC
family FINATIS
nf FINAXA
nf SOPHIA ( EX FINEXTEL)
nf FNAC
family FOCEP (CHATEAU D'EAU)
nf FONCIERE (CIE)
family FONCIERE EURIS
nf FONCIERE LYONNAISE
nf FONCIERE PIMONTS
nf FOURMI IMMOB.
family FRANCAREP
family FRANCE SA
nf FRANKOPARIS
family FROMAGERIES BEL
nf ASSURANCES BANQUE POPULAIRE (EX FRUCTIVIE)
nf GECINA (EX G.F.C.)
family GALERIES LAFAYETTE
nf GAN
family AZEO (EX GAZ ET EAUX)
nf GENEFIM
nf COMPAGNIE GL GEOPHYSIQUE (EX GEOPHYSIQUE)
family VIVARTE (EX GROUPE ANDRE)
nf GROUPE DE LA CITE
nf GROUPE GTM (EX GTM-ENTREPOSE)
family GROUPE ZANNIER
family GUILBERT
family GUYENNE & GASCOGNE
nf HAVAS (EX HAVAS ADVERTISING)
nf HAVAS
family HERMES INTL.
family HLDG.ST.-HONORE
family HOTELS DEAUVILLE
nf ICC
nf IDI
nf IDIA
nf IFD
family IMERYS (EX IMETAL)
nf IMMEUBLES DE FRANCE
nf IMMEUBLES PLAINE MONCEAU
nf IMMOB.BATIBAIL
family IMMOB.HOTELIERE
family IMMOB.MARSEILLAISE
nf IMMOBANQUE (SC.FINC)
nf IMMOBILIERE PHENIX
nf INSTITUT MERIEUX
nf SOPHIA (EX INTERBAIL)
nf INVESTI.(CENTRALE D')
nf INVESTI.DE PARIS
nf JEAN LEFEBVRE
nf KLEPIERRE
family LABINAL
nf LAFARGE
family LAGARDERE GROUPE
nf LAPEYRE
family LEBON
family LEGRAND

23
family LEGRIS INDUSTRIES
nf LOCAFINANCIERE
nf LOCINDUS
family L'OREAL
family LOUVRE (STE DU)
family LUCIA
family LVMH
family COMPTOIR LYON-ALEMAND LOUYOT (EX LYON-ALEMAND)
nf SUEZ (EX LYONNAISE DES EAUX)
family MANUTAN INTL.
family MATRA-HACHETTE
nf METALEUROP
family MICHELIN
family MINES KALI THERESE
family MONOPRIX
family MONTAIGNE PART.
nf MOULINEX
family NAF-NAF
nf NAVIGATION MIXTE
nf NORD-EST
family NRJ
family ODET (FINC DE L')
nf OGF
nf OXYGENE EO.
family PARFINANCE
nf PARIBAS
nf PECHINEY 'B' (EX PECHINEY CIP)
nf PECHINEY INTL.
family PERNOD-RICARD
family PEUGEOT SA
family PINAULT PRINTEMPS
family PLASTIC OMNIUM
family POCHET
nf POLIET
family PRIMAGAZ
family PROMODES
family PUBLICIS GROUPE
family RADAR
family REDOUTE (LA)
family REMY COINTREAU
family REXEL
nf AVENTIS (EX RHONE-POULENC A)
nf ROCHETTE (LA)
nf ROMBAS
nf ROUSSEL-UCLAF
family RUE IMPERIALE
nf SAFR
nf SAGAL
nf VINCI (EX S.G.E.)
nf SAGEM
nf SAINT GOBAIN
family SAINT-LOUIS
family SALOMON (FR)
nf SALVEPAR
nf SANOFI-SYNTHELABO (EX SANOFI fusion)
nf SAT
family SAVOISIENNE
family SCAC-DELMAS-VJX.
nf SCHNEIDER ELTE.SA
nf SCOA (FF 100)
nf SCOR
family SEB
family SEFIMEG
nf SEGIC
family SHM
nf SILIC
nf SIMCO R
nf SITA
family SKIS ROSSIGNOL
nf SLIGOS
nf SOCIETE GENERALE
family SODEXHO ALLIANCE
family SOFIDAV
nf SOGENAL
nf SOGEPARC

24
 family SOMMER-ALLIBERT
nf SOPHIA
family SOVAC
nf SPI BATIGNOLLES
nf SPIR COMM.
nf SPS N
nf SUEZ (CIE.)
family SYNTHELABO
family TF1 (TV.FSE.1)
nf THALES (EX THOMSON-CSF)
nf TOTAL SA
nf UAP (CIE.)
nf UFB LOCABAIL
nf UGINE SA
nf UIC
nf UIF
nf UIS
family UNIBAIL HEXING
nf UNION FINC.FRANC.
nf UNION INTL.IMMOB.
family VALEO
nf VALLOUREC
family VICAT
family WENDEL INVESTISSEMENT (EX MARINE WENDEL)
family WORMS ET CIE R
family ZODIAC

25

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