Professional Ethics Irac Internal Submission

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Foundations of Ethics (Symbiosis International University)
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PROFESSIONAL ETHCIS AND PROFESSIONAL ACOUNTING – 1ST INTERNAL
CASE ANALYSIS
IRAC I
CASE BRIEF
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Suo Motu Criminal Petition No 10 of 2001
Decided On: March 6, 2002
ARUNDHATI ROY, IN RE
(2002) 3 SCC 343
(In the matter of criminal contempt of Supreme Court)
HON’BLE JUDGES
G.B. Patnaik, J & R.P. Sethi, J
FACTS
 M/s Arundhati Roy resorted to dharna to protest against the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India 1 On receipt of contempt notice, she replied by
making derogatory remarks that the Supreme Court had no time for dealing with high profile
corruption cases, but is uneccesarily interfering with valid criticism and dissent of protestors.
 This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. Along with the
denial, Respondent’s response to the show cause notice criticized the Court for issuing
proceedings in the first place.
 On the basis of the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated against the
Respondent for imputing motives to the Court.
1
(2000) 10 SCC 644

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ISSUE
Whether Ms. Arundhati Roy is liable for criminal contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971?
RULES
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
Article 19(1)(a)- Freedom of Speech and Expression and Article 19(2)- Exceptions to Article
19(1)(a)
Article 129- Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a
Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
2. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (“the Act”)

Section 2(c)- Definition of criminal contempt
Section 12- Punishment for contempt of court
Section 14- Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.
ANALYSIS
Rule of law is the basic rule of governance of any civilized society. 2 The judicial integrity and
dignity is required to be maintained for better functioning of a democratic society in accordance
with Rule of Law.3 Any derogatory remarks, which erode the image of the judiciary and shakes the
confidence of the people in the ability and fairness of judiciary shall be strictly dealt with by
initiating contempt proceedings.4 Any words or expressions which scandalizes the judiciary and
interferes with effective administration of justice amounts 5 to criminal contempt, punishable under
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.6 In the present case, the contents of the affidavit eroded the dignity
of the judiciary by questioning its ability. In a country with a large number of illiterate people,
2
Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216
3
Harijai Singh, In re, (1996) 6 SCC 466; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US 331 (1946)
4
Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; R v. Gray, (1900) 2 QB 36
5
E.M. Shankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanna Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325
6
Section 2©, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

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such influencing statements create a negative impression about the judicial institution and whittles
the confidence reposed in it. Thus, the respondent shall be liable for contempt. Further, the defence
of fair criticism is available in a contempt case, in lieu of the freedom of speech and expression. 7
However, comments which may seem like fair criticism, but go to an extent of questioning judicial
integrity and efficiency shall not be spared.8 In the present case, though the comments appeared to
be fair criticism on the face of it they questioned the unbiased character and efficiency of the
judiciary. Further, criticisms are also treated differently on a case-case basis and in P.N.
Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker,9 the SC considered criticisms of judiciary made by a person who used
to be a part of the Judiciary. Thus, liability will differ depending upon the person who makes
criticism of the judicial system.
Furthermore, the defence that reply to a contempt notice cannot amount to contempt, by virtue of
second exception of Section 499 of IPC is invalid, as the principles of defamation cannot be
applied to Contempt.10
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that the comments made in the affidavit erode the dignity and integrity of
judiciary. As a result, the sacred function of due proceedings will be obstructed, thereby affecting
Rule of Law and the basic fabric of a democratic society. Therefore, it held Ms. Arundathi Roy
guilty of criminal contempt of Court and sentenced her to imprisonment for one day and imposed a
fine u/S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court refused to take any lenient view as the
respondent did not show any sign of guilt or remorse for her actions. The Court was justified in
light of the derogatory remarks made by the Respondent
7
Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950
8
Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re, AIR 1995 SC 2348
9
1988 AIR 1208
10
Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149; Surendra Nath Banerjee v. Chief Justice and
Judges of the High Court, ILR (1884) 10 Cal 109

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IRAC- II
CASE BRIEF
Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2006
Decided On: July 5, 2016
MAHIPAL SINGH RANA (Appellant)
Versus
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Respondent)
AIR 2016 SC 3302
(In the matter involving disciplinary proceedings under Advocates Act, 1961)
HON’BLE JUDGES
Anil R. Dave, J; Kurian Joseph, J &Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.
FACTS
 An appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the
judgment and order delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the High
Court found the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt for intimidating and threatening a Civil
Judge (Senior Division), and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months with a fine
of Rs. 2,000/- The High Court further directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to consider the
facts contained in the complaint of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and to initiate appropriate
proceedings against the appellant for professional misconduct.
 The appeal was admitted by Supreme Court and the part of the impugned judgment, which
imposed the sentence, was stayed and the appellant was directed not to enter the Court premises.

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Notice was issued to the Supreme Court Bar Association, Bar Council of India and to the
Attorney General.
ISSUE
Whether and to what extent, the Court has jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory power of Bar Council on
conviction of an advocate for criminal contempt and his right to practice.
RULES
1. Advocates Act, 1961
Section 38 - Appeal to the Supreme Court
Section 24A - Disqualification for enrolment as an Advocate
Article 129 -Supreme Court to be a court of record and has the power to punish for its contempt.
ANALYSIS
In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India 11, the court while examining its powers
under Article 129, held that this Court cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary committee of
the Bar Council and it is for the Bar Council to punish the advocate by debarring him from practice
or suspending his licence. It was further held that this court or the High Court can prevent the
contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts till he purges himself of the contempt
which is different from suspending or revoking the licence or debarring him to practice. Moreover,
the Rule for barring a lawyer from appearing in any court till he got himself purged of contempt by
an appropriate order of the court does not violate Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution nor
amounts to usurpation of power of adjudication and punishment conferred on the Bar Councils12.
In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court13 with reference to Section 34 of the Advocates
Act, it was held that the court has a right to bar the advocate concerned from appearing before the
11
(1998) 4 SCC 409
12
Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311
13
(2009) 8 SCC 106

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courts for an appropriate period of time. Regulation of right of appearance in courts is within the
jurisdiction of the courts.14
In Supreme Court Bar Association15, it was held that where the Bar Council fails to take action
inspite of reference made to it, this Court can invoke its appellate power under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act and exercise suo motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional
misconduct.
In view of such failure of the statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh
as well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the
Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary action.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court disposed of this appeal and upheld the conviction and the direction by the
Allahabad High Court that the advocate shall not be permitted to appear in courts in District Etah
until he purges himself of contempt. The Court also held Section 24A of the Advocates Act applies
to an advocate also and under this the enrolment of the contemnor Advocate will stand suspended
for two years. The Court also said that, as a disciplinary measure for proved misconduct, the
licence of the contemnor will remain suspended for further five years. The Court has however set
aside the imprisonment imposed on the Advocate.
IRAC-III
14
Ex-Captain Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45
15
(1998) 4 SCC 409

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CASE BRIEF
Civil Appeal No. 968 of 2009
Decided On: February 12, 2009
TUSHAR D. BHATT (Appellant)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANOTHER (Respondent)
(2009) 11 SCC 678
(In the matter of reference of Contempt of Court u/ Contempt of Courts Act, 1971)
HON’BLE JUDGES
Dalveer Bhandari, J & J.M. Panchal, J
FACTS:
The appellant had joined service of respondent no.1 as Food Inspector. he appellant worked for
14 years as Food Inspector at Ahmedabad as well as Gandhinagar Circle. Thereafter, for the first
time in 1996, he was transferred to Rajkot. He remained there for three years. On 30.9.1999, the
appellant was transferred to Bhuj. However, he did not join duty at Bhuj and after a period of 20
days, i.e. on 04.10.1999, he sent a fax message of illness of his mother. Though the appellant was
relieved on 05.10.1999 from Rajkot, yet he did not join duty at Bhuj. Afer that he was adviced by
Respondent No. 2 to join his duty at Bhuj, he still refused. The Assistant Commissioner, Bhuj
again on 04.01.2000 called upon the appellant to immediately join the duty, but the appellant not
comply with his direction. The appellant was served with a charge-sheet with certain charges
about his absence from duty, He on his own decided the place of discharging his duty without
receiving any prior permission of the competent officer instead of reporting at transferred place,

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He exerted mental pressure and also gave threats by writing letter to the Head of the department
for transferring him to a place of his choice.
ISSUE:
1. Is the punishment of dismissal from Service disproportionate to the guilt found to be

proved?
2. Is the scope of judicial review against actions taken by the Disciplinary Authority,
limited?
3. Is the transfer of the appellant mala fide?
RULES:
Rule 6 Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971.
Precedents used: Gujarat Electricity Board and Anr v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani
(MANU/SC/0200/1989) – “... If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance to the transfer
order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant Rules as has happened
ANALYSIS
Now, hearing the matter, the Division Bench observed that the appellant flouted the order of
transfer and deliberately remained absent from the duty without leave for over six months and he
indulged in the practice of brow-beating the superior officers and using intemperate language. The
legal position has been crystallized in number of judgments that transfer is an incidence of service
and transfers are made according to administrative exigencies16. In the instant case, in the entire
tenure of more than 18 years, the appellant was only transferred twice. The appellant's transfer
order cannot be termed as mala fide. The appellant was not justified in defying the transfer order
and to level allegations against his superiors and remaining absent from official duties. In the
interest of discipline of any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the
employees cannot be countenanced.
16
The Correspondent, Malankara v. J. Rabinson Jacob and Ors. (1998) 3 MLJ 595

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In Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani 17, This court observed
that transfer from one place to another is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public
administration. Similarly, in Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India and Others18 Court held that
absence from duty without proper intimation is indicated to be a grave offence warranting removal
from service. After thoroughly examining the matter in the instant case, the court dismissed the
appeal considering that the appeal is devoid of any merit and on consideration of the totality of the
facts and circumstances of this case, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
CONCLUSION
The appellant in the present matter failed to show cause as to why one of the punishments
indicated in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules should not be
imposed on him. The appellant has been giving improper and unaccepted justifications for failing
to obey the order of Head and remaining absent from his duties. It is thus concluded that the court
in hearing the present case has very well dismissed the appeal against the appellant as the appellant
failed to give answers for his unjustified and clearly seemed to be deliberate absence from his duty
calling him to be liable under the Provisions of Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules.
17
AIR 1989 SC 1433
18
AIR 2003 SC 1724

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IRAC-IV
CASE BRIEF
Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 312 of 2013
Decided On: 22.08.201
RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOYAL, ADVOCATE, IN RE
AIR 2014 SC 850
(Involving Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961)
HON’BLE JUDGES
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J & S.A. Bobde, J
PRIOR HISTORY
Arising out of Civil Appeal No. 1398 of 2005
FACTS
A civil appeal was dismissed in default vide order dated 8.3.2013 as none appeared to press the
appeal. An application for restoration of the said appeal was filed by Shri Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal, Advocate-on-Record. The Court was of the view that the facts contained in the application
were not correct and the counsel appearing for the applicant was not able to clarify the same. The
Court passed over the matter and asked the counsel appearing therein to call the AOR who would
be able to explain the factual controversy. When the matter was taken up in the second round AOR
refused to come to the Court. It was also pointed out that the said AOR has filed extremely large
number of cases in this Court but never appears in the Court. In view of the refusal of the AOR to
come to the Court, this Court had no other option but to dismiss the application. However, the
10

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Court issued a show cause notice to the said AOR as to why his name should not be removed from
the register of AOR, as his conduct was „unbecoming‟ of an AOR
ISSUE
Whether the act of lending signatures without taking responsibility towards the case amounts to
“misconduct”?
RULE
Advocates Act, 1961

Section 35- Punishment for professional and other misconduct
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has the power to take action against an AOR, by removing his name from the
register if it is of the opinion that he is guilty of “misconduct” or of “conduct unbecoming of an
advocate”.19 Such action is initiated when a complaint is filed or “otherwise”.20 Thus, it can be
interpreted that suo-motu cognizance can also be taken by the Supreme Court, if it forms a prima
facie opinion of “misconduct” by AOR.21 In the present case, prima facie opinion of “misconduct”
by AOR can be formed from the act of filing a large number of cases by lending signatures and
refusal to appear before the Court. Therefore, Court can initiate action suo-motu.
The term “misconduct” is wide and lacks a specific definition. It is widely described as a
“transgression of some established and definite rule of action, unlawful or improper behaviour,
willful in character, a dereliction of duty”.22 Lawyers, as professionals play a predominant role in
administration of justice and they have a duty to assist the court for dispensation of justice. 23 Every
lawyer who signs on a brief has to attend the proceedings before the Court. 24 Any refusal in this
regard is a dereliction of duty owed to Court and amounts to “misconduct” or “conduct
19
Order 4, Rule 8-A, Supreme Court Rules, 1966
20
Ibid
21
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of Inidia, AIR 1998 SC 1895; International Airports Authority of India
v. Grand Slam International, (1995) 3 SCC 151; MCD v. Tek Chand Bhatia, AIR 1980 SC 360; Krishun Gopal v.
Prakash Chandra, AIR 1974 SC 209
22
Black’s law dictionary, Ed. 16, 2016
23
Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 378; S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149; Bar
Council of Mahrashtra v. M. V. Dhabolkar, AIR 1976 SC 242
24
Lt. Col. SJ Choudhary v. State, AIR 1984 SC 618
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unbecoming of a lawyer”.25 The institution of AOR has been established to assist the Supreme
Court. A detailed examination is conducted to test if a lawyer is well versed with rules, procedure
and ethics required before enrolling him as an advocate. Thereafter, an AOR is entitled to act,
plead and conduct proceedings before this Court after filing memorandum of appearance on behalf
of a party.26 No other advocate other than AOR can appear, unless instructed by him. 27 In the
present case, the AOR merely lent his signatures to enter appearance on record for a petty amount
without any attachment with the case and never appeared before the Court. In Tahil Ram Issardas
Sadarangan v. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani28, such arrangement of lending signatures for the
purpose of record was held to violative of the duty owed by advocate to Courts and clients.
Therefore, in the instant case, the AOR violated his duty towards the Court and his actions amount
to “misconduct” and is also “conduct unbecoming of an advocate”. Further, an advocate has a duty
to revive the distressed client. 29 Exploiting the innocence of a client and disregard towards his
interest can be characterized as conduct “unbecoming of an advocate”. 30 The act of lending
signatures for a petty amount without appearing in Court is disservice to litigants. 31 In the present
case, the AOR breached his duty towards the clients and his acts can be characterized as “conduct
unbecoming of an advocate”
CONCLUSION
It’s hence known that “Law is no trade, briefs no merchandise”. An advocate being an officer of
the court has a duty to ensure smooth functioning of the Court. He has to revive the person in
distress and cannot exploit the helplessness of innocent litigants. A wilful and callous disregard for
the interests to the client may in a proper case be characterised as conduct unbefitting an advocate.
If the AOR does not discharge his responsibility in a responsible manner because he does not
appear whenever the matter is listed or does not take any interest in conducting the case, it would
amount to not playing any role whatsoever. In such a fact-situation, lending signatures for
consideration would amount to misconduct of his duty towards court. In case the AOR is only
25
Harish Uppal v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 739; N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shinde AIR 2001 SC 2028
26
Order 4, Rule 6(a), Supreme Court Rules, 1966
27
Order 4, Rules 6(b) & 10 , Supreme Court Rules, 1966
28
AIR 1993, SC 1182
29
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In re (1995) 3 SCC 619
30
Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar, AIR 2010 SC 1384; D. P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra, AIR 2001 SC 457; T.C.
Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvannathapuram, AIR 1999 SC 1385
31
Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangan v. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani, AIR 1993, SC 1182
12

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lending his signatures without taking any responsibility for conduct of a case, the very purpose of
having the institution of AOR stands defeated.
IRAC-V
CASE BRIEF
Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2008; Decided On: July 29, 2009
A.S. MOHAMMED RAFI (Appellant)
Versus
STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Respondent)
(2011) 1 SCC 688

HON’BLE JUDGES; B.N Agarwal, J; G.S Singhvi, J & Aftab Alam, J.
FACTS
Coimbatore Bar Association passed a resolution, exhorting its members not to defend the
policemen who were the accused in a particular criminal case. The Madras High, wherein the
resolution was challenged made some observations about the Coimbatore Bar Association in its
judgment. A civil appeal was filed before the Supreme Court seeking to quash the observations
made against it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the validity and propriety of this
resolution along with other resolutions of Bar Association, wherein members were asked not
defend rapists, mass murders, etc. Therefore, the matter is before this Hon’ble Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether resolution to not defend accused persons is against professional ethics?
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2. Whether resolution to not defend accused persons is against Article 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India?
RULES
1. The Constitution of India 1949

Art 22(1)- Right of accused to be defended by legal practitioner of “choice”
Article 21- Right to life and liberty
ANALYSIS
An advocate is an important player in the justice dispensation system. 32 He owes a duty to both
Courts and clients with regard to administration of justice. 33 He is the medium through which
litigants seek to further their interests and redresses their grievances. 34 Therefore, he occupies a
very high standing and has to discharge duties ethically and has to display a standard of behaviour
expected of him.35 It is against professional ethics of a lawyer to refuse a brief, provided that the
client is willing to pay the fee and the lawyer is not engaged. 36 The Bar Council rules also mandate
the lawyer to accept a brief before a Court at a fee consistent with his standing and nature of case.37
In the present case, the resolutions of the Bar Councils to not defend certain accused policemen; or
those accused of grave crimes such as rape for the fear of becoming unpopular or risking their lives
is against the professional ethics which need to be observed by lawyers. Further, Indian lawyers
have shown great valour in trying times by defending communists during Meerut conspiracy case,
alleged assassins of Mahatma Gandhi, etc. Therefore, the resolutions passed by Bar Council are
unethical and erode the dignity of the profession.
32
N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shinde AIR 2001 SC 2028
33
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advocate, In Re AIR 2014 SC 850
34
Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangan v. Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani, AIR 1993, SC 1182
35
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dahbolkar. AIR 1976 SC242
36
Anastaplo, In re, 366 US 82 (1961)
37
Chapter II, Part VI, Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
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Further, the right to life under Constitution of India includes to right to a fair and speedy trial. 38 To
ensure a fair trial, an accused has been afforded the right to be represented by a legal practitioner
of choice.39 In furtherance of this right, an accused shall be provided a fair opportunity to secure a
counsel of his choice.40Therefore, in the present case a resolution to not defend the accused persons
is against Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis it is evident that Bar resolutions against defending accused on the ground
that he is a policeman or on the ground that he is a suspected terrorist, rapist, mass murderer, etc. is
uncalled for. The Supreme Court has rightly held that such resolutions are null and void as they are
against the standards of professional ethics and rights afforded under Art. 21 & 22 of the
Constitution. It observed that right minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions for
democracy and rule of law to prevail. Thus, this ruling is apt and conforms to the principles of
equity.
38
Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors, (2004) 4 SCC
158; Sukh Dev v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1986 Cri. L.J. 1084
39
Article 22(2), Constitution of India, 1950
40
Ahmed Noor Mohammed Bhati v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2005 SC 156; Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932)
15

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IRAC-VI
CASE BRIEF
Contempt Petition No. 38 of 1996: Decided On: July 19, 1996
D.C.SAXENA (Contemnor)
Versus
HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA (Respondent)
AIR 1996 SC 2481

(In the matter of criminal contempt of Court)
HON’BLE JUDGES
K.Ramaswamy, J; N.P.Singh, J & S.P. Bharucha, J.
FACTS
The petitioner made wild allegations against the then chief justice, A.H. Ahmadi, in a second
writ petition, after losing his first one, filed against the then Congress president, P.V.
Narasimha Rao, for allegedly avoiding to pay his dues to the exchequer. The petitioner imputed
that Chief Justice Ahmadi had allowed the President to avoid payment of dues treating him as a
class by himself, and that the CJI should not be allowed to take judicial immunity, and was
liable to criminal prosecution.
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ISSUE
Whether imputation put by the Contemnor on the Chief Justice of India amounts to Contempt of the
court.
RULES
 Article 129 of the Constitution of India, 1950

 Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950
 Section 2(c) and Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
ANALYSIS
The Court in this regard referred to the scope of the Freedom of speech and expression as
guaranteed under Article 19. Such freedom encompasses that a citizen is entitled to bring to the
notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution including judiciary suffers
from. Indeed, the right to offer healthy and constructive criticism which is fair in spirit must be left
unimpaired in the interest of the institution itself. Judges have their accountability to the society
and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to defend
and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour.
However, in E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar,41 it was held by the Supreme

Court that the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19 does not protect a
person from scandalising the judges or courts as the same tends to bring the authority and
administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamount to contempt.
In the context of section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, scandalising the court would mean
hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection
with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender.
The Petitioner, a professor of English language in clear and unequivocal language emphasised and
reaffirmed that the averments against the Hon’ble CJI were "truthfully and carefully" worded. It
41
1970 Cri LJ 1670
17

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therefore was derived that the accusations made by the contemnor petitioner were gross contempt.
At the height of it, he stated that since the first writ petition was not disposed of by a bench of not
less than five Judges, the writ petition was not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of
dismissal is non est and it is "not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion of the
petitioner as held by the court flew in the face of the judicial finality of the order of this Court and
the assertion questioned the authority of the court. It created tendency to obstruct the
administration of justice and, therefore, was considered to be outrageous criminal contempt.
He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an
unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality of the facts and
circumstances, the contempt by the petitioner was considered to be of the gravest magnitude of the
contumacious conduct.
CONCLUSION
Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the
mistakes or bias or at times even corruption. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the
development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity,
equality and justice. However, when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to
conduct himself in a matter befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free
licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against
the judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed
to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and
independence of the judiciary would be a thing of the past. Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the present case rightly convicted the contemnor for contempt of court and the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India.
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IRAC-VII
CASE BRIEF
Civil Appeals Nos. 5301-02 of 2002; Decided On: 28.11.2006
Bar Council of India (Appellant)
Versus
Board of Management, Dayanand College of Law and Others (Respondents)
AIR 2007 SC 1342
HON’BLE JUDGES: H.K. Sema, J. & P.K. Balasubramanian, J.
PRIOR HISTORY: From Final Judgment and Order dated 7-12-2000 of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP Nos. 47967 of 2000 and 48183 of 200
FACTS
 Respondent No. 5 in this case, was appointed as the Principal of Dayanand College of Law in
accordance with the provisions of Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 (“University Act”).
 On an inspection, the Bar Council of India found that Respondent No 5 does not possess the
qualification in law and hence withdrew its recognition to the college. The Management of the
College filed a writ Petition to challenge the validity of the appointment. The Principal filed
another writ petition to challenge his transfer order. The High Court, upheld the validity of
appointment as “qualification in law” is not a prerequisite for appointment as per Universities Act.
Further, it held that the Universities Act prevails over Bar Council rules prescribed under Section
49 of Advocates Act. The Bar Council challenged this order and hence the appeal
19

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ISSUE:
Whether a person who does not hold a degree in law can be appointed as the Principal of a Law
College?
RULES
1. Advocates Act, 1961: Section 7(1) (h) & (i) - promotion of legal education and laying down of
standards for the same; recognition of Universities
2. Bar Council of India Rules: Rule 12- Principal and full-time teachers of Law College shall
hold post-graduate or graduate degree in law
3. Uttar Pradesh State University Act, 1973: Statute 11.14- principal of a degree college shall be
postgraduate in any subject
4. Constitution of India: Article 254- Superiority of law made by Parliament over State Law
ANALYSIS
Inconsistency between Statutes: The issue revolves around the conflict between provisions of
University Act, 1973 and the Bar Council rules prescribed under Advocates Act, 1961. 42 The
Advocates Act, 1961 is enacted by the Parliament and is traceable to List I of the Seventh
Schedule.43 Further, the Universities Act, 1973 is enacted by State Legislature under concurrent
list.44 By virtue of superiority accorded to statues enacted by Parliament 45, Advocates Act, 1961
prevails over the University Act. Therefore, in the present case, the High Court erred in holding the
University Act prevails over Advocates Act, 1961, by tracing both the enactments to concurrent
list
Harmonious Construction: Harmonious construction is the thumb rule of interpretation of

statutes. According to this method of interpretation, an interpretation which avoids inconsistency
between Statutes shall be adopted by the Court. As per Statute 11.14 of Kanpur Statutes under the
42
Section 49, Advocates Act, 1961; Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
43
Entries 78 & 79, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India, 1950; O.N. Mohindroo v. Bar Council of Delhi,
AIR 1968 SC 888; Bar Council of U.P. v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 261; Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India,
(1989) 3 SCC 488
44
Entry 25, List III, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India, 1950
45
Article 254, Constitution of India, 1950
20

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University Act, for a person to be appointed as principal of a college affiliated to Kanpur

University, he must possess “a doctorate degree and 7 years’ experience of teaching a degree
class”.46 The requirement of possessing a doctorate degree in one of subjects taught in the college
has been removed by an amendment, thereby implying that a doctorate degree in any subject will
suffice. However, the Bar Council Rules prescribe that a principal has to possess a postgraduate or
graduate degree in law.47 The Bar Council does not play an active role in imparting legal education
unlike the Universities, but it has a duty to promote and lay down standards of such education. 48
Further, it confers recognition to Universities, which is a precondition for a graduate from a
particular University to be enrolled as an advocate. 49 Thus, it controls legal education indirectly. If
the rule regarding qualification to be possessed by principal of Law College, i.e postgraduate or
graduate degree is not adhered to, then Bar Council may withdraw its recognition of the
University. This consequence is detrimental to a majority of students who graduate from that
college and seek to practice as advocates. Thus, Bar Council rules need to be adhered strictly.
Further, this rule of qualification is in accordance with basic common sense. Only a person who
possess degree in law can effectively lead a college as a Principal. The literal interpretation of
Statute 11.14 indicates that a person with doctorate in any subject, such as Engineering, Medicine,
etc. can be a Principal. Such a person cannot discharge his role effectively. To provide consistency
to the provisions, harmonious construction can be adopted and a person who possess doctorate in
law can be appointed as the principal, thereby making both the provisions consistent with each
other. The Selection Committee has to ensure that a person who possess this qualification of
“doctorate in law” which is consistent with both the Bar Council Rules and University Act is
appointed.
CONCLUSION
The High Court erred in ruling that that University Act, 1973 prevails over Advocates Act, 1961,
and thereby holding that the appointment of Principal in accordance with the University Act is
valid. However, as a matter of fact the Advocates Act, 1961 prevails. The Supreme Court rightly
46
Statute 11.14(i)(b), Uttar Pradesh State University Act, 1973
47
Rule 12, Section A, Part IV, Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
48
Section 7(1)(h), Advocates Act, 1961
49
Section 7(1)(i ), Advocates Act, 1961
21

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corrected this defect and adopted the rule of harmonious interpretation to give consistency to the
provisions of both Statutes. It recognised the role of Bar Council of India in legal education and
therefore, gave due importance to the qualification prescribed by it for appointment of principal.
Thus, this judgment is sound and ap
IRAC- VIII
CASE BRIEF
Civil Appeal No. 2140 of 1998; Decided On: April 20, 1998
CHETAK CONSTRUCTION LTD.(Appellant)
Versus
OM PRAKASH & OTHERS (Respondent)
(1998) 4 SCC 577
(In the matter of reference of Contempt of Court u/ Contempt of Courts Act, 1971)
HON’BLE JUDGES: Dr. A.S. Anand, J & K. Venkataswami, J

PRIOR HISTORY: From Judgment and Order dated 16-5-1997 of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in Misc. A. No. 143 of 1994
FACTS
 During the hearing of a suit related to a property dispute by the Learned Single Judge of Madhya
Pradesh High Court, it was noticed that the property in dispute was purchased by the judge himself
from the respondent. Therefore, an application requesting the Judge to recuse himself from the
hearing of the matter has been made by the appellant. The Judge recused from the matter, but made
observations that an attempt was being made to malign him and the proceedings. Further, general
remarks regarding browbeating of judges were also made.
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 He recommended that contempt proceedings have to be initiated by the Supreme Court. The
Appellant filed a Special Leave Petition against these observations of the Judge. Hence, the matter
is before this Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE
Whether contempt proceedings can be initiated against the appellant, for making an application to
the Judge requesting him to recuse from hearing the matter due to personal interest in the suit
property.
RULES
1) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Section 2©- “Criminal contempt” means the publication of any matter or doing of any act which
scandalises/lowers authority of Court; or prejudices/interferes with judicial proceedings; or
interferes/obstructs administration of justice.
2) Constitution of India, 1950
Article 129- Power of Supreme Court to initiate contempt proceedings
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court is empowered to initiate contempt proceedings. 50 One can be held liable for
criminal contempt if he scandalises the court; prejudices/interferes with judicial proceedings and
obstructs administration of justice.51 It is impermissible for lawyers and litigants to terrorize or
intimidate the judges with a view to secure favourable orders.52 Such actions will invite contempt
proceedings against the wrongdoer. The intention behind this provision is that contempt of court
50
Article 129, Constitution of India, 1950.
51
Section 2(c), Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
52
Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, (1995) Supp (1) SCC 403; Dr. D.C Saxena, Contemnor v. Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216
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obstructs the course of justice and affects the judiciary as a whole by lowering its dignity in the
society.53 This hampers administration of justice and shakes the confidence reposed in the
institution.54
However, contempt jurisdiction has to be exercised objectively 55 and Court cannot be

hypersensitive about trivial issues.56 Reasonable and fair criticism shall not restricted as it impairs
the fundamental right to free speech. 57 Thus, judges should act impartially and subjective
moods/personal bias shall not influence their actions.58 Any deviation in this regard will erode the
credibility of judiciary.
In the instant case, the learned Single Judge of the High has purchased the suit property from
respondent. Therefore, on application made by appellant he recused himself from hearing. Thus, he
acted in accordance with what is expected of a Judge. However, he alleged that this was attempt to
malign him and that he was threatened on phone calls. Further, he made general remarks regarding
browbeating of judges by a group of people. Thereafter, he suggested the Supreme Court to initiate
contempt proceedings. These remarks and suggestions are influenced by personal bias and are not
objective in nature. Thus, the Supreme Court should not initiate such proceedings as the appellant
was merely exercising his right to free speech to avoid any prejudial decisions from being passed
in the matter.
CONCLUSION
The Learned Single judge erred in recommending the Supreme Court to initiate contempt
proceedings. However, Supreme Court rightly held that application seeking recusal does not
amount contempt, as it is reasonable and is not unduly interfering with administration of justice.
Through this decision, it has shown due regard to cornerstone of the contempt law, i.e co-existence
of right to free speech and maintenance of judicial dignity. Thus, the judgment is apt and abides by
the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
53
Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re, 1995. 2. SCC 584
54
R.K. Ananad v. Registrar of Delhi HC, 2009 8 SCC 106
55
R. v. Gray, (1900) 2 QB 36
56
SC Bar Association v. Union of India, 1998 4 SCC 409; Anil Kumar Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, 2002. 4 SCC 21;
Court of Its Own Motion v. State,151 2008 DLT 695 (Del., DB),
57
Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950
58
Baradakanta Mishra v. Refgistrar of Orrisa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374
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IRAC- IX
CASE BRIEF
Criminal Appeal No. 1393 of 2008; Decided On: July 29, 2009
R.K ANAND (Appellant)
Versus
REGISTRAR, DELHI HIGH COURT (Respondent)
(2009) 8 SCC 106

HON’BLE JUDGES: B.N Agarwal, J; G.S Singhvi, J & Aftab Alam, J.
FACTS
 The criminal trial in a case of reckless driving by Sanjeev Nanda, a young person of a very
wealthy business family which crashed to death six people in Delhi.
 NDTV, a news channel telecast a programme on 30 May 2007 in which a Special Public
Prosecutor and R.K Anand, the Senior Defence Counsel, were seen negotiating sell out of a
prosecution witness for a very high price. According to NDTV channel, the programme was
based on sting operation.
 Delhi High Court Suo motu initiate a proceeding for criminal attempt and issued notice to R.K
Anand under Section 2 (c) of Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
 During the pendency of the matter in the High Court, R.K Anand filed a petition requesting
Justice Manmohan Sarin, the presiding judge to rescue himself from the proceeding. Mr Anand
made the prayer that main matter to be heard by some other bench of which Justice Sarin is not a
member.
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 The High Court held that the evidence and circumstances fully established that R.K Anand were
guilty of charges framed against them.
RULES
1. CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT, 1971 ; Section 2(c): Criminal contempt
2. INDIAN CONSTITUTION ; Article 235: Article 235 of the Indian Constitution that
vests the High Court with the power of control over sub-ordinate courts
Article 227: Article 227 of the Indian Constitution of India that gives the High Court the
authority of superintendence over the subordinate courts.
ISSUE
 Whether the appellant is responsible for the criminal contempt under Section 2 (c) of Contempt
of Court Act, 1971.
ANALYSIS
Suo motu cognizance is taken by High Court on the basis of telecast alone The court examined the
audio and video recordings of sting operation. The findings of High Court were sustained. It had
rightly punished them by prohibiting them from appearing for a period of 4 months and holding
that they had forfeited their right to be designated as Senior Advocates and imposing fine on them.
Further, interference in due course of justice lead to penal consequences. Telecast of sting
operation exposing collusion between defence counsel and prosecutor did not amount to contempt
of court. The programme was intended to prevent an attempt to interfere with or obstruct the due
course of pending matter. It was in larger public interest and served an important public cause. In
59
light of Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the present act can be regarded as
criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (c) (ii) & (iii) of the Act. But can the
programme be accused of interfering or tending to interfere with, obstructing or tending to obstruct
59
1993 Supp (1) SCC
26

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the due course of the case. The programme may have any other faults or weaknesses but it
certainly did not interfere with or obstruct the due course of the trial. The programme was thus
clearly intended to prevent the attempt to interfere with or obstruct the due course of the trial.
Furthermore, grave concern and dismay was expressed on decline of ethical and professional
standards among lawyers. Bar Council of India and Bar Council of State cannot escape their
responsibilities. If the lawyer is indulged in any kind of unethical practices there is fall in the
professional behaviour and norms of legal profession. It leads to inefficient administration of
justice in the country. In Sanjeev Datta, In Re, 60 it was held that no judicial system in a democratic
society can work satisfactorily unless it is supported by a bar that enjoys the unqualified trust and
confidence of the people, that share the aspirations, hopes and the ideals of the people and whose
members are monetarily accessible and affordable to the people.
The trial would fail when it was not protected from external interferences. Every trial that fails due
to external interference is a tragedy for the victim(s) of the crime. Every subverted trial leaves a
scar on the criminal justice system. Repeated scars make the system unrecognisable and it then
loses the trust and confidence of the people. Every failed trial is also, in a manner of speaking, a
negative comment on the State's High Court that is entrusted with the responsibility of
superintendence, supervision and control of the lower courts
CONCLUSION
It is concluded from the above judgment that there was no proper administration of justice. Every
trial would fail when it is not protected from external interferences. Every trial that fails due to
external interference is a tragedy for the victim(s) of the crime. The State's High Court that is
entrusted with the responsibility of superintendence, supervision and control of the lower courts. It
is, therefore, high time for the High Courts to assume a more pro-active role in such matters. It
provides sufficient stimulation and pressure for a fair investigation of the case. It can assign the
trial to some judicial officer who has made a reputation for independence and integrity
60
Sanjeev Datta, In Re, (1995) 3 SCC 619
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IRAC- X
CASE BRIEF
Civil Appeal No. 1938 of 2000; Decided On: August 22, 2000
R. D. SAXENA. (Appellant)
Versus
BALRAM PRASAD SHARMA (Respondent)
AIR 2000 SC 2912
(In the matter of professional misconduct under Section 35, Advocates Act, 1961)
HON’BLE JUDGES
K.T. Thomas, J & R.P. Sethi, J
PRIOR HISTORY: From Judgment and Order dated 24-7-1999 of Disciplinary Committee of
Bar Council of India, BCI TRC No. 21 of 1996
FACTS
The appellant, was appointed as legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co- operative Bank
Ltd. in 1990 to conduct the cases of the bank. The Bank terminated the retainership in 1993 and
requested the return of case files. The appellant refused and claimed a right of lien over the files,
for the outstanding professional fee of.97,100/-, . Thereafter, a complaint was filed with the State
Bar Council which was subsequently forwarded to Bar Council of India. The BCI held the
appellant liable for “professional misconduct’. An appeal has been preferred before this Hon’ble
Court
28

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ISSUE
Whether the Advocate has a Right of Lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by
his client.
RULES
1. Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 171- Attorney’s power to retain goods bailed as a security
for general balance of account. Section 148, Bailment of “goods” for a purpose, with promise
to return/dispose as per instruction after accomplishment of purpose
2. Advocates Act, 1961: Section 35- Punishment for professional misconduct of advocate.
3. Bar Council of India Rules : (Rules 24, 28, 29) - The Advocate can retain client’s money at
his disposal towards settlement of fee. He cannot adjust the fee owed by client against his
personal liability to the client.
ANALYSIS
In the contract of bailment, “goods” delivered for a purpose have to be returned/disposed as per the
instructions of the persons delivering them.61 Further, attorneys are entitled to lien over “goods”
bailed for general balance of account.62 In the instant case, advocate exercised lien over case files
of Bank for settlement of balance fee. However, case record does not fall under the ambit of
“goods” for bailment or for exercising lien, as there is no delivery in this case.63 Further, “goods”
refer to saleable goods.64 However, Court papers are not fit for commercial sale. Hence, the
advocate has no right to exercise lien. The Bar Council has prescribed that advocate cannot adjust
fee payable to him against his own liability to client. 65 Thus, lien cannot be exercised over
litigation papers, as it leads to abuse of the process of Court and is against the interests of litigants,
61
Section 148, Indian Contract Act, 1872
62
Section 171, Indian Contract Act, 1872;
63
CCE v. Eastend Paper Industries Limited, (1989) 4 SCC 244; Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co.
Ltd, AIR 1963 SC 791
64
Section 2(7), Sale of Goods Act, 1930
65
Rule 24, Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
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most of whom are poor in India. 66 The advocate can however, retain the client’s money in his
possession as adjustment towards fee.67 Therefore, in the present case, the actions of the Advocate
are unwarranted and against the Bar Council Rules. A client has the right to engage a counsel of
“choice”.68 Therefore, he can change counsel pendent lite for any reason whatsoever, during the
pendency of case. In such circumstances, the advocate shall return the brief to the client 69 and shall
not whittle down the Advocate’s personal choice by exercising lien. 70 Failure to do so would
amount to “professional misconduct” under Advocates Act, 1961.71 Misconduct is a wide term and
72
includes any wrongful or improper behavior or conduct unbecoming of an Advocate. An
Advocate shall aid in the administration of justice and plays an instrumental role in serving the
society.73 Therefore, a reasonable standard of behavior is expected out of him. 74 And he has to
uphold the dignity of the profession to which he is admitted. 75 The exercise of lien leads to
disruption of proceedings, for want of briefs. Further, it leads to exploitation of poor litigants, who
cannot afford the fee. Therefore, the advocate commits “professional misconduct” by exercising
such lien.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis it is evident that exercise of lien over Court papers cannot be allowed as it
obstructs the dispensation of justice. It is against the professionalism expected of a lawyer, who is
of high regard in the eyes of the society. The Supreme Court rightly upheld the decision of Bar
Council of India, holding the advocate guilty of “professional misconduct”, as he acted in utter
disregard of his duty towards to Court and client. However, it reduced the punishment of
suspension to mere reprimand due to lack of clarity on this issue in previous cases. Thus, the ruling
is justified and is in line with the “professional ethics” expected from advocates.
66
P. Krishnamachariar v. Official Assignee of Madras, AIR 1932 Mad 256; Tyabji Dayabhai and Co. v. Jatha Devji
and Co., AIR 1927 Bom 542; An Advoacte, In re, AIR 1933 Pat 571; Halsbury’s Laws of England, para 226, Vol,
44, 1995
67
Rules 28 & 29, Bar Council of India Rules, 1975
68
Article 22(1), Constitution of India, 1950
69
In re B.N. Advocate in the matter of Misc. Judl. Case No.18/33, AIR 1933 Pat 571
70
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shobharam and ors. (AIR 1966 SC 1910); Barrat v. Gough Thomas, (1950) 2 All ER
1048
71
Section 35, Advocates Act, 1961
72
Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Ed, 2010; State of Punjab v Ram Singh, AIR 1992 SC, 2188
73
N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shinde AIR 2001 SC 2028
74
'G', a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, Re, AIR 1954 SC 557.
75
M, an Advocate, Re, AIR 1957 SC 149
30

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Suo Motu Criminal Petition No 10 of 2001

Decided On: March 6, 2002

(2002) 3 SCC 343

(In the matter of criminal contempt of Supreme Court)

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1. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (“the Act”)

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2006

Decided On: July 5, 2016

MAHIPAL SINGH RANA (Appellant)

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Respondent)

AIR 2016 SC 3302

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1. Advocates Act, 1961

Section 38 - Appeal to the Supreme Court

Section 24A - Disqualification for enrolment as an Advocate

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 968 of 2009

Decided On: February 12, 2009

TUSHAR D. BHATT (Appellant)

STATE OF GUJARAT & ANOTHER (Respondent)

(2009) 11 SCC 678

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1. Is the punishment of dismissal from Service disproportionate to the guilt found to be

3. Is the transfer of the appellant mala fide?

Rule 6 Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971.

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 312 of 2013

Decided On: 22.08.201

RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOYAL, ADVOCATE, IN RE

AIR 2014 SC 850

(Involving Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961)

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J & S.A. Bobde, J

Arising out of Civil Appeal No. 1398 of 2005

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Advocates Act, 1961

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

A.S. MOHAMMED RAFI (Appellant)

STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Respondent)

(2011) 1 SCC 688

HON’BLE JUDGES; B.N Agarwal, J; G.S Singhvi, J & Aftab Alam, J.

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1. The Constitution of India 1949

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Contempt Petition No. 38 of 1996: Decided On: July 19, 1996

HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA (Respondent)

AIR 1996 SC 2481