Wa0004.

A PROJECT OF ICEP CSS INSTITUTE
The
INSIGHTFUL
A must-read Compilation for CSS/PMS Aspirants featuring :

 25 Plus Comprehensive Book Summaries
 Refined Content for English Essay
 Research articles for CSS Current Affairs/Pakistan Affairs
DR.AAMIR AYOUB
M.PHIL. SCHOLAR (GOLD MEDALIST) | PMS-12
AVAILABLE AT : ICEP CSS INSTITUTE | 22-B ALI BLOCK NEW GARDEN TOWN LAHORE
THE INSIGHTFUL CHRONICLES BY DR. AAMIR AYOUB
ICEP CSS/PMS INSTITUTE / 0322-2077774
The Insightful Chronicles

A Demystifying Approach to master the art of Essay
Writing while concurrently discerning valuable content
For both optional and compulsory subjects in CSS and PMS/PCS.
Compiled and Curated By:

DR. AAMIR AYOUB
M.Phil. Scholar (Gold Medalist) | PMS-12
First Edition: February 2024

A PROJECT OF:
ICEP CSS/PMS INSTITUTE
The right of Dr. Aamir Ayoub to be identified as the author/compiler/curator of this book,
"The Insightful Chronicles," has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or
by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior
written permission of the author and ICEP CSS/PMS Institute management, except in the case of brief Quotations
embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.
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The INSIGHTFUL CHRONICLES

Foreword
Embarking on the journey of competitive examinations, particularly
the Civil Services Examination (CSS), requires more than just academic
prowess; it demands a profound understanding of diverse subjects, a
keen analytical mind, and effective communication skills. Aspirants often
find themselves navigating through a vast sea of information, searching
for the right resources to sharpen their intellect and articulate their
thoughts effectively. It is in this quest for knowledge that this compilation
unfolds—an anthology meticulously curated to be your companion on
the arduous yet rewarding path to success in CSS.
The inclusion of book summaries and reviews further enriches this
compilation, recognizing the importance of a holistic approach to
knowledge acquisition. In a world inundated with information, the ability
to distill key ideas from voluminous texts is a skill that sets apart suc-
cessful aspirants. This section, therefore, serves as a valuable resource,
enabling aspirants to comprehend complex subjects with ease and of-
fering critical insights that can be a game-changer in the examination
hall.
As you embark on this literary journey, may this compilation be
more than just a book; may it be your companion, mentor, and guide.
Wishing you success in your endeavors,
DR. AAMIR AYOUB
M.Phil Scholar (Gold Medalist)
CSS/PMS Mentor
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Dedication
In the process of compiling this extensive guide for CSS aspirants, I feel
compelled to express my profound gratitude to my steadfast support system, my
parents,
M. Ayoub and Zahida Ayoub.
Their continuous encouragement, sacrifices, and unwavering belief in my abilities
have been the cornerstone of my educational journey. As I write these words, I am
deeply aware that their support has not only shaped my academic path but has
also fueled the motivation that led me to create this comprehensive resource. I am
equally grateful to my mentors whose wisdom and guidance have been the com-
pass guiding my academic journey. I would extend my deepest regards for Sir
Majid Ameer Sahib for his endless support through the platform of ICEP CSS
Institute for the wise counsel and unshakeable confidence in my potential that not
only strengthened my academic pursuits but also instilled in me a sense of deter-
mination and reinforced my commitment to empowering others through knowledge
sharing. The decision to dedicate this book to the community of aspirants striving
for civil services stems from a deep understanding of the challenges and aspira-
tions that define this demanding journey. As I reflect on the countless hours of
research, careful planning, and thorough compilation invested in this work, I am
keenly aware of the shared struggles and aspirations that bind us. This dedication
is not merely symbolic; it is a testament to the collective pursuit of knowledge and
the joint effort to overcome the barriers of competition and strive for excellence.
For every aspirant embarking on the challenging path of civil services, this book is
an offering—an offering of knowledge, guidance, and inspiration. It reflects the re-
silience and determination required to navigate the intricate landscape of CSS ex-
aminations. Through these pages, I aim to empower aspirants with the tools nec-
essary to overcome academic challenges, foster critical thinking, and develop a
comprehensive understanding of the subjects within the CSS syllabus. Each chap-
ter is a result of meticulous research and dedication aimed at providing a compre-
hensive and insightful resource that goes beyond traditional academic texts. Fur-
thermore, this dedication extends to the numerous individuals who have, directly
or indirectly, contributed to this endeavor. From mentors and teachers to friends
and family, every interaction, conversation, and piece of advice has played a piv-
otal role in shaping the content and ethos of this book.
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Contents
Sr. No Title Page
SECTION-I : MASTERING THE ART OF ESSAY WRITING
1 FPSC EXAMINER REPORT 7
2 DECODING THE PHILOSOPHY OF ENGLISH ESSAY 10
3 CSS/PMS ESSAY STRUCTURE 12
4 CURATED SAMPLE ESSAYS 20
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: ATTENTION GRABBERS 32
OVER DOMINANCE OF TECHNOLOGY 36
SECTION-II : COMPREHENSIVE CONTENT FOR COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION
BOOK SUMMARIES
5 21 LESSONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY BY YUVAL NOAH HARARI 49
6 HOMO DEUS BY YUVAL NOAH HARARI 64
7 THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH BY DAVID WALLACE-WELLS 66
8 LOSING EARTH BY NATHANIEL RICH 68
9 HOW TO AVOID CLIMATE DISASTER BY BILL GATES 70
10 A NEW CULTURE OF LEARNING BY THOMAS & BROWN 73
11 THE GREAT DELUSION BY JOHN MEARSHEIMER 75
12 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS BY JOHN MEARSHEIMER 82
13 PRISONERS OF GEOGRAPHY BY TIM MARSHALL 93
14 PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY BY ABDUL SATTAR 98
15 WHY NATIONS FAIL BY DARON ACEMOGLU AND JAMES.ROBINSON 101
16 PAKISTAN BEYOND THE CRISIS STATE BY MALEEHA LODHI 114
17 GOVERNING THE UNGOVERNABLE BY ISHRAT HUSSAIN 156
18 SOFT POWER BY JOSEPH NYE 176
19 ISSUES IN PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY BY S. AKBAR ZAIDI 179
20 PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK BY RASHID AHMAD 184
21 CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN 187
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22 PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION 215

23 WORLD ORDER BY HENRY KESSINGER 219
24 THE ANARCHY BY WILLIAN DALRYMPLE 226
25 INGLORIOUS EMPIRE BY SHASHI THAROOR 231
26 THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN BY STEPHEN. P. COHEN 240
27 THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN BY STEPHEN. P. COHEN 252
28 CHINA-PAKISTAN AXIS BY ANDREW SMALL 254
SECTION-III: NEWS ARTICLES FOR CSS CURRENT AFFAIRS
29 DEGLOBALIZATION & REGIONALISM 259
30 RISE OF INDIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN 261
31 BRICS EXPANSION & ITS IMPLICATIONS. 264
32 IS BRICS EXPANSION A HARBINGER OF NEW COLD WAR? 271
33 PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC WOES AND WATER CRISIS 281
34 THE NEXT GLOBAL WAR 297
35 CLIMATE VULNERABILITY OF PAKISTAN & CLIMATE JUSTICE 301
SECTION-IV: MISCELLANEOUS
36 FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN 308
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SECTION-I:
UNDERSTANDING CSS ENGLISH ESSAY
 DECIPHERING FPSC EXAMINER REPORT
 EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF ESSAY
 ILLUSTRATING COMPONENTS OF ESSAY
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FPSC EXAMINER REPORT

For facilitation and guidance of the CSS aspirants, some highly reputed educa-
tionists/examiners were asked to share opinions regarding what is expected of a
good essay and what mistakes are to be avoided. Some of the guidelines pro-
vided by these experts are reproduced in the next paras. It should be noted that
these observations/assertions are views of the individual educationists and not
the official prescription of FPSC. It is the sole discretion of the candidate to follow
these guidelines. The same cannot be quoted as a set of standard at any forum.
Subject Expert/Examiner - I
 Proper beginning with a compact and elaborated topic sentence that must
reflect the candidates clear understanding of the topic.
 Correct and flawless language.
 Use of appropriate vocabulary
 Literacy and idiomatic expression
 Use of relevant terminology if needed
 Selection of relevant thoughts
 Logical organization of ideas.
 Coherence in arrangement of material/paragraphs
 Cohesion in development of argument reaching the conclusion
 Clarity in language, ideas, debate and finish.
 Comprehensiveness
 Logical presentation of the argument
 Standard sizing as per requirement
 Avoidance of too much scholarship
 Through acquaintance with the nature of question i.e topic
 Quotation, when used, must be well placed and relevant
 Impressive finish
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Subject Expert/Examiner - II
 A good essay is not supposed to reflect crammed information or bookish
knowledge about the topic. It should rather tell us about the writer’s per-
sonal feelings or thoughts about it, and his ability to convert these feelings
and thoughts into arguments for convincing the readers.
 It should be self-contained and self-explanatory not depending on any out-
side source for its essential comprehension.
 Its basic stance should be creative, critical and analytical rather than narra-
tive or descriptive.
 It should contain a unified and coherent discussion on a particular topic
(strictly in accordance with the wording of the title), with no digression or
overshadowing.
 It should work through establishing the writer’s personal stand about the
subject, and substantiating that stand with convincing arguments.
 It should be compact and concise, with no loose constructions or unneces-
sary attachments.
 It should have a balanced body, with a beginning, middle and end-each
one serving its own distinct purpose.
 It should work as a unit of impression in the sense that the impact of the
beginning is still fresh when the reader reaches the end.
 It should be a fluent text with natural linkage among parts and paragraphs,
with no disjointed or segregated parts.
Subject Expert/Examiner III
 Relevance
 Structure
 How to handle an argument or to be argumentative
 Counter-viewing the argument
 Avoid superfluity
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 English – figurative and metaphoric

 How to pitch your bias
 How to avoid spurious ideas
 How to show difference between specific and general ideas
 Paragraph transition (most important)
Subject Expert/Examiner IV
 Answer the exact inquiry set, instead of displaying data that is
Comprehensively important to the theme.
 Have a reasonable contention or point of view, so the examiner knows from
the start what the candidate means to state, and can follow the advance-
ment of his/her contention all through the easy.
 Be critical and analytical clarifying why something is critical, instead of basi-
cally depicting what scholars have said.
 Provide reasons, in view of sound proof, to help the primary contention.
 Have good paragraphing, the primary concern of each passage is pre-
sented unmistakably, and sections pursue sensibly from one another.
 Evaluate alternate point of view, it weighs up the relative worth or im-
portance of various perspectives or speculations, assessing the key con-
tentions and proof for these, and clarifying why one lot of contentions, rea-
sons or proof is more persuading than others.
 Refer to speculations and ways of thinking important to the inquiry, showing
a comprehension of the criticalness of these to the subject.
 Include references where applicable, careful references (names and
dates).
 Be particular, it incorporates only the data and detail that is most applicable
to responding to the inquiry, and forgets about less important material.
 Be composed unmistakably and to the point, without waffle, reiteration, stu-
pendous speculations, bombastic language, superfluous language, or indi-
vidual tales.
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DECODING FPSC EXAMINER REPORT

Candidates are expected to reflect comprehensive and research-based knowledge on a selected
topic. Candidate’s articulation, expression and technical treatment of the style of English Essay
writing will be examined.
1. Topic Understanding:
 Demonstration of Understanding: The candidate should show a clear grasp of
the chosen topic. This involves identifying demand of essay, key concepts, issues,
and themes related to the subject.
2. Research Incorporation:
 Evidence from Research: Candidates are expected to support their arguments
with credible sources. This includes incorporating relevant data, facts, and quota-
tions from reputable research to strengthen their points.
3. Articulation and Expression:
 Clarity of Thought: Candidates should express their ideas in a clear and logical
manner. Articulation involves the ability to communicate thoughts effectively, en-
suring that the reader can easily follow the essay's flow.
 Coherent Structure: The essay should have a well-organized structure with an
introduction, body, and conclusion. Paragraphs should transition smoothly, creat-
ing a cohesive and coherent piece.
4. Language Style:
 Appropriate Language: The candidate is expected to use language that is suita-
ble for an academic essay. This involves avoiding slang and ensuring the tone is
formal and professional.
 Vocabulary Usage: Effective use of vocabulary demonstrates a strong command
of the English language. Candidates should choose words carefully to convey pre-
cise meanings and enhance the overall quality of the essay.
5. Technical Treatment:
 Grammar and Syntax: Candidates will be evaluated on their use of grammar and
syntax. Proper sentence structure, punctuation, and grammar contribute to the
overall readability and professionalism of the essay.
 Citation and Referencing: Accurate citation of sources is crucial. Candidates
should follow the specified citation style (such as APA, MLA, or Chicago) and pro-
vide proper references for all external information used.
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6. Critical Analysis:
 Depth of Analysis: The candidate's ability to critically analyze the topic is essen-
tial. This involves going beyond surface-level discussions and delving into the nu-
ances and complexities of the subject matter.
 Balanced Perspective: A well-rounded essay considers different perspectives on
the topic, acknowledging counterarguments and presenting a balanced viewpoint.
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CSS/PMS ESSAY STRUCTURE
Demand Content
of Topic
Structure
1. Demand of Topic:
Expository Essay:
 Clearly explain the chosen topic with a structured and informative approach.
 Provide in-depth details and insights.
 Ensure the information is accurate and relevant to the topic.
 Undertake information based exploration of the topic.
 In case of bifurcation of the topic into two or more areas using a column or
coordinating conjunction, carefully decipher the demand of the topic. The pre
column section should be given minimal coverage i: e, 5% and a substantial
part of discussion should be based on the post column section or the corre-
lation between the both. In case of coordinating conjunction, both the sec-
tions of the topic should be discussed comprehensively.
Persuasive Essay:
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 Clearly state and defend a specific position on a topic with pre-defined

stance.
 Use compelling arguments and evidence to persuade the audience.
 Address opposing viewpoints and anticipate counterarguments.
Argumentative Essay:
 Clearly define and take a stance on a debatable issue.
 Provide strong evidence and logical reasoning to support the argument.
 Acknowledge and counter opposing perspectives to strengthen the overall
position.
 The ideal approach is to follow a Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis structure.
Literary Essay:
 Analyze and interpret a specific aspect of a literary topic.
 Support interpretations with evidence from diverse discourses.
 Consider the broader literary context and apply relevant literary theories if
applicable.
Structuring an Essay:
An English Essay follows a very organized structure including an outline, an intro-
duction, a body section and finally a conclusion.
Outline:
 It should be organized in different sections including main headers and sub
headers.
 A good outline gives a very uniform outlook curated in either the phrase form
or the sentence form. Mixing the both form should be avoided.
 The main headers in the outline reflecting a specific idea should be neither
overly generalized nor overly narrowed. Facts/data should not be inculcated
in the main header, rather it should have a clear statement/phrase that can
be validated through any form of supporting detail in the sub header.
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 Parallelism should be reflected in all the sub headers contributing to the over-
all uniformity.
 The ideas presented in the outline should follow a logical sequence.
 The whole outline should be articulated like a cohesive body of ideas.
 It is a good practice to inculcate case in points/supporting data along with a
sub header to substantiate the given statement.
 All the ideas presented in an outline should be concise and comprehensive.
One word header/sub header in an outline is a lethal blunder for an aspirant.
 The outline should obey the principle of Completeness. The important ideas
pertinent to an essay paradigm should not be skipped or overshadowed by
least important ideas.
 The given essay topic should be deciphered in a nuanced manner. Analysis
should be incorporated by exploring multiple dimensions of the topic includ-
ing social, political, economic and legal etc. and discussing a multi-layered
approach including individual, societal, national and global.
Paragraphs:
A paragraph is a group of related sentences that discuss one (and usually only
one) main idea. The paragraph can be as short as one sentence or as long as ten
sentences. The number of sentences is unimportant; however, the paragraph
should be long enough to develop the main idea clearly. All paragraphs have a
topic sentence, supporting sentences, and a concluding sentence. The topic
sentence states the main idea of the paragraph. It not only names the topic of
the paragraph, but it also limits the topic to one specific area that can be discussed
completely in the space of a single paragraph. The part of the topic sentence that
announces the specific area to be discussed is called the controlling idea. Sup-
porting sentences develop the topic sentence. That is, they explain or prove the
topic sentence by giving more information about it. The concluding sentence sig-
nals the end of the paragraph and leaves the reader with important points to re-
member.
Topic Sentence:
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A topic sentence is the most important sentence in a paragraph. It briefly indicates

what the paragraph is going to discuss. For this reason, the topic sentence is a
helpful guide to both the writer and the reader.
 A topic sentence is a complete sentence; that is, it contains at least one sub-
ject and one verb.
 A topic sentence contains both a topic and a controlling idea. It names the
topic and then limits the topic to a specific area to be discussed in the space
of a single paragraph.
 A topic sentence is the most general statement in the paragraph because it
gives only the main idea. It does not give any specific details.
Supporting Sentences:
Supporting sentences explain or prove the topic sentence. One of the biggest prob-
lems in student writing is that student writers often fail to support their ideas ade-
quately. They need to use specific details to be thorough and convincing. There
are several kinds of specific supporting details: examples, facts, statistics, and
quotations. Examples are the easiest kind of supporting detail to use. Words and
phrases that introduce examples include for example, for instance, and such as.
Concluding Sentences:
A concluding sentence serves two purposes:
 It signals the end of the paragraph.
 It leaves the reader with the most important ideas to remember. It can do this
in two ways:
1. By summarizing the main points of the paragraph
2. By repeating the topic sentence in different words
End-of-Paragraph Signals Followed by a Comma:
Finally, in brief, in conclusion, indeed, in short, lastly, therefore, Thus, to sum up.
End-of-Paragraph Signals Not Followed by a Comma:
 The evidence suggests that
 There can be no doubt that.
 These examples show that.
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Introductory Paragraph:
An introductory paragraph has two parts, general statements and the thesis
statement. General statements introduce the general topic of the essay and cap-
ture the reader's interest. They give a reflection of the main ideas presented in
the outline. Explanation/ description of an idea is never given in introductory para-
graph. The Thesis Statement:
• states the specific topic.
• may list subtopics or subdivisions of the main topic or subtopics.
• may indicate the pattern of organization of the essay.
• is normally the last sentence in the introductory paragraph.
Funnel Introduction:
The introductory paragraph of a literary essay is a funnel introduction. This intro-
duction is so called because it is shaped like a funnel-wide at the top and narrow
at the bottom. It begins with one or two very general sentences about the topic.
Each subsequent sentence becomes increasingly focused on the topic until the
last sentence, which states very specifically what the essay will be about.
Attention Grabbing Introduction:
An attention grabber, also known as a hook, is a compelling and engaging element
placed at the beginning of an introduction to capture the reader's interest. It should
seamlessly lead into the thesis statement and the main content of the essay. The
effectiveness of an attention grabber depends on its relevance to the topic. Its
purpose is to draw readers into the essay and make them want to continue reading.
Here are some common types of attention grabbers:
1. Anecdote:
 Start with a short and relevant story or anecdote that connects to the
essay topic. It personalizes the introduction and makes it more relata-
ble.
2. Question:
 Pose a thought-provoking question related to the essay topic. This en-
courages readers to reflect and consider the subject matter.
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3. Quotation:
 Begin with a powerful quote that is relevant to the essay's theme.
Quotes from notable figures or literary works can be particularly effec-
tive.
4. Statistic or Fact:
 Present a surprising or intriguing statistic or fact that relates to the
topic. This can create a sense of curiosity and set the stage for the
essay's discussion.
5. Contrast or Contradiction:
 Highlight a surprising contrast or contradiction related to the topic. This
can pique the reader's interest by presenting something unexpected.
6. Description:
 Paint a vivid picture or use descriptive language to create a scene that
relates to the essay's subject. This helps engage the reader's senses.
7. Humor:
 Introduce a touch of humor, if appropriate for the tone of the essay. A
well-placed joke or witty remark can capture attention and create a
positive impression.
8. Rhetorical Question:
 Pose a rhetorical question that prompts readers to consider the essay's
main idea. This encourages active thought engagement.
9. Startling Statement:
 Begin with a bold or startling statement that challenges common as-
sumptions or perceptions. This can immediately grab attention by cre-
ating a sense of intrigue.
The Concluding Paragraph

The concluding paragraph in an essay serves to bring closure to the discussion
and leave a lasting impression on the reader. Here are key elements to include in
a concluding paragraph:
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1. Restate the Thesis:

 Summarize the main point or thesis statement from the introduction.
However, do so in a way that avoids simple repetition. Provide a fresh
perspective or insight.
2. Summarize Key Points:
 Recap the main arguments or key points presented in the body of the
essay. Concisely remind the reader of the central ideas discussed
throughout the essay.
3. Offer a Resolution or Conclusion:
 If the essay presented a problem or explored a question, provide a
resolution or a conclusive statement. This helps give the reader a
sense of closure.
4. Connect to the Introduction:
 Relate back to the attention grabber or anecdote used in the introduc-
tion. This connection reinforces the unity of the essay and provides a
sense of completeness.
5. Provide a Call to Action (if applicable):
 If the essay has implications for action or future consideration, offer a
call to action. Encourage the reader to think, reflect, or take a specific
step based on the essay's content.
6. Offer a Broad Insight or Implication:
 Expand the discussion by offering a broader insight or implication re-
lated to the essay's theme. Consider the broader context or real-world
applications of the topic.
7. End with a Memorable Statement:
 Conclude with a memorable and impactful statement that leaves a last-
ing impression. This can be a thought-provoking quote, a powerful
idea, or a reflection on the broader significance of the essay's content.
8. Maintain a Consistent Tone:
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 Ensure that the tone of the conclusion is consistent with the overall
tone of the essay. If the essay has been formal and academic, the con-
clusion should maintain that tone.
9. Avoid Introducing New Information:
The conclusion is not the place to introduce new arguments or information. Keep
the focus on summarizing and synthesizing existing content.
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SAMPLE ESSAYS FOR CSS/PMS

Globalization: The end of austerity
Outline:
1. Introduction
2. Deciphering the term “globalization”
3. Illustrating correlation between globalization and austerity
4. Globalization and subsequent end of austerity
At individual level:
a) Increased access to quality education and digital literacy
b) Expedited Skills acquisition and specialization
c) Higher Human Capital and enhanced employment opportunities
d) Potential reduction in personal financial constraints
At Society Level:
a) Thriving entrepreneurial environment contributing to more competitive
workforce
b) Increased social mobility by exploiting the emerging economic
Avenues
c) Enhanced distribution of wealth in the society alleviating Societal
Burden
d) Increased Social Capital through technology driven social connectivity
At State level:
a) Unrestricted access to global markets and economic growth
b) Enhanced economic activities through capital flows
c) Accelerated resource mobilization through transfer of Extraction technol-
ogy
d) Stimulated revenue generation through diverse economic ventures
5. Illustrating the role of Globalization in ending Austerity
a) Case study of China: Opening up to global market and lifting millions out
of poverty through export led growth
b) Case study of India: Economic Liberalization and incorporation into Glob-
alized market bringing prosperity and sustainable economic growth
6. Impacts of End of Austerity:
a) Increased government spending and investment
b) Improved Social services and progressive taxation
c) Enhanced infrastructure development and economic opportunities
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7. Conclusion
Introduction:
“In the tug-of-war between tightening budgets and embracing global possibilities, the scales are
tipping. Austerity, once seen as the remedy, now faces a formidable challenger — globalization.”
Verily, in a world that is no longer bound by borders but connected
by shared destinies, the symphony of globalization plays a tune that ech-
oes across continents. This seismic shift, with its far-reaching implica-
tions, raises a question: Can globalization mark the end of austerity? In
the annals of economic discourse, austerity has long been considered a
necessary prescription for financial malaise, prompting nations to tighten
fiscal belts in the face of economic uncertainty. The decision by states
to end austerity in the wake of globalization is often rooted in a recogni-
tion of the positive outcomes associated with global phenomenon
yielded at the individual, societal, and state levels. Globalization opens
doors to expanded economic opportunities. At individual level it provides
access to quality education and digital literacy contributing to a higher
skilled workforce. Similarly, the globalization promotes social mobility by
creating opportunities for individuals to explore emerging economic av-
enues. In the same manner, the participation of states in the global mar-
ket allows for diversification, attracting foreign investments, and foster-
ing economic growth. Witnessing the economic transformation through
exploration of case studies of China and India, a gaze is casted on the
impacts of the end of austerity in the form of increased government
spending, improved social services, and enhanced economic opportuni-
ties. As states recognize the positive outcomes of globalization on the individual, societal, and state levels—
ranging from increased economic opportunities and enhanced human capital to thriving entrepreneurial
environments—they increasingly pivot away from austerity measures.
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Body Paragraph:
Increased access to quality education and digital literacy, facilitated by globalization,
has the potential to mark the end of austerity at the individual level (Topic Sentence). Glob-
alization has dismantled geographical barriers, allowing individuals to access educational
resources and information from around the world. As people gain access to quality educa-
tion, they acquire the skills and knowledge necessary for the modern workforce. Digital
literacy further enhances their ability to navigate the digital landscape, fostering adaptabil-
ity and a deeper understanding of technological advancements. Empowered with education
and digital skills, individuals can pursue diverse opportunities, tapping into a global job
market and contributing to economic growth. Moreover, the knowledge economy rewards
innovation and creativity, providing a pathway for individuals to enhance their economic
well-being. In short, when individuals become more economically empowered, there is a
potential shift away from austerity measures at the personal level.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the intricate relationship between globalization and the end of aus-
terity, examined at individual, societal, and state levels, underscores the transform-
ative power of global interconnectedness. At the individual level, increased access
to quality education and digital literacy serves as a catalyst, breaking the shackles
of austerity by providing avenues for skill acquisition and specialization. This, in
turn, leads to a higher human capital, offering enhanced employment opportunities
and potentially reducing personal financial constraints. Societal benefits manifest
through a thriving entrepreneurial environment, increased social mobility, and the
distribution of wealth, alleviating societal burdens. At the state level, globalization
allows unrestricted access to global markets, stimulating economic growth, en-
hancing economic activities, and accelerating resource mobilization through the
transfer of extraction technology. Examining case studies, such as China's remark-
able lift out of poverty and India's sustainable economic growth, further exemplifies
how embracing globalization can result in widespread prosperity. The end of aus-
terity brings about positive impacts, including increased government spending and
investment, improved social services, progressive taxation, and enhanced infra-
structure development, thereby fostering economic opportunities. Embracing glob-
alization appears not only as a pathway towards ending austerity but as a para-
digm shift, laying the foundation for a more interconnected, inclusive, and econom-
ically vibrant world.
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The lethal challenges associated with AI must not be overshad-

owed by its potential prospects
Outline:
1. Introduction
2. Potential Prospects of AI:
a. Increased efficiency and productivity
Case in Point: Hyper-personalized marketing through AI
b. Innovation and technological advancements

Case in Point: AI powered automatic tractors in agriculture
c. Automation of repetitive tasks

Case in Point: Customer service chatbots addressing FAQs
d. Improving decision-making processes

Case in Point: AI powered security risk assessment and decision making
e. Enhancing the capacity of Professional Sectors

Case in Point: Diagnosis and treatment plan formulations in healthcare using AI
3. Challenges Associated with AI

3.1. Lack of transparency and explainability
a. Bias in AI algorithms
b. Lack of transparency in decision-making
c. Privacy and data security issues
3.2. Negative Impact on Employment
a. Job displacement and automation anxiety

b. Need for upskilling and reskilling
c. Socioeconomic inequality and job market shifts
3.3. Concerns for Accountability and Responsibility
a. Legal and ethical frameworks for AI

b. Challenges in assigning responsibility for AI decisions
c. Potential misuse and unintended consequences
3.4. Security Risks
a. Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities

b. Malicious use of AI in cyber attacks
3.4. Social and Psychological Impacts
a. Negative Impact on human relationships and social dynamics

23 | P a g e
b. Distressing Psychological effects of increased reliance on AI

3.5. Balancing Prospects and Challenges
a. Need for comprehensive regulations and guidelines

b. Transparency and explainability in AI systems
c. Investing in education and skills development
d. Collaborative efforts between governments, industries, and academia
e. Ethical AI development and responsible deployment
v. Conclusion
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Introduction:
In the current era of rapid technological advancements, Artificial Intelligence
(AI) stands out as a transformative force with significant promises. The potential
benefits, such as increased efficiency, innovative breakthroughs, and the automa-
tion of repetitive tasks, have positioned AI at the forefront of technological pro-
gress. From hyper-personalized marketing to AI-driven agriculture, the potentials
seem boundless. However, this narrative is nuanced, for within the intricacies of
AI lie challenges demanding keen attention. Transparency, employment shifts, ac-
countability, security risks, and socio-psychological impacts form the complex tap-
estry of concerns. Navigating this terrain is paramount to ensure the responsible
integration of AI. Delving into specific cases, including customer service chatbots
and AI-powered risk assessment, the juxtaposition of promises and challenges be-
comes evident. This essay seeks to explore this intricate balance, transcending
the binary of optimism and skepticism. Comprehensive regulations, transparency,
education, and ethical considerations form the pillars of responsible AI integration,
fostering a landscape where potential prospects harmonize with ethical safe-
guards. The promises of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in enhancing efficiency and in-
novation are compelling, yet its challenges, including transparency issues, employ-
ment concerns, and socio-psychological impacts, must not be overlooked. It is im-
perative to consider comprehensive regulations, transparency measures, and eth-
ical considerations for responsible AI integration.
Body Paragraph:
The potential prospect of increased efficiency and productivity stands as a
hallmark of Artificial Intelligence. Through advanced algorithms and machine learn-
ing capabilities, AI systems can analyze vast datasets, make data-driven deci-
sions, and execute tasks at remarkable speeds. For instance, in industries such
as manufacturing and logistics, AI-powered automation leads to optimized produc-
tion processes and streamlined supply chain management. This increased effi-
ciency not only accelerates operational timelines but also reduces errors, contrib-
uting to enhanced overall productivity. As organizations increasingly integrate AI
into their workflows, the potential for significant improvements in efficiency be-
comes a driving force for innovation and economic growth. Hence, AI has a poten-
tial to stimulate productivity promising transformative effects on operational pro-
cesses and overall output.
25 | P a g e
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the intricate exploration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) reveals a
landscape teeming with both promise and challenge. From the potential for in-
creased efficiency to the nuanced concerns of transparency and employment im-
pacts, AI shapes our technological future. Striking a delicate balance between har-
nessing its transformative capabilities and navigating ethical considerations is par-
amount. By considering specific cases and advocating for comprehensive regula-
tions, transparency, education, and ethical frameworks, a viable framework can be
laid for responsible AI integration. Hence, in the evolving technological terrain, the
imperative is clear; a future where AI's potential prospects harmonize with ethical
safeguards, ensuring the ethical deployment of these transformative technologies.
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Gender Empowerment: A plight with no expiry date

Outline:
1. Introduction
2. Deciphering the concept “Gender Empowerment”
3. Historical Perspective on Gender Inequality:
a. Evolution of women's rights movements
b. Persistent challenges and systemic barriers
4. An Illustration of Plight of Gender Empowerment in Contemporary era:
a. Gender pay gap and workplace inequality
b. Lack of representation in leadership roles
c. Gender-based violence and discrimination
d. Cultural and societal norms reinforcing gender stereotypes
5. Intersectionality in Gender Empowerment:
a. Overlapping challenges faced by women of different races, classes, and

backgrounds
b. Recognizing and addressing the unique struggles of marginalized groups
within the broader gender empowerment narrative
6. Challenges in Achieving Sustainable Gender Empowerment:

a. Resistance to change and patriarchal structures
b. Gaps in education and healthcare affecting gender empowerment
c. Role of media and societal attitudes in perpetuating gender stereotypes
7. Recommendations to address the plight of Gender Empowerment:

a. Implementation of educational programs and awareness campaigns to
challenge traditional gender roles and promote inclusivity.
b. Facilitation for community engagement initiatives to address cultural norms
that perpetuate gender inequality.
c. Implementation media literacy programs to empower individuals to critically
analyze and challenge harmful gender stereotypes in media content.
d. Development of healthcare initiatives addressing specific gender-related
health issues and ensuring affordable and accessible healthcare services
for all
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8. Conclusion
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Introduction:
In the relentless pursuit of gender empowerment, the struggle unfolds as an
enduring narrative, one that transcends epochs and societal shifts. The concept of
"Gender Empowerment" stands as a beacon in the quest for equality, a term that
encapsulates not only the acknowledgment of disparities but the collective en-
deavor to dismantle systemic barriers. A peep into the historical panorama of wom-
en's rights movements unravels both milestones and lingering challenges that at-
test to the persistent nature of the gender empowerment plight. The contemporary
era mirrors this struggle, marked by a gender pay gap, underrepresentation in
leadership, and deeply ingrained stereotypes. Unveiling the intersectionality inher-
ent in this narrative gives a stark recognition of the compounded challenges faced
by women of diverse backgrounds. Yet, the challenges persist in the form of re-
sistance to change, educational and healthcare gaps, and the perpetuation of ste-
reotypes through media and societal attitudes. The plight of gender empowerment,
symbolized by a gender pay gap, underrepresentation, and entrenched stereo-
types, demands a nuanced understanding. By exploring intersectionality and pro-
posing targeted recommendations against enduring challenges and systemic bar-
riers, this essay underscores the imperative for sustained efforts to dismantle pa-
triarchal structures and foster inclusivity.
Body Paragraph:
In the contemporary era, the persistence of the gender pay gap and work-
place inequality serves as a stark illustration of the ongoing challenges in achieving
gender empowerment. The gender pay gap not only reflects economic inequality
but also underscores systemic issues within workplaces. Women, on average,
earn less for the same work, contributing to financial imbalances and perpetuating
gender-based economic disparities. For instance, a study conducted by Pew Re-
search Institute, revealed that women, on average, earn approximately 82 cents
for every dollar earned by men for the same job roles. This substantial gap not only
underscores economic disparities but also exposes systemic issues within work-
places. Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive measures, including
pay transparency, equal opportunity initiatives, and dismantling ingrained gender
biases to foster workplaces where gender empowerment is not just a goal but a
tangible reality.
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Conclusion:
In conclusion, the exploration of gender empowerment's historical evolution
and contemporary challenges illuminates a narrative that refuses to be constrained
by the passage of time. As the concept is deciphered, historical perspectives re-
veal a dual trajectory of progress and enduring systemic obstacles. Examining
contemporary challenges, particularly the gender pay gap and workplace inequal-
ity, underscores the pressing need for transformative change. Case studies em-
phasize the stark realities faced by women, revealing undeniable disparities in
earnings and representation. The intersectionality in gender empowerment further
highlights the compounded challenges faced by diverse groups. Despite these ob-
stacles, targeted recommendations offer a beacon of hope in dismantling patriar-
chal structures and fostering inclusivity. The call to implement educational pro-
grams, address healthcare and educational gaps, challenge societal attitudes, and
promote inclusivity underscores the imperative of sustained efforts for a future
where the expiration date on the plight of gender empowerment is replaced with a
narrative of equality, diversity, and empowerment for all.
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SECTION.2
COMPREHENSIVE BOOK SUMMARIES AND ARTICLES FOR
 CSS/PMS ENGLISH ESSAY
 CSS CURRENT AFFAIRS
 CSS PAKISTAN AFFAIRS
 CSS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 CSS POLITICAL SCIENCE
 CSS SOCIOLOGY
 PMS PAKISTAN STUDIES
 CSS INDOPAK HISTORY
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QUOTATIONS & ATTENTION GRABBERS

TECHNOLOGY
“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human
race….It would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever increasing rate.
Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would
be superseded.”
— Stephen Hawking told the BBC
“I visualise a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to humans, and I’m
rooting for the machines.”
—Claude Shannon
“Artificial intelligence would be the ultimate version of Google. The ultimate search
engine that would understand everything on the web. It would understand exactly
what you wanted, and it would give you the right thing. We’re nowhere near doing
that now. However, we can get incrementally closer to that, and that is basically
what we work on.”
—Larry Page
“The pace of progress in artificial intelligence (I’m not referring to narrow AI) is
incredibly fast. Unless you have direct exposure to groups like Deep mind, you
have no idea how fast—it is growing at a pace close to exponential. The risk of
something seriously dangerous happening is in the five-year time frame. 10 years
at most.”
—Elon Musk wrote in a comment on Edge.org
“The upheavals [of artificial intelligence] can escalate quickly and become scarier
and even cataclysmic. Imagine how a medical robot, originally programmed to rid
cancer, could conclude that the best way to obliterate cancer is to exterminate
humans who are genetically prone to the disease.”
— Nick Bilton, tech columnist wrote in the New York Times
“I don’t want to really scare you, but it was alarming how many people I talked to
who are highly placed people in AI who have retreats that are sort of ‘bug out’
houses, to which they could flee if it all hits the fan.”
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—James Barrat, author of Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of
the Human Era, told the Washington Post
“I’m increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight,
maybe at the national and international level, just to make sure that we don’t do
something very foolish. I mean with artificial intelligence we’re summoning the de-
mon.”
—Elon Musk warned at MIT’s AeroAstro Centennial Symposium
“The real question is, when will we draft an artificial intelligence bill of rights? What
will that consist of? And who will get to decide that?”
—Gray Scott
“We must address, individually and collectively, moral and ethical issues raised by
cutting-edge research in artificial intelligence and biotechnology, which will enable
significant life extension, designer babies, and memory extraction.”
—Klaus Schwab
“Some people call this artificial intelligence, but the reality is this technology will
enhance us. So instead of artificial intelligence, I think we’ll augment our intelli-
gence.”
—Ginni Rometty
“I’m more frightened than interested by artificial intelligence – in fact, perhaps fright
and interest are not far away from one another. Things can become real in your
mind, you can be tricked, and you believe things you wouldn’t ordinarily. A world
run by automatons doesn’t seem completely unrealistic anymore. It’s a bit chilling.”
—Gemma Whelan
“You have to talk about ‘The Terminator’ if you’re talking about artificial intelligence.
I actually think that that’s way off. I don’t think that an artificially intelligent system
that has superhuman intelligence will be violent. I do think that it will disrupt our
culture.”
—Gray Scott
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“If the government regulates against use of drones or stem cells or artificial intelli-
gence, all that means is that the work and the research leave the borders of that
country and go someplace else.”
—Peter Diamandis
“The key to artificial intelligence has always been the representation.”
—Jeff Hawkins
“It’s going to be interesting to see how society deals with artificial intelligence, but
it will definitely be cool.”
—Colin Angle
“Anything that could give rise to smarter-than-human intelligence—in the form of
Artificial Intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, or neuroscience-based human in-
telligence enhancement – wins hands down beyond contest as doing the most to
change the world. Nothing else is even in the same league.”
—Eliezer Yudkowsky
“Artificial intelligence is growing up fast, as are robots whose facial expressions
can elicit empathy and make your mirror neurons quiver.”
—Diane Ackerman
“Someone on TV has only to say, ‘Alexa,’ and she lights up. She’s always ready
for action, the perfect woman, never says, ‘Not tonight, dear.’”
—Sybil Sage, as quoted in a New York Times article
“Some people worry that artificial intelligence will make us feel inferior, but then,
anybody in his right mind should have an inferiority complex every time he looks
at a flower.”
—Alan Kay
“Artificial intelligence will reach human levels by around 2029. Follow that out fur-
ther to, say, 2045, we will have multiplied the intelligence, the human biological
machine intelligence of our civilization a billion-fold.”
—Ray Kurzweil
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“Nobody phrases it this way, but I think that artificial intelligence is almost a hu-
manities discipline. It’s really an attempt to understand human intelligence and hu-
man cognition.”
—Sebastian Thrun
“A year spent in artificial intelligence is enough to make one believe in God.”
—Alan Perlis
“There is no reason and no way that a human mind can keep up with an artificial
intelligence machine by 2035.”
—Gray Scott
“Is artificial intelligence less than our intelligence?”
—Spike Jonze
“By far, the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude too
early that they understand it.”
—Eliezer Yudkowsky
“The sad thing about artificial intelligence is that it lacks artifice and therefore intel-
ligence.”
—Jean Baudrillard
“Forget artificial intelligence – in the brave new world of big data, it’s artificial idiocy
we should be looking out for.”
—Tom Chatfield
“Before we work on artificial intelligence why don’t we do something about natural
stupidity?”
—Steve Polyak
So, how would you weigh in? What’s your opinion about artificial intelligence?
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OVER-DOMINANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
AI is rapidly advancing, with breakthroughs and applications emerging daily in ro-
botics, machine learning, and computer vision. The subsequent effect has been a
decrease in human intervention and the requirement of humans to do the job. The
major fields witnessing recent developments are healthcare, programming, educa-
tion, finance, construction, transportation, entertainment, legal, real estate, space
exploration, and retail. The advancements are encouraging the automation of AI
and, thus, artificial intelligence and the future of humans. Data security risks tend
to rise, and ethical and moral concerns will arise, requiring new laws and regula-
tions. Despite ethical concerns and data security risks, the future of AI promises
significant advancements in every field, creating new opportunities and chal-
lenges. As machines take over repetitive tasks, humans can focus on creativity
and innovation, leading to further breakthroughs and developments.
AI in Healthcare
Artificial intelligence is one of the most promising fields in technology and has the
potential to help solve some of the world’s most pressing challenges, including
healthcare. The future of AI in healthcare is highly promising, with new develop-
ments and breakthroughs emerging every day. AI provides faster and more accu-
rate diagnoses, personalized treatment plans, and improved patient outcomes.
Machine learning also helps analyze vast amounts of data, including genetic data,
electronic health records, and medical images, to identify patterns and develop
new treatments. Recent developments in AI in healthcare include using robots to
perform surgeries, personalized drug discovery, and virtual assistants to monitor
patients. With further advancements, we expect to see even more exciting possi-
bilities in the future of AI in healthcare, transforming how we approach medicine
and providing better patient care.
AI in Education
Education is clearly the foundation for success, and our future depends on inno-
vation and creativity that will come from our students. AI has been introduced in
education to assist teachers, students and administrations by eliminating the need
to work on redundant tasks, increasing the quality of education with enhanced vis-
36 | P a g e
ualization effects, providing increased access to people and much more. The fu-
ture will be more personalized for students, and education will become more inter-
active and fun-based. The practical approach to knowledge will be more prominent
in a safer environment concerning laboratory experiments. It is more application
based owing to the decreased requirement of cramming the facts and information
which will be and are currently readily available for use. The smart classrooms will
progress to smart buildings, thus positively affecting the school environment.
AI in Transportation
The primary expectation of AI incorporation into transportation is self-driving cars
and other heavy vehicles. Currently, no self-driving cars are available, and those
able to do so work under driver supervision. AI is used to create autonomous cars,
enhance navigation systems, and optimize traffic flow, making transportation more
efficient, safer, and convenient. In recent years, AI and machine learning have
made significant strides in transportation, with Tesla and Waymo leading the way
in autonomous vehicle technology. The future of AI in transportation promises to
create a more efficient and sustainable industry, reducing congestion, emissions,
and accidents. We can expect to see even more exciting possibilities with new
developments and advancements. From autonomous vehicles to smart traffic
management systems, AI has the potential to transform the way we move and
travel.
AI in Customer Services
AI can help to improve customer service by automating routine tasks and providing
personalized recommendations. AI in customer service promises to revolutionize
the industry, with new developments and breakthroughs emerging daily. AI pro-
vides personalized and efficient customer service, including chatbots, virtual as-
sistants, and natural language processing. AI-powered chatbots can handle cus-
tomer queries 24/7, reducing response time and enhancing customer satisfaction.
The future of AI in customer service promises to create more efficient and satisfy-
ing customer experiences, making it easier and faster to solve customer queries.
We can expect to see even more exciting possibilities with new developments and
advancements. From voice-activated assistants to predictive analytics, AI has the
potential to transform the way we interact with customers.
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AI in Marketing
As AI continues to evolve, we can expect to see more intelligent automation in
marketing, making it easier and faster to reach our audience. The possibilities are
endless, and the future of marketing looks very exciting. AI in marketing promises
to transform the industry, with new developments and breakthroughs emerging
every day. Using prediction-based models, customer behavior analysis, and un-
derstanding their requirements and preferences will combine to help enhance mar-
keting techniques and reach the targeted audience at the correct time. The effect
of automated content creation with the above-stated parameters will lead to hyper-
personalized marketing suitable specifically for people rather than categories.
Voice search optimization to be more enhanced and accurate. Augmented reality,
fraud detection, and Whatsapp chatbots will also be part of the future of AI in mar-
keting, providing enhanced customer services from companies without human in-
tervention.
AI in Human Resource Management
Cognitive computing is going to be the next big thing in human resource manage-
ment. It is going to transform how we hire, train, and retain employees. AI in HRM
automates routine HR tasks, including candidate screening, onboarding, and per-
formance evaluations. AI-powered chatbots and virtual assistants can provide
quick and accurate answers to employee queries, reducing the workload for HR
professionals. AI promises to create more efficient and effective HR processes,
making hiring and managing employees easier and faster. We can expect to see
even more exciting possibilities with new developments and advancements. AI has
the potential to transform the way we approach HR management, improving em-
ployee engagement and creating new opportunities for innovation and growth.
AI in Banking
AI and machine learning will transform every aspect of banking over the next dec-
ade. AI in Banking and Finance ensures fraud detection, automates customer ser-
vice, and improves risk management. ML algorithms can analyze vast amounts of
data, providing insights into customer behavior, credit risk, and investment oppor-
tunities. It promises to create more efficient and accurate financial services, mak-
ing accessing financial products and services easier and faster. We can expect to
see even more exciting possibilities with new developments and advancements.
From chatbots to robo-advisors, AI has the potential to transform the way we in-
teract with banks and financial institutions.
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Role of AI in agriculture:
1. Precision Farming:
 Remote Sensing: AI-driven technologies, such as drones and satel-
lites, collect and analyze data on soil health, crop conditions, and over-
all farm performance. This allows farmers to make informed decisions
about irrigation, fertilization, and pest control, optimizing resource us-
age.
 Sensor Technologies: Smart sensors placed in fields can monitor en-
vironmental conditions, providing real-time data on temperature, hu-
midity, soil moisture, and more. AI processes this data to offer insights
for better crop management.
2. Crop Monitoring and Management:
 Image Recognition: AI algorithms can analyze images of crops to
identify diseases, pests, and nutrient deficiencies. This enables early
detection and intervention, helping farmers take timely corrective ac-
tions.
 Predictive Analytics: AI models can predict crop yields based on his-
torical data, weather patterns, and other relevant factors. Farmers can
use this information to plan their harvests and make marketing deci-
sions.
3. Autonomous Machinery:
 Autonomous Vehicles: AI-powered tractors, harvesters, and drones
can perform tasks like planting, harvesting, and spraying with preci-
sion. This not only increases efficiency but also reduces labor costs
and minimizes environmental impact by optimizing resource usage.
4. Supply Chain Optimization:
 Predictive Supply Chain Management: AI can analyze various fac-
tors, including weather conditions, market demand, and transportation
logistics, to optimize the supply chain. This helps in reducing waste,
improving efficiency, and ensuring a more reliable food supply.
5. Crop Breeding and Genetics:
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 Genomic Prediction: AI facilitates the analysis of vast amounts of ge-

nomic data to predict traits and optimize breeding programs. This ac-
celerates the development of crops with desirable characteristics such
as higher yields, resistance to diseases, and tolerance to environmen-
tal stress.
6. Farm Management Systems:
 Data-driven Decision Making: AI-based farm management platforms
integrate data from various sources to provide farmers with actionable
insights. This includes recommendations on planting schedules, crop
rotations, and resource allocation for enhanced productivity.
7. Weather Prediction and Risk Management:
 Advanced Weather Forecasting: AI can improve the accuracy of
weather predictions, helping farmers prepare for extreme weather
events and plan their activities accordingly. This contributes to better
risk management and resilience.
8. Financial Analysis and Planning:

 Financial Modeling: AI tools can assist farmers in financial planning
by analyzing market trends, input costs, and potential yields. This en-
ables better decision-making for budgeting and resource allocation.
Role in Defense:
9. Autonomous Systems:
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Drones: AI is used to enable
autonomous flight, navigation, and decision-making for UAVs, improv-
ing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target identification capabilities.
 Autonomous Vehicles and Robots: AI-driven robots and ground ve-
hicles can be deployed for tasks such as bomb disposal, surveillance,
and reconnaissance in hazardous environments.
10. Cybersecurity:
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 Threat Detection: AI is used to identify and analyze patterns indicative

of cyber threats, enabling faster detection and response to potential
cyber attacks.
 Security Analytics: AI algorithms analyze large volumes of data to
identify anomalies and potential security breaches, enhancing overall
cybersecurity measures.
11. Data Analysis and Fusion:
 Intelligence Gathering: AI helps in analyzing vast amounts of data
from various sources, including satellites, sensors, and social media,
to extract actionable intelligence for military decision-making.
 Data Fusion: AI algorithms integrate and analyze information from
multiple sources to provide a comprehensive and accurate situational
awareness.
12. Predictive Maintenance:
 Equipment Health Monitoring: AI is employed to monitor the health
of military equipment, predicting potential failures and recommending
maintenance actions to improve operational readiness and reduce
downtime.
13. Strategic Planning and Decision Support:
 Simulation and Modeling: AI assists in creating realistic simulations
for military training exercises, allowing personnel to practice and refine
their skills in virtual environments.
 Strategic Analysis: AI tools provide decision-makers with predictive
analytics, scenario modeling, and risk assessments to support strate-
gic planning and decision-making.
14. Biometric Identification:
 Facial Recognition: AI-based facial recognition systems aid in identi-
fying and tracking individuals, enhancing security measures at military
installations and during operations.
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 Biometric Data Analysis: AI is used to analyze biometric data, such

as fingerprints and iris scans, for identity verification and access con-
trol.
15. Communication and Language Processing:
 Natural Language Processing (NLP): AI-driven language processing
tools assist in the analysis of vast amounts of text and voice data, fa-
cilitating communication monitoring and intelligence extraction.
16. Logistics and Supply Chain Management:
 Optimization: AI algorithms optimize logistics and supply chain oper-
ations, improving the efficiency of resource allocation, transportation,
and distribution in military operations.
17. Counter-Drone Systems:
 Drone Defense: AI is employed in developing systems that detect,
track, and counter hostile drones, safeguarding military installations
and operations.
Risks associated with AI:
 The biggest concern remains privacy, with no information on parties receiv-
ing confidential information and their processing method.
 The requirement to share private information for seeking a job on an AI-
based job replacement.
 Lack of accountability further leads to helplessness on inappropriate actions
concerning the data.
 Lack of consent in processing, collection and storage of data
 Surveillance usage of AI is more likely to reveal highly confidential infor-
mation encouraging crime and terrorism.
 Biasedness and discrimination are expected to disclose the data based on
their partial judgment of the nature of the data.
 Ability to create fake images, videos or content concerning an individual or
organization without the ability to trace back the creator.
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1. LACK OF AI TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY

AI and deep learning models can be difficult to understand, even for those that
work directly with the technology. This leads to a lack of transparency for how and
why AI comes to its conclusions, creating a lack of explanation for what data AI
algorithms use, or why they may make biased or unsafe decisions. These con-
cerns have given rise to the use of explainable AI, but there’s still a long way before
transparent AI systems become common practice.
2. JOB LOSSES DUE TO AI AUTOMATION
AI-powered job automation is a pressing concern as the technology is adopted in
industries like marketing, manufacturing and healthcare. By 2030, tasks that ac-
count for up to 30 percent of hours currently being worked in the U.S. economy
could be automated — with Black and Hispanic employees left especially vulnera-
ble to the change — according to McKinsey. Goldman Sachs even states 300 mil-
lion full-time jobs could be lost to AI automation.
“The reason we have a low unemployment rate, which doesn’t actually capture
people that aren’t looking for work, is largely that lower-wage service sector jobs
have been pretty robustly created by this economy,” futurist Martin Ford told Built
In. With AI on the rise, though, “I don’t think that’s going to continue.”
As AI robots become smarter and more dexterous, the same tasks will require
fewer humans. And while AI is estimated to create 97 million new jobs by 2025,
many employees won’t have the skills needed for these technical roles and could
get left behind if companies don’t upskill their workforces. “If you’re flipping burgers
at McDonald’s and more automation comes in, is one of these new jobs going to
be a good match for you?” Ford said. “Or is it likely that the new job requires lots
of education or training or maybe even intrinsic talents — really strong interper-
sonal skills or creativity — that you might not have? Because those are the things
that, at least so far, computers are not very good at.”
3. SOCIAL MANIPULATION THROUGH AI ALGORITHMS
Social manipulation also stands as a danger of artificial intelligence. This fear has
become a reality as politicians rely on platforms to promote their viewpoints, with
one example being Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., wielding a TikTok troll army to capture
the votes of younger Filipinos during the Philippines’ 2022 election. TikTok, which
43 | P a g e
is just one example of a social media platform that relies on AI algorithms, fills a
user’s feed with content related to previous media they’ve viewed on the platform.
Criticism of the app targets this process and the algorithm’s failure to filter out
harmful and inaccurate content, raising concerns over TikTok’s ability to protect its
users from misleading information. Online media and news have become even
murkier in light of AI-generated images and videos, AI voice changers as well as
deepfakes infiltrating political and social spheres. These technologies make it easy
to create realistic photos, videos, audio clips or replace the image of one figure
with another in an existing picture or video. As a result, bad actors have another
avenue for sharing misinformation and war propaganda, creating a nightmare sce-
nario where it can be nearly impossible to distinguish between creditable and faulty
news. “No one knows what’s real and what’s not,” Ford said. “So it really leads to
a situation where you literally cannot believe your own eyes and ears; you can’t
rely on what, historically, we’ve considered to be the best possible evidence...
That’s going to be a huge issue.”
4. SOCIAL SURVEILLANCE WITH AI TECHNOLOGY
In addition to its more existential threat, Ford is focused on the way AI will ad-
versely affect privacy and security. A prime example is China’s use of facial recog-
nition technology in offices, schools and other venues. Besides tracking a person’s
movements, the Chinese government may be able to gather enough data to mon-
itor a person’s activities, relationships and political views. Another example is U.S.
police departments embracing predictive policing algorithms to anticipate where
crimes will occur. The problem is that these algorithms are influenced by arrest
rates, which disproportionately impact Black communities. Police departments
then double down on these communities, leading to over-policing and questions
over whether self-proclaimed democracies can resist turning AI into an authoritar-
ian weapon. “Authoritarian regimes use or are going to use it,” Ford said. “The
question is, how much does it invade Western countries, democracies, and what
constraints do we put on it?”
5. LACK OF DATA PRIVACY USING AI TOOLS
If you’ve played around with an AI chatbot or tried out an AI face filter online, your
data is being collected — but where is it going and how is it being used? AI systems
often collect personal data to customize user experiences or to help train the AI
models you’re using (especially if the AI tool is free). Data may not even be con-
sidered secure from other users when given to an AI system, as one bug incident
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that occurred with ChatGPT in 2023 “allowed some users to see titles from another
active user’s chat history.” While there are laws present to protect personal infor-
mation in some cases in the United States, there is no explicit federal law that
protects citizens from data privacy harm experienced by AI.
6. BIASES DUE TO AI
Various forms of AI bias are detrimental too. Speaking to the New York Times,
Princeton computer science professor Olga Russakovsky said AI bias goes well
beyond gender and race. In addition to data and algorithmic bias (the latter of which
can “amplify” the former), AI is developed by humans — and humans are inherently
biased. “A.I. researchers are primarily people who are male, who come from cer-
tain racial demographics, who grew up in high socioeconomic areas, primarily peo-
ple without disabilities,” Russakovsky said. “We’re a fairly homogeneous popula-
tion, so it’s a challenge to think broadly about world issues.” The limited experi-
ences of AI creators may explain why speech-recognition AI often fails to under-
stand certain dialects and accents, or why companies fail to consider the conse-
quences of a chatbot impersonating notorious figures in human history. Develop-
ers and businesses should exercise greater care to avoid recreating powerful bi-
ases and prejudices that put minority populations at risk.
7. SOCIOECONOMIC INEQUALITY AS A RESULT OF AI

If companies refuse to acknowledge the inherent biases baked into AI algorithms,
they may compromise their DEI initiatives through AI-powered recruiting. The idea
that AI can measure the traits of a candidate through facial and voice analyses is
still tainted by racial biases, reproducing the same discriminatory hiring practices
businesses claim to be eliminating. Widening socioeconomic inequality sparked by
AI-driven job loss is another cause for concern, revealing the class biases of how
AI is applied. Blue-collar workers who perform more manual, repetitive tasks have
experienced wage declines as high as 70 percent because of automation. Mean-
while, white-collar workers have remained largely untouched, with some even en-
joying higher wages. Sweeping claims that AI has somehow overcome social
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boundaries or created more jobs fail to paint a complete picture of its effects. It’s
crucial to account for differences based on race, class and other categories. Oth-
erwise, discerning how AI and automation benefit certain individuals and groups
at the expense of others becomes more difficult.
8. WEAKENING ETHICS AND GOODWILL BECAUSE OF AI
Along with technologists, journalists and political figures, even religious leaders
are sounding the alarm on AI’s potential socio-economic pitfalls. In a 2019 Vatican
meeting titled, “The Common Good in the Digital Age,” Pope Francis warned
against AI’s ability to “circulate tendentious opinions and false data” and stressed
the far-reaching consequences of letting this technology develop without proper
oversight or restraint. “If mankind’s so-called technological progress were to be-
come an enemy of the common good,” he added, “this would lead to an unfortunate
regression to a form of barbarism dictated by the law of the strongest.” The rapid
rise of generative AI tools like ChatGPT and Bard gives these concerns more sub-
stance. Many users have applied the technology to get out of writing assignments,
threatening academic integrity and creativity. Some fear that, no matter how many
powerful figures point out the dangers of artificial intelligence, we’re going to keep
pushing the envelope with it if there’s money to be made.
“The mentality is, ‘If we can do it, we should try it; let’s see what happens,” Messina
said. “‘And if we can make money off it, we’ll do a whole bunch of it.’ But that’s not
unique to technology. That’s been happening forever.’”
9. AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS POWERED BY AI
As is too often the case, technological advancements have been harnessed for the
purpose of warfare. When it comes to AI, some are keen to do something about it
before it’s too late: In a 2016 open letter, over 30,000 individuals, including AI and
robotics researchers, pushed back against the investment in AI-fueled autono-
mous weapons.
“The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or
to prevent it from starting,” they wrote. “If any major military power pushes ahead
with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the
endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will be-
come the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow.”
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This prediction has come to fruition in the form of Lethal Autonomous Weapon
Systems, which locate and destroy targets on their own while abiding by few reg-
ulations. Because of the proliferation of potent and complex weapons, some of the
world’s most powerful nations have given in to anxieties and contributed to a tech
cold war. Many of these new weapons pose major risks to civilians on the ground,
but the danger becomes amplified when autonomous weapons fall into the wrong
hands. Hackers have mastered various types of cyber-attacks, so it’s not hard to
imagine a malicious actor infiltrating autonomous weapons and instigating abso-
lute Armageddon. If political rivalries and warmongering tendencies are not kept in
check, artificial intelligence could end up being applied with the worst intentions.
10. FINANCIAL CRISES BROUGHT ABOUT BY AI ALGORITHMS
The financial industry has become more receptive to AI technology’s involvement
in everyday finance and trading processes. As a result, algorithmic trading could
be responsible for our next major financial crisis in the markets.
While AI algorithms aren’t clouded by human judgment or emotions, they also don’t
take into account contexts, the interconnectedness of markets and factors like hu-
man trust and fear. These algorithms then make thousands of trades at a blistering
pace with the goal of selling a few seconds later for small profits. Selling off thou-
sands of trades could scare investors into doing the same thing, leading to sudden
crashes and extreme market volatility. Instances like the 2010 Flash Crash and the
Knight Capital Flash Crash serve as reminders of what could happen when trade-
happy algorithms go berserk, regardless of whether rapid and massive trading is
intentional. This isn’t to say that AI has nothing to offer to the finance world. In fact,
AI algorithms can help investors make smarter and more informed decisions on
the market. But finance organizations need to make sure they understand their AI
algorithms and how those algorithms make decisions. Companies should consider
whether AI raises or lowers their confidence before introducing the technology to
avoid stoking fears among investors and creating financial chaos.
11. LOSS OF HUMAN INFLUENCE
An overreliance on AI technology could result in the loss of human influence —
and a lack in human functioning — in some parts of society. Using AI in healthcare
could result in reduced human empathy and reasoning, for instance. And applying
generative AI for creative endeavors could diminish human creativity and emo-
tional expression. Interacting with AI systems too much could even cause reduced
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peer communication and social skills. So while AI can be very helpful for automat-
ing daily tasks, some question if it might hold back overall human intelligence, abil-
ities and need for community.
12. UNCONTROLLABLE SELF-AWARE AI
There also comes a worry that AI will progress in intelligence so rapidly that it will
become sentient, and act beyond humans’ control — possibly in a malicious man-
ner. Alleged reports of this sentience have already been occurring, with one pop-
ular account being from a former Google engineer who stated the AI chatbot
Lambda was sentient and speaking to him just as a person would. As AI’s next big
milestones involve making systems with artificial general intelligence, and eventu-
ally artificial superintelligence, cries to completely stop these developments con-
tinue to rise.
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21ST LESSONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Chapter One — Disillusionment
Stories
On the topic of information overwhelm, Harari makes the point that ‘humans think
in stories rather than in facts, numbers or equations which is why the communist,
fascist and liberal stories of the 20th Century were so powerful.
The simpler the story, he says, the better. A lesson not only for those of you de-
claring political war, which is fair to say few of you are, but also for those of you in
the business and entrepreneurship game. It’s imperative that you make your sto-
ries simple.
While the 20th Century was all about three political systems, the 21st century in-
troduces new stories and classes, that of humans, superhumans and artificial in-
telligence.
Artificial Intelligence
As AI gets more sophisticated it will create classes of humans; superhumans who
are augmented by technology. As Elon Musk pointed out on a recent episode of
the Joe Rogan Experience, we’ve already been augmented, there’s just a discon-
nect and the data rate is too slow.
While there’s a lot of pushback against the liberal story today, Harari says that at
the end of the day humankind won’t abandon the liberal story because it doesn’t
have any viable alternatives. “People may give the system and angry kick in the
stomach but having nowhere else to go they will eventually come back.”
Chapter 2 — Work
Harari says that the better we understand the biochemical mechanisms that un-
derpin human emotions, desires and choices the better computers can get at an-
alysing human behaviour, predicting human decisions and replacing human pro-
fessions such as bankers and lawyers. At least in some lines of work, it might make
sense to replace all humans with computers even if individually some humans still
do a better job than machines.
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On Automation
The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated that in 2012,
31% of fatal crashes involved alcohol abuse, 30% speeding and 20% distracted
drivers.
Self-driving vehicles have none of these flaws and eventually, we could see the
displacement of 3.5 million professional truck drivers in the United States alone,
amongst other driving professions.
Rather than replacing humans entirely though, AI might actually help create new
human jobs. Instead of humans competing with AI they could focus on servicing
and leveraging AI. The job market of 2050 is likely to be characterised by human
AI cooperation rather than competition.
Several years after IBM’s Deep Blue defeated chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov,
human-computer cooperation flourished. However, in recent years computers
have become so good at playing chess that their human collaborators lost their
value, which could be seen as a precursor to what might happen at a more perva-
sive level.
Another computer program, DeepMind’s Alpha Zero, went from utter ignorance to
creative mastery in under four hours without the help of any human guide, to dom-
inate the world’s best AlphaGo players and programs.
AI and Creativity
People often say that AI could never feel like a human being, that it could never be
as creative as a human being. On this point, chess tournament judges are con-
stantly on the lookout for players secretly getting help from computers. One of the
ways to catch cheats, we’re told, is to monitor the level of originality players display.
If they play exceptionally creative moves, the judge’s suspect that this cannot pos-
sibly be a human move, it must be a computer move. At least in chess, creativity
is already the trademark of computers rather than humans!
By 2050 not just the idea of a job for life but even the idea of a profession for life
might seem antediluvian. However, Harari insists that many jobs are uninspiring
drudgery not worth saving and I tend to agree given all the work I’m doing to help
liberate people from playing boring process-oriented roles to unlock their potential
and help them lead more fulfilling work lives. Nobody’s life dream is to be a cashier,
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says Harari. He goes on to say that “what we should focus on is providing for peo-
ple’s basic needs and protecting the social status and self worth”. “Universal basic
income will protect the poor against job losses and economic dislocation while pro-
tecting the rich from populist rage”.
Alternatives to UBI
The government could subsidize universal basic services (UBS) rather than in-
come Instead of giving money to people who then shop around for whatever they
want the Government might subsidize free education, free healthcare, free
transport and so forth. This effectively brings the communist plan to fruition, albeit
not by revolution.
Harari warns of the threat of further geographic consolidation of wealth though. “If
a 3D printer takes over from the Bangladeshis, the revenues previously earned by
the South Asian country will now fill the coffers of a few tech giants in California.
This could pave the way for an even greater wealth gap and the collapse of devel-
oping countries.
Some say that the big tech companies should be taxed to cover the shortfall, and
right they may be, insofar as the local distribution of taxes is concerned, but Harari
points out that people are unlikely to support the distribution of these funds offshore
to places defined by president Trump as ‘shithole countries’. If you believe the
typical American voter will support that, says Harari, you might just as well believe
that Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny will solve the problem.
Happiness = Reality — Expectations
The problem with UBI or UBS is that human beings aren’t just built for satisfaction.
Human happiness depends less on objective conditions and more on our own ex-
pectations. Our expectations adapt to changing conditions including to the condi-
tion of other people (keeping up with the Joneses). When things improve, expec-
tations balloon and consequently even dramatic improvements in conditions might
leave us as a dissatisfied as before.
Today’s poor live better than yesterday’s kings, however, Americans are taking
antidepressants in astounding numbers, leading to the current opioid epidemic.
People need not only the basics, but they need to feel like they have enough, that
their contributions are worthwhile, that they are learning and growing and that they
have access to a community.
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Chapter 3 — Liberty
On Democracy and Voting
Harari shares the following quote: “You might as well call a nationwide plebiscite
to decide whether Einstein got his algebra right.” However, he goes on to say that
for better or worse, elections and referendums are not about what we think. They’re
about what we feel.
Winston Churchill famously said that ‘democracy is the worst political system in
the world, except for all the others’. Rightly or wrongly people might reach the same
conclusions about big data to algorithms that may come to run the world. They
might have lots of bugs but we have no better alternative.
‘Truth’: Recently on an episode of the Sam Harris podcast, Harris and psycholo-
gist Jordan Peterson debated for what seemed ad infinitum, the definition of
truth. Harari puts it simply; truth today is defined by the top results of the Google
search.
On big data algorithms, once we begin to count on AI to decide what to study,
where to work, and who to marry, democratic elections and free markets will make
little sense.
Psychology and AI in war
On 16 March 1968, a company of American soldiers went berserk in the South
Vietnamese village of My Lai and massacred about 400 civilians. This war crime
was initiated by American forces that had been involved in jungle guerrilla warfare
for several months. It was a fault of human emotions. If the US had the killer robots
in Vietnam, the massacre would never have occurred. However, if the US had killer
robots the war could have dragged on for many more years because the American
government would have had fewer worries about the moral of soldiers or massive
anti-war demonstrations.
Companies today are not only doing more with less, such as Netflix, which with
5,000 or so employees has a market capitalization of more than US$60 billion
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compared to Blockbuster which, with a workforce of 60,000 could only muster up

a market cap at its peak of US$5 billion. These benefits extend to the realm of
warfare. Today whenever Palestinians make a phone call or post something on
Facebook or travel from one place to another they’re likely to be monitored by
Israeli microphones, cameras, drones, and software. The data is analysed with the
aid of algorithms which helps Israeli security forces pinpoint and utilise potential
threats. It is therefore surprisingly easy for few Israeli soldiers to control about two
and a half million Palestinians.
Algorithms and Personal Finance
When you apply it to your bank for a loan, it’s likely that your application is pro-
cessed by an algorithm rather than a human. The bank might refuse to give you
alone and you ask why and the bank replies, “Algorithm said no”. You ask, “Why
did the algorithm say no, what’s wrong with me?” The bank replies “we don’t know,
no human understands the algorithm because it is based on advanced machine
learning but we trust our algorithm so we won’t give you a loan”.
Chapter 4 — Equality
Those who own the data own the future.
Harari says that unlike land and machines data is everywhere and nowhere at the
same time, it can move at the speed of light and you can create as many copies
of it as you want. So we had better call upon our lawyers, politicians, philosophers
and even poets to turn their attention to this conundrum. The key political question
of our era is quite possibly, “how do you regulate the ownership of data?” This also
echoes what many commentators are saying when analyzing the forward march
of big tech companies who, more often than not, are spearheaded by people who
lack the fundamentals when it comes to the broader economic, political, social or
philosophical implications of their work. We need to solve complex problems by
taking a multi-disciplinary approach.
Chapter 5 — Community
On tech addiction and how it is compromising genuine human connection and
community, Harari makes the point that it is easier than ever to talk to his cousin
in Switzerland but it is harder to talk to his husband over breakfast because he
constantly looks at his smartphone instead of at him.
Chapter 6 — Civilization
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10,000 years ago, humankind was divided into countless isolated tribes where we
knew no more than a few dozen people. With each passing millennium, these
tribes fused to larger and larger groups creating fewer and fewer distinct civiliza-
tions. In recent generations, the few remaining civilizations have been blending
into a single global civilization.
People care far more about their enemies than about the trade partners, says Ha-
rari. For every American film about Taiwan there are probably about 50 about Vi-
etnam. The people we fight most often are our family members.
Chapter 7 — Nationalism
There is nothing wrong with benign patriotism.
The problem, Harari warns, starts when benign patriotism morphs into chauvinistic
ultra-nationalism. Instead of believing that my nation is unique, which is true all
nations, I might begin feeling that my nation is supreme.
The Environment
Unless we dramatically cut the emission of greenhouse gases in the next 20 years,
average global temperatures will increase by more than two degrees celsius re-
sulting in expanding deserts, disappearing ice caps, rising oceans and more ex-
treme weather events such as hurricanes and typhoons.
It isn’t a coincidence that skepticism about climate change tends to be the preserve
of the nationalist right, says Harari. You rarely see left-wing socialists tweet that
climate change is a Chinese hoax. When there is no rational answer, but only a
global answer to the problem of global warming, some nationalist politicians prefer
to believe the problem does not exist.
To counter this, the advent of unconventional technologies might help. For exam-
ple, clean meat. This might sound like science fiction but the world’s first clean
hamburger was grown from cells and then eaten in 2013. It cost $330,000. Four
years of research and development brought the price down to $11 per unit and
within another decade, clean meat is expected to be cheaper than slaughtered
meat, which can count for a lot towards ecological rejuvenation when you consider
that the water footprint of beef alone is 1,800 gallons per pound of beef.
Three threats facing humanity: technological nuclear and ecological
We now have a global ecology, a global economy and global science but we are
still stuck with only national politics. This mismatch prevents the political system
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from effectively countering main problems. To have effective politics we must ei-
ther be globalising economics and the major science or we must globalise politics.
Global governance, Harari says, is unrealistic. Rather, to globalise politics means
that political dynamics within countries give far more weight to global problems and
interests.
Chapter 8 — Religion
Harari says that in order to understand the role of traditional religions in the world
of the 21st Century, we need to distinguish between three types of problems:
1- Technical problems: how should farmers in arid countries deal with severe
droughts caused by global warming?
2 Policy problems: what measures should Government adopt to prevent global
warming in the first place?
3 Identity problems: should I even care about the problems of farmers on the
other side of the world?
As Karl Marx argued, religion doesn’t really have much to contribute to the great
policy debates of our time.
Freud ridiculed the obsession people have about such matters as a narcissism of
small differences. On this point, I did some research to find out why the Eastern
Orthodox and Western Christian religions branched off from each other. One of
the key points of difference that ultimately split the churches was that most West-
ern Christians use a version of the Nicene Creed that states that the Holy Spirit
“proceeds from the Father and the Son”, whereas the original Orthodox version
doesn’t feature ‘and the Son’. That was it. Perhaps Freud had a point.
Chapter 9 — Immigration
To clarify matters, Harari defines immigration as a deal with three basic conditions
or terms.
1 The host country allows to immigrants in.
2 In return, the immigrants must embrace at least the norms and values of the host
country even if that means giving up some of their traditional norms and values.
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3 If they assimilate to a sufficient degree over time they become equal and full
members of the host country. They become us.
Precisely because you cherish tolerance, says Harari, you cannot allow too many
intolerant people in. While the tolerant society can manage more liberal minorities,
if the number of such extremes exceeds a certain threshold, the whole nature of
society changes. If you are bringing in too many immigrants from the Middle East,
you will eventually end up looking like the Middle East says Harari.
On culturists: People continue to conduct a heroic struggle against traditional rac-
ism without noticing that the battlefront has shifted from traditional racism to cul-
turists.
Terrorism
On terrorists: They kill very few people but nevertheless managed to terrify billions
and shake huge political structures such as the European Union or the United
States to their core. Since September 11, every year terrorists have killed about
50 people in the EU, about 10 people in the USA, about seven people in China
and 25,000 people globally, mostly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and
Syria.
Diabetes and high sugar levels kill up to 3.5 million people annually while air pol-
lution kills about seven million people.
Terrorism is like the fly that tries to destroy a china shop. The fly is so weak that it
cannot move even a single teacup. How does a fly destroy china shop, asks Ha-
rari? It gets inside a bull’s ear and starts buzzing. The ball goes wild with fear and
anger and destroys the china shop. This is what happened after 9/11 as Islamic
Fundamentalist got inside the ear of the American bull to destroy the Middle East-
ern china shop. Now they flourish in the wreckage. And Harari reminds us that
there is no shortage of a short-tempered bulls in the world.
The overreaction to terrorism poses a far greater threat to our security than terrorist
themselves. This lesson echoes lessons from Robert Greene’s 33 Strategies of
War, in luling your opponent into making premature, emotion-driven decisions and
ultimately, the wrong move, one that you are ready to capitalise on.
Harari says that a successful counter terrorism struggle should be conducted on
three fronts.
1 — Government should focus on clandestine actions against the terror networks.
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2 — The media should keep things in perspective and avoid hysteria theatre. As it
stands, the media obsessively report terror attacks because reports on terrorism
sell newspapers much better than reports of diabetes or pollution.
3 — The imagination of each and every one of us. Terrorist hold our imagination
captive and use it against us. It is the responsibility of every citizen to liberate his
or her imagination from the terrorists and to remind ourselves of the true dimen-
sions of this threat.
Chapter 11 — War
Today information technology and biotechnology are more important than heavy
industry when it comes to war.
Today the main economic assets consist of technical and institutional knowledge
rather than wheat fields, goldmines or even oil fields and you just cannot conquer
knowledge through war.
Chapter 12 — Humility
Even apes developed the tendency to help the poor, the needy and fatherless mil-
lions of years before the Bible instructed ancient Israelites to do the same.
Chapter 13 — God
Harari says that morality doesn’t mean following divinities. It means reducing suf-
fering. Hence in order to act morally, you don’t need to believe in any myth or story.
You just need to develop a deep appreciation of suffering. In the long run, immoral
behaviour is counterproductive. You’re not likely to live in a society where
strangers are constantly being raped and murdered. Not only would you be in con-
stant danger but you would lack the benefit of trust between strangers which sup-
ports trade and economic growth among other things.
Religious belief can either create compassion in people or justify and stoke their
anger especially if someone dares to insult their God ignores his wishes.
On secularism, Harari reminds us that the secular code enshrines the values of
truth, compassion, equality, freedom, courage and responsibility. The secular code
isn’t an ideal to aspire to rather than social reality.
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The most important secular commitment is to truth which is based on observation

and evidence rather than on mere faith. Interestingly, Harari notes that strong be-
lief is often required where the story isn’t true.
It is the commitment to the truth and modern science which has enabled human-
kind to split the atom, decipher the human genome, track the evolution of life and
understand the history of humanity itself.
Finally, secular people cherish responsibility. We need not credit any divine pro-
tector with these achievements the resulting from humans developing their own
knowledge and compassion. Instead of praying for miracles we need to ask what
we can do to help.
Harari makes a great point in saying that “as we come to make the most important
decision in the history of life I personally would trust more in those who admit ig-
norance than those who claim infallibility”. As I said in a recent blog post, beware
of people bearing absolutes.
He goes on to say that “if I asked you what was the biggest mistake your religion,
ideology or worldview committed, and you did not come up with something serious,
I for one would not trust you”.
Chapter 15 — Ignorance
On free will: Behavioral economists and evolutionary psychologists have demon-
strated that most human decisions are based on emotional reactions and heuristics
shortcuts rather than on rational analysis and that while out emotions and heuris-
tics were perhaps suitable for dealing with life in the Stone Age they are woefully
inadequate in the Silicon Age.
No individual knows everything it takes to build a cathedral and atom bomb or an
aircraft. What gave homo sapiens an edge over other animals was not rationality
but our unparalleled ability to think together in large groups.
Individual humans know embarrassingly little about the world and as history pro-
gressed we came to know less and less. We rely on the expertise of others for
almost all our needs. This is what Steven Sloman and Philip Fernbach refer to as
‘the knowledge illusion’. The reason we think we know a lot, even though individ-
ually we know very little, is because we treat knowledge in the minds of others as
if it were our own.
If you cannot afford to waste time you will never find the truth.
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Most political figures and business moguls are forever on the run. Yet if you want
to go deeply into any subject you need a lot of time and in particular you need the
privilege of wasting time to experiment with unproductive paths, to explore dead
ends to make space for doubts and boredom, to allow little seeds of insight to
slowly grow and blossom.
Fake News
When one thousand people believe some made up story for one month that’s fake
news.
When a billion people believe it for a thousand years that’s religion and we are
admonished not to call it fake news in order not to hurt the feelings but the faithful.
For better or worse, Harari says, fiction is among the most effective tools in hu-
manity’s toolkit. By bringing people together, religious creeds make large-scale
human cooperation possible.
Stories in Business
Besides religions and ideologies, commercial firms rely on fiction and fake news
too. Branding often involves retelling the same fictional story again and again till
people become convinced it is the truth. When I say Coca-Cola, you probably think
of young people enjoying it, playing sports and having fun. You probably don’t think
about overweight diabetes patients lying in hospital beds.
Harari goes on to say that while we certainly need good science, from a political
perspective a good science fiction movie is worth far more than an article in Sci-
ence or Nature.
Chapter 18 — Science Fiction
In the early 21st Century, perhaps the most important artistic genre is science fic-
tion because very few people read the latest articles in the field of machine learning
or genetic engineering, but instead movies such as the Matrix and Her and TV
series such as Westworld and Black Mirror shape how people understand technol-
ogy and its social and economic impacts.
This also means that science fiction needs to be far more responsible in the way it
depicts scientific realities otherwise it might give people with the wrong ideas or
focus their attention on the wrong problems.
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Perhaps the worst failing of present-day science fiction is that it attempts to con-
fuse intelligence with consciousness. As a result it is overly concerned about a
potential war between robots and humans when in fact we need to feel a conflict
between a small superhuman elite. In thinking about the future of artificial intelli-
gence, Harari says, Karl Marx is still a better guide than Steven Spielberg.
Chapter 19 — Education
Much of what kids learn today will likely be irrelevant by 2050, which echoes many
of my own teachings as part of the Lemonade Stand children’s entrepreneurship
program that we’ve been running for almost three years now. I’ve always main-
tained, during this time, that what kids really need to learn is adaptability, learning
how to learn, resilience, curiosity, critical thinking, problem solving and effective
collaboration. However, we’ll learn what Harari and pedagogical experts think
shortly.
Harari said that the last thing a teacher needs to give her pupils today is more
information for they already have far too much of it. Instead, people need the ability
to make sense of information, to tell the difference between what is important and
what is an important and above all to combine many bits of information into a broad
picture of the world.
Many pedagogical experts, Harari says, argue that schools should switch to teach-
ing the four C’s; critical thinking, communication, collaboration and creativity, ech-
oing my earlier sentiments. More broadly schools should downplay technical skills
and emphasize general-purpose life skills. Most important of all will be the ability
to deal with change to learn new things and to preserve your mental balance in
unfamiliar situations. Again, learning how to learn, resilience and adaptability.
If somebody describes to you the world of the mid-21st Century and it sounds like
science fiction. It is probably false, but if somebody describes to you the world of
the mid-21st Century and it doesn’t sound like science fiction, it is certainly false,
says Harari.
On adapting to change, after a certain age, Harari says, most people just don’t like
to change. When you are fifteen your entire life is change. By the time you are fifty,
you don’t want to change and most people have given up on conquering the world.
You prefer stability. You have invested so much in your skills, your career, your
identity and your worldview that you don’t want to start all over again. The harder
you’ve worked on building something the more difficult it is to let go of it and make
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room for something new. This shows up in most established organisations today
with entrenched ways of doing things and senior decision makers who are unwa-
vering in their desire to maintain the status quo.
In light of this, the best advice Harari has for today’s fifteen year olds is not to rely
on the adults too much. Most of them mean well but they just don’t understand the
world.
To run fast don’t take much luggage with you and leave all your illusions behind —
they’re very heavy.
Turtles All the Way Down
There is a story of a man who claim that the world is kept in place by resting on
the back of a huge elephant. When asked what the elephant stands on he replied
that I stand on the back of a large turtle. And the turtle? On the back of an even
bigger turtle. And that bigger total? The man snapped and said ‘don’t bother about
it, from there onwards it’s turtles all the way down’.
Going back to the introductory gambit on stories, the most successful stories, Ha-
rari says, are open ended.
Most stories are held together by the weight of the roof rather than by the strength
of the foundations. In history, the roof is sometimes more important than the foun-
dations.
Make People Believe in Your Story
If you want to make people really believe in some fiction entice them to make a
sacrifice on its behalf. Why do you think women ask their lovers to bring them
diamond rings, asks Harari? Once a lover makes such a huge financial sacrifice
he must convince himself that it was for a worthy cause. This is in line with ration-
alising and normalising our decisions and what Barry Schwartz calls satisficing.
When you inflict suffering on yourself in the name of some story, it gives you a
choice, either the story is true or I am a gullible fool. When you inflict suffering on
others you are also given a choice, either the story is true or I’m a cruel villain. And
just as we don’t want to admit we are fools we also don’t want to admit we are
villains so we prefer to believe that the story is true.
One more thing on Free Will
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Just consider the next thought that pops in your mind, where did it come from? Did
you really choose to think it and only then did you think it? Certainly not.
Realising this can help us become less obsessive about our opinions feelings and
desires. Humans usually give so much importance to their desires that they try to
control in shape the entire world according to these desires. It is better to under-
stand ourselves, our minds and our desires rather than try to realise whatever fan-
tasy pops up in our heads.
Social Media
It is fascinating and terrifying to behold people who spent countless hours con-
structing and embellishing a perfect self online, becoming attached to their crea-
tion, and mistaking it for the truth about themselves. If you could only feel what the
people in the photos felt while taking them. Hence if you really want to understand
yourself, Harari says, you should not identify with your Facebook or Instagram ac-
count.
The Buddha and the Universe
The Buddha taught that the three basic realities of the Universe.
1 — Everything is constantly changing
2 — Nothing has any enduring essence; and
3 — Nothing is completely satisfied.
Suffering emerges because people fail to appreciate this. You can explore the fur-
thest reaches of the galaxy, but you will never encounter something that does not
change, the has an eternal essence, and that completely satisfies you.
According to the Buddha, life has no meaning and people don’t need to create any
meaning.
Chapter 21 — Meditation
Harari echoes what philosophers have been saying for millenia, that the deepest
source of suffering is in the patterns of our own minds. When I want something
and it doesn’t happen, my mind reacts by generating suffering. Suffering is not an
objective condition in the outside world. It is a mental reaction generated by our
own minds. Learning this is the first step towards seizing to generate more suffer-
ing.
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Meditation is not an escape from reality. It is getting in touch with reality. Without
the focus and clarity provided by this practice, Harari says he could not have writ-
ten this book. He sees meditation as yet another valuable tool in the scientific talk-
ing, especially when trying to understand the human mind, which is an interesting
take on conflating calm and clarity with ambition and progress.
Harari closes out with some words of wisdom:
 Consciousness is the greatest mystery in the universe.
 We had better understand our minds before the algorithms make a match up
for us.
Final Remarks
This was one of my more enjoyable reads this year, and while many for the con-
cepts introduced here weren’t overly new to me, given my voracious appetite for
multi-disciplinary learning, which will come as no surprise to listeners of this show,
Harari has a way of packaging key concepts up in a way that not only makes for
entertaining reading, but also makes you better appreciate what you already knew.
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HOMO DEUS BY
YUVAL NOAH HARARI
1. How we became the most dominant species.

Harari argues that humans became the dominate species of the world not because
of our intelligence, but rather or our ability to cooperate in large numbers. Sapiens
seem to be the only species capable of weaving an “intersubjective web of mean-
ing: a web of laws, forces, entities and places that exist purely in [our] common
imagination”. This idea was strongly echoed his previous book, Sapiens.
2. Threats to liberalism
The predominant belief in many modern Western societies is liberalism. Liberals
believe that people are individuals with a clear and singular voice (the authentic
self) and that there is free will. However, recent scientific discoveries seem to con-
tradict these assumptions. Firstly, our current model of the brain is that it is just an
assemblage of genetic algorithms and we lack a single self. Secondly, the algo-
rithms that constitute us are not free — they are composed of our genes and en-
vironmental pressures. Ultimately, these algorithms take decisions deterministi-
cally or randomly but not freely. In addition, to challenging the foundations of liber-
alism, modern science has also shown that we can make external algorithms that
know us better than we know ourselves. Harari cited an experiment from Cam-
bridge which found that a computer is better at predicting a person’s personality
than other humans by analyzing their Facebook likes.
3. Dataism
A new religion that has begun to emerge in the past few years is dataism. Dataism
is a religion that espouses the freedom of information and seeks to make our world
more interconnected while constantly producing more information. This creed has
materialized itself in our daily lives through our tendency to record, upload and
share every aspect of our lives on social media. With an ever increasing amount
of data, non-conscious but high intelligent algorithms may soon know us better
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than we know ourselves. Authority might also start to shift from humans to near-
omniscient algorithms.
4. Homo Deus
As our ability to re-engineer our bodies and minds increases, Harari sees Homo
Sapiens upgrading into Homo Deus (human god). This new species will have ac-
quired the ability to escape old age, death and misery — divinity. Harari envisions
three paths to divinity: biological engineering, cyborg engineering and the non-or-
ganic being engineering. We could rewrite our genetic code to grow new limbs,
rewire our brains or even alter our chemical balance. We could merge our organic
bodies with bionic eyes or even bionic limbs. We could write software free our
organic limitations that could rule the galaxy: non-organic being engineering.
5. New Type of Inequality
Traditionally inequality has been attributed to an unequal distribution in income. As
wealthy individuals continue to upgrade themselves a biological gap may develop
in addition to our existing wealth gap. This prophecy mirrors the TV show, Altered
Carbon. In the show, Meths (elite humans) are able to live forever by continuously
making clones of themselves and backing up their consciousness with cloud com-
puting. On the other hand, an ordinary citizen’s life will be constrained by the du-
rability of their physical body. As machines get better at performing human tasks,
those without the wealth to undergo biological enhancements might be rendered
economically useless.
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THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH BY

DAVID WALLACE-WELLS
Climate change is not a new phenomenon. According to NASA, throughout history,
change in Earth’s temperature happened following a change in its orbit around the
sun, which created variations in the amounts of solar energy it received. However,
since the Industrial Revolution (1760–1840), temperatures have been rising at
an unprecedented rapid rate as a result of human activities, causing disturb-
ances that threaten life on the planet.
The Industrial Revolution marked a period where manufacturing processes transi-
tioned from hand production methods to the use of machines, and where the num-
ber of factories and new power sources rose. The period is considered by econo-
mists to be the most important event in human history since the domestication of
animals and plants and has led to unprecedented sustained growth in human pop-
ulation, as well as in the standard of living, largely in the West.
This period also marks the beginning of burning fossil fuels to produce energy to
fuel almost everything in our modern life. As fossil fuels are burnt, they release
carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases into the atmosphere. These emis-
sions increase “the greenhouse effect” on Earth, which raises its temperature.
“The Uninhabitable Earth” focuses on this specific aspect of climate change. It
takes us on a disheartening tour over all the horrifying consequences that global
warming has brought to the planet to this date, and to the more dramatic conse-
quences we should expect as the earth continues to warm: heat death, hunger,
drowning, wildfire, disasters “no longer natural”, freshwater drain, dying
oceans, unbreathable air, plagues of warming, economic collapse, and cli-
mate conflict.
Wallace presents historical evidence of how these phenomena have already been
taking place now that the Earth is 1.1 degrees warmer than it was before the In-
dustrialization Revolution, and how their effects will worsen dramatically with each
additional degree of warming. He tells the story of the 2003 heat wave that killed
70.000 Europeans, for example, and explains that these figures would become
normal if the earth is 4 degrees warmer; that countries around the Equator would
become so hot at that level of warming that going out would become a lethal risk;
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He also tells the story of the man who burned himself to raise the alarm about
global warming; explains that the wealthiest countries have the largest carbon foot-
print and that the poorest countries will be the most hardly hit and the most unpre-
pared; that each seat in an airplane equates to melting a few square miles in the
Arctic.
Wallace also predicts the rise of new viruses, diseases, and pandemics — a few
months before the world is hit by the COVID-19 pandemic.
“The Uninhabitable Earth” is a difficult read as it gives little hope for a brighter fu-
ture given our response to climate change so far. It nevertheless puts a strong
emphasis on the potential politics has in curving its consequences.
“We have all the tools we need today, to stop it all: a carbon tax and the political
apparatus to aggressively phase out dirty energy; a new approach to agricultural
practices and a shift away from beef and dairy in the global diet; and public invest-
ment in green energy and carbon capture.”
This book is an important read for its extensive climate change literature and re-
search, and the remarkable work carried by Wallace to collect all this information
and make it available to raise public awareness around the alarming issue of global
warming.
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LOSING EARTH BY NATHANIEL RICH

Summary: An account of the lost opportunity of the 1980’s to address climate
change and the birth of the polarized dialogue that exists to this day.
Did you know that much of the scientific understanding of the greenhouse
effect and global warming traces back to the nineteenth century? That in the 1950’s
and throughout the Sixties and Seventies, scientists were already warning of global
warming and contending that warming connected with higher carbon dioxide levels
was already evident? Did you know there was a time when climate change and the
science behind it was not a political issue and that political leaders in both parties,
and many others in most the the countries of the world, substantially agreed that
this was a looming problem that needed to be addressed? That world leaders
came very close to an agreement to limit and reduce carbon dioxide emissions in
1989? That was thirty years ago. In 1990 human beings emitted more than 20
billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Instead of cutting that
amount, by 2018, the amount was projected at 37.1 billion metric tons and growing.
Nathaniel Rich narrates the story of a lost moment through two figures: Rafe
Pomerance, an environmental lobbyist and Gordon MacDonald, a climate scien-
tist. A third figure who plays a prominent role is James Hansen, a NASA climate
scientist who compiled massive amounts of data, and gave compelling testimony
wherever called upon. Pomerance, came across this finding in a government study
on the continued use of fossil fuels: “continued use of fossil fuels might, within two
or three decades, bring about ‘significant and damaging’ changes to the global
atmosphere.” That was in the spring of 1979 and changed the course of his life. It
led to his interview with Gordon MacDonald, a geophysicist, who was glad that
someone beside him finally noticed.
Rich’s book traces their efforts to mobilize awareness and action, culminat-
ing in the formation of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and
a climate summit in the Netherlands in 1989. Initially, action on climate change
was widely supported, at least in public statements. Meanwhile, a transformation
began to take place in the fossil fuel industry from studying the issue themselves
and reckoning on the consequences of continued fuel use, to a movement of re-
sistance and a challenge to the science, and exercise of increasing leverage. In
the climate talks, the resistance of one US figure led to a meaningless agreement
to which the US never subscribed, and an increasingly politicized discourse around
climate issues. Perhaps the most stunning revelation of this book was that it was
not always so.
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Rich’s afterword is both hopeful and sobering. He both notes the technolog-
ical advances that might be turned to action limiting global temperature rises to
somewhere between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius. Yet he also wrestles with the pro-
pensity of human beings to not act to address possible dangers down the road and
instead prefer their present comfort. He not only condemns in the strongest terms
those who twist and deny what they know. He challenges all of us:
“We do not like to think about loss, or death; Americans in particular, do not like to
think about death. No matter how obsessively one follows the politics of climate
change, it is difficult to contemplate soberly an existential threat to the species.
Our queasiness even infects the language we use to describe it: the banalities of
“global warming” and “climate change” perform the linguistic equivalent of rolling
on sanitary gloves to palpate a hemorrhaging wound.”
To see how close the world came to a climate agreement on carbon emis-
sions in the 1980’s, to learn of a time when this was not a political football, suggests
that it may be possible in the future. To avert the worst possibilities, it is imperative.
One concludes Rich’s book wondering, will we seize or miss the opportunity that
we have?
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HOW TO AVOID CLIMATE DISASTER BY

BILL GATES
The Climate is at Stake
‘How to Avoid a Climate Disaster: The Solutions We Have and the Break-
throughs We Need’ is a February 16th, 2021 publication by the well-renowned in-
novator, author, and philanthropist Bill Gates. The author himself does not need
any introduction. Bill Gates is known for his affiliation with Microsoft; however, his
work spectrum has gone beyond his computer company.
Currently, he is more recognized for his work towards eradicating poverty
and diseases like malaria. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is the child of
this philanthropic spirit. With ‘How to Avoid a Climate Disaster’, Gates extends his
desire to work for better lives through the environmental sector. The book com-
prises a total of twelve chapters each a build-up to the concept of the following
chapter. As the complete title suggests, Gates’s book is a holistic insight on the
subject matter, with a range of explanatory chapters based on explaining climate
change; from the main contributors to its aggravation to suggesting a policy ap-
proach that he believes will work towards finding permanent solutions to its end.
The division of the work syncs with the argument that Bill Gates has built.
Solution to Climate Change?
Bill Gates’ main thesis of the book is his belief in there being a solution to
climate change in technology and innovation. To back this up, Gates shares his
learning from years of research on the topic. It is both explanatory and prescriptive.
Gates begins his work by first defining climate crisis and his main goal; ‘ways to
get to Zero’. By zero, he means zero carbon and carbon-related emissions to slow
down the process of deterioration of the planet. To this end, he highlights the sec-
tors that contribute the greatest to this, namely the manufacturing industry, agri-
culture, energy sector, and our transport. The themes are dealt with separately and
provide an in-depth analysis of each issue. In addition, Gates also suggests the
ways the switch will need to be made. He introduces his readers to the term, ‘Green
Premium’, which is the amount of capital that would go into switching to the sus-
tainable side of each sector. The concept of Green Premium is another one of the
major themes of Bill Gates’ study. Moreover, besides highlighting the issues, the
book has been used to also elaborate on the lack of action or complete inaction
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towards coming up with a plan on any level, be it individual, state, or system. He

adds that climate diplomacy will be the hardest to attain because of the lack of
consensus on it.
Climate Policy
Another theme that is recurrent in How to Avoid a Climate Disaster is his
policy suggestions which include a need to tackle this situation from all fronts. For
instance, he writes, “We can work on a local, national, and global level to build the
technologies, businesses, and industries to avoid the worst impacts of climate
change.” Gates is an innovator; he firmly believes that innovation is capable of
cutting down the damages it created in the first place. Here, he teams innovation
with policy for better results.
Bill Gates’s contributions to modern development starting from our PCs to
this very app I am using to type this review are rightfully recognized. Gates is a
developer and an innovator; he does not attempt to hide this side of him in the
book at all, rather it shines through. Gates’s penmanship should also be lauded;
his idea is to deliver the message across to everyone and that is exactly what he
does. The message is delivered in the simplest language, so that a simple, non-
scientific person may be able to learn and understand the same things about cli-
mate change as do the technicians in the field.
Every author brings in a perspective, but when one reviews a book, they
often do not review the language. When I read this book, as an International Rela-
tions specialist, I felt that Bill Gates made a point, a good one; we often want to
bring change, however, we forget to get everyone on board for that. Climate
change is one such change, it is true and extremely significant that a child, a
woman, and a man, all understand the issue with the same urgency.
All about Perspective
While I felt that the main content did not have any gaps, mainly because the
author in the very beginning declared that he wrote not from an expert’s angle but
that of a learner — and learners make mistakes. Thereafter, it is not a criterion
anymore. Expect mistakes. Mr Gates did, however, stay true to only the innovation
and development sides. He mentioned the many innovations around the world and
his policy suggestions often overlook certain ground realities.
Perhaps his philanthropist side got in the way, for which capital mobilization, for
the many policies he suggested, came about with much ease. He wrote from a
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neo-liberal angle, maybe a constructivist, even a little utilitarian. While reading, a

lot of questions came to my mind; why is Gates assuming that the rich will start
taking climate change seriously because of a pandemic and a Greta Thunberg?
Is he thinking that everyone can build a business from scratch, just like that? I
realized that my thoughts and approach were more embedded in post-structural-
ism. I tend to look at things from a local angle. To anyone else, Gates’s ideas made
perfect sense; to me, they lacked the consideration of disparities because I
acknowledge the reality of the rich never wanting to help the poor.
Bill dreamed of it, I did not. Yet, I appreciate what he wrote. ‘How to Avoid a Climate
Disaster: the Solutions We Have and the Breakthroughs We Need’ is a must-read.
Bill Gates is a perceptive man; he reinstates this with this book. Besides, if the
pandemic has taught us all one thing, it is that nature is going to be our biggest
challenge, staying in denial that it won’t is of little help. Better best be aware!
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A NEW CULTURE OF LEARNING:

CULTIVATING THE IMAGINATION FOR A
WORLD OF CONSTANT CHANGE: THOMAS AND
BROWN
Thomas and Brown began their book by saying:

When people think about learning, they usually think about schools. And when
people think about schools, they usually think about teachers.
They quickly followed up by saying this type of learning is being challenged
by a world that is in rapid flux. Current education systems are no longer able to
keep pace. Thomas and Brown examined this hot topic over the course of 140
pages and nine chapters. They talked about the wealth of information available to
a learner, and how learners learn by exploring resources, questioning experts, and
creating their own content.
For most of the twentieth century our educational system has been built on the
assumption that teaching is necessary for learning to occur.
Thomas and Brown contrasted two learning cultures: one that is teacher-
centric where teachers explain what is important, and one that is learner-centric
where learners determine what is important and learn through engagement with
the materials. The authors stressed the importance of moving to a learner-centric
approach primarily because change was occurring so rapidly. The importance to
teach learners to be lifelong learners is greater than it has ever been. New tech-
nologies are being developed, adopted, and discarded at a faster and faster rate.
Learners cannot rely on others to teach them about new changes through work-
shops and lectures; there is simply not enough time. However, Thomas and Brown
argued unfettered access to the Internet was not necessarily productive; teachers
were needed to help guide discovery. Learners have to learn not only by them-
selves but also in peer-to-peer environments. Learners must learn to also be cre-
ators of content not simply consumers.
Throughout the book, the authors provided examples. One example that I
thought was particularly interesting and highlighted the difference between educa-
tion and learning was the Avernir’s case that Ryerson University. The students
were involved in collective learning, and benefited from the power of technology;
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however, the professor who was locked in an education framework felt the effort
was cheating.
The connection between the personal and collective is a key ingredient in lifelong
learning.
Thomas and Brown explored learning through experimentation and explora-
tion, and they discussed how gamers learn through gaming. The authors noted
that “Gamers learn through experimentation. They play with the tools they have in
the virtual world they inhabit, repeatedly making minor adjustments and recording
the results.” Typically, this type of passion is evident in most learning opportunities;
however, it is not always evident in education opportunities. The authors argued
we need more opportunities for knowing, making, and playing.
One of the more interesting parts of the book, at least for me, was when the
authors discussed in detail how games like World of Warcraft are learning commu-
nities. Thomas and Brown stressed the importance of play in learning. It is some-
thing we do not do enough of. This was another enjoyable read, one that expanded
my knowledge on the topic. If you are interested in debating education and learn-
ing, it is worth having on your shelf.
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THE GREAT DELUSION BY JOHN MEARSHEIMER
Liberal Dreams and International Realities” does not refer to liberal

Democrats versus conservative Republicans. It refers to liberal societies
(those that value individual rights/economic openness and tend to be
democratic) versus non-liberal societies (those with little respect for in-
dividual rights and whose government controls the economy). His cen-
tral point is that, while liberalism is a fantastic method of governing in
domestic politics, it fails completely when nations attempt to export lib-
eralism to non-liberal nations. Naturally, this runs in direct opposition to
the decades of nation-building and democracy promotion that the United
States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. This week, let’s take
a closer look at the main theories of international relations and how this
book can help change the conversation.
REALISM
John Mearsheimer is widely considered among the most prominent
“realists” in international relations theories. First things first, what’s a re-
alist? Realism is a type of philosophy in international politics that rests
on a few key assumptions that define what is often called “realpolitik”
(real politics). These are:
1) The natural state of global politics is one of anarchy, since there is no
single global power to enforce rules. No nation can be 100% certain that
previously agreed upon rules will be enforced and must always prepare
for the worst.
2) States are rational actors (not crazy people) and will pursue actions
that they believe will further their interests.
3) States value their own survival and security above all other concerns
(such as maximizing profit or promoting an ideology).
4) Security seeking behavior leads states to maximize their relative
power on the global stage.
5) All weapons which have a defensive nature can also be used for of-
fensive means. In essence, this means that if a country arms purely to
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protect itself, all the countries around it need to make the assumption
that those defenses can be used for offensive purposes. Those coun-
tries must arm their own defenses accordingly.
Realism is often critiqued as being a pessimistic outlook on inter-
national politics. In particular, Mearsheimer points to the dramatic power
of nationalism and the ways in which strong nationalism have proven to
be the undoing of other ideologies such as global communism. But
Mearsheimer argues that such clear-eyed views are necessary in order
to prevent what he considers to be the misguided views of liberal inter-
nationalism. So what is liberal internationalism?
LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
In short, liberal internationalism is an international relations theory
that places a high value on the importance of individual rights and inter-
national institutions. These two values, combined with the idea that the
more nations who respect them means a more peaceful/prosperous
world, leads liberal internationalists to believe that states should work to
advance those rights throughout the world. This is often done with the
support of international institutions (like the United Nations or the World
Bank) that seek to promote these ideas worldwide. This theory is sup-
ported by ideas and trends that are often used as evidence proving the
effectiveness of the current Liberal International Order (LIO) in prevent-
ing war:
1) Democratic Peace Theory: The belief that democratic nations tend to
avoid going to war with one another because they are held accountable
by their people, who naturally favor peace and prosperity to war.
2) Economic Peace Theory: The belief that nations which have strong
interconnected economic ties will often avoid war because that costs of
war would outweigh the economic benefits of peace.
WHAT MEARSHEIMER GETS RIGHT
Mearsheimer makes a compelling case by pointing out the flaws of
liberal internationalism. Though democracy and liberalism work well for
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domestic policies (USA, USA!), it is doomed to fail in international rela-

tions. In domestic politics, liberalism allows for the healthy exchange of
ideas and opinions. The democratic process helps prevent any one po-
litical faction from gaining complete control, because opposing view-
points are tolerated rather than suppressed. According to Mearsheimer,
this whole system works because there is a single overarching power
that enforces the rules in domestic politics.
There is a military and police force that holds a monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence, respects the individual rights of the people
they oversee, and provides every person the security they need to trust
the rules of the system. However, there is no such military force or sys-
tem within the global community. Though the United States remains the
dominant power, it does not have full authority over the rules of interna-
tional relations and certainly cannot always be counted on to intervene
when another nation breaks those rules.
In fact, it is often the strongest powers (like the United States) who
break the rules most often! (This helps bolster the realist claims that the
international system is one of anarchy.) Mearsheimer’s case is certainly
strengthened by the actions of powers like the United States over the
last thirty years.
Another foundational aspect of liberal internationalism is that it can-
not resist attempting to enforce its self-imposed rules about human
rights and economic openness on others. Mearsheimer calls this a cru-
sader-like impulse. But such interventions are doomed to fail in part be-
cause of the incredibly powerful force of nationalism. When people per-
ceive an attack on their homeland, they are often very quick to “rally
around the flag” and support a regime (even one that was previously
unpopular). At the heart of nationalism is the idea of sovereignty. Think
of this as a nation’s ability to pursue its own destiny free from interfer-
ence. He cites examples such as the American wars in Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan as case studies proving the failures of attempting to
export liberalism abroad.
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He also excellently deconstructs some of the main selling points of

liberalism. For instance, Democratic Peace Theory is undermined by in-
stances where the United States intervened in Latin & South American
politics to overthrow democratically elected governments. Both were
democratically elected governments that essentially went to war, despite
their shared democratic values. Economic peace theory is undermined
by the outbreak of the First World War because most of the nations in-
volved had economic ties among them. Finally, the multiple interven-
tions in global affairs by powerful nations like Russia, China, and the
United States undermine the efficacy of international institutions in cur-
tailing aggressive behavior. After all, rules and norms of international
behavior might work for smaller nations, but the bigger ones always play
by their own rules.
WHAT MEARSHEIMER GETS NOT-SO-RIGHT
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The weakness in his arguments is that he doesn’t quite make the

most compelling case that “pursuing liberalism abroad leads to authori-
tarianism at home”. Mearsheimer makes the claim that pursuing liberal-
ism abroad leads not just to a state of nearly endless war (since there
will always be a nation trying to undermine the liberal system), but that
the endless state of warfare leads that nation to become a police state
at home. Though he may have a point about the endless war (see 2001-
Present Day), there is little evidence to show that nations which promote
liberalism become police states. The most obvious example of this being
that the United States is the chief pursuer of liberalism abroad, but is still
deeply democratic at home.
There are much better arguments that he could have emphasized
more closely like the socially and politically polarizing nature of endless
warfare or the opportunity costs lost to the American people from per-
petual defense spending. These points seem even more relevant in re-
cent years, with prominent presidential candidates already making argu-
ments that America’s broad defense budget could be better spent on
domestic programs.
The other problem is not a fault of his arguments, but of the nature
of international relations theories themselves: often we are trying to
prove a negative. Though he cites several examples where American
involvement actually weakened the LIO and made warfare more likely
(and includes examples where intervention worked), it’s nearly impossi-
ble to prove whether or not the LIO prevented conflicts from occurring
long before they ever really got started.
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THE CASE FOR RESTRAINT

Perhaps the most compelling point of Mearsheimer’s work comes
at the last chapter, where he ends with a call for restraint in American
foreign policy. His prescription is that the United States ought to focus
its attention only on core strategic interests in areas like North America
and Europe. The main focus of the United States would be to increase
its relative power in these regions where it has the most to lose if such
areas are neglected. On the plus side, America would likely be involved
in fewer costly wars since it wouldn’t seek to promote democracy or hu-
man rights by directly intervening in peripheral regions. I think most peo-
ple would agree that such interventions have failed more often than not.
On the other hand, it would also mean abandoning the pursuit of global
human rights since that would mean pursuing lofty idealism. This is
much more difficult to accept because the desire to protect human rights
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and fight injustice is hardwired into liberal societies. Both political parties
are guilty of this in America. For example, do you remember the last time
a Democrat condemned the imprisonment of LGBT individuals in an op-
pressive nation, or a Republican condemned the imprisonment of Chris-
tians in an oppressive nation? According to Mearsheimer, such priorities
can lead a nation into unnecessary and costly wars that distract from
much more critical objectives (i.e. the rise of China). In his view, the pur-
suit of these ideals outside of one’s own nation is simply a recipe for
disaster and almost never works.
Overall, his book is an excellent work. One that has even me, a
fervent defender of liberal internationalism, questioning the foundations
of my international relations philosophies. I won’t call myself a realist just
yet, but I can certainly see the merit of these arguments. I strongly en-
courage everyone who cares about the issues discussed in this article
to read this book and conduct your own independent research on these
theories of global politics. Only by educating ourselves and understand-
ing the world can we hope to improve it.
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THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER

POLITICS BY JOHN MEARSHEIMER
The first chapter “Introduction”, is actually an ‘abstract’ of his
book, in which he explains the behavior of great powers to assert that
security competition and war cannot be purged away from the interna-
tional system. Mearsheimer holds that any optimism regarding great
power cooperation is unfounded, and the evidence of “perpetual peace”
among great powers is minimal. The United States still maintains huge
military presence in Europe and Northeast Asia. The European powers
are still apprehensive of Germany, and the same is true in case of North-
east Asian powers like China and Russia about Japan. The possibility
of clash between China and United States over Taiwan exists.
Mearsheimer asserts that “the sad fact is that international politics has
always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain
that way” (p.2).
He contends that great powers are never satisfied with the distri-
bution of power and always try to change it in their favour. Their desire
for more power continues until a great power attains the status of a
hegemon. He observes that “great powers are primed for offence” (p.3).
They seek to gain power at the cost of other states. It is the structure of
international system that forces them to act aggressively against each
other. He aptly remarks:-
“This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is
genuinely tragic. Great powers have no reason to fight each other- that
are merely concerned with their own survival- nevertheless have little
choice but to pursue power to seek to dominate the other states in the
system” (p.3). The crux of the offensive realism theory is that great pow-
ers are ordained to look for opportunities to maximize their power at the
expense of each other. This intense security competition leads to war
and immense bloodshed. The theory focuses on great powers because
they have the largest impact on the international politics. The theory tells
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us a great deal about the international politics since 1792 till end of the
20th century; and has been used to make predictions about great power
politics in the twenty-first century. Mearsheimer explains how offensive
realism is different from other realist theories. ‘Human nature realism’ is
actually the ‘classical realism’, and Hans J. Morgenthau is its main pro-
ponent. According to this theory, “states are led by human beings who
have a will to power hardwired in them at birth” (p.19); and states have
limitless lust for power. Then there is the theory of ‘defensive realism’,
which is also called “structural realism”. Its basic assumption is that
“states merely aim to survive…They seek security” (p.19); and, due to
the structure of international system and its condition of anarchy, great
powers focus on balance of power.
Mearsheimer states that his theory of offensive realism is also a
structural theory. However, its main variation with regard to defensive
realism is the question of how much power do states want. According to
Mearsheimer, the International system compels the great powers to
maximize their power, till such time that one of the great powers
achieves the status of a regional hegemon- the best state for any great
power. This is done through aggressive behaviour; “Great powers be-
have aggressively not because they want to or because they possess
some inner drive to dominate, but because they have to seek more
power if they want to maximize their odds for survival” (p.21)
Chapter two of the book, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power”, is
the most important chapter in which Mearsheimer explains this theoret-
ical framework. The rest of the book is the historical evidence to prove
various hypotheses of the theory. The author argues that the great pow-
ers have always been searching for opportunities to become stronger
than their adversaries and have hegemony as their ultimate objective.
When one power achieves preponderance over other great powers,
then it becomes a status quo power.
The argument pre-supposes an international system that has many
great powers, and every one of them has revisionist intentions at the
core of their action. The competition and struggle of great powers in such
a system is carried out to maximize their share of the world power.
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Mearsheimer bases his explanation on five “bedrock assumptions”,

which are to be considered simultaneously to understand the competi-
tion among the great powers to achieve hegemony. The five bedrock
assumptions are in fact the basic assumptions of the realist theory that
are known to the students of political science and international politics:
“the international system is anarchic”; “great powers inherently possess
some offensive military capability”; and therefore, they are dangerous to
each other; “states can never be certain about other state’s intentions”,
especially when it comes to the use of military power; “survival remains
the basic objective of great powers”;
“Great powers are rational actors”, and take rational decisions
(p.30-31). It is only when all the five assumptions are synthesized to-
gether that offensive behaviour of states comes to the fore. Mearsheimer
explains the behavior of great powers in terms of “fear”, “self-help” and
“power maximization”. He argues that “great powers fear each other”,
and from the standpoint of one great power, all others are its enemies.
Their military capability coupled with uncertainty about intentions and
absence of a central authority (the author calls it 911- the number one
can call whenever help is required), is the main basis of this fear.
This is best exemplified by the apprehensions of United Kingdom
and France about the dangers of German re-unification at the end of the
Cold War. Consequently, the political competition among the great pow-
ers is dangerous as ithas often led to wars with massive casualties and
disasters. In such a system, states vie to ensure their survival. For this
they resort to “self-help” measures, which also include forming alliances
with other great powers, and to change them immediately when their
survival so demands. In the World War-II, the United States fought along
with USSR and China against Germany and Japan. But immediately af-
ter the war, enemies and friend were quickly changed to Germany and
Japan to fight a long Cold War against USSR and China. Mearsheimer
points out that when a state achieves hegemonic position, it becomes a
status quo power.
According to the author, the United State has been a regional
hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred
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years. He argues that in the absence of achieving a clear cut nuclear

superiority, it is impossible for any state to achieve status of a global
hegemon. No power has ever achieved the status of a global hegemon.
Even the Unites States has not achieved this status as it lacks the ability
to project power into the territory of another great power due to the stop-
ping power of water. Regional hegemony is the best state for a great
power. Mearsheimer argues that power and fear are connected to one
another. The more is the power possessed by a state, more is the fear
it generates. Also, there is difference between “potential” and “actual”
power.
According to the author, “a state’s potential power is based on the
size of population and the level of its wealth” and its actual power is
situated in “its army and the air and naval forces that directly support it”
(p.43). The author maintains that ”land power” component of the military
power is the key component even in the nuclear age. Power affects the
intensity of fear. Nuclear states fear each other less than those states
which had no nuclear weapons. It is because nuclear weapons reduce
the likelihood of war between states. But possibility of war always re-
mains and so does a degree of mutual fear. When great powers are
separated by large water bodies, their offensive capability reduces, and
so does the level of fear.
The distribution of power among states also affects the level of fear.
The author believes that more fear is generated in a multipolar system
which contains a potential hegemon, and this is referred to by the author
as “unbalanced multipolarity”. A multipolar system, without a potential
hegemon is called “balanced multipolarity”. In such a system, power
gaps among great powers are not very pronounced. The author postu-
lates that the great powers balance each other against capabilities not
against intentions. While stating “the hierarchy of state goals”, the author
opines that survival is the number one goal followed by economic pros-
perity, welfare of citizenry, promotion of ideology, national re-unification
and fostering human rights. It is accepted by offensive realism that great
powers do pursue these non-security goals, but as long as they do not
jeopardize the balance of power logic.
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In chapter three “Wealth and Power”, the author defines power and
gives methods to measure it. He looks at power as being based on ma-
terial capabilities possessed by a state. Therefore, according to
Mearsheimer, balance of power is done by employing tangible assets
like nuclear weapons, armoured divisions and fleets. State’s power com-
prises latent power and military power. Latent power is made up of so-
cio-economic ingredients which are state’s wealth, size and population.
These ingredients go on to build the military power. In international pol-
itics, a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces
vis-à-vis military forces of other states.
Therefore, balance of power is essentially the balance of military
power. Author’s offensive realism emphasizes force as the ultimate ar-
biter of international politics. At the same time, states pay serious atten-
tion to the balance of latent power also. The source of military power is
the population and wealth of great powers. Out of the two, the author
takes wealth alone to quantify military power, because wealth includes
both demographic and economic dimensions of power. Mobilized wealth
means the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build mili-
tary forces, and how much wealth is available to spend on defence.
Highly industrialized states have more surplus wealth than semi-indus-
trialized states, and the states with high-tech industries are liable to pro-
duce sophisticated weaponry.
The author argues that distribution of wealth had been the main
cause for rise or fall of the three European great powers - France, Ger-
many and Russia -during the last two centuries. According to the histor-
ical evidence, German wealth in World War-I was much more than Rus-
sia’s; so German Army defeated the Russian Army. In World War-II,
Russia was able to convert its superior latent power into military might
much more effectively, so she defeated the German army. At times,
wealthy states don’t build additional military forces or enter into arms
race, because they calculate that doing so would not give them better
strategic position. So they hold back and wait for more opportune times.
From 1815 to 1914, the United Kingdom was the wealthiest state in Eu-
rope. But she never translated her latent power into military might to
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become a hegemon, because it realized the huge problems in projecting

its power across the English Channel.
At times, states conclude that excessive defence spending might
be bad for economy, and at other time wealthy allies can compensate
for a state’s expenditure on its military. Distribution of economic might
cannot exactly be equated with distribution of military might. Germany
had more than 3:1 advantage in economic terms over Soviet Union in
1942. However, over the next three years, Russian economy translated
into military might with amazing efficiency, and Red Army prevailed over
German Army. Although wealth is the foundation of military power of a
state, but wealth is not synonymous with military might.
In chapter four “The Primacy of Land Power”, Mearshiemer argues
that power in international politics is largely a result of military forces a
state possesses. There are four types of military powers among which
states choose: independent sea power, strategic air power, land power
and nuclear weapons. The author believes that land power is the domi-
nant form of military power. Power of state is situated in its army and air
and naval forces which support it.
The offensive realism dictates that “most powerful states possess
the most formidable armies” (p.83). Hence quantification of the power of
land forces provides an approximate relative power balance of the great
powers; and large bodies of water severely limit the power projection
capacity of land forces. The stopping power of water- the oceans and
seas- is an important limitation to the very concept of global hegemony.
The author disagrees with Mahan’s theory of independent sea power
and Douhet’s theory of strategic air power. Mearsheimer maintains that
wars are won by big battalions and not by sea or air units. Even in the
nuclear environment, where the great powers have involved in intense
security competition, armies and “the air and naval forces that support
them” is the core ingredient of military balance.
Armies are the main instrument for conquering and controlling the
land which is the ultimate political objective. Navy and air forces can’t
conquer land; they only coerce the adversary. As regards the nuclear
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weapons and the balance of power, the author observes that these
weapons are revolutionary, as they can cause unprecedented destruc-
tion in matter of seconds. The author holds the view that even in case of
mutually destructive nuclear deterrence, the security competition be-
tween great powers continues, and the land power remains the key com-
ponent of the military power. However, possession of nuclear weapons
adds caution to the use of military force by one great power against the
other. He gives evidence of 1973 Arabs-Israel War, where Egypt and
Syria fought against a nuclear Israel; the war between Russia and China
along Ussuri River in 1969, where both had the nuclear arsenal; and
India and Pakistan who were embroiled in serious crisis in 1990, and the
border war in Kargil in 1999. He concludes that land power remains cen-
tral to military power even in the nuclear age, although, nuclear weapons
make great power war less likely.
In chapter five “Strategies for Survival”, the author discusses the
strategies used by great powers to maximize their share of world power.
The main objectives of a great power are: hegemony in their region;
ability to project power across stopping power of water, achievement of
wealth, development of large land forces and supporting naval and air
forces and achievement of the nuclear superiority. “War” is the main
strategy that the great powers employ to gain power. Then is “blackmail”,
which is threat of force and not its actual use, to produce results. Black-
mail is a complicated strategy because great powers are likely to fight it
out than to be blackmailed.
“Bait and bleed” is another strategy where a state weakens its rival
by provoking a long and expensive war between the rival state and an-
other state. Another strategy is “bloodletting”, where a state ensures that
the war in which its adversary is involved, is made long and protracted.
Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979 -1989) is a classic example of this strat-
egy. “Balancing” and “buck passing “are strategies to prevent an aggres-
sor from upsetting the balance of power. Balancing is employed when
states get together to balance or fight an aggressor. In buck passing,
states try to get another great power to check the aggressor, and they
themselves remain on the sidelines.
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The responsibility is passed on to the other state by the threatened

states. Then there are avoiding strategies of “appeasement” and “band
wagoning”. In these strategies, power is conceded to the adversary, and
hence great powers don’t generally follow them. In bandwagon a threat-
ened state joins the powerful state after recognizing that it can’t stand
the aggressor alone. In appeasement, a state aims to adjust the behav-
iour of the aggressor by conceding some of its power to the aggressor.
The most important strategies used by the great powers remain war for
acquiring additional power, and balancing and buck passing for preserv-
ing the balance of power.
In chapter six “Great Powers in Action”, Mearsheimer examines the
behaviour of great powers to prove that great powers seek regional he-
gemony. Based on exhaustive evidence from the history, the author es-
tablishes that revisionist great powers have been fighting with each other
to maximize their share of world power. Also, when one of them
achieves the status of regional hegemon, then it becomes a status-quo
state.
Great powers have not denied themselves the opportunity to shift
the balance of power in their favour. And, the desire to acquire more
power does not stop even when they have had the maximum of it. By
examing the foreign policy behavour of five dominant powers over the
last 150 years, the author has skillfully established the above stated
premises of the offensive realism. These powers have always expanded
through conquest, invariably seized any opportunity to change balance
of power in their favour, with gaining of power each one showed appetite
to gain even more to reach the status of a regional hegemon. In the
nuclear age, both the United States and the Soviet Union did not remain
contended with Mutual Assessed Destruction (MAD) situation; both
strived to achieve nuclear superiority over the other all the way till end
of the cold war.
In chapter seven “The Offshore Balancers”, the author examines his
theory by selecting the American and the British cases, as they provide
the strongest evidence against the offensive realism’s argument that
great powers are dedicated to maximize their power. It is a fact that the
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United States had become great power by 1898, yet it did not build a
powerful military to conquer more territories in the Western Hemisphere.
Similarly, in 1900s the United States was the most powerful economy in
the world, yet it did no project her power to Europe or Northeast Asia.
In the same vein, United Kingdom was substantially powerful be-
tween 1840 and 1860; yet it did not build its military power to dominate
Europe. Mearsheimer explains the United States case by arguing that
there were no worth while territories to be captured by her, and she was
busy consolidating the huge North American landmass it had acquired.
Similarly, the stopping power of water – the mighty Atlantic and the Pa-
cific oceans were responsible to stop the United States from projecting
her power into Europe and Northeast Asia.
As regards the United Kingdom, the fact was that Europe was in-
habited by many great powers at that time, which were difficult to be
conquered. Moreover, stopping power of the English Channel hindered
her power projection. Having examined this aspect, Mearshiemer goes
on to establish the offshore balancing role of both the United States and
the United Kingdom. “United States acted as an offshore balancer dur-
ing the twentieth century to ensure that it remained the sole regional
hegemon” (p.237). United Kingdom committed her military forces to the
Continent when it could not pass the buck, or another power threatened
to dominate Europe. She accepted the Continental commitment in both
the World Wars; and in the Cold War continued to fulfill this commitment
alongwith her forces in central Europe against the Soviet threat.
In chapter eight “Balancing versus Buck-Passing”, Mearsheimer ex-
amines the strategies employed by the great powers to defend the bal-
ance of power by balancing or by passing the buck. The author high-
lights that decision to balance or to buck-pass is actually linked with
structure of the international system.
A bi-polar system favours balancing strategy. A multipolar system
is more likely to offer buck-passing choice. Magnitude of threat and ge-
ography are the other factors in the decision to buck-pass. The author
has examined Revolutionary and Nepoleonic France (1789- 1815) with
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respect to its strategic targets, calculus of power within France, and the
power of other four states. The author concludes that balancing against
France by the European powers had remained problematic, and buck-
passing had worked mostly for United Kingdom. The study of Cold War
(1945-1990) is instructive in the sense that the end of World War-II had
left the Soviet Union as the most important state in Europe and North-
east Asia. United State had no choice left to pass the buck. It had to
“contain” the Soviet Union on its own. So it did throughout the Cold War.
In a multipolar world, buck-passing is frequent. However, geography in
the shape of common borders with the aggressor, or having buffer states
or water body in between, has often influenced the decisions to buck-
pass.
In chapter nine “The causes of Great Power War”, the author exam-
ines war as a strategy employed by the great powers to maximize their
share of world power. The author acknowledges that security competi-
tion is a perpetual condition among the great powers, and war is an oc-
casional happening. The author takes the help of the “structural theory”
to explain the causes of war between states when at least one of the
warring states is a great power. International anarchy is the main struc-
tural factor that causes war between states.
As per the author “the main causes of war are located in the archi-
tecture of the international system” (p.337). The number of great powers
and the distribution of power among them are other factors that influence
war. Bipolar or multipolar configurations of the structure and power im-
balance also increase or decrease the proneness to war. In a multipolar
system, there is more chance of miscalculation of strength and resolve,
which could lead to the decision to war. In a multipolar system, potential
hegemons increase fear among other great powers. Fear leads to com-
petition for power which is the recipe for conflict. The author draws heav-
ily on the historical evidence form seven periods of European history
starting from French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1792 to the
end of the Cold War in 1990.
The author states that during the 199-years of European history,
there have been 24 great power wars including 3 central wars (war
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among all great powers), 6 great power vs. great power wars, and 15
great power vs. minor power wars. Consequently, bipolarity seems to be
the most peaceful and least deadly architecture. Unbalanced multipolar-
ity is by far the most war prone and deadly distribution of power that led
to 3 central, 1 great power vs. great power and 5 great powers vs. minor
power wars with 27 million military and as many civilian deaths. Bal-
anced multipolarity falls between these two extremes with I great power
vs. great power war and 9 great power vs. minor power war and 1.2
million casualties.
In the last chapter “Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Cen-
tury”, the author has discussed the future of the current century from
the perspective of offensive realism. The author argues that despite the
end of the Cold War and the optimism about great power cooperation,
the realist theory holds as strong as ever. It is because the anarchic
nature of international system has not changed; neither there are any
signs that it would change. States do remain the most powerful actors in
the system without any “night watchman” over them. He puts forward
strong evidence from the decade of 1990- 2000 to show that security
competition among the great powers is on, both, in Europe as well as in
Northeast Asia.
There are one hundred thousand US troops each stationed in
Northeast Asia and Europe. The author predicts that in the next about
twenty years, there is likely to be greater instability in these regions due
to changes in the power distribution and emergence of more powers.
The author also predicts that the most dangerous potential threat to the
United States in the early twenty-first century would be China.
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PRISONERS OF GEOGRAPHY BY
TIM MARSHALL
Lesson 1: Russia has a strong presence in the Baltics to protect
itself from getting invaded from the West.
If you look at Russia on a map, you might be surprised at just how
enormous it is. The country spans 6 million square miles, making it the
biggest country in the world by far. While the country is massive, there
is one thing that keeps Russian President Vladimir Putin up at night. It
is a stretch of land bordering Russia that resembles a slice of pizza. It
starts in Poland, and the wedge stretches to the foot of the Ural Moun-
tains and northeast to Moscow. What worries Russian leaders is that
this land is part of the North European Plain. It stretches from France
through Belgium, the Netherlands, Northern Germany, Poland, and then
ends at the Ural Mountains. Because this area is flat, it makes Russia
vulnerable and difficult to defend from Europe. Hypothetically, any
country in the North European Plain could fairly easily send an
army across this flat region that leads directly into Moscow, Rus-
sia’s capital city. One of the reasons Putin is well aware of this is be-
cause it has happened throughout Russia’s history. Since 1812, North-
ern European invaders have attacked Russia here an average of once
every 33 years. So the Russian strategy has been to maintain control of
Poland and the Baltic states. Because this takes a huge chunk of the
vulnerable land, Russia can hold off potential invaders much more easily
by maintaining a strong defense here. Sadly, this has meant a tough go
for the Baltic States.
Lesson 2: The location of the United States makes it nearly invul-
nerable.
While most countries have to worry about invasions, for the most
part, the United States doesn’t. Its unique geographical position renders
it pretty much invulnerable to any invading army. The neighbors to the
north and the south are on friendly terms, and what’s more, they are so
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large that any army attempting to invade through them would have to
have impossibly long supply lines. On the east and the west, the United
States has the advantage of having oceans as borders. This all but cuts
them off from invasions in these areas because any invader would have
to cross an entire ocean to get there. In addition to these natural de-
fenses, there is one more thing that makes the US so secure-lenient gun
laws. American citizens own an estimated 393 million guns, which allow
every small town to have the ability to take up arms and defend them-
selves without the government, if necessary. The right to bear arms is
part of the American Constitution and is so deeply woven into the social
fabric that guns are easy to reach for many Americans. Any force at-
tempting to invade the United States wouldn’t just have to contend
with the US army, they would have to fight a new set of armed ci-
vilians in just about every city.
Lesson 3: Northern European countries flourish, while its Southern
ones struggle, all due to geography.
The world has Europe to thank for the Enlightenment and Industrial
revolution, which have both contributed to modern life in huge ways. Eu-
rope’s thriving societies are in large part a result of a temperate climate
with good soil and generous rainfall. But the geography of Europe has
also meant some areas have thrived more than others. At the peak of
the Eurozone crisis in 2012, nasty stereotypes were spread around the
media to explain why some people were experiencing such a bad eco-
nomic downturn. The generalizations were that northern Europeans
worked hard and were industrious, while southern Europeans were lazy
and had no work ethic. Marshal explains that the actual reason for the
southern Europeans’ struggles past and present is their geography. The
Northern European Plain gifted France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Germany with good soil and a wealth of crops. Because of the surplus
of crops and goods, northern Europe was associated with hard
work and developed big cities of commerce. On the other hand,
Southern Europe has far less arable land. For example, Greece doesn’t
have enough fertile soil to be a big agricultural exporter, which has
meant they could only develop a handful of major cities of commerce
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like there are in the north. And bigger cities also bring in highly skilled
and educated workers who will drive the economy and technology for-
ward.
In China, it discussed the strategic importance of Tibet. Both major Riv-
ers in China, the Yellow River in the North, and the Yangtze to the South
originate from the Tibetan Plateau. An independent Tibet aligning with a
country like India that has questionable intentions from the Chinese per-
spective, could be a potential source of military threat…and most im-
portantly could use the access to the water supply to their advantage. A
chapter was dedicated to the United State and how its territories provide
a competitive advantage in terms of access to oceans, navigable inland
rivers. It explored Cuba and its proximity to the United States, which
could be a source of access for an enemy attack on Florida. And thus
the years of tensions and involvement with the Island.
National rivalry between India and Pakistan and also between
Korea and Japan was discussed. These rivalries were the result of ide-
ologies (like in India and Pakistan) and long game strategic play (like in
North Korea and South Korea). It also touched on Africa and how its
isolation is a cause of its current economic position. Sub-Saharan Af-
rica is bordered to the North by the Sahara Desert, possesses few nat-
ural habours for ships to dock, and non-navigable inland rivers. The con-
tinent is also plagued with diseases and poor inland connections. These
complexities isolated its inhabitants from one another and the world pre-
venting the key to a society’s evolution: cross-pollination of ideas.
The Europeans arrived and colonised the region. They settled
around the coasts and overlooked the development of the hinterland.
They further carved out nations to serve the resource needs without con-
cern to the diverse histories people in the said regions. Upon independ-
ence, Africa nations had to construct nations out of the flawed institu-
tions and structures not positioned to assist them collectively improve
their lot. For the Middle East, the book’s main thrust was the disputes
arising in societies where borders were drawn by people with limited
knowledge of customs and ways of life: The Europeans. It makes an
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assertion that these borders according to the book, are being re-
drawn “in blood”. The middle East extends 1,000 miles west to east and
is 2,000 miles long. But despite its size, the most prominent feature is
the large Arabian Desert that creates some form of hallow centre push-
ing people to inhabit closer to the coastal regions. This unique geogra-
phy exacerbated by diverse religious views, the Israel/Palestine dispute,
the European efforts at drawing national borders contributed to the crisis
in the Middle East present today.
The last continent discussed was the Central and South America
(Latin America). Like Africa, most of its political crisis resulted from iso-
lation and its origins. Its big cities were developed by European settlers
who chose to settle around the coastal regions as they were not as in-
fected by mosquitoes and diseases. They also connected the coastal
regions better to sources of natural resources for easier access to ports,
and onward exportation. But they failed to connect inland regions, to one
another. Serfdom resulted as the minority rich European settlers, who
resided on the coast, controlled a large share of land and governed the
majority indigenous and post-slavery population. These past events
combined with their (dis)advantages of geography, resulted in the Latin
America we have today. The book was good at illustrating the im-
portance of geography in our economy and our lives.
Countries constrained by rivers mountains and desert have used
their political, human and natural resources at their disposal, to forge
ahead and break free from the restraints of geography. Some got ahead
and use that advantage to maintain trade routes, create markets and
provide easier access to natural resources. But most of these progress
has come at a cost. We now have global warming, desertification, de-
forestation of the Amazonian region, increase flooding and the melting
of the Arctic. There is the possibility of water wars (Ethiopia vs Egypt
and Syria vs Iraq). Mass migration might be the result of natural disas-
ters that we are unable to find a solution to. The book ends brilliantly
with a quote reminding the world to seek solutions to our global problems
not as countries, but as humans. It is a reminder of our connectivity as
ONE global civilization all in a quest to use what is available to live better
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lives. And it is also an advice that the success of one nation should
not be at the detriment of another.
“When we are reaching for the stars, the challenges ahead are such that
we will perhaps have to come together to meet them: to travel the uni-
verse not as Russians, Americans or Chinese but as representatives of
humanity. But so far, although we have broken free from the shackles of
gravity, we are still imprisoned in our own minds, confined by our suspi-
cion of the ‘other’, and thus our primal competition for resources. There
is still a long way to go”.
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PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY, 1947-2016:

A CONCISE HISTORY
In “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2016: A Concise History,” a former
diplomat and foreign minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar, charts the for-
eign policy of Pakistan from its inception. It is another book strongly rec-
ommended to CSS candidates because of the social and political as-
pects being used to understand Pakistan’s foreign policies.
The Indian Subcontinent
In “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Abdul Sattar chronicles the
events that affected foreign relations and the domestic politics of Paki-
stan. It tries to provide a more authoritative view of foreign policy and
how it evolved during different tenures. In the starting chapters, he por-
trays a scenario of historical events which laid the foundation of Paki-
stan. The state which was carved out from the vast empire and that ex-
panded from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea was a conglomerate
of many religions, languages, ethnicities, and cultures.
Following Alexander’s invasion across the Suleiman range in 325
BC, Chandragupta Maurya conquered the Gangetic and Indus plains.
This land gave birth to the greatest civilization in the world, the Indus
civilization. The region later became an amalgamation of empires and
dynasties. When Muslims swept across the world carrying the zeal of
religion, the Indian subcontinent, too, wouldn’t be spared. The most gal-
vanized story of the Muslim world is where Muhammad Bin Qasim de-
feated the tyrant leader, Raja Dahar, and laid the foundation of a new
empire. The subcontinent also attracted the British, a colonial power far
advanced in economy, power, and knowledge.
Pakistan is born
The strenuous struggle bore fruit and Pakistan emerged as an in-
dependent Islamic state on August 14, 1947. Muhammad Ali Jinnah ar-
ticulated a new vision for Pakistan based on the quest for peace and
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prosperity. In one of his speeches, he said, “There lies in front of us a

new chapter and it will be our endeavor to create and maintain goodwill
with Britain, and our neighborly dominion, Hindustan, along with other
sisterly nations so that we all together may make our greatest contribu-
tion to peace and prosperity.” There are several occasions where Mr.
Jinnah elaborated the foreign policy of Pakistan based on the principles
of bilateralism, cordial relations with neighboring countries especially In-
dia, open door policy for Muslim nations, and support for the self-deter-
mination of oppressed and colonized states.
The first foreign minister of Pakistan, Sir Zafarullah Khan, vocifer-
ously raised his voice for the independence of Indonesia, Libya, Mo-
rocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and other colonial states. The matters soon wors-
ened due to the Kashmir issue, Pakistan’s rejection of the USSR pro-
posal, and the visit to the US in February 1950. For economic support,
Pakistan incessantly painted the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire.’ Soon,
Pakistan signed defense treaties with the US like the Middle East De-
fense Organization (1953), Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, SEATO
1954, CENTO 1956, and the Mutual Defense Agreement in 1959. Paki-
stan’s sudden jump to the Western camp prompted Muslim countries to
withdraw their support for the unsolved Kashmir issue.
Changing Camps
During the sixties, Pakistan changed its camp and aligned with
USSR and China. Nikita Khrushchev extended a hand of friendship and
offered economic and technical support to Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani
war of 1965 proved very disastrous for both countries economically and
politically. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 also proved to be another hit
to Pakistan’s diplomatic and political fronts. In the socialist seventies,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a man with Bonapartist attributes and authoritative
proclivity, became the savior of the shattered nation. He elevated the
nation from the ashes of disintegration to the sky of prestige. The mo-
mentous turn was the nuclear program of Pakistan.
The foreign policy had also been more tilted towards Middle East-
ern states and the Soviet Union. The revivalist eighties was a turning
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point where the West and Muslim countries started pouring billions of
rupees into Pakistan, as the country was an epicenter of the training of
Mujahids and CIA operations. The flow of the economy also helped Pa-
kistan to expedite its nuclear program and reinforce its ailing economy.
The muddling nineties were marked by unstable political governments—
with Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif competing with each other to con-
solidate their position in the government—followed by a military coup.
Pakistan was also widely condemned for recognizing the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan.
After the 9/11 attacks, the US waged a global war against terrorism.
Due to economic restraints and international isolation, Pakistan had no
choice but to join the war on terror as a non-NATO ally. Later, China
inked the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)” with Pakistan in
2014 and pledged to invest 62 billion dollars in Gawadar, the energy
sector, and the infrastructure of Pakistan.
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“WHY NATIONS FAIL”
Chapter One: “So Close and Yet So Different”

Chapter 1, at the very beginning, gives you an in-depth explanation of
two places – Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales, Sonora, so similar, but with
a huge difference. Although this chapter is just a rough presentation of
the rest of the book, it will explain why geographical, cultural, and even
educational differences are not the reason for success or failure. These
two cities are examples of the same geography and culture, but very
different incomes. Why? The authors claim that the most essential rea-
son is political institutions if they are inclusive or extractive. The beauty
of this book lies in the rest of this chapter – profound historical examples
and research on how these political systems were made.
Chapter Two: “Theories That Don’t Work”
Chapter 2, relying on the first one, will explain three accepted but irrel-
evant theories about the failure of nations. The first one is a geography
factor like The Diamond Theory. But there is an example of North and
South Korea that refutes this factor. The second one will be cultural the-
ory, like the differences between the work ethics within nations; but we
have USA and Mexico, two countries with the same culture, but huge
life standard differences. And the last one is about the ignorance of
the leaders. And as you can guess, this theory also doesn’t work be-
cause there were a lot of leaders in one nation, and they had expert
pieces of advice but didn’t achieve any economic growth.
Chapter Three: “The Making of Prosperity and Poverty”
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of inclusive and extractive institutions,
which was mentioned at the beginning. There are numerous examples
of both types of institutions, but the difference between South and North
Korea is the clearest. The main distinction is the economic and political
factors: in inclusive institutions, citizens have the right to participate in
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these areas through opportunities provided by their country, while in ex-

tractive institutions, there is a lack of such opportunities, so it leads to
unstable education, infrastructure, and other areas of society.
Chapter Four: “Small Differences and Critical Junctures:
The Weight of History”
Chapter 4 begins with the example of the Black Death pandemic as a
critical juncture in the 14th century. Since the future is not predictable,
there are always wars, pandemics, or revolutions, points that can impact
one society and bring it an opportunity to change its economic and po-
litical system and grow. The Black Death is such an example for Euro-
pean countries. Besides this, slight differences like initial conditions can
play a big role in the turning point.
Chapter Five: “Growth under Extractive Institutions”

1. Growth under Extractive Institutions Overview:
 Extractive institutions, historically prevalent, favor a small
elite, hindering widespread prosperity.
 Political centralization emerges as a critical factor propelling
the expansion of extractive institutions.
2. Illustrative Examples:
 Instances such as coercion in Caribbean plantations and re-
source reallocation in the Soviet Union exemplify the work-
ings of extractive institutions.
3. Short-lived Prosperity and Sustainability:
 Extractive growth is marked by transient prosperity and
lacks long-term sustainability.
4. Inhibitors of Growth:
 The absence of creative destruction and innovation acts as
a limiting factor for growth within extractive institutions.
5. Elite Replacement Challenges:
 Incentives for elite replacement trigger internal conflicts, fos-
tering instability within extractive systems.
6. Historical Illustration - Maya City-States:
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The historical breakdown of Maya city-states serves as a


poignant example of chaos resulting from extractive institu-
tions.
7. Soviet Union's Growth Limitations:
 Despite rapid growth, the Soviet Union's experience demon-
strates the short-lived nature of progress under extractive
institutions.
8. Contemporary Comparison - China's Economic Growth:
 China's current economic growth, under the Communist
Party, is scrutinized in light of historical examples, empha-
sizing the necessity for political transformation to sustain
growth.
CHP.6 “Drifting Apart”
1. Venice's Prosperity in the Middle Ages:
 In the Middle Ages, Venice emerged as one of the world's
wealthiest places with inclusive economic institutions and
early political inclusiveness.
2. Venice's Independence and Economic Boom:
 Gained independence in AD 810, benefiting from Europe's
economic recovery and trade expansion.
3. Role of Commenda Contracts:
 Contractual innovations like the commenda facilitated eco-
nomic inclusiveness and upward social mobility in trading
ventures.
 Commenda contracts played a key role in fostering new
names and families within the Venetian elite.
4. Political Changes from Economic Inclusiveness:
 Economic inclusiveness led to political changes, including
the selection of the doge for life by the General Assembly.
5. Institutional Changes and Expansion of Power:
 Institutional changes, like the creation of the Ducal Council,
curbed the doge's power, expanding Venetian mercantile
and naval influence.
6. Innovations in Political Institutions:
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Innovations like the Great Council furthered political open-


ness and constraints on ducal power.
 The nomination of the doge by lot and the doge's oath of
office circumscribing power were additional political innova-
tions.
7. Reforms and Economic Innovations:
 Political reforms prompted institutional innovations in law, in-
cluding independent magistrates, courts, and new contract
and bankruptcy laws.
 Venice experienced rapid financial innovation and the begin-
nings of modern banking.
8. Tensions and Shift towards Extractive Institutions:
 Despite economic growth and inclusive institutions, tension
arose as creative destruction accompanied prosperity.
 Tensions between established elites and new entrants re-
sulted in attempts to close the system, leading to a heredi-
tary aristocracy.
9. Historical Development Globally:
 The chapter highlights the global historical development of
institutions, emphasizing the reversal of inclusive institutions
as seen in Venice.
 Challenges the idea of a simple cumulative process of insti-
tutional improvement and notes the ephemeral nature of
small institutional differences.
10. Institutional Development in Ancient Rome:
 Rome, like Venice, underwent major institutional innova-
tions, starting with inclusive economic institutions that later
became more extractive.
 The decline of the Roman Empire, once inclusive republican
institutions gave way to more extractive ones, became all
but inevitable over centuries.
CHP.7 “Turning Point”
1. William Lee's stocking frame knitting machine faced resistance from
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Queen Elizabeth I and later James I due to fears of unemployment,

political instability, and threats to royal power.
2. Elizabeth I refused to grant Lee a patent, expressing concerns that
the machine might ruin her subjects by taking away their employment.
3. James I, successor to Elizabeth I, also rejected Lee's request for a
patent, sharing similar fears of political destabilization resulting from
mechanized stocking production.
4. This episode illustrates the fear of creative destruction, a significant
reason for the lack of sustained living standards increase between the
Neolithic and Industrial revolutions.
5. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 marked a turning point, strength-
ening property rights, improving financial markets, and removing
barriers to industrial expansion, creating inclusive economic institu-
tions.
6. Inclusive economic institutions resulting from the Glorious Revo-
lution facilitated the Industrial Revolution in England, allowing in-
dividuals like James Watt and Richard Arkwright to develop their
ideas without facing monopolistic barriers.
7. England's break from extractive institutions and the development of
pluralistic political institutions were shaped by political conflicts be-
tween absolutism and its opponents, as seen in the Magna Carta, the
first elected Parliament, and later the Glorious Revolution. The Glori-
ous Revolution empowered those seeking to change institutions fun-
damentally and moved England away from attempts at creating re-
newed and stronger absolutism. The Industrial Revolution gained mo-
mentum in England due to uniquely inclusive economic institutions
established by the Glorious Revolution in 1688. These institutions
strengthened property rights, improved financial markets, removed
state-sanctioned monopolies in foreign trade, and opened the political
system to economic needs and aspirations. This inclusivity provided
individuals like James Watt and Richard Arkwright the opportunity and
incentive to contribute to the nation's industrial development.
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11.
CHP.8 “Not on our turf: Barriers to development”
1. Absolutism's Hindrance to Industrialization:
 Absolutist regimes in Spain, Russia, and Austria-Hungary
impeded their ability to benefit from the Industrial Revolution,
lacking political changes seen in post-1688 England.
2. Spain's Economic Decline and Lack of Incentive:
 Spain suffered economic decline due to insecure property
rights, leading to a lack of incentive for necessary invest-
ments and sacrifices.
3. Rulers' Opposition to Industrialization:
 Rulers in Russia and Austria-Hungary actively obstructed
the introduction of Industrial Revolution technologies and in-
frastructure.
4. Habsburg Absolutism and Political Changes:
 The Holy Roman Empire, under Francis I's absolutist rule,
resisted change, weakening non-monarchical institutions.
 Attempts by Maria Theresa and Joseph II to strengthen the
central state had limited success.
5. Impact on Merchants and Serfdom:
 Merchants had less influence in Habsburg lands compared
to England, and serfdom prevailed in Eastern European ter-
ritories.
6. Second Serfdom in Habsburg Lands:
 Hungary and Poland, integral to the Habsburg lands, expe-
rienced the Second Serfdom during the eighteenth century.
7. Absolutism's Perpetuation and Philosophy of Rule:
 Absolutist philosophy, characterized by Count Hartig as the
"unabated maintenance of sovereign authority," persisted
even after Francis's reign.
 Prince von Metternich played a crucial role in upholding ab-
solutism.
8. Global Impact of Absolutism on Industrialization:
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Absolutism in Asia, notably in China, hindered industrializa-


tion during the critical juncture of the Industrial Revolution.
 Despite leading in technological innovations under the Song
dynasty, China's growth was constrained by extractive insti-
tutions.
9. Ethiopian Absolutism and Economic Structures:
 Ethiopia's absolutism, rooted in Christianity, led to intense
and economically extractive rule, controlling international
trade and resembling European absolutism.
10. Challenges in Africa's Political Centralization:
 Africa, particularly in regions like Somalia, faced challenges
in embracing industrialization due to the absence of political
centralization, impacting law and order necessary for eco-
nomic development
CHP. 10 “REVERSING DEVELOPMENT”
1. English Penal Colonies and Australia's Inclusive Institutions:

 In the 18th century, England addressed criminality by trans-
porting convicts to penal colonies, initially in the American
colonies. After independence, Australia became the new
destination, fostering inclusive institutions that contributed to
economic growth without the need for revolutions.
2. Cables' Story and Lack of Convict Rights:
 The story of the Cables, convicts in Australia, highlights the
lack of rights for convicts in English law despite inclusive po-
litical and economic institutions in Britain.
3. Inclusive Paths in Former British Colonies:
 Australia, along with other British colonies like Canada and
New Zealand, followed a path to inclusive institutions without
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the need for revolutionary upheavals, contributing to their

prosperity.
4. French Revolution and Inclusive Institutions in Western Eu-
rope:
 The French Revolution in 1789 sought to overthrow the an-
cien régime in France, characterized by inequalities. The
revolution led to emancipation, societal changes, and the
rise of the Rothschild family in Frankfurt.
5. Japan's Transformation during the Meiji Restoration:

 In 1868, Japan, economically underdeveloped and controlled
by the Tokugawa shogunate, underwent a transformative pe-
riod known as the Meiji Restoration. The restoration abol-
ished feudalism, modernized the bureaucratic state, estab-
lished social class equality, and invested in infrastructure,
showcasing remarkable economic development.
6. Post-Restoration Achievements in Japan:
 Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan adopted a written
constitution in 1890, establishing a constitutional monarchy
with an elected parliament and an independent judiciary. Ja-
pan positioned itself as the primary beneficiary of the Indus-
trial Revolution in Asia, showcasing a remarkable transfor-
mation and sustained economic development.
CHP. 10 “THE DIFFUSION OF PROSPERITY”
1. Glorious Revolution (1688) and Pluralistic Interests:
 Pluralistic interests in Parliament were crucial during the Glo-
rious Revolution, preventing unilateral imposition of will by
merchants, industrialists, gentry, and aristocracy.
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2. Whig Dominance, Constraints, and Resistance:

 The Whig political party led the Glorious Revolution and
dominated Parliament (1714-1760). Despite temptations to
exploit power, Whigs faced constraints from competing
groups, leading to resistance against encroachments, exem-
plified by the Black Act of 1723.
3. Rule of Law, Virtuous Circle, and Persistency:
 The Glorious Revolution established the rule of law, creating
a virtuous circle of positive feedback that preserved inclusive
institutions. Constraints on elites persisted over time, limiting
their ability to undermine institutions, with a tendency for
greater inclusiveness.
4. Shift Toward Democracy and Social Unrest:
 The response to the Black Act increased awareness of
rights, leading to demands for political representation. The
first three decades of the 19th century witnessed social un-
rest, reflected in events like the Luddite Riots and Spa Fields
Riots, highlighting economic inequities and political de-
mands.
5. Emergence of Inclusive Institutions and Critical Junctures:
 Inclusive institutions emerged as a result of conflicts be-
tween elites resisting change and those seeking to limit elite
power. Critical junctures, such as the Glorious Revolution
and the foundation of Jamestown colony, weakened the hold
of elites and facilitated the formation of pluralistic societies.
6. Contingency in Historical Events:
 Outcomes of political conflicts are uncertain, and historical
events are contingent, not predetermined. The development
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of institutions and the trajectory of inclusiveness are shaped

by the dynamic interplay of various forces within society.
CHP. 11 “VIRTUOUS CYCLE”
1. Virtuous Circle in Inclusive Institutions:
 Inclusive institutions create a virtuous circle, fostering posi-
tive feedback that increases the likelihood of persistence and
expansion.
2. Mechanisms of the Virtuous Circle:
 Pluralistic Logic resists power concentration, posing chal-
lenges faced by figures like Roosevelt and Walpole.
 Rule of Law ensures equal application, limiting encroach-
ment on rights and promoting political participation.
3. Inclusive Political and Economic Institutions:
 Inclusive political institutions are intertwined with inclusive
economic institutions.
 Removal of extractive economic relations, reduction of mo-
nopolies, and a dynamic economy diminish short-term bene-
fits of seizing political power.
4. Media Freedom and Opposition Mobilization:
 Inclusive political institutions enable a free media, informing
and mobilizing opposition against threats.
 Historical examples include opposition to the economic dom-
inance of Robber Barons in the U.S.
5. Tendency for Persistence and Expansion:
 The virtuous circle tends to make inclusive institutions per-
sist, resist challenges, and expand.
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 Gradual democratization in Britain and the U.S. is less

threatening to elites and more likely to succeed.
6. Contrast with Extractive Institutions:
 Extractive institutions create a vicious circle, leading to their
persistence.
 The subsequent chapter explores forces favoring the persis-
tence of extractive institutions.
7. Virtuous Circles and Inclusive Political Institutions:
 Inclusive political institutions create constraints against
power usurpation and often generate inclusive economic in-
stitutions.
 Wealth dispersion weakens incentives for power control.
8. Resilience of Virtuous Circles:
 Virtuous circles contribute to the resilience and persistence
of inclusive institutions.
 While history is not destiny, the contingency plays a signifi-
cant role in the trajectory of virtuous circles.
CHP. 12 “VICIOUS CYCLE”
Extractive institutions generate formidable forces that contribute to
their enduring nature. Negative feedback mechanisms entrench extrac-
tive political institutions, intertwining them with extractive economic
structures, creating a self-sustaining loop. Instances of this destructive
loop include Guatemala, where the elite maintained power for centu-
ries through extractive institutions, the persisting plantation economy in
the U.S. South post-Civil War despite formal changes, and in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa (e.g., Sierra Leone, Ethiopia), where the Iron Law of Oli-
garchy perpetuates exploitation even after regime changes. This iron
law dictates that the overthrow of a regime with extractive institutions
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merely replaces old masters with new ones who exploit the same insti-
tutional flaws. Extractive political institutions, devoid of effective con-
straints on power, pave the way for monopolies, fostering huge ine-
qualities that, in turn, fuel internal strife, civil wars, state failure, and
pervasive chaos.
CHP. 13 “WHY NATIONS FAIL TODAY”
1. Extractive institutions create potent forces leading to their persis-
tence.
2. Negative feedback mechanisms intertwine extractive political and
economic institutions, reinforcing each other.
3. Specific examples, such as Guatemala and the U.S. South, illus-
trate the enduring power of extractive institutions.
4. The Iron Law of Oligarchy dictates that regime changes in extrac-
tive systems often result in new masters exploiting the same
flawed institutions.
5. Extractive political institutions provide minimal constraints on
power, facilitating the pursuit of great profits through monopolies.
6. The destructive facet of this vicious circle manifests in large-scale
inequalities, triggering infighting, civil wars, state failure, and over-
all chaos.
7. Continuous struggles for control ensue, exacerbating the cycle of
extractive institutions and perpetuating instability.
CHP. 14 “UNDERSTANDING PROSPERITY AND POVERTY”
1. Global living standards exhibit significant disparities, granting even
the poorest in the United States better resource access than many re-
gions.
2. Historical cases like Mexico, the United States, and Nogaleses un-
derscore recent emergence of economic gaps.
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3. Coexistence of extractive economic and political institutions with

short-term growth hampers sustained progress by resisting innovation
and facing destabilization from creative destruction.
4. Societies with extractive institutions commonly experience political
instability as groups contend for coveted political power.
5. Modernization theory, suggesting economic growth fosters democ-
racy and inclusive institutions, faces challenges due to the persistent
nature of extractive institutions.
6. International efforts to spur economic growth often neglect the role
of political institutions, resulting in ineffective policy implementation in
impoverished nations.
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PAKISTAN BEYOND THE CRISIS STATE BY

MALIHA LODHI
Maliha Lodhi was Pakistan’s Ambassador from 1993 to 1996 and
again from 1999 to 2002, she also served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to
the Court of Saint James from 2003 to 2008. She has combined a career
of public service to Pakistan and education of not only Pakistanis but
Americans studying Pakistan and the region. Her latest book collects
seventeen Pakistani intellectuals, economists, political thinkers, and mil-
itary affairs experts to discuss the future of their country.
The book is opportune, as relations between the United States and
Pakistan remains tense after the killing of Usama Bin Laden in Abbotta-
bad, Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal, who teaches at Tufts University, opens with
a chapter on how Pakistan’s past influences the present, she begins by
quoting a Washington Times article that referred to Pakistan and Para-
noidistan, and she then unpackaged the perceptions of distrust and
merges them with history and context. She argues that Pakistanis can-
not develop a historical consciousness without a credible history. Jalal
also discusses the devaluing of history for ideological reasons. Dr. Akbar
Ahmed who teaches at American University in Washington D.C. wrote a
thoughtful piece entitled, “Why Jinnah Matters,” it is time for more Amer-
icans to appreciate that there were two visions of Pakistan upon its
founding in 1947, that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder, a sec-
ular nation that accommodates diverse Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs
by not holding any religion above the state and those like Abu Al-
Mawdudi who envisioned a Pakistan that lives up to Islamic values, and
attempts to impose an interpretation of Islamic values on other Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. Ahmed distills Jinnah’s speeches and reminds
readers of the course Pakistan may have taken if Jinnah had not died a
year into Pakistan’s independence.
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Crux of the Book:

This book offers a wide angle of understanding of the contemporary
challenges which are confronted by Pakistan and the ways of tackling
them for a prosperous future. This book is written by Dr. Maliha Lodhi
who has twice served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Kingdom
and the United States. She has also been the first-ever permanent
woman representative of Pakistan to the United Nations. Due to these
designations and experiences, she carries a thorough knowledge and
strong influence over Pakistan’s polity and people. She is the author of
two books; Pakistan’s Encounter with Democracy and the External Chal-
lenge being the first one and Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State being
the second one. In this book, she has managed to assemble Pakistan’s
renowned scholars, academicians, policymakers, journalists, analysts,
and economists in one volume to give an insider view of Pakistan’s cri-
ses from multiple perspectives and to suggest solutions for a better fu-
ture. This book does not contain the collection of different conferences
proceedings, but it is a product of a virtual conference on cyberspace,
discussing and highlighting the themes of governance, security, foreign
policy, economic and human development, and the reforms to cater to
the issues within them. This book is an interesting and instructive read
for those people and audiences who seek to understand that how Paki-
stan became what it is, and how it can be much more than just a crisis
state in the world.
Segmentation:
The book has seventeen articles/ chapters which can also be di-
vided into five major parts based on their nature; the first part discusses
the history, the second relates to foreign policy, the third part deals with
the role of the army, fourth part suggests ways to enhance country’s
competitiveness and the last part depicts the problems mainly faced
by Pakistan at large in the shape of economic challenges, education,
bad governance, militancy and energy crisis.
Chapter1. “The Past as Present”
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This chapter explores the characterization of Pakistan as 'Para-

noidistan' by a prominent American columnist, delving into the perceived
paranoia and violence associated with the country. It attributes this im-
age to Pakistan's historical struggles, particularly its role as a focal point
for global terrorism. The ideological fissures within Pakistan, especially
concerning alliances and the internal debate on countering insurgency,
contribute to its complex relationship with the United States.
The article emphasizes the importance of understanding Pakistan's
troubled past to address its present challenges, urging for a critical self-
reflection and a shared historical consciousness. It also critiques the in-
fluence of distorted narratives, stifled intellectual traditions, and a lack of
rigorous historical inquiry, highlighting the need for a more informed and
open-ended internal dialogue to navigate Pakistan beyond its 'crisis
state.'
The article highlights the challenges faced by Pakistan in defining
its identity, torn between claims of Muslim nationalism and the pursuit of
a territorial state. It emphasizes the role of history in shaping a cohesive
nation but criticizes Pakistan's methods, particularly the suppression of
regional cultures in favor of an Islamic identity. The narrative delves into
Pakistan's historical dilemmas, such as its creation based on the 'two-
nation' theory and the subsequent loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The
impact of external factors, including alliances with the West during the
Cold War and the post-9/11 era, is explored, shedding light on the shift
towards Islamization in the 1970s and the subsequent rise of religious
extremism.
The article concludes by discussing the current challenges, includ-
ing the role of the military, regional conflicts, and the need for interna-
tional cooperation to address Pakistan's political, economic, and security
issues. It suggests that overcoming deeply ingrained strategic doctrines
and fostering cooperation with India are essential for a positive turnabout
in Pakistan's trajectory. The article discusses the complex challenges
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facing Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto's assas-

sination in 2007. It highlights the political ownership of military opera-
tions against insurgency by the PPP-led government but notes the op-
position's accusations of waging war on its own people for American
interests.
The growing American presence in Afghanistan raises concerns in
Pakistan about potential threats to its nuclear arsenal. The article em-
phasizes the need for Pakistanis to revise their national security para-
digm, engage in informed debates, and address internal political stabil-
ity. It stresses the importance of understanding Pakistan's history and
shedding myths for a mature and critical awareness, enabling the coun-
try to navigate its challenging present and shape a more coherent future
world.
Chapter.2 “Why Jinnah matters”
The article delves into the ongoing debate about the nature of the
Pakistani state, encompassing the struggle between those advocating
for a theocratic state, such as the Pakistani Taliban, and those pushing
for a more secular approach. Emphasis is placed on understanding the
vision of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, particularly
through his speeches in August 1947. Jinnah's vision of Pakistan
emerges as a modern Muslim nation, founded on principles of justice,
impartiality, and equal rights for all citizens, irrespective of their religious
or ethnic backgrounds. Despite facing immense challenges after Paki-
stan's creation, Jinnah's commitment to protecting minorities and foster-
ing tolerance is highlighted.
The article emphasizes the significance of Jinnah's speeches as a
testament to his sincere vision for Pakistan, striving to become one of
the greatest nations in the world. It also underscores Jinnah's rejection
of a theocratic state in favour of a democratic system that ensures equal
rights for everyone. The text explores Mohammad Ali Jinnah's profound
impact during the tumultuous period of the partition of India in 1947. Jin-
nah, deeply moved by the plight of refugees, worked tirelessly to aid
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those affected by the violence and mass migration. His commitment to

unity within Pakistan is evident in his calls for shared sacrifice and sup-
port for the refugees.
Furthermore, Jinnah envisioned friendly relations between India
and Pakistan, emphasizing the need to bury past animosities. Despite
challenges, he assured protection and rights for Hindu citizens in Paki-
stan, appointing a Hindu minister in his cabinet. Jinnah's vision for a joint
defence pact with India aimed at regional stability, but historical tensions
persisted. The narrative underscores the enduring relevance of Jinnah's
principles, emphasizing the importance of Muslim identity, compassion,
and standing up for rights in contemporary society.
Chapter.3 “Why Pakistan will survive”

The author acknowledges positive moves like the NFC award and
the eighteenth amendment as step forward devolution of power to prov-
inces and anticipates further devolution to regions and districts due to
democratic pressure Challenges the notion that Pakistan lacks a na-
tional identity and argues that it is overrated. The narrative discourages
clinging to oppressive ideologies asserting that ethnic diversity alone
doesn’t pose a significant risk of splitting. By accepting that Pakistan is
a real people in real place. The focus shift to understanding country’s
purpose.
The author criticizes the distraction caused by prolonged debated
on national identity suggesting that Pakistan's real lies in allowing itself
to be bogged down by such debates instead of addressing substantive
issues for its citizen wellbeing. While travelling throughout Pakistan the
author witnesses the profound difficulties experienced by its people de-
spite limited government funds and external aids he underscores the
inadequacy of the revenue collected from the citizens .With each person
contributing around Rs.700 per month highlighted the basic disparities
evident in thriving businesses and affluent individuals suggesting that
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the insufficient financial involvement of citizen in supporting the country

development.
Chapter.4 “Beyond the crisis state”
Pakistan stands at a pivotal juncture in its political trajectory, facing
a critical choice between perpetuating weak governance, traditional pol-
itics, economic stagnation, and eroding public trust in state institutions,
or leveraging isolation. Delving into Pakistan's intricate history, a pattern
of governance lapses and missed opportunities unfolds. The nation has
oscillated between ineffective civilian rule and military governance,
marked by intermittent public protests clamouring for change and im-
proved governance. A stark statistic emerges: half of Pakistan's exist-
ence has transpired under military rule and the other half under civilian
or quasi-civilian administrations.
Tragically, the premature demise of the country's founder resulted
in a succession of politically weak leaders, leading to power struggles
and reliance on the civil-military bureaucracy. Political discord over iden-
tity, provincial autonomy, and the role of religion impeded constitution-
making, fostering a vacuum that allowed military intervention and even-
tual control.
The chaotic early years deferred crucial reforms that could have
steered Pakistan differently. The failure to repurpose colonial mecha-
nisms for economic development and participatory democracy, opting
instead for order over representative government, contributed to the mil-
itary's encroachment. Crucial reforms, including significant land reforms,
were neglected, perpetuating the dominance of the feudal elite and im-
peding economic modernization.
Elections were frequently postponed, with the first free and fair
election occurring only in 1970, twenty-three years after Pakistan's in-
ception. The narrative suggests that rectifying Pakistan's systemic crisis
requires addressing its historical baggage, undertaking comprehensive
reforms, and breaking free from entrenched patterns that have hindered
progress for decades. Ongoing social changes to forge a new path. The
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author questions whether this is a democratic moment, an opportunity

to solidify a political process prone to disruption, or a transformational
moment challenging conventional politics.
They highlight the divergence between representational/electoral
politics and the evolving social and economic landscape. The burgeon-
ing urban middle class, buoyed by globalization and technology, seeks
enhanced governance and political participation. With an estimated 30
million individuals in this middle class, the narrative explores the poten-
tial a more accountable governance system. The tension between an
empowered middle class and entrenched oligarchic elites is examined,
contemplating whether recent changes could instigate a shift towards a
more responsive and functional political order.
Chapter.5 “Army and Politics”
In 2005, Pakistan's defense spending was 3.4% of GDP, surpas-
sing India's 2.3%. Balancing defense expenditure with development be-
comes crucial for Pakistan's growing economy. The military's budget
share, 30-40%, lacks scrutiny in the national assembly, unlike education
and health expenditures, which remain low. Similar challenges in other
developing countries include the crowding out of essential investments,
leading to overemployment and hidden subsidies.
Despite complaints about military power, civilian leaders have not
altered this order, sustaining military influence in politics. The Pakistan
Army, born from the British Indian Army, initially had a paradoxical iden-
tity but retained a moderate nature.
A cultural schism emerged over time, and conflict between the po-
litical system and the military is a recurring theme in Pakistan's history.
Recent military interventions, like General Pervez Musharraf's, brought
temporary stability but stifled political growth. Pakistan faces current
challenges combating domestic Islamist terrorism and insurgency while
dealing with complexities in its relations with India.
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The Army's engagement against 'Talibanization' represents a sig-

nificant shift in Pakistan's political and security dynamics. The composi-
tion of the Pakistan Army has undergone shifts, with officers increasingly
moving to urban centers, aligning with national urbanization trends. The
Zia era witnessed a notable surge in officer recruitment, and this cohort
is now poised to ascend into the General Officer category.
However, these officers faced limitations in overseas training dur-
ing their formative years, influencing their worldview. The current senior
Army leaders, benefiting from early overseas training, exhibit broader
perspectives on national issues. Military dominance in civil institutions,
visible during the Musharraf period, involved re-employing retired or
serving officers in various roles. General Kayani's initiatives indicate a
changing mindset, yet military presence persists in civil administration.
Pakistan's security challenges demand a strong defense establishment,
but there's a need for a reevaluation of the Army's size and organization.
Internally, the Army must adapt to combat insurgencies, emphasizing
low-intensity warfare training.
To foster stability, the Army should subject itself to civilian over-
sight, ensuring it doesn't become a tool of civilian dictatorship. In turn,
civilian governance must adhere to constitutional principles, avoiding
military involvement in political disputes to maintain the balance in the
civilian system of government. The transition for the Pakistan Army un-
der General Kayani involves adapting to collaboration with the Afghan
and U.S. governments, a shift from the independent approach during
Musharraf's era. Recognizing the political and economic dimensions of
counterinsurgency, Kayani faces the challenge of aligning military oper-
ations with broader governance strategies.
The importance of a strong civil-military partnership for post-military
operations in FATA and Swat is emphasized, though it remains to be
seen. Kayani's awareness of public sentiment limits swift resolutions
with India, requiring a delicate balance for peace initiatives. The role of
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the ISI may see greater oversight, aligning with Kayani's focus on re-
turning the Army to its professional roots.
The current composition of the Pakistan Army reflects a more di-
verse and urbanized force, influenced by new media and public dis-
course. While not a breeding ground for radical Islamists, managing the
influence of Islam in society remains a formidable task. The future tra-
jectory depends on the Army's ability to evolve into a national force and
the responsiveness of civilian leadership to societal changes, as pro-
longed military dominance raises the risk of state failure.
Chapter.6 “Praetorians and the people”

In post-2008 Pakistan, two notable trends emerge: the persistence
of political power within traditional elite families and a shift in the social
class origins of key institutions, notably the military and civil bureau-
cracy. This change in elite composition raises uncertainties about the
democratic future of Pakistan. The emerging elite, with more humble or-
igins, tends to hold conservative and authoritarian views, creating un-
certainty regarding democratic values and the party system.
The challenges facing Pakistan include a ruling class perceived as
prioritizing self-interest over public service, driving a debate for societal
reordering. The chapter discusses three key arguments: changing elite
dynamics, efforts to sustain a multi-party system, and the War on Ter-
ror's impact on democracy and civil- military relations. Theoretical per-
spectives on democracy, including economic development, education,
cultural pluralism, and elite interactions, are explored, with a focus on
their instructive role in understanding Pakistan's democratic landscape.
The transformation of military and bureaucratic elites is examined, em-
phasizing the shift in recruitment patterns and ideological orientations.
The decline in moral authority and institutional decay within the bu-
reaucratic elite raises concerns about its ability to support representative
government. In conclusion, Pakistan's intricate social and political land-
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scape, shaped by evolving elite structures, poses challenges to democ-

racy and stability, with the interplay between elites influencing the na-
tion's political trajectory. Post-2008 Pakistan witnesses the emergence
of a new breed of 'Laptop Wallas,' professionally competent individuals
in key roles, but their impact on service delivery is uncertain.
The transition to party-led government raises concerns about bu-
reaucrat politicization and the widening gap between competent and in-
adequately trained bureaucrats. Dynastic trends in political party elites
persist, lacking vision and organizational strength. The rise of a young,
assertive religious elite shifts the political discourse towards religiosity,
impacting various aspects of society. The U.S. structural presence blurs
lines between American interests and domestic elites, posing sover-
eignty challenges. The state struggles to accommodate competing in-
terests while maintaining authority. Pakistan oscillates between military
hegemony and coalition politics, with historical resistance movements
against military rule. The post-2008 period introduces a shift towards
maintaining balance among multiple parties in coalition politics, altering
governance dynamics without addressing fundamental democratization
issues.
Chapter.7 “Ideologically adrift”
Islam has played a pivotal role in shaping Pakistan's identity and
political landscape since its inception in 1947. The contested idea of na-
tionhood among Indian Muslims led to the creation of Pakistan, with cul-
tural and political divisions influencing its establishment. The 1949 Ob-
jectives Resolution formalized the association between Islam and Paki-
stan, emphasizing principles aligned with Islamic teachings. However,
the subsequent manipulation of religion for political and strategic pur-
poses has fueled religious extremism and sectarianism, deviating from
Jinnah's original inclusive vision.
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To address unprecedented challenges, Pakistan needs a new and

progressive Islamic narrative that channels religion as a force for posi-
tive change, emphasizing democracy, freedom, equality, and tolerance
in accordance with Islamic principles.
The trajectory of Islam's role in Pakistan has been complex, rang-
ing from its use in nation-building to security endeavors, particularly
heightened during the Zia era. This history has led to a current state
where extremist groups exploit Islam for various motives, posing an ex-
istential threat within Pakistan. The ideological response is crucial, in-
volving both military actions against such groups and an examination of
the role of Islamic parties and clerics.
The majority of Pakistanis reject extremism, and civil society ex-
pressions, such as the "Yeh Hum Naheen (This Is Not Us)" movement,
play a vital role. The challenge is to channel Islam as a force for pro-
gressive change, emphasizing inclusive and robust governance, educa-
tion reform, economic opportunities, and addressing regional insecuri-
ties. Pakistan's post-1971 war division into East and West Pakistan
marked a failure in promoting ideology and unity through Islam. Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto's attempt at an "Islamic socialism" narrative faced challenges,
and General Zia-ul-Haq's regime initiated widespread Islamization,
transforming Pakistan. Zia's tenure involved military, judicial, and edu-
cational reforms, emphasizing moral values rooted in Islam.
The Afghan-Soviet conflict in the 1980s provided an opportunity for
Zia to use Islam as a tool, supporting militant groups. The era left a last-
ing impact, influencing Pakistan's ideological landscape. After General
Zia's era, Pakistan faced political instability in the 1990s, with democratic
governments succumbing to a power struggle involving the military, in-
telligence services, and Islamic parties. Internationally, Pakistan contin-
ued using Islamic proxies in Kashmir and supporting the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan. Post-9/11, Musharraf's "enlightened moderation" aimed to
counter extremism but faced challenges.
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Militant groups persisted, and Pakistan became a battleground for

global jihad. The rise of Talibanization brought internal extremist threats,
leading to a struggle against groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The hijacking of Pakistan's national Islamic narrative by non-state actors
became a defining feature, posing an existential threat with attacks on
various targets within the country.
The Taliban's rise in Pakistan can be linked to mainstream Islamic
political parties, notably the Mutahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a six-party
Islamic alliance that ruled northwestern Pakistan from 2002 to 2007.
Formed hastily with military support before the 2002 elections, the MMA
united various religious and jihadi groups sharing anti-US sentiments.
Despite being mainstream, major alliance parties, Jamaat-e-Islami and
Jamiat Ul Islam, had histories of association with jihadist politics, over-
lapping with militant organizations.
The MMA's electoral success empowered extremists, enabling
them to enforce rigid Islamic rule, advocate for Shari'a laws, and oppose
Western values. The controversial Hisba law, resembling Taliban poli-
cies, faced constitutional opposition but created a favorable environment
for extremists. During the MMA's rule, measures supporting the use of
force contributed to the splintering of activists, particularly from Jamiat
Ul Islam, who later joined the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, the origin of Jamiat Ul Islam, emerged as an anti-
British movement within Sunni Hanafi Islam, emphasizing Islamic revival
and coexistence with other religions. The party's post-independence
evolution focused on Islamic practices, avoiding politics, contrasting with
overtly political Islamist ideologies.
This historical context underscores the ideological roots and politi-
cal maneuvering that facilitated the Taliban's emergence in Pakistan.
The rise of militancy in Pakistan, intricately linked to political, ideological,
and geopolitical shifts, underscores a complex evolution. Parties like Ja-
maat-e- Islami (JI) incorporated militancy into their politics, notably sup-
porting the military's actions in East Pakistan in 1971. With General Zia-
125 | P a g e
ul-Haq's Islamization policies in the 1980s, JI became a key player in

the Afghan jihad, aligning ideologically with Arab jihadists and contrib-
uting to the rise of al Qaeda.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan further intertwined JI with
Islamist groups globally, leading to financial support, military training,
and a shared vision of international Islamic revolution. Over time, the
Pakistani government underestimated the threat, fostering a policy of
appeasement from 2001 to 2009. The Taliban's subsequent advance
and the Swat Valley insurgency prompted a military response in 2009,
marked by a major offensive and displacement of millions.
Despite military successes, the lack of a comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategy, effective governance, and political mobilization poses
ongoing challenges to addressing the root causes of militancy in Paki-
stan, emphasizing the need for a holistic approach.
Chapter.8 “Battling Militancy”
Pakistan faces an escalating threat from violent extremists and Is-
lamic militants, a result of factors including the ongoing war in Afghani-
stan and limited gains against al Qaeda by both the US and Pakistan.
The ability of al Qaeda to adapt to pressure and form local alliances
contributes to this growing menace. Militant violence has not only in-
creased in numbers but also in sophistication, with various extremist
groups forming an interconnected web, collaborating closely. Pakistani
militant groups, including the Taliban and al Qaeda, are forming alli-
ances, engaging in violent activism. Initially, militants targeted Afghani-
stan, but since 2007, they turned against the Pakistani military, execut-
ing attacks and escalating violence, particularly through suicide bomb-
ings in urban centers.
The emergence of the Pakistani Taliban marked a significant de-
velopment, aiming for repressive rule not only in tribal areas but also in
adjacent regions. Al Qaeda, despite claims of being crippled, has
strengthened through alliances with Pakistani militants, attracting a new
generation committed to global jihad, including recruits from Western
countries.
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The local Taliban movement's rise coincided with Pakistan's strug-

gle against al Qaeda, aggravated by military operations undermining
tribal administration. The collapse of the administrative system in FATA
allowed Pakistani militants to fill the vacuum. In 2006, Taliban groups
expanded into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, imposing strict Islamic
codes, shutting down shops, and restricting cultural activities. The situ-
ation reflects a complex web of geopolitical and internal dynamics, re-
quiring a multifaceted approach to address the growing extremist threat
in Pakistan.
Chapter.9 “Retooling Institutions”
In the last two decades theoretical and empirical evidence have
offered a new insight: that broader socio-economic development includ-
ing the distribution of the benefits of growth is determined by the quality
of governance and institutions. Economic policies, however sound or
benign they may be, cannot disperse the gains widely unless the insti-
tutions intermediating these policies are strong, efficient and effective.
Although it is hard to precisely define governance there is wide consen-
sus that good governance enables the state, the civil society and the
private sector to enhance the well-being of a large segment of the pop-
ulation.
According to the World Bank,' governance refers to the manner in
which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority
to shape public policy and provide public goods and services.
The key dimensions of governance are: public sector management, ac-
countability, the legal framework for development and information and
transparency. Research by the Overseas Development Institute has
shown that the historical context, previous regime, socio-cultural con-
text, economic system and international environment are the main de-
terminants of governance and development.
The six core principles identified by Hyden et al.' that are related to
good governance are Participation, Fairness, Decency, Accountability,
Transparency and Efficiency. Each nation's path to good governance
will be different depending on culture, geography, political and adminis-
trative traditions, economic conditions and many other factors. Chronic
political instability and frequent changes in political regimes have also
127 | P a g e
caused disastrous consequences for economic governance. During the

1990s the changes were too many and too chaotic. Invariably, the in-
coming governments abruptly abandoned, discontinued or slowed down
the implementation of the policies, projects and programs inherited from
their predecessors.
As institutions take a long time to nurture, the implementation of
projects is spread over a multi-year period and the impact of policies is
felt with considerable time lag, premature abandonment caused more
damage than good. Starting all over again and before the benefits
started accruing, the government was either overthrown or had to step
down before completing its tenure.
The incoming government began the cycle again with a fresh set.
The majority of the populace never witnessed any benefits while unend-
ing costs were incurred by every successive regime. Devolution of pow-
ers to Local governments introduced in 2001 was a step in the right di-
rection to promote broader participation but has not been fully imple-
mented either in letter or in spirit.
Transparency in the actions of the government can be achieved by
several means, i.e. hearings of Parliamentary Committees, question
hours in the National and Provincial Assemblies, Freedom of Information
Act, removal of several clauses of the Official Secrets Act, introduction
of e-government and investigative reporting by competent and respon-
sible journalists. Most of these measures exist but more in form rather
than substance. In India, however, the Right of Information Act is bring-
ing about a silent revolution and civil society is using access to infor-
mation to expose corruption in public places and secure the rights of the
poor. The bureaucrats have become more cautious as their actions are
open to public scrutiny.
In Pakistan, excessive misuse of newly acquired power by some
media representatives in assassinating the character of political leaders
or public servants without substantiation or evidence may prove to be
more detrimental to the cause of disclosure and transparency. The rule
of law has been a subject of debate in Pakistan since March 2007. The
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lawyers' movement demonstrated that if a particular community gets ral-

lied around a legitimate cause it could make a difference. The judiciary
at the highest level is indeed trying to assert its independence, enforce
the rule of law and expedite disposal of cases. But it is not clear if a
common citizen is any better off today in terms of access to justice,
speedy redressal of grievances, and enforcement of contracts or prop-
erty rights. The reality is quite sobering.
Chapter.10 “An economic Crisis state?”
A trend-setter in Asia up to the sixties, economic management in
Pakistan has steadily deteriorated to the point where the economy has,
for the past few decades, lurched from one financial crisis to the next. At
the heart of the problem has been the poor management of public fi-
nances and deep-seated unresolved structural issues in the economy
that bad management and poor governance has exacerbated. The con-
sequences of this secular decline in economic governance are plain to
see: macroeconomic instability, high inflation, poor public services, crim-
inal neglect of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling power
outages, growing unemployment, deepening poverty and a deteriorating
debt profile.
In the early years, the economic scene was marked by relative sta-
bility, strong growth and low inflation. In Ayub Khan's era, Pakistan was
considered to be a 'model of development and 'aid- effectiveness'. Ayub
Khan was deeply interested in economic development. He placed the
Planning Commission under the President's Secretariat and himself be-
came the Chairman. The Planning Commission was staffed with some
of Pakistan's best and brightest economic minds. It was ably supported
by a number of fine economists from the former East Pakistan who
worked in the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, as well as
economists and policy analyst s from the Harvard Advisory Group. Ayub
Khan listened to their advice and often deferred to their judgment over
the views of the mighty ICS/CSP. Ayub Khan was a victim of economic
success.
The revelation by none other than the Chief Economist of the Plan-
ning Commission—his most beloved institution which he headed—that
twenty-two families controlled 70 per cent of manufacturing and 90 per
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cent of banking and insurance business in the country jolted his regime
to its foundations. It was a supreme irony that Ayub Khan was following
the growth philosophy as espoused by the Chief Economist of the Plan-
ning Commission in his Cambridge PhD thesis turned book, 'The Strat-
egy of Economic Planning'.
Growth philosophy argued that in the initial stages of economic de-
velopment some concentration of income and wealth in a few hands was
necessary and appropriate to stimulate 'animal spirits' and foster the
conditions for rapid growth.
Bhutto had little patience with economic matters. His nationaliza-
tion program was a shock to the system and a grievous blow m privet
sector confidence that would take years to rebuild. New private sector
investment came to a virtual halt. There was much (concealed) capita
flight as businessmen took their money out of the economy either before
or after nationalization and it would be many years for the capital flight
to itself. The economic effects of the break-ups of Pakistan were pro-
found. It caused vast disruptions to the financial and corporate sectors
that had operated on the basis of a single country.
The State Bank of Pakistan had been pushing the Pakistani com-
mercial banks into increasing lending in East Pakistan while their deposit
bar was almost entirely in the western wing where most, if not all of them
were headquartered. To be fair to Mr. Bhutto, the gods were not kind to
him. Each year brought a drought or a flood—negative domestic exoge-
nous shocks—which hurt growth and caused a pick-up in inflation. Yet
the economy was kept afloat and on a reasonably even keel thanks to
Bhutto's diplomatic success in wearing financing from friendly Islamic
countries (including $500 million from the Shah of Iran) and the Gulf, as
well as an emerging new phenomenon: rising workers' remittances
which were becoming an important source of financing the external ac-
counts.
Chapter.11 “Boosting Competitiveness”
Over the last two decades Pakistan has had the resilience to sur-
vive against all odds. How can it succeed is the main topic of this chap-
ter. Despite its many challenges, during this period, Pakistan has grown
at an average rate of over five per cent. As a country with a population
130 | P a g e
of 225 million people today, it is important to understand that 99 per cent

of the fabric of a diverse and rich culture and people can and do make
a difference. Pakistan remains open for business despite the enormous
challenges it confronts. Whilst international media and policy think tanks
focus on how to tackle militancy and extremism, the vast majority of the
people who live and work in Pakistan today say openly that this minority
does not represent them as a people and ask why the international me-
dia cannot recognize the simple fact that every Pakistani is not a militant
or extremist.
If the goal is to realize Pakistan's full potential, then putting the
house in order is a fundamental pre-requisite for the success story to
unfold at a time when most critics argue otherwise. One example of such
an adversity is the catastrophic floods in Pakistan in the summer of
2010--the worst natural disaster in the country's history. These have re-
sulted in a colossal setback to its economy: The extensive damage to
infrastructure will mean years of rebuilding and the mass displacement
of people will require the rehabilitation c millions across the country. All
of this will need an extraordinary amount of resources, thus compound-
ing Pakistan's economic woes an exacerbating long-standing chal-
lenges.
Among these challenges at macroeconomic instability, an inade-
quate infrastructure to support business activity, poor social indicators,
a deep governance deficit an limited integration into the global economy
at a time when competitor from China, India and other regional countries
grows in key expo sectors including textiles. With the world still dealing
with global recession and the count' struggling with the aftermath of
floods, sceptics suggest that Pakistan is today less able to handle such
shocks than it was ten or twenty years ago. They argue that Pakistan's
economic future is at best peril given decades of political instability and
economic mismanagement and that it is far down on the list of global
capital-seeking. Against this backdrop, addressing structural challenges
acquires sense of urgency and priority at all levels of government, in-
dustry at businesses.
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To achieve a sustainable rebound, policy priorities must set clearly

to meet the needs of reconstruction and deal with critical economic, so-
cial and political issues in the face of fierce competition, shrinking global
demand and increasing geo-political risk. Now more than ever, it is im-
perative to identify what Pakistan needs to do to become more compet-
itive and be among the winners in the coming decades. This chapter is
an attempt to challenge the view of the sceptics.
By focusing on the most critical policy measures needed to achieve
competitiveness, Pakistan has the ability to capture the energy and dy-
namism of its natural advantages, accelerate growth and 'catch up' on
the global economic stage. In 2005 Goldman Sachs formulated the no-
tion of the Next-11 (N-11) as a group of countries that have the economic
potential to become important players in the global system after the so-
called BRIC, an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China.' The N-11
though diverse in many ways was identified as rapidly developing econ-
omies with the ability to match, if not eventually overtake, the Group of
Seven (G-7) countries. The main criterion was demographic—with the
result that the N-11 is a group of large population countries beyond
BRIC.
Pakistan was identified as one among these countries owing to its
size, its growing population, and its industrial base. Pakistan' thriving
informal economy is not documented and consists of a vast network of
smugglers, traders and agriculturalists. The energy and dynamism of the
informal economy has, in part, been responsible in continued growth.
Pakistan's stock market capitalization to GDP (PPP basis) ratio is ap-
proximately 7 per cent. This is very low compared to the BRIC econo-
mies, where market capitalization to GDP ratio ranges from 25 per cent
in Russia to 60 per cent in Brazil. This ratio is a measure of the extent
of development of a country's capital market and of the valuation of its
listed assets relative to the overall size of the economy. Pakistan has
been the victim of two major international events in the last three dec-
ades.
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a war that saw the
influx of 3.5 million refugees and led to the rise of militancy in the region.
132 | P a g e
The US led invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 compounded Pakistan's

security challenges which dealt heavy blows to its economy. In the cur-
rent security situation, it has been difficult to attract foreign and mobilize
domestic investment.
Pakistan has not been given a preferred status for exports to the
United States or the European Union, which are Pakistan's main export
markets. As a consequence of geo-political risks, Pakistan is not seen
as a friendly investment destination. In many ways, Pakistan's corporate
leaders and professionals as amongst the most 'battle hardened' pool of
managerial talent in the world with the ability to manage risk and still
show growth under the most challenging business conditions.
Chapter.12 “Turning Energy around”

Pakistan's energy sector is in crisis. Its problems seem insurmount-
able. Although positive initiatives have been implemented over the years
many opportunities have been lost. The result is the current predica-
ment. Power outages of up to eighteen hours a day disrupt the lives of
people and threaten the economy in an unprecedented way. Despite
abundant installed capacity the power system is mired in critical opera-
tional issues including a pervasive circular debt. Payment arrears be-
tween various entities has jammed the flow of funds through the power
supply- chain, and deprived fuel suppliers and independent power pro-
ducers of cash to the extent that their viability and therefore output is
jeopardized.
Demand is out stripping supply at a time when the country's secu-
rity situation imposes obvious constraints. But if the energy deficit is not
urgently tackled it contains the seeds of dangerous social unrest. How
can this situation he remedied? In light of overwhelming evidence that
the absence of a coordinated energy policy remains a fundamental con-
straint, an integrated approach needs to be established together with an
institutional structure that supports it.
Without integration, decision-making remains inherently flawed
and policy initiatives are reduced to shooting in the dark. The country
133 | P a g e
has the capacity to speedily revive the integrate approach together with
the first steps of a supporting institutions structure.
The rest of the institutional changes can be phased in grads ally.
This will enable policy-makers to rapidly tackle, on an informed basis,
the urgent and longer-term problems facing the sector, replacing the cur-
rent ad hoc approach which reacts to, rather than averts the crises. It
will help pave the way for the recovery of the energy sector that ca then
aid the economic rebound. It is not so much the availability resources
but how they are managed which makes the different between success
and failure.
The official Pakistan Energy Yearbook 20091 lays out the supply
and consumption picture. Total primary energy supply in Pakistan is 63
MTOE (Million Tons of Oil Equivalence) of which natural gas accounts
for 48 per cent, oil 32 per cent, hydroelectricity 11 per cent and coal
around 7 per cent. Nuclear, LPG and imported electricity make up the
remaining 2 per cent. Pakistan imports a third of its energy requirements
mainly in the form of oil and coal, despite huge proven reserves of coal
and a significant exploration potential of oil. Over 80 per cent (17 MTOE)
of Pakistan's oil requirements are imported at a prohibitive cost of $12
billion a year, and over 60 per cent (3 MTOE) of its coal supplies come
from overseas.'
The official figure for total energy consumption is 37 MTOE', the
difference between supply and consumption being the losses in conver-
sion, processing, transmission, distribution, as well as non-technical
losses, which is a euphemism for theft. The industrial sector is the dom-
inant consumer with over 40 per cent of the market. The transport sector
consumes just over 30 per cent and households around 22 per cent. The
remainder consists mainly of commercial and agricultural consumers.
The Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP) in the
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources produces an impressive
document, the Energy Yearbook, based on input from various energy
related ministries and agencies. The quality of information and analysis
134 | P a g e
is testament to the fact that, despite the serious brain drain from Paki-
stan, islands of excellence remain. This offers hope for the future and
gives pause to those who maintain that the situation is beyond redemp-
tion.
Commercial energy is a key ingredient for national growth and
prima facie warrants the lion's share of attention, particularly if growth
has been stymied, as has often been the case in Pakistan, and there is
pressure on policy-makers to jump-start the economy. There is an inher-
ent fallacy in this approach. While commercial energy consumers con-
tribute significantly to GDP growth, neglected noncommercial consum-
ers drag down national output over the longer-term by unregulated and
unchecked practices and technologies, which waste energy and denude
forestry resources by harvesting beyond the maximum allowable cut, i.e.
beyond the level at which the forestry resource becomes unsustainable.
Although the economic, social and environmental implications of the ne-
glect requires a separate detailed study, we only need to look around us
to sec the disastrous effects on the degradation of forests and eco-sys-
tems, and the poverty that this approach has engendered over the past
sixty-four years.
In evaluating the state of the sector in relation to the economy,
three other parameters are significant. First, data from the Energy Year-
book and the Economic Survey clearly show that growth in energy con-
sumption and economic growth have followed almost identical patterns
for the last decade and a half, reaffirming that energy fuels the economy
and its short age curbs growth.
The second is Pakistan's per capita energy consumption, which at
0.49 TOE is significantly lower than the world average of 1.78. This re-
flects the country's level of development.' As energy availability is a key
determinant in the standard of living, this parameter is also indicative of
the high incidence of poverty. The third is Pakistan's energy consump-
tion per dollar of GDP growth, which is around 0.82 against the world
average of 0.32.
This illustrates the relative inefficiency of energy use in Pakistan
135 | P a g e
and highlights the pressing need to strengthen policy initiatives that en-
courage greater utilization efficiency.' In a constrained energy supply sit-
uation, any improvement in efficiency means adding to the supply.
Chp.13 “Education as a strategic imperative”

Education lies at the heart of Pakistan's multiple challenges. If Pa-
kistan is to emerge as a stable, moderate polity able to reap dividends
from its burgeoning population it must be able to provide the young and
future generations both personal safety and a decent livelihood. This
requires relative peace, an environment conducive for economic growth,
and a workforce that can power progress. Vital to such a turnaround is
a well-educated population. Only through massive quantitative and qual-
itative gains in education can Pakistan produce the skill set required to
drive the economy efficiently and produce a critical mass of well-in-
formed and visionary leadership it so badly needs. Equally important, it
is only through high quality, value- neutral education that Pakistan can
challenge the salience of the Islamist discourse that threatens to radi-
calize society and drive youth energies towards destructive— often vio-
lent—channels.
Modern societies grasped the importance of a well-educated youth.
In recent decades however, investment in human capital and human ca-
pacity has become a top priority for international, multinational, antina-
tional, and national efforts. Conventional wisdom suggested that educa-
tion was critical for a society to produce a skilled labor force that could
operate as productive members of the economy. Over time, education
has increasingly been seen as a force multiplier capable of having a
much broader impact—both positive and negative—on societies than
merely producing a skilled work force. High quality education can pro-
vide means of social mobility and act as a source of contentment ta peo-
ple. It can contribute to peace, drive societal narratives and thus mould
the very outlook of communities positively, as well as inculcate a civic
sense among citizens.
On the other hand, poor educational standard, or agenda-driven
education can contribute to a sense of alienation and deprivation, lead
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to internal discord and violence. However, the failure of education does

not have to be absolute cause behind alienation. Particular segments of
societies can be at a loss if the rest of the society is progressing. In fact,
the literature argues that feelings of alienation and marginalization are
often harbored to open access to opportunities rather than absent.
The education sector therefore ends up producing three distinct co-
horts from within the Pakistani youth, each quite cutoff from the other. In
terms of quality, madrasahs have the greatest mismatch with the re-
quirements of modern economies. They are essentially geared toward
producing cadres suitable only for the clerical sphere; this makes them
misfits for mainstream employment opportunities. The public education
and a large proportion of the non-elite private schools together account
for the overwhelming majority of Pakistani students—also suffer from
extreme qualitative shortcomings.
This is manifested in the learning outcomes, curricula, textbooks
and other learning materials assessments, teacher quality, and the
learning environment. Although they teach all subjects expected of mod-
ern school systems, they follow fixed syllabi, which encourage rote
learning- memorization. The medium of instruction in public schools is
predominantly Urdu; the even lack the capacity to develop a minimum
level of proficiency in the English language, which is necessary for most
white-collar jobs. The relatively small number of elite private schools are
the only ones who provide decent quality education. They use English
as the medium o learning and are ahead of the others in terms of teach-
ing standards and learning outcomes. Most of them encourage objectiv-
ity and creative thinking among students. It is hardly surprising then that
parents who send their children to private schools are found to be far
more satisfied than those whose kids attend public schools or formal
madrasahs."
The third layer of stratification is ideological. Though there is con-
siderably greater overlap across systems in this case, in general one ca
attribute distinct and often irreconcilable world visions across the three
systems. Pakistani madrasahs may not be actively engaged in produc-
ing militants as the West has suspected for long but they do produced
137 | P a g e
graduates with narrow-minded ideological biases. In her research on

madrasahs, Christine Fair argues that these cadres are much more
likely to sympathize with Islamists where they are we combed and given
a positive identity." The syllabi of the public schooling system are closely
managed by the state and provide a highly skewed historical narrative
that is nationalistic and creates a sieged mentality by portraying Pakistan
as being perpetually under three from all corners. The content also
meshes Islam with nationalism an presents the two as being intrinsically
linked.
Chapter.14 “Pakistan as a Nuclear State”

Pakistan is passing through an extremely delicate phase in its his-
tory. Recent instability in Pakistan, including the Taliban's advance into
settled areas, prompted the Pakistani military to undertake large-scale
military operations in the Swat Valley. As military and Taliban forces fight
in the rugged tribal terrain, several Western analysts have raised con-
cerns about the future of nuclear Pakistan. The nightmare specter of
nuclear weapons, nuclear material, or a whole country falling into al
Qaeda or Taliban hands is invoked, creating fear and mistrust between
critical allies in the war against terrorism.
The risk of a dangerous policy outcome in the United States, based
on flawed assumptions, is now far greater than the probability either of
nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and other extremists
or of the disintegration of Pakistan itself. Any misstep against a nervous
nuclear-armed country would be a greater mistake than any made in
Iraq. Fortunately, the current top leadership in the United States can dis-
tinguish reality from myth. Nevertheless, misperceptions about weapons
of mass destruction have influenced U.S. decisions too recently to be
ignored in a discussion of the current situation in Pakistan.
Western fears about Pakistani nuclear security range from valid to
bizarre. The more valid concerns involve theft of material, sabotage, un-
authorized use of nuclear weapons, and insider-outsider collaboration.
The potential for terrorist infiltration into the program is a concern for
Western analysts and the Pakistani nuclear establishment. The bizarre
fear involves the allegation that Pakistani armed forces and intelligence
138 | P a g e
agencies, who are the custodians and guardians of the nuclear arsenal,
could be accomplices to such an act as Taliban sympathizers. An alter-
nate scenario posits that the inability of the armed forces to defeat the
Taliban extremists would result in abdication of the Pakistani state to the
Taliban. Gen. Tariq Majid, chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee, called such scenarios "plain mischievous" and said they
"need to be contemptuously dismissed.
Two main dangers emanate from the hype on nuclear insecurity in
Pakistan. The first danger is that the grossly exaggerated threat percep-
tion in the West may prompt the United States into policy choices it
would later regret. The second danger is that continuing media focus on
this issue stokes Pakistani paranoia about U.S. intentions. These fears
and suspicions about U.S. intervention inside Pakistan could provoke
that country to take defensive actions against foreign intervention rather
than focusing on the possibility of reducing internal threats to nuclear
security and could further fan anti-U.S. public sentiment. It is true that
stability in Pakistan is shaky, its fledgling democracy is in transition, and
it is facing internal threats from extremists.
The nuclear dimension of regional security in South Asia is essen-
tially a deterrence construct between India and Pakistan. Although little
has changed between India and Pakistan in the decade following their
1998 nuclear tests, the regional security landscape has been completely
altered. The region now faces new forms of asymmetric threat, the likes
of which have never been experienced.
The war in Afghanistan, now in its eighth year, has metastasized into a
classic insurgency and expanded into Pakistan. The impact of the Af-
ghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s, insurgency in Indian-admin-
istered Kashmir, and domestic changes brought about during the Zia ul-
Haq era have had a deleterious impact on the social fabric of Pakistan.
New forms of religious-based militancy and an ethos of jihad were intro-
duced in Pakistan at a time when the country was politically abandoned
by its Western allies and slapped with nuclear sanctions. Thus began a
bitter history of distrust between Pakistan and the United States.
States managing a nuclear weapons program typically have three
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main types of nuclear security concerns. First, every nuclear-capable

state worries about the external threat of a preventive strike by hostile
powers against its nuclear facilities. Second, such states worry about
physical invasion of the state by a hostile neighbor. The third and prob-
ably the most dangerous concern is insider-outsider collaboration. Paki-
stan has lived with all three categories of threats since the inception of
its nuclear program. Like every state, Pakistan's program places great
emphasis on secrecy and compartmentalization. In the past, no single
office, organization, or authority held ultimate responsibility for supervi-
sion. For the past decade, there has been a National Command Author-
ity (NCA) with a dedicated secretariat (the Strategic Plans Division, or
SPD), which is responsible for all nuclear-related activities.[15] Since
these institutions were established, events, controversies, and deterio-
ration of the regional and domestic environment have forced Pakistan to
tighten its oversight and control.
The Taliban threat within Pakistan is a new phenomenon. The mil-
itant group led by Baitullah Mehsud belonging to the tribal belt in Wazir-
istan calls itself the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). The TTP is an extremist
fringe whose activities have now expanded from the tribal areas into the
settled areas of Pakistan. This provoked military operations that con-
tinue today and have resulted in the displacement of millions of people.
The exact size of the Taliban in Pakistan is not known, but estimates
range from 5,000 to 15,000. Grisly practices such as the public flogging
of a young woman in April, against a backdrop of kidnapping, bombings
of schools and mosques, and general killing of innocent civilians, turned
the Pakistani public against any accommodation with the TTP or any
other religious extremist organization. The tipping point arrived when the
TTP exploited the "peace deal" and advanced further inland. The Paki-
stani public was shocked at the actions of an elected government that
abdicated to such a force by negotiating a deal.
Pakistan has existed under the threat of invasion throughout its ex-
istence. Several wars were fought with India, one of which resulted in
Pakistani national dismemberment. Even during the British Raj, the In-
dian subcontinent lived under the threat of physical invasion, especially
from armies using historical routes such as the Khyber and Bolan
140 | P a g e
Passes. New doctrines of wars to defeat and destroy Pakistan continue

to be contemplated, practiced, and exercised in India. Since the mid-
1980s, six major military crises of varying degrees of intensity have
forced Pakistan to consider physical invasion from India an existential
threat in perpetuity. This perception cannot be wished away unless India
and Pakistan undertake a structured and sustained program of conflict
resolution, in conjunction with conventional and nuclear arms control
measures. The Pakistani armed forces must balance three dimensions:
India, Afghanistan's threat to the western border, and internal extremist
threats. When selecting strategic sites, Pakistan carefully takes these
threats into account. Material storage, missile silos, and movement of
sensitive material and personnel are being carefully and professionally
watched, and best practices are being developed to prevent security
breaches. Details of such procedures cannot be publicly shared for ob-
vious security reasons.
No state with nuclear weapons is likely to discuss its operational
management; it is always shrouded in secrecy. After the nuclear tests in
1998, the Pakistani nuclear program faced three major needs: to review
national security policies, institutionalize the management of the nuclear
program, and develop a prudent strategy for a robust strategic force.
The first challenge required Pakistan to have a national security appa-
ratus capable of comprehensively analyzing national security policy in
changing times. This challenge is being tackled nationally at the political
level. The remaining two challenges involve the NCA, which comprises
the top civilian, military, and scientific decision-makers in the country.
The SPD, formed in 1999, provides institutional oversight on nuclear de-
cision-making.
Pakistan's strategic force goals are designed to redress the vulner-

abilities described above and to restore strategic balance. Matching war-
head to warhead or accumulating fissile stocks for military purposes is
not the goal. The objective is to ensure deterrence stability by calculating
a minimum deterrence posture that is related to the increasing capabili-
ties of its adversary, namely India. Nuclear security culture evolved in
141 | P a g e
Pakistan after the September 11 attacks. Pakistan improved its supervi-

sory procedure for military and scientific manpower.
The security division of the SPD established a reporting system for
monitoring the movements of all officials. Two identical programs for em-
ployment security were created: the Personnel Reliability Program
(PRP) and the Human Reliability Program (HRP), for military and civilian
personnel, respectively. A security clearance system of annual, semian-
nual, and quarterly review was created. Counter Intelligence Teams
were created to act as the daily eyes and ears of the SPD. Weekly,
monthly, and quarterly reports for the security of all organizations are
maintained by the SPD to prevent theft, loss, or accident.
Next, a system of sensitive material control and accounting was intro-
duced. The system was derived from modern training, possibly modeled
on U.S. national laboratory procedures. The system involved regular
and surprise inspections to tally material production and waste in order
to maintain transparency and accountability.
Under a careful, secret plan instituted by the SPD, professional
guards at static sites and escorts with tight security procedures are in-
volved during transportation. Special theft- and tamper-proof vehicles
and containers are used. In peacetime, nuclear weapons are not mated
with their delivery systems and are not operationally deployed. Opera-
tional secrecy precludes specific discussion of management of nuclear
arsenals, but a two-man rule and, in some cases, a three-man rule is
followed, with physical safety and firewalls built into the weapon system
to prevent any unauthorized launch.
Chapter.15”Reversing Strategic Shrinkage”

Pakistan has been a strategically challenged state from the mo-
ment of its creation—facing hostility from its separating neighbor, India;
gross inadequacies in the military, financial and bureaucratic structures,
and a huge refugee influx. Pakistan survived those early years against
all odds, due to the iron will of its founder, Mohammad Ali _Jinnah, and
the enthusiasm of its Muslim population for a state free not only from
British rule but also the threat of Hindu subjugation and the dream of
142 | P a g e
reviving the glory of Islam's millennia of rule in the subcontinent. Today,

despite the prognostications of its detractors, Pakistan's existence as a
sovereign state is not in question.
Pakistan has acquired its unique identity; all the country's major
power centers and provinces--despite periodic dissent—have a vested
interest in its existence; the armed forces are determined to defend its
independence and territory and the acquisition of nuclear weapons ca-
pability has provided the presumption of immunity from external aggres-
sion of the sort that led to the separation of East Pakistan. But, as always
in its short history, Pakistan still confronts serious strategic challenges,
short and long term, which, if not wisely confronted and overcome, could
become life threatening. Several of these challenges are internal—mis-
governance, extremism and terrorism, economic stagnation and social
breakdown.
The immediate challenges facing Pakistan are visible and imposing
in themselves: the violent attacks by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistar (TTP)
in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and major cities; Pakistan's costly
and unpopular involvement in Afghanistan, the alienation of many
Baloch, economic stagnation— manifest in the power crisis— and the
growing poverty and social deterioration affecting the vast majority of
Pakistan's population. The combination of political turbulence and inco-
herence, growing extremism, ethnic and social violence terrorist attacks
and economic stagnation, have created a dangerous mood of national
pessimism, bordering on despair.
The first priority is to overcome these immediate challenges. De-
spite the confused political circumstances and inadequate governance,
start has been made towards confronting some of these challenges. This
start—as so often in Pakistan's history—has been initiated, directly or
indirectly, by the Pakistani Army.
In 2009 the Army made the vital determination that the foremost
priority was to confront and defeat the TTP and its affiliates, which pose
the most direct challenge to Pakistan. The US was asked to use ii drones
to target the TTP, not only the Afghan Taliban, to prove the credibility of
its alliance with Pakistan. While placing action again the Afghan Taliban
143 | P a g e
on the backburner, massive military operation were launched in Swat

and, later, in South Waziristan, Orakzai and other Agencies.
Progress has also been made in preserving Pakistan's interests in
Afghanistan. This required the Army and the ISI to play 'hardball' over
the last two and a half years. India had to he convinced that its interven-
tions in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
were not cost-free. Certain Afghan Taliban groups were targeted where
essential; in other instances action was held back when it served Paki-
stan's interests.
For four consecutive years until 2007, Pakistan recorded encour-
aging if uneven, economic growth. But it failed to address fundamental
economic problems—poverty and human development, job creation in-
frastructure and economic efficiency and productivity. The politico tur-
moil of the following two years, mounting terrorist attacks, erosion of
business confidence and the impact of the concurrent global economic
crisis pushed the Pakistan economy into a severe and fundamental cri-
sis. This crisis cannot he overcome without significant extern, financial
support. Unfortunately, despite promises of a 'democratic dividend',
Western assistance has been extended in dribs and drabs an often with
unacceptable conditions e.g. those reflected in the Kerry Lugar Bill. Sim-
ultaneously, Pakistan's traditional friends—China, Sam Arabia, and
UAE— have been halting in the commitments due to doubts about the
political leadership in Pakistan. Yet, perhaps wh. has been most lacking
is a clear and comprehensive Pakistani plan r address the economic
challenge.
With the improved prospects for a period of political equilibrium, not
stability, in Pakistan, the new national determination to confront anti-
state terrorism and the growing international consensus that Pakistan
needs to be rescued economically for the sake of regional stability there
is now scope for reviving Pakistan's economic fortunes.
Apart from the economy, a credible effort is required to heal the
festering sore in Baluchistan. Ending the violent attacks and disaffection
in the province is vital for national cohesion, political stability and eco-
144 | P a g e
nomic growth. Baluchistan’s untapped natural resources and its strate-

gic location will be essential elements of Pakistan's future economic
growth and political importance.
Prospects for ending violence in Baluchistan will greatly improve
once India is stopped from aiding the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)
insurgents through Afghanistan. Targeted action against recalcitrant el-
ements will need to be accompanied by effort at political accommodation
with the major tribal and political groups and a fair resolution of legitimate
Baloch grievances. It is vital, however, that the pressing challenges of
today do not deflect attention from the more enduring and fundamental
strategic challenges that confront Pakistan.
As ever, the most enduring and formidable of these challenges em-
anate from India. The hostility between Pakistan and India has deep his-
torical and popular roots in both countries. Despite cultural, linguistic and
ethnic affinities, the mutual hostility between the Muslims and Hindus of
the sub-continent is real and endemic. It was the raison d'être for the
creation of Pakistan. The history of the last sixty years has, if anything,
further intensified this hostility and given it structural expression in the
relationship between the two states. The Kashmir dispute, in essence,
is but one expression of this divide and hostility. (Bangladesh's relation-
ship with India displays the same dynamic).
Chapter16.” The Afghanistan Conundrum”

The Obama Administration has failed to “develop a comprehensive
political strategy in Afghanistan that the US military could not delay or
even hold hostage” (p.90). The Pentagon and the CIA have, conse-
quently, gained autonomy in conducting counter-insurgency and coun-
ter-terrorism operations, including drone strikes in Pakistan and night
raids in Afghanistan, which are hugely counterproductive. The US mil-
itary and intelligence also prefer to pursue the military course in Afghan-
istan and resent the option of making peace with the Taliban.
However, since the “West can no longer afford to fight in Afghani-
stan”, the “faster the United States talks to the Taliban and works out a
peaceful settlement that will allow the [US and NATO] troops to depart
145 | P a g e
in good order, the better it will be, both for the United States and the
region”. “Most Afghans want US troops to leave but are divided between
wanting a peace settlement and wanting to share power with the Tali-
ban” (p.15). The option of integrating insurgents in Afghan society will
not work until their leaders are reconciled. As for the logic and morality
of making peace with the enemy, the Taliban “have matured considera-
bly since the 1990s”, and they do not share al-Qaeda’s global agenda.
The Taliban have also “mellowed on the issues of girls’ education,
the media, and health services for women”. The War in Afghanistan
commenced in October 2001 with the launch of the US led Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) as a direct response to the multiple Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist strikes in the US heartland. This operation aimed
at the capture of al Qaeda supreme Osama bin Laden (OBL), destruc-
tion of al Qaeda and removal of the brutal Taliban regime (1996-2001).1
The US has approximately 30,000 troops in OEF 2 looking after the east-
ern and southern parts of Afghanistan, especially along the disputed Du-
rand Line which divides Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is home to the
most militant and lawless Pashtun tribes. The other international force
in Afghanistan is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
which was established by the UN Security Council in December 2001 to
secure Kabul and its surroundings. In 2003, NATO assumed control of
the ISAF and has around 55,000 troops from 47 countries including
around 23000 troops 3 from the USA.
After successful removal of the Taliban regime during the initial
phase of OEF, the USA led Coalition Forces are now bogged down in
the security quagmire of Afghanistan with President Hamid Karzai’s writ
diminishing gradually, an alarming rise in the Taliban – al-Qaeda control
over the Afghan countryside, flourishing poppy trade and above all, the
dangerous situation astride the Durand Line from where rebel Pashtuns
and the Taliban – al-Qaeda terrorists, especially in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas(FATA) and equally restive North Western
Frontier Province (NWFP), operate with impunity against the Kabul re-
gime.
By itself, Afghanistan is a landlocked country, characterised by
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harsh terrain, sparse population and with hardly any resources which
could precipitate any conflict of interests. However, its unique geograph-
ical location sandwiched between Central and South Asia, has always
made it a much coveted strategic pivot in the ‘Great Game’. In the 19th
century, the first ‘Great Game’ was prompted by Czarist Russia’s quest
for the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the creation of a buffer
between Imperial Britain and Russia.
Today, the stakes are significantly higher which include oil and gas,
strategic metals, hydro-power, pipelines, transit routes and access to the
developing markets of Central Asia. The growing geo-strategic im-
portance of Central Asia has led to the most powerful political cum mili-
tary blocs vying for strategic space and influence in this region, namely
one lead by the USA through the NATO and the other bloc by China and
Russia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour, Pakistan, has always sur-
mised that Afghanistan confers additional strategic depth to it in the
event of a military confrontation with India and that an adversarial regime
in Kabul could impinge on Pak security by forcing it to face two fronts.
The Chinese too have looked for access to the Indian Ocean and are
feverishly engaged in building the Gwadar Port on Pakistan’s Makaran
coast. This port would also be able to serve Central Asia, albeit through
Afghanistan. For India too, this country remains the economically signif-
icant transit route to energy rich Central Asia, besides being a co-partner
in the fight against terror especially engineered by Pakistan. The other
major regional player in this area remains Shia dominated Iran which
also seeks to influence the already complex political scenario of Afghan-
istan and has provided shelter and support, off and on, to some of its
favourite warlords.
Hamid Karzai chief of the Popalzai tribe hails from a widely re-
spected Pathan family and was the US favourite to take over the reins
of Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001. In Afghan-
istan, a conclave of tribal chieftains, the Loya Jirga considered as the
source of all legal authority, also legitimized Karzai as Afghanistan’s
President in mid-2002. Despite recalcitrant warlords spooking a nose at
147 | P a g e
Kabul, an unrelenting drug mafia fueling crime and terrorism, and Paki-
stan’s perennial mischief to put manifold obstacles in the Kabul admin-
istration’s path especially by fomenting violence through the Taliban-al
Qaeda extremists, Karzai has endeavored to put Afghanistan on the
road to development and stability, though without much success.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) in the 1960's to the 90's was ear-
lier trained and equipped by the erstwhile Soviet Forces. After the ouster
of the Talibans the West commenced restructuring and equipping the
ANA. It was planned to have a force level of 70,000 troops for the ANA
by 2009.4 The strength by February 2009 is around 79,300 personnel
though it is felt by many experts that the overall level must touch around
1,35,000 troops. The ANA Chief, General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi
has expressed that “The National Army has developed but frankly not
fast enough. We’re facing terrorists, the Taliban and interference from
Pakistan and we cannot yet control our own borders. The force strength
of 70000 is not going to be sufficient.”5 The ANA comprises five region-
ally based army corps, comprising 14 brigades along with a nascent air
corps. In addition to the ANA, the Afghan National Police and some Min-
istry of Interior troops total around 50,000 policemen. The ANP does not
carry a good professional reputation like the ANA and is perceived to be
corrupt.
In addition, currently the ANA’s Air Corps woefully lacks adequate
rotary lift capability. Despite limitations in terms of equipment, air power
and training, the ANA has recently commenced independent operations
in the hinterland. Other encouraging trends in the ANA has been the fall
in desertion rates and the recruitment of women soldiers 6 including in
the parachute wing. The Karzai government has been rather unsuccess-
ful in attracting ex-Talibanis and local militias to join the ANA and ANP
so far. India’s growing influence in Afghanistan has unnerved the Paki-
stanis who have always visualised this region as its own exclusive back-
yard.
Immediately on taking over the US Presidency, Barack Obama sig-
naled his priority for Afghanistan over Iraq by nominating the veteran
diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, as the Special Envoy for the Afghanistan-
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Pakistan region besides ordering a ‘surge’ of 17000 additional troops to

Afghanistan. President Obama has expressed that “Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan are central in the war on terror”.
He also stated that the situation remained “perilous” in Afghanistan
and that his envoy would lead “our effort to forge and implement a sus-
tainable approach to this critical region.”10 Meanwhile a dismal picture
of spiraling violence and a disintegrating society in Afghanistan has been
reported in a confidential NATO report prepared by the Pentagon on be-
half of the ISAF. Also, casualties figures for both Afghan civilians and
those of the US and NATO forces were the highest in 2008 since 2001
according to both the Pentagon and UN reports.11 The latter found 2118
civilians being killed and in the same report, UN secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon stated, “despite the enhanced capabilities of both the Afghan
National Army and the international forces, the security situation has de-
teriorated markedly.”
Pakistan has had age-old civilizational, political and economic ties
with Afghanistan and cordial relations with all governments in Kabul ex-
cept with the Karzai. Since long, India has been assisting the Afghan
government in various developmental projects. In recent years, the UPA
government has pledged over $1.2 billion (Rs 6000 crore) for develop-
ment works in Afghanistan. Only in January 2009, the strategic 215 km
road Zaranj-Delaram in south western Afghanistan which connects Ka-
bul along the Garland Highway to Iran was opened despite many at-
tempts by the ISI and Taliban to disrupt its construction. This important
road opens up a doorway for trade with Central Asia through Iran and
its port of Chabahar. In addition, India is completing a second major in-
frastructure project that is the Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul transmission line
and the sub station at Chimtala in Northern Afghanistan is being com-
pleted shortly.
Besides, Indian assistance in various educational, telecommunica-
tions, medical and agricultural projects is well underway. India also trains
ANA and ANP personnel on a regular basis. In addition, faced with a
common threat emanating from the Taliban-al Qaeda and ISI combine,
intelligence sharing between the two countries is only natural. As India
enlarges its strategic footprint in Afghanistan, Pakistan is rather wary of
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the growing Indian influence, whilst some in the US establishment may

expect to see India also taking on a direct military role to augment the
ISAF.
Nevertheless, it will be prudent for India to keep away from direct
military involvement in Afghanistan, even if requested by Kabul. How-
ever, India can augment training of Afghan military and police personnel,
and also consider selling/donating combat equipment like T-72/55 tanks,
BMP-2s, small arms including mortars, light artillery, radio, night vision
and mine clearing equipment, helicopters and light aircraft, and non-le-
thal equipment like B vehicles, winter clothing etc.
Chapter.17 “The India factor”

Since the creation of Pakistan and India, the relationship of these
two states has been adversarial. The continued antagonism of these
neighboring states have also been an enigma for many who have kept
a close watch on the developments in the Sub-continent; Pakistan and
India have not only fought wars, but also realized the sagacity to search
for peace. The fact that both the states are nuclear armed, may have
weighed heavily on the minds of the leaders of Pakistan and India, push-
ing them to explore ways for normalizing relations. In searching for
peace, the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) since its inception in
1997, has proven to be a most encouraging vehicle in visibly improving
the relations between Pakistan and India. The usefulness of the Com-
posite Dialogue Process can also be gauged by the fact that it allowed
leaders of both the states to also use back channel diplomacy to find
solutions to the Jammu &Kashmir dispute, which is the thorniest and the
most intractable issue of the process. The efficacy of the Composite Di-
alogue Process can also be assessed from the fact that the process
faced interruption many a times and was revived again.
There is a deep mistrust between Pakistan and India, especially
within the political and military leadership. The military has its own prior-
ities; the various wars that the two armies have fought should not spring
any surprise over the hardening of their stance. The negativity, bolstered
by media and political propaganda has also impacted on a segment of
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the public in both the countries. This has, in recent times, resulted in a
complete breakdown between the two countries in communicating the
desire to improve relations.
Despite Pakistan-India watchers who have studied these two
states for decades, and who are not very hopeful of any permanent res-
olution in the short term, the CDP was, and still remains the most effec-
tive vehicle. There seems to be no incentive, especially for India, a big-
ger power led by a leadership whose ascendency to power is imbedded
in having convinced a major segment of its electorate that only Pakistan
is to be blamed for the problems India was facing, but also that Pakistan
was not getting away ‘free’. The seeds of this enmity between Pakistan
and India are not only well-documented, but at the same time surprising
to some extent, keeping in view that the commonalities of language and
culture of these two neighboring states should have been the glue to
keep them together. “Pakistan and India have the ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic and historical commonalities, as well as economic complemen-
tarities which should have been an important factor for bringing the re-
gion together and promote co-operation.
“At the heart of the mistrust lie the unresolved disputes, which not
only adversely affect regional peace and security, but also hinder eco-
nomic development and efforts to eradicate poverty, illiteracy, and dis-
ease in the two countries.” Raghavan, a seasoned Indian diplomat,
known for his sane and balanced analysis, adds his voice to the history
of acrimony of these two neighboring states, “Evidently, there is the all–
encompassing bitterness associated with the violence and displacement
of partition….By any standards and for any period of history, India and
Pakistan started with a background and an inheritance which could not
have been worse.”
In addition, the absence of significant economic and trade relations
between the two states, which is a people-centric activity - all cause the
mistrust and rivalry to persist. The result of this animosity has impacted
the Sub-continent, and since the partition, it has witnessed four wars and
a number of serious interstate crises. On almost every issue that arose
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in relations with India, Pakistan found itself faced with New Delhi’s re-
fusal to resolve the differences on the basis of principle of law and jus-
tice. Looking at decades of Pakistan-India visible hostility, late US Pres-
ident Nixon summed up, “The Indo-Pakistan conflict is one of the most
tragic examples of senseless military spending in postwar history.” He
again echoes the same analysis, “Two of the poorest in the World – India
and Pakistan – spent more than $11 billion a year for the purpose of
waging a future war.”
Just as much that India continues to occupy successive Pakistani
governments since the inception of the country, one cannot also dispute
that, “South Asia, India’s immediate periphery, will perhaps remain criti-
cal to every Indian Prime Minister and every Indian administration.”
The question which continue to haunt the people of Pakistan and
India include: Are wars, antagonism and politics based on sheer bigotry
necessary or a need for sanity and deep reflection; for jointly pooling of
energies and resources which positively impacts the teeming millions in
both the countries?.
Among the peace initiative undertaken between Pakistan and India, the
Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) tops the list and shall also continue
to attract sceptics to cast their gloominess and misgivings; they are con-
vinced that Pakistan and India regretfully are determined not to learn
from history and shall pay no heed to the fact that once rivals, France
and Germany, United Kingdom and France, Thailand and Laos, Russia
and China, known to be at loggerheads for years , have now in the larger
national interest or in pressing public interest, ‘buried the hatchet’. As
one discusses this regional competition, the two Koreas, known arch
rivals, are reaching out to each other. China and India, these two adver-
saries are not only managing their differences inspite of a serious border
dispute going back to the creation of modern India and China, but also
visibly enlarging bilateral economic and trade relationship.
In this scenario, are Pakistan and India to be the solitary states
condemned to spend another seven decades emulating ‘Don Quixote's
fight with the windmills’? Or the current leadership of both the neighbor-
ing countries have the courage to turn a new page in their chequered
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and sad history, and shall demonstrate maturity and tutor their popula-
tion that wars have never been the solution in resolving the differences
which exist between these nuclear armed states. The counter argument
to the sceptics of Composite Dialogue Process is, if not this process,
then what other process is there to resolve or make efforts to bring at
least ‘normalcy’ to the relationship of these two neighboring states,
whose ‘unmanageable’ population are crying out for an end to conflicts
and to be allowed a semblance of normal living.
Despite the natural animosity, “India and Pakistan recognize each
other’s right to exist; they have regular diplomatic relations, and they
periodically engage in diplomatic negotiations such as the “composite
dialogue” attempting to settle their disputes.
The Composite Dialogue Process encompasses a whole range of is-
sues of bilateral concerns, ranging from security, terrorism, trade, com-
merce, to territorial disputes, including Kashmir.
The record of the process reflects positivity, “Nevertheless, despite
all the posturing, suspicion and doubt, progress was made in that it was
agreed that all the eight subjects identified would be discussed as part
of a comprehensive package known thereafter, as the Composite Dia-
logue.”10 Aziz Khan, a former senior diplomat adds, “… there can be no
substitute to Composite Dialogue or Comprehensive Bilateral Process
(CBD), or any other name which the two countries agree to call. It was
once a very dynamic process and made tangible progress.”11 Thus, it
is imperative for the two countries and for the region that prodding con-
tinues for a resolution of the issues.
Pakistan and India are not unique globally in their history of rivalry,
nor of the brutal conflicts, but certainly exceptional in the ‘longevity’ of
the rivalry in the modern era. It seems that in the very recent past, suc-
cessive leadership of both states have somehow been ‘compelled’, for
their own myopic domestic reasons, to put on the back burner any
thought or prospect to resolve their differences through peaceful means.
The consequences could be grim in a most challenging scenario: The
nuclear tests by Pakistan and India in May of 1998 steered the deeply-
fissured conflict dynamics of South Asia to a new dimension and is
153 | P a g e
fraught with possible repercussions of any deliberate or inadvertent cri-

sis generation in a nuclear environment.
As the record of the bilateral relationship since the inception of Pa-
kistan and India has clearly shown, there have been periods of steps
taken to move the dialogue process forward, followed by a ‘ghastly’ in-
cident or incidents in either of the two neighboring countries, leading to
two steps backward and thus putting to a freeze, the whole process of
engagement into a uncharted future! The anti- government lawyers’
movement and the assault on the extremists groups holed up in the Lal
Masjid (mosque) in 2007, weakened President Musharraf’s ability to
take crucial decisions.
This was followed by the cowardly bombing on the Samjutha Ex-
press Train in India (which carries Pakistani & Indian nationals to each
other’s countries) on February 18, 2007 and the Mumbai carnage of No-
vember 26, 2008 which naturally impacted on the bilateral relationship
and added to the already present mistrust between the two countries.
The 2008 elections in Pakistan brought a political government for
whom any initiative having taken by a military-led government, even
though a positive one and in the long term interest of the country was
termed ‘anathema’ and thus rubbished. Such is unfortunately, the nature
of politics in South Asia.
History is a testament to unfortunate developments in South Asia;
at any given time, even if there is a whiff of Pakistan and India attempting
to talk, hardliners and sceptics on both sides of the divide open up their
‘volley of cannons’, to shoot down the dove which had dared to tread a
different flight. “There are Pro-India and anti- India lobbies in Pakistan.
However, India has never been a factor in Pakistan’s elections, whereas
anti-Pakistan bashing is a continuous factor in Indian elections, wit-
nessed in the last, and the present one.”34 In the past and at present,
fears and concerns of the hardliners have prevented leaders in both the
neighboring countries in taking any fresh or out of the box initiative which
could push them towards sitting across the table to thrash out the issues.
However, history is replete that these fears and concerns later turned
out to be mere misconceptions.
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Within SAARC, Pakistan and India can look to cooperate on Non-tradi-

tional issues many among which include:
1. Poverty Alleviation: Addressing and alleviating poverty through tar-
geted policies and initiatives.
2. Population Stabilization: Implementing strategies for stabilizing
population growth, drawing from individual experiences.
3. Empowerment of Women: Prioritizing the empowerment of
women, recognized as a top priority across states.
4. Mobilizing the Youth Bulge: Effectively mobilizing and addressing
the challenges posed by the youth bulge in the population.
5. People-to-People Contact: Promoting people-to-people contact as
a vehicle for building trust and fostering cooperation.
6. Human Resource Development: Improving skills and capabilities
to cultivate a skilled and useful citizenry.
7. Promotion of Health and Nutrition: Prioritizing health and nutrition
promotion as prerequisites for developing useful citizens.
8. Protection of Children: Recognizing the protection of children as
key to the welfare and overall well-being of all South Asians.
9. Environmental Conservation: Undertaking and reinforcing regional
cooperation in environmental conservation, pollution prevention, and
preparedness for natural disasters.
10. Food Security: Ensuring food security as the foundation for the
survival and well-being of the population.
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GOVERNING THE UNGOVERNABLE BY

ISHRAT HUSSAIN (2018)
CHAPTER -1 INTRODUCTION
Pakistan started as a nation with economic and political weak-
nesses and faced the tragic death of its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
Despite these challenges, within its first 40 years, Pakistan became one
of the top ten economic powers globally, with impressive achievements.
In 1947, it accommodated 8 million refugees and engaged in wars with
India in 1965 and 1971, which resulted in the loss of its eastern part.
Pakistan's close involvement with the USA in Afghanistan, opposing the
Soviet Union, strained its social fabric.
Despite internal and external challenges, Pakistan registered a 6%
growth rate during its initial 40 years and outperformed India and Bang-
ladesh in various social and economic indicators. In the 1980s, Pakistan
became a middle-income nation but saw a decline in its growth rate from
6.5% to 4.5% after 1990. Political instability and frequent changes of
government created uncertainty for investors in the 1990s. Although
there was a smooth transition of power in 2008, it couldn't effectively
address the country's economic issues. Pakistan's external image is of-
ten associated with extremism and heavy military spending, especially
on nuclear weapons. Tensions persist with India over the Kashmir dis-
pute, and instability in Afghanistan adds to the region's challenges.
Pakistan's relationship with the US is marked by mistrust on both
sides, with the US perceiving Pakistan as having a duplicitous relation-
ship with both the US and the Taliban. The country is seen as a source
of instability in the region, making foreign investors reluctant to invest.
Despite travel advisories and various economic and humanitarian issues
from 2002 to 2016, Pakistan achieved macroeconomic stability and
growth.
Some analysts attribute Pakistan's economic betterment to foreign
aid received in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as well as foreign currency
deposits by residents and non-resident Pakistanis in Pakistani banks.
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The US's $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar bill for economic and military assis-
tance also played a role. However, it's believed that these aids often
benefited military dictators at the expense of democratic governments.
The frequent overturning of elected regimes in the 1990s and the
1977 ousting of Bhutto are believed to be politically engineered, contrib-
uting to economic instability. The defense budget surpasses spending
on education and health, and military corporate interests in companies
like Fauji Foundation, Askari, and Bahria have come under scrutiny.
Effective institutions are crucial for a government's functioning, and they
determine a nation's fate. Pro-poor growth was observed in Pakistan
during 1996-2005, but the income of the bottom 20% of the population
decreased. Governance sub-components, such as government effec-
tiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, political stability, and
absence of violence, underperformed during this period.
The decline of civilian institutions also partially explains civil-military
relations in Pakistan and the military's increasing influence. Reforms and
restructuring of state-oriented institutions are needed to restore the
country, emphasizing merit, integrity, dedicated service, and problem-
solving.
Comparatively, Bangladesh and India have made great strides in
growth, reduced poverty, and improved living standards over the past
25 years. The text suggests that Pakistan's economic decline is tied to
the decay of its key governance institutions and their malfunction. To
address this, lessons
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from success stories should be applied to Pakistan's institutions, and

society, media, NGOs, and professional bodies should participate in
providing social services like education and healthcare.
CHAPTER -2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Early Years
Pakistan inherited a well-functioning judiciary, civil service, and mil-
itary at the time of its independence but faced inadequate financial re-
sources and human capital. Muhammad Ali Jinnah's vision for Pakistan
was a powerful, united, and happy nation. After Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
Khan's deaths, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) relied on bureau-
cratic patronage rather than organizational promotion.
Ayub Khan's Era.
In the early two decades of Pakistan's history, civilian institutions
retained their strength and played critical roles. Ayub Khan introduced
the Basic Democracies system to gain legitimacy, but it eroded his
regime's popularity and credibility. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami
League capitalized on the disaffection with the military regime, leading
to a majority win in East Pakistan. President Yahya Khan's reluctance to
transfer power to the elected leader of the Awami League reinforced
Bengali mistrust of West Pakistan and the Pakistani Army.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Government:
Bhutto, a former foreign minister under Ayub Khan, formed the Pa-
kistan People's Party (PPP) and promised justice and legitimacy under
the banner of Islamic Socialism. Bhutto weakened governance institu-
tions and relied on discretionary powers instead of adhering to the Plan-
ning Commission's policies. His rule was marked by tension with civil
servants, whom he blamed for hindering his socialist vision.
Zia-ul-Haq's Rule
General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law and banned political party
participation in local government to legitimize his regime. He promoted
a more Islamic state, utilized religious schools (Madrassas), and fanned
anti-India sentiments. Zia's rule had a lasting impact on Pakistan's soci-
ety and institutions.
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Post-1980s
The quality of civil service recruits began to deteriorate after re-
forms in 1973. There were alternating elected governments in the late
1980s, breaking the momentum of reforms. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif took turns as Prime Ministers, each facing their unique set of chal-
lenges. Moeen Qureshi, a caretaker Prime Minister, implemented im-
pressive changes in policy and institutions, focusing on merit-based se-
lection.
General Musharraf's Rule
General Musharraf came to power in 1999 and introduced techno-
crats in key positions. He initiated the Nazim system of local government
and various reforms such as the Police Order 2001, the National Ac-
countability Bureau (NAB), and the Higher Education Commission
(HEC). His initial years in power were marked by relatively good govern-
ance.
Post-2008
In 2008, a political elected government returned to power, and con-
stitutional amendments were made to transfer administrative and legis-
lative powers to the provinces.
CHAPTER -3 THE ECONOMY
At the time of independence the prospect of the economic survival

of Pakistan appeared quite bleak. Pakistan had more land than France
and more population than Germany but fighting a close battle with eco-
nomic bankruptcy. 80% people from 7 million migrated population were
farmers and only 26000 workers were employed by industry. Pakistan’s
financial troubles were compared by her political, trade and industrial
failure. From shaky start Pakistan is now 34th largest economy with per
capita income $ 1500 compared with $ 100 in 1947. A country of 30
million people in 1947 was unable to feed her people and depended on
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imports of wheat etc. but in 2016 these products were exported. Cotton
production crossed 14 million bails as compared with 1 million in 1947.
The Zia period (1977-78) was characterized by a surge in economic
growth that was back to the over 6% average record in 1960s. Economic
indicators were impressive with growth rate 6%, inflation down 7.6% ag-
ricultural growth 4% and industrial growth 8%.
The opportunity to undo most of the damage wrought by nation was
missed by the Zia Govt. rather than taking proactive measures to re-
verse the state owned and state dominated economy, the Govt. main-
tained influenced the adoption in national economy 1) Bhutto case 2)
Pakistan’s national security involvement in Afghanistan 3) lack of military
officers in economy and 4) adoption of conservative and risk free poli-
cies.
Nawaz Sharif after assuming power in 1990 took some bold steps
to liberalize, deregulate and privatize economy showing average trend
of GDP 4.4% per year. Govt. provided preferential soft loan but industrial
winners but social sector was neglected. The military Govt. in 1999 has
set economic recovery during sanctions and technocrats cabinet made
reforms during 2000-07. Devolution of powers to local Govt. reduced
poverty 10% and unemployment 2% created 11.8 million jobs during
1999-2008. 2008-13 tenure was unable to motivated foreign investors,
unsatisfactory economic performance with GDP under 3%, double digit
inflation, highest fiscal deficit 6% of GDP and so on.
The principle thrust of the reform undertaken since 1991, role of
state was redefined as facilitator, enabler, protector and regulator rather
controlling the economy directly. Three large nationalized banks were
privatized. Diversion of natural gas to CNG on political grounds created
huge demand and supply gap. The growth acceleration of 2002-07 was
also accompanied by a similar increase in the investment ratio from
15.5% of the GDP in 2001-02 to 23% in 2007-08.
Exports of goods and services in early 2000s raised from $ 13.6

billion to $ 21.2 billion an increment of 55%. Foreign workers’ remit-
tances increased $ 6.5 billion in 2007-08 from $ 1 billion. Pakistan’s track
record of a sharp reduction in poverty 2001-16 has had a natural effect
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of a rising middle class.
CHAPTER -4 THE POLITY

The economy and economic players require a stable political envi-
ronment. Economic policy decision affects various segments of the pop-
ulation. People rejected the policies of authoritarian regimes soon, so
pure representation of public through political process had been always
required. There is widens gap in perceived and actual reality. Political
stability promotes transparency, rule of law and economic policies.
Manmohan Singh president of India was an economist but during his
tenure Indian economy was in crunch but then people elected Modi on
the base of his performance of Gujrat province. Soon Indian economy
boosted rapidly. After overwhelming victory of All India Muslim League
(AIML) in 1945/46 M Ali Jinnah become Governor General of Pakistan
and Liaqat Ali Khan was 1st Prime Minister of Pakistan. AIML was suc-
ceeded and divided India in 2 parts creating Pakistan a Muslim country
for Indian Muslims.
Nawab Mamdot was 1st CM of Punjab and was removed for party
disobedience. There were quick changes of elected governments in Pa-
kistan but Indian National Congress (INC) who was counterpart of AIML
for independence remained in govt. for 30 years till 1977. AIML created
Pakistan but was not emerged as national party of Pakistan and faced
lack of leadership after the deaths of M Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan.
India drafted new constitution in 1948 but Pakistan was unable to do so.
Pakistan Muslim League (PML) has passed through several periods of
trial and tribulation since 1947.
It provided space to emerge new political parties in the country.
These parties can be catogerised as 1. National Parties: PMLN, PPP
and PTI 2. Regional Parties: ANP, MQM and BNP and 3. Religio- Polit-
ical Parties: JI and JUI. After sweeping the general election of 1970 PPP
lost charismatic founder Zulifqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) who was hanged in
1979. PPP regained power in 1988 in the leadership of Benazir Bhutto
who was elected Prime Minster in 1988 and 1993. PPP again come into
power after the assassination of BN in 2008 but the tenure was failed
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badly with huge corruption scandals and bad governance by Asif Ali
Zardari. Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) was in power recently
in Punjab and Center but just established political system of patronage
both in bureaucracy and police.PTI is newcomer party in Pakistan and
emerged 2nd largest party in the country having KP Govt.
The dynastic families had been in power since 1947. Mostly
electable belongs to these families. Pakistan has had been ruled about
30 years by military rulers. So, most of democratic components could
not be developed during these eras. On the other hand, intra-party de-
mocracy is also just showoff. Even Election Commission of Pakistan has
rule to hold polls regularly. Pakistan’s political institutions have not yet
achieved the level of maturity than can contribute to the process of im-
proved democratic governance.
CHAPTER -5 THE SOCIETY

The politics of patronage so widely practical in Pakistan is deeply
rooted in Pakistani societal structure. Pakistani society is structured
along family, bradri, tribe and ethnicity. Family is male centred and he
does all kind of decisions of the family. Cultural norms are very difficult
to change social behaviour is governed like Sharama and Murawat from
childhood. Pakistan was predominantly a rural agrarian society in which
feudal, tribal and caste relationship were the principal drives of the soci-
ety’s behaviour and attitude.
Like many other heterogeneous countries Pakistani society also

have many overlapping identities based on ethnicity, language, location,
caste, clans, tribes or ideology. Social structure is the traditional or pre-
dominant rural area is based on tribal affiliation in parts of Baluchistan
and KP provinces, with clear linguistic divide on kinship Bradri and caste
(Arain or Jutts) in Punjab with Pothohari, Punjabi and Saraiki as spoken
dialects and feudal and presents in Sindh proud of their native language
along with affluent middle class in urban areas mostly Muhajirs on the
migrant and sticking with language of their ancestors.
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After the death of Jinnah ML was controlled by elite and they used
caste, tribes and language basis for their parochial benefits. The
younger generation which reached adolescence in the 1970s and 1980s
eras had not witness the sacrifices and turmoil of 1947, were fed by their
political leaders the mature injustice being meted out to their linguistic,
provincial and ethnic groups. In Zia regime MQM was formed as coun-
tervailing force against Sindhis nationalists. MQM become powerful
voice of Muhajirs in Sindh. Although Pakistani society has faced many
crises and downturns, it has invariably rebound and demonstrated resil-
ience. There are many institutions like family and kinship which bonds
and together society.
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Pakistan’s elite was unable to establish good governance due to unsta-

ble state and society. The orientation of Pakistani society towards Islam-
ization since 1980s and trend has become more perceptible and en-
trenched since 9/11. The biggest shift towards Islamization happened in
Zia era with law, policies and curriculum changes. Musharaf make at-
tempt to do liberal Islamic society as Enlighten Moderation and tried to
change identity of Zia’s regime. General Musharaf introduced private
media in 2000 and breaks the monopoly of state owned media. Media
has both positive and negative influences on viewers or readers.
In 2014, Pakistan was ranked 47 score out of 188 countries despite

of improvement in human development index (HDI) score over its period,
Pakistan relative performance was met at all encouraging. Pakistan has
own of the lowest labour productivity rates in the region and suffers from
poor work ethics. The climate of suspicion, hate and intolerance sup-
presses not only dissent but also free thinking.
Pakistan ranks at the bottom rung among the developing countries

in the global gender index. Honour killings, acid attacks and rape are
some of the social evils. Women’s participation in labour is only 22%
which is negative point for country’s development. Women wage is also
very low and harassment at work premises is also a big hurdle for their
employment. Women representation in National assembly is 2.8% and
in provincial assembly is 2.6%. Female literacy rate risen upto 55% in
2014-15, but low with comparison to male which is 70%. Enrolment of
girls is 37% but boys is 73%.
Civil society organizations have become active and some of them

are making useful contributions in education, health and other fields. The
institutional landscape can’t be organically nurtured until disconnect be-
tween the prevalent societal values and norms and the ingredients upon
which the institutions thrive bridged.
CHAPTER -6 FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
There are large number of variants of governments, structures and
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models in which state, markets and increasingly civil society play differ-
ent roles. So role of governments is to provide inter/external security,
collect taxes, manage public finance, foreign affairs, stable microeco-
nomic and healthy financial system, infrastructure and facilities, educa-
tion, health, water and sanitation, R&D for innovation and provide frame-
work to private sector to participate in development.
Along with Govt. NGOs and civil society are also playing role for
the betterment of the country. To run day to day affairs of the country
there are many departments with mistrial to clerical staff hierarchy. Dur-
ing Ayub khan era powers of federal secretaries were enhanced for ef-
ficient and smooth working.
According to Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2014 there were

191 public enterprises worth of $ 9.4 million and employees 420,000
which account for 10% of GDP like PIA, Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM) etc.
in 1990s privatization process of state owned enterprises were started,
between 1991- 2015 Rs656 million transactions were completed. PSM
in past few years placed loses of Rs 100 million.
After 18the amendment provincial fiscal policy is in the hands of prov-

inces. In new fiscal policy new institutions arrangements and policy
changes have to be put in place by provinces. There are some proposed
reforms in this regard. Develop powers, responsibilities and resources
from provincial to local governments
 Inter govt. vigilance policy
 Separate policy making from policy operations
 Full empowerment of ministries and departments, reduce number of
layers in departmental hierarchy, streamline departments,
 Viable environment should be provided for FDI and business invest-
ments and taxation should also be re- structured
CHAPTER -7 LOCAL GOVERMENT
The three major initiatives to develop powers and resources were
taken in 1960s Ayub’s era, 1980s Zia’s era and 2000s Musharaf era
associating Local Government (LG). To empower LG means that you
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are by passing provincial and federal level legitimacy of politicians.
Ayub Khan did not believe in complete democracy so, he legislative

basic democratic ordinance 1959 and municipal administration ordi-
nance in 1960 and tier 4 structure of LG. Zia wanted party less elections
so he organized LG pools under LG ordinance 1979. Musharaf was
given 3 years by Supreme Court to hold general elections but he also
organized LG elections to empower his legitimacy. He introduced Nazim
system the commissioner, DCO and ACs were reporting to district
Nazim.
According to World Bank (WB) effective government are those who

have close collaboration with businessmen and citizens. Accountability,
delivery of public goods, policy formulation and improvement, revenue
generation, political participation, proper money transfer, service deliv-
ery, transfer of administrative authority, education and health are some
keys for successful government. After Musharaf regime LG system was
abolished soon, even in KP there was some of its taste remained with
limited powers. Most of pubic interaction with district level govt. machin-
ery but they are ill trained, poorly paid, unhelpful and rude individuals
enjoying arbitrary powers. So recruitment of these public servers should
be through public service commission purely on merit basis. The devo-
lution of development projects, programs and departments was working
satisfactory until 2007 and should remain with the district governments.
CHAPTER -8 THE CIVIL SERVICES
The channel through which governance affects development is its
civil servants, their quality incentives afforded to them as their account-
ability in terms of results. The key to quality and high performance lies
in attracting, retaining and motivating. The Civil servants should be of
high professional caliber and their integrity.
Pakistan inherited the British Civil Services as its administrative ap-

paratus from India. New Pakistani govt. decided to continue the system
called Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) with specialization/categories
like police service, Foreign Service, audit and accounts etc. In 1960s top
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cadre officers were appointed as deputy commissioner, commissioner

and some heads of the departments and newly established departments
like WPDA, KDA, CDA and PIDC etc. the practice were most of the po-
sitions of secretaries, heads of departments, autonomous bodies, public
operations and other state cadre institutional were reserved for mem-
bers of the CSP continued uninterrupted until the 1973 reforms.
Elected Govt. of 1972 decided to break up the frame of the civil services
and make them more pliable and flexible. Zia continue with the same
structure of Bhutto period. 1988-89 was turning point in the history of
civil services and the process of institutional decay.
The 2001 Local Government Ordinance (LGO) and Police Order

2002 abolished the post of deputy commissioner and transfer powers to
elected Nazims. The Dc-SP duo played a crucial role in enforcing the
state’s writ in the districts.
Due to these change have seen deterioration in the quality of new

entrants of Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). In 2016 the total
posts were 202 and 9643 candidates were appeared but only 1999 were
passed the examination. The state can’t resolve development chal-
lenges without an effective civil service. So, structure of recruitment pol-
icy should be reviewed time to time.
CHAPTER -9 THE JUDICIARY

Among all the three organs of the state set out in the constitution a
well-functioning judiciary is crucial to democracy, governance, security,
economic growth and equity. An independent judiciary ensures the Rule
of Law is available to all citizens. Pakistan has 3 tiers of judiciary; apex
level is Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan followed by High Courts (HC)
and then District Courts (DC).
The Supreme Court’s record over the decades has been at best,
mixed. In 1950 SC endorsed action of dissolving elected assemblies. In
1972 ruled against General Yahya Khan, in 1977 martial law was sus-
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pended and in 2000 endorsed intervention. In 2007 SC declared Provin-

cial Constitutional Order (PCO) illegal. The conviction of Bhutto by LHC
in 1979 and the decision by SC proved to be a highly controversial and
contentious issue in the judicial history of Pakistan.
In matters related to economy and finance, much damage was

done in the post-2007 period of judicial activism and there is still no res-
pite. A World Bank enterprise survey reported that 38% of Pakistani
firms find the court system a major constraint in doing business in com-
parison to 14% in South Asia as a whole. Under Investment Climate
Assessment 1/3 of Pakistani firms perceive the low quality of courts as
an obstacle in comparison to 1/5 in Bangladesh. Policy-makers, leaders
of the legal profession, the National judicial policy committee and others
involved in the chain providing justice and the rule of law in the country
should realize how much good they can bring.
CHAPTER -10 THE LEGISLATURE

Pakistan has experimented with both the presidential and parlia-
mentary forms of government under different arrangements. The consti-
tution of 1956 envisaged a parliamentary form of government with a sin-
gle house, i.e. the National assembly elected directly on the basis of
adult franchise but the constitution was soon thereafter cast aside by
military coup of Oct 1958.
The election of president, on the one hand, and the national and
provincial assemblies on the other were held indirectly by an electoral
college of 80,000 basic democrats. The constitution has remained in
force except that is has been suspended twice in 1977 and 1999. Under
18th amendment the power of dismissal of assemblies by president was
withdrew. According to new Pakistan legislative system president is as
the ceremonial head of the state.
There is no doubt that parliament is the supreme body for legisla-
tion and constitutional drafting. Primary object of parliamentarian is to
debate, adjournment motions and ask questions about different issues.
The role of standing committees of parliament and senate is also very
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important but most of recommendations by these committees are failed

to become a law or any change in law.
Accountability of executives is also duty of parliament but they

never been asked. Same the role in economic governance of legislature
is also not up to the mark. Parliamentary supremacy is true and its right
and ability to make law on any subject. But there are some reservations
about legislations against accountability of institutions like NAB etc.
Electoral reforms should also be done by parliament. 2014 Dharna was
based on demands of electoral reforms.
According to noble prize winner Amartaya Sen “while democracy

is not yet universally practiced nor uniformly accepted, in the general
climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the
status of being taken to be generally right.” The election commission
should be fully empowered and electronic machine be used. Careful
Scrutiny of parliamentary candidates and financial source for campaign
should also be exercised. Parliament would then be able to ask execu-
tive and enforce rule of law.
CHAPTER -11 THE MILITARY

In the governance of Pakistan, the role of military has been existed
directly or indirectly. Pakistan was major source of British army recruit-
ment, including main part of soldiers from Pothohar region and some
parts of KPK. At the independence men source of Pakistan army was
120,000 by 1965 the number reached at 300,000 and currently it is
around 520,000 with 45 major training establishments across the coun-
try.
The ISI gained more importance during involvement in Afghanistan
war, in Zia regime and in Musharaf era. 1985-71 was the era of army
control when head of state and army chief was same person. The lost
of Eastern Pakistan in 1971 with 92,000 prisoners blow prestige of army.
Most of the young army officers didn’t wish that Yahya Khan should con-
tinue as COAS, and forced to transfer power to elected Bhutto. After
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Shimla agreement Bhutto sacked army and air chiefs. This was back-
ground story of 1973 constitution was enacted. By Bhutto’s own picked
army chief constitution was violated and proved that army is an institu-
tion and did not believe in any personal relations.
Highly importance and funds were given to PMA, the command and
Staff College and other military establishments for professional training.
No doubt these institutions produced highly professionals to better serve
the country. According to condition of region army always have vital and
influential role over defence policy of the country. Foreign policy and de-
fence policies are correlated. This is a popular hypotheses that army
expenses are very high to manage and maintain security and defence.
In 1960 defence expenditure was 28.3%, 1970 22.6%, 1980s 23.1%,
1990s 26.5%, 2000s 21.5%, 2010 12.5% and in 2015 the share was
13% of total budget. A popular myth become quite entrenched as the
entrenched concerns the large corporate incentive of military. It is accu-
rate that military has trusts and foundations those have enterprises but
proceeds and profits they earn utilised for army pensioners and martyrs
etc. The details of assts of Fauji Foundation are, in 1970 52 million, 2009
125 billion and in 2015 it was 342 billion.
Defence budget crowded out social sector spending in particular
and development expenditure in general. It is true that up to 1990 the
budget was inflicting heavy cost on development and social spending
but it has now fallen to under 3% OF GDP and continues less than 15%
public expenditure but the growth performance in this period of declining
defence spending has been dismal.
CHAPTER -12 THE RELIGIOUS EDIFICE
Role of religion in Pakistan is critical, will religion be facilitator for
economic and other developments or retard. Teachings of Islam are to
share part of wealth with poor and care others etc. Some outside Paki-
stan assumed that from Zia regime to onward 3 decades Pakistan be-
come a religious country. However, religious parties did not receive
more than 11% votes in poll history. Pakistan being formally called Islam
Republic with terrorists in bordering of Afghanistan. Although Muslims
share common religious identity but they are not united on politics on the
basis of region, class and ideological affiliations.
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There is contrary view that Pakistan was not existed on Islamic

movement but was seeking better social and economic opportunities.
Islam is not practiced strictly but western views, social and political seg-
ments are the part of society.
Different religious groups are not agreeing on the form of Sharia and
which is valid? According to Zia presidential order article 2A Islam is
“one of its salient on defining feature of Pakistan’s constitution.” Some
of the causes of Jihadists formulation were unemployment, corruption
and bad governance and were originated from sectarian extremism.
A well-established Islamic economic system in Pakistan is missing. Is-
lamic economic model can help to improve capitalist economy model as
well. Islamic economy revolves around Masajid and Mudarassas and no
doubt some bad elements and products belong to Mudarassas. Sectar-
ianism also grew parallel with Islamization and become source of viola-
tion, violence against women and minorities and source of negative im-
age of Pakistan too.
The use of religion for political and strategic goals has been one of
the prime causes of extremism. Since inception of the country, religion
a message of peace has been exploited and used for politics and other
vested interests.
CHAPTER -13 THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Pakistan had no industry worth at the time of independence. There
was no organized private sector as known today. Agriculture sector was
controlled and dominated by landlords and Jagidars. So government in-
troduced imagination economic policies in 1950s and 1960s and emerg-
ing private sector became engine of growth. In 1970s nationalization of
industrial and banking sectors suffered private sector and it was draw-
back.
Revival of private sector was quite slowly with Govt. inventions of
taxation, regulation, inspection etc. A breakdown of the different sectors
of the economy shows that public sector ownership is confined to only
10% of the GDP and Govt. investment and consumption together con-
stitute around 16-17% of the GDP. Employment by public sector is less
than 10% of the labour force. Pakistani businessmen only rely on Govt
and use old customers for marketing products.
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21st century shows that empowering of economy is related man-

datory with growth of private sector. An effective taxation system should
be able to capture some returns to finance public goods and services.
Flourishing economy is based on innovation, risk taking and abandoning
old ways of production. State is unable to perform due to parochial in-
terests of corporate sector and also non payment of taxes. In British rule
the land record management was satisfactory, the land utilization report
was submitted and then tax was collected accordingly.
Labour market is also facing skilled labour shortage. Financial mar-
kets in Pakistan have been liberalized and have become competitive
and relatively efficient but continue to remain shallow. In 1960s agricul-
ture growth rate was 5.1%, 2.4% in 1970s, 5.4% in 1980s, 4.4% in 1990s
and 3.2% in 2000s. Growth rate was down due to inefficiency of Paki-
stan’s national agriculture research system.
Taxation system is also not up to the mark. Corporate sector paying

40-50% in the shape of tax, super tax, cesses, fees, EOBI charges etc.
Tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan is only 15-16% while in India exceeded
upto 30% and Bangladesh around 30%. Out of 3.2 million potential tax
payers only 1.1 million are filling tax returns. Some departmental regu-
lation is required to stabilize and grow the economy like NEPRA, OGRA,
FBR, PEMRA etc. So, economy and growth of private sector is depends
on policies and governmental institutions.
CHAPTER -14 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Pakistan’s system of administration and justice comprising the po-
lice, prosecution, prisons and courts is the principal vehicle for ensuring
rule of law, dispensation of justice and enforcement of contracts. The
most troubled segment is transfer of responsibility from one to other
component and conviction rate is 5-10%. Even in terrorism cases 282
out of 447 high profile terrorists were acquitted in 2011 in Punjab prov-
ince. A blatant example of Malik Ishaq is there, having 70 murder cases
he was not convicted due to solid evidences.
In 1947 Pakistan police was formed with 12 Muslim and 14 British

172 | P a g e
officers and its current strength is 400,000 with 1500 police station. With
huge strength police is not capable to due to poorly trained, inadequate
equipment, improper rules and laws, procedures and practices. Pakistan
suffered over 30,000 causalities $123 billion loss in war against terror-
ism. To overcome terrorism there is dire need to implement National Ac-
tion Plan.
The prosecution service became independent in the early 2000 as

a follow up to the police reforms in which the functions of watch and
word, investigation and prosecution were unbundled. Prisons are over-
crowded with under trial prisons accounting for over 80% of the prison
population. In 2010 out of 81,000 prisoners only 27,000 were convicted,
life of imprisoned is miserable. So there are many amendments needed
in administration of justice.
CHAPTER -15 ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

Many local and international observers are strongly convinced that
Pakistan’s birth was propped up through external assistance. The 1st
Pakistani premier Liaqat Ali Khan was invited by Russia and US also
want to build ties with Pakistan. As pointed out in Chapter 3 that partition
of India by Britain was biggest mistake. 10-12 million people migrated
and widespread killings with bigger tragedy than world war. Pakistan
was divided in two wings with poor resources. The reunion narrative was
popular. Meanwhile accession of Jammu and Kashmir was also a prob-
lem. India launched army and occupied Kashmir in 1948. Jawarlal Nehru
met many dignitaries and formed Non Aligned Movement (NAM). While,
Pak-US alliance provided an opportunity to Russia to gain influence in
India.
Many analysts argue that foreign assistance play a crucial role for
economic survival of Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with IMF always re-
mained misunderstood and controversial believing that country will lose
sovereignty because IMF policies were controlled by USA and western
forces. Opposition parties opposing IMF also take loans during their gov-
ernments. Since Dec 1958 Pakistan borrowed 16 times from IMF, 5
times since Dec 1988, 5 times during Nawaz-Beazir era, 2 times
173 | P a g e
Musharaf regime, 1 time Zardari and most by recent PMLN govt. on the
other hand India just taken loan from IMF in 1991, Bangladesh thrice
and Sri Lanka twice since 1990. The reason behind Pakistan’s borrow-
ing was to quick infusion of funds to sustain balance of payment.
In public opinion World Bank is also same however, there is funda-

mental difference between the two institutions. WB is being approached
for development, growth and poverty alleviation. In 1960s WB provided
1st aid to Pakistan. The WB lent Pakistan $ 31.4 billion and provided
grants of $ 9.3 billion since its inception. The $21.5 billion soft loan was
provided without interest for 10 years grace period. Pakistan repaid $
9.3 billion 14.6 billion debt while 13.4 billion are on concessional terms.
Asian Development Bank (ADB) is regional bank which aims to develop
member Asian countries. It is providing yearly $1.2 billion assistance to
Pakistan for energy, transportation and agriculture, natural resources
and rural development, water and infrastructure development, public
sector management and finances sector.
China has been always trustworthy friend of Pakistan and is invest-

ing in $50 billion CPEC project for sustainability and development of Pa-
kistan. Indo-Pak relations were unstable since 1947 but, official and un-
official trade touched $2 billion during 2001-2011. Pak-Afghan relations
also took a dip in recent years. Pakistan was closely part of two wars in
Afghanistan. Pakistan handled Afghan refugees and lost 50,000 civil
and military lives with $100 billion loss.
CHAPTER -16 RESTRUCTURING KEY INSTITUTIONS

Institutional and structural reforms are dire need to boost the country.
There are many examples of different countries we can use models of
those countries, like China, South Korea and Malaysia etc. here are
some key issues and solutions.
1. The Election commission should be fully authorized, carefully
screening candidates and electronic voting machines be used.
2. Political process should be implemented in political parties to choose
chairman etc.
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3. Some powers were devolved under 28th amendment but need to

work more for devolution.
4. Restructuring of civil services should be done.
5. Timely justice is needed.
6. Freedom of information act should be implemented across the coun-
try.
7. Check and balance by parliament in every department and institu-
tions needed.
8. Management practices in government sectors implemented.
Meanwhile, institutions of accountability transparency and oversight, se-
curity, growth and equity are challenging up lifting of the country. So
need to act as under:
 Select capable persons as department heads with fixed tenure.

 Respect the mandate and give reasonability to function key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs).
 Appointment of independent board of governors where necessary.
 Grant on line budgetary allocation with financial autonomy with sub-
ject to audit.
 Delegate powers to heads to appoint professional staff through trans-
parent process.
 Departments should submit annual reports to committees and parlia-
ment and liable about their performances.
 They can provide policy direction not to interfere day to day matters.
CHAPTER -17 LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER
COUNTRIES
 Acceleration in the economic growth does not require wholesale im-
provement in governance, as the experience of Bangladesh, India
and other countries suggests. Some institutions are more helpful to
economic growth than others because they remove binding con-
straints e.g. sensible economic policies put in place and the private
sector is unfettered. Although poor governance in India and Bangla-
desh they were able to perform better than Pakistan since 1960s for
variety of reasons, i.e. political stability
175 | P a g e
Soft Power: The Means to Success in

World Politics
In Soft Power, Joseph Nye advocates the benefits of using soft

power in US foreign policy. His definition of soft power is as follows: "A
country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries - admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level
of prosperity and openness - want to follow it (p. 5)." Of course, this is
diametrically opposed to the use of hard power, which is predicated on
the use of coercion, inducement, and at its most negative, force. Soft
power can only be used if others acknowledge this power, and those
who wish to use it, can shape it as a means to achieving their goals. As
the author notes, in a free society, soft power cannot and is not shaped
by those who wish to use its powerful influence.
The author states that "much of American soft power has been pro-
duced by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft and Michael Jordan (p. 17)."
Soft power waxes and wanes based on world geopolitical events and
the world's perception, rightly or wrongly, of the country in question.
Fareed Zakaria (2003), in his expose in Newsweek, "Why America
Scares the World and What to Do About it," states that America's soft
power has been eroding since the end of the cold war.
The cold war kept Europe pro-American as their distrust of the for-
mer Soviet Union was far greater than their distrust of the US abusing
its immense economic and military power. However, the end of the cold
war, which left only one superpower remaining, the US, has caused a
widening worry that the US would shape and dominate the world; thus,
this has caused a prevailing feeling of deep and widening mistrust from
the rest of the world.
Although worthwhile, the strategy assessment of the US's use of
soft power is not a new or novel idea. The management and psychology
literature has long touted the benefits of using referent power (soft
power) over coercive power (hard power). In their classic article, "The
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Bases of Social Power," Raven and French (1959), describe the five
bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. Ref-
erent power is based on identification and attraction, and yields the
greatest influence in relation to the other bases along as this strong at-
traction exists.
The authors point out that referent power has the broadest range
of power. The most negative power is coercion, which decreases attrac-
tion, and thus referent power. In relation to the rest of the world, there
are some countries and individuals that are attracted to the US and its
culture and others that are not. This is especially true of Islamic funda-
mentalists who believe that the US's secular culture is evil and corrupt.
Moreover, many European countries have long shared feelings that their
cultures are far superior to that of the US.
The major failure of the Bush administration in gaining broad sup-
port for the war against Iraq may in fact be a failure in assessing the
strength of the referent power of the US, which had been eroding for
many years prior to the administration. Although it would have been best
to move ahead with broad support using soft power, the US could not
use what they did not have. The fault of the Bush administration could
lie in their immediate use of coercive power without the exploration of
the other bases of power before declaring war. But it is important to note
that France, Germany, and Russia had their own self-interest in mind
when they opposed the war against Iraq.
These countries had a long history of trying to weaken the contain-
ment of Iraq to ensure that they could have good trading relations with
it. The book is well written and well researched, and is a worthwhile read.
It certainly would generate a great deal of introspection and discussion.
The book explores the sources of American soft power as well as the
sources of the Soviet Union, Europe, and Asia. The author comments
and assesses how soft power should be wielded, noting full well that
there are many limitations to its creation and its use. As Nye states. Soft
power is more difficult to wield, many of its crucial resources are outside
the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on ac-
ceptance by the receiving audiences. Moreover, soft-power resources
177 | P a g e
often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and some-
times take years to produce the desired outcome, (p. 99)
These difficulties aside, the US has been sadly lacking in its crea-
tion of soft power. In its arrogance at being the only superpower remain-
ing, the US has ignored the need to create soft power, and thereby has
dismissed its use in obtaining its long-term strategic goals in foreign pol-
icy. Nevertheless, there are times when coercive power is necessary
and is the only means to create a successful outcome. However, the
creation of government created and sanctioned soft power would go a
long way in accomplishing goals without diminishing credibility. Nye con-
cludes that the US needs a better strategy for wielding soft power and
that the US needs to combine hard and soft power to meet the new chal-
lenges in years ahead.
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ISSUES IN PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY:

S.AKBAR ZAIDI
The book provided comprehensive information on different aspects
of the economy in Pakistan since independence. The idea of writing this
book originated from Oxford University Press as there was no book on
the economy of Pakistan to benefit the graduate students, researchers,
scholars, academicians, and the general public. The book was pre-
scribed as a standard text book in the area of issues in Pakistan’s econ-
omy. It is also used as a standard book on the courses on South Asia’s
development, economic history, and political economy of the region.
The book became a best seller due to its subject matter. That is
why a great need was felt to update the book that forced the author to
expand, update, and revise the book and improve the shortcomings left
in the previous edition. The Second edition includes a large amount of
new research material. Also, the most recent available data have been
included in the tables of the text throughout the book. Three new chap-
ters have been added, some of the chapters have been reformulated,
and the new arrivals in theory and empirical research have also been
incorporated, accordingly. The book under review presents the im-
portant issues in the form of boxed text, appendices, chapter summar-
ies, and provides suggested readings to further enhance the knowledge
in specific areas. The efforts and the pains of the author in completing
this book are highly laudable in producing such a valuable piece of re-
search on economic development in Pakistan over the fifty-seven years
to benefit the end users in completing their studies, research work, and
policy-oriented assignments.
This edition of the book consists of six parts and contains twenty
two chapters. Chapter 1 provides general historical information on the
economy of Pakistan, policies adopted in different sectors of the econ-
omy in various regimes and/or decades, the after-effects of the policies
and its comparison with other countries of the region. The epoch include
laying the foundation (1947-58), the decade of development (1958-68),
179 | P a g e
the bad luck years (1971-77), the second military government (1977-88),
and the era of structural adjustment (1988 and onwards). The chapter
tries to identify the sectors in which Pakistan has gained advantage so
far and the sectors those had left behind and could not cope with pro-
gress in the region.
Part 1, Chapters 2 through 5, deals with the historical account of
the development of agriculture in Pakistan including the importance of
the Green Revolution and Land Reforms, the nature and the direction of
agrarian change and other critical issues in agriculture. The author de-
scribes that feudal agriculture is now a part of history and has been re-
placed by capitalist agriculture in Pakistan. Four chapters of the book in
Part 2 deal with industry and trade. The chapters investigate the process
of industrialisation in Pakistan.
According to the author Ayub Khan’s regime discussed in Chapter
6 was the golden period in economic growth due to the adoption of cap-
italistic policies while Bhutto could not maintain the consistency in indus-
trial growth partly due to his nationalisation policies and broadly because
of the unfavourable extrinsic and foreign factors which were beyond the
control of the government.
Chapter 7 describes the process of industrialisation in Pakistan
during 1977 to 2004. Emphasis is laid on the nature and extent of
growth, industrial policy, public and private sectors, and deregulation
and liberalisation in Zia’s regime. It also covers the period of structural
adjustments in that was 1988 onwards.
Chapter 8 examines the key issues in the industrial sector in Paki-
stan and comes to the conclusion that though in the beginning there
were severe hurdles in the growth of the sector but on average it per-
formed well. Foreign trade in Pakistan is critically evaluated in the next
chapter resulting in inefficient industry due to the high protection given
to it. It also discusses some political economy issues and analyses the
impact of globalisation and the new WTO regime. The third part of this
book examines the fiscal and monetary policy issues in a considerable
detail. Chapter 10 describes the nature of the taxation structure and re-
source mobilisation during different regimes in Pakistan and tries to sort
out the possible reasons for fiscal deficits in the country.
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Pakistan’s major economic problem, accumulated debt burden, is

thoroughly described in Chapter 11. It clarifies that fiscal deficits are not
always and everywhere a bad thing. The important thing to note is the
type of expenditure and the context of the fiscal deficit. The author of the
book has given enough space for financial sector reforms in Chapter 12
which is devoted to equity market issues that highlight the importance of
credit schemes, subsidised credit, and distorted credit markets as better
policy options.
Inflation is an outcome of the government’s administered prices
and devaluation rather than a monetary phenomenon is discussed in
Chapter 13. The chapter examines the salient features of monetary pol-
icy and monetary management, elaborates monetary expansion and
credit disbursement, highlights inflation and its causes, and discusses
the low saving rates in Pakistan.
Part 4 of the book is concerned with the structural adjustment pro-
gramme imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank and implemented by the governments in the region that enforced
extensive changes in almost all the sectors of the economy. Chapter 14
illustrates the composition and effects of structural adjustment programs
and also discusses economic liberalization and openness in the econ-
omy. In this chapter the author presents a brief historical look over the
last fifty years and compares it with the present situation in different sec-
tors.
It is viewed, that in general, structural adjustment programs had a
negative impact on growth, inflation, income distribution, social sectors,
and poverty eradication. Chapter 15 discusses the issues presented in
the previous chapter in the context of Pakistan and illustrates that the
performance of the economy had declined sharply which had adversely
affected the low income class. Poverty, inequality, unemployment, and
inflation have increased with the implementation of structural adjustment
programmes resulting in low growth in the economy. Macroeconomic
development after 1998 and the aftereffects of September 11, 2001
termed as the turnaround of the economy are critically evaluated in
Chapter 16. The economy has performed well in the last thee years and
the same trend is expected to prevail in the next few years. To attract
181 | P a g e
domestic and foreign capital and investment, there must be an improve-

ment in security, law and order and future expectations along with full
control on political, regional, and geo-political factors. Part 5 contains
four chapters and elaborates the Pakistan’s development paradox.
Growth in different sectors of the economy has not been translated
into the social sectors leaving the poor in miserable conditions. Chapter
17 focuses on the issues pertaining to health, education, housing, and
population. Despite the high growth rates, the social sectors have shown
poor performance over the 57 years. It presents some international and
regional comparisons, describes the planning for social sectors includ-
ing health, education, population welfare and family planning, and ur-
banisation and housing. Issues of gender inequality and women, infra-
structural developments, the environment indicators, and regional ine-
qualities are discussed in Chapter 18.
The most important issue of poverty is the subject matter of Chap-
ter 19. It elaborates different definitions of poverty, explains trends in
poverty, and pinpoints the poor and their localities, tries to find out the
causes of persistent poverty, and recommends the ways to alleviate
poverty. Institutional issues containing factors and constraints that have
hindered social development have been analysed in detail in Chapter
20. The chapter discusses the Social Action Programme (SAP), govern-
ance, decentralisation, and local-level delivery, Non-Government Or-
ganisations and community participation.
The last two chapters pertaining to Part 6 elaborate the impact of
the economy on political formation, the state and the classes and the
political economy of neighboring nations. Issues related to South Asia
are also discussed in this part. The critical review of the performance of
economy over the entire period is presented in the last chapter. How-
ever, the author of the book can further improve it by incorporating the
following suggestions in a forthcoming edition.
Firstly, the data should preferably start from the inception of Paki-
stan or at least from 1959-60 preferably on constant prices of 1980-81
in the Appendix of each chapter that would be very useful for research-
ers. Secondly, there must be a list of abbreviations used throughout the
text. Thirdly, references used in the text must be checked for their latest
182 | P a g e
status of publication. Lastly, the graphical representation can make the

analysis more attractive and understandable to the readers. That would
make it a complete reference book in the literature on the issues in Pa-
kistan’s Economy.
The objective of the book under review is to provide and interpret
basic facts to raise issues pertaining to the overall macro-economy of
Pakistan in context of the globalization and the new developments in the
region. The book filled the gap that had not been covered in the previous
books on this topic. This book provides the relevant material in quota-
tions from numerous published articles and books to encourage the
readers in developing the habit of searching the literature for further de-
tailed perception of the topic concerned from the original source. The
emphasis of the book is on providing the information on the processes,
based on past experience learnt from half a century, and find out the
best options to make the future bright. The book is really an asset to the
students, a facilitator for researchers, a guide for academics, and a
source of information for general readers.
183 | P a g e
PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK:

RASHID AHMAD
Ahmed Rashid, one of Pakistan’s premier journalists and analysts,
knows the region’s pressures better than most. He literally wrote the
book on the Taliban and now has added a superb work on the future of
Pakistan, a country many people deem the world’s most dangerous.
“Pakistan on the Brink” depicts a nation with a severe socioeconomic
crisis, and with political leadership that has neither the courage nor the
will to carry out essential reforms and is building the fastest-growing nu-
clear arsenal on the globe. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in a state
of virtual meltdown, Rashid rightly contends, with both sides to blame.
The relationship is so bad that “the United States and Pakistan are
just short of going to war,” Rashid writes. Much of the growing enmity
between the two countries can be traced to the U.S. raid that killed bin
Laden — and that’s where Rashid begins his tale. It did not enhance
trust for the United States to discover that the al-Qaeda leader was hid-
ing less than a mile from Pakistan’s premier military academy and had
been there running his global terror network for at least five years. Ac-
cording to The Washington Post’s reporting on the material found in his
hideout, he was in regular communication with other jihadists, including
the Afghan Taliban leader, Mohammad Omar. His hideout had been built
by a contracting firm often used by the ISI.
Rashid argues that there is a complex syndicate of jihadi terrorists
operating today in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda gets the most
attention in the United States, but it is a relatively small organization in
a much larger network. Lashkar-i-Taiba, the militant Islamist terror group
that attacked Mumbai in 2008, for example, has a much bigger and very
overt presence in Pakistan. It routinely holds large demonstrations in
Pakistan’s cities that attract tens of thousands of supporters. Its leader,
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, openly mourned bin Laden’s death last May
and called for revenge on America. He and bin Laden had been close
partners in terror stretching back to the 1980s, when the Saudi helped
184 | P a g e
fund the creation of Lashkar-i-Taiba. The two men were in communica-

tion until the SEALs killed bin Laden in his hideout in Abbottabad, ac-
cording to the materials found there.
So while al-Qaeda may be on the defensive thanks to U.S. drones
and Navy SEALs, Rashid writes that its much larger allies are thriving
and widening the terrain for its operations. Pakistan is the epicenter of
this jihadist syndicate, and Rashid does a great job of describing how
the Pakistani army and the ISI helped build this Frankenstein’s monster
over the past four decades. As he notes, the obsession of Pakistani gen-
erals with India has been the driving force behind this creation, which is
increasingly out of control. But as he establishes, the army has not
changed its fundamental approach of supporting jihad. We now know
that the Mumbai plot, for example, was led by Lashkar-i-Taiba but
funded by the ISI and inspired by al-Qaeda. The Pakistani American who
helped plan the attack, David Headley, has confessed in court to how
this deadly cocktail was put together.
Rashid’s focus is on how the United States has tried to defeat ji-
hadist extremists and work with Pakistan to build stability in South Asia.
President Obama embarked on a strategic engagement with Pakistan
when he entered the Oval Office just months after the Mumbai massa-
cre. There was also a new elected civilian government in Islamabad led
by Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who was killed in an
al-Qaeda plot abetted by the ISI in 2007. Zardari promised to put an end
to Pakistan’s policy of taking both sides in the war on terror and to go
after the jihadists.
As Rashid eloquently describes, it has not turned out that way. Zardari
has never had any control of the ISI. He was clueless about bin Laden’s
hideout in Abbottabad and out of the loop on Mumbai. The generals want
to get rid of him, but he is holding on to his office in spite of their plots.
Tension has always existed between Obama’s engagement strategy
and the unilateral U.S. strikes on the al-Qaeda infrastructure in Pakistan.
U.S. drones that violate Pakistani sovereignty every day have created a
backlash in the country, and Pakistani enmity reached a crescendo after
American commandos found bin Laden. Polls show that three out of four
185 | P a g e
Pakistanis opposed the raid. Pakistanis see the United States as an ar-
rogant superpower that views their country as a killing field. Americans
see Pakistan as duplicitous and dangerous. Both are right.
Rashid also highlights the strains within Obama’s camp and the
infighting among his lieutenants. Dealing with Pakistan was always go-
ing to be tough, and internal bickering has made it all the harder. Rashid
argues that Obama and his team bear the majority of blame for the de-
terioration in Pakistan because of their failure to work together, lack of
clarity and contradictory statements. Much of the friction arose around
the late envoy Richard Holbrooke, who Rashid says was “hated” and
“snubbed” by the White House. But he overstates the impact of the inner
White House tensions. Pakistan’s problems are mostly a result of Paki-
stani machinations and conspiracies. The United States has often made
the situation worse by backing generals over civilians, but as long as
Pakistanis blame someone else for their troubles, their country will only
go further toward the brink.
Obama was planning to visit Pakistan in 2011; instead, it was the
year the U.S.-Pakistan relationship fell apart. The collapse occurred for
many reasons, but the deadliest blow was the realization that high-value
target No. 1, bin Laden, was not holed up in a cave but in a villa near a
military academy, operating as the chief executive of a global terror em-
pire. Until we know who was helping him hide in the heart of the Paki-
stani national security system, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will only
deteriorate further.
186 | P a g e
CONSTITUTONAL AND POLITICAL

HISTORY OF PAKISTAN: HAMID KHAN
Constitutional and Political Development (1947-1973) Pakistan
came into being as an independent State in August, 1947 and continued
to be governed under an interim constitutional arrangement (i.e. through
the Indian Independence Act, 1947). Pakistan has had a troubled con-
stitutional history since its very inception as a nation state. Not long after
partition from India in 1947, Pakistan was plunged into a Constitutional
crisis in 1954 when the Governor General dissolved the Constituent As-
sembly when he did not agree to the proposed constitution. This first
major subversion of the constitutional process was challenged before
the Federal Court, which validated the dissolution of the assembly in the
Moulvi Tamizuddin case (1955 Federal Court 240).
Although a new Constituent Assembly adopted the country‟s first
constitution in March, 1956, it lasted only two years until the first Presi-
dent of Pakistan, Major-General Iskander Mirza, abrogated the Consti-
tution, dissolved the national and provincial legislatures and imposed
Martial Law in October, 1958, appointing General Ayub Khan as the
Chief Martial Law Administrator. This was the first time that the Supreme
Court was confronted with an unprecedented situation. The Court faced
a dilemma how to prevent the country to be governed purely by the dic-
tate of an army ruler and ensure that the country was back on the rails
of constitutional governance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan validated
once again the extraconstitutional actions of the executive and enunci-
ated the doctrine of „revolutionary legality.‟ It (in case of State v. Dosso
(PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 533) validated the imposition of martial law by in-
voking the Kelsenian theory and held that, “a victorious revolution was
itself a law creating fact.”
Although the application of Kelsenian theory in the facts and cir-
cumstances of that case has been subject of critical comment but the
positive aspect of the judgment was that it unequivocally declared that
the country would continue to be governed as nearly as possible under
187 | P a g e
the Constitution which stood abrogated (Province of East Pakistan v.

Muhammad Mehdi Ali Khan (PLD 1959 SC 387). After passing a new
Constitution in 1962 that empowered an autocratic executive, General
Ayub Khan ruled until 1969. He was forced to hand over the reins of
power to General Yahya Khan after widespread student protests led by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his newly-founded Pakistan Peoples‟ Party
(PPP). General Yahya Khan presided over a disastrous military cam-
paign in East Pakistan, Pakistan‟s loss to India in the war of 1971, and
ultimately the secession of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh.
The Martial Law was however, lifted and a new Constitution was
promulgated in 1962. There was constitutional democracy but in March
1969, the country plunged into yet another constitutional and political
crisis leading to the imposition of Martial Law and the Constitution was
abrogated. The political turbulence and war with India led to separation
of East Pakistan which is now Bangladesh. The Chief Martial Law Ad-
ministrator was forced to hand over power to the political party which
commanded majority in the Western wing of the country i.e. the areas
which now constitute Pakistan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became President.
The issue of legality of martial law once again came under consideration
before the Supreme Court (in the famous Asma Jilani’s case PLD 1972
SC 139).
Declaring the martial law to be illegal, the Court dubbed the Chief
Martial Law Administrator as a usurper. It revisited the ratio laid down in
the earlier judgment by holding that Kelsenian theory had been wrongly
applied; that no valid law comes into force from “the foul breath or
smeared pen of a person guilty of treason against the national order.”
The 1973 Constitution In 1973 Pakistan adopted its current constitution
after thorough deliberation and consensus of all the political parties. The
Constitution of Pakistan created a parliamentary form of government fol-
lowing the British model whereby the elected Prime Minister is the locus
of executive power and the President is a figurehead. The other key
foundational principle of the 1973 Constitution is that of federalism.
Pakistan’s four provinces each have their own provincial legisla-
tures. Whereas the seats in the National Assembly, the lower house of
188 | P a g e
the national parliament, are distributed between provinces on a demo-

graphic basis, each province is entitled to equal representation in the
upper house, the Senate. Constitutional amendments require the ap-
proval of two-thirds majorities in both the National Assembly and the
Senate. The superior courts, including the Supreme Court and the four
provincial High Courts, complete the trichotomy of powers. The superior
courts have been granted the power to judicially review legislation as
well as executive action and ensure the enforcement of Fundamental
Rights. The 1973 Constitution also incorporates a Bill of Rights, but the
constitutional safeguards are weak and the text of some of the more
important rights provisions make them subject to the law.
Article 9, for instance, states that “No person shall be deprived of
life or liberty save in accordance with law,” while the freedoms of expres-
sion and association are likewise subject to “reasonable restrictions im-
posed by law” in the interest of public order or national security. Article
10 permits the preventive detention, without judicial scrutiny, of “persons
acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defense of Pa-
kistan or external affairs of Pakistan, or public order, or the maintenance
of supplies or services” for an initial period of three months which may
be extended if a Review Board (consisting of current and former superior
court judges) authorizes such extension. Other basic rights, including
freedom from slavery and forced labor, double jeopardy and retroactive
punishment, self-incrimination, torture and gender discrimination are
more absolutist. The Zia Era and its Constitutional Legacy In 1973 the
Parliament unanimously passed a new Constitution and it was because
of this wide approval and acceptance that it continues to be the Consti-
tution of the country.
In 1977, General Elections were held, there were serious allega-
tions of rigging, and there was country wide street agitation which
prompted the Army to take over. Assemblies were dissolved and gov-
ernment was dismissed. But this time, the constitution was not abro-
gated but it was declared to be, “held in abeyance”. The Supreme Court
of Pakistan validated the action taken (in Begum Nusrat Bhutto’s case
PLD 1977 SC 657) on the ground of “State necessity” and the principle
of salus populi suprema lex. The Court found that on account of massive
189 | P a g e
rigging in the 1977 elections, the State machinery had crumbled down
and the constitution did not provide remedy. This period of constitutional
deviation continued till 1985 when the constitution was revived and with
this came the 18th amendment in the Constitution which was approved
by the Parliament In 1977, after imposition of Martial Law in the country,
the Constitution was held in abeyance and replaced by an interim Pro-
visional Constitutional Order (PCO).
In the Nusrat Bhutto case (1977) the Supreme Court once again
validated the coup on the basis of the Common Law “doctrine of state
necessity.” Zia then made several changes to the Constitution to
strengthen the power of the president, including introducing Article
58(2)(b) to the Constitution via the notorious Eighth Constitutional
Amendment. Article 58(2)(b) granted the President discretionary powers
to dismiss the Parliament and call for fresh elections. After a decision by
the Supreme Court challenging the jurisdiction of military courts, Zia also
sought to undermine the independence of the judiciary by requiring
judges to take a fresh oath of allegiance under the PCO. These actions,
along with the Supreme Court‟s capital conviction of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
– despite a widespread belief that the charges were fabricated – se-
verely undermined the credibility of the legal process and the esteem of
the judiciary. The prime legacy of the Zia era, namely enhanced presi-
dential powers and Islamisation measures, continued to haunt the na-
tion‟s political landscape for another decade. The 1990’s and Disen-
chantment with Politics In the 1988 elections Benazir Bhutto led the PPP
to victory and became the first Prime Minister after the Zia era, ushering
in a decade of alternation between the elected governments of Bhutto‟s
PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Mian Nawaz Sharif.
The military interfered several times in politics and backed presi-
dential use of Article 58(2) (b) to dissolve the government, usually justi-
fying its actions based on corruption charges against the political lead-
ers. The Supreme Court ruled in most of these cases, mostly upholding
the dissolution and other times in validating presidential action, as when
it restored PM Mian Nawaz Sharif in 1993. Mian Muhammad Nawaz
Sharif VS. President of Pakistan (P LD 1993 SC 473), Federation of Pa-
kistan Vs. Haji Saifullah Khan (PLD 1989 SC 166), Ahmed Tariq Rahim
190 | P a g e
Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 646), Federation of Pakistan

Vs. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (PLD 1992 SC 723), Sabir Shah Vs.
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 738), Benazir Bhutto Vs. Presi-
dent of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 388), Zafar Ali Shah Vs. Pervez
Musharaf (PLD 2000 SC 869). Both Bhutto and Sharif had strained re-
lations with the superior judiciary and may be accused of attempting to
undermine its independence. Most notable in this regard is Bhutto‟s dis-
regard for constitutional tradition in her 1994 decision to appoint Justice
Sajjad Ali Shah as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court while super-
seding two senior judges. This led to the Al-Jehad Trust case (Al-Jehad
Trust through Habib Wahab Ali Khairi, Advocate and 9 others Vs. Fed-
eration of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324), in which the Supreme Court
elaborated key principles for the appointment process of the High Court
and Supreme Court judges, enhancing the power of the Chief Justice
and bolstering the independence of the judiciary (see Judicial Independ-
ence section below for an elaboration of these principles).
In practice, these principles have not been consistently followed,
and the judiciary has continued to be subject to pressure and manipula-
tion. Tensions between Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and Prime Minister
Sharif, which started in 1997, eventually led to a division within the Su-
preme Court, an attack on the Supreme Court by PML party members,
and the removal of the Chief Justice. This episode is viewed as a low-
point in the judicial history of the country.
The Musharraf Coup and yet another ‘Transition to Democracy’ Im-
mediately after the military’s takeover of power in 1999, Pakistan began
to experience the unfolding of a blueprint developed by the earlier mili-
tary regimes and ratified by the superior courts. A Proclamation of Emer-
gency was declared, the constitution was put in abeyance, a Provisional
Constitutional Order (PCO) was issued to provide a temporary govern-
ing framework, and the general assumed the office of the Chief Execu-
tive. In January 2000, when the Supreme Court entertained a challenge
to the military coup, the judges of the superior courts were compelled to
take a new oath of office pledging to serve under the PCO. Six out of a
total of thirteen judges of the Supreme Court refused to take the oath
191 | P a g e
and resigned from the bench, including then Chief Justice Saeduz-
zaman Siddiqui and Justice (R) Wajih-ud-Din Ahmad, who was a candi-
date in the 2007 presidential elections. A reconstituted Supreme Court
decided the case of Zafar Ali Shah v General Pervez Musharraf (PLD
2000 SC 869) 2000) and validated the coup on the grounds of the doc-
trine of state necessity.
The court granted virtually unlimited powers to the military regime,
including the power to amend the constitution. The court, however, re-
quired the military regime to hold general elections for the national par-
liament and provincial legislatures no later than three years from the
date of the coup. The general elections were held on October 10, 2002.
An alliance of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),
emerged as the prime beneficiary, along with the party loyal to General
Musharraf, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q). In December 2003, the re-
gime mustered the two-third majority in parliament necessary to pass
the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, which validated almost
all of the actions taken during the state necessity phase, including the
revival of the presidential power to dismiss the parliament. Musharraf
later garnered a simple majority to pass the President to Hold Another
Office Act, 2004 (PHAA), which seemed to violate constitutional provi-
sions in allowing Musharaff as the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) to also
assume the office of the President. In the Pakistan Lawyers Forum case
(PLD 2005 SC 719) the Supreme Court validated both the Seventeenth
Amendment and the PHAA, based on an extension of the doctrine of
state necessity.
In legitimizing the power of the military and executive over the Par-
liament, this case further strengthened the popular perception of the
subservience of the Supreme Court to the military regime. In October
2007, when his term of office was to expire, Musharaff wanted to contest
for the second term and his eligibility to do so was challenged by one of
the candidates and this matter came up before the Court (an 11 Mem-
bers Bench ) in Wajihuddin v. the State (PLD 1996 SC 324). The issues
involved in the said petition were twofold: whether General Pervaiz
Musharraf could contest the elections notwithstanding the Constitutional
restraint that no holder of public office could contest the elections unless
192 | P a g e
a period of two years has elapsed between his retirement and the elec-
tions. General Musharraf was still holding the office of the Chief of Army
Staff; (ii) whether the Assemblies whose term was to expire in two
months’ time or the succeeding Assemblies would form the Electoral
College in view of Article 43 of the Constitution.
The current Assemblies had elected the President for a term of five
years which was about to expire. I was member of the 11- Members
Bench which was hearing the case. The arguments dragged on and
when the polling day approached nearer, on the application of General
Musharraf the Court instead of postponing the elections (as that would
have changed the complexion of electoral college by efflux of time) al-
lowed him to contest the elections with the rider that the Election Com-
mission of Pakistan shall not notify the result till the final disposal of the
pending petition. On the 2nd of November, 2007, the counsel for the
petitioner who happened to be the President of Supreme Court Bar As-
sociation as well filed an application for issuance of a restraint order
against respondent General Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, not to pass
any order which had the effect of suspending the constitution or chang-
ing the composition of the court.
The Court directed the office to put up the petition on the next work-
ing day which was 5th of November, 2007 as it was a long weekend and
the Court was closed. In the afternoon of 3rd of November, 2007, the
word went around in the Capital that martial law was being imposed.
Apprehending this the Chief Justice of Pakistan with the available
Judges in the Capital city Islamabad assembled in the afternoon (7-
Members) and passed a restraining order which reads as follows:-
(i) Government of Pakistan, i.e. President and Prime
Minister of Pakistan are restrained from undertaking
any such action, which is contrary to Independence of
Judiciary;
(ii) No judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts in-
cluding Chief Justice (s) shall take oath under PCO or
any other extra-Constitutional step;
(iii) Chief of Army Staff, Corps Commanders, Staff Offic-
193 | P a g e
ers and all concerned of the Civil and Military Authori-

ties are hereby restrained from acting on PCO which
has been issued or from administering fresh oath to
Chief Justice of Pakistan or Judges of Supreme Court
and Chief Justice or Judges of the Provincial High
Courts;
(iv) They are also restrained to undertake any such action,
which is contrary to independence of Judiciary. Any
further appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan
and Judges of the Supreme Court and Chief Justices
of High Courts or Judges of Provinces under new de-
velopment shall be unlawful and without jurisdiction.
(v) Put up before full court on 5th November 2007.”
Notwithstanding the order passed General Musharraf, the then Chief of
Army Staff imposed the “State of Emergency”, directed the constitution
to be held in abeyance, issued a provisional constitutional order pre-
scribing a special oath for judges of the superior courts with the stipula-
tion that those who did not take oath would cease to hold office. Out of
the 18 Judges, 13 did not take oath in the Supreme Court and out of 93
Judges from all over the four Provinces of the country, 61 did not take
oath. Those who did not take oath were motivated by no reason other
than defending the Constitution and upholding the Rule of Law. After the
general elections in February 2008, the Constitution was restored and
an elected Government revived. General Musharraf resigned, and there
was a growing demand for restoration of the Judges who had been re-
moved from the Constitutional Courts.
In September 2008, several of the deposed Judges rejoined the
Court, and finally, on 16 March 2009, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr.
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was re-instated by an executive
order of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Judicial Activism and the Judicial
Crisis Soon after his appointment as the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP)
in 2005, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry began to exercise the court‟s suo
moto1 judicial review powers.2 Suo moto, meaning "on its own motion,"
194 | P a g e
1 Beginning with the case of Darshan Masih v The State (PLD 1990 SC
513), where the Supreme Court converted a telegram sent by bonded
laborers into a writ petition, the Supreme Court rapidly fashioned for it-
self the power to take up cases of its own accord, based on letters or
media reports. The court also relaxed other procedural requirements
and public interest cases have increasingly come to acquire an inquisi-
torial or administrative inquiry mode rather than the strict adversarial
model of adjudication that a common law system envisages. 2 Articles
184(3) and 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
1973, vest judicial review powers in the Supreme Court and the High
Courts, respectively. The majority of these powers are based upon the
prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas cor-
pus. Under Article 199, the High Court’s powers include the power to
issue orders
(i) directing any person performing “functions in connection with the
affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain
from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do
anything he is required by law to do;
(ii) declaring that any act or proceeding … has been done or taken
without lawful authority and is of no legal effect;
(iii) directing that a person in custody … be brought before it so that
the Court may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody
without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner;” and
(iv) Requiring a person … holding or purporting to hold a public office
to show under what authority of law he claims to hold that office.”
In addition, Pakistani courts may, subject to certain restrictions, make
an order giving “such directions to any person or authority … as may be
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights” con-
ferred by the Constitution. Although these powers were conferred on the
courts in 1973, it is an Indian legal term, approximately equivalent to the
English term, sua sponte. It is used, for example, where a government
agency acts on its own cognizance, as in "the Commission took Suo
195 | P a g e
Moto control over the matter.” Following the Indian example, the Su-
preme Court of Pakistan had established in 1997 the power for itself to
initiate „Public Interest Litigation‟ on its own accord under Article 184(3)
of the Constitution.3 The Court could use this power to respond to indi-
vidual or collective petitions for a wide range of issues that were not
being resolved through legal or administrative means.
However the frequency and the robustness with which the CJP ex-
ercised these powers were unprecedented. Many of these cases in-
volved abuse of police powers, manipulation of legal processes by rural
landed elites and corruption in the bureaucracy. These cases won the
Chaudhry-led court increasing popularity amongst the populace as well
as grudging respect amongst the legal fraternity. In November 2007,
President Musharraf announced he would introduce a constitutional
amendment to withdraw the Supreme Court‟s suo moto powers under
the authority of his Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). The Paki-
stani courts continue to use the power: it was reported that the Chief
Justice of the Lahore High Court in September 2008 referred the matter
of police releasing an accused to one of the justices for a hearing pur-
suant to the suo moto power.
Two cases pursued by the Supreme Court in the latter part of 2006
became a source of significant unease within government circles. First,
the Supreme Court invalidated the privatization of the Pakistan Steel
Mills, rendering a judgment that painted a grim picture of economic mis-
management, failure to abide by rules and patronage of businessmen
implicated in securities fraud Watan Party VS Federation of Pakistan
(Pakistan Steel Mill Privatization Case PLD 2006 SC 587 & 697). In the
second case, the Supreme Court began to pursue habeas corpus peti-
tions brought by the relatives of the „missing persons‟ who had allegedly
been held by Pakistan‟s feared intelligence agencies without legal pro-
cess. This case brought unwanted attention to the government‟s in-
creasingly unpopular role in the US-led War on Terror and its prosecu-
tion of the campaign against separatists in the Baluchistan province. The
196 | P a g e
Supreme Court‟s decisions in these cases were preceded by several

cases decided by the High Courts, which had challenged the abuse of
powers by the executive.6 was only in 1988 when the Supreme Court
decided Benazir Bhutto v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416),
that these broad constitutional powers were „discovered‟ and the seeds
of public interest or social action litigation were sown. The court‟s ap-
proach in these cases also caused some nervousness that the court
might create difficulties for the government in the forthcoming elections.
In particular, the issues of the President‟s re-election and the continued
occupation of dual office were likely to come up before the court. In a
surprise move, General Musharraf, suspended the CJP from office de-
claring him to be „non-functional‟ on March 9, 2007, and moved a refer-
ence for the CJP‟s accountability before the Supreme Judicial Council
(SJC) under Article 209 of the Constitution. This move was widely seen
as a de facto dismissal of a sitting CJP and resulted in widespread pro-
tests from the legal community. The CJP‟s suspension and the proceed-
ings of the SJC were challenged before the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
As the lawyers‟ movement for the reinstatement of the CJP gained mo-
mentum, the SC announced its decision in a short order on July 20,
2007.
The court invalidated the suspension of the CJP and reinstated him
to his position. This case considerably enhanced the powers and the
prestige of the position of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. In the aftermath
of the reinstatement, the SC began to focus on political and constitu-
tional issues. The court insisted on ensuring equal opportunities for elec-
tioneering to the 8 opposition political parties, including the return of the
leaders of the main opposition political parties who had been in exile.
The court supported Mian Nawaz Sharif‟s plea for return to Pakistan,
and began to prosecute contempt of court charges against the highest
levels of the Executive Office for deporting Sharif in violation of its judg-
ment. Secondly, the SC granted an injunction against a presidential or-
dinance passed on the eve of the presidential elections, the National
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Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), designed to grant immunity from cor-

ruption charges to Benazir Bhutto and her party members in return for a
softer stance with regard to General Musharraf‟s re-election for a third
term. The court began to display the confidence that it had by far the
most „democratic‟ support and legitimacy when compared to the out-
going civil executive, the legislatures, and a president whose approval
rating had been plummeting in the aftermath of the confrontation with
the CJP.
It is in this context that General Pervez Musharraf contested the
election for the office of the President of Pakistan on October 6, 2007,
and secured more than fifty-five percent of the votes cast by the mem-
bers of the national and provincial legislatures that form Pakistan's Elec-
toral College. However, the SC declared that he may not take the oath
of office until the SC decided a number of petitions challenging his can-
didacy on the grounds that his re-election while still being the CoAS vi-
olated the Constitution. On November 3, seemingly fearing an adverse
decision by the SC, General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency.
The blueprint of the legitimating of military takeovers was put into place
once again, with a PCO and fresh oath of office required of the judges.
However, an overwhelming majority of the judges of the Supreme Court
and the High Court refused to take the oath or to validate the imposition
of emergency. In the run-up to Parliamentary elections, which took place
on February 18, 2008, both of the main opposition parties, the PPP and
PML-N, elevated the issue of the reinstatement of the judges who had
refused to take the oath under the PCO. The elections were an over-
whelming rebuke of Musharraf and the PML-Q, which lost many of its
Parliamentary seats.
The PPP and PML-N formed a coalition government, with the issue
of reinstating the judges high on their agenda. Initial efforts failed, how-
ever, when the two parties failed to reach an agreement on the appro-
priate legal process for reinstating the judges. The PPP subsequently
drafted a package of constitutional amendments, which repealed many
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of the provisions of the Seventeenth Amendment to curtail executive

power, and set the stage for reinstatement of the judges while limiting
certain powers of the Chief Justice. This was passed in the form of 18th
amendment which is currently is under challenge before the Supreme
Court. In August 2008, General Musharraf resigned as President amidst
a threat of impeachment by the legislators. Subsequent Asif Ali Zardari,
chairman of the PPP, was elected as President of Pakistan. Islamization’
of Laws in Pakistan The Objectives Resolution of 1949, adopted as the
original preamble to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (and later incor-
porated as a substantive provision, Art. 2-A, during the Zia era) made
explicit reference to the “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tol-
erance and social justice as enunciated by Islam” as a foundational prin-
ciple of the constitution. The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan provided a
specific mechanism for the „Islamization‟ of laws. The powers of bring-
ing the laws of the land into conformity with Islamic law were granted to
the Parliament and an advisory body was created to provide suitable
suggestions. The Constitution of 1973 preserved this approach to Islam-
isation. The project of Islamisation of laws did not gather impetus until
the later half of the 1970‟s, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, under pressure from
an opposition alliance that included the religious political parties, an-
nounced measures such as prohibition on the consumption of alcohol
and declaration of Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.
With the advent of General Zia ul Haq on the political scene, the
landscape changed dramatically and the enforcement of Shari’a be-
came the rallying cry of a military regime desperately in need of legiti-
macy and some level of popular support. Zia‟s Islamisation is most
closely associated with the „Hudood’ laws. These are five presidential
ordinances that introduced new sexual and property offenses, main-
tained the prohibition on the consumption of alcohol, and provided for
exemplary Islamic punishments such as stoning to death (for adultery),
whipping and amputation (for fornication and theft). These laws caused
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immense controversy and were criticized for being misogynistic and dis-
criminatory towards religious minorities. The real impetus for Islamisa-
tion came not through the above-mentioned legislative interventions but
through the Islamic courts, which were created by an amendment to the
constitution in exercise of the emergency powers. The Shariat Courts,
including the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and the Shariat Appellate
Bench of the Supreme Court (SAB), both of which are appellate courts,
were empowered to review any law for conformity with „the injunctions
of Islam‟ and declare any offending law, including parliamentary legisla-
tion, to be null and void. In reality, the court could exercise these powers
in such a manner as to dictate to the legislature what Islamic law provi-
sions would replace the voided legal provisions.
The major decisions of the Shariat courts were delivered in the pe-
riod immediately following Zia‟s demise and coincided with the first ten-
ures of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the late
1980‟s and early 1990‟s. The late 1990‟s have been an era of emerging
Islamic critiques that have pointed out not only the human rights viola-
tions resulting from these laws but also focus on their divergences from
classical Islamic law in several respects. The Musharraf regime has
sought to amend many of these Islamized laws, which have become
increasingly notorious internationally. While in the West the Islamisation
of the laws of Pakistan is generally perceived to be a retrogressive
movement characterized by the introduction of discriminatory and sexist
laws, another vital aspect of this movement is generally overlooked. The
bulk of Pakistan‟s laws, especially the criminal laws, date back to the
colonial era and they embody the assumptions of that era. Historically,
the state and its laws have been perceived by much of the citizenry to
be of mostly alien origin and are followed only to the extent that the co-
ercive power of the state compels such obedience.
With the Islamisation of laws a new discourse has begun to take
shape questioning the legitimacy and moral authority of laws that govern
citizens‟ conduct. This dimension is also beginning to be reflected in the
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jurisprudence of the superior courts, other than the Shariat courts, where
references to Islamic principles are frequently made in justification of
rulings concerning subjects as diverse as due process in administrative
law, enforceability of contracts and environmental regulation, to refer to
a few examples. This shifting discourse on the Islamisation of the law
forms, along with the constitutional crises and frequent shifts in the locus
of authority, provides the backdrop for the current state of the rule of law
in Pakistan. In Pakistan, the independence of judiciary is enshrined in
the Constitution. Like the U.S. we have a written constitution based on
the principle of separation of powers. A separate part (part 7) is allocated
to the judiciary, and it was made independent of the Executive by a con-
stitutional mandate that was given effect to by a judgment of the Sindh
High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court (Government of Sindh v.
Sharf Faridi, PLD 1994 SC 105, Besides being the last court of appeal
both under the civil and criminal law, the Supreme Court under the Con-
stitution has power to pass an appropriate order “on any question of
public importance with reference to the enforcement of Fundamental
Rights.” (Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 Article 184) To further buttress
the authority and independence of the Supreme Court, the Constitution
inter alia provides that the law or a principle of law declared by the Su-
preme Court shall be binding on all courts and all executive authorities
in the country shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. (Article 190) The
Judges of the constitutional courts have security of tenure, and they can,
as per the Constitution, only be removed on proven charges of miscon-
duct by the Supreme Judicial Council headed by the Chief Justice of
Pakistan. It is under this constitutional dispensation that the Supreme
Court and other courts function.
The Supreme Court in several judgments has given liberal inter-
pretation to fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution and
thereby promoted the Rule of Law and democratic norms. In one case it
interpreted the right to freedom of association to include the rights of a
political party to keep functioning. (Abul Alamaudoodi v. the State, PLD
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1964 SC 673). It further expanded this right by holding that a political

party, if in power, has the right to complete its term unless its Govern-
ment is ousted under the Constitution. (Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pa-
kistan, PLD 1993 SC 473). In certain cases, the superior courts acted
as “social engineers” and catalysts of change. Pakistan has been a male
dominated society where instances are not lacking when women were
deprived of their right to inherit property, despite the mandate of law,
through involuntary surrender. There have been instances when they
were denied the right to marry a person of their choice or when they
were given in marriage without their consent. The court, when called
upon to decide such matters, laid down law, which had the effect of
changing the unjust customs and mores. For instance, in cases of denial
of right to inherit property, the Supreme Court held that this being a gross
violation of fundamental right of a socially disadvantaged gender, claims
could be filed even long after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation.
(PLD 1970 SC 1). Similarly, there was a socially sanctified tradition un-
der which even a sui-juris woman could not marry without permission of
her guardian. In a case where an adult girl married a person of her
choice, her father, relying on a document evidencing a fake and illegal
marriage with her cousin, launched criminal prosecution for adultery
against her, and she was arrested.
The matter was brought before the High Court; it not only declared
counter marriage as illegal but quashed the criminal proceedings. (Hu-
maira v. State, PLD 1999 Lahore 494. In certain remote areas of Paki-
stan there is a custom of giving young and even minor girls in marriage
as a settlement in blood feuds. The Supreme Court interfered in such
cases, the state functionaries were reprimanded for apathy, and a direc-
tion was issued to the government to take preventive and punitive action
in such cases. Because of the court interventions, the law was amended,
and now it is a Penal offence to given a young girl in marriage as a set-
tlement of a blood feud. In terrorism related cases, the Supreme Court
has been particularly strict. It upheld the Anti Terrorism Act by holding
202 | P a g e
that the legislature could pass a special law to cater for such heinous
crimes. (Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445). It
chided the High Court for being too liberal in cases under the Anti Ter-
rorist Laws. (Mirza Shaukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil (PLD 2005 SC 530
).The court has always maintained, however, that while investigating
such cases, cannons of due process should be duly observed. Because
when the law enforcement agencies roughshod the law in the name of
terror, it amounts to playing on the wicket of the terrorists who wreak
violence in disregard to law.
One of the most onerous functions of the judiciary in a constitu-
tional democracy is to protect the liberty, the due process and the Rule
of Law. The brief overview of the powers and working of the Supreme
Court would indicate that under the Constitution it has wide powers. But
the magnitude of injustices it is confronted with is still wider both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. In absence of responsive and credible institu-
tions of law enforcement, people tend to bring every cause, every griev-
ance, and ever lie before the constitutional courts and in particular be-
fore the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by and large has refrained
from interfering in matters of public policy. We believe that it is not the
function of the court to get embroiled in politics and passions of the day.
Or perception on such matters has been, “the constitution does not con-
stitute us as „Platonic Guardians‟ nor does it vest in this court the au-
thority to strike down laws because they do not meet its standards of,
„desirable social policy‟, „wisdom‟, or „commonsense‟.
While dispensing justice, the Supreme Court has broadly kept three
considerations in view. First, that Judiciary is one of the three organs of
the state, and good governance is possible only if the three remain within
their defined limits. Second, the law may not keep pace with the chang-
ing times and may not respond to every situation. The Court has a role
to bridge the gap between the law and the society. This consideration is
particularly relevant to the powers of the Supreme Court under Article
184 of the Constitution. Third, the court has been conscious that as a
203 | P a g e
member of the United Nations and being part of a global community,

Pakistan has certain obligations under the international law. We live in
an interdependent world.
Any activity within the country that has or has a potential to have
nexus with a crime committed outside the country, be it a financial crime
or an act of terror, has to be brought to justice under the law. If laws are
flouted, it breeds contempt. The society becomes prey to stagnation,
resentment, and violence, which is then exported. Dr. Martin Luther King
was alluding to this chain reaction of injustice when he said, “Injustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” Court structures Superior
Courts: The Supreme Court is the apex court of Pakistan and consists
of a Chief Justice, known as the Chief Justice of Pakistan, and such
other judges (now 17) as may be determined by Act of Parliament. The
court has limited original and extensive appellate jurisdiction.
A special bench of the Supreme Court known as the Shariat Appel-
late Bench hears appeals from the orders/judgments of the Federal
Shariat Court. The Supreme Court has important powers with regard to
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Judges of the Supreme Court hold
office till the age of 65 and are appointed by the President in consultation
with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. There is one High Court for each of
the four provinces in the country. The High Courts have a principal seat
and one or more benches. The Lahore High Court has three added
benches at Rawalpindi, Multan and Bahawalpur. Recently a fifth High
Court was established for Islamabad. High Courts have extensive ap-
pellate and substantial original jurisdiction. They have powers to issue
orders in the nature of writs. High Courts are also entrusted with powers
of superintendence and control over most courts. The Federal Shariat
Court comprises of not more than eight judges including the Chief Jus-
tice.
The Court has appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in Hudood
cases and jurisdiction to review laws to find out their compatibility with
204 | P a g e
injunctions of Islam. Subordinate Courts: Courts of general jurisdiction

are courts which deal with the main body of civil and criminal law in Pa-
kistan. These courts have jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters
unless provided otherwise by legislative enactment. Courts of general
jurisdiction are provincial in character. Civil courts have general civil ju-
risdiction and try all suits pertaining to torts, lands and declaration of
rights. Procedure in these courts is regulated by the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure 1908. Section 3 of the Civil Courts Ordinance provides for the
following classes of courts: Court of District Judge Court of Additional
District Judge Court of the Civil Judge In each district there is one district
judge and varying number of additional district judges and civil judges.
Based on pecuniary jurisdiction, courts of civil judges are divided into
three types- courts of civil judge class I, courts of civil judge class II,
courts of civil judge class III. In every district one of the civil judges is
known as the senior civil judge. The Senior Civil Judge assigns cases
among his colleagues. Criminal courts of general jurisdiction are set up
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. These courts can try all
cases arising out of the Pakistan Penal Code. Criminal courts are of two
types: Sessions Court Courts of Magistrates. The Sessions Court com-
prises one Sessions Judge who is in charge of the administration of the
court and varying number of Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges.
Additional Sessions Judges have same judicial powers as the Sessions
Judge. Sessions judges are invariably District Judges and are known as
District and Sessions Judges. There are three types of courts of magis-
trates: Magistrate of the First class, Magistrate of the second class, and
Magistrate of the third class. Magistrates do not always act as courts.
In addition to the above noted types of magistrates there are spe-
cial judicial magistrates and section 30 magistrates. These magistrates
belong to one of the three classes mentioned above but because of spe-
cial powers are known as Special Judicial Magistrates or section 30
magistrates. Specialist Courts: Specialist courts deal with offenses re-
lating to a particular subject and most but not all have both civil and
205 | P a g e
criminal jurisdiction. Special courts are set up both by the federation and
the provinces and in certain cases specialist courts are constituted by
federal legislation but their finances are provided by the provincial gov-
ernment. Listed below are important federal and provincial specialist
courts. This division is by statute of origin and not by provision of fi-
nances: Federal specialist courts The important specialist courts/tribu-
nals set up by federal enactment are: Banking Courts: Established under
the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 Spe-
cial Courts for banking offences: Established under the Offences in re-
spect of Banks (Special Court) Ordinance, 1984 Anti-terrorism Courts:
Established under the Anti-terrorism Act 1997. Anti-terrorism court can
be established by both the federal and provincial governments (13) Ac-
countability courts: Established under the National Accountability Bu-
reau Ordinance, 1999 Drug Courts: Established under the Drugs Act,
1976. In addition to establishing Drug Courts itself the federal govern-
ment is authorized under this Act to direct a provincial Government to
establish Drug Courts (s 31) Special Courts for emigration offences: Es-
tablished under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 (s 24) Labour Courts:
Established under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002(s 33). The
Act however empowers the provincial government to establish Labour
Courts. Court of Special Judge (Customs): These Special Judges are
established under section 185 of the Customs Act, 1969. Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal: This tribunal is established under the Income Tax
Ordinance, 2001 (s130) Provincial Specialist courts Revenue Courts:
Established under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (s 77) Consumer
Courts: Established under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005
Rent courts: Established under the Punjab Rented premises Act, 2007
Family courts: Established under the Family Courts Act, 1964(s 3). It has
been estimated that there are now nearly 2,000 judges in Pakistan at all
levels of court, for a population of roughly 160 million. Each judge is
burdened with an extremely high caseload.
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As noted in Section B 2 above, salaries and working conditions are

poor and are not regarded as sufficient to attract interest on the part of
the elite bar, and some incumbents informed the team that they relied
on family support to continue on the bench. Working conditions in the
Subordinate Courts observed are generally inadequate, as these courts
sit in small, un-cooled courtrooms with antiquated equipment and furni-
ture. The High Courts are far better-equipped, including a plenitude of
computers and staff. Subordinate courts may have one computer in a
court, generally used by either the stenographic officer to record case
results or by the judge. Subordinate court judges rarely are promoted to
the superior courts: entering the Subordinate courts at the lowest level
in effect limits their advancement to, at most, the position of District and
Sessions Judge, which may require 30 years to reach.
ANT-CORRUPTION LAWS A glance at the efforts to develop anti-
corruption institutions indicates that the ruling regimes, barring excep-
tions, have been tinkering with the anti-corruption departments, primarily
with political opponents in focus. The anti-corruption institutions of the
early 1960s took cognizance of the crime even if „approved‟ by the ruling
masters. The Prevention of Corruption Act-1947, Public Representa-
tives (Disqualification) Act 1949(repealed), the Elected Bodies (Disqual-
ification) Ordinance-1959 (Repealed), etc. were mostly labelled with ex-
ercise in victimisation. Anti Corruption Establishments (ACE) were
formed in all the provinces in 1970 and the FIA in the capital in 1975.
These establishments are in existence for over four decades now
with low key development priority, thus no meaningful results can be
shown by these bodies to control corruption. ACEs are victims of political
and bureaucratic controls. Poor investigation capacity, under-sourcing
and lack of operational freedom have virtually rendered these outfits in-
effective. The FIA mainly looks into immigration, financial crimes, cyber
crimes and now anti-terrorism. The multiple mandates, politicobureau-
cratic intrusions in the form of Federal Anti Corruption Committee
207 | P a g e
(FACC) and host of other organisational difficulties have made the func-
tioning of FIA an uphill task. Had we kept the development of anti-cor-
ruption bodies on our national agenda by allocating them top-class hu-
man resource, sufficient funds, and freedom in decisionmaking, the
menace of corruption would have been significantly curtailed. The
Ehtesab Bureau, which was formed in 1997, supplementing the Ehtesab
Commission, was the first serious effort aimed at combating corruption
in the country.
The Bureau assumed the responsibility of investigation while pros-
ecution was entrusted to the commission. Ehtesab law was a strong law
where the prosecution of cases at two tiers, i.e. Ehtesab Courts under
the judges of the High Courts in each province with right of appeal in the
SC was a far better and speedy trial process than the three-tier prose-
cution approach followed by NAB under National Accountability Ordi-
nance (NAO). The Ehtesab Bureau investigated a significant number of
White Collar Crime (WCC) cases and its performance was by and large
commendable as evident from the statistics of high profile prosecutions
it undertook in a short span of time. It traced assets stashed abroad for
the first time in the history of Pakistan and exhibited foreign documentary
evidence on ill-gotten assets in trial courts. Unfortunately, Ehtesab Bu-
reau was dismantled due to military takeover on October 12, 1999. The
political opponents labelled this bureau as infested with agenda against
political opponents. The Ehtesab Act1997 was passed by the National
Assembly with a two-third majority. It had all the merits and political sup-
port that justified its retention with certain amendments necessary for
modernisation/functional improvements.
The NAB was established after Ehtesab Bureau. It was provided
management on deputation from the armed forces. The bureau faced
multifarious challenges in the formative years as it neither had the
trained workforce of its own for investigating white collar crimes nor the
capacity to handle substantially large portfolio of corruption/corporate
fraud cases reported by the public as well as inherited from the Ehtesab
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Bureau. The NAB took the first challenge of recovery of defaulted loans.
A list of top bank loan defaulters compiled by various banks/institutions
was given by the State Bank of Pakistan to NAB for a countrywide crack-
down. The nation witnessed arrest of influential personalities and reten-
tion in NAB custody till full/part payment of the defaulted loans. A handful
of defaulters, however, managed restructuring of their defaulted loans.
The drive against the loan defaulters was highly effective and widely ap-
preciated by the public.
The hierarchy of NAB was conscious of the necessity for incorpo-
rating modern antiCorruption Concepts and techniques in the system.
For this, foreign consultants were engaged for organisational review. It
succeeded in incorporating new initiatives in the orbit such as Aware-
ness and Prevention Division, integration of FIA‟s Anti-Corruption and
Economic Crime Wings, Research and Training Wing, IT Wing, Logistics
Wing, Security wing and a mini secretariat for National Anti-Corruption
Strategy (NACS) Committee to oversee implementation of Governance
Reforms in the Country. The FIA transferred over 30 percent of their
workforce to NAB after thorough scrutiny of their moral and professional
reputation. The transfer of FIA workforce also brought-in voluminous
workload of Corruption Cases to the NAB. But as it was still at a nascent
stage, the present government reversed the decision.
The SC announced landmark judgment in favour of NAO-99, with
directions to remove certain anomalies in the ordinance. It was the first
legal validation of NAO by the apex court of Pakistan. The blow to the
potency of NAB‟s operations came in year 2001- 02, when NAB‟s power
to take cognizance of bank default cases was clipped through an
amendment moved by the federal government where NAB could deal
with the default cases when referred by a committee headed by the gov-
ernor SBP only.
A final payment notice to the bank defaulter by the SBP was made
mandatory. The net outcome was an abrupt decline in the bank default
209 | P a g e
prosecution cases by the NAB, leading to loss of deterrence value of the

bureau. Allegations of favouritism in cases against the pro-government
politicians could not be defended in the public. Pro-Government politi-
cians were openly accused by the civil society to be the beneficiaries as
complaints, probes, inquiries, investigations prosecution cases against
them were either not pursued with due competence or were shelved.
The bureau‟s anti-corruption operations against businessmen and poli-
ticians were drastically curtailed after November 2002 general elections.
The corrupt bureaucrats, however, came on top of the agenda for crim-
inal prosecution.
External influence/intervention leads to compromise, thus affecting
the resolve to combat corruption. Shortfalls in investigation and prose-
cution skills also had the telling effect on organisational output that con-
tinued to decline. Perpetual delays in inquiries, investigations and pros-
ecution in courts resulted in delays. Voluntary return and pleabargaining
concepts, although prevalent in many foreign countries, were also
viewed by the public as instruments of compromise with the offender.
The worst offender could get released after paying 1/3rd amount
as the first instalment in case of plea bargain. The details of voluntary
return cases never became public. The closure of inquiries, investiga-
tions, and withdrawal of cases from the courts remained a grey area
throughout. The formulation of the first National Anti-Corruption Strategy
(NACS) for Pakistan with the assistance of foreign specialists was good
work that never got the attention it deserved. Resultantly, the reforms
agenda for National Integrity System was not pursued by various stake-
holders with due vigour. The bureau also undertook research and anal-
ysis work on systemic weaknesses in governance; it trained prosecutors
in prosecutorial skills for the first time in Pakistan. It worked as apex
body for drafting anti-money laundering bill and ratification of Interna-
tional Convention against Corruption (ICAC). The NAB also worked as
an institution to promote reforms in the provincial ACE‟s of all the prov-
210 | P a g e
inces, including Ehtesab Bureau of AJK. It conducted numerous ses-

sions with the concerned provincial ACEs and drafted changes in their
charter of assignments. In what had been billed as a verdict in NRO
case, that may change the course of country‟s political history, the Su-
preme Court on 16.12.2009 declared the controversial National Recon-
ciliation Ordinance (NRO) as never to have existed and against the Con-
stitution by reviving all cases and reversing acquittals of its beneficiaries,
thus putting the PPP parliamentarians and cabinet members and Presi-
dent Asif Zardari in a quandary. In a late-night short order that has no
parallel in country‟s judicial history, the 17-judge bench, headed by Chief
Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, ordered the federal government
to take immediate steps to seek revival of the original requests or claims
for mutual legal assistance to pursue money laundering cases pending
in foreign countries, including Switzerland.
Historic as it is, the Supreme Court verdict has also raised as many
questions as it has answered regarding the fate of the cases. Perhaps
in coming days and weeks it may become clear if the cases in Switzer-
land can at all be revived because, according to legal experts, the Swiss
legal system does not have any such provision. Since the verdict has
not directly touched the immunity issue of the president, legal opinion
remains divided on whether President Zardari can be prosecuted on the
basis of corruption cases as they existed before the promulgation of
NRO on Oct 5, 2007.
Similarly, fate of those who were convicted in absentia and are at
present members of parliament or even in the cabinet also hangs in the
balance and depends on the view and action of National Assembly
Speaker Fehmida Mirza and Senate Chairman Farooq Naek. Equally
important will be the reaction of the MQM as a number of its leaders and
members were direct beneficiaries of the NRO in thousands of criminal
cases that the party has always dismissed as politically motivated, but
now stand revived as a result of the verdict. Authored by the Chief Jus-
tice himself, the 18-page verdict was quite clear on many points as it
211 | P a g e
also revived all convictions or sentences under section 31-A of the NAB
Ordinance that deals with punishment to an absconder after declaring
him proclaimed offender.
Since the NRO has been declared void ab initio, any benefit de-
rived by any person in pursuance of Section 6 (amendment in section
31-A of the NAB Ordinance) will also be deemed never to have legally
accrued to any such person, and consequently, of no legal effect. It held
that cases under investigation or pending inquiry and which had either
been withdrawn or where the inquiry had been terminated on account of
the NRO shall also stand revived and the authorities shall proceed in the
said matters in accordance with law.
As a consequence of the declaration, the judgment said, all cases
in which the accused persons were either discharged or acquitted under
Section 2 of NRO (amendment in Section 494 of the Criminal Procedure
Code) or where proceedings pending against the holders of public office
had been wound up in view of Section 7 shall revert to the preOct 5,
2007, position. All courts, including the trial, the appellate and the revi-
sion courts, were ordered to summon the persons accused in such
cases and then to proceed from the stage from where proceedings were
closed under the NRO.
The federal government, all provincial governments and all relevant
and competent authorities, including NAB Prosecutor General Dr Dan-
ishwar, the special prosecutors in accountability courts, the prosecutors
general in the four provinces and other officers or officials involved in the
prosecution of criminal offenders, were also directed to offer every pos-
sible assistance required by the courts in this connection. The court also
ordered the federal government and other competent authorities to pro-
ceed against former attorney general Malik Mohammad Qayyum by de-
claring unauthorised, unconstitutional and illegal his acts of writing to
various authorities/courts in foreign countries, including Switzerland.
212 | P a g e
The court noted that no order or any authority was established authoris-
ing the former AG to address unauthorised communications and thus
the conduct of Malik Qayyum resulted in unlawful abandonment of
claims of the government to huge amounts of the allegedly laundered
money lying in foreign countries, including Switzerland. The court also
expressed its displeasure over the conduct and lack of proper and hon-
est assistance and cooperation to the court by NAB Chairman Nawid
Ahsan, the prosecutor general of the NAB and of Additional Prosecutor
General Abdul Baseer Qureshi.
It suggested the federal government to appoint competent, honest
persons who fulfil the criteria outlined in Section 6 of the NAB Ordinance.
The court asked the government to go through its observations in the
Asfandyar Wali case. The verdict regretted that the conduct of NAB‟s
bosses made it impossible for the court to trust them. However, till such
fresh appointments the present incumbents may continue to discharge
their obligations strictly in accordance with law, but obligated them to
transmit periodical reports of the actions taken by them to the monitoring
cell of this Court, which is being established through succeeding parts
of this judgment. The cell so established in the Supreme Court will com-
prise the chief justice or any judge to be nominated by him to monitor
the progress and the proceedings in the cases under the NAB Ordi-
nance. Similar cells will also be set up in the High Courts of all the prov-
inces.
The law secretary was directed to take steps to increase the num-
ber of accountability courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases. The
removal of bottlenecks is the best approach rather than dismantling the
entire system that demonstrated the capability far better than any other
contemporary anti-corruption bureau in the SAARC region. The selec-
tion of directors and others strictly on the basis of high moral and pro-
fessional standards can be an effective firewall against corrupt practices
within the bureau. The need for introducing a check and balance system,
involving the civil society, media, and judiciary to oversee closed cases
213 | P a g e
will have a check on the discretionary powers of the competent authori-

ties. Likewise, selection of prosecutors after carrying out consultations
with various bar councils will have a salutary impact on the performance
of the bureau. Introspection of the present workforce and elimination of
non-professional officers in the bureau can also enhance their efficiency.
The government should re-evaluate the NAO, its mandate and or-
ganisational shortfall. Any effort to dilute the law will be contrary to the
spirit of accountability. A group of specialists from the judiciary and the
executive can identify human resource of weak moral and ethical stand-
ards, allegedly involved in closure and delays of inquiries, complaints,
investigations, prosecutions on external influences or vested interests.
This screening exercise should also be undertaken for FIA and Provin-
cial ACEs for across the board effects. We should also set up a national
anti-corruption authority, headed by Chief Justice of the SC (retired),
with chairman FBR, Accountant General, Auditor General, Chairman
PAC, Chairman JCSC, Federal Secretary Cabinet/Establishment, and
an MNA each from the main political parties and few members from the
civil society to act as a body to oversee federal anti-corruption institu-
tions.
214 | P a g e
PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN NATIONAL

INTEGRATION: ROUNAQ JAHAN
Rounaq Jahan is a distinguished fellow, centre for policy dialogue,
Dhaka, Bangladesh and adjunct, professor, international affairs at the
school of international and public affairs, Columbia University, New
York, USA. She obtained a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard Uni-
versity, USA. She was a professor of political science at Dhaka Univer-
sity, Bangladesh (1970-1982); coordinator of the women in development
program at UN Asia-Pacific Development Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malay-
sia (1982-84); and head of the program on rural women at the Interna-
tional Labor Office, Geneva, Switzerland (1985-89). It was the traumatic
event in 1971 that disintegration of Pakistan, which was divided and
emerged of new state as Bangladesh. Writer has mainly focused on the
Ayyub era (1958-69) the history of Pakistan. She observed and differen-
tiated the period that why Pakistan did not frame the systematic way to
bring both wings on same page to continue amalgamation. She de-
scribes policies and evaluation on this it breaks out the disintegration of
Pakistan. And she also edited in her book the period of (1969-71) to
improve her final thesis. This book is thesis of her Ph.D. She has written
a statement on her introduction to provide the primary material and con-
ducted interviews in Pakistan during summer and winter of 1968, which
are not mentioned after edition of the book.
Pakistan's struggle with national integration is extensively explored
in a book divided into eight chapters. The inaugural chapter meticulously
dissects the challenges encountered in national integration post the birth
of Pakistan. It vividly portrays the swift emergence of ethnic, religious,
linguistic, tribal, and class-related issues, particularly in East Pakistan.
To address these concerns, a concerted effort was made to establish a
consensus, emphasizing power-sharing with Bengalis. The primary goal
215 | P a g e
was to fortify national institutions and political unity, thereby dispelling

prevailing misconceptions between East and West Pakistan.
The second chapter delves into the period of 1947-1958, spotlight-
ing the pronounced imbalance between East and West. Factors such as
geography, population, societal homogeneity, religious distinctions, and
interregional disparities are meticulously examined. Simultaneously, the
chapter explores state-building and nation-building endeavors, where
asymmetric conflicts amongst political elites, administration, and the
pursuit of political centralization, including the demand for an autono-
mous state by Bengalis, are chronicled. This period witnessed signifi-
cant events like the formation of the Awami League in 1949, the lan-
guage movements of 1952, and the 1954 elections, all shaping the po-
litical landscape.
The third chapter transitions into the decade of Ayub Khan's rule
from 1958 to 1969. Ayub Khan's abrogation of the constitution and the
declaration of a military coup as a "revolution" marked a pivotal shift in
governance. Ruling with the support of the military-civil bureaucracy al-
liance, Ayub Khan banned political parties and introduced the EBDO
(Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order) to disqualify prominent leaders.
The introduction of basic democracy aimed to consolidate power and
implement economic reforms, including the "Green revolution," fostering
economic development under an authoritarian regime.
Chapter four revolves around national building through economic
development, elucidating Ayub's prime focus on economic progress.
Various initiatives, such as the five-year plan (1960-65), Pakistan Indus-
trial Development Corporation (PIDC), and the twenty-year perspective
plan (1965-1985), were launched to bridge the economic gap between
East and West. However, Bengali's economic demands evolved into po-
litical autonomy, underscoring the significance of physical and social in-
frastructure.
216 | P a g e
Bureaucracy and its role in nation-building are scrutinized in the fifth

chapter. Bureaucratic policies centered on centralization to maintain
power relations between the central and provincial governments. How-
ever, this approach led to the exclusion of Eastern Pakistanis from sig-
nificant decision-making processes, necessitating the representation of
the East in the central government.
The sixth chapter navigates through the introduction of basic de-
mocracies and its impact on political parties. Ayub Khan's shift towards
a party-less polity through basic democracies aimed to garner support
from rural and land elites, reshaping national and regional dynamics.
Political movements, including the six points movement and Pakistan
Democratic Movement (PDM), emerged against Ayub's regime, advo-
cating the restoration of constitutional systems.
The seventh chapter scrutinizes the 1962 constitution and the po-
litical movements in East Pakistan. Ayub's constitution favored the cen-
tral government, increasing presidential powers and perpetuating auto-
cratic behavior. This chapter also unveils the discontent in East Paki-
stan, with leaders demanding a parliamentary form of government and
facing suppression through the EBDO.
The eighth chapter addresses the dilemmas of political develop-
ment, emphasizing the political structural differences between the East
and West. East Pakistan's grievances, predominantly political, contrib-
uted to demands for autonomy due to insufficient policies addressing
their needs. The final chapter recounts the unexpected disintegration of
Pakistan under General Yahya's rule, triggered by political differences,
Bengali demands for a separate autonomous state, and military opera-
tions in East Pakistan.
In essence, the book unfolds a profound narrative of Pakistan's in-
tricate journey from independence to disintegration. It meticulously dis-
sects the multifaceted challenges of national integration, exposing the
fissures between East and West Pakistan. The chapters unravel the
217 | P a g e
complexities of political, economic, and bureaucratic dynamics, shed-

ding light on pivotal events and movements that shaped the nation's
destiny. The narrative underscores the struggle for consensus, power-
sharing, and equitable development, while delving into the unintended
consequences of policies and power dynamics. The unexpected disin-
tegration under General Yahya's rule becomes a poignant culmination,
reflecting the culmination of deep-rooted political differences and un-
addressed grievances. This comprehensive exploration not only en-
riches our understanding of Pakistan's history but also serves as a
poignant reflection on the complexities inherent in the pursuit of national
unity amidst diverse sociopolitical landscapes.
218 | P a g e
WORLD ORDER BY HENRY KISSINGER

Henry Kissinger’s World Order sets the stage by addressing the
evolution of the state as a permanent and fundamental entity in conduct-
ing international relations. He puts light on the significance of the Peace
of Westphalia (1648) in the first institutionalising international order
among states. In so doing, Kissinger deftly explains the role of the state
and its enduring legacy in structuring relations between and among the
states.
Peace of Westphalia (1648)
In World Order, Henry Kissinger states that a century of sectarian
conflict and political upheaval across Central Europe ushered in the
Thirty Years’ War. He says, unlike other landmark agreements such as
the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 or the Treaty of Versailles in 1919,
the Peace of Westphalia did not emanate from a single conference. The
Catholic powers, including 178 separate participants from different
states constituting the Holy Roman Empire, gathered in the Catholic city
of Münister.
Nearly thirty miles away, in the mixed Lutheran and Catholic city of
Osnabrück, Protestant powers gathered. He writes that both powers laid
the foundation stone of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Kissinger ar-
gues that the Peace of Westphalia became a cornerstone in the history
of nations as the elements already existing were much more compli-
cated. Under this treaty, the state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious
confession, was termed as the building block of European order and the
concept of a state was established.
Each state was given the sovereignty to choose its own domestic
structure. Henry Kissinger writes that this led to the system of interna-
tional relations where diplomacy, including the stationing of resident rep-
resentatives in the capitals of fellow states, was designed to regulate
relations and promote the arts of peace. He further explains that if a state
219 | P a g e
accepted these basic prerequisites, it could be recognised as an inter-

national state able to maintain its own culture, politics, religion, and do-
mestic politics, protected by the international system from outside
forces. He argues that with the end of the universal Church as the ulti-
mate source of legitimacy and the weakening of the Holy Roman Em-
peror, the ordering concept for Europe became the balance of power.
With all its intricacies, the balance of power was thought to be an im-
provement over the exaction of religious wars.
The Spread of Islam
Henry Kissinger writes that in the sixth century B.C., the Persian
Empire emerged on the Iranian plateau and tried to unite heterogeneous
African, Asian, and European communities into a single, organised in-
ternational society. This society was ruled by a Shahanshah, or “King of
Kings.” He states that by the end of the sixth century A.D., two great
empires presided over much of the Middle East: the Byzantine (or East-
ern Roman) Empire, with its capital in Constantinople and practising the
Christian religion (Greek Orthodox), and the Sassanid Persian Empire,
with its capital in Ctesiphon, near modern-day Baghdad, which pro-
fessed Zoroastrianism.
In 602, Persion’s invasion of Byzantine territories ushered in a 25-
year-long war. He says both empires fought to the best of their abilities.
However, the Byzantine empire defended its territory and a state of
peace prevailed in the region. Ultimately, he argues, this led to the vic-
tory of Islam. The author states that in western Arabia, far from the con-
trol of any empire, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his followers
started to gather strength.
He argues that as the Byzantine and Persian empires dismantled
each other, Muhammad (PBUH) and his followers framed a polite, com-
posed Arabian Peninsula and embarked upon a voyage to replace the
existing faiths of the region, particularly Judaism, Christianity, and Zoro-
astrianism-with the religion of one and only God, Islam. He puts forth
220 | P a g e
that an unprecedented wave of expansion and the rise of Islam proved

to be one of the most consequential events in history.
Kissinger writes that following the death of Prophet Muhammad
(PBUH) in 632, Arab armies spread Islam as far as the Atlantic coast of
Africa, to most of Spain, into central France, and as far east as northern
India. Alternatively, carried by merchants and conquerors, in the regions
of Central Asia and Russia, parts of China, and most of the East Indies,
Islam gained ground as the most dominant religion.
In World Order, Henry Kissinger further states that Islam’s fast
growth across three continents turned out to be the faithfulness of its
divine mission. Islam, driven by the conviction that its expansion would
unite and bring peace to all humanity, became a religion with a multieth-
nic superstate and a new world order. Putting light on the structure of
the Islamic world, Kissinger states that the regions where Islam swayed
were conceived as a single political unit: dar al-Islam, the “House of Is-
lam,” or the realm of peace. Moreover, he writes that the Dar al-Islam
was governed by the Caliphate, an institution defined by rightful succes-
sion to the political authority that the Prophet had exercised.
Iran: A Nuclear State
Henry Kissinger argues that the modern balance of power can be
reflected through the scientific development of a society. He says that
America’s nuclear monopoly was challenged in 1949 when the Soviet
Union attained its first nuclear weapon. American presidents and the
United Nations Security Council denounced Iran’s effort to acquire nu-
clear weapons and demanded that Iran abandon its quest for nuclear
weapons. However, Iran did not heed the UN and the US, and instead
focused on its nuclear arsenal. Kissinger unearths that Iran possessed
130 centrifuges when the negotiations commenced in 2003. At the time
of writing World Order, Henry Kissinger says that Iran had acquired ap-
proximately 19000 centrifuges. Moreover, in November 2013, Iran dis-
closed that it had seven tonnes of low-grade enriched uranium.
221 | P a g e
The author states that the Iranian negotiators told their opponents
that they would not back down from pursuing their nuclear arsenal even
if they were attacked. Kissinger elaborates that Iran viewed its nuclear
programme as one facet of a larger struggle for regional order and ide-
ological dominance. In November 2013, Iran agreed to a qualified, tem-
porary suspension of enrichment in return for the lifting of some of the
international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. He puts
forth that if Iran abandons its military nuclear program, the West’s rela-
tionship with Iran could return to normal. Furthermore, he states that the
desire of Iran’s geostrategic rivals—namely Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia—to attain or purchase their nuclear programmes will become ir-
resistible. Nevertheless, the author points out that the United States
should develop good relations with Iran based on the Westphalian prin-
ciples of nonintervention.
The Asian World Order
Kissinger narrates that there has been no common religion in Asia,
as there is in the West. He says that Asia is home to different religions
such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. Moreover, there
was no common empire in Asia comparable to that of Rome. He argues
that the political and economic structures of Asia show the region’s com-
plex tapestry. Furthermore, he explains that a large Muslim population
exists across Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangla-
desh, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and a sizeable Muslim population in In-
dia, China, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines. Kissinger argues
that Asian countries maintained a European balance of power system
during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.
Asia, with the exception of Japan, fell prey to the international order in-
duced by colonialism and was not an actor in it. The author writes that
although Thailand sustained its liberation, unlike Japan, it was too weak
to take part in the balance of power as a system of regional order. He
further explains that China’s large territory kept colonisers at bay, but it
could not maintain its domestic affairs.
222 | P a g e
He says that Asia’s prosperity and economic dynamism came into

view with the rise of Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Tai-
wan, and Thailand. He writes that Japan opted for democratic institu-
tions and surmounted those of Western nations. The writer states that
in 1979, under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese model of govern-
ance proved transformative for China and the world. Additionally, Kis-
singer argues that in Asia, states are regarded as the fundamental units
of international and domestic politics, in contrast to the Middle East,
where almost all states are threatened by militant challenges to their le-
gitimacy. He further states that the doctrine of the Westphalian model of
international order was followed by the majority of Asian nations. Kissin-
ger states that for the people who lay at the crossroads of two or more
imperial powers, the way to emancipation was often to side with more
than one sphere as a nominal subordinate. He writes that in Asia’s his-
toric diplomatic systems, the monarchy was termed as an expression of
divinity or a kind of paternal authority.
The author quotes the example of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid
tribute to both Japan and China for a time in Northeast Asia. He further
illustrates that in the northern hills of Burma, the tribes maintained their
de facto autonomy by paying allegiance to both the Burmese loyal court
and the Chinese Emperor. Kissinger also puts forth the example of Ne-
pal, which for centuries masterfully maintained its diplomatic order be-
tween the ruling dynasties in China and those in India. Lastly, he quotes
Thailand, which prevented colonisation altogether by maintaining cordial
ties with all foreign powers at once.
America: A Goodwill Ambassador
Kissinger narrates that no country has played such an important
role in structuring the international order as the United States. The au-
thor argues that America’s foreign policy was based on the conviction
that its domestic principles were self-evidently universal. He illustrates
that America, for Thomas Jefferson, was not merely a superpower but
223 | P a g e
an “empire of liberty.” He adds that because it was surrounded by two

great oceans, the United States could treat foreign policy as a series of
episodic problems rather than a permanent enterprise. He further states
that diplomacy and force were considered distinct levels of activity, each
following its own autonomous rules.
The author writes that America followed the Westphalian principles
and the balance of power. Kissinger says that where Europe contended
with itself by maintaining security through equilibrium, America cher-
ished dreams of unity and governance, enabling a redeeming purpose.
He draws upon the American Declaration of Independence which de-
clared its audience to be “the opinions of mankind.” He adds that Amer-
ica sided with alliances not to secure a concept of an international order
but to serve its national interests. The author quotes John Quincy Ad-
ams: “[America] does not go abroad looking for monsters to destroy. She
is the well-wisher of all freedom and independence. She is the champion
and vindicator only of her own.” Thus, the writer says, the United States
was not merely a country but an engine of God’s plan and an example
of world order. Moreover, he states that American policy did not limit
itself to neutrality; it felt its obligation to translate its universal moral rel-
evance beyond its geopolitical role.
Conclusion
In the concluding chapter, Henry Kissinger states that the contem-
porary pursuit of world order will need a coherent strategy to set up a
concept of order within the different regions and to relate these regional
orders to one another. He argues that these targets are not necessarily
identical; the victory of a radical movement might bring order to one re-
gion at the expense of other regions. He puts forth that a world order of
states emphasizing individual dignity, participatory governance and co-
operation in accordance with agreed-upon principles can bring about the
true world order. Kissinger believes that a meaningful American role will
224 | P a g e
be philosophically and geopolitically compulsory to overcome the obsta-

cles of the contemporary world. However, he argues that world peace
cannot be achieved by any single country.
To accomplish a bona fide world order, he adds, its elements, while pre-
serving their own values, need to develop a second culture that is global,
structural, and juridical. At the same time, he explains, this would mean
the modernization of the Westphalian principles, keeping in view the
contemporary realities.
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THE ANARCHY: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY BY WILLIAM
DALRYMPLE
In The Anarchy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Com-
pany, William Dalrymple gives a new character-driven account of the as-
cent to power of the East India Company following the collapse of the
Mughal Empire and the resulting ‘anarchy’ that followed. Tracking the
Company’s ruthless profiteering and territorial conquests, The Anarchy
is not only a fine addition to Dalrymple’s studies of the emergence of
British rule in India, but also prompts reflection on the dangers of corpo-
rate excess in our present, writes Thomas Gidney. The rapid collapse of
the mighty and opulent Mughal Empire in the early eighteenth century
stands as almost an enigma of history, but perhaps what was even more
improbable was its complete replacement not by a rival state, but by a
European trading company a century later. In his latest work The Anar-
chy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Company, William Dalrymple
charts the disintegration of India into a state of civil strife and atomisa-
tion, providing a valuable window of entry through which the British
sealed their rule over the subcontinent.
Much of the research of The Anarchy is built on pre-existing studies
of the East India Company and eighteenth-century India, although it is
accompanied by an important assortment of manuscripts and Mughal
chronicles from Indian and British archives. The Anarchy doesn’t neces-
sarily seek to radically retell the history of the Company or push a new
argument or debate; it’s about the way Darlymple recounts the story. He
offers a journey through a war-torn and beleaguered eighteenth-century
South Asia, focusing on the characters rather than underlying social
movements. By concentrating on Mughal nobles, English merchants
and Indian financiers, with all their intriguing attributes, Darlymple
226 | P a g e
breathes life into figures from history who, for many of us, are simply
names in historical textbooks.
Although some may dispute this character-driven version of events,
the attention given to individuals supplies endless nuance and can help
in understanding the importance of the social and personal ties that build
history. After all, the infamous Battle of Plassey (1757) that marked the
way for British dominion in India was not primarily won due to the larger
historical currents such as the superiority of European military technol-
ogy, but because the Nawab of Bengal was betrayed by his ambitious
general, Mir Jafar. The instigators of the plot – the Jagat Seths, Marwari-
Jain bankers and kingmakers in Bengali politics – reveal the significance
of private actors in the rise of the Company. Indeed, the Company itself
was not emblematic of a state-driven institution but one responsible to
its shareholders. Nor was the East India Company devoid of influence
over the British state, as its members used their great wealth to buy po-
sitions in Westminster. This emphasis on historic actors effectively
breaks down the distinction between state and private agents.
The purpose of the actual ‘anarchy’, the collapse of the Mughal
Empire, is largely covered in Chapter One rather than forming a study
unto itself, serving to contextualise the rapid ascendency of the East In-
dia Company. Although Darlymple recounts the fall of Delhi to the Per-
sian forces of Nader Shah in 1739 with the chagrin of Edward Gibbon’s
recounting of the Fall of Rome, The Anarchy’s focus on the rise of the
East India Company somewhat skates over the histories of other suc-
cessor Empires. Though regularly mentioned, the Maratha Empire of the
Deccan that arguably instigated the collapse of the Mughals, as well as
the short-lived Durrani Empire from Afghanistan that invaded the former
Mughal heartlands, are not the focus of this book. Instead they play a
supporting role, as both allies and ultimately opponents of the East India
Company in its rise to power.
227 | P a g e
When it comes to examining the Mughal’s twilight years however,

Dalrymple dives much deeper into the intricate court politics and the
tragic figure of one of the last Emperors to make a bid for resurrecting
Mughal glory, Shah Alam. A young, intelligent and empathetic leader,
Alam’s position as a Mughal Prince granted him considerable gravitas
and legitimacy that the Company saw as a possible basis to justify their
growing rule in India. Though often little more than a pawn in the clash
for supremacy in North India, he was relatively effective as pawns go,
almost bringing the Mughals to the cusp of political resuscitation, before
being brutally humiliated, robbed and blinded by his former hostage, Mir
Quasim. Through these figures of the Mughal Court, Darlymple covers
the Mughal Empire’s death throes more forensically than the rise and
fall of India’s other Empires.
The real focus of the book, the Company’s ‘relentless rise’, traces
the Company from its piratical origins in the Elizabethan period as the
birthchild of early monopoly companies that had operated in Turkey and
Russia. Despite its less-than-stable origins, the nascent East India Com-
pany ran the gauntlet of competitors from Portuguese merchants to the
initially more successful Dutch East India Company, before confronting
the growing menace of the French ‘Compagnie des Indes’. Only with the
anarchy, the collapse of the Mughals and India’s descent into atomisa-
tion and civil strife could the East India Company begin its rapid ascent
to South Asian hegemony.
The first half of the book begins with the Company’s dominance
over Bengal, and its clashes with the local Nawabs for control. This is
largely conducted by the figure of the brutish but cunning Robert Clive,
whose combined use of subterfuge and aggression won the Company
the Mughal right as the ‘Diwani’, or economic comptroller of Bengal. With
Bengal, arguably one of the richest regions in the world, under the Com-
pany’s control as of 1757, the East India Company gained a dominant
position in India. Company officials engaged in a systematic orgy of as-
228 | P a g e
set-stripping Bengal, contributing to one of Bengal’s worst famines, kill-

ing millions. Rather than organise effective tax or famine relief, as was
common among Indian rulers, the Company maintained its tax harvest-
ing to sustain a high share price.
This cold-hearted profiteering is presented as a cautionary tale of
the excess of modern-day mega-corporations. However, unlike the less
militarised financial institutions of today, the Company’s perfidious ac-
tions in Bengal doomed it to evolve into a quasi-governmental organisa-
tion. The pillaging of Bengal contributed to the ultimate crash in the Com-
pany’s share price, leading to one of the world’s first massive bailout
packages in exchange for greater parliamentary scrutiny, which would
soon position the UK Parliament and the Company at loggerheads. Ed-
mund Burke’s famous prosecution of the Company’s Governor-General,
Warren Hastings – often held up as an admission of guilt by Indian na-
tionalist historians of Britain’s drain of wealth from India – was, Dalrym-
ple argues, aimed at the wrong individual. An intellectual, an Indophile
as well as a sharp administrator, Hastings is deemed by Darlymple to
have been largely innocent of the many charges levelled against him
(though he does not dispute the Company’s general behaviour in Ben-
gal, which occurred often in spite of Hastings).
With Hastings’s removal from office, the Company become a very
different organisation, and one run increasingly by military commanders
rather than merchants. Backed by Bengal’s tax revenues, the Company,
under the control of a redemption-seeking Lord Cornwallis after his fail-
ure against American revolutionaries, alongside the Wellesley brothers
(including the future Duke of Wellington), embarked on large-scale terri-
torial conquests exceeding those of Napoleon in Europe. Their main op-
ponents, the fractured Marathas and the fearsome Tipu Sultan, reveal
the rapidity by which Indian Princes adopted European methods of war-
fare. Accompanied by a panoply of European mercenaries, Indian ar-
mies rapidly closed the technological gap with the British. Yet the finan-
cial ability of the East India Company to raise funds for its wars by the
229 | P a g e
end of the eighteenth century allowed it to host much larger armies, often
dwarfing the number of troops the British government fielded back in
Europe.
Dalrymple concludes with the fall of Delhi in 1803, when the aging
and blind Shah Alam finally comes under the Company’s custody again
in a full circle of events. The capture of the Ozymandian city of the
Mughals sealed the Company’s hegemony over South Asia, coating
their rule with the legitimacy endowed by the Emperor. The choice to
finish the book in 1803 rather than with the end of the Marathas in 1818,
when the last major South Asian Empire (with the exception of the Sikh
Empire in Punjab) had been annexed, accentuates the transfer of power
from the Mughals to the British. Although this diminishes the history of
other Indian states, it stresses the significance of the retention of Mughal
symbols in early British rule, a strange, unbalanced, symbiotic relation-
ship that was simultaneously destroyed half a century later in the Indian
revolt of 1857.
230 | P a g e
INGLORIOUS EMPIRE: WHAT THE BRITISH

DID TO INDIA BY SHASHI THAROOR
Inglorious Empire arose from a speech given by Dr Shashi
Tharoor in May 2015 at the Oxford Union in support of the motion ‘Britain
Owes Reparations to Her Former Colonies’, focusing on British exploi-
tation of India. The Union then posted the speech on the web. Tharoor
‘promptly tweeted a link to it and watched in astonishment as it went vi-
ral’, swiftly accumulating millions of hits on hundreds of sites. In various
forms it currently has almost seven and a half million hits on YouTube
alone.
As the British economy could not afford a quantifiable representa-
tion of the wealth extracted from India, reparation would necessarily
have to be a nominal gesture (Tharoor suggested £1 a year), as an
acknowledgement of Britain’s debt to the Indian economy. The theme
of Inglorious Empire (originally published as An Era of Darkness), which
Tharoor was encouraged to write in response to the online interest that
his speech had created, is the broader one that in almost all respects
British rule in India was profoundly damaging to the sub-continent’s pop-
ulation and economy:
The British state in India was […] a totally amoral, rapacious imperialist
machine bent on the subjugation of Indians for the purpose of profit, not
merely a neutrally efficient system indifferent to human rights. And its
subjugation resulted in the expropriation of Indian wealth to Britain,
draining the society of the resources that would normally have propelled
its natural growth and economic development’ (p. 222).
Moreover, the supposed British legacy to India (railways, educa-
tion, the English language, democracy and so on) has been greatly ex-
aggerated, was not intended for the benefit of Indians and, without col-
onisation, would have been introduced on a timeline more favourable to
the needs of the Indian people.
231 | P a g e
In his first chapter, ‘The looting of India’, Tharoor sets out the ‘drain
theory’ of British economic exploitation of India—by which ‘India was
governed for the benefit of Britain’ and ‘Britain’s rise for 200 years […], fi-
nanced by its depredations in India’ (p. 3)—generally held to have orig-
inated 150 years ago in a speech, and later a book, by the Parsi scholar
and British MP, Dadabhai Naoroji. Recent estimates of the relative
share of world GDP by India and Britain over a quarter of a millennium,
Tharoor argues, support Naoroji’s theory.
India’s share of world GDP fell from 27 per cent in 1700 to 3 per
cent by the time the British left in 1947. (By contrast, Britain’s share was
about 3 per cent in 1700, rising to a peak of 9 per cent in 1870.) The
plundering of India began with the exploitative activities of the East India
Company and its officials, such as Robert Clive, and accelerated during
the 19th century through British industrial strength and naval networks,
control of communications, and the cynical application of free trade pol-
icies. The effect was to complete India’s economic ruin commercially.
Among the most flagrant examples of this tendency, Tharoor ar-
gues, was the deliberate destruction of India’s ship and textile concerns,
while at the same time Britain became a world-leader in these indus-
tries. The increasingly agricultural Indian state paid for its own vassal
status through outrageously high levels of taxation, which were sy-
phoned off to pay for such developments (all in the British interest) as
the enormous Indian army, the construction of railways (at an abnor-
mally high five per cent return for British investors), and the building of
public works in both India and Britain. Among the many negative impacts
on the Indian population were an increasingly poor agricultural sector,
recurrent famine, and a low national morale which stifled independence
and ingenuity.
In Chapter two, drawing on historical parallels, such as the unifica-
tion achieved by the emperors Ashoka (268–232 BC) and Aurang-
zab (1658–1707 AD), Tharoor argues that India would have become
232 | P a g e
united without British intervention, as throughout its history ‘there has

existed an impulsion for unity […]. [I]t is entirely possible that an In-
dian ruler would have accomplished what the British did, and consoli-
dated his rule over most of the subcontinent’ (p. 37). Jon Wilson’s India
Conquered (2016) is enlisted to argue that Indian governance ‘had a dy-
namic economic and political order’ (p. 42), which the greed of the East
India Company destroyed and which, under the Raj, was re-
placed by an Indian Civil Service memorably described by Jawaharlal
Nehru as ‘neither Indian, nor civil, nor a service’.
Chapter three describes the destruction of the pre-colonial system
of government by a British system of ledgers and regulations designed
not so much to change or reform, as to impose itself on India. A member
of the Indian National Congress for a decade, Tharoor proposes that the
post-independence parliamentary system, which was modelled on the
British parliament, ‘was from the start unsuited to Indian conditions and
is primarily responsible for many of the nation’s principal political ills’ (p.
87).
In chapter four, ‘Divida et impera’, Tharoor charts the subliminal
British policy of embedding previously indistinct Hindu-Muslim (and
other) differences, which had its disastrous outcome in the bloodshed
and massacres of Partition. In chapter five he challenges the British no-
tion of effective rule through ‘enlightened despotism’, by which the state
takes on a parental role towards its subjects, making decisions in what
it perceives to be their best interest.
In real terms, Tharoor argues, the imperial administrators were
more despotic than enlightened. Lawrence James’s claim that they
“were humane men and, although hampered by inadequate administra-
tive machinery and limited resources, they made a determined effort to
feed the hungry” (p. 157) is dismissed in favour of the ‘Catch-22’ strategy
actually practised by the British. This involved the administration in main-
taining the pretence that the famines exposed the Indians’ inability to
233 | P a g e
govern for themselves, while itself failing to respond adequately to the

food shortage or subsequently to acknowledge responsibility for the re-
sulting mass starvation.
Chapter six, ‘The remaining case for Empire’, refutes claims that
the historic British presence contributed usefully to the modern India
state. The much lauded railway system, Tharoor contends, ‘was a big
colonial scam’ designed to benefit its British builders and investors, con-
structed at huge expense to the Indian taxpayer and ‘intended principally
to transport extracted resources […] to ports for the British to ship home
to use in their factories’ (pp. 177– 8).
The education system imposed by the British displaced an existing
and much older organisation, while the English language, rather than
being a gift to the Indian people, was necessary to implement colonial
policy. Its emergence as the language of international commerce is more
a consequence of American globalisation than British imperialism.
Tharoor concedes that tea and cricket might be the exception to his the-
sis, acknowledging that ‘this time it is difficult to argue that one could
have had extensive tea cultivation and a vast market for the product
without colonization’ (p. 205). However, tea cultivation led to mass de-
forestation, the decimation of wildlife, and the displacement of indige-
nous peoples, while the author muses whether ‘cricket is really […] an
Indian game accidentally discovered by the British’ (p. 207).
Chapter seven consists partly of a riposte of Niall Ferguson’s view
that empire generates economic benefits; Lawrence James’s interpreta-
tion of British policy in India as the successful application of “reason […]
in the form of Western education and the application of science” is also
rebutted (p. 218). In his final chapter, Tharoor argues that, despite the
British public’s woeful factual ignorance of their former empire, ‘coloni-
alism […] remains a relevant factor in understanding the problems and
the dangers of the world in which we live’ (p. 236). After revisiting Fer-
234 | P a g e
guson’s defence of empire to dispel his (as it turned out) misplaced con-
fidence in the 21st century as that of Pax Americana, Tharoor discusses
the possibility of returning some of the antiquities acquired by the British
from their colonial possessions. He also considers the global relevance
of Ghandi’s non-violent response to racism, concluding that ‘the ultimate
tribute to the British Raj might lie in the quality of the “Great Soul” who
opposed it’ (p. 245).
Elegantly and engagingly written, Inglorious Empire is also polem-
ical and therefore rather sets itself up for criticism, as a number of re-
views demonstrate. The most serious critique seems to be that of the
‘drain theory’ itself, as articulated by Tirthankar Roy:
The statistic that India produced 25 per cent of world output in 1800 and
2-4 per cent of it in 1900 does not prove that India was once rich and
became poor. It only tells us that industrial productivity in the West in-
creased four to six times during this period. […] The drain theory of In-
dia’s poverty could not be tested, because the intrinsic value of the pay-
ments India made to Britain could not be measured. […] The research
shows that the colonial links […] do not sufficiently explain British invest-
ment and British economic growth and that arguments for the empire
rested on strategic needs more than material gains […]. National in-
come statistics do not show that during British rule the Indian economy
became steadily poorer.
In addition, Roy maintains, Tharoor ‘misreads British history’, ‘is ill-
informed on the record of Indian economic growth in colonial times’ and
has a ‘naïve’ understanding of Indian political history. Other reviewers
agree that Tharoor underestimates the British cultural impact on India.
Tharoor’s occasional misinterpretation of Victorian politics is de-
monstrable in his treatment of Robert Lytton, viceroy from 1876 to
1880. Lytton was appointed, the author contends, because he was
Queen Victoria’s favourite poet (p. 155), although no evidence is pro-
235 | P a g e
vided for this surprising claim: the Queen’s preference is generally un-
derstood to have been for Alfred Lord Tennyson or Adelaide
Procter. The durbar where Lytton proclaimed Victoria Empress of India
is given as 1887 (it was 1877) and his response to the 1876-8 famine
likened to that of Stalin during the famines caused by collectivisation (p.
155). To represent Lytton as entirely indifferent to the misfortunes of
those he governed is misleading. His wife’s account of her hus-
band’s actions during the famine, for example, tells a different story. In
February 1877, Edith Lytton mentions that ‘the famines […] had made
R[obert] very anxious, and just this year for the finances this is a great
blow’.
On ‘the 25th [July 1877] the talks over famine matters became very
serious’, with the outcome in August 1877 that ‘two great fam-
ines [were] grappled with’. Subsequently, ‘when R arrived in Banga-
lore’, he saw that ‘[p]eople were dying in the streets […], starving’. In
terms of organising relief, although other Raj administrators ‘all helped
immensely, […] they feel R has really done all himself’. Lutyens and
Bence Jones to some extent support this interpretation of Lytton’s re-
sponse, which clearly conflicts with the viceroy’s stated Malthusian be-
liefs. However, the discrepancy should be viewed in the context of Mal-
thusian orthodoxy regarding famine relief, which ‘had the support of
many official reports of the period’ and was a widely held belief in gov-
ernment circles.
During 1866–7, a future viceroy, Lord Dufferin, in ‘a series of let-
ters in The Times tackling the renewed agricultural depression in the
Irish countryside’, advocated ‘Malthusian arguments in favour of further
emigration from a country whose population had apparently outstripped
its resources’. Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India during 1866–
7 and 1874–8, declared in response to the 1874 Bihar famine that ‘emi-
gration on a considerable scale […] seems to me the only way out of a
difficulty which is closing round us’. Recalling his own inaction at the
time of the 1865-6 Orissa famine, Salisbury later wrote regretfully: ‘
236 | P a g e
I did nothing for two months. Before that time the monsoon had closed
the ports of Orissa—help was impossible—and—it is said—a million
people died.
By contrast, despite Salisbury’s intransigence, there were ‘large-
scale relief efforts’ in 1876–9. Explanations for the failure of these—
given that the famine resulted in the deaths of five million Indians—ap-
pear to have depended on nationality: ‘Senior British officials argued that
India, particularly the dry Deccan, was simply prone to famine’, while
‘most Indians, by contrast, blamed the British’. Roy concludes that a pro-
posal from any source that
“Famines were an outcome of colonial politics is an unconvincing theory
because it fails to explain the rarity of famines during late colonial rule
and presumes that the capacity of the state to mitigate famines was lim-
ited only by its own intention to act.”
Like other vicereines, Edith Lytton adopted various philanthropic
causes. Of course, there was already a long-standing tradition of charity
in India, which was not much recognised by the British, who viewed it—
very much as they did the Elizabethan Poor Law—as an inducement
to dependence and idleness. Nevertheless, British women campaigned
successfully to promote causes considered suitable for Western female
involvement, which included the abolition of sati and child marriage,
while also working in a variety of other gender-appropriate causes,
such as improving levels of childbirth survival and standards in girls’ ed-
ucation.
However, in a narrative remarkable for its male-centred-
ness, Tharoor does not mention the philanthropy of British women. Ad-
mittedly, such humanitarian aid often took place within the context of
British-style institutions and Tharoor would perhaps argue that, had In-
dia remained independent, it would have occurred anyway.
237 | P a g e
Nevertheless, British patronage seems to have had a cathartic ef-

fect on India’s future philanthropists, such as Pachaiyappa Mudaliar,
Sir J. and Lady Jamsetji Jeejeebhoy, Jagannath Shankarshet and Ka-
vasji Jehangir Readymoney, who ‘thus encouraged […] went about
building some of the country’s most important institutions’. Another im-
portant oversight is the lack of convincing evidence in support
of the claim that Indian unification would have occurred a priori, an as-
sumption based on a mystical conception of India’s past and challenged
by present-day realities. As John Keay points out: ‘imperial interludes
account for no more than five hundred years of imperfect integration
scattered across two millennia of chaotic fragmentation’; reviews by Ta-
hir Ganie, Sumantra Maitra and Ferdinand Mount also point to weak-
nesses in Tharoor’s counterfactual.
Although he cites Jon Wilson’s India Conquered and other recent
reputable works, Tharoor’s statistics and ‘much else’ are taken from a
lesser-known work, The Case for India (1930) by Will Durant, an Amer-
ican writer and teacher who had toured India. Keay argues that, as Du-
rant was ‘averse to [establishing] primary sources’, he relied on the re-
search and opinions of a fellow-American, Jabez T. Sunderland, in the
latter’s India in Bondage (1928). As a result, ‘[t]he ‘uncompromising
views and unevenly-sourced statistics of India in Bondage perme-
ate The Case for India, much as Durant’s material permeates Inglorious
Empire’.
Tharoor was surprised that his Oxford Union speech, which he felt
merely restated established arguments, had created such a stir and con-
cluded that what he ‘considered basic was unfamiliar to many, perhaps
most, educated Indians’ (p. xxii). However, as Keay points out, ‘Indians
are not the only ones who need reminding that empire has a lot to an-
swer for’. In a 2014 YouGov survey, 1,741 respondents voted by three
to one that ‘the British Empire is more something to be proud than
ashamed of’ and that Britain’s former colonies are better off for being
238 | P a g e
colonised. If only from the point of view of enabling individual relation-

ships in a multicultural society, this should be addressed. But in terms
of global politics, as Tharoor points out, it is essential. Coming to terms
with Britain’s record in India is as good a place to start as any.
Current GDP ranking statistics indicate that during 2019 the size of
India’s economy overtook that of its old colonial masters, France and the
UK. In the event of Britain leaving the EU, when could there be a better
time to steal a march on the decade-long and still unresolved EU-India
trade talks and secure a deal with an economy which, within 20 years,
will be one of the world’s three largest? Any such negotiations would
certainly be facilitated by the kind of official apology for past injustices
that Tharoor recommends. On 1 September 2019, the 80th anniversary
of the start of the Second World War, the German President apologised
to his Polish counterpart for the Nazi invasion of Poland. Earlier in the
year, on the 100th anniversary of the Amritsar Massacre, Theresa May
expressed ‘regret’ for what had happened, but stopped short of an out-
right apology.
As with David Cameron’s earlier refusal to apologize during a visit
to Amritsar, it is tempting to speculate that the nostalgia of British voters
for their ‘jewel in the crown’, expressed by the popularity of such recent
dramas as Indian Summers and Beecham House, informed the prime
ministerial decision. In such circumstances, a change in the na-
tional zeitgeist is best implemented top-down. As Tharoor puts it: ‘atone-
ment was the point—a simple sorry would do’.
239 | P a g e
THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN:

STEPHEN P. COHEN
The book begins with historical overview of the ideas that led to the
birth of an Islamic home for Indian Muslims in 1947, and then progresses
in discussing how these ideas were implemented. Cohen seems con-
fused and out of steps as he starts interpreting the idea of Pakistan
(chapter-10 and purpose of the foundation of the Independent State of
Pakistan, his one argument contradicts his second one. The author laid
the foundation of his thesis by calling Jinnah a “secular lawyer-politician”
(p.28) (without citing any historic/ bibliographic reference to his claim),
for whom, “Pakistan would be a democratic, liberal, and just state (p.38).
He succeeded in turning two ‘nation theory’ into political reality but
failed to build a consensus on the kind of state Pakistan was to become
(p.29). He was the individual, most responsible for the merger of the idea
of Pakistan with the State of Pakistan. Later, he calls Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, an advocate of distinctive Muslim Indian identity, Pakistan’s
George Washington, the first world class political figure produced by Pa-
kistan- by the idea, not the state (p.28).
However, Cohen forgets to explain that a leader likes Jinnah, who
is the product of the Idea, how can he be secular once the product is
realized. Cohen contradicts his own thesis about the idea of Pakistan
while acknowledging Iqbal’s role. Iqbal believed, “Pakistan would not
only solve India’s Hindu-Muslim puzzle, it would awaken and recreate
Islam”. Iqbal’s idea of Pakistan was based on “an acute understanding
that political power was essential to the higher ends of establishing
God’s law”. “Iqbal supported Jinnah by turning the idea of separate Mus-
lim homeland into a mass movement, drawing intellectuals, professional
and community leaders into the fold”(p.30). On the next page, Cohen
tries to conclude his views point without giving any rationales,” Iqbal
240 | P a g e
wrongly believed that the Islamic nature of a new Pakistan would give it
inherent strength.
In short, Cohen contends that there was confusion from the very
beginning about the idea of Pakistan but refrains from passing his judg-
ment on whether the idea was good or bad. His statement "Jinnah's di-
visive rhetoric and acceptance of extralegal procedures suddenly gave
to a vision of a democratic Pakistan” (p.42) is self-conceived having no
mention of even one extralegal procedure adopted by Jinnah.
In order to support his claim about “secular Jinnah and his secular
vision of Pakistan”, Cohen writes, “While he (Jinnah) left no document
outlining his plans for the new state, Jinnah had given several important
addresses that constitute benchmarks in the history of both the state and
the idea of Pakistan.
The most remarkable aspect of these later speeches was their sec-
ular character”. I am really surprised that how a man like Cohen could
fail to trace the true benchmark from Jinnah’s addresses. One may help
him, by mentioning just a few out of so many passages indicative of his
secular or Islamic vision. "It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our
Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism.
They are not religions in the strict sense of the word but are, in fact,
different and distinct social orders… The Hindus and Muslims belong to
two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures.
They belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on con-
flicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects of life and our life are dif-
ferent.” (Quaid-e-Azam - Presidential Address in 1940) In his speech at
the Frontier Muslim League Conference on November 21, 1945, he said:
"We have to fight a double edged battle, one against the Hindu Congress
and other against the British Imperialists, both of them being capitalists.
The Muslims demand Pakistan where they could rule according to their
own code of life and according to their own cultural growth, traditions
241 | P a g e
and Islamic laws”. In a message to NWFP Muslim Students Federation

in April 1943, he said: "You have asked me to give a message.
What message can I give you? We have got the great message in
the Quran for our guidance and enlightenment." In an Eid message to
the nation in 1945, he said: "… Everyone except those who are ignorant
knows that the Quran is the general code of the Muslims. A religious,
social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal and penal code; it reg-
ulates everything from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life;
from the salvation of the soul to the health of the body; from the rights of
all, to those of each individual; from morality to crime; from punishment
here to that in the life to come, and our Prophet (S) has enjoined on us
that every Muslim should possess a copy of the Holy Quran and be his
own priest.
Therefore, Islam is not confined to the spiritual tenets and doctrines
and rituals and ceremonies. It is a complete code regulating the whole
Muslim society in every department of life, collectively and individually."
In his presidential address delivered to the annual session of the All India
Muslim League, in Delhi on April 24, 1943, he said: "Here I should like
to give a warning to the landlords and capitalists who have flourished at
our expense by a system which is so vicious, which is so wicked and
which makes them so selfish that it is difficult to reason with them.
The exploitation of the masses has gone into their blood. They
have forgotten the lessons of Islam. Greed and selfishness have made
these people subordinate to the interests of others in order to fatten
themselves. It is true we are not in power today. You go anywhere to the
countryside. I have visited villages. There are millions and millions of our
people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilization? Is this the aim
of Pakistan? Do you visualize that millions have been exploited and can-
not get one meal a day? If this is the idea of Pakistan, I would not have
it. If they are wise, they will have to adjust themselves to the new modern
conditions of life. If they don’t, God help them, we shall not help them."
242 | P a g e
Cohen goes on to discuss how the state of Pakistan came to be

ruled by an oligarchy composed of the army, the civil bureaucracy and
the landowning class (called feudal lords in Pakistan). Kashmir and the
mission of "liberating'' it from Hindu oppression has been a recurrent
theme in the narrative of the idea of Pakistan by first-generation Paki-
stanis. The army has incorporated this theme into Pakistan's military
doctrine as a guerrilla movement sponsored to bleed India. As a cause,
this movement serves to channel extremists and the victims of domestic
oppression, but its strategic consequences have not been thought
through. According to the author, the military is only one (the most im-
portant) component of the” moderate oligarchy" or” establishment” of
about 500 individuals which runs Pakistan and "whose membership de-
pends on adherence to a broad set of values and norms, including a
particular understanding of the idea of Pakistan" (Page 69). Cohen
opines that “the establishment’ is an informal political system that com-
prises of the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, the judiciary,
and other elites possessing a common set of beliefs that:
• India has to be countered at every move and issue militarily, thereby
giving the military a primary role in Pakistan.
• The national interest is understood only by the army, not by civilian
politicians.
• Nuclear weapons have obliged Pakistan with security and status
• Kashmir is the unfinished part of the partition plan,
• Large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unaccepta-
ble
• Verbal Muslim nationalism is desirable but Islamism is not
• The armed forces are considered a "model" and democracy is seen as
good only as long as it does not interfere with the governance of the
elite.
243 | P a g e
• Washington should not be trusted but should be taken maximum ad-

vantage of.
• The media need to be on a tight leash
• Existence of radical Islamic extremists could be a useful tool for state
policy
• "something or someone will always come to Pakistan's rescue because
of its location" (Page 270)
Then he explores the role of the Pakistan Army and core belief of the
officers’ corps and their strategic vision for Pakistan, the prospects for
their Islamization, and their relationship with the population. According
to a popular but rather humorless Pakistani joke, "all countries have their
own armies, but (in case of Pakistan), an army has its own country."
Indeed, even when civilian governments have nominally been in
charge in Pakistan, there has never been much doubt about who actu-
ally takes the shots. In addition to holding political power, the Pakistani
army controls vast commercial and industrial interests and owns mas-
sive rural and urban properties. As Cohen remarks, "regardless of what
may be desirable, the army will continue to set the limits on what is pos-
sible in Pakistan (p.97)." For all these reasons, the army despite its self-
perceived guardianship role is part of the problem of Pakistan’s instabil-
ity. ‘Pakistan’s army’, Cohen holds, is strong enough to prevent state
failure, but not imaginative enough to impose the changes that might
transform the state’ (p 274).
Indeed in one possible future scenario, he maintains that the cur-
rent socially liberal military backed regime may be replaced by a military
Islamist alliance (p 289). He describes Pakistan Army, evolved through
four generations as follow:
• The British Generation comprised of group of officers who were trained
in Sand Hurst (UK) or Indian Military Academy (IMA) at Dehra Dun. This
generation of officers left an important legacy by shaping the orientation
244 | P a g e
of the Army as they founded, commanded and trained the major institu-
tions of the Pakistan Army. The experiences of partition, India’s occupa-
tion of Kashmir, her refusal to deliver Pakistan’s allotted share of military
stores, its forceful absorption of the princely state of Hyderabad, and
many other examples of duplicity- became part of the Pakistan’s army’s
legacy. However, they continued seeing their British predecessor as
their role models and possibility of turning the Pakistan Army into an
“Islamic Army” was never seriously considered. (pp.99- 102)
• The American Generation: This generation emerged with the Paki-
stan’s joining with America in SEATO and CENTO (Baghdad Pact1955)
till its breakup with the connivance of America in 1971. American
weapon system, their training programs, their military doctrine and re-
sultant socio-interaction with them, influenced and shaped new orienta-
tion in thinking as well as working style of Pakistan army (pp.102- 106).
• The Pakistani Generation, 1972-82: Those who joined Pakistan Army
in the post-Bangladesh years were most purely” Pakistani” of all, repre-
senting wider society in class origin, and less exposure to American in-
fluence.
Their professional careers and world outlook were shaped by the
1971 debacle and believed that United States had let Pakistan down.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was over thrown in 1977 initiated secret nuclear
program, which was intended to bring balance of power of the army by
giving Pakistan a new way of offsetting India’s military superiority. Zia’s
long tenure as chief of the army staff and president of the Pakistan inev-
itably shaped the offices corps in three respects: his emphasis on Islam,
stress on the revival and legitimization of irregular and covert warfare,
and acceleration of the nuclear program, bringing it under army direction
(pp.108-109).
Cohen blames that Zia’s over emphasis on Islam encouraged Is-
lamic zealotry and cites September 1995 coup led by Major General Za-
hir ul Islam Abbasi in support of his argument (p.108). I may remind Dr.
245 | P a g e
Cohen here that General Abbasi is the product of so called “American

Generation”, which witnessed American double standards and their dual
face in their training institutions.
• The Next Generation: Cohen duplicates the same old “Pakistani gen-
eration” in this category, which entered in army in the 1970s, belonging
mostly to the middle class and joined the army simply to improve their
standard of living. Distinction between the public and the private do-
mains is fast disappearing, as senior officers misuse official transport,
manpower, and regimental resources and facilities. For junior officers,
there is greater latitude to do the same, and the incidents of disregard
for civilian laws are increasing.
Cohen argues that rather than seeing the army only in a short-term
perspective and as a bulwark against ‘radical Islam’, the US should, “in-
sist as a condition of aid that the Pakistan government allow the main-
stream political parties (such as Pakistan People’s Party and the Paki-
stan Muslim League) to function freely.” “The goal”, he continues, 139
“should be a spectrum of moderate parties, Islamic and secular that are
willing to operate within a parliamentary and peaceful context, and are
tolerant of sectarian and other minorities” (p 317). Educated Pakistanis
would concur wholeheartedly with the vision of a tolerant and plural dem-
ocratic order. Such bald exhortations for external manipulation of the
affairs of a sovereign country are nevertheless likely to further increase
the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan which so exercises the author.
He remains realistic that a ‘staged’ military withdrawal will be a slow pro-
cess (p 160).
It will depend on much improved relations with India so that Paki-
stan is no longer a ‘garrison’ state (p 278). Even in the circumstances of
the removal of the strategic threat posed by India, the army may already
be too entrenched to contemplate a withdrawal (p 279). Cohen provides
an extensive critique of militarism in Pakistan and how it has adversely
affected its national security. Pakistani generals steadfastly hold that
246 | P a g e
“What is good for the army is good for Pakistan.” He further says, "The
army lacks the capability to fix Pakistan's problems, but it is unwilling to
give other state institutions and the political system the opportunity to
learn and grow; its tolerance for the mistakes of others is very low, yet
its own performance, when in power, has usually dug the hole deeper."
Cohen points out how Western leaders and academics have often
ended up supporting military dictators. For example, he mentions how
the noted Harvard professor Samuel Huntington called Ayub Khan a So-
lon, after the great Athenian lawgiver. General Zia was widely praised in
the West for being a bulwark of freedom against the Soviet Union. Much
of the same is true of the standing that Musharraf enjoys in the West.
Cohen argues that Musharraf's international backers "see him as a
wise and modern leader, a secular man who is not afraid to support the
West or to offer peace to India and a man who can hold back the onrush
of Islamic extremists". Yet, he concedes, "No serious Pakistani analyst
140 sees Musharraf in these terms". They see him as claiming to act in
an undefined and abstract "national interest" and "taking people into
confidence" only after having made the key decisions.
Cohen aptly comments that Musharraf believes that no civilian can
understand the national interest. One wishes he had analyzed this point
further. Does it imply that no civilian can be trusted with its protection? If
so, that might suggest something more sinister, that in Musharraf's view,
the term "national interest" is a synonymous to the military's interest.
Cohen credits US military action in Afghanistan for enabling the religious
alliance of the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to make a breakthrough
in the 2002 national and provincial elections (p 187). Cohen importantly
links the state’s failures to provide basic healthcare and education with
the rise of Islamist organizations supported by proliferation of ‘madaris’
(religious schools), filled these gaps (pp 184, 315).
He opines that mosque schools ill-equip their students for modern
life and in some instances they are breeding grounds of sectarian hatred
247 | P a g e
and jihadi sentiment. Cohen pins more hope in external support for re-
building of Pakistan’s education system (pp 314-15). The author terms
Pakistan one of the world's most ethnically and linguistically complex
states (Probably not more than the U.S). Destabilized political environ-
ment, he contends, is caused by repeated military interventions and
domination of the Punjab. What this really means in a statistical sense
by Cohen, when any reader considers this excerpt: "The focal point of
Punjabi domination was and remains the army. Seventy-five per cent of
the army is drawn from three Punjab districts (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and
Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in the NWFP (Kohat and Mar-
dan). These districts contain only nine per cent of Pakistan's male pop-
ulation.
The officer corps is drawn from a wider, more urban base, but is
still predominately Punjabi, often 141 the sons of junior commissioned
officers. Pakistan's air force and navy are drawn from a much wider
base." I am afraid that he intended to air the flames between various
ethnic groups, and overplayed separatist tendencies in the country to
protect the Army’s role as the only efficiently functioning institution. Per-
haps the only chapter of this book, which presents real mosaic, is ‘on
Pakistan's demographic future’. Pakistan's population is growing by 2.9
per cent annually, which is the highest in the world and, if this trend con-
tinues, by 2015, Pakistan's population will be 219 million, 225 million by
2025 and 295 million by 2050(p.232). This high population growth rate,
coupled with massive urbanization and large youth ratio, can result in
massive unemployment and politico-economic challenge for the succes-
sive governments of Pakistan. The author criticizes that the local gov-
ernment plan is a deliberate effort to weaken provincial power and to
create a class of notables who owe their position to the army.
Successive spells of martial laws have weakened political institu-
tions and undermined civil society. High military expenditures (p 255)
plus low state revenue and no tax on agricultural incomes (p 258) have
been at the cost of investment in human capital. In his views, the reason
248 | P a g e
for the increase in the Fauji Foundation's assets from 2.06 billion to 9.8
billion rupees in 2005 is not that it was profitable but owing to the fact
that the foundation received government subsidies and preferential con-
tracts. In short, Cohen identifies demographic pressures along with po-
litical institutional weaknesses, educational imbalances and economic
structural problems as hampering Pakistan’s longer term stability. In his
view, besides, the growing appeal of radical Islam, the most glaring
threats Pakistan faces are the booming population and the deteriorating
education system as over 1 million Pakistani children now attend
madrassas where the syllabus needs drastic revision. 142 Cohen puts
forth his guesses on where the country is headed in the future. He ex-
amines several broad scenarios over the next five to eight years, includ-
ing the most extreme, a catastrophic war with India, and the most be-
nign, an enlightened democracy at peace with its neighbors, as well as
other scenarios and sub-scenarios in between. For each, he appreciates
its environment, identifies key drivers and likelihoods. The book lays out
six scenarios of the near-to-mid-term future:
(1) Continuation of the status quo, which involves rule by an establish-
ment-dominated oligarchic system,
(2) Liberal, secular democracy,
(3) Soft authoritarianism,
(4) An Islamist state,
(5) Divided Pakistan and
(6) Postwar Pakistan.
In all scenarios Cohen appears to be pessimistic about Pakistan, alt-
hough he feels it is unlikely that Pakistan will break up, become an Is-
lamic state or a normal democracy.
While the scenarios are interesting in themselves but represent
mostly the author's wishful thinking as methodology for developing them
249 | P a g e
is never laid out clearly. The final chapter talks about recommendations
on what America should do to prevent Pakistan from sliding into one of
the worse scenarios. Before writing Pakistan off as a hopelessly failed
state that its critics believe it to be, Washington may have one last op-
portunity to ensure that this troubled state will not become America's
biggest foreign policy problem in the last half of this decade (p.328). Co-
hen's prescription for Pakistan regarding what America should do are:
reviving the economy, ensuring army is kept away from radical Islam,
encourage democracy 143 with army’s pronounced role, reforming edu-
cation through secularization of curriculum, secularized education to re-
place madrassas; and "shape" Pakistan's environment as per American
and Indian suiting.
• He suggests that the US adopt a carrot and stick policy with Pakistan
in which the Pakistan is awarded with military aid if it continues to be
seen as being faithful in implementing American suggestions about ed-
ucation reform in Pakistan (Page 315).
• He recommends the continuation of the present joint military training
program, which brings Pakistanis to the United States and allows Amer-
icans to visit Pakistan. Cohen believes that this relatively inexpensive
program should be preserved and expanded to other non-military sub-
jects, because it allows the United States access to the Pakistan army
and its young upcoming officers.
Cohen says any backsliding on progress should be taken as a
"danger sign'', on which American support should be withdrawn and
more punitive measures taken against Pakistan. • He believes that India
should "make the kind of concessions that Musharraf can use to get the
military and others to "bite the bitter pill" of a status quo settlement for
Kashmir" (Page 323).
• He reminds US policy officials that Musharraf is not irreplaceable and
was he to be forced out of office; his replacement would be a like-minded
general.
250 | P a g e
• Cohen concludes his book by saying, "Americans must remember that

although Pakistan will pursue its own vital interests as it sees them, an
opportunity may exist to 144 incrementally shape Pakistan's future in a
direction that is compatible with important American interests. Seen in
the historic canvas of last three years, Cohen’s only first suggestion
seems materializing. Where, Pakistan has demonstrated a faithful client
to American interests in even bombing own people, secularizing curric-
ulum on the name of reformation and ordering ‘no stay for foreign stu-
dents’ in madaris.
In turn America seems willing to supply F-16 as a show piece (not
mentioning of the Nuclear Deal with India). However, there is ever wid-
ening gulf between Cohen's view of Musharraf and the Indian perspec-
tive despite Musharaf’s well praised flexibility on Kashmir. Cohen's sug-
gestions have been rejected out rightly by Indians.
251 | P a g e
THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN: STEPHEN P.

COHEN
Dr. Cohen's recent publication, 'The Future of Pakistan,' follows his
earlier work, 'Idea of Pakistan,' where he demonstrates a unique intel-
lectual ability to dissect complex political phenomena within Pakistani
political culture. The current book, well-received by scholars both do-
mestically and internationally, delves into the future of a state that has
gained increasing significance in global politics over the past fifteen
years.
Addressing a crucial responsibility in the realm of international pol-

itics, Dr. Cohen and his colleagues provide logical predictions for future
scenarios based on present and emerging situations. Their perspective
leans toward pessimism regarding Pakistan's future, exploring various
scenarios during the period of 2012-2017. The book, comprising eight-
een essays, including an afterword, emanates from a workshop held in
Italy in May 2010, reflecting the collaborative effort of authors from
America, Europe, India, and Pakistan.
The book's uniqueness lies in its international and comparative per-
spective, comprehensive analysis considering internal and external fac-
tors, and a logical sequence presented by seventeen contributors
across three continents. Authors were tasked with outlining essential
variables shaping Pakistan's future, speculating on likely outcomes, and
discussing policy options for various countries.
Cohen's overview initiates the book, contextualizing Pakistan
within contemporary geopolitics and international economics. Subse-
quent essays focus on specific issues such as radicalization, political
violence, militancy, the China factor, security, regime and system
change, population growth, urbanization, female literacy, and youth and
252 | P a g e
the future. The book scrutinizes military and internal security apparatus,
social and gender issues, political and party developments, and power
dynamics between Islamabad and local powers.
While the futuristic portrayal is not overtly perilous, it raises con-
cerns about the fate of Pakistan's population exceeding 180 million. 'The
Future of Pakistan' facilitates understanding not only of current circum-
stances and relevant actors but also potential outcomes and implica-
tions for various nations and regions.
Excerpts from the book highlight Pakistan's initial purpose, eco-
nomic challenges in the 1990s, Musharraf's reforms, Zardari's political
challenges, and the country's population boom, making it one of the
world's youngest populations. The 1990s are referred to as the "lost dec-
ade" for economic growth, witnessing increased poverty levels. Mushar-
raf's reliance on technocrats and Zardari's political struggles are ex-
plored, emphasizing the demographic shift in Pakistan's population. In
conclusion, the book provides a comprehensive exploration of Paki-
stan's future, incorporating diverse perspectives and factors that contrib-
ute to the complexity of the nation's trajectory.
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CHINA-PAKISTAN AXIS: ASIA’S NEW GEO-

POLITICS
Andrew Small’s “China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics” de-
scribes the relations between the two Asian states. The book is an in-
depth analysis of the impact of geographical factors on the past and pre-
sent ties between China and Pakistan. Through his extensive research,
Andrew Small has explained how this relationship is one of mutual ben-
efit, and both of the countries involved have put themselves and their
defense ahead of everything else. This book explores some really un-
der-explored areas of the China-Pakistan “friendship”. China-Pakistan
Axis provides huge data on the Sino-Pakistan relationship and is the first
in-depth work on this relation. Its reliability is assured by years of re-
search and interface with officials on both sides of the margin.
Andrew Small’s China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics has a total
of seven chapters and an epilogue that collectively covers all important
aspects of the past and present Sino-Pakistan relations. Small’s choice
of quotation before every chapter is remarkable and explains half the
truth about the title of each chapter and also makes the reader stick to
the book and develop curiosity. Hence, China-Pakistan Axis is not only
a masterpiece of research but is also well written in terms of literature.
Synopsis of Andrew Small’s “China-Pakistan Axis”
A Friendship Forged by War
The first chapter – “A Friendship Forged by War” – reflects upon
the reality behind what is seen and shown internationally as “friendship”
or “brotherly ties” formed on the basis of the neighborhood and common
enmity towards India. The China-Pakistan friendship starts with the 1971
Indo-Pakistan War, laying out how China remained, to a great extent, on
the sidelines in spite of the US and Pakistani appeals.
254 | P a g e
The starting points of Pakistan’s misrepresented desires for Chi-

nese help in 1971 evolved from the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, in which
the possibility of Chinese interference played an essential role. Regard-
less of early variations between the opposite sides, the 1962 Sino-Indian
War was the vital motivation for the relationship and opened up the pos-
sibility of a “two-front war” that has never completely subsided from the
area’s key environment.
Nuclear Fusion
The second chapter, “Nuclear Fusion,” covers the touchy history of
atomic collaboration between China and Pakistan. It sheds light upon
why China wants a stable Pakistan. As collaboration increased in the
mid-1980s, the US declined to obstruct atomic participation among Pa-
kistan and China on the grounds that both were apparently partners
against the Soviet Union.
While Pakistan has profited the most from the relationship, mainly
from the security ensured atomic weapons, China keeps on profiting
shrewdly from Pakistan’s exchange of touchy Western innovation. The
chapter additionally covers how the common strategic concern – India –
has been strengthening the military ties between Pakistan and China.
Small states, “If military relationships lie at the heart of China-Pakistan
ties, nuclear weapon lies at the heart of the military relationship.”
Re-hyphenating India
The third chapter, “Re-hyphenating India,” mapped the develop-
ment of Chinese key thinking about the role of Pakistan which starts with
reviewing the 1996 Pakistan visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin and
2008 wrangling over the permission of India into the Nuclear Supplier
Group (NSG). It argues that, if the US’ way of dealing with India, in the
course of the most recent decade, has been one of de-hyphenation from
Pakistan, China’s has been one of re-hyphenation.
255 | P a g e
Since the nuclearization of South Asia in the late 1990s, Washing-

ton and Beijing have been bound together in their endeavors to prevent
full-scale war on the subcontinent. The Kargil War in 1999, writes Small,
is proof of this dynamic. During that clash, China declined to help Paki-
stan and Beijing coordinated with Washington to guarantee the de-
heightening of the emergency.
Regardless of coordination with the US during times of emergency,
China has proceeded atomic collaboration with Pakistan over the US
and global resistance as an appearance of China’s technique of utilizing
Pakistan to adjust against India.
The Chinese War on Terror
The fourth chapter, “The Chinese War on Terror,” talks about the
issue of Xinjiang and Islamic terrorism in China. It traces the historical
backdrop of the issue and subtle elements of the risk presented by the
East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to China, which has on occa-
sion been recognized as the principal danger to the soundness of the
Chinese state.
One of China’s methodologies to contain the danger of ETIM and
other Uighur activist gatherings has been to extend associations with
Pakistani religious associations with an end goal to disengage ETIM and
its comparative associations. China worked with the United States and
Saudi Arabia to arm the mujahedeen powers in Pakistan against the
Soviet Union in the 1980s, however, in the 1990s, China turned out to
be progressively awkward with developing fanaticism in the area.
China has utilized its impact on Pakistan to limit support from Pa-
kistani and Afghan Islamic gatherings for the Uighur cause, even going
into an inferred consent to help the Taliban in Afghanistan in return for
keeping ETIM from working on Afghan soil. Anyway as fanatics’ ties with
the Pakistani state have crumbled as of late, China progressively faces
a quandary about how to face the risk of Islamic psychological warfare.
256 | P a g e
The Trade Across the Roof of the World

The fifth chapter is “The Trade Across the Roof of the World” which
talks about the Sino-Pakistan relationship with reference to economic
ties. The Sino–Pakistan monetary relations have been, extensively, dis-
appointing. Uncertainty in Pakistan has represented a noteworthy haz-
ard to the general financial relationship since Pakistan has picked up a
notoriety for being the most unsafe nation on the planet for the Chinese.
The section talks about the job and issues with the Karakoram
Highway, which has been proposed as the foundation of an exchange
and vitality hallway from the inside of China to the port of Gwadar on the
Persian Gulf. Gwadar itself has not been created to the degree that was
guaranteed at first, owing to the Baloch militancy to some extent. Nev-
ertheless, China sees the port as a possibly significant maritime office.
Tea with Taliban
The sixth chapter, “Tea with Taliban,” follows the historical back-
drop of Sino-Afghan relations, concentrating on China’s association with
the Taliban and connections with Afghanistan in the repercussions of
9/11. This part examines the job of the Aynak mine in Sino-Afghan rela-
tions, yet contends that China’s choice to assume liability for impacting
the political and security circumstance in Afghanistan did not come from
its interests in the nation, but instead, from fears that mayhem in Afghan-
istan could overflow into Pakistan and Xinjiang.
In the 1990s, China kept up great relations with the Taliban gov-
ernment with the end goal to keep Afghanistan from turning into a shelter
for ETIM activists, and in the 2000s, it tried to abstain from taking sides
between the US-drove powers and the insurrection. The chapter takes
a gander at the movements in China’s position as fears over vital enclo-
sure by US powers moved to fears over the 2014 result.
Lord, Make Them Leave…But Not Yet
257 | P a g e
The seventh chapter, “Lord, Make Them Leave…But Not Yet,”

starts by depicting how the US exploits wiped out a large number of
China’s most-needed Muslim separatists in Pakistan starting in 2009.
This part portrays how China’s general system has been to guarantee
that it doesn’t get on the wrong side of the fanatics, which has regularly
put China inconsistent with the United States.
This part develops the ongoing history of how China has moved its
situation on fanaticism in South Asia and turned out to be more okay
with the possibility of the United States proceeding to give security in
Afghanistan. It investigates the cutoff points of the Sino–US participa-
tion, including a speculative seizure of the Pakistani atomic weapons on
account of the state destabilizing.
In the wake of the execution of Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan be-
came more inclined towards China as its relations with Washington
plunged. In the meantime, Chinese authorities were guaranteeing their
US partners that they shared worries about Pakistan’s fanatic issue and
would not “refill for the Americans.” Furthermore, as of late, China has
been more helpful to the US in its work to desert a steady and secure
Afghanistan.
Conclusion
Andrew Small’s China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics ex-
plores the reality of the Sino-Pakistan relationship by explaining that at
each event, it has been a relationship of mutual benefit, and both of the
countries have put themselves and their defense ahead of everything
else, which is accurate to a great extent. Even if China has supported
Pakistan at some points it has been because China had its own interests
invested in that particular action.
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It’s Not Deglobalization, It’s Regionalization

Decoupling and derisking, deglobalization, slowbalization, and lo-
calization. Journalists, columnists, and more than a few authors are tout-
ing the end of an era of hyperglobalization characterized by open mar-
kets and capital flows, of seamless transport and ever-rising trade
across the world. Policymakers and CEOs caution that this fragmenta-
tion of the global economy is slowing innovation, boosting inflation, and
leaving workers, shoppers, and citizens worse off.
Yet these takes largely miss the biggest international economic
story of the last five decades. More than globalizing, the world economy
was regionalizing. That means the starting point for today’s shifts in in-
ternational supply chains is distinct from most conventional takes.
And these views tend to overstate the ability of government policies
to disentangle international commerce. Even in the face of hostile geo-
politics and industrial policy and protections, the factors that drove re-
gionalization in recent decades will remain powerful and profitable. True
globalization may not be in our future, but regionalization still is. Much is
being made of the recent downturn in trade, with international ex-
changes falling over 3 percent over the last twelve months. Yes, trade is
slowing down, and no longer outpacing global growth. But this is off of
record highs. And looking over the last forty years, trade has steadily
grown in volume and importance to the global economy, now comprising
a significant majority of all economic activity.
To be sure, production and trade are shifting as international supply
chains reconfigure themselves. The biggest shift has been from China,
which has pulled back as the main engine of global commerce. Trade
as part of the Chinese economy has fallen from a high of 64 percent of
the GDP in 2006 to just 37 percent today.
China’s pullback explains in part why global trade growth has
slowed. Yet it has also opened opportunities for other nations to step in.
And many have. Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, India, Mexico, Poland, and
the Czech Republic are among those that have boosted exports in real
terms.
None of these rising trading nations will make the singular splash that
259 | P a g e
China’s entry into the world’s economy did at the turn of the 21st century.
For most, their populations and markets are smaller, so they won’t indi-
vidually impact global flows as significantly. India, the most obvious con-
tender to replace China given its size and global ambitions, has yet to
be able to get beyond its bureaucracy, limited infrastructure, and inher-
ent protectionism. And for any nation aspiring to fill the trading gap being
left by China, the market-led opening of the 1990s and 2000s, often
dubbed the Washington Consensus, has given way to one increasingly
guided by governments and public policies. The path China took to man-
ufacturing dominance is no longer as clear or open in the 2020s. Still,
collectively this host of countries can be as significant for global flows,
ensuring that deglobalization, just like globalization, remains a myth.
These new trading paths will lean regional. Many of the winners in
Southeast Asia are rejiggering supply chains around the region, bol-
stered by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or
RCEP, which lowered tariffs and cut out paperwork for inputs and fin-
ished goods moving between its fifteen members.
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) helps its five Asian members as well by making it
more efficient and profitable to trade with each other compared to those
outside the club. Mexico’s trade growth also reflects deepening regional
ties particularly with the United States through the USMCA, which re-
placed NAFTA in 2020.
What companies are finding is that internationalization still makes
sense for costs, talent, and profits. Governments will find that national
security strengthening, supply chain resilience, and economic competi-
tiveness also benefit from a geographic spread. But as we are seeing, it
is shifting directions from that of the last forty years. Geopolitics and in-
dustrial policy matter. And regionalization looks to be that Goldilocks
middle that will enable governments to protect growing national security
concerns, boosting supply chain resilience and allowing companies to
thrive.
260 | P a g e
Rise of India and implications for Pakistan and

the Muslim world
The rise of China has forced the West to devise strategies to retain
world leadership, or at least be major players in the future. West feels
that a democratic, capitalist and economically resurgent India is their
natural ally in this struggle against communist China. Therefore, despite
its massive human rights violations, the West continues to support India.
A strong India not only helps in containment of China but also possible
de-nuclearization of Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear country, through
its balkanization. Therefore, the West and its allies are fully supporting
India to become an economic and military regional power.
How would a strong India treat its neighbouring region, specially
Pakistan, the Middle East and the Central Asian Republics (CARs)? In-
dia has the World’s third largest armed fForces. The bulk of these are
deployed against Pakistan. None of India’s large mechanized forces can
be used against China due to the Himalayas. Indian future behaviour
can be predicted from its emerging military capabilities and past employ-
ment of its armed forces against its neighbours. India militarily invaded
Kashmir in October 1947 and since then is in perpetual occupation
against multiple UN resolutions. It militarily annexed Junagadh and Hy-
derabad (Deccan) in November 1947 and September 1948 respectively,
followed by Goa in 1961.
Through employment of its armed forces it captured erstwhile East Pa-
kistan in 1971 and annexed Sikkim in 1975. It intervened militarily in Sri
Lanka from 1987-90 and in the Maldives in 1988. The rise of India and
its track record of using military instruments to further its policies does
not augur well for the regional countries.
When Indians look at the Middle East and the CARs, they see oil-rich,
sparsely populated and militarily weak countries. History has many ex-
amples where strong countries always found reasons to occupy or dom-
inate economically prosperous, resource-rich but militarily weak neigh-
bours. Indian interests in the region are not hidden. Th3n Prime Minister
261 | P a g e
Manmohan Singh, while addressing senior military officers in 2004, said,

“Our strategic footprint covers the region bounded by the Horn of Africa,
West Asia (Middle East), CARs, Afghanistan and South Asia, and be-
yond to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean.”
Pakistan is the only hurdle to these aggressive Indian designs. Pakistan
is like a dam, holding back a billion -plus Indians from coercing the /mid-
dle East and CARs into subjugation. Therefore, Indian strategic thinkers
openly advocate balkanization of Pakistan into weak client states. Paki-
stan in future, will play the same role in the east for the Muslim world
against India as Ottomans played in the west against Europe. See what
happened to the Middle East and CARs once the Ottomans became
weak and then collapsed. The CARs were occupied by Russia and the
Middle East carved into multiple weak client states after World War I.
The Western world has trampled and exploited the Middle East’s Muslim
countries, at will since the demise of the Ottomans.
Nuclear Pakistan with a strong economy is a guarantor of sover-

eignty of Middle Eastern countries and the CARs. Unfortunately,
there are certain people in and outside Pakistan, who in the name
of religion (TTP), sub-nationalism or political gains are pursuing
the agenda of substantially weakening or balkanization of the
country. They are either deliberately or inadvertently advancing the
Indian agenda. During World War I, Arabs revolted against Turkey
in the name of regional sovereignty (Lawrence of Arabia may be
remembered).
India has a very poor track record of dealing with its neighbours. The
Indian rise as a powerful state is a fact and its associated implications
for the region cannot be overlooked. Though China has also risen as a
World power, it has to be understood that China’s strategic heartland is
along the Pacific due to the location of the bulk of its population and
major industrial areas.
Historically, China has never ventured militarily beyond its geographical
boundaries. The Indian heartland, economic interests and long coast
line makes it a southern and western Asia-centred country.
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What BRICS Expansion Means for the Bloc’s

Founding Members
After more than 40 countries expressed interest in joining, the
question of whether BRICS would admit new members was finally an-
swered during the group’s summit last week. Despite pre-summit reports
of division over the potential expansion, leaders from the five-nation
bloc announced that Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would join the group starting in 2024.
Leaders representing the five-nation BRICS bloc on stage at the group’s
summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. August 24, 2023. (Government
of South Africa/Flickr)
With the addition of these six countries, BRICS now represents 42
percent of the world’s population and 36 percent of global GDP. The
primarily economic bloc was originally created as an alternative to the
U.S.-led international order, with the goal of offering growing countries
in the Global South a counterbalance to Western institutions.
BRICS’s consensus-based approach has hampered its effective-
ness in the past, but the geopolitical factors driving its expansion — as
well as the sometimes-conflicting strategic goals of its individual mem-
bers — will have a major role in shaping the future of the international
system. USIP experts examine what BRICS expansion means for its
founding members (China, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa) and
what the recent summit can tell us about the bloc’s plans going forward.
China
Tugendhat: This gathering has largely been seen as a diplomatic vic-
tory for Chinese leader Xi Jinping. He was lauded with the “Order of
South Africa” as he arrived; he scheduled meetings with African heads
of state who joined as observers to the meetings; and he even managed
to de-escalate tensions on the Sino-Indian border.
264 | P a g e
But above all this, China was able to see through an expansion of the
bloc’s membership. This matters, because the BRICS combination of
U.S. adversaries like Russia and Iran alongside U.S. partners like Brazil
and India will force the United States to consider the security interests
they may come to share.
On the negative side for China, its ambitions to reform the world’s finan-
cial architecture in favor of Global South interests continue to meet frus-
trations. We have heard a lot about the possibility of a shared BRICS
currency in recent months, but this is unlikely to gain traction for many
reasons.
For starters, it implies that BRICS members would hold larger amounts
of each other’s currencies, and it’s unclear that any members of the new
or expanded BRICS would wish to buy Russian rubles right now even if
they could. Moreover, the Chinese yuan still struggles to internationalize
meaningfully for its closed capital markets. And finally, the introduction
of the Euro in 2002 has had very little impact on the dominance of the
U.S. dollar in the 20 years since, so it seems unlikely that a middle-in-
come alternative would pose much more of a threat.
China’s attempts to drive the New Development Bank may fare some-
what better, but it is still unclear how much funding it may receive from
existing or new members. It also remains to be seen how the bank might
distinguish itself from already-existing Global South development banks.
Furthermore, the New Development Bank has suffered from its depend-
ence on sometimes fractious relations between the founding members,
such as former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s sometimes hostile
engagements with China and the fallout over India and China’s 2020
border clashes. It’s possible that BRICS institutions will frequently fall
victim to similar political disruption.
Which brings me to a final consideration. China’s ambition to expand
BRICS membership has been analyzed by some as an attempt to es-
tablish a counterpoint to the G7. And yet, China may have inadvertently
265 | P a g e
created something far closer to the G20: a big grouping with no secre-
tariat, no legal authority to their decisions and often no consensus.
With so many competing views, this expansion may introduce more
challenges than opportunities for the founding members, especially
when it comes to creating alternative institutions to the current world or-
der. The enlarged BRICS will undoubtedly serve as an important forum
for global conversations among middle-income countries, but that may
be its biggest impact on global affairs.
India
Markey: This year’s BRICS summit was a tricky assignment for Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who aimed to tackle several thorny is-
sues: balancing India’s ties with Russia and the West, managing BRICS
expansion, and addressing border tensions with China.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, New Delhi has tried to balance close
ties with Moscow (including major oil and defense deals, as well as con-
tinued diplomatic relations) against pressure from Western friends and
partners like the United States. In part to sidestep Western ire, India
transformed its July Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit into a
virtual-only gathering, and Putin’s absence from the BRICS summit
made India’s life easier. To complete New Delhi’s balancing act, Modi
followed up with a friendly phone call to Putin a few days after returning
home.
On BRICS expansion, India simultaneously sought to preserve its privi-
leged stature as a founding member, advance its claim to leadership as
a voice of the Global South, and resist moves by Beijing to dominate the
group by packing it with overtly China-centric partners.
Battling widespread speculation that India initially objected to the expan-
sion agenda, Modi took pains to express enthusiasm for the added
members. The new member list could have been worse for India, which
enjoys increasingly warm relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Only
266 | P a g e
Iran’s admission creates minor headaches, as it reinforces the group’s

anti-Western reputation and saddles the bloc with another prominent
member facing U.S. sanctions.
Back in India, the most anticipated meeting of the summit was between
Modi and Xi. The two leaders had barely spoken in person since the
summer of 2020, when Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Ac-
tual Control engaged in their bloodiest border skirmishes in over four
decades.
In the end, a closed-door, “informal” one-on-one session bore all the
hallmarks of intensive negotiations. There were no prior announce-
ments, dueling readouts (with India’s more upbeat than China’s), and a
day-long delay before the exchange was publicly disclosed. The meet-
ing achieved no obvious diplomatic breakthrough, and Indian opposition
politicians pounced on Modi. Overall, the experience will only raise the
stakes for the next major Modi-Xi exchange, likely to happen in New
Delhi at the G-20 summit in September.
Brazil
Randolph: In an increasingly polarized world driven by competition be-
tween the United States and China, Brazil is finding it more difficult to
assert its relevance and leadership, as demonstrated by last week’s
BRICS expansion announcement. China managed to secure the expan-
sion despite the reservations of India and Brazil — shifting the forum
from one grounded in alternative economic development to one in-
tended to directly challenge Western-dominated forums and institutions.
Brazil’s President Lula publicly stated during last week’s summit that the
BRICS forum is not meant as “a counterpoint to the G7, G20 or the
United States,” instead characterizing the group as a means of organiz-
ing developing countries. To that end, President Lula exclusively fo-
cused his speech to the forum on the bloc’s economic nature, empha-
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sizing its importance in securing greater financing for developing econ-

omies, achieving fairer global trade and building more Global South-
driven economic growth.
However, Chinese leader Xi articulated a much broader mission for the
group in a speech to the forum read by Chinese Commerce Minister
Wang Wentao, laying out a vision in which BRICS works to reform global
governance and expand political and security cooperation among mem-
bers. This vision, as well as the inclusion of Iran among the six new
member states, belies President Lula’s insistence that the group is not
taking on an anti-West stance and places Brazil in a progressively more
uncomfortable position in its relationship with the United States.
This is not a new approach for President Lula, who has historically
sought to elevate Brazil on the international stage by serving as an in-
termediary for competing powers. In 2010, he traveled to Iran to try and
facilitate a nuclear deal between Iran and the United States. Most re-
cently, President Lula’s government has struggled to finesse its at-
tempts to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine.
It remains to be seen what Brazil stands to gain from its concession to
China in remaking the nature of BRICS. Brazil is widely considered to
have supported the expansion of BRICS in return for China’s support of
Brazil’s addition to the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member,
alongside fellow BRICS country India. The compromise appears lop-
sided from the start — China walks away with immediate gains and Bra-
zil receives only hollow promises, given that U.N. Security Council re-
form appears unlikely.
Perhaps President Lula will be able to use China’s support to his ad-
vantage during his expected meeting with President Biden before the
U.N. General Assembly. However, Brazil may find itself increasingly one
power among many struggling for relevance in the ongoing competition
between the United States and China to define the future of the interna-
tional order.
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South Africa
Verjee: For South Africa, the current BRICS chair and host, the summit
can be divided into two halves.
During the run-up to the meeting, the possibility of hosting Russian Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin given his International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant
loomed large. Had Putin attended, South Africa would have been legally
required to detain him. The episode evoked the 2015 visit of then-Suda-
nese dictator Omar el-Bashir, who narrowly escaped arrest after attend-
ing the African Union summit in Johannesburg, leading to a severe re-
buke of the South African government by both domestic and interna-
tional courts. Ultimately, Putin’s absence from the BRICS summit de-
fused any significant domestic controversy in South Africa.
However, the summit itself brought few tangible outcomes for South Af-
rica, whose membership in BRICS is largely symbolic. South Africa is
the smallest and most economically insignificant member of the club.
The expansion of BRICS will diminish South Africa’s significance even
further — the two African states joining, Egypt and Ethiopia, are both
more populous than South Africa and are experiencing higher rates of
economic growth, albeit in much smaller economies.
Perhaps more important than the summit was the bilateral visit from
President Xi the day before, as well as the preparatory visits that Chi-
nese trade ministers and business groups made just weeks earlier. As
Xi himself pointed out, this was his sixth visit to South Africa. South Af-
rica was the first African country to sign the Belt and Road cooperation
document, and China is South Africa’s largest trading partner. Bilateral
trade volumes continue to grow, as does Chinese foreign investment in
South Africa. Summit or not, South Africa’s relations with the other
BRICS countries remain far less important.
Russia
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Sharad/Ashby: As Russia deals with economic sanctions and interna-

tional condemnation for its war against Ukraine, BRICS has become an
important forum for Moscow to demonstrate it is not internationally iso-
lated. Russia not only needs BRICS — it needs BRICS to expand in
order for Moscow to advance its own foreign policy.
Evading an ICC arrest warrant, President Putin had no choice but to
deliver his summit speech remotely. Similar to his message at the Rus-
sia-Africa Summit in July, Putin used his BRICS speech to align Russian
foreign policy with Global South countries and accused the United
States and the West of advancing a rules-based system that hinders
most countries politically, economically and militarily. He also sought to
frame the war against Ukraine as a defensive mechanism against per-
ceived Western aggression.
Touching on the economic fallout from that war, Putin deflected blame
for exiting the Black Sea grain deal — a move that has led to increased
food costs in many of the countries attending the summit. Instead, Putin
proposed an increase in trade between Global South countries, which
would further mitigate shocks to his own economy due to Western-led
sanctions.
After over a decade in existence, it remains to be seen whether BRICS
will become a force politically and economically within the international
system. Russia is banking that it will, based on its support for BRICS
expansion during the summit. Russia has varying degrees of relations
with the new BRICS members, with its strongest bilateral partner among
them being Egypt. The motley crew of established and new BRICS
countries works in Russia’s favor, though — particularly economically,
as the UAE, Iran and Saudi Arabia add energy heft to the group. From
Russia’s perspective, BRICS and its new members will enable the Rus-
sian government to further push for a multipolar world order — a key
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talking point under Putin’s rule. Russian officials also reiterated aspira-
tions for the bloc to decrease their dependency on the U.S. dollar and to
further the goals of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025.
BRICS expansion: A warning to the US, but not

a ‘new Cold War’
BRICS is alluring to aspiring members precisely because it does not re-
quire them to commit to an alliance.
Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, China's President Xi Jinping,
South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, India's Prime Minister Nar-
endra Modi and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pose during
the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa August 22, 2023 [Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry/Reuters]
Last week, the bloc of nations known as the BRICS took the historic step
of inviting six new countries for membership. The grouping of Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa will be joined by Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina and Egypt as part of
an expanded collective.
But these six new entrants are among dozens of countries that have
expressed interest in joining the BRICS. Further expansions of an or-
ganisation many have touted as a systemic rival to the G7 seem almost
certain to follow in future summits.
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As economic tensions soar and geoeconomics becomes a battleground,

countries of the Global South seem drawn to the BRICS group, which
includes and is partially led by China.
So, why are so many countries, including many US partners, participat-
ing in this project and seeking to boost its mission?
Many argue we are in the midst of a new Cold War. Even members of
the United States Congress have lent credence to that concept. But that
is an imperfect analogy.
As many have pointed out, China is a peer economy to the US and is
likely to overtake it in gross domestic product (GDP) soon, while the for-
mer Soviet Union’s economy was, at its peak, only a third that of the US.
But what is critically different in the global landscape of alliances is that
many countries are in a position to choose their alignment.
Scholars and analysts have been discussing the rise of the Global South
for decades, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, pointing to how
the unprecedented and sustained economic growth of many countries
outside the West was redistributing global power. Researchers have
also concluded that while the global economy’s centre of gravity was in
the Atlantic, between the US and Europe, in 1980, it had moved 4,800
miles (7,725km) to Izmir, Turkey, by 2008 and will likely lie somewhere
between India and China by 2050.
This new environment presents the nations of the Global South with op-
tions about how to respond to growing friction among major powers and
how to position their nations in the midst of great power competition.
During the Cold War, one could awkwardly divide the world into three
camps: the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc and the countries that were
part of the so-called non-aligned movement. After the Cold War, many
of the norms of the Western bloc formed what is often referred to as the
liberal rules-based international order. This new order was enshrined
272 | P a g e
into new organisations like the World Trade Organization and older ven-
ues like the United Nations during a “unipolar moment”, when demo-
cratic capitalism and trade liberalisation seemed to have vanquished
every foe. But today, the rising power balancing the US is not looking to
form a Soviet-type bloc. The reasons are both material and ideational.
China does not have the military capacity to project power over large
parts of the planet and make security guarantees to faraway friends. It
also has a grim history with alliance politics – such as its fallout with the
Soviet Union. So it eschews the kind of alliances that define the US’s
relationship with its linchpin allies in Europe and East Asia. Beijing has
many partners, even “comprehensive strategic partners”, but no allies.
Beijing also has a precarious relationship with the international order
Washington built. The order is one designed and carried out with US
interests and preferences in mind – and to a lesser extent those of its
close allies. As China rises, the West, and the US in particular, jealously
guard the rules they’ve crafted and the pegging order within those or-
ganisations. China’s voting power and position in international fora are
still extremely small compared with its economic weight. For example,
China has a 5 percent voting share in the World Bank’s main lending
arm despite representing 16 percent of the global GDP.
China has repeatedly asked for its voting power, and those of other
emerging economies, to be increased to represent modern global eco-
nomic distribution to no avail. This is a rather enticing combination to
many countries of the Global South. Many of them also see their prefer-
ences and interests underrepresented or ignored in the world order as
currently constituted. Additionally, aligning with organisations like
BRICS does not mean binding commitments to one side of the new Cold
War. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may be a security
cooperation forum like NATO but it lacks any Article 5 feature. If the
worst-case scenario, a Sino-American military confrontation, came to
pass, US allies would be expected to quickly join it in the war but China’s
partners would not. In fact, an increasingly large coalition of countries
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with competing and conflicting political systems, ideologies and ap-

proaches to the West may produce an increasingly unwieldy organisa-
tion and exacerbate its collective action problem. But China is clearly
gambling that a larger, more geographically and economically diverse
set of countries can eventually be marshalled towards the goal of en-
hancing their collective representation in the world order. For example,
the inclusion of more countries, especially major commodity exporters
like Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, may make greater
economic integration among BRICS states and the use of non-dollar
currencies in trade among them more appetising. Scholars who
have examined Beijing’s relationship with the international order argue
that China seeks to engage international institutions to argue for its pref-
erences. But when it is denied what it sees as power commensurate with
its global position, it seeks to create parallel institutions. This can be
seen in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the SCO
and BRICS. The US and its linchpin allies have common values and
deep social interaction. More importantly, they have similar forms of gov-
ernment and economic management. This both binds them together and
solves collective action problems regarding world affairs. US partners in
the Global South, however, are not under this umbrella and instead court
multipolarity to maximise their bargaining position vis-à-vis duelling pow-
ers. Joining a forum like the BRICS is less a declaration of alignment
with Beijing and more an assertion by a country that they wish to remain
neutral or play both sides in line with their specific national interest.
Expansion of the BRICS: What are the economic implications?

BRICS membership to more than double:
In late August it was announced that from 2024, the BRICS—a political
grouping that currently comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa—will admit six new members: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Argen-
tina, the UAE and Ethiopia. The eleven countries combined represent
274 | P a g e
around 45% of the planet’s population, over 40% of world oil production
and roughly a third of global GDP. Through our forecast horizon to 2027,
the BRICS’ average economic growth rate is likely to be notably above
the global average. That said, the G7’s GDP is still substantially larger
at market prices, and should remain so over the medium term.
What is the economic upshot?
Right now, not very much. The group’s key economic institution, the New
Development Bank (NDB), is still tiny in comparison to other multilateral
lenders. The Bank has financed projects worth around USD 33 billion
since 2015; in contrast, the World Bank alone committed around USD
50 billion each year over the same period. Other overarching economic
structures are lacking, and a BRICS trade deal seems difficult to fathom
given members’ vastly different stages of development and policy prior-
ities. Internal geopolitical disputes could further complicate economic
rapprochement between members: Egypt and Ethiopia are at logger-
heads over a dam on the Nile river, relations between Iran and its Gulf
neighbors are still strained, and there are tensions between India and
China over their shared Himalayan border and Indian restrictions on Chi-
nese imports and technology.
What’s next:
The expansion of the BRICS could encourage greater political overtures
and financial generosity from the G7 towards emerging markets going
forward; the G20 summit later this year will be key to watch, with the
U.N. calling on USD 500 billion of annual financing from wealthy nations.
More countries are likely to join the BRICS in the coming years, as cur-
rent members—particularly China and Russia—look to bolster an alter-
native to the G7-led world order. BRICS members will increasingly con-
duct intra-member trade in local currencies to reduce dependence on
the dollar, with the yuan and rupee set to be major beneficiaries. That
said, the dollar will remain the global reserve currency for the foreseea-
ble future: incumbency, dollar liquidity, the strength of the U.S. economy,
275 | P a g e
and the reliability of the U.S. government as a debt issuer are key ad-
vantages. As for the BRICS grouping as a whole, it is likely to remain
more of a political than an economic force.
Insight from analysts
On the BRICS’ prospects, EIU analysts said:
“The BRICS group will not become a solid construction, regardless of
how many bricks are added to the wall, and it will continue to face inter-
nal tensions and divisions. However, the expansion will bolster its geo-
political significance and its combined economic power, and the organi-
zation will continue to evolve. The relatively trouble-free and productive
BRICS summit will enhance South Africa’s standing without damaging
its relations with key Western partners.”
On the future of the dollar, ING analysts said:
“Until international issuers and investors are happy to issue and hold
international debt in non-dollar currencies – and the take-up of CNY
Panda bonds has been very slow indeed – we suspect this will be a
decade-long progression to a multi-polar world, a world in which perhaps
the dollar, the euro and the renminbi become the dominant currencies
in the Americas, Europe and Asia respectively.”
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Foreseeable Implications of BRICS Expansion

BRICS began as a close-knit group of four countries, namely Rus-
sia, China, Brazil, and India. They came together to develop an inclusive
financial system that would advance multilateral trade and investments
and run parallel to the Western-dominated financial structures. In
2010, South Africa became a member, and with its inclusion, BRIC re-
ceived its “S,” and as a result, the acronym BRICS was born. BRICS
expansion was on the cards for a long time, but it was repeatedly put on
hold since the members differed over who should and should not be
admitted. China pushed for immediate expansion as it wanted to di-
lute the Western influence. India prioritised admission criteria formula-
tion over rapid expansion, arguing that democracies should be the focus
of membership considerations along with states that were not the tar-
get of internal sanctions.
The BRICS Summit from 22 to 24 August 2023, held in Johannesburg,
South Africa, gave this discussion new life when the alliance formally
extended a membership invitation to six states: Saudi Arabia, Argentina,
Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Egypt. The existence
of “BRICS” in a literal sense ended when it added new members. A new
term, therefore, became a necessity to reflect its new reality. The re-
cent expansion of BRICS in August 2023 represents a pivotal moment
in the alliance’s history, offering a plethora of advantages and a fair
share of drawbacks. A careful analysis of the pros and cons is essential
to grasp the full implications of this expansion for the member states. In
terms of expansion, BRICS is taking the same trajectory that the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganisation (NATO), for instance, have taken. Started off as a close
grouping and, with time, expanded due to the influx of various states.
The question, therefore, arises whether BRICS will share the same fate
as the aforementioned groupings. Will it also have to deal with the polit-
ical and economic difficulties brought on by the influx of new states?
277 | P a g e
Most probably, yes. Rapid expansion does come at the expense of in-
ternal coherence and consensus formation.
BRICS must redefine its purpose and develop a contemporary
blueprint to ensure continued relevance and effectiveness.
BRICS was criticised for having a relatively loose alliance structure, as
well as for its frequent internal conflicts, lack of cohesion, and absence
of a collective vision. Since the bloc’s establishment, it has been under
fire for having more differences than similarities. There have been count-
less objections regarding the futility of the alliance, as it has achieved so
little in terms of notable outcomes. Hence, there is growing concern that
adding six additional members, each with its own sociopolitical and eco-
nomic circumstances, might expose existing internal conflicts and ac-
centuate member-state disparities, thus complicating the bloc’s ability to
function. However, the rapid expansion of BRICS does offer a plethora
of potential benefits to individual members and the community at large
that should be acknowledged. For example, the enlargement of BRICS
represents a success for Brazil’s longstanding policy goal of champion-
ing the Global South’s cause. For Russia, the expansion provides a per-
fect opportunity to counter the narrative of isolation at the global level,
which has arisen as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis. Likewise,
for Iran, inclusion into BRICS demonstrates that their integration in the
community of nations does not depend solely on the Western nations.
Hence, it could be stated that, as a result of expansion, BRICS geo-
graphically appears to be more inclusive and diversified as it includes
representation from South America, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, eco-
nomically speaking, it caters to developing and developed countries and
gives hope for a financial structure independent of Western hegemony.
Additionally, it creates opportunities for supply chains and market diver-
sification. It offers a promising future for the global energy market by
bringing oil consumers and producers together on one stage where they
may work together to ensure energy security. BRICS also provides an
equal voice to the monarchies in the Middle East, dictatorships in Africa,
278 | P a g e
autocracies in Russia and China, and partial or flawed democracies in

India and Argentina. The inclusivity of political systems discourages
Western policies of snubbing leaders and states that dare to choose a
path different from the West. It creates a pathway for future cooperation
between SCO and BRICS, encouraging the development of a multipolar
system free from Western influence. Additionally, it brings together tech-
nologically developed and deprived states, hence opening the door for
technical collaborations.
Yet, the enormous obstacles to cooperation among the BRICS members
should not be disregarded, as each member brings a different agenda
to the table. Russia prioritises security-related interests, whereas India
seeks to attract more Chinese investments and address climate-in-
duced pressures. Consequently, streamlining and achieving consensus
within the group becomes a challenging endeavour. The fundamental
restriction, thus, is internal cohesion, which has been a subject of inves-
tigation since its inception. It could be a challenge to reach unanimity
among the members due to disparities in their political systems, eco-
nomic structures, and collective identities. Numerous groupings have
faced the difficulty of forging consensus due to the prevalence of diverse
perspectives. BRICS is no exception. With the inclusion of new mem-
bers, reaching an agreement might become more complex. One such
example of disagreement was regarding BRICS’s possible outlook. Ser-
gey Lavrov, in his statement, said that the strategic line of G7 is deter-
mined by the United States (US) while BRICS works fairly. This state-
ment of pitting the alliance against the US was unwelcome by Brazilian
President Lula da Silva. He reiterated the notion of BRICS not wanting
to challenge the US and the G7 but to organise the Global South.
Limitations are not restricted to organisational and functional matters;
they also include policy matters. The absence of a shared identity and
outlook is another crucial impediment. Some see the bloc as an alterna-
tive to the Western-dominated system; others view it as a chance to pro-
mote South-South cooperation. For instance, India sees it as a forum
279 | P a g e
to seek its vision for a multipolar order. The addition of new entrants has
worsened the situation as it has increased the range of possible themes
for the alliance’s future direction. Moreover, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s
membership has added a new layer of complexity. Their contradictory
ambitions might cause conflict and possibly politicise the bloc, under-
mining BRICS’s effectiveness. Differences between India and China
are widely recognised. The inclusion of an additional set of competitors
might hinder the alliance’s decision-making process. Furthermore, for
some new entrants like Egypt and UAE, committing to the BRICS
agenda may be a balancing act because they also have partnerships
with the US to meet their economic and security needs. Thus, any
BRICS initiative undertaken with this in mind, such as the most widely
advocated one, de-dollarisation, may not materialise as easily due to
such apparent priority differences between member states. In short, the
expansion of BRICS presents both opportunities and challenges. The
recent growth of the bloc prompts the need for a new acronym that mir-
rors the evolving dynamics within the group. BRICS must redefine its
purpose and develop a contemporary blueprint to ensure continued rel-
evance and effectiveness. Failure to do so may erode the spirit of the
bloc, rendering it meaningless.
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Pakistan’s Political Economy Perpetuates Its

Water Crisis
Pakistan’s water crisis relates to equity, access, and intersectoral distri-
bution–not a Malthusian notion of water scarcity. Millions of Pakistanis
remain water insecure despite the country having abundant water re-
sources. Elite interests tied to water-intensive agriculture have stymied
necessary reforms in the political economy. International lenders have
also failed to prioritize water security when providing external assistance
to Pakistan for decades. Pakistan’s reliance on cotton-based goods per-
petuates the problem due to the crop’s high water footprint with little
economic benefit. As climate change impacts worsen, addressing struc-
tural issues in the agricultural sector becomes paramount to safeguard
Pakistan’s collective water security and avert broader regional instabil-
ity.
Introduction
As political instability, economic uncertainty, and climate shocks con-
sume Islamabad’s policy bandwidth, another long-term challenge re-
mains neglected–Pakistan’s water crisis. Unequal access to clean water
is deepening existing socioeconomic disparities and holds the potential
to catalyze civil unrest amid macroeconomic instability. Aging infrastruc-
ture, weak water governance, and the unpredictable impact of climate
shocks could solidify water security as a threat multiplier for the state
and society.
Elite interests tied to water-intensive agriculture stymie the reforms nec-
essary to address structural fault lines in the political economy that per-
petuate water insecurity. Also complicating reform efforts are uncertain
political timelines and a lack of policy continuity from one government to
the next. International lenders, meanwhile, have failed to prioritize water
281 | P a g e
security when providing external assistance to Pakistan for decades. As

a result, existing agricultural policies are geared toward maintaining the
status quo by borrowing resources–both economic and water-related–
from current and future generations.
A confluence of domestic and international factors suggests the current
moment may offer an opportunity to address these enduring challenges.
Water insecurity is likely to gain increasing domestic political salience as
the impacts of climate change are felt by vast swaths of the country,
which were seen most dramatically in the aftermath of the devastating
floods in 2022. International financial institutions and foreign investors,
meanwhile, are demanding demonstrable policy changes and greater
accountability.
Pakistani policymakers can improve domestic water security through
policies that incentivize intersectoral transfers within Pakistan’s water-
intensive agricultural sector, increase export competitiveness in nonag-
ricultural industries, and revisit the colonial Canal and Drainage Act
(1873) to equitably tax water usage. International financial institutions
and bilateral lenders can also incentivize such policy changes through
adopting environmentally conscious lending, trade, and investment
practices. International financial institutions can channel donor states’
voluntary Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) based on demonstrated pro-
gress on environmentally focused Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). Bilateral partners seeking to invest in Pakistan’s agricultural
sector through the recently created Special Investment Facilitation
Council (SIFC) can choose to channel resources into non-water-inten-
sive crops.
Without meaningful structural changes in Pakistan’s agricultural sector,
the water crisis will likely become one of the country’s most consequen-
tial domestic challenges going forward, with implications for broader re-
gional stability.
Pakistan’s Water Crisis
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Pakistan has enough water to meet the needs of its population many
times over, yet millions of Pakistanis remain water insecure (Figure 1).
According to the World Health Organization, 50 to 100 liters of water per
person per day enables conditions for a human to live a dignified
life. Based on Pakistan’s population, the country requires between 3.5
and 7 million acre-feet (MAF) of water to meet its collective domestic
demand every year. While estimates range, Pakistan’s collective annual
water availability roughly amounts to 193 MAF.
Pakistan’s water crisis relates to equity, access, and intersectoral distri-
bution–not a Malthusian notion of water scarcity.
The United Nations estimates that 40 percent of all annual excess
deaths in Pakistan can be directly or indirectly attributed to an insufficient
supply of clean water. Less than 40 percent of households have access
to piped water in Karachi, the world’s seventh most populous
city. Drought conditions are endemic in rural Baluchistan and Sindh,
constituting a push factor for increasing rural-urban migration. Mean-
while, Pakistan is seen as a booming market for water-intensive urban
beautification and horticulture projects as a result of a surge in upscale
private housing societies across the country. Pakistan’s water crisis re-
lates to equity, access, and intersectoral distribution–not a Malthusian
notion of water scarcity.
Agriculture and the Water Crisis
As one point of comparison, Jordan’s per capita water availability is
roughly 140 cubic meters per person (whereas Pakistan’s is 1,000 cubic
meters per person). In other words, Jordanians have roughly seven
times less available water per person than Pakistanis. Instead of grow-
ing water-intensive crops, 30 percent of Jordan’s agricultural output is
tomatoes, a far less water-intensive product. To produce 1 kilogram of
tomatoes requires 180 liters of water while producing 1 kilogram of cot-
ton requires 9,800 liters of water.
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The helpful but inexact concept of virtual water helps illuminate the water
used in a product’s production cycle (Figure 3). Pakistan devotes almost
three-quarters of its water supply to cultivating its water-intensive crops:
approximately 23 percent for wheat, 21 percent for rice, 19 percent for
sugar cane, and 14 percent for cotton (Figure 4).
Existing policies encourage the cultivation of water-intensive crops pri-
marily because water is not priced into the agricultural cost of produc-
tion. Pakistan’s Canal and Drainage Act (1873) enables consumers of
canal irrigation to pay an annual abiana (water tax) charge for water us-
age. Under the Act, the Government of Punjab, for instance, charges flat
fees ranging from Rs. (Pakistani Rupee) 400-550 ($2-3) per acre of
farmland for a year of effectively unlimited water use. By comparison,
households in Karachi without municipal water supply typically pay more
than Rs. 3,300-4,500 ($12-16) for a standard water-tanker service every
week.
Toward Agricultural Reform
Policy prescriptions in the agricultural sector require nuance to reflect
the importance of individual crops. Rice and wheat (roti) are essential
crops because they are food staples in the national diet. The govern-
ment’s stated policy is to prioritize maintaining sufficient stocks to ensure
food security, either through domestic production or imports. Conflict in
Ukraine and recent global supply shocks have increased the domestic
focus on ensuring food security through local production. While policy-
makers could consider importing greater quantities of rice and wheat to
alleviate domestic stresses on water security, such a policy is not real-
istic given Pakistan’s foreign exchange shortfall. Instead, Pakistan’s
cash-crop sector represents a riper target for reform efforts. Pakistan’s
primary cash crops, sugar and cotton, collectively consume almost a
third of its water resources. A recent analysis found that sugar cane
alone consumes about 42 percent of the total annual household water
demand in Pakistan.
284 | P a g e
Pakistan’s primary cash crops, sugar and cotton, collectively consume

almost a third of its water resources.
Of the two crops, reforms within the sugar sector are more challenging
because Pakistan’s sugar barons wield significant political influence.
Sugar mills partly bankroll all of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties.
A study found that around 40 of Pakistan’s 89 sugar mills are owned by
the political elite and their families, whose corporate farming practices
have helped Pakistan become the fifth-largest sugar producer in the
world. Sugar cultivation is entrenched in Pakistan as a result of decades
of favorable government laws and policies, such as subsidies and price
fixing, which reward uncompetitive practices and artificially prop up
sugar’s domestic profitability. Phasing out sugar production would inev-
itably encounter severe pushback from the political elite because of the
crop’s importance to their businesses and political stature.
Beginning reform efforts in the cotton sector could minimize political re-
sistance, while catalyzing a much-needed policy debate about the sali-
ence of broader agricultural reforms down the line. Like sugar, cotton is
a nonessential, water-guzzling cash crop. State incentives to produce
cotton could be feasibly phased out over time in favor of export alterna-
tives–such as high-value goods, services, and information technology–
that are more sustainable for Pakistan’s long-term economic and water
security.
Exporting Water
Pakistan’s reliance on water-intensive cotton exports has made it the
largest exporter of virtual groundwater in the world, ahead of the United
States and India. Pakistan roughly exports 13 MAF of its total water sup-
ply through cotton-based textiles annually. In other words, Pakistan ex-
ports between two or three times the amount of water it needs to satisfy
domestic demand yearly (Figure 5).
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One key challenge to reining in cotton production is the outsized role the
crop plays in Pakistan’s overall exports. The cotton industry contributed
to almost 60 percent of the country’s total exports, making cotton an
important source of foreign exchange amid recurring challenges to the
balance of payments (Figure 6). Despite cotton’s importance in gener-
ating foreign exchange reserves, the cotton industry constituted only 0.3
percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product, indicating that the coun-
try’s exports are of extremely low value both domestically and interna-
tionally.
Recent macroeconomic challenges and low foreign exchange reserves
have fueled policy impulses to double down on cotton and agricultural
production. Pakistan plans to double cotton production by 2025 to in-
crease exports and generate foreign exchange reserves. The military
has launched corporate farming schemes in a partial bid to seek external
assistance from the Gulf States. Punjab’s government recently an-
nounced cash rewards for cotton producers and related government de-
partments.
Pakistan’s reliance on water-intensive cotton exports has made it the
largest exporter of virtual groundwater in the world.
Successive administrations have sought to increase Pakistan’s ex-
ports. International financial institutions have also pushed for market-de-
termined foreign exchange rates to incentivize cheaper exports and in-
crease competitiveness. Export-oriented policies should retain their pri-
macy because they help increase cumulative exports and reduce stress
on diminishing foreign exchange reserves. However, increasing exports
while maintaining the current range of cotton-based goods will severely
drain Pakistan’s water resources.
Navigating Challenges
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While there are no easy fixes, Pakistan could minimize its reliance on
cash crops and work toward long-term economic and water sustainabil-
ity through forward-looking strategies that prioritize export diversifica-
tion. The state can consider targeted initiatives, beginning with the cot-
ton sector, to move away from the abiana levy and to price water into
the cost of agricultural production. Targeted water pricing would create
disincentives for producing cotton, while simultaneous incentives in
other export sectors could help boost alternative high-value sources of
foreign exchange reserves in the long term.
This could also help address exploitative formal and informal markets
that limit domestic access to water. Costly water-tanker services already
fill the supply void in water-stressed cities like Karachi, where municipal
water lines are not reliable water-supply sources. Pricing water for non-
essential cash crops such as cotton and sugar–instead of indirectly pric-
ing water at exorbitant rates–can help limit the potential for civil unrest
amid growing inflation.
Agricultural reforms, like all reforms, generate winners and losers. There
are four key hurdles to instituting agricultural reforms in Pakistan: (1)
pressure on the country’s foreign exchange reserves; (2) the impacts of
reforms on national food security; (3) elite interests in cash-crop sectors;
and (4) the impacts on farmers’ livelihoods. All these concerns, while
valid, are not insurmountable, especially through a phased, iterative ap-
proach to specific cash-crop reforms.
First, the challenge with Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves is not the
import bill, but rather low export receipts. Policies focusing on increasing
exports through Pakistan’s current basket of cotton goods do not offer a
viable solution for Pakistan’s long-term economic or water security. Cot-
ton, the largest export product, has intrinsically low value in domestic
and international markets but demands exceedingly high costs for Paki-
stan’s water security. At the same time, export quality has been improv-
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ing in the services sector, according to the World Bank. Knowledge-in-

tensive exports grew from 10 percent of all service exports in 2010 to 50
percent in 2020, which is now almost equal to all of Pakistan’s vegetable
sectors combined. Policies incentivizing the trend of exporting high-
value goods, services, and information technology should continue to be
encouraged–rather than policies geared toward the export of knitwear,
bed wear, or towels.
Policies focusing on increasing exports through Pakistan’s current bas-
ket of cotton goods do not offer a viable solution for Pakistan’s long-term
economic or water security.
Second, differentiating between essential and nonessential water-inten-
sive crops is important when delineating where the onus of reforms
should fall. Cash crops do not significantly impact Pakistan’s food secu-
rity. Like rice and wheat, sugar cane (importantly, not sugar) is a critical
component of food security, too. Sugar cane’s high fiber content makes
it a key component of diets in rural Pakistan. However, once sugar cane
is processed into sugar, it becomes a cash crop. Policies related to ag-
ricultural reforms should not impact goods that contribute to Pakistan’s
food security. Rather, they should seek to substitute the value generated
by cash crops through long-term export diversification strategies.
Third, encouraging export diversification as an alternative to cotton pro-
duction could partly assuage inevitable pushback from elite interests.
Iterative reforms in the cotton sector would increase domestic water
availability in the short term while giving policymakers time before initi-
ating reforms in the more politically divisive sugar sector in the medium
term. Simultaneous export diversification incentives for high-value
goods and services would also attenuate stresses on Pakistan’s water
sector while generating more foreign exchange reserves than current
cotton-based exports.
Fourth, it is important to distinguish the impact of reforms on subsistence
farming and corporate farming. Agricultural elites largely use corporate
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farming techniques that do not require subsistence labor, reducing the

human impact of reforms relative to subsistence farming. Highly mech-
anized sectors such as cotton require relatively fewer labor inputs from
small-scale subsistence farmers. Nevertheless, farmers have histori-
cally protested increases in production costs.
A two-pronged approach might help mitigate economic risks to poten-
tially vulnerable subsistence farmers through pricing water for cash
crops. Deploying cash transfers could mitigate the immediate, short-
term losses of farmers moving away from cultivating cash crops. Next,
cash transfers could be coupled with land grants and voluntary training
programs to ensure farmers could grow other crops. A recent survey
indicated that more than 60 percent of farmers were willing to change
their farming practices. Such flexibility was evident in responses to the
2020 locust attacks, which pushed farmers to adjust and explore alter-
native crop options, albeit through natural phenomena and not policy
dictates. In addition, Pakistan should learn from other countries with
similar climates and economies to seek less water-intensive crops more
conducive to safeguarding collective water security.
Looking Ahead
Uncertain political timelines have historically dissuaded policymakers
from engaging in structural reforms. Policymakers have relied on inter-
national economic assistance instead of instituting reforms to foment os-
tensible economic stability while protecting their political capital. Given
perennial political resistance to reform implementation, the international
community can play a role in incentivizing needed changes in the agri-
cultural sector.
By guiding investment dollars toward more sustainable agricultural prac-
tices and rewarding reforms with additional external support, interna-
tional donors and lenders can partner with Pakistan in mitigating its
growing water scarcity. This should be a key objective of the U.S.-Paki-
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stan Green Alliance given its focus on climate-smart agriculture, renew-

able energy, and water management in service of climate resilience, en-
ergy transformation, and inclusive economic growth. Pakistan’s Gulf
partners have also reportedly expressed notional interest in investing $6
billion in military-run corporate farms over the next five years. Should
Pakistan’s international partners choose to invest in water-friendly farm-
ing practices with a focus on less water-intensive crops, their invest-
ments could pay dividends in incentivizing water-conscious agricultural
practices domestically.
Given perennial political resistance to reform implementation, the inter-
national community can play a role in incentivizing needed changes in
the agricultural sector.
International financial institutions assisting Pakistan often neglect the
environmental impact of their policies, particularly those promoting the
expansion of cotton-intensive exports, which harms Pakistan’s water se-
curity. Recent developments, such as the voluntary reallocation of IMF
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
present opportunities for positive change.
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) SDRs are reserve financial
assets that supplement foreign exchange reserves, with advanced
economies receiving most of the SDR allocation. In 2022, G20 finance
ministers supported voluntarily channeling their IMF SDRs through in-
ternational financial institutions to countries facing liquidity chal-
lenges. However, there has been a lack of leadership in redistributing
SDRs through international financial institutions, which, if addressed
could create new opportunities going forward.
The United Nations and the World Bank are well-positioned to allocate
SDRs based on countries’ progress in achieving water-related Sustain-
able Development Goals. This approach could incentivize countries like
Pakistan, facing liquidity challenges, to implement essential policy
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changes and adopt water-conscious practices in anticipation of progres-

sive lending strategies.
Civil unrest, economic challenges, political fragility, and transboundary
water disputes already plague Pakistan. Water insecurity, if left un-
addressed, could exacerbate any or all of Pakistan’s existing challenges
as a threat multiplier with dangerous downstream implications. The al-
ternative is for Pakistan’s policymakers to center the public, not cash-
crop-producing agriculturalists, as the primary beneficiary of the coun-
try’s ample water resources through iterative agricultural reforms.
The Role of Hydro politics in Pakistan’s Water Crisis

Pakistan has been embroiled in politics over water resources since its
independence – at both local and international levels. Pakistan and India
initially had disagreements over the Indus Basin, which was finally set-
tled by the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. However, with India now de-
manding modifications in the 62-year-old treaty, serious water-based
conflicts between the two countries are a likely possibility. Pakistan also
faces water troubles within, as provincial governments have failed to
reach an agreement over the much-needed construction (& even usage)
of dams.
Hydro politics and Subcontinent
Water disputes between and within countries are particularly prevalent
in South Asia. There were water disputes among the provinces and the
princely states throughout the British colonization of the region. Political
boundaries were redrawn as a result of the country’s split (into what are
now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) which led to intense hydropolitics
and further disagreements over water rights.
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Since the end of British colonial rule in Indo-Pak, Pakistan and India
have been at odds over the Indus Basin. Elhance asserts that the scien-
tific study of conflict and cooperation over water resources among actors
is known as “hydro-politics.” This hydropolitics can be seen between
states that cross international borders or among the interstates of a na-
tion.
Hydro politics over the Indus Basin
With a roughly one million square kilometer extent, the Indus Basin is
the largest river basin in Asia. In the area between Pakistan and India,
it is the main supply of water. In South Asia, it covers four countries –
China in the north, India in the east, Afghanistan in the northwest, and
most of Punjab, Sindh, and KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) province in Pa-
kistan.
Pakistan is home to 56 percent of the Indus Basin, which takes up
around 70 percent of the nation’s land. Three western rivers—the Indus,
Jhelum, and Chenab—as well as three eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas, and
Ravi—make up the Indus system of rivers. Snowmelt from the Hin-
dukush-Himalayan region is the main factor in these rivers’ yearly water
flow.
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“File:Indus river basin.jpg” by Malikaveedu Kmhkmh is licensed un-

der CC BY 3.0.
Before entering Pakistan, all of the rivers in the Indus Basin travel
through India. When the Indian subcontinent was split into two sovereign
nations on August 14, 1947, one of the most advanced irrigation sys-
tems in the world was already in place. Without taking the irrigation work
into consideration, the border between the two nations was drawn.
On April 1, 1948, India abruptly stopped water flow in Pakistan’s canals
that were being supplied by the Indian-controlled rivers Ravi, Beas, and
Sutlej. After this, the dispute between Pakistan and India caused as a
result of hydropolitics was finally resolved by the World Bank, resulting
in the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) being signed in 1960. The Indus, Jhe-
lum, and Chenab rivers in the west were given to Pakistan, whereas the
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three eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, were exclusively granted
to India.
Pakistan was required to build the appropriate replacement works,
which included storage dams and inter-river transfer links, to meet the
needs of the eastern river canals from the western rivers. After Pakistan
finished these projects in the ten-year period between 1960 and 1970,
India was given the authority to prohibit water from flowing to Pakistan
in the three eastern rivers.
However, serious disagreements over the sharing of water have existed
between Pakistan and India for the past few years. India is allegedly
building a number of dams on rivers, which has made Pakistan quite
worried. Once Afghanistan starts building water storage projects on the
River Kabul, a significant portion of the water contribution from it may be
lost. Afghanistan is already conducting feasibility studies to construct
new dams. Therefore, it is crucial that Pakistan and Afghanistan come
to a water-sharing agreement before disagreements escalate into major
water conflicts.
Interprovincial Water Conflict in Pakistan
The World Bank-funded big dam projects at Mangala, Tarbela, and Kala-
bagh were built to help Pakistan meet its rising water and energy needs.
Following their construction, the provincial governments of Punjab,
Sindh, and KPK provinces fought over the Mangla and Tarbela reser-
voirs. The majority of irrigation water is used for agriculture in these prov-
inces.
The provincial government of Punjab was accused by the government
of Sindh of diverting its fair share of water from these reservoirs. The
provincial government of Punjab, on the other hand, denied the accusa-
tions and asserted that it has been utilizing less water than necessary to
satisfy the provincial governments of Sindh and KPK.
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Due to the ongoing interprovincial water-sharing issues from the existing

reservoirs, the development of additional water reservoirs in Pakistan
nearly came to an end in 1977. Before coming to an agreement in the
1991 Water Distribution Accord, the nation experienced a 1.5-decade-
long crisis involving irrigation supply and hydropower production.
To resolve the long-running conflict over the use of canal water, distri-
bution of river supplies, and excess flows in the form of floods, an inter-
provincial agreement became necessary. A water-sharing agreement to
settle intra-hydropolitics was formed in 1991 among the four provinces
of Pakistan. This agreement allocated the available water among the
provinces, with Punjab receiving the lion’s share.
This agreement allocated the balance of river supplies, including flood
surpluses and future storage, across the provinces while also protecting
each province’s current use of canal water. Also, constructing the Kala-
bagh Dam was deemed vital to address the nation’s power needs due
to the country’s 10% annual increase in electricity demand. However, all
of Pakistan’s provinces are continuously at odds with one another over
the Kalabagh dam issue, providing a hindrance in the way of its con-
struction.
Punjab is putting special emphasis on building the Kalabagh dam to
properly utilize the 38-million-acre feet of water that will eventually flow
into the ocean. The other three provinces of Sindh, KPK, and Balochi-
stan are opposing its construction due to concerns about royalties. The
storage of Indus water, according to Sindh, will negatively impact the
ecosystem of its delta. Provinces are worried about losing their fair share
of water, blaming one another without understanding the situation, and
prioritizing their own interests over that of the nation.
Despite the 1991 agreement, Sindh was still wary of large-scale Indus
River projects. Due to this, Sindh raised concerns about the Basha
Dam’s construction in 2018, despite the national hype and support for
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the project. Sindh was worried that the dam might reduce the environ-
mental flows that flow into Kotri downstream, which have already been
significantly reduced over the previous ten years.
History has shown, quite clearly, that Sindh has a point, and Punjab
must take note of its concerns, which are supported by historical devel-
opments.
Conclusion
Interprovincial conflicts must be resolved because, if they do not, they
could rip apart the social fabric and weaken Pakistan even more. Water
is a problem that affects South Asia as a whole, not only Pakistan, and
it has the potential to generate significant upheaval in the area.
Since the Indus River system originates in the Himalayas, India, Paki-
stan, and Afghanistan need new regional agreements on water distri-
bution on a regional scale. A constructive mutual agreement on water
sharing was achieved with the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, but re-
searchers and water specialists agree that it needs to be updated ur-
gently. Therefore, for Pakistan’s future as well as the future of South
Asia, a fair regional distribution of water resources and faith in its im-
plementation is essential.
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The Next Global War

How today’s Regional Conflicts Resemble the Ones That
Produced World War II
The post-Cold War era began, in the early 1990s, with soaring vi-
sions of global peace. It is ending, three decades later, with surging risks
of global war. Today, Europe is experiencing its most devastating mili-
tary conflict in generations. A brutal fight between Israel and Hamas is
sowing violence and instability across the Middle East. East Asia, fortu-
nately, is not at war. But it isn’t exactly peaceful, either, as China coerces
its neighbors and amasses military power at a historic rate. If many
Americans don’t realize how close the world is to being ravaged by
fierce, interlocking conflicts, perhaps that’s because they’ve forgotten
how the last global war came about.
When Americans think of global war, they typically think of World
War II—or the part of the war that began with Japan’s strike on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941. After that attack, and Adolf Hitler’s subse-
quent declaration of war against the United States, the conflict was a
single, all-encompassing struggle between rival alliances on a global
battlefield. But World War II began as a trio of loosely connected con-
tests for primacy in key regions stretching from Europe to the Asia-Pa-
cific—contests that eventually climaxed and coalesced in globally con-
suming ways. The history of this period reveals the darker aspects of
strategic interdependence in a war-torn world. It also illustrates uncom-
fortable parallels to the situation Washington currently confronts.
The United States isn’t facing a formalized alliance of adversaries,
as it once did during World War II. It probably won’t see a replay of a
scenario in which autocratic powers conquer giant swaths of Eurasia
and its littoral regions. Yet with wars in eastern Europe and the Middle
East already raging, and ties between revisionist states becoming more
pronounced, all it would take is a clash in the contested western Pacific
to bring about another awful scenario—one in which intense, interrelated
regional struggles overwhelm the international system and create a cri-
sis of global security unlike anything since 1945. A world at risk could
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become a world at war. And the United States isn’t remotely ready for
the challenge.
PAST IS PRESENT
The parallels between this earlier era and the present are striking.
Today, as in the 1930s, the international system is facing three sharp
regional challenges. China is rapidly amassing military might as part of
its campaign to eject the United States from the western Pacific—and,
perhaps, become the world’s preeminent power. Russia’s war in Ukraine
is the murderous centerpiece of its long-standing effort to reclaim pri-
macy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space. In the Middle
East, Iran and its coterie of proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis,
and many others—are waging a bloody struggle for regional dominance
against Israel, the Gulf monarchies, and the United States. Once again,
the fundamental commonalities linking the revisionist states are auto-
cratic governance and geopolitical grievance; in this case, a desire to
break a U.S.-led order that deprives them of the greatness they desire.
Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are the new “have not” powers, struggling
against the “haves”: Washington and its allies.
Two of these challenges have already turned hot. The war in
Ukraine is also a vicious proxy contest between Russia and the West;
Russian President Vladimir Putin is buckling down for a long, grinding
struggle that could last for years. Hamas’s attack on Israel last Octo-
ber—enabled, if perhaps not explicitly blessed, by Tehran—triggered an
intense conflict that is creating violent spillover across that vital region.
Iran, meanwhile, is creeping toward nuclear weapons, which could tur-
bocharge its regional revisionism by indemnifying its regime against an
Israeli or U.S. response. In the western Pacific and mainland Asia, China
is still relying mostly on coercion short of war. But as the military balance
shifts in sensitive spots such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China
Sea, Beijing will have better options—and perhaps a bigger appetite—
for aggression.
As in the 1930s, the revisionist powers don’t always see eye-to-
eye. Russia and China both seek preeminence in central Asia. They are
also pushing into the Middle East, in ways that sometimes cut across
Iran’s interests there. If the revisionists do eventually push their common
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enemy, the United States, out of Eurasia, they might end up fighting
among themselves over the spoils—just as the Axis powers, had they
somehow defeated their rivals, surely would have then turned on one
another. Yet for now, the ties between revisionist powers are flourishing
and Eurasia’s regional conflicts are becoming more tightly interlinked.
Russia and China are drawing closer through their “no limits” stra-
tegic partnership, which features arms sales, deepening defense-tech-
nological cooperation, and displays of geopolitical solidarity such as mil-
itary exercises in global hot spots. And just as the Molotov-Ribbentrop
pact of 1939 once allowed Germany and the Soviet Union to rampage
through Eastern Europe without risking conflict with each other, the
Sino-Russian partnership has pacified what was once the world’s most
militarized border and enabled both countries to focus on their contests
with Washington and its friends. More recently, the war in Ukraine has
also enhanced other Eurasian relationships—between Russia and Iran,
and Russia and North Korea—while intensifying and interweaving the
challenges the respective revisionists pose.
The world could be as little as one mishandled crisis away from
pervasive Eurasian conflict.
Thus, the United States would have great difficulty mobilizing for a
multithreaded war, or even mobilizing for protracted conflict in a single
region while keeping allies supplied in others. It might struggle to gener-
ate the vast magazines of munitions needed for great-power conflict or
to replace ships, planes, and submarines lost in the fighting. It would
surely be hard-pressed to keep pace with its most potent rival in a po-
tential war in the western Pacific; as a Pentagon report puts it, China is
now “the global industrial powerhouse in many areas—from shipbuilding
to critical minerals to microelectronics,” which could give it a crucial mo-
bilization advantage in a contest with the United States. If war does en-
gulf multiple theaters of Eurasia, Washington and its allies might not win.
It isn’t helpful to pretend that there is an obvious, near-term solution
to these problems. Focusing U.S. military power and strategic attention
overwhelmingly on Asia, as some analysts advocate, would take a toll
on American global leadership in any circumstances. At a time when the
Middle East and Europe are already in such profound turmoil, it could
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be tantamount to superpower suicide. But although dramatically ramp-

ing up military spending to drive down global risk is strategically essen-
tial, it seems politically inexpedient, at least until the United States suf-
fers a more jarring geopolitical shock. In any case, it would take time—
time Washington and its friends might not have—for even sizable in-
creases in defense outlays to have a tangible military effect. The Biden
administration’s approach seems to involve muddling through in Ukraine
and the Middle East, making only marginal, selective increases in mili-
tary spending, and betting the house that China doesn’t become more
bellicose—a policy that could work well enough, but could also fail dis-
astrously.
The international scene has darkened dramatically in recent years.
In 2021, the Biden administration could envision a “stable and predicta-
ble” relationship with Russia—until that country invaded Ukraine in
2022. In 2023, U.S. officials deemed the Middle East quieter than at any
time this century—just before a devastating, regionally destabilizing con-
flict broke out. U.S.-Chinese tensions aren’t particularly febrile at the mo-
ment, but sharpening rivalry and a shifting military balance make for a
dangerous mix. Great catastrophes often seem unthinkable until they
happen. As the strategic environment deteriorates, it’s time to recognize
how eminently thinkable global conflict has become.
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CLIMATE VULNERABILITY OF PAKISTAN

AND PLIGHT OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE
Pakistan produces less than 1% of the world’s carbon footprint yet
is suffering the biggest consequences of climate change. According to
the Global Climate Risk Index, Pakistan is currently the fifth most cli-
mate-vulnerable country in the world, having lost nearly ten thousand
lives and suffering economic losses worth 3.8 billion USD due to climate
change throughout the years 1999 to 2018. Changing seasonal weather
patterns, rising temperatures, variability of monsoons and melting of
glaciers in the north — compounded with recurrent extreme weather
events and natural disasters — are just some of the effects of climate
change that Pakistan has been forced to contend with in recent years.
In the aftermath of Pakistan's devastating 2022 floods, concerns around
sustainability, justice, and equity gaps in policy responses were ex-
posed. This has reignited the discussion for transformative climate jus-
tice and calls for greater accountability and responsibility for emissions.
While there is an urgent need for both global and local policies prioritiz-
ing climate justice and reparations, there are few practical policy actions
associated with implementing these principles. Floods persist as one of
the most frequent and devastating natural disasters, affecting millions
worldwide, especially in developing countries. The likelihood of such
events has increased due to the rising frequency of extreme weather
conditions. In 2022, Pakistan experienced unprecedented flooding that
submerged a third of the country, displacing 30 million people and re-
sulting in a staggering cost of US$ 30 billion and 2,000 lives. This imme-
diate human toll was compounded by the financial burden of flood ad-
aptation and mitigation measures.
Despite contributing just 0.3% to global emissions, Pakistan's peo-

ple are confronted with a staggering 15-fold higher risk of death from
climate-related disasters compared to other countries. The failure of
high-income countries to reduce emissions places immense pressure to
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adapt to the consequences of climate change. The 2022 floods in Paki-

stan emphasize the need for both global and local policies to prioritize
climate justice and reparations. Pakistanis face vulnerabilities rooted in
poverty, colonial legacy, and weak governance, necessitating a socially
and environmentally equitable response. Accordingly, it is vital to recog-
nize the multidimensional impact of climate-induced disasters to effec-
tively address this pressing issue. The blog discusses Pakistan’s expe-
rience with floods, identifying key sustainability, justice and equity gaps
in policy responses and a way forward based on elements of a trans-
formative climate justice framework.
Floods expose vulnerabilities by uncovering (and exacerbating) ex-

isting inequalities and injustices in society, such as poverty, gender dis-
crimination, ethnic marginalization, and lack of access to basic services.
These can cause loss of life, displacement, damage infrastructure, dis-
rupt livelihoods, and increase health risks. Vulnerability to floods isn't
uniform; some individuals lack the resources and opportunities neces-
sary to cope, recover, or adapt, exacerbating disparities. These disas-
ters not only devastate lives but also impede progress towards achieving
SDGs related to poverty eradication, health, education, gender equality,
and environmental protection. Floods thus illuminate systemic injustices
and underscore the need for equitable and sustainable finance. Climate-
induced events like floods are not just natural phenomena, they are in-
extricably linked to social and environmental justice, as the poor popu-
lations bear the disproportionate burden of these events' impacts. These
issues raise serious concerns about climate justice. Climate justice can
be approached in various ways within policy discourse. One approach
views it as a conflict between wealthy and poorer nations, developed
and developing countries, centred on historical culpability for emissions.
Alternatively, it can be framed as a transition towards a low-carbon econ-
omy, seeking to balance mitigation efforts with adaptation, development,
and equity considerations. Another perspective focuses on vulnerability,
emphasising the need to protect the most affected and least responsible
parties from the impacts of climate change.
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Climate justice has gained attention among activists, scholars, and

policymakers, yet its translation into concrete policies and practices re-
mains a work in progress, with specific implementation pathways still
being developed. There is more discussion on distributional aspects
(who will be affected by floods and climate change) than procedural as-
pects (i.e., who gets a say in decisions). There is therefore limited em-
pirical evidence on the impact of different forms of participation on out-
comes of flood management. Additionally, efforts tend to prioritise short-
term emergency responses over long-term systemic solutions, including
addressing the root causes of flood risks.
The concept of transformative climate justice bridges the gap be-

tween idealistic climate justice notions and practical policymaking by
recognising and addressing local vulnerabilities. It targets the root
causes of the climate crisis, focusing on economic and social inequali-
ties, and advocates for inclusive and participatory governance to chal-
lenge prevailing power structures. In the context of floods, these frame-
works highlight the north-south divide, the plight of marginalised com-
munities, and the paramount importance of equitable representation in
critical funding decisions. Differing priorities between high-income and
low- and middle-income countries on sustainability highlight contrasting
perspectives. As historically major emitters, high-income countries ben-
efited from fossil fuels, while low- and middle-income countries face cli-
mate vulnerabilities, lacking access to clean energy and finance due to
historical injustices. Low- and middle-income countries call for support
in adaptation and mitigation, while high-income countries stress collec-
tive action and shared responsibility in addressing climate change.
Achieving climate justice is an endeavor, fraught with trade-offs

and uncertainties. It necessitates addressing root causes and long-term
consequences while respecting and upholding the rights and needs of
those affected. Additionally, there is a pressing need for more research
on climate justice led by the developing countries, as current studies are
predominantly shaped by high-income countries’ viewpoints and agen-
das. The distinct interests and obligations of the rich and poor countries
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significantly shape international climate negotiations and outcomes.

Moreover, the landscape of climate justice is continually evolving, intro-
ducing new ideas, concepts, and challenges. All of this limits the scope
for transformative change and raises the question of how justice can be
practically applied to the ways developing countries adapt to growing
and on-ground impact of climate change.
In 2022, Pakistan witnessed record-breaking floods during the

summer, displacing a sixth of its population and causing extensive dam-
age to infrastructure, livestock, and agriculture. These floods surpassed
the devastation of the 2010 floods, earlier deemed as the worst disaster
seen by the UN. The economic loss was projected at 2.2% of Pakistan's
GDP, with around 2,000 deaths along with the destruction of 2 million
homes. It is thought that global warming may have increased rainfall in-
tensity by 50%, leading to eight cycles of monsoon rain instead of the
usual four, with certain areas experiencing rainfall exceeding 500% of
the 30-year average.
The burden of the devastating human and economic costs of the

floods falls disproportionately on the poor. Pakistan allocates less than
7% of its GDP to social protection while as many as 9.1 million Paki-
stanis fell into poverty due to these floods. Areas lacking social safety
nets experienced outbreaks of water-borne diseases. Many of the dis-
placed were children needing immunization and nutrition, elderly with
special needs, and pregnant women with reproductive care needs.
Reaching the affected populations proved difficult in the aftermath of the
floods. Of 33 million affected people across 72 districts, only 5.2 million
were targeted by the Flood Response Plan. Inaccessibility due to secu-
rity concerns or damaged infrastructure, as well as specific challenges
related to gender, age, disability, or ethnicity, further exacerbated the
situation.
Compensation for the loss – where does Pakistan stand?
Pakistan’s floods starkly demonstrate three ways in which the

principals of climate justice are challenged:
304 | P a g e
Responsibility: Pakistan continues to bear the brunt of actions by

other countries with higher emissions and more historical responsibility
for causing climate change
Vulnerability: The floods disproportionately affect the poorest and

most vulnerable populations, who are more likely to live in flood-
prone/affected areas.
Climate politics: Pakistan’s insufficient resources and access to cli-

mate finance hinder its ability to undertake a just transition to a low-
carbon economy.
Pakistan’s floods have rekindled discussions about 'loss and damage,'

prompting calls for compensation from the countries that significantly
contribute to climate change. Pakistan’s emissions are negligible (less
than 1%) compared to the over 50% share of China, US, EU, and India.
However, Pakistan ranks amongst the ten most vulnerable countries to
climate change. A recent study quantified economic losses for the first
time, attributing US$ 60 billion of losses in Pakistan to the largest emit-
ters, notably the US and China, as a consequence of their fossil fuel-
driven emissions.
Pakistan's situation highlights crucial questions in the climate jus-

tice agenda for developing countries. It prompts discussions on the ac-
countability of high-income countries for historical and current emis-
sions, as well as their obligation to provide adequate support to the de-
veloping countries for adaptation, mitigation, and development. Existing
literature, however, provides limited guidance on practical pathways to
tackle these challenges, underscoring complexity of the issue. Despite
Pakistan's high vulnerability to climate change and its efforts to garner
global support, its voice in international climate forums remains ineffec-
tive. Pakistan struggles with limited participation and influence in the
UNFCCC process due to a lack of capacity and resources. Additionally,
its dependence on fossil fuels hampers its ability to commit to ambitious
emission reduction targets, undermining its credibility as a leader in cli-
mate action.
305 | P a g e
In a significant shift, high-income countries, previously reluctant to

discuss loss and damage in UN climate negotiations, made it a focal
point at COP27. Pakistan played a crucial role in negotiating the estab-
lishment of a dedicated fund for climate-related loss and damage. The
specific structure of this fund will be decided at the upcoming COP in the
United Arab Emirates in 2023. Pakistan, as the chair of the G77 group
of developing nations and China, had called for the creation of a finance
facility at COP27 to compensate countries for the "loss and damage"
incurred due to extreme weather events. However, ahead of COP28, the
modalities of the fund still remain unclear.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s floods are not an isolated incidents but rather manifesta-

tions of an escalating climate change pattern spanning decades. Ad-
dressing these events in isolation would be a dereliction of duty to
those most affected, further perpetuating ongoing “cycles of crisis”. Cli-
mate injustice is deeply rooted in social and economic disparities influ-
enced by power structures, extending beyond climate issues. How-
ever, a transformative approach challenging these dynamics could
face resistance from vested interests. Powerful nations often evade ac-
countability for their historical actions, including colonialism, slavery, or
climate-related harm. It is crucial to focus on what the global commu-
nity and historical emitters can do to reduce emissions and establish
climate compensation mechanisms, beyond what Pakistan's govern-
ment and its citizens can do (and they can do plenty). Pakistan expects
debt relief, time-bound financing for energy transition, and emission re-
duction commitments from the developed countries. Despite initiatives
like the Debt Service Suspension Initiative by the World Bank and IMF
in 2020 for COVID-19, similar support has not been extended for ex-
treme climate events, highlighting ongoing challenges in climate poli-
tics. Moreover, new funding for fossil fuel exploration continues una-
bated. To ensure climate justice and integrate different frameworks in
flood response, it is imperative to adopt flexible, adaptive, and inclusive
306 | P a g e
approaches. This entails establishing a global mechanism to provide fi-

nancial support to vulnerable countries, based on common but differ-
entiated responsibilities. Achieving consensus on climate financing at
COP28 will require navigating resistance from high-income nations. It's
crucial to promote low-carbon, resilient, and equitable development
pathways in Pakistan that respect ecological limits and cultural diver-
sity. Additionally, empowering the voices of the most affected, includ-
ing farmers, women, children, minorities, and displaced individuals, in
decision-making processes remains paramount.
307 | P a g e
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ENSHRINED

IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION OF
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN.
Article 8: Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental
rights to be void
- This article declares that any law that is inconsistent with or in dero-
gation of fundamental rights shall be considered void.
Article 9: Security of person
- Article 9 ensures the security of an individual's person, emphasizing
that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty except in accordance
with the law.
Article 10: Safeguards as to arrest and detention
- This article outlines safeguards for individuals who are arrested or de-
tained, ensuring fair treatment and protection of their rights.
Article 11: Slavery is non-existent, and forbidden
- Article 11 prohibits all forms of slavery and forced labor, ensuring the
freedom and dignity of individuals.
Article 12: Protection against retrospective punishment
- This article protects individuals from retrospective punishment, em-
phasizing the principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws.
Article 13: No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the
same offense more than once
- Article 13 establishes the principle of double jeopardy, preventing in-
dividuals from being prosecuted or punished for the same offense
more than once.
308 | P a g e
Article 14: Inviolability of dignity of man

- Article 14 emphasizes the inviolability of the dignity of every individ-
ual, promoting the protection of human rights.
Article 15: Freedom of movement
- Article 15 guarantees the freedom of movement to every citizen
within the territory of Pakistan, subject to reasonable restrictions im-
posed by law.
Article 16: Freedom of assembly
- Article 16 grants citizens the right to assemble peacefully and without
arms, subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order.
Article 17: Freedom of association
- Article 17 ensures the freedom of association, allowing citizens to
form associations or unions, subject to certain reasonable restrictions.
Article 18: Freedom of trade, business, or profession
- Article 18 protects the freedom of trade, business, or profession, sub-
ject to certain limitations imposed by law.
Article 19: Freedom of speech
- Article 19 guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression, with certain reasonable restrictions in the interest of public
order.
Article 19 A: Right of Information
Under Article 19-A of the Constitution, RTI (Right to information) is a
fundamental right of every citizen of Pakistan to have the right to have
access to information in all matters of public importance subject to reg-
ulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law.
Article 20: Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious
institutions
309 | P a g e
- Article 20 grants citizens the freedom to profess and practice their re-
ligion, including the right to manage religious institutions.
Article 21: Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particu-
lar religion
- Article 21 safeguards against the use of taxation for the promotion of
any particular religion.
Article 22: Safeguard as to educational institutions in respect of
religion
- Article 22 provides safeguards for educational institutions to maintain
their autonomy in matters of religion, allowing them to impart religious
instruction.
Article 23: Provision as to property
- Article 23 outlines provisions related to the right to property, empha-
sizing its protection under the constitution.
Article 24: Protection of property rights
- Article 24 further reinforces the protection of property rights, recogniz-
ing the importance of safeguarding individuals' interests in their prop-
erty.
Article 25: Equality of citizens
- Article 25 enshrines the principle of equality before the law and equal
protection of the law for all citizens.
Article 25 A: Right to Education
The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children
of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be deter-
mined by law
Article 26: Non-discrimination in respect of access to public
places
310 | P a g e
- Article 26 prohibits discrimination in access to public places on the

basis of race, religion, caste, sex, or place of birth.
Article 27: Safeguard against discrimination in services
- Article 27 ensures safeguards against discrimination in services pro-
vided by the state on the basis of race, religion, caste, sex, or place of
birth.
Article 28: Preservation of language, script, and culture
- Article 28 emphasizes the preservation of regional languages, scripts,
and cultures, recognizing their significance in the diverse fabric of the
nation.
311 | P a g e

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