Assess the consequences for the international situation from 1930 to 1936 of the Great

Depression

The Great Depression, which began in 1929 and persisted throughout the 1930s, had
profound consequences for the international situation.

Economic Instability, the Rise of Protectionism, and the Destruction of International

Cooperation and Economic Interdependence

The Depression triggered a worldwide economic downturn, characterised by

plummeting GDP, mass unemployment, deflation and lowered international trade. This
economic instability led to significant political and social upheaval in many countries, as
governments struggled to respond effectively.
Prior to the Great Depression, the United States and Europe had strong
economic ties, with Europe importing American goods and the United States investing
heavily in European markets. However, the Depression disrupted this interdependence
as many nations turned to protectionist measures such as tariffs, import quotas and
other trade barriers in an attempt to shield domestic industries from foreign
competition and protect jobs.
Countries also engaged in competitive currency devaluations to boost their
exports and protect their domestic industries. This "beggar-thy-neighbour" approach to
currency policy led to currency wars and instability in international financial markets.
This rise in protectionism exacerbated the economic downturn and contributed to a
decline in international trade.
The Depression also had devastating effects on colonies and developing
countries, which relied heavily on exports of primary commodities. Plummeting demand
and prices for these goods led to economic collapse in many regions, exacerbating
poverty and political instability.
In response to the economic crisis, efforts were made to foster international
cooperation and stabilise the global economy. Initiatives such as the World Economic
Conference and the London Economic Conference aimed to coordinate policy
responses among nations. However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to
competing national interests and the failure of major powers to agree on a coordinated
approach.

Rise of Isolationism in the United States and Autarky in Europe

In the United States, the Depression led to a resurgence of isolationist sentiment as

many Americans turned inward, focusing on domestic concerns rather than
international affairs. This isolationism had implications for global diplomacy and
security, as the US retreated from its role as a global leader, particularly in Europe.
Many countries sought in response to become more self-reliant economically and
politically, such as Britain, which set up an ‘Imperial Preference’ system which
discriminated against foreign goods outside its empire. Italy and Germany also led
economic policies of autarky through measures such as promoting domestic industry,
restricting imports, and minimising reliance on foreign markets and resources.
In addition, some countries looked to forge alliances or partnerships with
emerging powers outside of the Western hemisphere. For instance, China sought
support from the Soviet Union and other Asian countries to counter Japanese
aggression in the region, while Latin American countries explored economic ties with
European nations and Japan as alternatives to the United States.

Political Radicalization and the Rise of Nazism in Germany

The economic hardship caused by the Depression fueled the rise of extremist political
movements across the globe. In Europe, this manifested in the form of fascist regimes in
Italy, Germany, and Spain, as well as the attempted spread of communism from the
Soviet Union primarily into Eurasian countries. These movements exploited the
economic crisis and social discontent to gain power, leading to increased militarization
and aggression.
The Great Depression in particular played a significant role in the rise of the Nazi
Party in Germany by bringing about the conditions of extreme economic hardship and
political instability that made radical solutions more appealing. The existing economic
woes in the Weimar Republic were exacerbated by the global economic downturn from
1929, with widespread unemployment, poverty, and inflation leading to social unrest and
discontent among the German population.
The economic crisis weakened the credibility of the Weimar government and
undermined confidence in democratic institutions. The inability of mainstream political
parties to effectively address the economic challenges further eroded public trust in the
political establishment. This created fertile ground for radical political movements like
the Nazi Party to exploit the situation and gain support. The Nazi Party, led by Adolf
Hitler, capitalised on the economic turmoil and social dislocation caused by the Great
Depression by offering simplistic and extreme solutions to Germany's problems. Hitler's
charismatic leadership and promises of national renewal, economic recovery, and the
restoration of Germany's prestige resonated with many Germans who were
disillusioned with the status quo.
The Nazi Party used propaganda effectively to scapegoat minorities, particularly
Jews, and blame them for Germany's economic woes. By tapping into existing prejudices
and resentments, the Nazis were able to channel popular frustration and anger towards
Jews and ‘bourgeois elements’, presenting them as internal enemies and rallying support
for their discriminatory policies.
The Nazi Party exploited this desperation by promising to create jobs and restore
prosperity through public works projects, rearmament, and militarization. This
resonated with many unemployed Germans who saw little hope for economic
improvement under the Weimar government.
 Overall, while the rise of the Nazi Party cannot be attributed solely to the Great
Depression, the economic crisis created conditions conducive to its ascent to power.
The combination of economic hardship, political instability, the appeal of extreme
solutions, propaganda, and social discontent provided fertile ground for the Nazi Party
to exploit and ultimately seize control of Germany.

Diplomatic Tensions and the rise of the Aggressive Foreign Policies of Germany, Italy
& Japan

Economic hardship fueled diplomatic tensions between nations. Countries engaged in

currency devaluations and competitive trade policies, leading to strained relations and
trade disputes. Economic nationalism also contributed to growing distrust and hostility
between nations.
The rise of isolationism in the 1930s, particularly in the United States and to
some extent in other Western democracies, created a vacuum of leadership and a
perception of weakness in the international arena. This emboldened the ‘have-not’
powers like Germany and Italy to pursue more assertive and expansionist foreign
policies with reduced fear of significant opposition from the formerly internationalist
Western countries with whom they had interdependence with. Germany, under Adolf
Hitler, sought to overturn the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and
establish German dominance in Europe. Italy, under Benito Mussolini, aimed to revive
the glory of the Roman Empire and expand its territories in the Mediterranean.
The isolationist policies of major powers weakened international institutions
such as the League of Nations, which was established after World War I to maintain the
status quo through peace and security. Without strong support from key players like the
United States, the League's ability to enforce collective security and deter aggression
was severely compromised, providing aggressive states with greater freedom to pursue
their objectives. Britain, and by extension France, proved reluctant to intervene in
international conflicts and crises due to its strategic withdrawal from Europe to focus
on maintaining its empire, desiring some kind of settlement with Germany to revise the
Versailles settlement. Britain felt that it could not bear the burden of enforcing the
mandates of the League of Nations without the support of the United States, and so
largely looked to settle international disputes through old-fashioned channels of
diplomatic compromise.
This therefore limited the responses to any potential aggressive actions by
Germany and Italy, encouraging them to take increasingly bolder actions such as the
remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany and the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy. In an
attempt to avoid conflict and appease aggressive powers, Britain and France pursued
policies of appeasement, making concessions to Germany and Italy in the hope of
maintaining peace. However, these concessions only served to embolden the aggressors
further, as they interpreted them as a sign of weakness and a lack of resolve on the part
of their adversaries.
 In summary, the Great Depression had far-reaching consequences for the
international situation, contributing to economic turmoil, political upheaval, and
increased tensions between nations. By removing the American loans which held
together the tentative political stability of Europe during the 1920s, the Depression led
to the decoupling of the ‘have-not’ nations who looked to revise the post-war order
with those ‘satisfied’ nations who set such terms to maintain the status quo. The
destruction of this system of interdependence emboldened Germany and Italy to pursue
policies of domestic autarky and expansionist policies internationally. The Depression
simultaneously caused Britain and France to focus more on maintaining and exploiting
their empires to solve their economic problems and to seek settlements with Germany
and Italy to limit their expansionist designs without going to war. The perceived
weakness of Western democracies in doing so, coupled with the limited responses and
appeasement policies adopted by these nations, however, emboldened Germany and
Italy to escalate their aggressive actions and set the stage for World War II.

Assess the importance of each of the following as causes of the Second World War:
treaties; economic factors; ideology.

The origins of the Second World War is one of the most controversial and
debated topics in historiography in recent history. It is difficult to isolate a specific
origin for World War Two because of the intensely interlocked and complex
environment such a conflict originated in. The Great Depression could be said to have
destroyed the economic conditions of interdependence upon which the tentative
stability of Europe rested, allowing for the revisionist powers to forcefully rewrite its
terms and carve out their own spheres of influence. The crisis of the late 1930s thus
takes the shape of a world without leadership, with the US in temporary isolationist
retreat and the UK too weak to hold the tide of the revisionist powers while
simultaneously maintaining its vast but fractious empire. The role of ideology in the
causes of the war was largely that of mobilisation and propaganda, with these economic
and geopolitical elements of the world situation constituting its underlying origin.
Britain and France’s decision to go to war with Germany in 1939 could be said to be an
attempt to reinforce the strictures of Versailles, but from a vastly weaker position
owing to their policy of ‘appeasement’ that was informed by their economic fragility,
strategic withdrawal and desire to diplomatically contain Hitler. The Versailles
settlement can therefore be seen indirectly as a long-term cause of the war in Europe,
but the contingencies of the world situation after 1929 point to the economic crisis as
being the formative cause in upending the world system and leading to the escalated
tensions of the late 1930s.

The failures of the Treaty of Versailles and the policies of appeasement caused
an opportunistic Hitler to implement an expansionist foreign policy. While the
orthodox view states that Hitler was an all controlling dictator with incredible
charisma, the revisionist view argues instead that he was more likely spontaneously
responding to both internal and external factors. In other words, he did not have a
defined foreign policy aim to control Europe, but rather had a brief outline of what he
wished to accomplish and opportunistically seized the moment to further these goals.
The focus of these goals, like those of his predecessors, was to slowly revise the Treaty
of Versailles until Germany again became a respectable and powerful nation that would
naturally take the lead of Europe. Versailles was scorned in Germany and became a
psychological burden as the rest of the world seemed to be oppressing the German
people and classifying them as a weaker nation. Article 231 had placed the blame of the
First World War squarely on Germany and demanded from it massive monetary
reparations, military reductions, and territory losses. The Treaty thus instilled anger
and suffering in the hearts of the Germans, allowing them to be more vulnerable to
Nazi propaganda in the future and especially during a crisis. This psychological and
reparations burden accordingly took centre stage in Hitler’s political attack on the
Weimar Republic as Germany felt the effects of the Great Depression, allowing him to
take advantage of the political and economic chaos to profit electorally.

Without unilateral support from all of the Western powers, there was no
enforcement of any of the Treaty of Versailles’ conditions. Instances such as the failure
of the “Stresa Front” of 1935, where Britain broke away from the terms of the treaty to
offer a policy of negotiation and appeasement toward Germany, showed Hitler that the
West was divided. Throughout the 1930s, Chamberlain actively pursued a policy of
appeasement in response to what he perceived as the wrongs of the Treaty of
Versailles. Later historians refer to his thinking as the “diplomacy of illusion”, as he
believed that Hitler only desired revision of the unjust Treaty of Versailles. These
divided policies thus allowed for Hitler to play diplomats off of each other and achieve
his territorial ambitions in Europe without significant opposition. Britain’s public was
also intensely opposed to another war against Germany, especially if the casus belli was
over a German-speaking area they in fact sympathised with in returning to the Reich
and ‘righting’ another unjust provision of Versailles.

The failures of the League of Nations likewise enabled Hitler to successfully

pursue his short-term expansionist aims in Europe. The League was entirely ineffective
in fulfilling its purpose of preventing conflict around the world, for example offering
only rhetorical condemnation and limited sanctions in response to Italy’s invasion of
Abyssinia in 1935. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the League had nothing but
mild words of rebuke. These actions led Hitler and the Axis powers accurately to view
the League as ineffective and useless. Without the backing of the United States or the
USSR, the League of Nations did not possess the means of enforcing any of its
mandates, militarily or economically. Therefore, as there was no global structure to
preserve peace, Hitler had a prime opportunity to pursue his expansionist policies
throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

The instability of these treaties were, however, primarily the result of the Great
Depression which Europe was facing at the time. The insecurity that resulted from
these poor economic conditions drove the primary decision making prior to the Second
World War: preventing British politicians from pursuing any policy other than
appeasement, allowing for the National Socialist Party to seize control in Germany, and
principally leading to the conflict in the Pacific. The dire economic conditions of the
1930s made the policy of appeasement seem reasonable to western powers. Although
the orthodox view of appeasement was that Chamberlain was the “guiltiest of guilty
men” for following through with those ideas, later revisionist views have shown that
these policies were appropriate. Chamberlain was facing complex domestic economic
issues throughout this time period; for example, at this dangerous point along recovery,
most of the men serving in the army were actually in the reserve corps, so that if
Chamberlain was to activate these troops, British industry would be crippled. Balancing
economic issues was also crucial for the politically unstable French government, which
was trying to reconcile between different political factions. To prevent economic
meltdown, the French moved towards policies for increased defence, such as building
the Maginot line, rather than mobilising a large army that would consume resources
and deprive a delicate industrial system of its workers. Economic considerations were
therefore at the forefront of Britain and France’s foreign policy calculations at this time,
as the need for security needed to also be balanced with financial constraints.

Poor economic conditions in Germany were likewise the primary cause of

Hitler’s rise to power. The National Socialist Party was initially seen as an extremist
party during its founding. During the boom years of the 1920s, when German people
were better off economically and socially, Germany had no need for retaliation against
the Western powers. The Dawes Plan permitted continued economic growth, which
pacified the German people. Hitler was even imprisoned at this time for his actions in
the Beer Hall Putsch. However, the stock market crash of 1929 and the global depression
that came afterwards ended this peaceful era. Soon, the United States ended aid
provided by the Dawes Plan, which increased the financial burden on Germany. As
inflation rose and unemployment rose, common people began to again blame the Treaty
of Versailles; and as National Socialists promised full employment and an end to the
financial chaos, their support began to swelter among both the rural and urban
populations. The NSDAP’s political success during the Great Depression can be traced
through its increase from 2.63% share of the vote in 1928, to 15.62% in 1930, to 43.91% in
March 1933. Without the economic shock of the Wall Street Crash, the National Socialist
party would therefore not have found sufficient support among the public at large for
its radical nationalist solutions and criticisms of Versailles, which seemed befitting for a
country plunged into chaos due to its dependence on foreign loans.

The manipulation of economic sanctions by the United States on Japan was also
the primary cause of the war in the Pacific. Although Japan was already waging war in
China, that front was quickly reaching a stalemate. Japanese troops were stalled even as
the emperor needed more resources to maintain control. The US chose this time to
implement an oil and steel embargo, drastically threatening the future of the Japanese
empire. As a result, Japan became more opportunistic and looked to attack
resource-rich Southeast Asian countries and islands. There were plenty of crucial
resources, such as oil and rubber, to be found in French colonies, and the League of
Nations had already shown no resistance to its invasion of Manchuria. Thus, economic
tensions were the primary cause for the war in the Pacific as Japan attempted to carve
out its own self-sufficient empire independent of the Western powers who opposed
such an empire.

Orthodox interpretations placed a heavy emphasis on the ideological

motivations of both the Axis powers and the Western powers in the start of World War
II. In most United States propaganda films, the war was depicted as a fight between the
liberties of democracy against the terror of tyranny. However, Western powers entered
the war primarily because of economic and political tensions, not because of
irreparable ideological differences. To differentiate between two branches of
ideological conflict, there existed the clash between the democracies and fascist states
and the competing national brands of Hitler’s Nazism and Stalin’s Communism. While
the driving rhythm of national ideologies did play an important role in setting the
propaganda tone for the belligerent nations to mobilise their populations, at its core
the deterioration of economic interdependence and conflicting security interests drove
these countries into believing that war was the only recourse.

The United States existed in “golden isolation” during the interwar period and
was not ready to rearm solely because of ideological differences. Even as conditions in
Europe were deteriorating due to the lack of US involvement, Congress refused to
provide military forces or other types of support to stabilise Europe by passing the
Neutrality Acts. The US public was broadly against involvement in Europe’s affairs
during the 1930s and even opposed intervention following the outbreak of war in 1939
and the fall of France the following year. It was only the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour which gave US policymakers a pretext to intervene in both the European and
Pacific theatres; the narrative of an irreconcilable ideological conflict between
‘democracies’ and ‘fascism’ only then being used to drum up domestic support for the
war effort. It could be said on the other hand that ideology was an important factor in
German rearmament plans. Hitler’s National Socialist programme was built on the ideas
of Lebensraum and anti-Semitism that he expounded in Mein Kampf. Hitler justified his
military build-up on grounds of security and his long-term goal of incorporating ethnic
Germans into the Reich prior to expansion into Eastern Europe to secure ‘living space’.
These aims were, however, largely inherited from the German Empire pre-1918, which
had temporarily satisfied these aims through their victory over Russia in WW1, though
shorn of the more radical anti-Slav racial component. Mussolini likewise used the
iconography of the Roman Empire to justify his spheres of influence in the
Mediterranean, though had much less freedom of action when it came to achieving
these goals without German assistance. The Japanese version of a martial anti-Western
resistance, similarly the US, only became valid after the decision was taken to go to war.
Thus ideology played a supporting role in pushing states toward war but had an
important role once war broke out for domestic propaganda reasons.
To conclude, the primary short-term cause for war was the collapse of
inter-economic cooperation caused by the fallout of the Great Depression. This
simultaneously enabled the revisionist powers of Germany, Italy and Japan to challenge
the system of Western hegemony established in the post-WW1 era while weakening
those same Western powers’ means to form a collective front of resistance deemed
acceptable to their publics. The Great Depression destroyed economic cooperation and
political stability across the world, pushing states and their populations to look inward
to solve their national problems and influencing the Western powers to follow a
cautious policy of appeasement toward Germany. Britain and France held out the
possibility of revising the Treaty of Versailles, which Hitler held as necessary to
dismantle, thus limiting German ambitions, but failed both to so or to commit to strong
policy of enforcement and resistance. Britain in particular felt constrained to oppose
German actions and risk another costly war while its empire was in disarray, economic
recovery stunted, and forced by the isolation of the US to carry the global burden of
enforcing the League of Nations practically alone. Thus the onset of the global
depression combined with the weak structures and diminished leadership of the
post-WW1 order to breed a fertile ground upon which dangerous opportunism could
be greatly rewarded, leading to a series of international crises that challenged the fabric
of Western power Versailles had attempted to enshrine.