“The foreign policies pursued by Charles V in Europe were of no benefit to Spain”

Overall, the phrase “no benefit” is too strong to agree with, as Spain did benefit from some aspects
of Charles V’s foreign policy in Europe, seen during the Habsburg-Valois wars (1494-1559) which
aided the formation of the Spanish road to the low countries, and other policies that helped increase
the security of Spain such as the strengthening of relations with Portugal and preservation of
security along the northern border with France. Despite this, it is imperative we recognise the partial
validity of the statement, as in many cases, Charles V’s foreign policy in Europe was of “no benefit”
to Spain and was often of detriment to Spain, shown in the draining of Castilian finances for HRE
wars that didn’t benefit Spain directly, the encirclement of France due to Charles’s vast territories,
which caused France to take extreme action against Spain, and finally, the neglection of the Turk
threat to Spain in the Mediterranean.

One case in which the statement “no benefit” can be seen to be too strong is Charles’s foreign policy
towards Portugal. Despite the fact that the Portuguese were traditional enemies of Spain, illustrated
by their role supporting Joanna la Beltraneja in the Castilian war of succession (1475-1479), Charles
V managed to maintain peace with Portugal, and even enhanced Spanish relations with the
Portuguese through a series of dynastic marriages between Portugal’s royal house of Aviz and the
Habsburgs. Charles himself married Isabella of Portugal in 1526, Philip II married Maria of Portugal in
1543, and Charles’s youngest daughter Joanna and his eldest sister Eleonore both marrying into the
Portuguese royal household. This policy did benefit Spain, as it eliminated the credible military
threat of Portugal, however didn’t curb their imperialistic or economic ambitions, leaving room for
further competition with Portugal. Nevertheless, it could be argued that Charles’s actions also
strengthened Spain with respect to non-military competition with Portugal, as it was the marriage of
Joanna to John Manuel of Portugal , and the birth of their son, Sebastian I in 1554 that paved the
way for such close family relationships between Portugal and Spain that Philip II was able to claim
the crown of Portugal in 1480, reducing competition between the states, proving the policy did
benefit Spain to some extent.

An aspect of Charles’s foreign policy that both benefitted and damaged Spain was his policies
towards the French. The 3 leading areas of tension with France were the Franco-Spanish border,
Italy and the Low Countries. At the border, hostility came to a head in 1521 when Francis I attacked
Navarre, taking advantage of the comuneros revolt which had plunged Spain into turmoil at the
time. The French managed to capture Pamplona but were quickly driven out. This attack was most
likely meant to draw Charles’s attention away from the war in Northern Italy, as no further military
action was seen at the border, and at the same time, the French invaded Milan. Despite continued
French efforts to press further into Italy, Charles won a decisive victory at the battle of Pavia (1525)
which resulted in the capture of Francis I who was subsequently forced to sign the treaty of Madrid
in 1526. A final French force was launched into Naples, however after the defection of Genoese
Admiral Doria in 1528 they were once again defeated at the battle of Landriano. Charles had
protected Milan and Naples against the threat of France, both of which benefited Spain. Naples was
a valuable territory economically, as it had a thriving grain industry and tactically, as it could be used
to defend Sicily, Sardinia and even Spain from the Ottoman threat in the Mediterranean. Milan was
also useful, as it paved the way to the formation of the ‘Spanish road’, a useful transport route that
ended in the Low countries and bypassed France.

However, there are examples in which Charles’s policies towards the French were of no benefit to
Spain. Much of the conflict seen between Charles and the French stemmed from French fears of
Habsburg encirclement. Due to Charles’s control of such a vast array of territories in Europe, France
viewed the Habsburg empire, which included Spain, as a major threat. This fear was enhanced by the
Habsburg-Valois war, which worried the French that Charles sought a universal monarchy to
dominate Europe. France therefore endeavoured to reduce Charles’s territories, resulting in a series
of aggressive policies towards Spain (and the HRE) being put in place. These included Henry II’s deal
with the Turks, in which he allowed them to use the French port of Toulon to repair damaged ships,
and the French occupation of Metz in 1552. Charles attempted to reclaim control over Metz by
means of siege, however, this was unsuccessful and cost Charles 2.5 million ducats, mostly payed for
by Castile. In these cases, Charles’s foreign policy were of no benefit to Spain, and instead resulted in
the damage of Spain’s security and economy.

Another area of Charles’s foreign policy that was of no benefit to Spain were his actions on behalf of
the Holy Roman Empire. The first instance of Charles’s commitment to the HRE interfering with
Spain was during the election of 1519 in which Charles left Spain just after the Cortes of Santiago to
be elected Holy Roman Emperor. This absenteeism triggered the comuneros revolt in the last week
of May 1520. Whilst the grandees didn’t support the rebels, it wasn’t until the near terminal stages
of the revolt that they decided to back Charles, as the rebels began to get too radical and finally
intervened, culminating in the rebel’s defeat at Villalar on the 23rd April 1521. Not only did this
plunge Spain into turmoil, but it also damaged Spain’s wealth as Charles had to raise the vast funds
needed to bribe the electors. Originally, he intended to get this from Castile at the cortes of
Santiago, however he ended using loans, and turned over Spain’s military orders to the fuggers,
meaning Charles’s title as Holy Roman Emperor came at a cost to Castile. The biggest challenge to
Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor was the reformation and the resultant protestant movement. The
reformation was triggered in 1517 when Martin posted his 95 theses at Wittenburg after his
pilgrimage to Rome, in which he was disgusted by the wealth, corruption and impiety he saw. As
German states converted to Protestantism, some because they believed in it and some simply to
distance themselves from the HRE, the Schmalkaldic League was formed in 1529. Throughout the
1530’s and much of the 40’s, Charles attempted to reach a common ground with the Protestants,
seen at the 1541 Diet of Regensburg the 1455-49 Council of Trent. However, these negotiations
proved fruitless and both sides resorted to military action. At the 1547 Battle of Muhlberg Charles
won a decisive victory, however it didn’t quash the Protestants as it inspired a new wave of enemies
such as Maurice of Saxony, who defected from Charles after the battle as he became concerned with
Charles’ increasing power. Finally, in 1555 Charles gave into the Protestant demands, and with the
Peace of Augsburg he allowed the German states to choose their own religion. Charles had therefore
wasted enormous sums of money and time fighting a war with an outcome that could have been
reached peacefully 20 years earlier. This war had deprived Spain of their leader as Charles was
present for just 6 of 26 years and was often too preoccupied with his German states that he
effectively neglected Spain, allowing threats such as the Turks to grow stronger. The wars also
depleted Spain of its finances, as Charles funded the campaign against the Protestants using taxes
and loans to the fuggers, taken out on Spain’s credit. Eventually the Castilian cortes grew tired of
paying for Habsburg wars that wouldn’t benefit Castile, so in 1538 they refused Charles’s proposal of
the new sisa tax on food. Despite these issues, there were some benefits to Charles’s position as
Holy Roman Emperor, such as the fact that it gave Spain great prestige, and that Charles’s crusade of
the heretics in Germany was met with support from nobles and the church in Spain was the most
deeply militant Catholic state in Europe at the time, and were deeply concerned by the spread of
Protestantism.

The final area of Charles’s foreign policy was that towards the Ottomans. Charles had to fight the
Turks on 2 fronts, in eastern/central Europe and in the eastern Mediterranean. In eastern Europe
the Ottomans were expanding, lead under Suleiman the Magnificent, and in 1529 they lay siege to
Vienna. Charles managed to repel the Ottomans, however, much like with the Protestant threat in
the HRE, Castile was unwilling to funds for this war, and in 1527, the cortes refused to raise tax for
that purpose. In the Mediterranean the Ottomans sought to destroy Spain’s outposts in North Africa
and posed a strong threat to Spain itself, as they could conduct coastal raids. There was even
concern of an Ottoman invasion of Spain from the Mediterranean, as it would be well received by
moriscos in Granada. In 1529 Ottoman admiral Barbarossa took Penon of Algiers, which could be
used as a base for coastal raids on Valencia. Charles had little to defend Spain, as he was pouring his
resources and attention into the defence of the HRE, however after the defection of Admiral Doria in
1528, Charles used his fleet to defend the Mediterranean in the 1530’s (after using the fleet in
numerous battles for the HRE). Charles’s successes against the Ottomans peaked in 1535 when he
captured Tunis and expelled Barbarossa. Kamen states “the two decades after Tunis, however, saw a
slow deterioration” in Spanish power in the Mediterranean, and this is evident in the 1538 battle of
Prevesa, in which Spanish forces were defeated by Barbarossa due to their limited resources, the
failed campaign to retake Algiers in 1541, and the loss of numerous North African outposts such as
Tripoli (1551) and Bougie (1555). Kamen speculates that Charles’s weakness in defending Spain from
the Ottoman threat in the Mediterranean was “due primarily to Charles’s commitments in Northern
Europe”. We can see that Charles’s policy against the Ottomans was of little benefit to Spain, as he
prioritised the defence of the HRE from the Ottomans at the expense of Spain’s security and Castile’s
finances. This prioritisation meant little resources were left for the protection of Spain, seen in the
multitude of Charles’s military failures within the Mediterranean.

To conclude, I partially agree with the statement, as it is too strong to completely agree with, as
some of Charles’s foreign policies clearly carried some benefits to Spain, such as a strong, stable
relationship with Portugal, and maintained security at the border with France. Charles also managed
to retain Naples and Milan from the French, benefitting Spain with regards to trade and security.
Despite these benefits, the majority of Charles’s foreign policies in Europe were of ‘no benefit’ to
Spain, for instance the unstable and hostile relationship that developed with France, the futile
defence of the HRE from Protestantism which depleted Castile of resources , and most importantly,
the neglection of the Ottoman threat to Spain which put Spain’s safety directly in peril.