a5/4 introduction

status analysis and recommendation

12.02.2021 | Network Solution Engineering
Summary

Encryption on 2G air interface insecure

 A5/3 (2G voice) and GEA (GPRS & EDGE) 64 bit encryption at risk – with publication on breach expected in March / April 2021
 Breach of interface seems comparably easy and can be achieved “in minutes”

Improved encryption available - but implementation is patchy

 128 bit encryption ciphers available for A5/4 (voice) and GEA4 (data) are available and offers increasing protection
 A5/4 can be implemented and ready by mid 2021; GEA4 requires missing ePC suppport
 Core (MSS): A5/4 supported in current releases but not released by DTAG, MSS swap ongoing in several NatCos
 Core (ePC): GEA4 not supported by core solutions implemented at DT
 Radio (BSS): A5/4 supported in current releases but not released by DTAG
 Terminal: A5/4 is supported by the existing terminals, GEA 4 disabled in terminals due to unavailability of ePC (and testing options)
 The actual implementation costs are expected to be low

We recommend to drive A5/4 introduction and escalation of GEA4 ePC function development
 Trigger DTAG specific BSS & MSS introduction procedure by all NatCos
 Clarify MSS readiness timeline for all NatCos
 Continue discussion on GEA4 with suppliers and bring this to the world market feature stage
insecure encryption require a5/4 upgrade
background
VOICE DATA Encryption Breaching  POTENTIAL RISKS
A5/4 GEA 4 128bit n.a.  DTAG not supporting A5/4 Reputation threat
when being on lower level than competitor
A5/3 GEA 3 64 bit Minutes, brute force
 DTAG not supporting GEA4: Less critical as
A5/2 GEA 2 54 bit <1sec. on COTS PC GEA4 availability is not given by world market
 Customer impact low, as A5/4 capable devices
A5/1 GEA 1 54 bit Near real time since 2009
would normally support VoLTE and user will be
Implemented at DT on VoLTE (-> coverage based LTE rollout)

A5 / GEA provides over the air encryption for 2G voice and data A5/4 & GEA 4 have not been breached and provide a
 A5/3 (2G voice) and GEA3 (GPRS & EDGE) 64 bit encryption at risk – with publication on vulnerability secure way forward.
of GSM expected (April 2021: GEA1 can be cracked, May/ June 2021 (?) possible impact on A5/3)
 Hackers claim that breach of interface can be achieved with COTS hardware and can be achieved “in
minutes”
 Vodafone already announced A5/4 (voice) support for their networks, GEA4 (data) most likely not
supported in any European network
 Outlook: For DT 2G voice (A5/4) can be secured short-term – 2G data (GEA4) only mid- to long-term.
A5/4 ready to implement, GEA4 remains challenge
Network Impact Overview
MSS generally safe, ePC at risk
MSS ✅  (MSS): A5/4 supported in current releases and being implemented.
Implementation readiness differing by country (see detail) but generally OK
 (ePC) GEA 4 support for ePC (SGSN) not available by DTAG SGSN suppliers –
Core
ePC ❗ offered by E/// as DT specific function (€1mn / Mid 2022)

BSS generally safe, software to be approved

 (BSS): Software releases including A5/4 are available, pending approval by DT
✅ and implementation
 Some hardware setups not supporting update and require swap
RAN

A5/4 ✅ Terminals supporting A5/4 but dependent on ePC for GEA 4

 A5/4 is supported by the existing terminals and part of routine testing
 GEA4 is deactivated by default as inter-operability testing can not be provided
GEA4 ❗ until ePC (SGSN) support is established – solution depending on ePC availability
Terminals
bss update available, introduction to be triggered
radio: bss availability of a5/4
2021 2022

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr

NOkia

❗ Greece: Not supported for Nokia, swap ongoing SWAP to be completed

❗ Poland: Software update (SRAN 20.c) t.b.d. Clarify update from 20.b (April 2021) Nto 20.c.
Ericsson

✅ Greece (though not all HW supporting A5/4) Switched on (based on local verification)

✅ Slovakia for current gen BSC HW (last gen HW t.b.d.) 6-8 weeks Software available, DT acceptance process to be triggered by NatCo

✅ DE, ME, HT, HU, RO 6-8 weeks Software available, DT acceptance process to be triggered by NatCo
Huawei

✅ AT, MKT, DE, CZ, NL, PL 6-8 weeks Software available, DT acceptance process to be triggered by NatCo

Around 300 sites not supporting A5/4 in TM-CZ

confidential, internal, public | Author | Topic of presentation

MSS availability expected mid 2021
Core: Mss availability of A5/4
2021 2022

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr

Nokia MSS Data on swap

CGR, HT, TMA, TDG, TMCZ, TMNL Swap from old Nokia MSS to Nokia cloud based MSS, first NatCos ready timelines / re-routing
setup to be updated
✅ e.g. Germany Swap finalised
Ericsson MSS

✅ CT, SK (swap from E/// to Nokia cloud based MSS) Swap finalised

✅ MT, MKT A5/4 supporting software available, DT acceptance process to be triggered by NatCo

 Current Nokia MSS A5/4 functionality not acquired - cloud based MSS supporting A5/4
 Hardware swaps almost completed, but setup of traffic rerouting to new MSS to be finalized. Finalization until end of 2021, depending on local priority.

A5/4 END TO END INTRODUCTION REQUIRED TO ACTIVATE A5/4 – MSS WILL MOST LIKELY DETERMINE THE AVAILABILITY OF A5/4 PER NATCO

confidential, internal, public | Author | Topic of presentation

GEA4 not supported by DT epc Suppliers,
TO be requested for next world market releases

GEA4 needs SGSN support, not yet provided by DTAGs SGSN vendors. Impact evaluation
 GEA4 will not be supported before 2022
Ericsson SGSN-MME not supporting GEA4  World market commitment on GEA4 missing
 First price offer from Ericsson: 1M€ for development as DT specific feature  Development as DTAG specific function considered to
(availability mid 22) be quite expensive

Huawei SGSN-MME not supporting GEA4 on implemented platform Recommendation

 Feature request on existing SGNS: Not requested (due to expected swap)  Drive roadmap discussion of GEA4 to world market
feature level
 Huawei swap timeline t.b.d.
 Discuss on GSMA to drive commitment of other
operators and increase leverage on suppliers
Cisco, Affirmed SGSN-MME not supporting GEA4
 Suppoert not planned
 Feature request on existing SGNS: Not requested
GEA4: Push for World release most sensible option
Push for dedicated Push for World
Turn off Data Turn off 2G, Keep 3G Solution Release
Approach Deactivate data for 2G Deactivation of 2G network, Acquire compatible SGSN Push for feature to „world
(GPRS, EDGE) keep 3G updates from suppliers, as market feature“ status (part of
customized feature global release)
Pro Secure solution for legacy  High security level on 3G  No impact on 2G network  No impact on 2G network
technology, no invest required  Higher data rates on 3G  Same security level as voice  Same security level as voice
 General terminal support
 Reduced feature costs
Con  2G data still in use  Ignores sizeable amount of  Availability ca. mid-2022  Availability t.b.d. –
(messenger services, IoT, 2G only devices (esp. IoT)  Comparably expensive potentially 2023
M2M)  Impact on coverage, as 3G (indicative: €2-3 mn for DT
 Additional coverage gaps, as has lower coverage group)
2g is fallback for 3G/4G  Contradicts refarming  Terminal availability t.b.d –
strategy only chipsets available now
Security
Impact

RE C O M M E N D E D
not secure Very secure
No impact High Impact
Terminal support a5/4 given,
GEA4 deactivated & requiring EPC implementation

A5/4 supported by the existing terminals and part of routine testing

✅  Based on network statistic from January 2021 in TDG around 70% of the calls are
using A5/3 while the rest is using A5/1.
 Few old terminals / SIMs1 are still only supporting A5/ 1, especially simple feature
phones and M2M/IoT-terminals.

GEA 4 deactivated until availability of SGSN (ePC) GEA 4 support

 First chipsets (e.g. Qualcomm and MediaTek) are supporting GEA4, but not
supported in terminals, due to lack of test possibility against real infra structure.
 Testing could start as soon as test possibility (with real EPC support) is given in
❗ lab, including verification of existing terminal portfolio (so that GEA could be
enabled within DT terminal portfolio)
 Reasonable terminal support not likely as long as GEA4 is not seen as world
market feature

1) uSIM required for A5/4

Recommendations

Core
❗  (MSS): Continue swap and then upgrade to A5/4 (negligible costs, see backup)
 (ePC) Escalate GEA4 support & implementation in GSMA and to suppliers –
Support from board requested
Core

RAN
✅  (BSS): Trigger software release acceptance processes by NatCos
 Costs are negligible (see backup)
RAN

✅ Terminals
 Continue IODT for A5/4

Terminals
Backup
a5/4 introduction costs negligible, gea t.b.d.

NatCo MSS SWAP A5/4 ordered Cost estimate Comment

Greece Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS YES 0€ Part of SD Voice framecontract
Croatia Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS open 0€ Part of SD Voice framecontract
Austria Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS YES 0€ Part of overall local R4 contract with Nokia
A5/4 as part of a feature bundle contracted; A5/4 activation planed after all RN are re-
Germany Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS YES 200k€ homed
Czech
Republic Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS open < 150k€ estimated based on calculation of TD
Netherland Nokia R4 -> Nokia cloud based MSS open < 150k€ estimated based on calculation of TD
Montenegro Ericsson -> Nokia cloud based MSS open 0€ Part of SD Voice framecontract
Slovakia Ericsson -> Nokia cloud based MSS open < 150k€ estimated based on calculation of TD
Macedonia Ericsson MSS (no swap) open < 100k€ estimated based on offer towards Poland
Hungary Ericsson MSS (no swap) open < 100k€ estimated based on offer towards Poland
Poland Ericsson MSS (no swap) open 90k€ based on offer from Nov. 2019
Romania Ericsson MSS (no swap) open < 100k€ estimated based on offer towards Poland
< 1mn€

 Total MSS software license costs less than €1mn for the group (plus potential costs for local services & deployment)
 BSS updates will be free of charge (part of annual software fee). Partial BSS HW swap (GR, CZ) pending on actual volumes
 EPC Updates depending on way forward for GEA4
END TO END INTRODUCTION COSTS FOR A5/4 <1€MN
network responsibilities / counterparts (international)
BSS (A5/4)
Ericsson BSS (Laszlo Tanczos, Security: Azzurra la Torre)
Huawei BSS (Jürgen Reinert, Harald Wollstadt, Security: Nick Radner)
Nokia BSS (Petr Sablik, Security: Nick Radner)

MSS (A5/4)
Nokia (Frank Prösl, Security: Karsten Friebe)
Ericsson (Robert Lorenc, Security: Karsten Friebe)

EPC (GEA 4) (Roland Schulz)

Huawei
Ericsson
Cisco (Mariusz Kolakowski)

Terminals (A5/4 and GEA 4) (Oliver Ast, Security: Volker Schenk)

Buyin:
RAN: Thomas Eich; Sergiu Avram
MSS: Uwe Marin
ePC: Anna Rebecca Stock

TEU: Harald Schmitt