[ G.R. No.

240984, September 27, 2021 ]

HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO

CORP. AND PHILIPPINE FOREMOST MILLING CORP., RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 241120]

MICHAEL L. ROMERO, PETITIONER, VS. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP, AND PHILIPPINE

FOREMOST MILLING CORP., RESPONDENTS.

In Oca v. Custodio,21 the Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt, as follows:

The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt.

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the
benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's
authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party for
disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses
to perform.

In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:

Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as
civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a
judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed
against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment
imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate
the dignity and power of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or
both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid
to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive
measure to enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final
judgment or decree rendered in his behalf the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree,
be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in
nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is
appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases. x x x The question of whether the contempt
committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction or the power of a Court to punish the
same.

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in People v.
Godoy:

It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or
the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose, is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal, or quasi-criminal
actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested
in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of
the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they axe not
criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime.
The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a
civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt
proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal
cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent, with the summary nature of contempt proceedings.
So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for
criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular
criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they
are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person
to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to
preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a
judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil
contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit,
of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed,
and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure
governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil
contempt proceedings.

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or has

successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal
contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed
innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In
proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the
complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more
than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair
preponderance" burden.

Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or
decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and
the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The
purpose of the contemner's punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is
not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove
it.22 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)

In the case at bar, respondents prayed for the following reliefs in their petition for indirect contempt,
as follows:

a) DECLARE [petitioners] guilty of indirect contempt, under Section (b) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure;
b) ORDER HCPTI and each of the individual [petitioners] to pay the fine of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) each;

c) ORDER that each of the individual [petitioners] be imprisoned for six (6) months; and

d) ORDER each of the [petitioner] jointly and severally liable to pay [respondents] in the amount of
SIXTEEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
and 27/100 (P16,712,789.27), and other demurrage and unloading costs that may be incurred
should [petitioners] continue to violate the writ of preliminary injunction after the filing of the instant
petition.23

While the reliefs prayed for by respondents is a combination of both criminal and civil, punishment,
the nature of the contempt proceeding in. this case is more civil than criminal. To recall, respondents
alleged that during the period. March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009, thirty-nine (39) of its vessels and
barges were denied access to HCPTI's rail lines and unloaders and the use of its port facilities in
violation of the WPI and the November 19, 2004 MOA.

Clearly, the purpose of the contempt petition was for the enforcement of the September 25, 2008
WPI. It is a remedy resorted to preserve and enforce the rights of respondents and to compel
obedience to the injunctive writ which was issued for their benefit. Hence, the petition for contempt is
civil in nature. Accordingly, an appeal from the decision dismissing the same is not barred by double
jeopardy. The appellate court was therefore correct in holding that the petition, for indirect contempt
instituted by the respondents herein is civil in nature.

Be that as it may, We find that petitioners are not guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's order, but
such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the
law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during
litigation.24

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order injudicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.25 "However, such power should be
exercised on the preservative, not on the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the court
invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect[,] without which the administration of justice
will falter or fail."26 Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice.27

In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels during the
period material to the case was not intended to undermine the authority of the court or an act of
disobedience to the September 25, 2008 WPI of the RTC Branch 24.

To recall, the WPI enjoined HCPTI and any of its agents from "preventing plaintiffs access to its rail
lines and unloaders and from using the port facilities of HCPTI." It likewise directed the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) to "ensure that HCPTI is enjoined from the acts complained of, particularly any
act that would prevent plaintiffs from utilizing the port facilities of defendant HCPTI in accordance
with the MOA dated November 19, 2004."
G.R. No. 182738 February 24, 2014

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ, Respondent.

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper
39

conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of

justice may be punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules
40

states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions
prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall
apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The
enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as
shown by the phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, We said:41

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the
law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party;
contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; staying further proceedings.42

If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. In this case, the
43

threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 for every
day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of
penalty.

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is44

instructive:

x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1)
motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A.
Doctor, Jr. (Calimlim) clarified the procedure prescribed for indirect contempt proceedings. We held
in that case:

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt. First, there
must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third,
there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s
answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly. (Citations omitted.)

As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through a verified petition,
the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.

The Rules itself is explicit on this point:

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the
court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have the duty to
ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves
them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main case, unless the
presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt proceedings and the main action.

But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules, as clarified
in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the
proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform
the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process. This formal charge is
done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should
not be cited in contempt of court.

In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain their failure to bring the
accused before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was
not yet sufficient to initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a show-cause
order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in contempt. The formal charge
has to be specific enough to inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings are being
conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she will be cited in contempt.
The Order must express this in clear and unambiguous language.

xxxx

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to docket
and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much less to
exercise the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to
be docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it is the show-
cause order that initiated the proceedings.

What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court
motu proprio, is the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the
right to due process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the contempt charge is satisfactory, the
proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the respondent’s
answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.

xxxx
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to defend himself or herself and
have a day in court – a basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in indirect contempt
proceedings, as the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court. As We
have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her, and there must be a hearing, and the
court must investigate the charge and consider the respondent’s answer. 45

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s mind, the
1âwphi1

September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002
Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as
contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution
petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to produce
and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of
another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate
the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.

Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a
case of indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners’ advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt proceedings. It
states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order of a court in
a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution
of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in
contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the
appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.

The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged in
indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and
post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead,
46

petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required
bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.

G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent.

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.23 It is defined as disobedience to the Court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and
the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice.24
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.25

Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of
contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him to
uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties to a suit awarded by the
Court.26

In our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely direct contempt and
indirect contempt. 27

Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so.28

On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts which
constitute indirect contempt, thus:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property
by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (Emphasis
supplied.)29

Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect contempt should be
commenced, thus:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal
charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the
court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)

As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt
proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified
petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements
as outlined must be complied with.

There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under paragraphs (a) and (d)
of Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty of indirect contempt. But were the
proceedings conducted in convicting petitioner done in accordance with law?

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by respondent Go through a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.30 It was based on the aforesaid Motion that the appellate court
issued a Resolution31 dated 19 November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause
why she should not be cited for contempt.

Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything
in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to
the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado.
Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have
been initiated at all.

Indeed, the appellate court itself, in its Resolution dated 30 August 2004, made categorical findings
as to how the contempt charge was initiated, to wit:

In the present case, [respondent’s Go] Manifestation With Omnibus Motion which led to our 19
November 2003 Resolution requiring Atty. Regalado to explain why she should not be cited for
contempt, x x x.32

We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt
charge without contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which rendered the
questioned resolution.

It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet,33 this Court ruled that the contempt proceedings was
considered commenced by the court motu proprio even if the show cause order came after the filing
of the motions to cite for contempt filed by the adverse party. The Decision thus reads:

Thus, independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, it was the Pasay MTC which
commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No verified petition is required if proceedings
for indirect contempt are initiated in this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not
affect the procedure adopted.
It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For Contempt Of Court,
dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading they prayed that Union Bank be declared in indirect contempt
of court for its disobedience to the Pasay MTC’s Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order dated May 9,
2000 specifically directed Union Bank to "return immediately to the defendants the replevied motor
vehicle." However, the Tamondong Spouses’ unverified motion dated May 17, 2000 cannot
invalidate the contempt proceedings because these proceedings were initiated by respondent judge
motu proprio in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This above-cited case, however, has no application in the case at bar for the factual milieu of the
cases are different from each other. In Leonidas, there was an order of the court that was utterly
violated by Union Bank. Thus, even in the absence of the motion of spouses Tamondong to cite
Union Bank in contempt, the court a quo on its own can verily initiate the action. In the present case,
the appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalado’s misbehavior
without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct
committed by the former.

Having painstakingly laid down that the instant case was not initiated by the court motu proprio
necessitates us to look into the second mode of filing indirect contempt proceedings.

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.

The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in contravention with the
categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which
was unverified and without any supporting particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw
notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance
with the appellate court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt
and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the commencement
of the indirect contempt action.

It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with
caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual. 34

The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are delineated by the
procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Strict compliance
with such procedural guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings against person alleged to
be guilty of contempt are commonly treated as criminal in nature.35

As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado,36 the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the
requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory, and thus states:

1. This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt
proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former
Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a motion
without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

xxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal
charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second
paragraph of this section.

Time and again we rule that the use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the
Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.37

In Enriquez v. Enriquez,38 this Court applied the word "shall" by giving it mandatory and imperative
import and ruled that non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the Rules goes into the
very authority of the court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, thus:

"However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997, now
require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an
appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the same rules that,
"(W)ithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees."