JANUARY 2023

MOST IMPORTANT SC
CRAFTED AND DRAFTED WITH
JUDGMENTS LOVE BY STUDENTS FROM
NLSIU AND NLU-DELHI
(JAN ‘23)
Judgment Space for Notes
1. Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India ★
 Bench: Justices S Abdul Nazeer, BR Gavai, AS Bopanna, V
Ramasubramanian and BV Nagarathna.
 The Union Government's decision to demonetize the Rs. 500
and Rs. 1000 denominations of currency upheld by the
Supreme Court Constitution Bench by a 4:1 majority.
i. Even though demonetization was well-intentioned,
according to Justice BV Nagarathna's dissenting
opinion, it must be declared unlawful on legal grounds
(and not on the basis of objects).
 Demonetization had a reasonable nexus to the objectives
(eliminating black marketing, terror funding, etc.), according to
Justice BR Gavai, who read out the majority ruling. Whether or
not the goal was accomplished is irrelevant, he said.
i. “There has to be great restraint in matters of economic
policy. Court cannot supplant the wisdom of executive
with its wisdom.”
 Section 26(2) of the RBI Act: “On recommendation of the
Central Board the Central Government may, by notification in
the Gazette of India, declare that, with effect from such date as
may be specified in the notification, any series of bank notes of
any denomination shall cease to be legal tender save at such
office or agency of the Bank and to such extent as may be
specified in the notification.”
i. The Bench ruled that Section 26(2) of the RBI Act,
granting authority to the Central government to
invalidate entire sets of currency notes, can indeed be
utilized for the demonetization of an entire currency
series. The Court also emphasized that the provision
cannot be invalidated as unconstitutional due to
excessive delegation, as there are inherent protective
measures in place.
ii. “Restrictive meaning cannot be given to word "any" in
Section 26(2) of RBI Act. The modern trend is of
pragmatic interpretation. Interpretation which leads to
absurdity must be avoided. The purposes of the Act
must be considered while interpretation.”
iii. Justice Nagarathna, in her dissenting opinion,
contended that the term "any series" as stated in Section
26(2) should not be interpreted as encompassing "all
series".

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  “Section 26(2) can be only for a particular series
of currency notes & not for the whole series of
currency notes of a denomination.”

2. Ashok Pandey v. Union of India and Ors.

 Bench: Justices SK Kaul and AS Oka
 The SC has has held that the Constitution of India does not
contain any clause that forbids lawyers practicing within the
Supreme Court from being designated as judges in High
Courts. The observation was made in response to a petition that
argued against the eligibility of individuals who had initially
registered with a State Bar Council and later transitioned their
practice to the Supreme Court, citing Article 217 of the
Constitution.
i. “...on a bare reading of the petition, it is meritless and
a complete waste of judicial time. The reading sought
to be put to Article 217 would amount to the saying
that the Supreme Court is not one of the courts from
which judges can be appointed to the High
Courts…There is nothing in the Constitution which
provides a prohibition for a lawyer practicing in the
Supreme Court to be appointed as a judge of the High
Courts. In fact, every lawyer is enrolled at the Bar
Council of a particular State.”

3. Kaushal Kishore v. State of UP ★

 Five Judges’ Constitution Bench: Justices S. Abdul Nazeer,
B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B.V.
Nagarathna.
 The origin of the case lies in the Bulandshahr rape incident,
during which Azam Khan, the then Minister of the State of Uttar
Pradesh, downplayed the seriousness of the act by attributing it
to a 'political conspiracy with no substantial basis'. Subsequently,
the survivors of the incident lodged a formal request with the SC,
urging action against Khan. In response to this, the Court
instructed Khan to provide an unreserved apology. During this
process, the Court remarked that the case raises significant
concerns relating to the obligations of the state and the
boundaries of freedom of speech and expression. This led to the
case being referred to a Constitution Bench in 2017.
 The Court had framed five questions in the matter, that were then
answered in the present final judgment:

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 i. Can a fundamental right under Articles 19 or 21 of
the Constitution of India be claimed other than
against the state or its instrumentalities?
 The Bench held that “…a fundamental right
under Article 19 or 21 can be enforced even
against persons other than the state or its
instrumentalities.”
ii. Is the state under a duty to affirmatively protect the
rights of citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution
even against a threat to the liberty of citizens by the
acts or omissions of another citizen or private agency?
 The Bench held that “The state is under a duty to
affirmatively protect the rights of a person under
Article 21 whenever there is a threat to personal
liberty even by a non-state actor.”
iii. Can a statement made by minister traceable to any
affairs of the state or for the protection of the
government be attributed vicariously to the
government itself, especially in view of the principle of
collective responsibility?
 The Bench held that “A statement made by a
minister even if traceable to any affairs of the state
or for protection of the government cannot be
attributed vicariously to the government by
invoking the principle of collective
responsibility…”
 In her dissenting opinion, Justice B.V.
Nagarathna noted that if a Minister makes
derogatory comments while acting in an "official
capacity," those statements can be vicariously
attributed to the government. Nevertheless, if the
Ministers' statements are isolated remarks that do
not align with the government's stance, they
would be considered personal comments, she
clarified. The Judge indicated her reluctance to
establish guidelines for curtailing derogatory or
venomous statements by public officials, stating
that this issue should be dealt with by the
Parliament.
a. “It is for the party to control the speeches
made by their ministers which can be done
by forming a code of conduct. Any citizen

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 who feels attacked by such speeches made
or hate speech by public functionary etc
can approach court for civil remedies.”
iv. Does a statement made by a minister inconsistent with
the rights of a citizen under Part III of the
Constitution constitute a violation of such
constitutional rights and is actionable as a
constitutional tort?
 The Bench held that “A mere statement made by
a minister inconsistent with the rights of a citizen
of Part III of the Constitution may not constitute a
violation of constitutional rights and become
actionable as a constitutional tort. But, if as a
consequence of such a statement, any act of
omission or commission is done by the officers
resulting in harm or loss to a person or citizen,
then the same may be actionable as a
constitutional tort.”
 In sum, the Bench has held that additional restrictions, not found
in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed on the exercise of right to
free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of Ministers, MPs and MLAs.
It held that the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) for restricting
free speech are exhaustive.

4. KC Cinema v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and others and

connected matters.
 Bench: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justice PS Narasimha.
 The Supreme Court has ruled that cinema hall operators have
the right to prevent patrons from bringing their own food
and drinks into the theatres, asserting that this restriction is " not
unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable."
 Article 19 of the Constitution: Protection of certain rights
regarding freedom of speech etc.
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) omitted
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any
occupation, trade, or business.

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 i. "The condition of entry is imposed as a direct result of
the exercise of the right of cinema owners to carry on a
business or trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution. The commercial logic of prohibiting
movie goers from carrying their own food to the cinema
hall is to stimulate and boost a vital aspect of the
business – the sale of food and beverages. If business
owners are not permitted to determine the various
facets of their business (in accordance with law),
economic activity would come to a grinding halt. While
movie goers may have no choice but to sign on the
proverbial dotted line (and thereby not carry any food
of their own into the theatre) in order to enter the
cinema hall and watch a movie of their choice, this does
not by itself render the condition of entry unfair,
unreasonable or unconscionable…"
ii. “Whether or not to watch a movie is entirely within the
choice of viewers. If viewers seek to enter a cinema hall,
they must abide by the terms and conditions subject to
which entry is granted. Having reserved the right of
admission, it is open to theatre owners to determine
whether food from outside the precincts of the cinema
hall should be permitted to be carried inside.”
iii. “As for movie goers with chronic diseases who may
have received dietary instructions from their doctors or
who may otherwise be under dietary restrictions due to
their medical condition, we request cinema hall owners
to consider requests from such movie goers on a case-
by-case basis.”

5. Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation Ltd v. Kerala

Ayurvedic Co Operative Society Ltd.
 Bench: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justice Hima Kohli
 Noting that the government is not endowed with unrestricted
authority in expending public funds, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle that government contracts should
generally be assigned through a competitive tendering
procedure.
 The Court emphasized that the divergence from this tendering
process must not be “unreasonable or discriminatory”, stating its
disapproval of the State of Uttar Pradesh for issuing a
procurement order for Ayurvedic medicines without following

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 the tender route. The Court stressed that the tender process
ensures a fair competitive environment for competing entities.
i. “Inviting tenders and conducting public auctions are
considered to be preferred methods of allocation for
two reasons: firstly, procurement can be made at the
best price; and secondly, allocation is through a
transparent process. However, if the purpose of
allocation by the State is not revenue maximization, the
State could award contracts through other methods,
provided it is non-arbitrary and meets the requirements
of Article 14.”
 The court highlighted that the following principles govern the
Government contracts:
(i) Government action must be just, fair and reasonable and
in accordance with the principles of Article 14;
and
(ii) While government can deviate from the route of tenders
or public auctions for the grant of contracts, the deviation
must not be discriminatory or arbitrary. The deviation from
the tender route has to be justified and such a justification
must comply with the requirements of Article 14.

6. Advocates Association Bengaluru v. Barun Mitra and Anr. ★

 Bench: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Abhay S Oka
 The SC has issued a significant clarification regarding the
categorization of vacancies in a High Court when a Judge is
transferred from another High Court. Typically, High Courts
maintain a specific balance between judges from the Bar and
those from the judicial service. In general, around two-thirds of
High Court judges are appointed from the Bar, while the
remaining one-third are promoted from the district judicial
service. This raised a question of whether a judge transferring
from one High Court to another should be classified under the
'bar quota' or 'service quota'.
 The SC asserted that when a judge is transferred from one HC
to another, they do not carry a specific label of being a 'bar judge'
or a 'service judge.' Instead, they are transferred as a judge
without such categorization. The responsibility of determining
how to categorize the vacancies in the receiving High Court
should be left to the discretion of the Chief Justice of that High
Court.

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 i. “It should be appreciated that in every High Court
there is a sanctioned strength of judges. 2/3rd of the
judges are from the bar and 1/3rd are from the service.
If a judge is transferred from a court, it is not as if a
replacement can be provided from the bar or the service
from that court, as the total strength of a court is
specified.”
ii. “When a judge is transferred to another court, he is a
transferred judge - neither categorised from the bar nor
from the service. In the Court where he is transferred,
he occupies a physical position in the strength of that
court and unless correspondingly judges are
transferred from that court, there will be lesser persons
appointed in that court from bar/service, as the total
strength of the court to which the transfer has been
made cannot be exceeded.”
iii. “The transferred judge does not carry the label of a bar
or a service judge and it is up to the Chief Justice of
Court where to he is transferred to reduce the inflow in
the Court of transfer, i.e from the bar or the service.
Similarly, if from the Court where to judges are
transferred, in turn judges from other category are
transferred to other courts, they in turn will carry the
label of a transferred judge and not from the bar or
from service. This aspect is being clarified as there
appear to be some doubts expressed as to how the
system of transfer will operate.”

7. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India ★

 Bench: CJI DY Chandrachud and Justice PS Narasimha
 The Supreme Court declined to consider a public interest
litigation (PIL) that contested the actions of Uttarakhand and
Gujarat in establishing committees for the introduction and
enforcement of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC). The Bench,
recognizing that these states had the constitutional authority to
create such committees according to Article 162 of the Indian
Constitution, declared that the PIL lacked validity or substance.
i. “Article 162 of the Constitution indicates that the
executive power of a State extends to matters with
respect to which the Legislature of the State has power
to make laws. In view of the provisions of Entry 5 of the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule, the

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 constitution of a Committee per se cannot be
challenged as ultra vires.”
 Article 162 of the Constitution: Extent of Executive Power
of State.
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive
power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which
the Legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided
that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State
and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power
of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive
power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law
made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.

 Entry 5 of List III (Concurrent List): Marriage and divorce;

infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy, and succession;
joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties
in judicial proceedings were immediately before the
commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal
law.

8. Residents Welfare Association & Anr. v. The Union Territory of Trivia:

Chandigarh & Ors. In 2016,
 Bench: Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna UNESCO granted
 In a significant development, the Supreme Court criticized the the highly coveted
widespread practice in Chandigarh of transforming single heritage
residential properties into apartments, considering the city's designation to the
heritage status and the sustainability principle. The SC Division Capitol Complex,
Bench observed that the UT administration had repealed the a creation by
controversial Chandigarh Apartment Rules, 2001, which aimed Corbusier,
to legitimize this practice. The Bench declared that, according to highlighting the
the relevant laws and rules, and with the repeal of the 2001 worldwide
Rules, any division, subdivision, or conversion of a residential recognition of the
unit in Phase I of Chandigarh into apartments is now prohibited. Swiss-French
i. Following the introduction of the 2001 Rules, which architect's
permitted residential plots in the union territory to be architectural
used for constructing apartments, the Chandigarh achievements.
administration faced strong public opposition. This
opposition was based on the concern that such a
practice would fundamentally change the city's
character and strain its existing infrastructure and
amenities. Consequently, the rules were revoked
through a notification in October 2007. However, the

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 appellant-association alleged that the administration
turned a blind eye to the covert conversion of residential
units into apartments, even after the rules were
withdrawn. It was claimed that builders and developers
routinely sold entire residential units as independent
floors to three different individuals or families, despite
the prohibition on further subdividing the self-
contained units. These three parties would jointly own
the residential unit and establish an internal agreement
through MoUs to govern their shared ownership.
ii. “It is high time that the legislature, executive, and the
policymakers at the centre and state-level take note of
the damages to the environment on account of
haphazard development and take necessary measures
to ensure development does not damage the
environment.”
iii. “We therefore appeal to the Legislature, the Executive
and the Policy Makers at the Centre as well as at the
State levels to make necessary provisions for carrying
out Environmental Impact Assessment studies before
permitting urban development”.

9. Manik Majumder And Ors. v. Dipak Kumar Saha (Dead)

through Lrs. And Ors.
 Bench: Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna
 The Supreme Court issued a split verdict in a case concerning
the importance of producing a Power of Attorney document
when a sale deed is executed based on it.
 While Justice Shah emphasized that the plaintiff had failed to
present the Power of Attorney document, Justice Nagarathna
held the view that the absence of such documentation did not
fatally undermine the plaintiff's case. She pointed out that
providing the original power of attorney was not an absolute
requirement to prove the validity of a sale deed. According to
Justice Nagarathna, the examination mandated by the
Registration Act of 1908 did not encompass determining
whether the individual who executed the document as a power
of attorney holder for the principal had a valid power of attorney
to do so or not.

 “Extinction of private character of a property can be inferred

from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient

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 length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or
public purposes.”

10. Deepal Ananda Patil v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

 Bench: Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice P.S.
Narasimha
 The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the fundamental legal
principle that an adjudicatory body is precluded from grounding
its decisions on any evidentiary matter unless the individual
subject to its use has been informed of such material and
afforded the opportunity to provide a response.
 In instances where the authority, without revealing any evidence
to the affected party, incorporates said evidence into its
deliberations and subsequently issues an adverse determination,
such a decision is tainted because it amounts to a deprivation of
a bona fide and efficacious chance for the party to confront the
allegations against them. This guiding principle has been
consistently observed in numerous judicial decisions where the
withholding of pertinent materials from the affected party has
been deemed fatal to the legitimacy of the hearing proceedings.
 Furthermore, the Bench in the case of T. Takano v. SEBI (2022)
distilled the pertinent tenets as follows:
i. A quasi-judicial authority is under an obligation to
disclose the materials it relies upon during the
adjudicatory process.
ii. The ultimate criterion for determining the necessity of
disclosure is whether the material in question is
germane to the objectives of the adjudication. If it is
determined to be relevant, then the principles of natural
justice mandate its proper revelation.

11. The Union of India & Ors. v. Rajib Khan & Ors. ★
 Bench: Justices MR Shah and CT Ravi Kumar
 The SC has affirmed that academic qualifications serve as a
legitimate criterion to establish distinct pay scales for various
employees, even when their job responsibilities are largely
similar in nature.
 The court opined that the High Court's perspective is at odds
with previous rulings of this Court, as exemplified in cases such
as Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers Federation
Limited and Another versus Balbir Kumar Walia and
others, (2021) 8 SCC 784; Director of Elementary

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 Education, Odisha and Others versus Pramod Kumar
Sahoo, (2019) 10 SCC 674; and Secretary Department of
Personnel Public Grievances & Pension & Anr. versus
T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 653.
i. It is imperative to emphasize that in the aforementioned
cases, the Supreme Court upheld the differentiation of
pay scales and pay structures based on varying
educational qualifications. Furthermore, it reiterated
that distinct educational qualifications and experience
requirements established for appointments can
constitute a valid basis for implementing different pay
scales and pay structures.
 Consequently, the court concluded that, "Applying the legal
principles established by this Court in the aforementioned
decisions to the circumstances of the present case, the High
Court's stance that educational qualifications cannot justify the
denial of Nursing Allowance to Nursing Assistants is
untenable."

12. Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of

Customs (Import), Nhava Sheva
 Bench: Justices Surya Kant and Vikram Nath
 In the present matter, the adjudicative bodies, particularly the
Commissioner of Customs (Appeal), extensively relied on
online resources like Wikipedia to substantiate their findings.
The Supreme Court, in response, made the following
observation:
i. "While we duly acknowledge the value of these
platforms, which offer free access to information
worldwide, it is imperative to exercise caution when
using such sources for the resolution of legal disputes.
We make this assertion because these sources,
notwithstanding their wealth of information, are
constructed upon a collaborative and user-driven
editing model that may not be entirely trustworthy in
terms of scholarly accuracy. This Court has previously
highlighted instances of such sources disseminating
misleading information. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon the courts and adjudicative authorities to
encourage legal practitioners to rely on more
dependable and authoritative sources."

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13. Jabir v. State of Uttarakhand
 Bench: Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and P S Narasimha
 In the present case, aside from the 'last seen' theory, there existed
no other corroborative circumstance or evidence. The SC
observed:
i. “In the present case, save the “last seen” theory, there
is no other circumstance or evidence. Importantly, the
time gap between when the deceased was seen in the
company of the accused on 09-10-1999 and the
probable time of his death, based on the postmortem
report, which was conducted two days later, but was
silent about the probable time of death, though it stated
that death occurred approximately two days before the
post mortem, is not narrow. Given this fact, and the
serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the
witnesses, as well as the fact that the FIR was lodged
almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on
the “last seen” circumstance (even if it were to be
assumed to have been proved) to convict the accused-
appellants is not justified.”

14. Guddan @ Roop Narayan v. State of Rajasthan

 Bench: Justices Krishna Murari and V. Ramasubramanian
 The SC made important observations wrt the conditions of Bail:
i. “The conditions of bail cannot be so onerous that
their existence itself tantamounts to refusal of bail. In
the present case, however, the excessive conditions
herein have precisely become that, an antithesis to the
grant of bail. Any other accused in a similar
circumstance at this point would not be in custody,
however, the present Appellant, because of the
conditions imposed, has not been able to leave the
languish of jail. Can the Appellant, for not being able
to comply with the excessive requirements, be detained
in custody endlessly? To keep the Appellant in jail, that
too in a case where he normally would have been
granted bail for the alleged offences, is not just a
symptom of injustice, but injustice itself.”

15. Google LLC v. Anr. ★

 Bench: CJI DY Chandrachud, Justices PS Narasimha, and JB
Pardiwala

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  The Supreme Court declined to intervene with the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal's (NCLAT) decision, which
had rejected the request to suspend the Competition
Commission of India's (CCI) penalty of Rs 1,338 crore imposed
on Google India for abusing its dominant position within the
Android ecosystem.
 Nevertheless, the Court directed the NCLAT to conclude the
appeal initiated by Google by March 31, 2023. The Supreme
Court took note of the fact that the NCLAT had instructed
Google to deposit 10% of the penalty without resolving the
stay application. Additionally, the NCLAT had postponed the
hearing of Google's appeal against the CCI's decision to April
2023. In light of these circumstances, Google had approached
the Supreme Court.
i. As the appeal remains pending, the Supreme Court
panel, led by Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud,
refrained from expressing any opinions on the merits of
the case.
 The bench also observed that the CCI's findings "cannot be
regarded as contrary to weight of record at interlocutory stage."
 The bench further noted, "Findings by CCI cannot be said to be
without jurisdiction or with manifest error."
 "We affirm the order of NCLAT declining interim relief though
for the reasons given above....Since appellants were pursuing
interlocutory remedies before NCLAT before and this court now,
the compliance with the order of CCI is extended by further
period of one week…" the bench stated in the order disposing of
Google's petition.

16. Saurav Das v. Union of India ★

 Bench: Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar
 The Supreme Court has ruled that law enforcement and
investigative agencies such as the CBI and ED cannot be
compelled to publish chargesheets in cases on a public platform
for unrestricted access by the general public.
 The court characterized as "misplaced" the reliance placed on
the Supreme Court's decision in the Youth Bar Association
Case by Advocate Prashant Bhushan. In that case, directions
were issued to the police to upload FIRs on a website within 24
hours, except in sensitive cases like rape and sexual offenses.
The Court determined that the directive in the Youth Bar
Association case does not extend to chargesheets.

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 The petitioner argued that a chargesheet, similar to an FIR,
qualifies as a 'public document' since its submission is an
action undertaken by a public official as part of their official
duties, falling within the definition of a 'public document'
outlined in Section 74 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Consequently, Bhushan contended that a chargesheet filed by a
police department or investigative agency should be subject to
the provisions of Section 76 of the Act, which mandates the
public disclosure of any public document by a public officer in
custody of such document to a person entitled to inspect it.
i. “It may as such, violate the rights of the accused as well
as the victim and/or even the investigation agency.
Putting the FIR on the website cannot be equated with
putting the charge sheets on public.”
ii. "Documents mentioned in S.74 of Evidence Act only
can be said to be public documents, certified copies of
which are to be given by the concerned public authority
having the custody of such a public document. Copy of
charge sheets along with necessary public documents
cannot be said to be public documents u/s 74 of the
Evidence Act".
 Justice CT Ravikumar pointed out that the Supreme Court's
ruling in the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case (which upheld
the PMLA provisions) had determined that an ECIR was not
equivalent to an FIR, and as a result, the accused was not entitled
to a copy of it. Therefore, the judge expressed doubt about
whether a directive could be issued to the ED to publicly release
chargesheets.
 The Court also determined that copies of the chargesheet and
relevant documents accompanying it do not fall within the
purview of Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act.
 Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Public
Documents
The following documents are public documents: --
(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts --
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, [of
any part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign
country;
(2) Public records kept [in any State] of private documents.

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17. Boby v. State of Kerala
 Bench: Justices B R Gavai and M M Sundresh
 The Supreme Court has noted that the admissibility of recovery
evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is questionable
when there is no documented record of the statement made by the
accused.
 Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: How much of
information received from accused, may be proved.
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered
inconsequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.
 “Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the fact discovered
embraces the place from which the object is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must
relate distinctly to the said fact. The information as to past user, or
the past history, of the object produced is not related to its
discovery.”
 “Two essential requirements for the application of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act are that (1) the person giving information must be an
accused of any offence and (2) he must also be in police custody.
The Court held that the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act
are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in
consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded
thereby that the information was true and consequently the said
information can safely be allowed to be given in evidence.”

18. Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) ★

 Bench: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi
 The Supreme Court has observed that it would be imprudent to
categorize every breach of a promise to marry as a false promise
and to initiate prosecution against an individual for the offense
of rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
 In the case at hand, several key facts were brought to light: (i)
The complainant was a married woman with three children. (ii)
The accused resided in a rented property situated in close
proximity to the complainant's residence. (iii) Although initially
hesitant, the complainant developed an affection for the accused,
and they both engaged in a sexual relationship. (iv) A child was
born as a result of their relationship. (v) In 2012, the complainant

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 visited the accused's hometown and discovered that he was
already married with children. (vi) Despite this revelation, the
complainant continued to reside separately with the accused.
(vii) In 2014, the complainant and her husband obtained a
divorce by mutual consent, after which she permanently left her
three children with her husband. (viii) The complainant filed a
complaint on March 21, 2015, alleging that she had consented
to a sexual relationship with the accused because he had
promised to marry her but subsequently failed to fulfill that
promise.
i. “One cannot deny a possibility that the accused might
have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her,
and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his
promise.”
 A false promise of marriage for obtaining consent for sexual
intercourse is considered as misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. Thus, it is
not considered as a valid consent in the eyes of the law and
would be charged under Section 375 of the IPC. The second
explanation of Section 375 of IPC provides punishment for rape
if sexual intercourse is done without victims' consent.
 Therefore, to sum up the law in these kinds of cases:
i. Intercourse under promise to marry constitutes rape
only if from initial stage accused had no intention to
keep the promise.
ii. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused
was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

19. Baharul Islam and Ors. v. Indian Medical Association and Ors. ★
 Bench: Justices B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna
 The Supreme Court has invalidated the Assam Rural Health
Regulatory Authority Act, 2004, which authorized individuals
with diplomas in Medicine and Rural Health Care to diagnose
certain common illnesses, perform minor medical procedures,
and prescribe specific medications.
i. “While the state has every right to devise policies for
public health and medical education with due regard to
peculiar social and financial conditions, these policies

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 ought not to cause an unfair disadvantage towards any
class of citizens.”
ii. “The citizens residing in rural areas are subjected to
direct and indirect forms of discrimination on the basis
of their place of birth or residence. Any variation in the
standards of the qualifications required of medical
practitioners who render services in rural areas qua
those rendering services in urban and metropolitan
areas circumscribe constitutional values of substantive
equality and non-discrimination.”
iii. Any variation in the standards of the qualifications
required of medical practitioners who render services in
rural areas vis-à-vis those rendering services in urban
and metropolitan areas is violative of the constitutional
values of substantive equality and non-discrimination.
 The Assam Act, enacted under the authority of Entry 25 of List
III, aimed not only to introduce a new educational framework in
the field of medicine but also to regulate the professional
activities of successful candidates. Furthermore, the regulatory
body established by this act was empowered to establish the
minimum standards for the educational program, including its
duration, curriculum, teaching methods, and examinations. The
challenged act also granted the state government the authority to
approve the establishment of medical institutions. The
Supreme Court bench determined that these matters fell
within the legislative domain of coordinating and
establishing standards for higher education institutions,
research institutions, and scientific and technical
institutions, as outlined in Entry 66 of the Union List.
 Importantly, the bench made a distinction between the concepts
of repugnancy and occupied field, clarifying that repugnancy
arises only when there is an actual conflict between a state law
and a union law, both enacted within their respective
jurisdictions and not exceeding their legislative competence. In
this particular case, the relevant legislative entry in the state list
was expressly made "subject" to a corresponding entry in the
union list, rendering the Assam legislature lacking in legislative
competence. The judgment stated, “The doctrine of repugnancy,
as defined in Article 254 of the Constitution, does not apply...”
While Entry 25 of List III grants powers to both central and state
legislatures to enact laws pertaining to education, it is important
to note that any such state legislation is subject to, among other

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 things, Entry 66 of List I. Consequently, when there is a direct
conflict between a state law and a union law regarding the
coordination and determination of standards in institutions for
higher education, such as in the context of medical education in
modern medicine, the state law lacks validity as the state
legislature lacks legislative competence.
 It is also noteworthy that the validity of a subsequent legislation,
namely the Assam Community Professionals (Registration
and Competency) Act, 2015, was upheld. This act came into
effect after the contested judgment of the Gauhati High Court.
i. “The 2015 Act is also not in conflict with the Indian
Medical Council Act, since the latter does not deal with
community health professionals who would practise as
allopathic practitioners in the manner as they were
permitted to practise under the Assam Act, in rural
areas of the state. Hence, the Act of 2015 is not hit by
Entry 66 of List I of the Constitution and is within the
legislative competence of the State Legislature under
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.”
 While upholding the validity of the Assam Community
Professional (Registration and Competency) Act, 2015, the
Supreme Court examined the scope of powers of legislature to
overrule a judgment.
i. “The Legislature cannot directly overrule a judicial
decision. But when a competent Legislature
retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation
of a judgment to make the decision ineffective, the said
exercise is a valid legislative exercise provided it does
not transgress on any other constitutional limitation.
Such legislative device which removes the vice in
previous legislation which has been declared
unconstitutional is not considered an encroachment on
judicial power but an instance of abrogation.
ii. The power of the sovereign legislature to legislate
within its field, both prospectively and retrospectively
cannot be questioned. It would be permissible for the
legislature to remove a defect in earlier legislation
pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its
powers by way of judicial review. This defect can be
removed both retrospectively and prospectively by a
legislative process and the previous actions can also be
validated.

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iii. But where there is a mere validation without the defect
being legislatively removed, the legislative action will
amount to overruling the judgment by a legislative fiat
which is invalid.”

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