1 Appendix A

3 Four personal values. Values reflect the overarching goals that people find most

4 important (Steg et al., 2014). They serve as the guiding principles in people’s daily lives

5 (Schwartz, 1992). In general, people who give priority to altruistic (focusing on others’

6 welfare) and biospheric values (focusing on the environment for its own sake) are more likely

7 to support environmental affairs and policies, whereas the opposite holds for those who

8 endorse hedonic (focusing on one’s feeling and pleasure) or egoistic values (focusing on the

9 enhancement of self-interest) more strongly (Steg, 2016). We used a brief value instrument

10 developed by Steg et al. (2014) to measure these values (see Table A.1). Respondents rated

11 the importance of each value item to themselves from 0 (not important at all) to 6 (extremely

12 important). Following Steg et al. (2014), participants were requested to vary their responses

13 and to rate only a few items as extremely important. Each value scale was created by

14 averaging its corresponding items.

15 Environmental self-identity. Environmental self-identity has been suggested as a key

16 predictor of a range of pro-environmental behaviors (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010). People

17 who see themselves as environmentalists are more inclined to support environmental policies

18 and participate in environmentally friendly activities (Truelove and Nugent, 2020; Van der

19 Werff et al., 2014). Three items were adapted from Van der Werff et al. (2013) to measure

20 the extent to which participants regarded themselves as environmentally friendly persons

21 (Table A.1). Respondents indicated their degree of agreement on each item from 1 (strongly

22 disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We averaged these items to create the scale of environmental

23 self-identity.
24 Perceived social norms of environmentalism. It is well-established that individuals’

25 thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced significantly by what others think and do

26 (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Residents are more likely to engage in a pro-environmental

27 affair when they perceive that other social members do the same (Bergquist et al., 2019;

28 Farrow et al., 2017). Prior research also suggests that the perceived social norms of

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29 environmentalism would influence individuals’ support for environmental policies (De Groot

30 and Schuitema, 2012). By reference to Lapinski et al. (2017) and Whitmarsh and O’Neill

31 (2010), We developed four items to measure respondents’ perceptions about the prevalence

32 of environmentally-friendly persons among the neighbors and the social influence of

33 neighbors on their decision to recycle (Table A.1). Respondents indicated their degree of

34 agreement on each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We used the

35 average of these items to represent the scale of perceived social norms of environmentalism.
36 Self-efficacy of attaining pro-environmental goals. Self-efficacy is referred to as a

37 person’s confidence to achieve a particular goal (Bandura, 1986), which has been suggested

38 to be an important predictor of individuals’ PEBs (Steinhorst et al. 2015). Three items

39 adapted from Steinhorst et al. (2015) were used to measure participants’ personal belief in

40 their ability to achieve pro-environmental goals (Table A.1). Respondents indicated their

41 degree of agreement on each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We

42 averaged these items to generate the scale of self-efficacy of attaining pro-environmental

43 goals.
44 Personal ecological norms. Personal ecological norms are defined as an individual’s

45 self-determination to engage in pro-environmental activities and are experienced as a feeling

46 of moral obligation (Van der Werff et al., 2013; Steinhorst et al., 2015). People with higher

47 personal norms are more willing to support pro-environmental affairs (Van der Werff et al.,

48 2013). Four items adapted from Steinhorst et al. (2015) were used to measure individuals’

49 moral obligation concerning environmental conservation (Table A.1). Participants were asked

50 to rate their degree of agreement on each item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly

51 agree). The average of these items was used to identify the scale of personal ecological

52 norms.
53 Pro-environmental preference. Besides recycling, we also investigated individuals’ self-

54 reported pro-environmental behaviors in other domains, including reusing plastic bags,

55 energy conservation (saving electricity and water usage), green traveling (taking public

56 transportation instead of private cars), and two public-sphere behaviors (donating to

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57 environmental organizations and engaging in community volunteer environmental activities).

58 Participants were required to report their frequency of participation in each behavior during

59 the past six months (1 = never, 5 = always). We averaged all six pro-environmental behavior

60 items to measure the overall pro-environmental preference of individuals at baseline.

61 Four socio-demographic variables. The socio-demographic indicators included gender

62 (0 = male, 1 = female), age, education degree (1 = no education, 7 = graduate and above),

63 and household monthly income (1 = < 5,000 CN¥, 6 = ≥ 25,000 CN¥).

64 Local pro-environmental norms. In addition to perceived social norms of

65 environmentalism, local pro-environmental norms were also measured, as they can produce

66 unique contextual influences on individual pro-environmental behaviors (Lapinski et al.,

67 2017; Ling and Xu, 2020). Considering that the pre-test participants were randomly selected

68 from the complete list of registered residents of each estate, the estate-level means of

69 personal scores of six pro-environmental behaviors were further computed to capture the

70 overall level of pro-environmental behavior of residents in each housing estate (i.e., local pro-

71 environmental norms), similar to Lapinski et al. (2017) and Ling and Xu (2020).
72 Administrative subdistricts. The ten housing estates involved in this study were

73 subordinate to two geographically adjacent administrative subdistricts in Anji (CS and DP).

74 Considering that several contextual factors (e.g., local population and built environment)

75 might vary systematically across administrative subdistricts and that these local features are

76 potential antecedents of individual PEBs (Ling and Xu, 2020), we generated a dummy

77 variable for CS to measure the potential variation across the subdistricts.

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 Table A.1
Measurement items of values, self-identity, perceived norms, self-efficacy, and personal norms.
Personal values
Altruistic values: equality, social justice, helpful, world peace
Biospheric values: respecting the earth, protecting the environment, unity with nature, preventing pollution
Egoistic values: social power, authority, influential, ambitious, wealth
Hedonic values: pleasure, enjoying life, gratification for oneself
Environmental self-identity
I think of myself as an environmentalist
Engaging in PEB is one part of my life
I am the type of person who really wants to engage in environmental protection
Perceived social norms
My neighbors are the persons who care about the environment
Most community members are devoted to environmental conservation
I will join in waste sorting when I observe that my neighbors are also doing so
I will join in waste sorting if my neighbors persuade me to do so
Self-efficacy
I believe that I can contribute to environmental protection
I am capable of protecting the environment
I am certain that I can protect the environment in my everyday life
Personal ecological norms
No matter what other people think or do, I feel personally obliged to protect the environment
Due to my values/principles, I feel personally obliged to protect the environment
I feel shame when I fail to perform the pro-environmental behavior
I feel guilty when recalling my past environmentally unfriendly behaviors

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 Table A.2
Summary statistics of study variables.
All (N = 525) Incentive (N = 272) Control (N = 253)
Variable Range
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Recycling (T0) 3.39 1.12 3.52 1.10 3.24 1.12 1-5
PAYT support (T0) 3.62 1.19 3.42 1.17 3.83 1.18 1-5
Plant support (T0) 4.05 1.06 4.10 0.91 4.00 1.19 1-5
Goal commitment (T0) 3.87 0.99 3.83 0.90 3.90 1.07 1-5
Issue importance (T0) 4.15 0.95 4.17 0.89 4.14 1.00 1-5
Individual importance (T0) 4.09 1.10 4.24 0.87 3.94 1.28 1-5
Recycling (T1) 3.92 1.02 4.17 1.03 3.64 0.94 1-5
PAYT support (T1) 3.37 1.51 2.85 1.56 3.93 1.24 1-5
Plant support (T1) 4.21 1.00 4.04 1.01 4.39 0.96 1-5
Goal commitment (T1) 3.82 1.18 3.50 1.28 4.16 0.96 1-5
Issue importance (T1) 4.46 0.73 4.43 0.80 4.50 0.66 1-5
Individual importance (T1) 4.47 0.72 4.42 0.76 4.51 0.66 1-5
Recycling (T2) 4.04 0.96 4.42 0.86 3.63 0.91 1-5
PAYT support (T2) 3.74 1.32 3.46 1.39 4.05 1.17 1-5
Plant support (T2) 4.29 0.93 4.27 0.91 4.31 0.95 1-5
Goal commitment (T2) 4.06 0.96 4.03 0.96 4.10 0.97 1-5
Issue importance (T2) 4.47 0.73 4.47 0.75 4.47 0.70 2-5
Individual importance (T2) 4.45 0.67 4.43 0.68 4.48 0.66 2-5
Altruistic values (T0) 4.42 0.93 4.34 0.98 4.51 0.86 0.75-6
Self-identity (T0) 3.82 0.82 3.83 0.82 3.81 0.82 1-5
Perceived norms (T0) 4.03 0.76 4.07 0.71 3.98 0.81 1.5-5
Self-efficacy (T0) 3.99 0.82 4.06 0.77 3.92 0.86 1-5
Personal norms (T0) 4.13 0.80 4.16 0.74 4.09 0.87 1-5
Biospheric values (T0) 4.66 0.80 4.61 0.85 4.72 0.73 1.5-6
Hedonic values (T0) 4.05 1.38 4.51 1.06 3.55 1.51 0.33-6
Egoistic values (T0) 2.77 0.97 2.87 1.00 2.67 0.91 0.2-6
PEP (T0) 3.30 0.79 3.33 0.86 3.26 0.71 1-5
Female (T0) 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.49 0/1
Age (T0) 46.86 13.82 44.29 14.50 49.62 12.51 20-90
Education (T0) 3.94 1.28 4.21 1.33 3.66 1.15 1-7
Income (T0) 2.38 1.26 2.44 1.33 2.32 1.18 1-6
Local norms (T0) 3.31 0.20 3.37 0.23 3.25 0.14 3.10-3.72
Subdistrict dummy 0.62 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.48 0/1
Note. PAYT = Pay-As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental preference; T0 = pre-test; T1 = post-test 1; T2 = post-test 2.

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78 Appendix B
79

80 Owing to the quasi-experimental nature of our study (i.e., nonrandom assignment of

81 participants), there might be systematic baseline differences between the incentive and

82 control conditions, which would confound causal inference. Using OLS regressions for

83 continuous variables and logistic regressions for dichotomous variables, we found a total of

84 eleven pre-test measures to be unbalanced between the two conditions (see Table B.1). We

85 utilized the propensity score technique to mitigate the systematic imbalance in baseline

86 characteristics between the experimental conditions, before estimating the effects of the

87 incentive program.
88

Table B.1
Baseline characteristics before and after the application of inverse-probability-weighting
(IPW) procedure.
Before IPW After IPW
Pre-test measure
Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
Recycling 3.52 3.24 0.28** 3.47 3.48 -0.01
PAYT support 3.42 3.83 -0.41*** 3.68 3.70 -0.02
Plant support 4.10 4.00 0.10 4.18 4.19 -0.01
Goal commitment 3.83 3.90 -0.07 3.99 3.92 0.07
Issue importance 4.17 4.14 0.03 4.22 4.20 0.02
Individual importance 4.24 3.94 0.30** 4.21 4.14 0.07
Self-identity 3.83 3.81 0.02 3.84 3.79 0.05
Perceived norms 4.07 3.98 0.09 4.06 4.06 -0.002
Self-efficacy 4.06 3.92 0.14* 4.04 4.02 0.02
Personal norms 4.16 4.09 0.07 4.14 4.10 0.04
Altruistic values 4.34 4.51 -0.17* 4.46 4.46 -0.01
Biospheric values 4.61 4.72 -0.11 4.67 4.72 -0.05
Hedonic values 4.51 3.55 0.96*** 4.12 4.05 0.08
Egoistic values 2.87 2.67 0.20* 2.72 2.71 0.01
PEP 3.33 3.26 0.07 3.32 3.30 0.02
Female 52.94 39.92 13.02** 49.44 49.25 0.19
Age 44.29 49.62 -5.33*** 47.60 46.73 0.87
Education 4.21 3.66 0.55*** 4.00 4.03 -0.03
Income 2.44 2.32 0.12 2.46 2.49 -0.03
Local norms 3.37 3.25 0.12*** 3.31 3.26 0.05**
Subdistrict dummy 59.59 63.64 -4.05 66.63 66.60 0.03

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 Note. The table reports mean values for continuous variables and proportions for dichotomous variables. PAYT = Pay-As-
You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental preference; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. N = 525.
89
90 The propensity score is defined as the probability of receiving the treatment given

91 observed baseline characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In practice, it is commonly

92 estimated with the fitted value derived from a logistic regression, in which the treatment

93 dummy (1 = treatment group, 0 = control group) is regressed on the observed baseline

94 variables (Austin, 2011). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have mathematically demonstrated

95 that the propensity score is the best representation of baseline variables and their distribution,

96 and that, conditional on the propensity score, treatment status is independent of baseline

97 variables. Therefore, the propensity score is a balancing score: the distribution of observed

98 baseline variables would be similar across the experimental conditions when the propensity

99 score is accounted for (Austin, 2011).

100 There are four kinds of propensity score methods: propensity score matching (PSM;

101 forming matched sets of treated and control subjects with similar propensity score),

102 stratification on the propensity score (stratifying subjects into mutually exclusive subsets

103 based on their propensity score), inverse-probability-weighting (IPW; using the weight

104 derived from the propensity score to create a weighted sample in which the distribution of

105 baseline variables is similar across the conditions), and covariate adjustment for the

106 propensity score. Previous studies have demonstrated that PSM and IPW tend to perform

107 better in eliminating balance imbalance than does stratification on or covariate adjustment for

108 the propensity score (Austin, 2011). Yet, a potential drawback of PSM is that many subjects

109 may be dropped in the matching procedure (Guo and Fraser, 2015). This would endanger

110 statistical power when the sample size is not very large (as in this study). Instead, with the

111 IPW all subjects can be used for analysis.

112 We hence employed the IPW procedure to reduce the detected baseline imbalance. We

113 began by estimating the propensity score with a logistic regression of the incentive

114 intervention dummy on baseline variables measured in the pre-test survey. Prior research on

115 variable selection for estimating the propensity score recommends that, instead of only

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116 including the covariates that are associated with the intervention, it is preferable to include

117 baseline measures that may affect the outcome (Austin et al., 2007). Since each pre-test

118 measure was a plausible predictor of pro-environmental intrinsic motivation, we incorporated

119 all the 21 pre-test measures in the propensity score model. The inverse-probability-of

120 treatment weight for the subject i was then calculated in the following form:
Zi 1−Z i
121 ω i= +
ei ( X) 1−e i (X )
122 in which ω i is the weight, Zi denotes the intervention dummy, and e i represents the estimated

123 propensity score based on a vector of baseline variables ( X ). However, it may happen that

124 some treated subjects have a very low propensity score or that some control subjects have a

125 very high propensity score (i.e., outliers), making the weight extremely high and unstable

126 (Robins et al., 2000). In addition, the inverse-probability-of- treatment weight would change

127 the size of the original sample, resulting in an underestimate of the variance of treatment

128 effect (Xu et al., 2010). To address these issues, we followed previous research to stabilize

129 the inverse-probability-of-treatment weight by multiplying the original weight by the

130 marginal probability of receiving the actual treatment (Austin, 2011; Hernán et al., 2002).

131 The stabilized weight could preserve the sample size of the original data and generate an

132 appropriate estimation of the variance of the treatment effect (Xu et al., 2010).
133 We evaluated whether the IPW procedure had mitigated the baseline imbalance. We first

134 performed a formal test for the overall baseline balance developed by Imai and Ratkovic

135 (2014). We found no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the overall baseline balance

136 had been achieved ( χ 2 = 6.577, p = 0.999). Despite this, baseline balance is a large-sample

137 property of the propensity score, so imbalance may still exist for specific variables in single

138 studies after adjusting for the propensity score (Austin, 2011). We next examined whether

139 each pre-test measure had been balanced after the use of IPW via several diagnostic tools.
140 1) Using the conventional approach of statistical hypothesis testing, we found that only

141 local pro-environmental norms varied across the experimental conditions significantly after

142 the IPW procedure was applied (Table B.1).

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143 2) We calculated the standardized differences to scrutinize the exact degree of imbalance

144 for each pre-test variable (Austin and Stuart, 2015). A perfectly balanced measure has a

145 standardized difference of zero. Despite no rule determining how much imbalance is

146 acceptable, the proposed maximum value of the acceptable standardized difference ranges

147 from 0.1 to 0.25 in the literature (Austin, 2009; Stuart et al., 2013). As is shown in Fig. B.1,

148 the standardized difference exceeded 0.1 for fourteen pre-test measures before the use of

149 IPW. After the use of IPW, only the standardized difference in local pro-environmental

150 norms (0.25) exceeded 0.1.

151 3) As the balance is not only a property of the sample means but also of the overall

152 distribution, we also evaluated the higher-order sample moments of the distribution. We

153 followed Rubin (2001) to calculate the ratio of treated and control variances for each pre-test

154 variable. A perfectly balanced measure has a variance ratio of 1. Imbalance is defined by

155 ratios greater than 2 or less than 0.5 (Rubin, 2001). In our study, the variance ratio met the

156 criterion and was close to 1 for most variables. The only exception was local norms (2.24).
157 Taken together, the baseline imbalance had been mitigated greatly after the use of IPW,

158 while it had not been eliminated and was still salient for local norms. 1 Previous research

159 suggests that in case of remaining imbalance, regression adjustment can be applied to further

160 eliminate the residual baseline imbalance (Nguyen et al., 2017) and achieve double

161 robustness within the IPW framework (Morgan and Winship, 2014). We hence controlled for

162 all pre-test measures throughout subsequent regression analyses.

1
17 To improve baseline balance, we also emulated Austin and Stuart’s (2015) complex specification, in which several higher-
18 order terms of pre-test measures (e.g., interaction terms, quadratic and cubic smoothing spline terms of continuous variables)
19 were incorporated to estimate the propensity score. Yet, the IPW achieved poorer performance of balancing when these terms
20 were added. Hence, we only used the first-order terms of pre-test measures to estimate the propensity score.
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 Fig. B.1. Standardized differences in pre-test measures between the incentive and control
conditions.
Note. PAYT = Pay-As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental preference; IPW = inverse-probability-weighting.

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163 Appendix C
164

165 Baron and Kenny (1986) proposed an analytical framework that has been widely used to

166 answer the “whether” and “how” questions concerning the relationship between the

167 independent and dependent variables (see Fig. C.1). This framework involves several steps:

Fig. C.1. Illustration of the analytical framework proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986).
168

169 1) Examining if there is a total effect of the independent variable on the dependent

170 variable (i.e., path c in Fig. C.1). This step aims to answer the “whether” question.
171 2) Examining if the independent variable affects the mediator (path a in Fig. C.1).
172 3) Examining if the mediator affects the dependent variable while controlling for the

173 independent variable (path b in Fig. C.1).

174 Step 3 aims to show the unique effect of the mediator on the outcome over and above

175 the effect of the independent variable (i.e., path c’ in Fig. C.1). The path c’ refers to the

176 “direct” effect of the independent variable when the mediator has been considered. It is not

177 equivalent to path c, which reveals the overall relationship between the independent and

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178 dependent variables. If the mediator completely mediates the relationship, then path c’ should

179 be indifferent from zero. Thus, a significant path c’ indicates additional mediation

180 mechanisms to be at work other than the examined mediator.

181 Separate regressions can be performed to estimate c, a, b and c’. The indirect effect of

182 the independent variable on the dependent variable through the mediator can be quantified as

183 the product of a and b (i.e., ab), and the total effect c is the sum of the direct and indirect

184 effects: c = c’ + ab. There are several approaches to examining the indirect effect through the

185 proposed mediator (for a review see, e.g., Preacher and Hayes, 2008), while the bootstrapping

186 strategy is the most used method in recent literature. This strategy focuses on the sampling

187 distribution of the product term ab. It is a non-parametric method based on resampling with

188 replacement that is done many times. From each sample the indirect effect ab is calculated

189 and a sampling distribution and 95% confidence interval (CI) of ab can be empirically created

190 (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). An indirect effect is significant if its bootstrap CI excludes zero.
191 Following the framework described above, we first performed OLS regressions to

192 investigate whether there were total effects of the incentivized recycling program on policy

193 support measures. In a similar vein, we also examined the incentive effect on residents’ self-

194 reported behavior. The regression coefficients of the incentive effects are plotted in Fig. 3 in

195 the main text, and the full regression results are presented in Tables C.1 and C.2.
196 Regarding the question as to how incentives affected policy support, we used structural

197 equation models (SEMs) to estimate the influence of the incentive program on each of the

198 three putative mediators and the influence of each mediator on policy support simultaneously.

199 In each model, we allowed the residuals of the endogenous variables (mediators and policy

200 support measures) to be interrelated. The estimates of the key paths are summarized in Fig.

201 C.2, and the full regression results are presented in Tables C.3 and C.4. The estimated

202 incentive effects on the proposed mediators are plotted in Fig. 4 in the main text.
203 We then conducted mediation analyses by computing the bias-corrected asymmetric

204 95% CIs of the direct and indirect pathways involved in the SEMs based on 5,000 bootstrap

205 samples. The estimates are plotted in Fig. 5 in the main text. Due to the multicollinearity

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 206 between the perceptions of issue and individual importance (r = 0.69 in post-test 1 and 0.71

207 in post-test 2, ps < 0.001), we excluded one mediator (perceived issue importance) and rerun

208 the SEMs. The bootstrapping estimates derived from this set of SEMs are plotted in Fig. 6 in

209 the main text.

210
Table C.1
Full regression results concerning the effects of incentivized recycling program on self-reported recycling
behavior and support for the PAYT scheme and waste disposal plants in post-test 1.
Recycling (T1) PAYT support (T1) Plant support (T1)
Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
Incentive program 0.391*** 0.113 -1.238*** 0.175 -0.481*** 0.098
Recycling (T0) 0.019 0.072 0.083 0.088 -0.034 0.066
PAYT support (T0) -0.067 0.063 0.027 0.083 -0.061 0.039
Plant support (T0) -0.004 0.072 0.137 0.100 0.234*** 0.068
Goal commitment (T0) 0.041 0.068 0.121 0.090 0.021 0.055
Issue importance (T0) -0.047 0.082 0.132 0.113 -0.006 0.075
Individual importance (T0) 0.000 0.079 0.028 0.104 0.046 0.065
Self-identity (T0) 0.190 0.114 0.041 0.150 -0.023 0.090
Perceived norms (T0) 0.226* 0.108 -0.300 0.181 -0.022 0.104
Self-efficacy (T0) -0.018 0.112 0.100 0.143 0.078 0.102
Personal norms (T0) -0.181 0.138 -0.114 0.176 0.023 0.095
Altruistic values (T0) -0.103 0.069 0.133 0.105 -0.024 0.060
Biospheric values (T0) -0.020 0.074 -0.039 0.119 -0.116 0.071
Hedonic values (T0) -0.049 0.050 -0.051 0.078 -0.014 0.044
Egoistic values (T0) 0.039 0.056 -0.121 0.095 -0.021 0.054
PEP (T0) 0.033 0.107 0.022 0.147 0.052 0.103
Female (T0) 0.126 0.105 -0.031 0.168 -0.097 0.102
Age (T0) 0.007 0.005 -0.009 0.007 -0.005 0.005
Education (T0) 0.117* 0.056 0.026 0.078 -0.012 0.046
Income (T0) 0.040 0.044 -0.028 0.069 -0.035 0.034
Local norms (T0) 0.389 0.319 1.206* 0.483 0.281 0.300
Subdistrict dummy (T0) -0.142 0.143 -0.463* 0.202 -0.297* 0.125
Constant 1.540 1.216 -0.152 1.744 3.588*** 1.035
Note. SE = standard error; T0 = pre-test measure; T1 = post-test-1 measure; PAYT = Pay-As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental
preference; * = p < .05, *** = p < .001. The stabilized inverse-probability-of-treatment weight is used. N = 525.

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Table C.2
Full regression results concerning the effects of incentivized recycling program on self-reported recycling
behavior and support for the PAYT scheme and waste disposal plants in post-test 2.
Recycling (T2) PAYT support (T2) Plant support (T2)
Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
Incentive program 0.682*** 0.104 -0.510*** 0.153 -0.098 0.123
Recycling (T0) 0.028 0.065 -0.282** 0.097 -0.122 0.065
PAYT support (T0) 0.006 0.062 0.227* 0.090 0.237* 0.101
Plant support (T0) -0.064 0.057 -0.032 0.080 0.014 0.069
Goal commitment (T0) 0.039 0.063 0.006 0.085 -0.074 0.057
Issue importance (T0) 0.121 0.079 0.123 0.111 0.021 0.075
Individual importance (T0) 0.010 0.065 0.072 0.090 0.040 0.062
Self-identity (T0) -0.092 0.104 -0.076 0.132 -0.182 0.103
Perceived norms (T0) -0.123 0.104 -0.299 0.190 0.055 0.129
Self-efficacy (T0) -0.009 0.123 -0.059 0.146 0.162 0.116
Personal norms (T0) 0.050 0.115 0.300 0.186 -0.136 0.138
Altruistic values (T0) -0.021 0.062 0.208* 0.095 0.118 0.072
Biospheric values (T0) -0.055 0.074 -0.172 0.121 0.007 0.079
Hedonic values (T0) -0.064 0.040 -0.115 0.069 0.028 0.047
Egoistic values (T0) 0.080 0.052 -0.051 0.076 0.000 0.057
PEP (T0) 0.188 0.100 0.197 0.156 0.078 0.101
Female (T0) 0.028 0.099 -0.590*** 0.148 -0.383 0.120
Age (T0) -0.008 0.004 0.000 0.007 -0.001 0.004
Education (T0) -0.006 0.042 0.034 0.074 0.071 0.051
Income (T0) -0.009 0.042 -0.086 0.063 -0.145* 0.060
Local norms (T0) 0.798*** 0.238 2.094*** 0.401 1.319*** 0.291
Subdistrict dummy (T0) -0.005 0.115 -0.258 0.200 0.057 0.146
Constant 1.346 0.831 -2.667 1.482 -0.824 1.020
Note. SE = standard error; T0 = pre-test measure; T2 = post-test-2 measure; PAYT = Pay-As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental
preference; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. The stabilized inverse-probability-of-treatment weight is used. N = 525.

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 Fig. C.2. Key estimates concerning the mediating effects of goal commitment, issue
importance, and individual importance on the relationships between the incentivized
recycling program and policy support measures.
Note. The numbers are regression coefficients. A dashed arrow indicates that the path is not significant at the p = 0.05 level.
PAYT = Pay-As-You-Throw scheme; PEB = pro-environmental behavior; + = p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p
< .001. The stabilized inverse-probability-of-treatment weight is used. N = 525.

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Table C.3
Full regression results concerning the mediating effects of goal commitment, issue importance, and individual
importance on the relationships between incentivized recycling program and policy support measures in post-test
1.
Goal Issue Individual PAYT Plant
commitment (T1) importance (T1) importance (T1) support (T1) support (T1)
Goal commitment (T1) 0.510*** (0.062) 0.288*** (0.039)
Issue importance (T1) 0.363** (0.134) 0.244** (0.092)
Individual importance (T1) 0.015 (0.108) 0.139 (0.089)
Incentive program -0.992*** (0.138) -0.246** (0.082) -0.221** (0.073) -0.640** (0.141) -0.104 (0.094)
Recycling (T0) -0.021 (0.059) -0.040 (0.048) -0.011 (0.048) 0.108 (0.082) -0.017 (0.064)
PAYT support (T0) -0.143*** (0.044) -0.026 (0.039) -0.002 (0.034) 0.110 (0.068) -0.013 (0.037)
Plant support (T0) 0.229** (0.073) 0.048 (0.054) 0.054 (0.047) 0.002 (0.080) 0.149** (0.056)
Goal commitment (T0) 0.093 (0.064) -0.015 (0.045) -0.036 (0.042) 0.079 (0.077) 0.003 (0.051)
Issue importance (T0) 0.042 (0.089) 0.102 (0.058) 0.067 (0.055) 0.073 (0.096) -0.052 (0.064)
Individual importance (T0) 0.054 (0.093) 0.075 (0.049) 0.015 (0.051) -0.027 (0.081) 0.01 (0.057)
Self-identity (T0) -0.040 (0.112) 0.004 (0.073) -0.075 (0.07) 0.061 (0.128) -0.002 (0.079)
Perceived norms (T0) 0.108 (0.138) -0.019 (0.078) 0.032 (0.071) -0.349* (0.143) -0.053 (0.093)
Self-efficacy (T0) -0.145 (0.109) 0.008 (0.078) -0.059 (0.073) 0.172 (0.126) 0.126 (0.094)
Personal norms (T0) -0.011 (0.121) -0.042 (0.089) 0.080 (0.078) -0.094 (0.141) 0.025 (0.094)
Altruistic values (T0) 0.061 (0.082) 0.001 (0.047) -0.001 (0.044) 0.101 (0.082) -0.041 (0.048)
Biospheric values (T0) -0.032 (0.094) -0.020 (0.053) 0.053 (0.053) -0.016 (0.089) -0.109 (0.057)
Hedonic values (T0) 0.071 (0.061) -0.020 (0.037) -0.007 (0.033) -0.080 (0.056) -0.028 (0.036)
Egoistic values (T0) -0.017 (0.073) 0.003 (0.043) -0.009 (0.046) -0.113 (0.072) -0.016 (0.046)
PEP (T0) 0.037 (0.098) 0.058 (0.077) -0.015 (0.072) -0.018 (0.135) 0.029 (0.095)
Female (T0) -0.138 (0.136) -0.053 (0.082) 0.083 (0.074) 0.057 (0.122) -0.056 (0.083)
Age (T0) 0.0002 (0.006) -0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) -0.008 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004)
Education (T0) 0.009 (0.054) 0.032 (0.039) 0.014 (0.035) 0.010 (0.062) -0.024 (0.041)
Income (T0) -0.139** (0.054) -0.073* (0.031) -0.023 (0.029) 0.070 (0.052) 0.026 (0.029)
Local norms (T0) 1.435*** (0.381) 1.035*** (0.228) 0.912*** (0.217) 0.085 (0.407) -0.511* (0.260)
Subdistrict dummy (T0) -0.700*** (0.151) -0.197* (0.099) -0.247*** (0.092) -0.031 (0.17) -0.013 (0.111)
Constant -0.860 (1.380) 1.052 (0.793) 1.143 (0.770) -0.112 (1.373) 3.420*** (0.876)
Note. Coefficients are listed on left and robust standard errors are in parentheses right. T0 = pre-test measure; T1 = post-test-1 measure; PAYT = Pay-
As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental preference; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. The stabilized inverse-probability-of-treatment
weight is used. The residual variances of the endogenous variables are 1.143 (goal commitment), 0.484 (issue importance), 0.446 (individual
importance), 1.413 (PAYT support), 0.609 (plant support). The residual covariances between the endogenous variables are 0.206 (between goal
commitment and issue importance), 0126 (between goal commitment and individual importance), 0.310 (between issue and individual importance), and
0.197 (between PAYT and plant support). All variance and covariance estimates are significant at p < 0.001 level. N = 525.

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Table C.4
Full regression results concerning the mediating effects of goal commitment, issue importance, and individual
importance on the relationships between incentivized recycling program and policy support measures in post-test
2.
Goal Issue Individual PAYT Plant
commitment (T2) importance (T2) importance (T2) support (T2) support (T2)
Goal commitment (T2) 0.576*** (0.080) 0.426*** (0.067)
Issue importance (T2) 0.319* (0.126) 0.187 (0.112)
Individual importance (T2) 0.052 (0.125) 0.162 (0.127)
Incentive program -0.312*** (0.089) -0.209** (0.077) -0.243*** (0.074) -0.251 (0.129) 0.113 (0.104)
Recycling (T0) -0.146*** (0.052) -0.032 (0.049) -0.064 (0.037) -0.185* (0.083) -0.043 (0.059)
PAYT support (T0) -0.024 (0.041) 0.035 (0.031) 0.017 (0.031) 0.229** (0.076) 0.238** (0.092)
Plant support (T0) 0.033 (0.049) 0.080 (0.044) 0.123** (0.040) -0.083 (0.067) -0.036 (0.059)
Goal commitment (T0) 0.083 (0.052) -0.006 (0.039) -0.065 (0.035) -0.037 (0.070) -0.098 (0.050)
Issue importance (T0) -0.009 (0.067) 0.118* (0.056) 0.047 (0.050) 0.087 (0.100) -0.005 (0.066)
Individual importance (T0) 0.037 (0.056) 0.082 (0.056) 0.050 (0.058) 0.021 (0.074) 0.001 (0.053)
Self-identity (T0) -0.060 (0.087) -0.142* (0.071) -0.152* (0.069) 0.012 (0.119) -0.105 (0.088)
Perceived norms (T0) 0.057 (0.106) -0.117 (0.084) 0.071 (0.076) -0.299 (0.153) 0.041 (0.116)
Self-efficacy (T0) -0.043 (0.097) -0.022 (0.071) 0.030 (0.079) -0.029 (0.128) 0.179* (0.089)
Personal norms (T0) 0.140 (0.102) 0.110 (0.080) 0.004 (0.074) 0.184 (0.152) -0.217 (0.113)
Altruistic values (T0) 0.117* (0.047) -0.003 (0.051) -0.059 (0.041) 0.145 (0.079) 0.078 (0.058)
Biospheric values (T0) -0.200** (0.066) 0.034 (0.059) 0.089 (0.050) -0.073 (0.100) 0.071 (0.070)
Hedonic values (T0) 0.059 (0.041) 0.008 (0.037) 0.037 (0.032) -0.154** (0.058) -0.005 (0.039)
Egoistic values (T0) 0.038 (0.046) 0.005 (0.049) 0.032 (0.036) -0.077 (0.071) -0.023 (0.049)
PEP (T0) 0.245* (0.096) 0.091 (0.072) 0.076 (0.057) 0.022 (0.134) -0.056 (0.090)
Female (T0) -0.284*** (0.084) -0.150 (0.078) -0.102 (0.074) -0.374** (0.123) -0.218* (0.103)
Age (T0) -0.008 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 0.0004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.006) 0.003 (0.004)
Education (T0) -0.031 (0.040) -0.010 (0.034) 0.017 (0.028) 0.054 (0.064) 0.083 (0.045)
Income (T0) -0.044 (0.040) -0.076* (0.034) -0.024 (0.033) -0.035 (0.052) -0.108* (0.049)
Local norms (T0) 1.416*** (0.258) 1.454*** (0.215) 0.851*** (0.206) 0.771* (0.354) 0.306 (0.263)
Subdistrict dummy (T0) -0.064 (0.123) -0.308** (0.102) -0.269** (0.089) -0.108 (0.164) 0.185 (0.121)
Constant -0.838 (0.885) -0.624 (0.715) 1.023 (0.676) -2.038 (1.320) -0.517 (0.929)
Note. Coefficients are listed on left and robust standard errors are in parentheses right. T0 = pre-test measure; T2 = post-test-2 measure; PAYT = Pay-
As-You-Throw scheme; PEP = pro-environmental preference; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. The stabilized inverse-probability-of-treatment
weight is used. The residual variances of the endogenous variables are 0.702 (goal commitment), 0.437 (issue importance), 0.388 (individual
importance), 1.143 (PAYT support), 0.577 (plant support). The residual covariances between the endogenous variables are 0.192 (between goal
commitment and issue importance), 0.147 (between goal commitment and individual importance), 0.280 (between issue and individual importance), and
0.228 (between PAYT and plant support). All variance and covariance estimates are significant at p < 0.001 level. N = 525.

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