PASSAGE - 1

The Bar Council of India (BCI) has opened up the law practice in India to foreign
lawyers and firms. It notified the ‘Registration and Regulation of Foreign Lawyers and
Foreign Law Firms in India, 2022’ on Monday, March 13. Although foreign lawyers and
firms cannot appear in courts, they can, however, set up offices in India and practice
transactional and corporate work on a reciprocal basis. The BCI, which is a statutory
body governing law practice in the country, defined the scope of work foreign players
would be permitted to do in India. “Foreign lawyers or foreign law firms shall not be
permitted to appear before any courts, tribunals or other statutory or regulatory
authorities. They shall be allowed to practice on transactional work/corporate work
such as joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, intellectual property matters, drafting
of contracts and other related matters on a reciprocal basis,” the BCI notification said,
according to Indian Express. Explaining the rationale for opening the doors of legal
practice to outside players, the notification said that the move will make India a hub of
international commercial arbitration and also help address concerns pertaining to the
flow of foreign direct investment into the country.
“In case we sleep over the matter, the legal fraternity of India may be left behind in
providing legal/professional expertise in accordance with the rule of law in a manner
consistent with the best interests of this fast-growing class of clients in India,” the
Objects and Reasons of the notification stated. It also highlighted that the decision
would benefit Indian lawyers and assured that enough safeguards are in place to protect
them from any adverse impact. “The legal fraternity in India is not likely to suffer any
disadvantage in case law practice in India is opened up to foreign lawyers in a restricted
and well-controlled and regulated manner on the principle of reciprocity as it would be
mutually beneficial for lawyers from India and abroad, and these Rules are an attempt
by Bar Council of India in this direction,” the BCI notification said, according to The
Hindu. The rules stated that lawyers with a foreign degree would be allowed to practice
in India conditional upon their registration with the BCI. The notification also clarified
that the reciprocity rule will not be applicable if a foreign lawyer or law firm works on a
‘fly in and fly out’ basis for the purpose of giving legal advice to a client in India on
foreign law or international legal issues. In such a scenario, the lawyer or firm
concerned cannot establish an office in India, and their practice cannot exceed 60 days
in any 12-month period. The Rules, however, come with a precondition that foreign
lawyers and firms have to submit an undertaking that they “shall not practice Indian law
in any form or before any court of law, tribunal, board or any other authority legally
entitled to record evidence on oath”.
Source: Bar Council's New Rules to Allow Foreign Lawyers, Legal Firms to Practice
in India, The Wire, March 16, 2023

Legal Issue: Scope of work for foreign lawyers and foreign law firms in India

Q.1) Tom, a foreign lawyer from the United States, has recently registered with the BCI
to practice law in India. He specializes in intellectual property matters and has been
approached by an Indian client to represent them in a patent dispute in an Indian court.
Can Tom represent his client in the patent dispute in an Indian court?

A) Yes, because Tom has registered with the BCI and specializes in intellectual
property matters
 B) No, because foreign lawyers are not permitted to appear before any courts,
tribunals or other statutory or regulatory authorities
C) Yes, because Tom can practice on transactional work/corporate work such as
intellectual property matters
D) No, because Tom is only allowed to practice on a 'fly in and fly out' basis

Explanation: Option A is incorrect because the passage states that foreign lawyers
cannot appear in courts even if they are registered with the BCI. Option B is correct
because the passage states that foreign lawyers are not permitted to appear before any
courts, tribunals, or other statutory or regulatory authorities. Option C is incorrect
because the passage states that foreign lawyers can practice transactional
work/corporate work such as intellectual property matters but not represent clients in
courts. Option D is incorrect because the 'fly in and fly out' rule does not apply to Tom's
situation.

Legal Issue: Reciprocity rule for foreign lawyers and law firms in India

Q.2) Sandra, a lawyer from the United Kingdom, visits India to advise her Indian client
on a legal issue related to British law. She plans to stay in India for a month, advise her
client, and return to the UK without setting up an office in India. Is Sandra's practice in
India subject to the reciprocity rule?

A) Yes, because Sandra is practicing law in India

B) No, because Sandra is not setting up an office in India and is not staying for
more than 60 days
C) Yes, because Sandra is providing legal advice on foreign law
D) No, because Sandra is not involved in transactional or corporate work

Explanation: Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the reciprocity rule
will not be applicable under certain conditions. Option B is correct because the passage
states that the reciprocity rule will not be applicable if a foreign lawyer works on a 'fly in
and fly out' basis, does not establish an office in India, and their practice does not exceed
60 days in any 12-month period. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention that providing legal advice on foreign law automatically triggers the reciprocity
rule. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention that the nature of work
affects the applicability of the reciprocity rule.

Legal Issue: Working on a 'fly in and fly out' basis for the purpose of giving legal advice
in India.

Q.3) Emily, a foreign lawyer, is invited by an Indian company to provide legal advice on a
foreign law matter for three weeks. Emily does not have an office in India and does not
intend to set one up. She plans to visit India solely for this purpose and return to her
home country afterward. The Indian company wants to ensure that Emily's visit and the
provision of legal advice are compliant with the BCI's regulations. According to the BCI
notification, can Emily visit India on a 'fly in and fly out' basis to provide legal advice to
the Indian company on foreign law without establishing an office in India?
 A) Yes, because Emily is providing legal advice on foreign law and her practice
does not exceed 60 days in any 12-month period.
B) No, because Emily must register with the BCI and establish an office in India to
provide legal advice.
C) Yes, but only if the Indian company submits a formal request to the BCI for
Emily's visit.
D) No, because foreign lawyers are not allowed to provide legal advice in India on a
'fly in and fly out' basis.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the reciprocity rule will
not be applicable if a foreign lawyer or law firm works on a 'fly in and fly out' basis for
the purpose of giving legal advice to a client in India on foreign law or international legal
issues, provided their practice does not exceed 60 days in any 12-month period. Option
B is incorrect because the passage states that the reciprocity rule does not apply in this
scenario, and Emily does not need to establish an office in India. Option C is incorrect
because the passage does not mention any requirement for a formal request from the
Indian company. Option D is incorrect because the passage allows foreign lawyers to
provide legal advice in India on a 'fly in and fly out' basis under certain conditions.
Legal Issue: Practice limitations for foreign lawyers and law firms in India

Q.4) Alice, a foreign lawyer from Australia, has set up an office in India after registering
with the BCI. She is approached by an Indian client to represent them in a labor dispute
before a statutory authority. Can Alice represent her client in the labor dispute before
the statutory authority?

A) Yes, because Alice has registered with the BCI and set up an office in India
B) Yes, because labor disputes are not mentioned as an area of restriction in the
passage
C) No, because foreign lawyers and law firms are not permitted to appear
before any courts, tribunals or other statutory or regulatory authorities
D) No, because Alice is not allowed to practice labor law in India

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that foreign lawyers and law
firms are not permitted to appear before any courts, tribunals, or other statutory or
regulatory authorities. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that foreign
lawyers cannot appear in courts, tribunals, or other statutory or regulatory authorities
even if they are registered with the BCI and have set up an office in India. Option B is
incorrect because the passage states that foreign lawyers are not permitted to appear
before any statutory or regulatory authorities, which includes labor disputes. Option D
is incorrect because the passage does not specifically mention that foreign lawyers
cannot practice labor law in India; however, they cannot appear before statutory or
regulatory authorities.

Legal Issue: Benefits of opening up law practice in India to foreign lawyers and firms.

Q.5) The Indian government is considering whether the decision to allow foreign
lawyers and firms to practice in India will benefit Indian lawyers. The government is
concerned that Indian lawyers may suffer a disadvantage with the entry of foreign
players in the market. According to the BCI notification, will the legal fraternity in India
suffer any disadvantage from opening up law practice in India to foreign lawyers and
firms?

A) Yes, because foreign lawyers and firms may take away business from Indian
lawyers.
B) Yes, because the foreign lawyers and firms will have better resources to compete
in the market.
C) No, because the BCI notification states that the decision would not benefit Indian
lawyers.
D) No, because the BCI notification states that it will be mutually beneficial for
lawyers from India and abroad.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the BCI notification states that the decision
would be mutually beneficial for lawyers from India and abroad. Option A is incorrect
because the passage states that the legal fraternity in India is not likely to suffer any
disadvantage. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not mention anything
about the resources of foreign lawyers and firms. Option C is incorrect because the
passage states that the decision would benefit Indian lawyers, contrary to what this
option suggests.

Legal Issue: The rationale for allowing foreign lawyers and firms to practice in India.

Q.6) The Indian government wants to understand the reasons behind the BCI's decision
to open up the law practice in India to foreign lawyers and firms. They want to ensure
that the decision aligns with India's best interests. According to the BCI notification,
what is the rationale for opening the doors of legal practice in India to foreign lawyers
and firms?

A) To increase competition and improve the quality of legal services in India.

B) To make India a hub of international commercial arbitration and help
address concerns pertaining to the flow of foreign direct investment into
the country.
C) To promote international collaboration and partnerships between Indian and
foreign lawyers.
D) To provide more opportunities for Indian lawyers to gain experience working
with foreign clients.

Explanation: Option A is incorrect because the passage does not mention increasing
competition or improving the quality of legal services as the rationale. Option B is
correct because the passage states that the move will make India a hub of international
commercial arbitration and also help address concerns pertaining to the flow of foreign
direct investment into the country. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention promoting international collaboration and partnerships as the rationale.
Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention providing more
opportunities for Indian lawyers to gain experience workitng with foreign clients as the
rationale.
PASSAGE – 2
Article 324 of the Indian Constitution provides the framework for the Election
Commission (EC). It vests the superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the
EC, and allows the President to appoint the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and
other ECs subject to any law made by Parliament. However, no such law has been
enacted to date. The majority and concurring opinions in a recent judgment emphasize
the importance of the EC's independence from executive interference. The Court's
reasoning draws from historical context, the expanding role and powers of the EC, and
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to keep the EC free from executive control.
The Court highlights the gap in the constitutional scheme and takes upon itself the
responsibility to fill this gap until Parliament enacts legislation. The historical analysis
shows that the framers intended for the EC's appointment mechanism to ensure its
independence from the executive. The Court also highlights the post-Independence
history of the EC, including its powers and functions, which have expanded over time.
The examination of comparative appointment processes reveals that India's method of
vesting appointment power in the Prime Minister is an outlier.
The structural argument focuses on the nature of the right to vote and the function of
the EC. The Court examines the constitutional right to vote as central to elections and
democracy. The EC is responsible for actualizing this right and ensuring free and fair
elections, tasks for which it has been given extraordinary powers. The Court then
proceeds to address the gap in the constitutional scheme. It finds that the absence of
parliamentary legislation and the executive's control over the appointment process
create a situation where the EC's independence is insufficiently guaranteed. This affects
the constitutional right to vote and the conduct of free and fair elections, which triggers
the Court's jurisdiction to intervene. The Court devises a temporary measure to protect
the EC's independence until Parliament enacts legislation. This measure involves the
appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the
Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India. This intervention is intended to
preserve the independence of the EC and safeguard the constitutional right to vote and
the democratic process in India. In conclusion, the Court's judgment highlights the
importance of the Election Commission's independence from executive interference to
ensure the conduct of free and fair elections and protect the constitutional right to vote
in India. By closely examining the historical context, structural aspects, and the role and
powers of the EC, the Court identifies a gap in the constitutional scheme due to the
absence of parliamentary legislation.
Source: Decoding the Supreme Court’s Election Commission Judgment, The Wire,
March 4, 2023.

Legal Issue: The independence of the Election Commission from executive interference.

Q.1) In the fictional Republic of Imaginaria, the President has complete authority to
appoint the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners. Recently,
the President appointed their close friends and political allies as Election
Commissioners, raising concerns about the independence of the Election Commission.
Based on the passage, which of the following is the most appropriate temporary
measure to protect the independence of the Election Commission in Imaginaria, until
legislation is enacted?
 A) The President should consult with the Prime Minister before appointing Election
Commissioners.
B) The President should consult with the Chief Justice of Imaginaria before
appointing Election Commissioners.
C) The Election Commissioners should be appointed by a committee comprising the
President, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of Imaginaria.
D) The Election Commissioners should be appointed by a committee
comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief
Justice of Imaginaria.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that the Court devises a
temporary measure involving the appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee
comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of
India. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the EC's independence from
the executive is necessary, and consulting with the Prime Minister alone is insufficient.
Option B is incorrect because the passage suggests a committee, not merely the
consultation with the Chief Justice. Option C is incorrect because the passage
recommends a committee that includes the Prime Minister, not the President.

Legal Issue: The gap in the constitutional scheme due to the absence of parliamentary
legislation.

Q.2) In the country of Hypothetica, the Constitution provides for the appointment of
Election Commissioners by the President but does not specify any criteria or process for
the appointment. The Parliament has not enacted any legislation to address this issue.
According to the passage, which of the following best describes the implications of the
absence of parliamentary legislation in Hypothetica regarding the appointment of
Election Commissioners?

A) It does not affect the independence of the Election Commission.

B) It creates a situation where the Election Commission's independence is
insufficiently guaranteed.
C) It enhances the independence of the Election Commission.
D) It has no consequences for the constitutional right to vote.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the absence of
parliamentary legislation and the executive's control over the appointment process
create a situation where the EC's independence is insufficiently guaranteed. Option A is
incorrect because the passage emphasizes that the absence of legislation affects the EC's
independence. Option C is incorrect because the passage states that the gap in the
constitutional scheme undermines the EC's independence. Option D is incorrect because
the passage explains that the insufficient guarantee of the EC's independence affects the
constitutional right to vote and the conduct of free and fair elections.

Legal Issue: The Court's jurisdiction to intervene in the appointment process.

Q.3) In the nation of Fictivia, there is a gap in the constitutional scheme regarding the
appointment of Election Commissioners. This gap threatens the independence of the
Election Commission and affects the constitutional right to vote. Based on the passage,
under what circumstances does the Court have jurisdiction to intervene in the
appointment process of Election Commissioners in Fictivia?

A) When the Parliament is unwilling to enact legislation.

B) When the President refuses to appoint Election Commissioners.
C) When the Court believes the appointment process is too complicated.
D) When the executive's control over the appointment process creates a
situation where the Election Commission's independence is insufficiently
guaranteed, affecting the constitutional right to vote.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that the Court's jurisdiction
to intervene is triggered when the EC's independence is insufficiently guaranteed,
affecting the constitutional right to vote and the conduct of free and fair elections.
Option A is incorrect because the passage does not mention the Court's intervention
being based solely on the Parliament's unwillingness to enact legislation. Option B is
incorrect because the passage does not discuss a scenario where the President refuses
to appoint Election Commissioners. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention the Court intervening due to the complexity of the appointment process.

Legal Issue: The relationship between the Election Commission's independence and the
constitutional right to vote.

Q4) In the country of Scenariozia, there are concerns about the independence of the
Election Commission due to the executive's control over the appointment process.
Citizens worry that this may affect their right to vote in upcoming elections. Based on
the passage, how does the independence of the Election Commission in Scenariozia
relate to the constitutional right to vote?

A) The independence of the Election Commission is essential for actualizing

the constitutional right to vote and ensuring free and fair elections.
B) The independence of the Election Commission has no impact on the
constitutional right to vote.
C) The independence of the Election Commission only affects the conduct of
elections, not the constitutional right to vote.
D) The independence of the Election Commission is unrelated to the constitutional
right to vote.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the EC is responsible
for actualizing the constitutional right to vote and ensuring free and fair elections, tasks
for which it has been given extraordinary powers. Option B is incorrect because the
passage emphasizes the importance of the EC's independence in actualizing the
constitutional right to vote. Option C is incorrect because the passage connects the EC's
independence to both the conduct of elections and the constitutional right to vote.
Option D is incorrect because the passage establishes a relationship between the EC's
independence and the constitutional right to vote.

Inference Legal Issue: The intent of the framers of the Constitution regarding the
independence of the Election Commission.
Q.5) The constitutional scholars are debating the intent of the framers of the
Constitution when designing the appointment mechanism for the Election Commission.
Based on the passage, which of the following best represents the intent of the framers of
the Constitution regarding the appointment mechanism for the Election Commission?

A) To give the executive complete control over the appointment process.

B) To make the appointment process as complex as possible.
C) To ensure the Election Commission's independence from the executive.
D) To leave the appointment process to the discretion of the judiciary.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the historical analysis
shows that the framers intended for the EC's appointment mechanism to ensure its
independence from the executive. Option A is incorrect because the passage emphasizes
the importance of the EC's independence from executive interference. Option B is
incorrect because the passage does not mention the framers' intent to make the
appointment process complex. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not
suggest that the framers intended to leave the appointment process to the judiciary's
discretion.

Inference Legal Issue: The Court's intervention aims to reduce the executive's control
over the appointment process, and having a committee consisting of only the Prime
Minister would not achieve that goal.

Q.6) What temporary measure did the Court devise to protect the Election
Commission's independence until Parliament enacts legislation?

A) Appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee consisting of only the Prime
Minister
B) Appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee comprising the Prime
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India
C) Appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee consisting of only the Chief
Justice of India
A. Appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee comprising the President, the
Prime Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition

Explanation: Option A is incorrect because the passage mentions that the Court's
intervention aims to reduce the executive's control over the appointment process, and
having a committee consisting of only the Prime Minister would not achieve that goal.
Option B is correct because the passage states that the Court devised a temporary
measure involving the appointment of the CEC and ECs by a committee comprising the
Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India. This
intervention is intended to preserve the independence of the EC and safeguard the
constitutional right to vote and the democratic process in India. Option C is incorrect
because, although the passage emphasizes the importance of the EC's independence
from executive interference, it does not suggest a committee consisting of only the Chief
Justice of India. Instead, the Court devises a committee that balances the interests of the
executive, opposition, and judiciary. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not
mention the President as part of the committee for the temporary measure. The Court's
intervention aims to reduce executive control over the appointment process, so
including both the President and the Prime Minister would not be consistent with this
objective.
PASSAGE - 3
The case involves the Kerala High Court's refusal to entertain an application against
the issuance of summons by the Trial Court for offences related to the illegal alienation
of certain properties of the Church. The Sessions Court also rejected the appeal, and the
Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ. refused to interfere with
the findings of three Courts below. The accused, the Archbishop, challenged the High
Court's order under Section 482 of CrPC, which dismissed all the seven Criminal
Miscellaneous Cases vide order dated 12-8-2021. The present batch of Special Leave
Petitions challenges the High Court's order. The Court noted that the Trial Court had
already taken cognizance by issuing summons before the dismissal of the previous
complaint, and mere non-disclosure of facts in the previous complaint would not be
grounds to set aside the summons issued by the Trial Court based on prima facie
allegations taking cognizance of not all but specific offences, which shows application of
mind. The Court also held that a fresh complaint could be entertained after the dismissal
of the previous complaint under Section 203 of CrPC when there was manifest error or
manifest miscarriage of justice or when fresh evidence was forthcoming. The Court
refused to interfere with the findings of the three Courts regarding the involvement of
the Archbishop in the alleged offences and directed the Trial Court to decide the
complaints against the accused in accordance with law. The Court refused to entertain
the SLPs filed by the petitioners due to the limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India and the absence of any other and further material on record to
support the petitioner's grievances.
The Court quashed and set aside all the subsequent orders passed by the High Court
after the passing of the impugned order dated 12-8-2021. The Court commented that
the High Court's belief of self-righteousness or smugness while exercising judicial
review should not overawe the other authorities discharging their statutory functions.
The Court further added that unwarranted judicial activism may cause uncertainty or
confusion not only in the mind of the authorities but also in the mind of the litigants.
The Court also clarified that the High Court's subsequent orders passed in the present
matter were beyond the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC and of Article 226 of the
Constitution. In conclusion, the Court upheld the Trial Court's issuance of summons
against the accused for the alleged offences, rejected the appeal filed by the accused
challenging the High Court's order, and quashed all subsequent orders passed by the
High Court in the matter. The Court emphasized the need for judicial restraint and
adherence to well-established judicial principles to ensure uniform application of law
and prevent confusion and uncertainty among authorities and litigants.
Source: High Court’s belief of self-righteousness or smugness while exercising
judicial review should not overawe other authorities discharging statutory duties:
Supreme Court, SCC OnLine Blog, March 18, 2023.

Legal issue : Issuance of summons by the Trial Court

Q.1) James Goodwin, a member of the St. Thomas Church, files a complaint alleging that
Archbishop Samuel, the head of the Church, has illegally alienated certain Church
properties. The Trial Court, after examining the complaint, issues summons to the
Archbishop based on prima facie allegations. However, the Archbishop argues that the
summons should be set aside as there was a non-disclosure of facts in the previous
complaint filed by James. Based on the factual situation, should the Trial Court's
issuance of summons against Archbishop Samuel be set aside due to the non-disclosure
of facts in the previous complaint?

A) Yes, because the non-disclosure of facts invalidates the complaint.

B) No, because the Trial Court took cognizance of specific offences after
applying its mind.
C) Yes, because the Archbishop has the right to challenge the summons.
D) No, because the complaint filed by James Goodwin was completely dismissed.

Explanation:
Option A is incorrect because the passage states that mere non-disclosure of facts in the
previous complaint would not be grounds to set aside the summons issued by the Trial
Court. Option B is correct because the passage states that the Trial Court based its
summons on prima facie allegations taking cognizance of not all but specific offences,
which shows the application of mind. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
indicate that the Archbishop's right to challenge the summons is a valid reason to set
aside the summons. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the dismissal
of the previous complaint does not automatically invalidate the current complaint.

Legal issue: Entertaining a fresh complaint after dismissal of a previous complaint under
Section 203 of CrPC

Q.2) After the dismissal of his previous complaint against Archbishop Samuel, James
Goodwin files a fresh complaint with new evidence supporting his allegations. The Trial
Court examines the fresh complaint and takes cognizance of specific offences.
Archbishop Samuel argues that the fresh complaint should not be entertained as the
previous complaint was dismissed. Based on the factual situation, should the fresh
complaint filed by James Goodwin be entertained by the Trial Court after the dismissal
of the previous complaint under Section 203 of CrPC?

A) Yes, because there was manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice in

the dismissal of the previous complaint.
B) No, because the dismissal of the previous complaint prevents any subsequent
complaints.
C) Yes, because the fresh complaint contains new evidence that was not previously
presented.
D) No, because the Trial Court has already issued summons based on the previous
complaint.

Explanation:
Option A is correct because the passage states that a fresh complaint could be
entertained after the dismissal of the previous complaint under Section 203 of CrPC
when there was manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice. Option B is incorrect
because the passage indicates that a fresh complaint can be entertained under certain
circumstances despite the dismissal of a previous complaint. Option C is also correct
because the passage states that a fresh complaint could be entertained when fresh
evidence is forthcoming. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention
that the issuance of summons based on a previous complaint would prevent the Trial
Court from entertaining a fresh complaint.
Legal issue: Limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

Q.3) Archbishop Samuel challenges the Kerala High Court's order under Section 482 of
CrPC in a batch of Special Leave Petitions. The Court examines the matter and considers
whether it should interfere with the findings of the three Courts below. Based on the
factual situation, can the Court interfere with the findings of the three Courts below due
to the limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the absence
of any other and further material on record to support the petitioner's grievances?

A) Yes, because the Court has the power to interfere with the findings of the three
Courts below.
B) No, because the limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India does not allow the Court to interfere.
C) Yes, because the Archbishop has the right to challenge the High Court's order
under Section 482 of CrPC.
D) No, because the Court has already decided to quash and set aside all the
subsequent orders passed by the High Court.

Explanation:
Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the Court refused to entertain the
SLPs filed by the petitioners due to the limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. Option B is correct because the passage emphasizes that the
limited jurisdiction under Article 136 and the absence of any other and further material
on record to support the petitioner's grievances prevent the Court from interfering with
the findings of the three Courts below. Option C is incorrect because the passage does
not indicate that the Archbishop's right to challenge the High Court's order is a valid
reason for the Court to interfere with the findings. Option D is incorrect because the
Court's decision to quash subsequent orders passed by the High Court is separate from
its decision not to interfere with the findings of the three Courts below.

Legal issue: Quashing and setting aside subsequent orders passed by the High Court

Q.4) Following the impugned order dated 12-8-2021, the Kerala High Court passes a
series of subsequent orders in the matter involving Archbishop Samuel and James
Goodwin. The Court examines these subsequent orders and their legality under Section
482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution. Based on the factual situation, should the
Court quash and set aside all the subsequent orders passed by the High Court after the
passing of the impugned order dated 12-8-2021?

A) Yes, because the subsequent orders were beyond the scope and ambit of
Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution.
B) No, because the High Court has the power to pass subsequent orders in the
exercise of its judicial review function.
C) Yes, because the High Court exhibited unwarranted judicial activism in passing
the subsequent orders.
D) No, because the subsequent orders were passed in the interest of doing real and
substantial justice.
Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Court quashed and
set aside all the subsequent orders passed by the High Court after the passing of the
impugned order dated 12-8-2021, as they were beyond the scope and ambit of Section
482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution. Option B is incorrect because the passage
emphasizes that the High Court had crossed all boundaries of judicial activism and
judicial restraint by passing such orders under the guise of doing real and substantial
justice. Option C is also correct because the passage indicates that the Court quashed the
subsequent orders due to unwarranted judicial activism by the High Court. Option D is
incorrect because the passage criticizes the High Court for passing orders under the
guise of doing real and substantial justice, as they were beyond the scope and ambit of
Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal issue: The need for judicial restraint and adherence to well-established judicial
principles

Q.5) In the case involving Archbishop Samuel and James Goodwin, the Court highlights
the importance of judicial restraint and adherence to well-established judicial
principles. It emphasizes the need for uniform application of law and preventing
confusion and uncertainty among authorities and litigants. Based on the factual
situation, why does the Court emphasize the need for judicial restraint and adherence to
well-established judicial principles?

A) To ensure uniform application of law and prevent confusion and

uncertainty among authorities and litigants.
B) To allow the Archbishop to challenge the High Court's order under Section 482 of
CrPC.
C) To encourage unwarranted judicial activism in the exercise of the High Court's
powers.
D) To invalidate the Trial Court's issuance of summons against the Archbishop for
the alleged offences.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Court emphasized
the need for judicial restraint and adherence to well-established judicial principles to
ensure uniform application of law and prevent confusion and uncertainty among
authorities and litigants. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not indicate
that the need for judicial restraint and adherence to well-established judicial principles
is related to the Archbishop's right to challenge the High Court's order. Option C is
incorrect because the passage criticizes unwarranted judicial activism, not encourages
it. Option D is incorrect because the passage does not mention that the need for judicial
restraint and adherence to well-established judicial principles has any impact on the
validity of the Trial Court's issuance of summons against the Archbishop.

Q.6) According to the passage, under what circumstances can a fresh complaint be
entertained after the dismissal of the previous complaint under Section 203 of CrPC?

A) When there is manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice, or when

fresh evidence is forthcoming
B) When the accused has not been informed of the allegations against them
C) When the Trial Court has not applied its mind to the facts of the case
 D) When the High Court has passed subsequent orders that are beyond the scope
and ambit of Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that "a fresh complaint
could be entertained after the dismissal of the previous complaint under Section 203 of
CrPC when there was manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice or when fresh
evidence was forthcoming." Option B is incorrect because it is not mentioned in the
passage as a circumstance under which a fresh complaint can be entertained after the
dismissal of a previous complaint. Option C is incorrect because, although the passage
mentions that the Trial Court applied its mind to the facts of the case, it does not state
that this would be a ground for entertaining a fresh complaint after the dismissal of the
previous complaint. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the High
Court's subsequent orders were beyond the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC and
Article 226 of the Constitution, but it does not state that this would be a ground for
entertaining a fresh complaint after the dismissal of the previous complaint.
PASSAGE - 4
Section 3 of the Right To Information Act states all the citizens shall have the right to
information. While dealing with a case related to the RTI request of a Tibetan refugee,
the Delhi High Court this week considered the question whether a non-citizen or a
foreigner can also seek information under the RTI Act. Justice Pratibha M. Singh said
that it would be inherently contradictory to hold that only citizens are entitled to the
Right to Information, considering that the RTI Act accords information relating to life or
liberty an important and distinct position. Justice Singh ruled that while Section 3 would
have to be read as positive recognition of the right in favour of citizens, it cannot be seen
as a prohibition against non-citizens. However, the court emphasised that in case of
non-citizens, it would be the discretion of the authorities to disclose such information or
not. The ruling also does not seem to suggest that a foreigner can seek any information
under the Act. In what situations can a non-citizen then seek information under the RTI
Act?
Justice Singh in the ruling said that the Constitution confers a large number of rights
on citizens but there are some rights for non-citizens also. It referred to travel related
permissions, OCI card, Visas, Refugees, asylum seekers, property related issues
concerning persons of Indian origin who may not be citizens, extradition related
information, etc. The court said in all situations, non-citizens would have some contact
with the public authorities, and an absolute bar on disclosure of information “would be
contrary to the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India which recognizes some
rights of even non-citizens”. Observing that Article 21 of the Constitution is not available
merely to citizens but all persons, Justice Singh took note of the proviso to Section 7(1)
of the RTI Act which states that information relating to life or liberty of a person is to be
disclosed within 48 hours. "Life or liberty could also relate to non-citizens including
foreigners, NRI’s, OCI card holders and such other persons," said the court. “It would be
left to the discretion of the authority concerned to decide depending upon the facts,
situation and the surrounding circumstances as to whether the information deserves to
be disclosed or not. Creating an absolute bar would be contrary to the purpose and
object of the RTI Act itself, and such an absolute bar cannot be read into the RTI Act,”
said the court.
Source: Can Foreigners Seek Information From Authorities In India Under RTI
Act? Explained, Live Law, March 15, 2023.

Q.1) John, a British citizen, is currently living in India on a long-term visa. His Indian
wife, Meera, has been detained by the police under suspicious circumstances. John
believes that Meera's detention is unlawful and wants to access information about her
case under the RTI Act. He files an RTI request to obtain details about her detention. Can
John, a non-citizen, seek information about his wife's detention under the RTI Act?
A) Yes, because John is married to an Indian citizen
B) Yes, because the RTI Act allows non-citizens to seek information related to
life or liberty
C) No, because only Indian citizens can access information under the RTI Act
D) No, because the RTI Act does not apply to non-citizens in any situation

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the RTI Act allows
non-citizens to seek information related to life or liberty, which in this case includes
information about Meera's detention. Justice Singh's ruling highlights that life or liberty
could relate to non-citizens, including foreigners, NRI's, OCI cardholders, and such other
persons. In the context of the passage, the ruling suggests that non-citizens like John can
seek information under the RTI Act, particularly when it concerns matters of life or
liberty. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that the right to information for
non-citizens is not dependent on their relationship with an Indian citizen. Justice
Singh's ruling focuses on the broader applicability of the RTI Act to non-citizens in
certain situations, especially those involving life or liberty, rather than their marital
status or connection to an Indian citizen. Option C is incorrect because the passage
states that the RTI Act does not create an absolute prohibition against non-citizens.
According to Justice Singh's ruling, Section 3 should be read as positive recognition of
the right to information in favor of citizens, but not as a prohibition against non-citizens,
leaving it to the discretion of authorities to decide whether to disclose information to
non-citizens. This means that non-citizens like John can seek information under the RTI
Act in certain situations. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that non-
citizens can seek information related to life or liberty under the RTI Act. The court
refers to various situations where non-citizens may have some contact with public
authorities and emphasizes that an absolute bar on disclosure of information for non-
citizens would be contrary to the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India. In
light of Justice Singh's ruling, non-citizens like John can seek information under the RTI
Act in situations related to life or liberty, such as Meera's detention.

Q.2) Maria, a foreign journalist, seeks information about an ongoing investigation

involving a high-profile Indian politician. Maria files an RTI request to access the details
of the case. The concerned authority is uncertain about whether to disclose the
information to Maria or not. Can the concerned authority refuse to disclose the
requested information to Maria, a non-citizen?
A) Yes, because the authority has discretion in disclosing information to non-
citizens
B) Yes, because Maria is not related to the case
C) No, because the RTI Act requires authorities to disclose information to anyone
who requests it
D) No, because the RTI Act guarantees equal access to information for all persons

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the authorities have
discretion in disclosing information to non-citizens. Option B is incorrect because the
passage does not mention any requirement of being related to the case to seek
information under the RTI Act. Option C is incorrect because the passage states that the
disclosure of information to non-citizens is at the discretion of the authorities. Option D
is incorrect because the passage states that the RTI Act does not guarantee equal access
to information for all persons.

Q.3) Chen, a Chinese businessman, is in India on a business visa. He has invested in

several Indian properties and now seeks information about the local property tax rates
from the concerned public authority. Chen files an RTI request for this information.
Does the Indian Constitution recognize any rights of non-citizens like Chen?
A) Yes, because the Constitution grants some rights to non-citizens in certain
situations
B) Yes, because the Constitution guarantees equal rights for all persons
C) No, because the Constitution only grants rights to Indian citizens
 D) No, because the Constitution does not mention any rights for non-citizens

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the Indian Constitution
recognizes some rights of non-citizens. Option B is incorrect because the passage does
not state that the Constitution guarantees equal rights for all persons. Option C is
incorrect because the passage states that the Constitution does recognize some rights of
non-citizens. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the Constitution
recognizes some rights of non-citizens in certain situations.

Q.4) Alex, a foreign national, is in India on a tourist visa. He gets involved in a legal
dispute and requires some information from the court to defend himself. Alex files an
RTI request to obtain the information, citing Article 21 of the Indian Constitution as a
basis for his right to access the information. Is Alex, a non-citizen, entitled to protection
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution?
A) Yes, because Alex is involved in a legal dispute in India
B) No, because Article 21 is only applicable to Indian citizens
C) No, because the RTI Act does not mention Article 21
D) Yes, because Article 21 is applicable to all persons, not just citizens

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage explicitly states that Justice Singh
observed that Article 21 of the Constitution is available to all persons, not just citizens.
In her ruling, she emphasizes the importance of life or liberty in the RTI Act and refers
to the proviso to Section 7(1) of the RTI Act, which states that information relating to
life or liberty of a person is to be disclosed within 48 hours. Justice Singh's observation
implies that non-citizens like Alex can seek protection under Article 21 in the context of
the RTI Act. Option A is incorrect because the passage does not mention any
requirement of being involved in a legal dispute to be entitled to protection under
Article 21. Justice Singh's ruling focuses on the broader applicability of Article 21 to all
persons, regardless of their citizenship status or specific circumstances, such as
involvement in a legal dispute. Option B is incorrect because the passage clearly states
that Article 21 is applicable to all persons, not just citizens. Justice Singh's ruling
emphasizes that even non-citizens, including foreigners, NRI's, OCI cardholders, and
others, can seek protection under Article 21 in certain situations. Option C is incorrect
because the passage states that Justice Singh took note of Article 21 in the context of the
RTI Act, and her ruling examines the relationship between the RTI Act and Article 21.
She refers to the proviso to Section 7(1) of the RTI Act, which states that information
relating to life or liberty of a person is to be disclosed within 48 hours, and connects this
provision to Article 21's applicability to all persons, including non-citizens like Alex.

Q.5) Considering Justice Pratibha M. Singh's ruling in the Delhi High Court, how should
Section 3 of the Right to Information Act be interpreted in the context of non-citizens,
particularly when the Constitution of India recognizes some rights for non-citizens, and
the ruling emphasizes the importance of life or liberty in the RTI Act?

A) Section 3 of the RTI Act should be read as granting the right to information
exclusively to Indian citizens, thereby prohibiting non-citizens from seeking any
information under the Act.
 B) Section 3 of the RTI Act should be read as allowing non-citizens to seek
information under the Act without any restrictions, treating them on par with
Indian citizens.
C) Section 3 of the RTI Act should be read as positive recognition of the right
to information in favor of citizens, but not as a prohibition against non-
citizens, leaving it to the discretion of authorities to decide whether to
disclose information to non-citizens.
D) Section 3 of the RTI Act should be read as providing non-citizens with the right to
information only in life or liberty situations, while completely barring them from
seeking information in any other situations.

Explanation: Option C is correct because, according to the ruling, Section 3 should be

read as positive recognition of the right to information in favor of citizens, but not as a
prohibition against non-citizens. Justice Singh emphasizes that it would be left to the
discretion of the authority concerned to decide, depending on the facts, situation, and
surrounding circumstances, whether the information deserves to be disclosed or not to
non-citizens. Option A is incorrect because Justice Singh's ruling explicitly states that
Section 3 should not be read as a prohibition against non-citizens. The court also
emphasizes that an absolute bar on disclosure of information for non-citizens would be
contrary to the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India. Option B is incorrect
because the ruling does not suggest that non-citizens should be treated on par with
Indian citizens when it comes to seeking information under the RTI Act. The court
emphasizes that in the case of non-citizens, it would be the discretion of the authorities
to disclose such information or not. Option D is incorrect because the ruling does not
limit the circumstances under which non-citizens can seek information to only life or
liberty situations. The court refers to various other situations where non-citizens may
have some contact with public authorities, and it emphasizes that an absolute bar on
disclosure of information for non-citizens would be contrary to the principles enshrined
in the Constitution of India.

Q.6) Under what circumstances can a non-citizen seek information under the Right to
Information Act according to the ruling of Justice Pratibha M. Singh in the Delhi High
Court?
A) Non-citizens can seek information in any situation under the RTI Act.
B) Non-citizens can seek information only in situations related to life or liberty.
C) Non-citizens can seek information only in situations where they have some
contact with public authorities, and it is at the discretion of the authority
concerned to decide whether the information deserves to be disclosed or
not.
D) Non-citizens are strictly prohibited from seeking information under the RTI Act.

Explanation: Option C is correct because Justice Singh's ruling states that non-citizens
can seek information in situations where they have some contact with public
authorities. The court observes that creating an absolute bar on disclosure of
information for non-citizens "would be contrary to the principles enshrined in the
Constitution of India which recognizes some rights of even non-citizens." However, the
ruling emphasizes that it would be left to the discretion of the authority concerned to
decide, depending on the facts, situation, and surrounding circumstances, whether the
information deserves to be disclosed or not. Option A is incorrect because the ruling
does not suggest that non-citizens can seek information in any situation under the RTI
Act. The court emphasized that in case of non-citizens, it would be the discretion of the
authorities to disclose such information or not. Option B is incorrect because although
the ruling does mention that information relating to life or liberty holds a distinct
position in the RTI Act, it does not limit the circumstances under which non-citizens can
seek information to only life or liberty situations. The court refers to various other
situations where non-citizens may have some contact with public authorities, such as
travel-related permissions, OCI card, Visas, Refugees, asylum seekers, property-related
issues concerning persons of Indian origin who may not be citizens, extradition-related
information, etc. Option D is incorrect because the ruling specifically states that creating
an absolute bar on disclosure of information for non-citizens would be contrary to the
purpose and object of the RTI Act, and that such a bar cannot be read into the Act.
PASSAGE – 5
The Supreme Court of India has clarified the concept of 'cause of action' under Article
226(2) of the Constitution of India in a recent judgment. According to the Court, only
those facts that are relevant to the grant of relief will give rise to a cause of action. The
Court held that a company cannot challenge a GST notification issued by one state
before a High Court located in another state solely on the ground that it has an office
there. The Court was considering the appeals filed by the State of Goa against a decision
of the Sikkim High Court that it has jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed by a
company challenging the notification issued by the Goa Government. The Supreme
Court noted that there is no pleading in the writ petition as to how the cause of action
has arisen in Sikkim, except a statement that both the petitioners and the respondents
are located within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court said that in
the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such ‘cause of action’ is the
material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain
relief as claimed. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject matter of
challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant
or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring
jurisdiction on the court.
The Court held that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions as
against the State of Goa even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the
territorial jurisdiction of a high court. The Court said that the principle of forum
conveniens should be considered in such cases. The Court added that even if a small
part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court, it
could not be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions
alive against the appellant to decide the matter qua the impugned notification, on merit.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has provided clarity on the concept of 'cause of action'
and the principle of forum conveniens in the context of writ petitions. The Court has
emphasized that only those facts that are relevant to the grant of relief will give rise to a
cause of action and that the principle of forum conveniens should be considered while
deciding on jurisdiction.
Source: Article 226(2) - Supreme Court Explains Tests To Determine If Cause Of
Action Has Arisen Within Jurisdiction Of High Court, Live Law, March 15, 2023.

Q.1) Company X, based in Maharashtra, has a branch office in West Bengal. The
Maharashtra government issues a notification that imposes an additional tax on
Company X's products. Company X believes the tax is unconstitutional and files a writ
petition in the Calcutta High Court challenging the Maharashtra government's
notification. Can Company X's writ petition be entertained by the Calcutta High Court
based on the concept of ‘cause of action' as clarified by the Supreme Court of India?

A) Yes, because Company X has a branch office in West Bengal.

B) No, because the notification was issued by the Maharashtra government.
C) Yes, if the additional tax affects the business operations of Company X in West
Bengal.
D) No, unless Company X can prove that the cause of action has arisen in West
Bengal.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage clarifies that only those facts
relevant to the grant of relief will give rise to a cause of action, and the notification was
issued by the Maharashtra government, not the West Bengal government. Option A is
incorrect because the passage states that having an office in the jurisdiction of the High
Court is not sufficient grounds to establish the cause of action. Option C is incorrect
because the passage states that the material facts must have a nexus with the subject
matter of the challenge based on which the prayer can be granted, and the additional
tax's effect on business operations is not the subject matter of the challenge. Option D is
incorrect because the passage states that even if a small part of the cause of action
arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court, it could not be a determinative
factor compelling the High Court to entertain the writ petitions.

Q.2) Company Y, based in Uttar Pradesh, challenges a notification issued by the

Karnataka government imposing new regulations on e-commerce companies. Company
Y files a writ petition in the Karnataka High Court, stating that the new regulations will
have a detrimental effect on their business nationwide, including their operations in
Karnataka. In determining whether the Karnataka High Court can entertain Company
Y's writ petition, which of the following factors is most relevant to establish the cause of
action?

A) The detrimental effect of the regulations on Company Y's business nationwide.

B) The revenue generated by Company Y in Karnataka.
C) The number of employees Company Y has in Karnataka.
D) Company Y's operations in Karnataka.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that material facts must
have a nexus with the subject matter of the challenge based on which the prayer can be
granted, and the company's operations in Karnataka are directly affected by the
Karnataka government's notification. Option A is incorrect because the passage states
that those facts which are not relevant or germane for the grant of the prayer would not
give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court, and the nationwide
effect is not the direct subject matter of the challenge. Option B and C are incorrect
because the passage does not mention revenue or employee numbers as relevant
factors for establishing the cause of action.

Q.3) Company Z, based in Delhi, has operations in several states, including Haryana and
Rajasthan. The Haryana government issues a notification that affects the operations of
Company Z in Haryana. Company Z files a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court,
challenging the Haryana government's notification on the grounds that it has an office in
Rajasthan. Should the Rajasthan High Court entertain Company Z's writ petition based
on the principle of forum conveniens?

A) Yes, because Company Z has an office in Rajasthan.

B) No, because the Haryana government issued the notification.
C) Yes, if the notification affects Company Z's operations in Rajasthan.
D) No, because the principle of forum conveniens should be considered.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage highlights that the principle of
forum conveniens should be considered in such cases, and since the Haryana
government issued the notification, it is more appropriate for the Haryana High Court to
entertain the writ petition. Option A is incorrect because the passage states that having
an office in the jurisdiction of the High Court is not sufficient grounds to establish the
cause of action or forum conveniens. Option C is incorrect because the passage states
that even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of
a high court, it could not be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to
entertain the writ petitions, and the effect on Company Z's operations in Rajasthan is
not the direct subject matter of the challenge. Option D is incorrect because it restates
the legal issue without addressing the specific facts of the case.

Q.4) Company B, based in Andhra Pradesh, challenges a notification issued by the

Telangana government that imposes new licensing requirements for certain businesses.
Company B files a writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court, stating that the
notification will negatively impact its operations in both Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana. Which of the following factors is most relevant for Company B to plead and
prove in its writ petition to obtain relief?

A) The negative impact of the notification on Company B's operations in

Andhra Pradesh.
B) The revenue generated by Company B in Andhra Pradesh.
C) The number of employees Company B has in Andhra Pradesh.
D) The location of Company B's headquarters in Andhra Pradesh.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that material facts must
have a nexus with the subject matter of the challenge based on which the prayer can be
granted, and the negative impact of the notification on Company B's operations in
Andhra Pradesh is directly related to the subject matter of the challenge. Option B is
incorrect because the passage does not mention revenue as a relevant factor for
establishing the cause of action. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention the number of employees as a relevant factor for establishing the cause of
action. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the location of a company's
headquarters or office is not sufficient grounds to establish the cause of action.

Q.5) Based on the Supreme Court's recent judgment clarifying the concept of 'cause of
action' under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, which of the following
situations would most likely give rise to a cause of action in a writ petition?

A) The petitioner's company has an office in the state where the High Court is
located.
B) The facts pleaded by the petitioner are relevant to the grant of relief.
C) The petitioner has a strong emotional connection to the state where the High
Court is located.
D) The petitioner's company conducts a significant amount of business within the
state where the High Court is located.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the Supreme Court held that only those facts
that are relevant to the grant of relief will give rise to a cause of action. The Court
emphasized that the material facts should be imperative for the writ petitioner to plead
and prove to obtain relief as claimed. Option A is incorrect because the mere presence of
an office in the state where the High Court is located does not give rise to a cause of
action, as explained in the passage. Option C is incorrect because emotional connections
are not relevant or germane for the grant of relief and would not give rise to a cause of
action. Option D is incorrect because the amount of business conducted within the state
where the High Court is located is not a determining factor for the cause of action. The
focus should be on the material facts that are relevant to the grant of relief.

Q.6) According to the Supreme Court's judgment, in which of the following situations
should the principle of forum conveniens be considered while deciding on jurisdiction
in a writ petition?

A) When the petitioner has an office in the state where the High Court is located.
B) When the respondent resides within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
C) When a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court.
D) When the facts pleaded by the petitioner are relevant to the grant of relief.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the Court held that the principle of forum
conveniens should be considered in cases where even a small part of the cause of action
arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court. The Court further added that the
existence of a small part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of a high court
could not be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions
alive against the appellant to decide the matter on merit. Option A is incorrect because
the mere presence of an office in the state where the High Court is located does not
automatically invoke the principle of forum conveniens. Option B is incorrect because
the respondent's residence within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court is not the
determining factor for applying the principle of forum conveniens. Option D is incorrect
because the relevance of the facts pleaded by the petitioner to the grant of relief is
related to the concept of 'cause of action,' not the principle of forum conveniens.
PASSAGE - 6
Hours after a group of people chanting pro-Khalistan slogans took down the Indian
flag at the High Commission in London, the Indian government on Sunday summoned
the “senior-most” UK diplomat, Deputy High Commissioner Christina Scott, and lodged a
strong protest, The Indian Express reported. On the same day, a group of pro-Khalistan
protesters attacked and damaged the Indian Consulate in San Francisco, reported Press
Trust of India. All this is against the Vienna Convention. The term “Vienna Convention”
can refer to any of a number of treaties signed in Vienna, most of which are related to
the harmonisation or formalisation of the procedures of international diplomacy. The
treaty being referred to by the MEA in this instance is the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (1961), which “provides a complete framework for the
establishment, maintenance and termination of diplomatic relations on a basis of
consent between independent sovereign States”, as per an introductory note on the
treaty in UN’s Audiovisual Library of International Law. The Convention codifies the
longstanding custom of diplomatic immunity, in which diplomatic missions are granted
privileges that enable diplomats to perform their functions without fear of coercion or
harassment by the host country. It affirms the concept of “inviolability” of a diplomatic
mission, which has been one of the enduring cornerstones of international diplomacy.
As per the Vienna Convention, a “receiving State” refers to the host nation where a
diplomatic mission is located. In this case, the host nation is the UK and as per the
Vienna Convention, it has some basic obligations towards the diplomatic missions it
hosts on its sovereign territory. Article 22 of the Convention deals with obligations with
regards to the premises of the Mission. Part 2 of this article states that “The receiving
State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of
the mission or impairment of its dignity”. Basically, the security of any High Commission
or Embassy is the responsibility of the host nation. While diplomatic missions can also
employ their own security, ultimately, the host nation is accountable for security. The
fact that protestors were able to climb the walls of the High Commission premises
indicates a breach.
As per the MEA statement, “India finds unacceptable the indifference of the UK
Government to the security of Indian diplomatic premises and personnel in the UK. It is
expected that the UK Government would take immediate steps to identify, arrest and
prosecute each one of those involved in today’s incident, and put in place stringent
measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.”
Source: Vandalism by pro-Khalistan protestors at Indian High Commission in
London: What is the Vienna Convention, invoked by MEA, The Indian Express,
March 20, 2023.

Q.1) John, a UK citizen, plans a protest with several other individuals in support of pro-
Khalistani sentiments. He intends to target the Indian Consulate in London. During the
protest, the group breaches the security measures implemented by the local police and
enters the premises of the Consulate, causing damage to the property and raising
Khalistani flags. The Consulate personnel manage to remove the flags, but significant
damage has already been done to the property. In this situation, has the UK government
fulfilled its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) to
protect the premises of the Indian Consulate from intrusion and damage?

A) Yes, because the local police attempted to implement security measures.

 B) No, because the protestors were able to enter the premises and cause
damage.
C) Yes, because the Consulate personnel managed to remove the flags.
D) No, because the UK government is not responsible for the actions of its citizens.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the UK government has
the obligation to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage,
and the protestors were able to enter and cause damage. Option A is incorrect because
the passage states that the host nation is accountable for security, and the fact that
protestors were able to breach security measures implies a breach in obligations. Option
C is incorrect because the removal of the flags by Consulate personnel does not negate
the UK government's obligation to protect the premises. Option D is incorrect because
the passage states that the host nation, in this case, the UK, is ultimately

Q.2) Sarah, a UK diplomat, is stationed at the British Embassy in New Delhi, India. An
extremist group plans to attack the embassy, believing that doing so will send a strong
message to the UK government. The group manages to enter the embassy's premises
and cause significant damage to the property, endangering the lives of embassy staff,
including Sarah. The Indian government had received intel about the planned attack but
did not take any action to prevent it. Has the Indian government breached its obligations
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) with respect to the
concept of "inviolability" of a diplomatic mission in this situation?

A) Yes, because the Indian government did not take appropriate steps to
protect the embassy's premises.
B) No, because the extremist group, not the Indian government, was responsible for
the attack.
C) Yes, because the Indian government had received intel about the planned attack
but did not act.
D) No, because the Vienna Convention does not apply to attacks from non-state
actors.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the concept of
"inviolability" is one of the enduring cornerstones of international diplomacy, and the
receiving State (in this case, India) has the obligation to protect the premises of the
mission against intrusion or damage. Option B is incorrect because the passage states
that the host nation is ultimately responsible for the security of the diplomatic mission,
regardless of who perpetrated the attack. Option C is incorrect because although
receiving intel about the planned attack and not acting upon it contributes to the breach,
the primary reason for the breach is the failure

Q.3) In a small European country, a group of anti-government protestors gathers near

the Indian Embassy, seeking to voice their grievances against their own government.
The protest, while non-violent, becomes extremely loud and disruptive, disturbing the
normal functioning of the Indian Embassy. The host country's police force is aware of
the protest but does not take any measures to prevent the disturbance. Has the host
country breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
(1961) to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity in this situation?

A) Yes, because the host country's police force was aware of the protest but did
not take any measures to prevent the disturbance.
B) No, because the protest was non-violent and only aimed at voicing grievances
against the host country's government.
C) Yes, because the disturbance affected the normal functioning of the Indian
Embassy.
D) No, because the Vienna Convention only applies to physical intrusions and
damage.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that the receiving State (in
this case, the host country) is under a special duty to prevent any disturbance of the
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. Since the host country's police force
was aware of the protest but did not take measures to prevent the disturbance, they
failed in fulfilling this obligation. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not
differentiate between violent and non-violent disturbances; the obligation is to prevent
any disturbance of the peace

Q.4) In Australia, a group of environmental activists targets the Indian Consulate in

Sydney to protest India's environmental policies. They vandalize the Consulate's
property and spray-paint derogatory messages on the building's exterior. The Australian
police manage to detain several of the protestors, but some manage to escape. The
Indian government demands that the Australian government take immediate steps to
identify, arrest, and prosecute all those involved. Is the Australian government obligated
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) to identify, arrest, and
prosecute all those involved in the incident?

A) No, because the Vienna Convention does not specifically mention the obligation
to identify, arrest, and prosecute those involved.
B) Yes, because the Indian government demands that the Australian government
take such action.
C) Yes, because the Vienna Convention requires the host nation to take action
against those causing damage to diplomatic premises.
D) No, because the environmental activists were protesting India's environmental
policies, not Australia's.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage implies that the host nation, in this
case, Australia, has an obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the diplomatic
mission, which includes identifying, arresting, and prosecuting those involved in
incidents causing damage to the premises. Option A is incorrect because although the
Vienna Convention may not specifically mention these obligations, the host nation's
responsibility to protect diplomatic missions and their dignity is implied. Option B is
incorrect because the obligation to identify, arrest, and prosecute those involved is not
dependent on the Indian government's demand, but rather on the Vienna Convention's
provisions. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the host nation's
responsibility is to protect the diplomatic mission regardless of the reason behind the
protest. The focus of the protestors' grievances does not absolve the host nation from its
obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) to ensure the
security and dignity of diplomatic missions.
Q.5) Based on the principle of diplomatic immunity, which of the following statements is
correct regarding the obligations of the host nation towards a diplomatic mission on its
sovereign territory?

A) The host nation has no obligation towards the diplomatic mission on its
sovereign territory.
B) The host nation has the duty to provide complete security to the diplomatic
mission.
C) The host nation has a special duty to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
D) The host nation is responsible for the conduct of the diplomatic mission on its
sovereign territory.

Explanation: Option C is correct because it accurately reflects Article 22 of the Vienna

Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states that the receiving state has a special
duty to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The
passage also emphasizes that the security of any High Commission or Embassy is the
responsibility of the host nation, and the fact that protestors were able to breach the
Indian High Commission in London indicates a breach of this duty. Option A is incorrect
because it goes against the principle of diplomatic immunity and the obligations of the
host nation. Option B is incorrect because although the host nation has a duty to provide
security, it is not expected to provide complete security. Option D is incorrect because
the diplomatic mission is responsible for its own conduct.

Q.6) Based on the passage, which of the following statements is correct regarding the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)?

A) The Convention is related to the harmonization of international trade

procedures.
B) The Convention provides a complete framework for the establishment,
maintenance, and termination of diplomatic relations on a basis of consent
between independent sovereign States.
C) The Convention provides a complete framework for the establishment,
maintenance, and termination of economic relations between independent
sovereign States.
D) The Convention is not relevant to the establishment, maintenance, and
termination of diplomatic relations between independent sovereign States.

Explanation: Option B is correct because it accurately reflects the introductory note on

the treaty in UN’s Audiovisual Library of International Law, which states that the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) provides a complete framework for the
establishment, maintenance, and termination of diplomatic relations on a basis of
consent between independent sovereign States. The passage also notes that the
Convention codifies the longstanding custom of diplomatic immunity and affirms the
concept of "inviolability" of a diplomatic mission, which has been one of the enduring
cornerstones of international diplomacy. Option A, C, and D are incorrect because they
do not accurately reflect the purpose and scope of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (1961) as stated in the passage.

PASSAGE - 7
The Supreme Court has referred to a landmark ruling from 2005 in Rameshwar Prasad v
Union of India to define the powers of the Governor in the event of a hung assembly or
internal dissatisfaction within a party. The case involved a hung Legislative Assembly in
Bihar after the state elections in 2005, with no party or alliance able to muster the
required majority. The Governor recommended President’s Rule under Article 365 and
kept the Assembly in “suspended animation,” preventing it from conducting any
business. A group of 17 independent MLAs and three smaller parties extended their
support to the NDA group led by Nitish Kumar, prompting the Governor to send two
reports to the President, recommending fresh elections and the dissolution of the
existing Assembly. The Union Cabinet forwarded the reports to the President for his
assent, and the Bihar Assembly was dissolved. However, a group of MLAs challenged the
constitutionality of the Presidential Proclamation and asked for the dissolution of the
Assembly to be struck down as “unconstitutional.” The Supreme Court struck down the
Proclamation as unconstitutional but chose not to restore the Assembly due to the
approaching elections. The court ruled that the Governor was required to be kept out of
controversies like the disqualification of members of a Legislative Assembly, and that
the Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts stated in the Governor’s
report before accepting it as a gospel truth. The court also frowned upon the conduct of
the Governor in the Maharashtra case, expressing concern over his use of powers to
order a floor test, which pushed the Chief Minister to resign. The five-judge Bench
distinguished between the decision in Rameshwar Prasad and the present case, stating
that the Governor cannot refuse the formation of a new government and override the
majority because of his subjective assessment.
The crisis in Maharashtra arose after a rebellion in the Shiv Sena in June 2022, with the
majority of MLAs going over to the faction led by the current Chief Minister. The
Governor's intervention in calling for a floor test prompted the Supreme Court to
question whether the Governor could intervene in case of internal dissatisfaction within
a party. The Solicitor General referred to the 2005 ruling in Rameshwar Prasad's case,
but one of the judges pointed out that in that case, the government was never formed,
whereas in the present situation, the government in Maharashtra had been in power for
more than three and a half years. The Chief Justice of India distinguished between the
decision in Rameshwar Prasad and the present case, stating that the Governor cannot
refuse the formation of a new government and override the majority due to his
subjective assessment. The ruling in Rameshwar Prasad's case, therefore, provides
clarity on the Governor's powers in the event of a hung assembly, but it does not give the
Governor the authority to intervene in a legitimately formed government due to internal
dissatisfaction within a party.
Source: Maharashtra crisis: What was the Rameshwar Prasad case, in which the SC
decided on the powers of the Governor in 2005?, The Indian Express, March 17,
2023.

Q.1) In the fictional state of Azuria, after the recent state elections, no party or alliance
was able to form a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The Governor of Azuria, seeing
the hung assembly, recommended President's Rule under Article 365 and kept the
Assembly in "suspended animation." A group of independent MLAs and a small party
extended their support to the Azuria Democratic Alliance (ADA) led by Anjali Sharma.
The Governor then sent two reports to the President, recommending fresh elections and
the dissolution of the existing Assembly. The Union Cabinet forwarded the reports to the
President for his assent, and the Azuria Assembly was dissolved. A group of MLAs
challenged the constitutionality of the Presidential Proclamation, asking for the
dissolution of the Assembly to be struck down as "unconstitutional." Herein, what would
be the likely outcome if the Supreme Court were to consider the constitutionality of the
Presidential Proclamation dissolving the Azuria Assembly?
A) The Supreme Court would uphold the Presidential Proclamation as
constitutional.
B) The Supreme Court would strike down the Presidential Proclamation as
unconstitutional and restore the Assembly.
C) The Supreme Court would strike down the Presidential Proclamation as
unconstitutional but not restore the Assembly.
D) The Supreme Court would decline to hear the case.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the Supreme Court
struck down the Proclamation as unconstitutional in Rameshwar Prasad's case but
chose not to restore the Assembly due to the approaching elections. In this hypothetical
situation, the Court would likely follow a similar approach, striking down the
Proclamation but not restoring the Assembly. Option A is incorrect because the passage
states that in Rameshwar Prasad's case, the Supreme Court struck down the
Proclamation as unconstitutional. Option B is incorrect because the passage states that
although the Supreme Court struck down the Proclamation as unconstitutional in
Rameshwar Prasad's case, they chose not to restore the Assembly due to the
approaching elections. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that the
Supreme Court did hear and decide on the Rameshwar Prasad case, so it is unlikely they
would decline to hear a similar case.

Q.2) In the fictional state of Bellaria, after the recent state elections, no party or alliance
was able to form a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The Governor of Bellaria,
Governor Redwood, attempted to dissolve the Assembly and recommend fresh elections
without exploring the possibility of any alliance forming a government. A group of
independent MLAs and two smaller parties claimed they could form a government by
joining the Bellaria Democratic Coalition (BDC) led by Benjamin Thompson. They
approached the Governor to reconsider his decision, arguing that they have the required
majority to form a government. Herein, did Governor Redwood act within his powers as
the Governor of Bellaria when he attempted to dissolve the Assembly without exploring
the possibility of an alliance forming a government?

A) Yes, the Governor has the authority to dissolve the Assembly and recommend
fresh elections in the event of a hung assembly.
B) No, the Governor should have first explored the possibility of an alliance
forming a government before dissolving the Assembly.
C) Yes, the Governor has the authority to dissolve the Assembly, but he must first
consult with the President.
D) No, the Governor can only dissolve the Assembly after a floor test has been
conducted.
Explanation: Option B is correct because, based on the Rameshwar Prasad case, the
Governor should be kept out of controversies and should not override the majority due
to his subjective assessment. In this situation, Governor Redwood should have first
explored the possibility of an alliance forming a government before dissolving the
Assembly. By attempting to dissolve the Assembly without exploring this possibility, he
acted outside his powers as the Governor of Bellaria. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that the Governor cannot refuse the formation of a new government and
override the majority due to his subjective assessment, as indicated in the Rameshwar
Prasad case. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not suggest that the
Governor needs to consult with the President before exploring the possibility of an
alliance forming a government in a hung assembly situation. Moreover, the issue in this
hypothetical situation is the Governor's decision to dissolve the Assembly without
considering the possibility of an alliance forming a government. Option D is incorrect
because the passage does not specifically mention that a floor test must be conducted
before dissolving the Assembly. The main issue in this hypothetical situation is the
Governor's failure to explore the possibility of an alliance forming a government, which
goes against the Supreme Court's ruling in Rameshwar Prasad's case.

Q.3) In the fictional state of Corallia, the Governor, Governor Willow, sent a report to the
President recommending the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and fresh elections.
The report contained several allegations of corruption and maladministration against
the current government, led by the Corallia United Party (CUP). The Union Council of
Ministers accepted the report without verifying the facts stated in it and forwarded it to
the President for his assent. Following the President's assent, the Corallia Assembly was
dissolved. The CUP challenged the dissolution, arguing that the Union Council of
Ministers should have verified the facts stated in the Governor's report before accepting
it. Herien, should the Union Council of Ministers have verified the facts stated in
Governor Willow's report before accepting it and forwarding it to the President for his
assent?

A) Yes, the Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts stated in
the Governor's report before accepting it.
B) No, the Union Council of Ministers is not required to verify the facts stated in the
Governor's report before accepting it.
C) Yes, the Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts stated in the
Governor's report but only if there was a hung assembly.
D) No, the Union Council of Ministers should accept the Governor's report as gospel
truth and forward it to the President without verification.

Explanation: Option A is correct because the passage states that in Rameshwar Prasad's
case, the court ruled that the Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts
stated in the Governor's report before accepting it as gospel truth. In the hypothetical
situation, the Union Council of Ministers should have followed the same principle and
verified the facts in Governor Willow's report before accepting it. Option B is incorrect
because the passage states that the court ruled in Rameshwar Prasad's case that the
Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts in the Governor's report before
accepting it. This principle applies to the Corallia situation as well. Option C is incorrect
because the passage does not limit the requirement of verification of facts in the
Governor's report to situations involving a hung assembly. In Rameshwar Prasad's case,
the court ruled that the Union Council of Ministers should have verified the facts in the
Governor's report before accepting it, regardless of the specific circumstances. Option D
is incorrect because the passage states that in Rameshwar Prasad's case, the court ruled
against accepting the Governor's report as gospel truth without verification. The Union
Council of Ministers should have verified the facts in Governor Willow's report before
forwarding it to the President.

Q.4) In the fictional state of Daleria, a rebellion occurred within the ruling Daleria
People's Party (DPP). The majority of MLAs switched their allegiance to a faction led by
the current Chief Minister, Claire Davidson. Governor Oakley, concerned about the
stability of the government, used his powers to order a floor test, which ultimately led to
the Chief Minister's resignation. The Supreme Court was later asked to review the
appropriateness of Governor Oakley's conduct in this situation. Herein, was Governor
Oakley's conduct appropriate in ordering a floor test due to internal dissatisfaction
within the Daleria People's Party?

A) Yes, Governor Oakley had the authority to order a floor test in case of internal
dissatisfaction within the ruling party.
B) No, Governor Oakley should have waited for the new faction to approach him
before ordering a floor test.
C) Yes, Governor Oakley's conduct was appropriate as the floor test ensured the
stability of the government.
D) No, Governor Oakley's conduct was not appropriate as he should not
intervene in a legitimately formed government due to internal
dissatisfaction within a party.

Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage states that in the Maharashtra
case, the court frowned upon the Governor's conduct in ordering a floor test due to
internal dissatisfaction within a party. In the hypothetical situation, Governor Oakley's
conduct was similarly inappropriate, as he should not intervene in a legitimately formed
government due to internal dissatisfaction within the Daleria People's Party. Option A is
incorrect because the passage states that in the Maharashtra case, the court frowned
upon the conduct of the Governor in ordering a floor test, which pushed the Chief
Minister to resign. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not specifically
mention that the Governor should wait for a new faction to approach him before
ordering a floor test. Option C is incorrect because the passage indicates that the court
disapproved of the Governor's conduct in the Maharashtra case, as it was seen as an
intervention in a legitimately formed government due to internal dissatisfaction within
a party.

Q.5) Based on the Rameshwar Prasad case and the Maharashtra case, under what
circumstances can a Governor intervene in the affairs of a Legislative Assembly?

A) When there is a hung assembly, and no party or alliance can muster the
required majority.
B) When there is internal dissatisfaction within a party.
C) When the Governor has a subjective assessment that the majority is not stable.
D) When the government has not been formed yet, and no party has a clear majority.
Explanation:
Option a) is correct because, in the Rameshwar Prasad case, the Governor intervened
when there was a hung assembly, and no party or alliance could muster the required
majority. Option b) is incorrect because, although the Maharashtra case involved
internal dissatisfaction within a party, the Chief Justice of India distinguished it from the
Rameshwar Prasad case and stated that the Governor cannot intervene in such
situations. Option c) is incorrect because the court ruled that the Governor cannot
refuse the formation of a new government and override the majority based on his
subjective assessment. Option d) is incorrect because, although the Rameshwar Prasad
case involved a situation where the government had not been formed yet, the court's
decision focused on the Governor's role in a hung assembly, not the absence of a formed
government.
PASSAGE – 8
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is a stringent law that makes it difficult
for an accused to get bail. Under this law, investigating agencies can have up to 180 days
to probe allegations against the accused. This period can be extended by an additional
90 days if the agency is unable to complete the investigation within the initial 90 days.
Recently, the Delhi High Court considered whether the investigating agency should be
granted the further 90-day period in one go or if the Special Court has the discretion to
decide the time period during which the investigation can be completed. The court ruled
that the Special Court has the power to grant an extension of up to 90 days at a time,
based on how much time is reasonably required to complete the investigation. The court
also stated that the public prosecutor must scrutinize the investigating agency's request
for an extension of remand and submit a report to the court that independently applies
their mind. The public prosecutor must ensure that the investigation is carried out with
utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays. The court also emphasized that
the investigating agency should not procrastinate, be tardy or take it leisurely for the
next few days, and file the charge sheet at the end nearing the 90th day.
The court's ruling emphasizes that the investigating agency must carry out the
investigation in a reasonable and prompt manner, with no unnecessary delays or
procrastination. The court emphasized that the Special Court must apply its mind to find
out the reasonable time required to complete the investigation whenever a report of the
Public Prosecutor is presented seeking an extension of time for investigation beyond 90
days. The ruling is significant as the UAPA has been frequently invoked against activists
and protestors in recent years. Critics have accused the law of being draconian and
unduly harsh, as it makes it difficult for an accused to obtain bail, and undertrials can
languish in jail for years, sometimes even without charges having been framed by the
court. The court's ruling is a step towards ensuring that the UAPA is implemented fairly
and justly, and the investigating agency does not misuse its powers to keep the accused
in detention indefinitely. In conclusion, the Delhi High Court's recent ruling provides
clarity on the interpretation of the UAPA and emphasizes the importance of carrying out
investigations with utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays. The ruling
aims to strike a balance between safeguarding the rights of the accused and ensuring
that investigations are carried out properly and promptly.
Source: Explained | UAPA, Extension Of Period Of Investigation Beyond 90 Days &
Court's Duty, Live Law, Feb 28, 2023.

Q.1) Alan, a political activist, is arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 for his alleged involvement in disruptive activities. The investigating agency has
been granted the initial 90 days for the investigation. As the 90th day approaches, the
investigating agency requests an extension of another 90 days, stating that they need
more time to gather evidence and complete the investigation. The public prosecutor
submits a report, but it lacks independent scrutiny. The Special Court is now required to
decide whether to grant the full 90-day extension or decide on a different time period
based on what is reasonably required to complete the investigation. In the case of Alan,
what should the Special Court do while deciding whether to grant the full 90-day
extension to the investigating agency or decide on a different time period based on what
is reasonably required to complete the investigation?

A) Grant the full 90-day extension as requested by the investigating agency.

 B) Ask the public prosecutor to resubmit a report that independently applies
their mind and scrutinizes the investigating agency's request for an
extension.
C) Deny any extension and force the investigating agency to complete the
investigation within the initial 90 days.
D) Grant an extension exceeding 90 days if the investigating agency presents strong
evidence for needing more time.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage states that the public prosecutor
must scrutinize the investigating agency's request for an extension of remand and
submit a report to the court that independently applies their mind. In this case, the
public prosecutor's report lacks independent scrutiny, and the Special Court should ask
for a resubmitted report before making a decision. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that the Special Court has the power to grant an extension of up to 90
days at a time, based on how much time is reasonably required to complete the
investigation and the public prosecutor's report that independently applies their mind.
Option C is incorrect because the passage does not suggest that the Special Court should
deny any extension; instead, it emphasizes the importance of carrying out investigations
with utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays. Option D is incorrect
because the passage states that the Special Court has the power to grant an extension of
up to 90 days at a time, not exceeding it.

Q.2) In light of the facts in the previous question, based on the defense counsel's
challenge to the validity of the public prosecutor's report, what is the most appropriate
action for the Special Court to take in Alan's case?

A) Accept the public prosecutor's report without questioning its validity and grant
the full 90-day extension.
B) Reject the public prosecutor's report and deny any extension to the investigating
agency.
C) Request the public prosecutor to resubmit a report with proper
independent scrutiny and assessment of the investigating agency's request
for an extension.
D) Grant an extension, but only for a period shorter than the requested 90 days, as a
compromise between the parties.

Explanation: Option C is correct because the passage states that the public prosecutor
must scrutinize the investigating agency's request for an extension of remand and
submit a report to the court that independently applies their mind. In this case, the
public prosecutor's report lacks independent scrutiny, and the Special Court should
request a resubmitted report before making a decision. Option A is incorrect because
the passage states that the public prosecutor must scrutinize the investigating agency's
request for an extension of remand and submit a report to the court that independently
applies their mind. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not suggest that the
Special Court should deny any extension solely based on an insufficient report; instead,
it emphasizes the importance of carrying out investigations with utmost promptitude
and without unnecessary delays. Option D is incorrect because the passage states that
the Special Court must apply its mind to find out the reasonable time required to
complete the investigation whenever a report of the Public Prosecutor is presented
seeking an extension of time for investigation beyond 90 days. Granting a shorter
extension as a compromise between the parties is not based on the reasonable time
required to complete the investigation.

Q.3) Betty, a journalist, is arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
for her alleged involvement in inciting violence through her articles. The investigating
agency is granted the initial 90 days for the investigation. On the 60th day, the
investigating agency has gathered sufficient evidence to file the charge sheet. However,
the agency procrastinates and does not file the charge sheet, waiting until the 89th day
to do so. The defense counsel for Betty argues in the Special Court that the investigating
agency's delay in filing the charge sheet is a violation of the requirement to carry out the
investigation with utmost promptitude. In Betty's case, how should the Special Court
respond to the defense counsel's argument that the investigating agency's delay in filing
the charge sheet is a violation of the requirement to carry out the investigation with
utmost promptitude?

A) Dismiss the argument, stating that the investigating agency is allowed the full 90
days to file the charge sheet.
B) Agree with the argument and sanction the investigating agency for delaying the
filing of the charge sheet.
C) Order the investigating agency to explain the reasons for the delay in filing
the charge sheet and assess whether the delay was justified.
D) Grant additional time to the investigating agency to file the charge sheet,
disregarding the defense counsel's argument.

Explanation: Option C is correct because, based on the passage, the Special Court should
ensure that the investigation is carried out with utmost promptitude and without
unnecessary delays. Asking the investigating agency to explain the reasons for the delay
and assessing whether the delay was justified is in line with the court's emphasis on a
reasonable and prompt investigation. Option A is incorrect because the passage states
that the court emphasized that the investigating agency should not procrastinate, be
tardy, or take it leisurely for the next few days and file the charge sheet at the end
nearing the 90th day. Option B is incorrect because the passage does not mention that
the Special Court should directly sanction the investigating agency for delaying the filing
of the charge sheet. Option D is incorrect because granting additional time to the
investigating agency to file the charge sheet goes against the passage's emphasis on
carrying out investigations with utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays.

Q.4) In light of the facts in the previous question, what should the Special Court do to
ensure the fair and just implementation of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, and prevent the misuse of powers by the investigating agency?

A) Dismiss the defense counsel's argument and accept the charge sheet filed on the
89th day.
B) Require the investigating agency to provide a valid justification for the
delay in filing the charge sheet and assess the reasons presented.
C) Order the immediate release of Betty, citing the delay in filing the charge sheet as
a misuse of power by the investigating agency.
 D) Sanction the investigating agency and grant additional time for the investigation,
disregarding the defense counsel's argument.

Explanation: Option B is correct because, based on the passage, the Special Court should
ensure that the UAPA is implemented fairly and justly and that the investigating agency
does not misuse its powers. Requiring the investigating agency to provide a valid
justification for the delay in filing the charge sheet and assessing the reasons presented
is in line with the court's responsibility. Option A is incorrect because dismissing the
defense counsel's argument without further inquiry goes against the passage's emphasis
on ensuring the fair and just implementation of the UAPA and preventing the misuse of
powers by the investigating agency. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
suggest that the Special Court should order the immediate release of the accused based
solely on a delay in filing the charge sheet. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of
carrying out investigations with utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays.
Option D is incorrect because sanctioning the investigating agency and granting
additional time for the investigation do not address the defense counsel's argument
regarding the misuse of powers and do not ensure the fair and just implementation of
the UAPA.

Q.5) Based on the Delhi High Court's ruling, what is the role of the Special Court in
determining the extension of time for an investigation under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967?

A) The Special Court must grant the full 90-day extension in one go, as requested by
the investigating agency.
B) The Special Court cannot grant any extension, and the investigation must be
completed within 180 days.
C) The Special Court can only grant an extension if the accused agrees to it.
D) The Special Court has the discretion to grant an extension of up to 90 days
at a time, based on the reasonable time required to complete the
investigation.

Answer and Explanation: Option D is correct because the passage highlights the Delhi
High Court's ruling that the Special Court has the discretion to grant an extension of up
to 90 days at a time, based on how much time is reasonably required to complete the
investigation. Option A is incorrect because, as stated in the passage, the Delhi High
Court ruled that the Special Court has the power to grant an extension of up to 90 days
at a time, based on the reasonable time required to complete the investigation. The
ruling does not require the Special Court to grant the full 90-day extension in one go.
Option B is incorrect because the passage indicates that the investigating agency can
request an extension of up to 90 days if they are unable to complete the investigation
within the initial 180 days. The Special Court has the discretion to grant this extension
based on the reasonable time required to complete the investigation. Option C is
incorrect because the passage does not mention any requirement for the accused to
agree to the extension for the Special Court to grant it. The court's discretion is based on
the reasonable time required to complete the investigation.
Q.6) According to the Delhi High Court's ruling, what is the responsibility of the public
prosecutor in cases involving the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, where an
extension of remand is requested?

A) The public prosecutor must always support the investigating agency's request for
an extension of remand without questioning it.
B) The public prosecutor must independently scrutinize the investigating
agency's request for an extension of remand and submit a report to the
court that applies their mind.
C) The public prosecutor must ensure that the accused is granted bail within the
initial 180-day period.
D) The public prosecutor is responsible for completing the investigation within the
initial 180-day period.

Explanation: Option B is correct because the passage highlights the court's emphasis on
the public prosecutor's role in scrutinizing the investigating agency's request for an
extension of remand and submitting a report to the court that independently applies
their mind. The public prosecutor must ensure that the investigation is carried out with
utmost promptitude and without unnecessary delays. Option A is incorrect because the
passage states that the public prosecutor must scrutinize the investigating agency's
request for an extension of remand and submit a report to the court that independently
applies their mind. This implies that the public prosecutor should not merely support
the request without questioning it. Option C is incorrect because the passage does not
mention any responsibility of the public prosecutor to ensure that the accused is
granted bail within the initial 180-day period. The focus is on the public prosecutor's
role in scrutinizing the request for an extension of remand and ensuring that the
investigation is carried out promptly and without unnecessary delays. Option D is
incorrect because the passage does not state that the public prosecutor is responsible
for completing the investigation within the initial 180-day period. The responsibility of
the public prosecutor, as mentioned in the passage, is to scrutinize the investigating
agency's request for an extension of remand and submit a report to the court that
independently applies their mind. The investigating agency is responsible for carrying
out the investigation.