MANU/KA/0396/2020

Equivalent Citation: 2020(4)KarLJ147

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Writ Petition No. 44418/2017 (LR)
Decided On: 07.01.2020
Appellants: D. Ramanatha Reddy and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Karnataka and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B. Veerappa, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R.S. Ravi, Advocate
For Respondents/Defendant: M.C. Nagashree, AGA
Case Note:
Miscellaneous - Validity of Order - Section 83 of Karnataka Land Reforms
Act - Petitioners have filed petition for writ of certiorari to quash impugned
order passed by tribunal confirming order passed by assistant commissioner
- Whether assistant commissioner was justified in exercising his power
under provisions of section 83 of Act to nullify registered sale deed within
reasonable period under facts and circumstances of case - Held, considering
entire material on record and in view of fact that registered sale deed came
to be executed on 24.4.1974, very proceedings initiated on 12.4.1996 that
too after lapse of more than two decades, could not be sustained -
Therefore, impugned order passed by assistant commissioner and affirmed
by tribunal dismissing appeal on ground of delay were liable to be quashed
- Accordingly, point raised for consideration in petition was answered in
negative holding that assistant commissioner wasnot justified in initiating
proceedings under provisions of section 83 of Act after lapse of 22 years, by
setting aside registered sale deed which was confirmed by tribunal thereby
dismissing appeal on ground of delay was liable to quashed - Appeal
allowed. [28],[29]
ORDER
B. Veerappa, J.
1. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari to quash
the impugned order dated 31.3.2017 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in
Appeal No. 879/2009, confirming the order dated 12.4.1996 passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division, Bangalore in LRF(83)47/1995-96 as
per Annexures - A and B respectively.
I - Facts of the Case
2 . It is the case of the petitioners that they are the absolute owners of the land
bearing Sy. No. 33/1, measuring 1 acre, situated at Kadiganahalli village, Jala Hobli,

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Bangalore North Taluk having purchased under the Registered Sale Deed dated
24.4.1974 for a valuable sale consideration from its previous owner Sri A.
Rudraswamy and from the date of purchase, they are in possession and enjoyment of
the said land. In pursuance of the registered Sale Deed, all the revenue documents
viz., Mutation Registrar, RTC including the Encumbrance Certificate stand in their
name. When the things stood thus, they came to know that in the first week of
August 2009, the 2nd respondent has passed the impugned order dated 12.4.1996
holding that petitioners have violated the provisions of Sections 79A and 79B of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
Immediately, they obtained the certified copy of the said order on 12.8.2009 and an
appeal was filed before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore challenging the
order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. In turn the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal
proceeded to dismiss the appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeal. Hence,
the present writ petition is filed.
3. The respondents-State has not filed any objection to the main writ petition.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis.
II - Arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners
5. Sri R.S. Ravi, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended with vehemence that
the impugned order passed by the Assistant Commissioner dated 12.4.1996 as per
Annexure-B is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice since no notice was
served on the petitioners and therefore, the impugned order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner and confirmed by the Karnataka Appellate Authority (for short,
hereinafter referred to as 'the KAT') on the ground of delay and laches cannot be
sustained. He further contended that the Assistant Commissioner initiated
proceedings against the petitioners after a lapse of 21 years which is impermissible
under law. Therefore, the very initiation of proceedings under the provisions of
Section 79A & B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, is unreasonable and on that
ground alone, the initiation of proceedings is liable to be quashed.
6 . The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the Assistant
Commissioner has not provided an opportunity to being heard to the petitioners
before passing the impugned order. The petitioners have not violated the terms and
conditions of the provisions of Sections 79A, 79B and 80 of the Act while purchasing
the land in question. He further contended that the petitioners belong to an
agricultural family and their income would not exceed the limit prescribed under the
provisions of Section 79A of the Act. He also contended that as on the date of
purchase of the land, the income of the petitioners had not exceeded Rs. 12,000/-.
He further contended though the KAT by the impugned order dismissed the appeal
mainly on the ground of delay, it has categorically recorded a finding that the
petitioners and their ancestors are agriculturists and they belong to an agricultural
family and hence, they have not violated the provisions of Section 79A and 79B of
the Act. The said finding of the KAT has not been challenged by the respondents-
State and therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition.
IIII - Arguments advanced by the Learned AGA for respondents-State
7 . Per contra, Smt. M.C. Nagashree, learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondents sought to justify the impugned orders passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and confirmed by the KAT and contended that in view of the
fact that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner clearly depicts that notice

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was issued to the petitioners, they neither appeared, nor have produced any
document and now the petitioners cannot contend that the impugned order passed by
the Assistant Commissioner is in violation of the principles of natural justice and
therefore, she sought to dismiss the writ petition.
IV The point for determination
8. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions urged by the counsel for the parties, the
only point that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is:
"Whether the Assistant Commissioner is justified in exercising his power
under the provisions of Section 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act to
nullify the registered Sale Deed dated 24.4.1974 within the reasonable period
under the facts and circumstances of the present case?
V - Consideration
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned
Counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record carefully.
10. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are the owners of the property in question
bearing Sy. No. 33/1, measuring 1 acre, situated at Kadiganahalli village, Jala Hobli,
Bangalore North Taluk having purchased the same under the registered Sale Deed
dated 24.4.1974 for a valuable sale consideration from its previous owner, Sri A.
Rudraswamy and the same was recognized by the competent authorities after
following the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of Section 129 of the
Act and Rules 63 to 66 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules after satisfying
themselves that the sale made in favour of the petitioners was valid and necessary
entries in the record of rights were made specifying the petitioners as the owners of
the land in question. Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner, admittedly initiated the
proceedings in the year 1996 after a lapse of 22 years holding that inspite of service
of notice, the petitioners have not produced any documents to show that they are
from the agricultural family and their annual income does not exceed more than Rs.
12,000/-.
11. On the appeal filed by the petitioners, the Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact
that the petitioners belong to an agricultural family and have not violated the
provisions of Sections 79A and B of the Act. Admittedly, since the petitioners have
purchased the land under the registered Sale Deed dated 24.4.1974 and the
proceedings were initiated on 12.4.1996 by the Assistant Commissioner after a lapse
of 22 years, is not within the reasonable period and the provisions of Section 83 of
the Act does not contemplate to initiate proceedings at a belated stage.
12. It is not in dispute the petitioners have purchased the agricultural land and the
State Government has statutorily recognized them as the lawful owners under the Act
and they have been cultivating the land and enjoyment of the peaceful possession for
all these years (22 years), and the rights accrued to the petitioners under the
registered Sale Deed in respect of immovable property should not be disturbed by the
authorities after a lapse of more than two decades.
13. The respondent - Authority - Assistant Commissioner arbitrarily, capriciously and
without any justification whatsoever has chosen to pick the petitioners to initiate
proceedings. The intimation of arbitrary proceedings after the lapse of 22 years
against the petitioners by the Assistant Commissioner in purported exercise of power

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under the provisions of Section 83 of the Act, where it is not vested in him is illegal
and unconstitutional procedure with the threat of depriving them of their lands is in
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 300A of the
Constitution of India. The proceedings are also violative of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
14. In view of the controversy, it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section
80 of the Act which reads as under:
8 0 . Transfers to non-agriculturists barred.--1[(1)] 1(a) No sale (including
sales in execution of a decree of a civil court or for recovery of arrears of
land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue), gift or
exchange or lease of any land or interest therein, or
(b) no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which the possession of
the mortgaged property is delivered to the mortgagee,
shall be 2 [lawful] 2 in favour of a person,--
(i) who is not an agriculturist, or;
(ii) who being an agriculturist holds as owner or tenant or partly as
owner and partly as tenant land which exceeds the limits specified in
section 63 or 64; or
(iii) who is not an agricultural labourer; or
(iv) who is disentitled under section 79A or section 79B to acquire or
hold any land:]
Provided that the Assistant Commissioner having jurisdiction
over the area or any officer not below the rank of an
Assistant Commissioner authorised by the State Government
in this behalf in respect of any area may grant permission
for such sale, gift, or exchange, to enable a person other
than a person disentitled to acquire or hold land under
section 79A or section 79B who bona fide intend taking up
agriculture to acquire land on such conditions as may be
prescribed in addition to the following conditions, namely:--
(i) that the transferee takes up agriculture within one year
from the date of acquisition of land, and
(ii) that if the transferee gives up agriculture within five
years, the land shall vest in the State Government subject to
payment to him of an amount equal to eight times the net
annual income of the land or where the land has been
purchased, the price paid for the land, if such price is less
than eight times the net annual income of the land.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to lands granted under section 77.
A careful reading of the said provision makes it clear that certain transactions shall
not be valid in favour of certain specified persons.

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15. The provisions of Section 83 of the Act which is the most relevant provision for
the purpose of present case reads as under:-
"83. Inquiry regarding illegal transactions.--The prescribed authority shall,
after a summary inquiry, determine whether the transaction reported to it
under section 82 or coming to its notice in any other manner is in
contravention of or is unlawful or invalid under the provisions of this Act, 2
[as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act and make a declaration accordingly. Any transaction so
declared to be in contravention of or is unlawful or invalid under any of the
provisions of this Act, as they stood before or as they stand after the date of
commencement of the Amendment Act shall be null and void. The land in
respect of which such transaction has taken place shall, as penalty, be
forfeited to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. No
amount is payable therefor."
16. A bare reading of the said provision clearly depicts that the proceedings under
the said Section are quasi-criminal proceedings in respect of illegal transactions in
contravention of the provisions of the Act. Besides the action contemplated under the
provisions of Section 83 of the Act, criminal proceedings can also be initiated in
respect of illegal transactions in contravention of the provisions of the Act against the
person concerned under the provisions of Section 125(2C) of the Act and on
conviction by a Magistrate, he shall be punished with fine which may extend upto Rs.
500/-.
17. In view of the provisions of Sections 80 and 83 of the Act, we can see that there
is a clear distinction of illegal contracts in contravention of the provisions of law and
contracts merely declared to be void or illegal and it is clear from the provisions of
Section 83 of the Act that the duty assigned to the prescribed authority under that
Section is to determine whether any transaction in respect of any land is in
contravention of the provisions of the Act and any transaction so declared to be in
contravention of any of the provisions of the Act shall be null and void. The word
'contravention' means an act done in violation of a legal condition or obligation. In
other words, it would mean a positive act done contrary to some statutory prohibition
or the doing of an act which is forbidden by statutory provisions.
18. In view of the above, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Act dealing
with transactions in respect of land within the meaning of the Act. The provisions of
Section 5(1) of the Act prohibits the creation of tenancies and leasing of lands which
reads as under:
"5. Prohibition of leases, etc.--(1) Save as provided in this Act, after the date
of commencement of the Amendment Act, no tenancy shall be created or
continued in respect of any land nor shall any land be leased for any period
whatsoever.
(2) xxx
(3) xxx"
19. The provisions of Section 19 of the Act deals with the restriction on transfer of
resumed land for a period of 15 years which reads as under:
19. Restriction on transfer of resumed land.--(1) Notwithstanding anything

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 contained in any other law or in section 80, no land resumed from a tenant
shall within fifteen years from such resumption be transferred by sale, gift,
exchange or otherwise:
Provided that such land may be sold to the tenant who on
resumption had been evicted from that land, at a value to be
determined by the Tahsildar.
Provided further that such land may be sold by the father, the
mother, the spouse, the child or the grand child of a soldier who has
died while in service and who was dependent upon such soldier at
the time of his death.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), it shall be lawful
for a landowner to take a loan and mortgage or create a charge on his
interest in the land in favour of the State Government, 2 [a financial
institution, a co-operative land development bank, a co-operative society,] 2
a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 in which not
less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State
1962 : KAR. ACT 10] Land Reforms 51 Government or a Corporation owned
or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government or both, for
development of land or improvement of agricultural practices; and without
prejudice to any other remedy provided by any law, in the event of his
making default in payment of such loan in accordance with the terms and
conditions on which such loan was granted, it shall be lawful to cause his
interests in the land to be attached and sold and the proceeds to be utilised
in payment of such loan.
20. The provisions of Section 61(1) of the Act prohibits for a period of 15 years the
transfer of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or assignment of any land for which
occupancy right has been granted to any person under Chapter III of the Act. Section
21(1) of the Act declares that no sub-division or letting of the land held by a tenant
or assignment of interest therein shall be valid and Section 80(1) declares that no
sale, gift or exchange or lease of any land or interest therein or no mortgage of any
land or interest therein in which the possession of the mortgaged property is
delivered to the mortgagee shall be valid in favour of persons specified in Section
80(1)(i) to (iv) of the Act.
21. The provisions of Sections 21(1) and 80(1) do not prohibit any transaction as
has been done in Sections 5(1), 19(1) and 61(1) of the Act. They merely declare that
the transactions specified will not be valid. On the other hand, the transactions
referred in Sections 5(1), 19(1) and 61(1) are forbidden by law and the transactions
so forbidden will be transactions in contravention of the relevant sections of the Act.
So the transactions referred to under the provisions of Section 80 of the Act being
only not valid, it cannot be said to be illegal or forbidden being in contravention of
the provisions of the Act to fall within the scope of Section 83 of the Act.
VI Judgments of the Apex Court relied upon
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in an identical circumstances in the case of Joint
Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others
MANU/SC/0024/2015 : (2015) 3 SCC 695 relying upon the dictum in the case of
State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha MANU/SC/0406/1969 : (1969) 2 SCC 187
while considering the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code,

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1879 held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211
to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be
exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose,
the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held
to be too late.
2 3 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court considering the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,
1966 in the case of Santosh kumar Shivgond Patil vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale
reported in MANU/SC/1608/2009 : (2009) 9 SCC 352 at para-11 has held that it
seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for
exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at
any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the
law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a lapse of long time. Where
the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of
revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that
exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. In the said case,
the reasonable period within which the power of revision would be exercised was
three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of
course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of
revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of
revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of
the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and
legally not correct.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 21 of the
Punjab General Sales Tax Act in the case of State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Co-
operative Milk Producers Union Ltd., MANU/SC/8017/2007 : (2007) 11 SCC 363 in
page 367, at paragraph 11 has held that a bare reading of Section 21 of the Act
would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the
same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. It is
trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must
exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities
thereunder and other relevant factors. The revisional jurisdiction should ordinarily be
exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the
said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years.
2 5 . Admittedly in the present case, the Assistant Commissioner has initiated
proceedings under Section 83 of the Act for violation of the provisions of Section 79A
and 79B of the Act. The Act does not prescribe any period of limitation which does
not mean that the Assistant Commissioner can initiate proceedings after a period of
22 years which is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. My view is also fortified by
the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin
vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in MANU/SC/1261/1997 : (1997) 6 SCC 71 where
while considering the provisions of Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 has held that though the said section does not prescribe
for any time-limit for initiation of proceedings, such power should be exercised
within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated
under the said section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond
reasonable time and at paragraphs-1 and 2 it is held as under:
"1. The appellant by two registered sale deeds dated 11-12-1972 and 28-12-

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 1972 purchased from the respondent Survey Plot No. 53 measuring an area
of Ac. 3.06 gunts and Survey Plot No. 372/1 + 2 measuring an area of Ac.
3.18 gunts. On the basis of aforesaid purchase the name of the appellant was
mutated in the record of rights on 14-2-1973. It appears that in September
1976 the Mamlatdar of the area concerned initiated a suo motu enquiry under
Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as
applicable to the State of Gujarat, (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act")
in respect of the validity of the aforesaid sale deeds. On 29-4-1977 the
Mamlatdar held that the sales in question were invalid as the appellant was
not an agriculturist belonging to the State of Gujarat. The appeal, revision
and the writ petition filed against the aforesaid order have been dismissed.
2. Although Mr. Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a
stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any
discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which
such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that
question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu
power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84-C of the
Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view
of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a
power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit,
such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case
the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry
was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared
to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he
has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on
behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B.
Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v.
Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah [Spe. WA No. 2770 of 1979] disposed of on 1-3-
1990, where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power
under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time.
This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State
of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha [MANU/SC/0406/1969 : (1969) 2 SCC 187 :
(1970) 1 SCR 335] and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India
[MANU/SC/0559/1994 : (1994) 1 SCC 44] has impressed that where no
time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not
mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised
within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances
of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was
not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs."
2 6 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore
Yadav, MANU/SC/0781/2017 : (2018) 12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be
taken within reasonable time, where no period of limitation specified - even while
dealing with beneficial legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be ignored
lightly where no period of limitation prescribed and actions initiated after delay and
at paragraphs-9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 it has been held as under:
"9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted
that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of
legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed
during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this

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Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. C. Padma, MANU/SC/0704/2003 : (2003) 7 SCC 713 : 2003 SCC
(Cri.) 1709], where this Court held that in a motor accident which took place
on 18-12-1989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995, after
limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court
held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court
held that the claim petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the
ground of limitation, after the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This
view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however,
find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a
settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the
provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time.
10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., "reasonable
time" is explained as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and
advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he
ought not to suffer."
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve rights
and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the
losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within
a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party
who might suffer losses.
11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows:
"The auction-sale took place in 1942, the application for restoration
of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was
dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands
changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant-
writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986. Such a long-settled position
could only be upset for some very compelling reasons and on
making out an extremely strong case for restoration of the appeal.
There is nothing on record to suggest anything remotely like that.
Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the
appeal even without any notice to the appellant-writ petitioners was
clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act."
The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken.
1 2 . It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional
Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and
since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in
this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the
power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any
time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in
Collector v. D. Narsing Rao [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao,
MANU/SC/0024/2015 : (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where
this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao,
MANU/AP/1154/2010 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

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 Para '17' of the judgment reads as follows: (D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v.
D. Narsing Rao, MANU/SC/0024/2015 : (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Civ) 396], SCC p. 706, para 17)
"17. ... that the suo motu revision under taken after a long lapse of
time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary
and opposed to the concept of rule of law."
Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must
be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a
reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before
us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond
reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred
several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not
encumbered by any rights.
14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and
no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored
lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as
observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand [Situ Sahu v. State
of Jharkhand, MANU/SC/0744/2004 : (2004) 8 SCC 340].
2 7 . On the appeal filed by the petitioners, the Appellate Authority/Tribunal has
recorded findings of fact that the petitioners are from the agricultural family and they
have not violated the provisions of Section 79A and B of the Act and the said findings
have reached finality. The very initiation of proceedings by the Assistant
Commissioner after a lapse of 22 years is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. The
impugned order passed by the KAT dismissing the appeal on the ground of
technicality cannot be sustained. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to
be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being
done on technicality. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of
its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so. Therefore, the KAT ought to have
allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, since the proceedings have been initiated after the lapse of 22 years.
The assertions made in the present writ petition by the petitioners are not denied by
the State Government by filing any objections.
VII Conclusion
28. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, considering the entire material on record
and in view of the fact that the registered Sale Deed came to be executed on
24.4.1974, the very proceedings initiated on 12.4.1996 that too after a lapse of more
than two decades (22 years), cannot be sustained. Therefore, the impugned order
passed by the Assistant Commissioner and affirmed by the KAT dismissing the appeal
on the ground of delay (technicality) are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the point
raised for consideration in the writ petition is answered in the negative holding that
the Assistant Commissioner is not justified in initiating the proceedings under the
provisions of Section 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act after a lapse of 22 years,
by setting aside the registered Sale Deed which is confirmed by the KAT thereby

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dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay is liable to quashed.
IX Result/Decision
29. For the reasons stated above, writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated
31.3.2017 made in Appeal No. 879/2009 on the file of the Karnataka Revenue
Appellate Tribunal, confirming the order dated 12.4.1996 made in LRF(83)47/1995-
96 passed by the Assistant Commissioner as per Annexures A and B are hereby
quashed.
Rule is made absolute.
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