B2_Villamarin

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant,

vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Complainant Alejandro
Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner.
Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her
husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Quilapio without the benefit of
marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio.

ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent can be held administratively liable.

RULING/ APPLICATION:

The Court remanded the case to the Court Administrator as there was a need to give the State the
opportunity to adduce evidence that it has a more "compelling interest" to defeat the claim of the
respondent to religious freedom.

The Court further stated that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause (Sec. 5, Art. III of the
Constitution). This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. The Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees
voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the
advancement of religious groups on their intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state.

The Court, in a separate case, also mentioned several tests in determining when religious freedom may be
validly limited. First, the Court mentioned the test of "immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community" and "infringement of religious freedom only to the smallest extent necessary"
to justify limitation of religious freedom. Second, religious exercise may be indirectly burdened by a
general law which has for its purpose and effect the advancement of the state's secular goals, provided
that there is no other means by which the state can accomplish this purpose without imposing such
burden. Third, the Court referred to the "compelling state interest" test which grants exemptions when
general laws conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest intervenes.

CONCLUSION:

The case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to
intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state
adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing
should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.