Inocando FP

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Inocando, Justine Julian O.

The Necessity of Providing Reasons to Act Morally

In the previous chapters, Peter Singer evaluated different ethical issues and tried to
provide practical considerations for understanding and responding to the ethical problems. As
Singer closes the book, he leads readers to explore the question, “Why act morally?” The
question seems to demand reasons for acting morally rather than opting to act and live immorally
or indifferently. Some thinkers have rejected the question as “logically improper” (Singer 1993,
315). However, this paper argues that it is necessary to provide reasons to act morally in light of
the inalienability of self-interests.

In the last chapter, Singer highlights again the ethical point of view he posits, which
requires and challenges agents to “go beyond the personal basis of action and acting only on
judgments one is prepared to prescribe universally” (Singer 1993, 317). This view is visible in
the previous chapters where Singer gives suggestions on addressing pressing ethical issues.
Some of these are becoming vegetarian or aiding in reducing absolute poverty. Singer admits that
these prescriptions and conclusions “require so much of us,” which could be understood as
implying the consideration of interests. With our interests on the rack, “should we bother about
ethics at all?” (Singer 1993, 314). Admitting the inalienability of self-interests, and providing
reasons that would motivate people to transcend their self-interests to act morally becomes
practically necessary if we are to continue to advocate morality today.

Within this context, Singer is correct in rectifying the traditional false view that an action
is moral without the need for further explanation insofar as it is done because it is right in the
absence of any ulterior motives. This disinterested view, as Singer points out, leaves ethics
“hanging without support” as it is without any rational justification (Singer 1993, 325).
However, Singer affirms that this does not mean that people should stop acting correctly just
because they are right without any further reasons to do them.

Singer appeals to Hare to demonstrate a viable justification of ethics in relation to


self-interest to address the failure of the disinterested view. Singer agrees that in searching for
reasons for acting ethically and living an ethical life, one must look for all reasons while also
considering self-interested ones. These reasons would lead the person to take the ethical point of
view as a way of life, which would make the things the person assumes to be right as part of the
person’s interests (Singer 1994, 326). The difference between this approach and the traditional
view is that it begins not with the presumption that being ethical is doing moral acts simply
because they are right without the need for other reasons, but with the reasons gathered by the
person that guides the person’s way of living to be an ethical person.

It must be clarified that while self-interested reasons are considered in the justification,
they should not be the primary motivations for living an ethical life and determining what is
right. Bradley argues that appealing to self-interest is misconstruing ethics (Singer 1993, 322).
Explaining the argument, Singer affirms that acting based on self-interest is not acting morally at
all (Singer 1994, 323).

At this point, this paper has already established the careful participation of the person’s
inalienable interests in finding reasons to drive a person toward living an ethical life. However,

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Inocando, Justine Julian O.

the fundamental demand remains unaddressed: what are the reasons that would compel people to
act morally and take up an ethical point of view?

Singer looks at happiness as a probable compelling reason that would suffice the demand
this paper attempts to provide (Singer 1993, 326). Some thinkers ground happiness in the
dynamics of reward and punishment in the afterlife. However, Singer believes that these
arguments are not feasible anymore today (Singer 1993, 326). He tried to explore other facts
where ethics and self-interest coincide like benevolence or sympathy and even implicate
Maslow’s assertion of the human need for self-actualization (Singer 1993, 327). The problem
with benevolence and sympathy is that they may be suppressed to feed one’s happiness.
Maslow’s self-actualization theory, on the other hand, is insufficient in showing how it would
constitute the happiness of the individual (Singer 1993, 327). Singer even looks into the notion
of a meaningful life as he explores happiness and the concurrence of ethics and self-interest
(Singer 1993, 331).

Singer ends the chapter with an unsurprising but impactful conclusion: there is no single
and accurate answer to the question at hand (Singer 1993, 335). But insofar as the question
remains to be raised and unanswered, people who are reflective enough would appreciate the
discourse Singer stimulated. While there remains to be a necessity to provide reasons to act
morally, Singer also wishfully remarks that there could probably be a time when people would
grow out of their interests and become conscious of their place in the world (Singer 1993, 334).
They are led to reflect on their purpose, which the author of this paper believes would lead to a
state where the person acts beyond personal basis. But insofar as people are still concerned about
their interests, the discourse on “why act morally?” should continue to provide reasons for
people to live ethically.

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Inocando, Justine Julian O.

Bibliography

Singer, Peter. 1993. “Why Act Morally?” Chapter. In Practical Ethics, 2nd ed., 314-335.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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