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India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Debate
RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN JUNE 30, 2016
REGIONAL INSIGHT
Source: Getty

Though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian strategic

community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate no longer produces
new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New Delhi faces:
countering Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons.

This piece is part of a compilation bringing together Regional Voices on the Challenges of Nuclear
Deterrence Stability in Southern Asia.

INTRODUCTION
India’s nuclear doctrine is an important variable
determining nuclear stability in South Asia, especially Rajesh Rajagopalan
Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor at the
because the doctrine is generally considered to be Center for International Politics,
Organization, and Disarmament at
restrained. So any indication of change in the doctrine is Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

a cause for concern. Such an indication of change

happened most recently in 2014, when the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) released its election manifesto, in which it promised to “revise and
update” India’s nuclear doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current time.”1 This led
to some speculation that a key element of India’s nuclear doctrine, India’s no-first-use
commitment (NFU) for nuclear weapons, might be altered.2 Though the BJP leaders quickly
denied that the NFU policy would be altered, this episode indicated the continuing
discomfort among sections of the Indian strategic elite about India’s NFU pledge.3 This
essay surveys the debate over India’s nuclear doctrine for signs of any imminent changes. It
suggests that though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian
strategic community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate has stagnated, and
no longer produces new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New
Delhi faces: countering Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). India might need to
shift its massive retaliation nuclear strategy to some form of modulated retaliation to deal
with this challenge. By using this website, you agree to our cookie policy.
G
I begin with a brief overview of the official Indian nuclear doctrine. In the subsequent
section, I survey the debate over various aspects of the doctrine, examining six major areas
around which India’s nuclear doctrine debate revolves. Indian perspectives on the nuclear
doctrine can be broadly divided into two camps: those who largely support the current
doctrine, the moderates; and those who would revise it significantly to make it more
aggressive, the expansionists. To the extent that the moderates seek any revision, it is to align
India’s nuclear plans more closely with the Draft Nuclear Doctrine that the National
Security Advisory Board produced in 1999. As with any exercise in taxonomy, this is a
necessarily crude effort, and not everyone within each camp might agree with others in their
group on all aspects of doctrine. More complicated taxonomies are also possible, but they are
unnecessary for the purposes of this effort, which is to broadly outline the current debate
and, more important, the possibility of change in India’s nuclear doctrine. I conclude with
an assessment of the prospects for changes in the doctrine.

INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

India released its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in August 1999. The DND was prepared by
the semiofficial National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and was quickly disowned by the
Indian government, though many details of the DND faithfully followed previous
 government statements, including authoritative statements in parliament regarding credible
minimum deterrence and NFU. In January 2003, New Delhi released its official nuclear
doctrine.4 The official doctrine itself was based on the DND, though there were also some
differences. These included suggesting that India might use nuclear weapons to retaliate
against attacks using chemical and biological weapons (CBW), and that Indian retaliation to
any nuclear attack would be massive. In a speech in 2010, the then national security adviser,
Shivshankar Menon, stated that India’s doctrine is “no first use against non-nuclear weapon
states,” implying that NFU does not apply to nuclear-armed powers.5 Though Menon’s
remarks created some controversy, they appear to have been an inadvertent error—such a
formulation has not been reiterated subsequently. In April 2013, a few additional details
about the nuclear doctrine were outlined in a speech by Shyam Saran, the head of the NSAB,
in a speech in New Delhi.6 Saran explicitly stated that the “views” he was sharing were his
own and not those of the government, but he did reveal details about the management of
India’s nuclear forces that were not in the public realm, so his speech can be considered an
unofficial elaboration of the details of India’s nuclear doctrine. He outlined the makeup of
the Strategic Programme Staff, which carries out the general staff work of the NCA, and of
the Strategic Armament Safety Authority, which looks after the safety and security aspects of
nuclear weapons. In March 2012, a nonofficial task force of strategic analysts, put together
by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, also produced an alternate
nuclear doctrine for India, which largely stuck to the principles of the official doctrine, with
the exception of rejecting the characterization of “massive” to refer to retaliation to any
nuclear attack on India, preferring the characterization of “punitive” that was used in the
DND.7

SURVEYING THE DEBATE

Indian strategists have debated India’s nuclear doctrine sporadically and inconclusively for
well over a decade. Though the NFU remains the most controversial element of India’s
nuclear doctrine, other aspects of the doctrine have also been contested. These include
references in the doctrine to “massive” retaliation and to deterring CBW attacks, as well as
the adequacy of the doctrine for dealing with new developments such as Pakistan’s reported
development of TNWs.

Despite many contestations over the nuclear doctrine, the dominant view within India
broadly endorses the current Indian nuclear doctrine, with one exception: There is almost
unanimous rejection of the doctrine’s allusion to massive retaliation. It is also important to
note that many developments in the region that are related to nuclear weapons have not
triggered very much debate in India—in particular, persistent reports that Pakistan has
surpassed India in the size of its nuclear arsenal, or frequent reports about Pakistan’s missile
capability. Similarly, only scant attention has been given to the doctrine’s efficacy in
deterring China.

The following considers opposing perspectives on six major issues that agitate the Indian
debate: India’s NFU commitment, credible minimum deterrence, nuclear retaliation to
CBW attacks, command-and-control aspects of the doctrine, massive retaliation, and
Pakistan’s resort to TNWs and terrorism.

NO FIRST USE
The most controversial element of the Indian nuclear debate is undoubtedly India’s NFU
pledge. One analyst calls India’s NFU “not so much a strategic choice, but a cultural one.”8
India’s nuclear doctrine promises an NFU posture, and also that India will only use nuclear
weapons in retaliation—though a subsequent line modulates the NFU commitment to say
that India will retain the option of nuclear weapons retaliation to CBW attacks. The
inclusion of a CBW attack as a reason for nuclear retaliation is considered in a later section;
here, I consider the arguments over the usefulness of the NFU pledge itself.

Moderates and expansionists disagree with great vigor over NFU. Moderates tend to be
nuclear deterrence optimists who generally expect that achieving deterrence is relatively easy
as long as nuclear weapons capability exist. They are not particularly concerned about the
possibility that not striking first has any great deterrence disadvantages. As the late K.
Subrahmanyam pointed out, deterrence is more about perception than numbers, and as long
as the other side perceives a survivable nuclear capability, deterrence will hold.9 Moderates
therefore consider NFU to be the centerpiece of India’s nuclear doctrine and strongly
support it. For them, India’s NFU posture provides multiple advantages. As Manpreet Sethi
points out, the most important advantage is that it obviates the need for the expensive
nuclear weapons infrastructure that is associated with a first-use doctrine.10 Sethi points to
several other advantages of an NFU posture; for one, it puts the onus of escalation on the
adversary, without preventing India from defending itself.11 Elsewhere, she suggests that by
 conceding the initiative to the adversary, NFU is actually “liberating,” which is a good way
of describing the attitude of moderates to the NFU.12 In addition, a purely retaliatory
posture allows New Delhi to limit its reaction to nuclear attacks, forgoing threats of use of
nuclear weapons. Further, there is little need for India to have nuclear forces on hair-trigger
alerts, which are always risky.13 Finally, NFU allows India to keep its weapons disassembled,
thus averting the need for systems such as Permissive Action Links, which are necessary to
maintain control over nuclear weapons if they are stored ready to fire. NFU thus reflects
India’s traditional abhorrence of nuclear weapons.

These and similar points are reflected in the writings of many moderates. Admiral Verghese
Koithara, who wrote a well-received book on the Indian nuclear forces, suggests that NFU
avoids the need for war-fighting approaches that use TNWs and counterforce targeting
philosophies, both of which add to the size and complexity of a nuclear arsenal. NFU also
reduces the difficulties and expenses associated with a complicated command-and-control
system.14 But India’s NFU commitment is also conditional: Rajiv Nayan points out that, by
making the NFU conditional, India lost an advantage without gaining any strategic or
security value.15

The expansionists reject these arguments, and Bharat Karnad provides the best exemplar of
opposition to NFU. Karnad argues that an NFU posture is only possible for a country that
has “extreme confidence not only in the survivability of its national nuclear forces sufficient
to muster a devastating retaliatory strike, but also in the efficacy of its crisis management
system.”16 He argues that crisis management is not India’s forte. The Indian bureaucratic
system, he says, “is manifestly incapable of handling any emergency as dire as a nuclear
strike.”17 He also points to an additional flaw with NFU, that “the NFU principle is
unenforceable.” Since there is no way in which nuclear weapons can be designed only for a
second strike, NFU is more a peacetime declaration that a country does not have to abide by
during war.18 Not surprisingly, those who recommend against altering the NFU turn this
argument around, pointing out that since the NFU is a declaratory policy that does not
affect India’s war-fighting ability, there is no reason to move to a first-use doctrine, which
could bring unwanted international pressure, spur an arms race, and prevent confidence
building between the two sides.19

P. R. Chari, not so much an expansionist as an opponent of nuclear weapons, also highlights

the “insufficiency” of NFU, proposing that it frees Pakistan from fearing an Indian nuclear
riposte to either terrorism or limited war. He believes that Pakistan could even deploy
TNWs without fear that India might attack them, though he does not appear to consider the
possibility that India could use conventional military forces for such contingencies.20 Some
expansionists suggest that India should abandon NFU because India cannot keep its arsenal
limited if it has to prepare to receive an initial attack and then have enough weapons left over
for retaliation. They believe, in short, that NFU is a solution that makes the problem worse.
Moreover, they suggest that Pakistan does not actually believe India’s NFU pledge.21

Moderates dismiss many of these arguments. In response to the often-expressed fear that
NFU will prevent India from acting against an imminent nuclear attack, Subrahmanyam
points out that such a preemptive strike would not prevent retaliation. Subrahmanyam,
however, did not consider the possibility than striking first could potentially reduce the
lethality of the retaliation. Much more important, he points out that it is always possible that
an adversary might decide not to launch an attack at the very last moment but that a
preemptive strike will force them to retaliate.22 This is without doubt the most important
argument against nuclear preemption.

Rajesh Basrur, a moderate, agrees with critics that no country can believe others’
declarations about NFU.23 He rejects, however, the argument that NFU makes Indian
doctrine defensive, arguing that if that were the case, Pakistan—which has rejected NFU—
should have actively deployed nuclear weapons on high alert, which it does not do. He
rightly points out that there is no major difference between Indian and Pakistani nuclear
deployment styles in peacetime. In wartime, India can be expected to deploy its weapons
much the same way as Pakistan does. In essence, then, beyond of declaratory policy, there is
no real difference between India and Pakistan in how they deploy nuclear weapons. This is
another important argument that expansionists ignore: that Pakistan’s refusal to accept
NFU does not mean there is a great distinction between the two sides in actual deployment
patterns.

CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETERRENCE

A second important aspect of India’s nuclear doctrine is credible minimum deterrence
(CMD), which refers to the quantity of nuclear forces that India needs to deter potential
nuclear adversaries. Moderates and expansionists disagree about how many weapons are
necessary, as well as about India’s progress in weaponization.
As deterrence optimists, moderates are generally less concerned about the quantity or
quality of nuclear weapons. Writing immediately after India’s official nuclear doctrine was
released, K. Subrahmanyam pointed out that credibility is a function of how well command
and control functions; the essence of deterrence, he argued, is to have a command-and-
control chain “from the political level to the implementing level” that demonstrates its
“survivability under the worst conditions of decapitation attack.”24 Many years later,
Subrahmanyam wrote that what matters is not so much the “exchange ratio” of damage
suffered by both sides, but how much punishment an adversary calculates that it can accept.
This level of punishment is achievable “so long as India has a survivable retaliatory force.”25
In other words, decisionmakers are worried not about who suffers more, but about how
much they themselves will have to suffer. Other moderates argue that India does not need to
seek superiority “or even parity” with adversaries in terms of numbers, yield, or types of
weapons. All India has to worry about is maintaining an assured capability for
counterstrike.26 In a detailed analysis of India’s CMD, Basrur argues that CMD fits well
within India’s overall strategic culture, pointing to reports that the Indian nuclear weapons
are kept unassembled and undeployed—a physical arrangement close to virtual deterrence.27
Basrur is also dismissive of arguments about credibility, suggesting that in previous India-
Pakistan crisis situations, “there is no evidence that the question of credibility significantly
shaped the thinking of either side.”28

However, moderates worry that India will develop a much larger arsenal because of political
inattentiveness or bureaucratic inertia. Ali Ahmed argues that cultural factors have already
led to a more assertive Indian military doctrine.29 Basrur suggests that Indian strategic
culture could change, and that there are elements in the Indian nuclear doctrine that could
lead it away from CMD. As he puts it: “Because Indian thinking and practice lack clarity on
minimum deterrence as a concept, particularly with respect to the operational aspect, there
is a tendency towards drift.”30 He argues that Indian thinking on nuclear deterrence is
ambiguous, pointing to differences between the DND and the official doctrine.31

Basrur argues that India has moved from deterrence to compellence in the aftermath of the
terror attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, claiming that the attack “seems to
have opened the door to an open-ended future in which a minimalist conception of
deterrence will no longer be the solitary plank of nuclear policy. Compellence directly
contradicts minimum deterrence.”32 He admits this might be a one-off occurrence; and in
retrospect, it is difficult to conclude that it was indicative of a pattern. For moderates, the
absent-mindedness of India’s political leadership on strategic issues is a concern because it
could potentially lead to India acquiring a much larger arsenal simply through drift and
bureaucratic inertia. Some moderates submit that the CMD concept itself might be a
problem because of the possible contradiction between minimum and credible.33

In contrast to moderates, expansionists tend to be deterrence pessimists who see deterrence

as a matter of delicate balance that needs constant care. They want much larger nuclear
arsenals and worry about what they consider to be the slow pace of India’s weapons
development. Analysts like Brahma Chellaney argue that India needs intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to “underpin its doctrine of minimum but credible deterrence.”
Relying on long-range bombers, he says, “is antithetical to a credible deterrence posture.”34
He has also argued that Indian nuclear forces are being allowed to deteriorate, pointing to an
isolated statement by then–defense minister Pranab Mukherjee that referred to India’s
“minimum credible deterrent” instead of “credible minimum deterrent.”35 That statement
was simply an example of the Indian political leadership’s unfamiliarity with the arcana of
India’s nuclear policy, but Chellaney latched on to it as an indication of a fundamental
change in policy. This in itself is a good illustration of the concern that expansionists have
about the deterioration of India’s nuclear deterrence. Chellaney worries that Indian leaders
might not maintain even the CMD, especially given what he and others considered were
“concessions” that the Indian government made to Washington for the United States–India
nuclear deal.36

Karnad has argued that the idea of CMD, at least as visualized by the NSAB in the DND,
was an elastic concept that sanctioned “sizable and progressively more modern nuclear
forces.” Karnad believes that India’s nuclear development has since strayed from this
conception.37 Moderates like Subrahmanyam accept that, although it is not necessary for
deterrence, CMD could be adjusted to facilitate “influencing the perception of the
adversary.”38 Here, Subrahmanyam is not necessarily supporting the expansionist suggestion
that the nuclear arsenal be enlarged, but only leaving open that possibility should such a
need arise. In contrast, Karnad disagrees with the very notion of “minimum” nuclear
deterrence, which he calls “a real military liability.”39 Karnad visualizes a much grander role
for nuclear weapons in India’s rise as a great power. He argues that “a relatively large and
robust nuclear deterrent . . .would lead to a genuinely independent strategic role for India.”40
A “megaton thermonuclear-ICBM” will also permit India to “stare down” China and deter
China from seeking a military confrontation.41 Such a capability “will entail a millennial
 reordering of nation-States [sic], that is perhaps overdue,” hamstring China from seeking to
undermine India, and remove the threat of a preemptive strike by the United States, while
also permitting India to depend on itself if other powers like the United States or China
decline.42 He does not explain how this conversion happens, but in any case his ideas go far
beyond the purpose of deterrence alone. Moderates have suggested that such an expansive
arsenal is unnecessary for the purposes of deterrence.43

Though Chellaney and Karnad do not represent the dominant viewpoint on India’s nuclear
arsenal, they are not alone in holding expansionist views about India’s nuclear arsenal. A
former official closely associated with the framing of the nuclear doctrine, Ambassador
Satish Chandra, has argued that maintaining the credibility of India’s threat of
“unacceptable damage” requires that the size of India’s nuclear arsenal be a function of its
threat perceptions, suggesting that size has to be open-ended and not fixed.44 Elsewhere,
Chandra had argued that, in light of long-standing China-Pakistan collusion, India should
seek a capability sufficient to inflict “unacceptable damage on both Pakistan and China.”45
Chandra points to the complexity of the triangular deterrence relationship that has not been
fully considered in the Indian nuclear doctrine literature.

In addition to Chandra, a former commander of the Strategic Forces Command, Lieutenant-

General B. S. Nagal, has also suggested that India needs to keep the idea of CMD open-
ended, saying that “with a policy of No First Use and Massive Retaliation, the concept of
CMD must factor in ‘survivability and sufficient numbers’ that can inflict unacceptable
damage.”46 In a later essay, Nagal argues that the actual size of the arsenal associated with
CMD “has to be dynamic, because, the adversaries’ arsenals are increasing by the year.”47
Nagal goes on to argue that India has “adequate means and potential to cause unacceptable
damage to any adversary if attacked by nuclear weapons,” notwithstanding the gap in long-
range missiles to reach all of China.48 CMD is tied to India’s capacity to cause unacceptable
damage, which Nagal defines expansively as requiring a plan to “destroy a large number of
countervalue targets to include population centres, industrial complexes and important
infrastructure, and available counterforce targets.” For Nagal, CMD requires the capacity for
destruction of the enemy’s society to an extent that would make recovery and reconstruction
long and costly. A nuclear strike must render the adversary’s economy “regressed,” the
military defeated, and “the political leadership that decided on war is decimated.”49 Though
not all expansionists suggest such requirements explicitly, most probably agree with Nagal’s
assessment, which illustrates the distance between expansionists and moderates on the key
question of sizing the arsenal.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OF CBW USE

The Indian nuclear doctrine leaves Indian decisionmakers the option of using nuclear
weapons to retaliate against CBW use, something which was not considered in the DND.
This expansion is something to which moderates have objected, but it is also an issue on
which not much debate has been generated. Some moderates such as Sethi disagree with this
expansion, arguing that this did not work in the case of the United States, and it “hardly
makes the Indian nuclear deterrent more credible,”50 an argument with which most
moderates would agree.51 Sethi argues that the CBW are anyways outlawed, and if nonstate
actors use these weapons, then India’s nuclear deterrent could in any way not be effective
because it is not designed to counter such actors. Expansionists have not developed
arguments about the CBW issue, but they would presumably support nuclear use in response
to a CBW attack—arguing, as some officials reportedly have done, that nuclear retaliation
for CBW attack is simply leaving an option open since India has given up its CBW
capacity.52

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The nuclear doctrine mentions a few details about command-and-control issues, but the
main point it makes is that the political leadership will determine how to employ the nuclear
deterrent. There is little disagreement on this score, but moderates and expansionists
disagree about how centralized India’s nuclear command-and-control structure should be.53
Moderates largely accept the command-and-control arrangements detailed in the doctrine
and point to the NFU as a critical factor in reducing pressure on Indian command-and-
control systems. None of the moderates, however, have written on the specifics of these
arrangements. For expansionists, on the other hand, the deficiencies of the command-and-
control arrangements are yet another indicator of the weaknesses of India’s nuclear doctrine.
Military doctrines are, after all, about how military forces are to be used in war.
Expansionists contend that India’s nuclear deterrence will not be effective unless potential
adversaries accept that India has the operational capacity to employ its nuclear weapons. As
former admiral Koithara points out, “both doves and hawks skirt operationalisation issues
 in India.”54 To many critics of the Indian nuclear doctrine, especially those within the
military, India’s nuclear operational capacity is doubtful because the Indian nuclear doctrine
leaves the military out of the decisionmaking loop.

There are several subissues within the command-and-control debate. Menon identifies the
lack of a chief of defence staff as a serious lacuna.55 Writing in 2003, Menon was hopeful that
the new Integrated Defence Staff would help overcome this problem; but a decade later, he
was much less hopeful.56 As far as Koithara is concerned, the lack of attention to
operationalization issues is tied to the discounting of the military’s role in nuclear issues. As
he points out, a “higher level of operationalisation and much greater involvement of the
military in nuclear matters are essential both for robust deterrence and for safe and secure
operations under alerted conditions.”57 These problems are only likely to get more
complicated as the Indian nuclear force grows. An enlarged nuclear force—based on
multiple, mobile platforms—makes “safety, security, and control issues far more problematic
than was the case earlier.”58

Even India’s de-alerted and de-mated nuclear posture, which moderates see as a great virtue,
is severely criticized by former military officers. Menon, a former admiral, argues that India’s
posture is a “bizarre arrangement,” adopted because of bureaucratic turf battles.59 This is not
an unchallenged view—others, such as Koithara, suggest that integrating the warheads in
storage would be detrimental to safety and security.60 Other analysts point out that the
imminent deployment of India’s nuclear missile submarine makes the de-alerted and de-
mated posture a moot point.61 Whether canisterized weapons require a different doctrine
has been disputed by some analysts, who point out that China has also deployed such
warheads without it affecting China’s nuclear doctrine.62

Expansionists such as Karnad argue that a de-mated posture elongates the logistics chain
and increases the number of potential targets, rendering the delivery system or warhead
inoperable if even one of the targets is hit.63 Large numbers of such strikes with advanced
conventional weapons “would leave the entire nuclear deterrent in disarray and, great parts
of it, unusable.” It also makes the nuclear force vulnerable while these weapons are being
readied for operation, a process that he expected would take days, weeks, or months. Instead
of creating additional time for Indian decisionmakers to react, the additional time would be
used by the adversary to conduct “mopping-up strikes.” Moreover, the additional time would
be used by global powers to pressure India into settling for some “symbolic” token
retaliation. He also dismisses other presumed benefits of a de-alerted and de-mated nuclear
force, such as the greater safety of such a force and its reduced vulnerability to theft and
inadvertent use or misuse. He suggests that it is easier to protect fewer mated weapons than a
large number of distributed components, and that the Indian military has a good record of
protecting its hardware. In addition, he also points out that in a nuclear war, India will have
to go to war with whatever forces it has on hand—there will be no time to increase
manufacturing. It is not manifestly clear why this would be a hindrance since the
components would already be manufactured.

MASSIVE RETALIATION
One of the rare areas of agreement between the moderates and the expansionists is over
India’s threat of massive retaliation to any nuclear attack. Most analysts in both camps fear
the threat to be empty. Some argue that India should consider substituting “punitive” for
“massive” in the doctrine.64 Moderates such as Basrur say that massive retaliation is a threat
that the enemy will always expect, and is unnecessary since it does not take much to deter.65
Others suggest that any Pakistani first use might be a very limited attack calibrated to avoid
massive retaliation by India. They propose that India retaliate with low-level strikes in the
case of Pakistan’s limited first use.66

Expansionists such as Karnad are equally dismissive of massive retaliation, arguing that
threatening such retaliation in response to Pakistani tactical nuclear first use undermines
India’ deterrence by violating the principle of proportionality.67 Another problem to which
Karnad points is the lack of compatibility between massive retaliation and minimum
deterrence. Though Karnad does not spell out his reasoning, he presumably means that a
small nuclear force cannot produce massive attacks.68

It is quite possible that these analysts are misreading what is stated in the doctrine. Many
Indian analysts continue to refer to “massive retaliation” as Indian doctrine,69 though the
doctrine actually does not use this phrase, saying instead that “nuclear retaliation to a first
strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”70 Saying retaliation will
be “massive” is different from massive retaliation; in all likelihood, the framers of the
doctrine were ignorant of the meaning of “massive retaliation” in nuclear theology and
simply wanted a tougher-sounding word to replace the DND’s phrase “punitive retaliation.”
OTHER ISSUES: TERRORISM AND TNWS
Though issues such as terrorism and TNWs were not mentioned in the Indian nuclear
doctrine, the doctrine’s capacity to deal with these challenges has become a contentious
issue. On Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism, moderates generally suggest non-nuclear
measures. They propose building up India’s conventional military capabilities, holding the
state that is giving sanctuary to terrorists responsible, and creating better global norms as
well as better intelligence capability.71 Former diplomat Arundhati Ghose argues that, while
the military option should not be closed, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has to be the
first option.72 Expansionists also suggest conventional or covert military responses; Karnad,
for example, suggests that Pakistan’s use of terrorism can be countered by India also
developing similar capabilities, rather than having to escalate to the nuclear level.73 But
moderates such as Subrahmanyam discount arguments for the preemption of Pakistan,
saying that as a status-quo power, India should be focused on “forestalling threats as they
arise and cannot be planning any pre-emptive moves.”74 It is clear that neither moderates
nor expansionists have any credible answers to Pakistan’s support for terrorism under the
nuclear shield.

On Pakistan’s reported move to deploy TNWs, there is a general consensus that

counterdeployment of Indian TNWs provides no answer. This is clear from the various
contributions to the only book-length study of the TNW problem, an edited volume by
Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria.75 Even expansionists such as Karnad dismiss
concerns that Pakistan might escalate a conventional war to the nuclear level. “The actual
possibility of use of nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, is near zero,” he argues.76 This is
because of India’s overall superiority will mean that any Pakistani use of TNWs will be
national suicide, and the Pakistan army as a professional army would do no such thing.
Other analysts suggest that India develop conventional military means to neutralize
Pakistan’s TNWs,77 and double down on its doctrine to ensure that its retaliatory forces are
ready, especially since any use of nuclear weapons will be strategic.78 Some, like former
senior Army officer Sawhney, do suggest that India acquire TNWs, but only to prevent a
rapid Chinese breakthrough. He proposes that such TNWs be maintained under central
control rather than delegated to local commanders.79 Both the general consensus in the
debate and the clear absence of even theoretical alternatives for how New Delhi might deal
with Pakistan’s TNWs reflect a recognition that the problem is with India’s political
credibility and that it cannot be solved by tweaking the doctrine. One solution that does not
appear to have been seriously considered in this debate yet is the possibility of considering
some Indian version of the flexible response doctrine. Indian nuclear doctrine could be
modified from “massive retaliation” to “modulated retaliation” to leave options for the level
of response that India could consider in response to any nuclear attack, giving it the
flexibility to consider a proportional or proportional-plus retaliation. This requires no
change in Indian nuclear force structure or command-and-control arrangements, which are
the biggest problems with TNWs. India could conduct such a proportional retaliation with
low-yield gravity nuclear bombs delivered by aircraft. At worst, this requires India to develop
such a low-yield weapon, if one is not in its inventory. The added benefit to such a change is
that it also alters the one element of the doctrine that both moderates and expansionists
dislike: massive retaliation.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

There is a near consensus in the Indian strategic community that India’s nuclear doctrine
needs to be periodically reexamined.80 There is also a consensus that the Indian government
needs to release more information about its nuclear doctrine and policy, both in order to
deter adversaries and so that Indian public debate is better informed.

This does not mean, however, that everyone in the strategic community agrees that the
doctrine needs to be revised. At the least, there is no consensus about the direction any
revision would take. Though there has been significant debate and disagreement about the
advisability of India’s NFU policy, the dominant opinion is still that India should maintain
it. To the extent that there is a desire to change the NFU, moderates would like to reorient
the doctrine more in the direction of the DND and abandon some of the expansion that the
official doctrine introduced, such as nuclear retaliation for CBW attacks and references to
massive retaliation. Expansionists, on the other hand, would prefer abandoning the NFU
altogether and retaining a much more flexible approach toward nuclear force expansion.

On the issue of tactical weapons, though there has been disquiet about Pakistan’s TNWs and
their impact on India’s conventional war options, the predominant opinion appears to be
that there is no need for India to consider any change to its doctrine. This reflects the fact
that New Delhi has few realistic alternatives available for dealing with Pakistan’s TNWs.
 Ultimately, these public doctrinal debates might not be particularly important in keying
changes to India’s nuclear doctrine. As Vipin Narang has pointed out, India might drift
toward a much more aggressive nuclear doctrine simply because the country’s political
leadership does not pay sufficient attention to the military and defense scientific
bureaucracies.81

The effect of these debates on India’s official policy is difficult to predict. On one hand, it
appears as if the Indian government was indeed responding to public criticism when it
released the official doctrine in 2003. On the other hand, despite several years of vigorous
debate, there is little public indication that there is any effort at the official level to respond
to criticisms from either the moderates or the expansionists. While it is unlikely that the
Indian government will radically alter its existing nuclear doctrine, it is possible that it might
release a new edition of the nuclear doctrine, given the strong consensus among India’s
strategic elite about the need for periodic review and the need for the release of more
information about the nuclear doctrine. If a new edition of the doctrine does come out, it
will hopefully correct some of the errors and contradictions in the previous edition, thereby
strengthening the doctrine as a whole.

Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor at the Center for International Politics, Organization, and
Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

NOTES
1
Bharatiya Janata Party, Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat: Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas: Election
Manifesto 2014 (New Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014), 39.

2
Sanjeev Miglani and John Chalmers, “BJP Put ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy in Doubt,”
Reuters, April 7, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/india-election-bjp-manifesto-
idINDEEA3605820140407.

3 “Will Stick to ‘No-First-Use’ of Nukes Policy: Rajnath Singh,” Rediff, April 14, 2014,

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/ls-election-will-stick-to-no-first-use-of-nukes-policy-
rajnath-singh/20140414.htm; Douglas Busvine, “Modi Says Committed to No First Use of
Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, April 17, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/uk-
india-election-nuclear-idINKBN0D20QB20140416.

4 Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,

2008), 85.

5
“Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on ‘the Role of Force in Strategic
Affairs,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, October 21, 2010,
http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?
dtl/798/Speech+by+NSA+Shri+Shivshankar+Menon+at+NDC+on+The+Role+of+Force
+in+Strategic+Affairs.

6
Shyam Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” (speech at the India Habitat Centre,
New Delhi, April 24, 2013).

7
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, India’s Nuclear Doctrine: An Alternative Blueprint
(New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2012).

8
Raja Menon, “Just One Shark in the Deep Blue Sea,” Outlook, August 10, 2009,
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Just-One-Shark-In-The-Deep-Blue-Ocean/261048.

9
K. Subrahmanyam, “No Second Thoughts,” Indian Express, September 8, 2009,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/no-second-thoughts/514258/0.

10
Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards Credible Deterrence (New Delhi:
Knowledge World / Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009), 130–31.

11
Other than where noted, this section is based on Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 312–18.

12
Manpreet Sethi, India and No First Use: Preventing Deterrence Breakdown (New Delhi:
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014).

13
For a similar argument, also see Sheel Kant Sharma, “Should We Review India’s Nuclear
Doctrine?,” Tribune, April 28, 2014,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140428/edit.htm#5; and Happymon Jacob, “On the
Desirability of NFU,” Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2014,
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/on-the-desirability-of-nfu/167724.html.

14
Verghese Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2012), 84–85.
15 Rajiv Nayan, “Modi Sarkar’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Pioneer, May 25, 2014,

http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/agenda/foreign-policy-special-issue/modi-
sarkars-nuclear-doctrine.html.

16
Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy
(New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), 442.

17
Ibid., 442–43.

18
Ibid., 443.

19
Pravin Sawhney, “Re-Visiting Our Nuclear Doctrine,” Pioneer, April 10, 2014,
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/re-visiting-our-nuclear-doctrine.html.

20
P. R. Chari, India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/indiasnucleardoctrinestirringsofchange/hcks.

21
D. Suba Chandran, “Should India Give Up Its NFU Doctrine?,” Institute for Peace and
Conflict Studies, June 29, 2010, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/should-india-give-up-
its-nfu-doctrine-3171.html.

22
K. Subrahmanyam, “Because the Bluff Might Just Be Called,” Indian Express, September
16, 2009, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/because-the-bluff-might-just-be-
called/517622/.

23
Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2006), 44; Rajesh Basrur, South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and
Conflict in Comparative Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2008), 69–70.

24
K. Subrahmanyam, “The Essence of Deterrence,” Times of India, January 7, 2003.

25 K. Subrahmanyam, “Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” Indian Express, September 15,

2009, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/thinking-through-the-unthinkable/517179/.

26
Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 130.

27
Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 30.

28
Basrur, South Asia’s Cold War, 64.

29
Ali Ahmed, India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (New Delhi: Routledge
India, 2014).

30
Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 49.

31
Ibid., 30.

32
Ibid., 100.

33
Reshmi Kazi, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Study of Its Tenets,” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal 9, no.1 (January–March 2014): 46–55.

34
Brahma Chellaney, “India’s Missing Hard Power,” Mint, April 21, 2010,
http://chellaney.net/2010/04/20/indias-missing-hard-power/.

35
Brahma Chellaney, “Why India’s Powerful Anti-Deterrent Lobby Supports Nuclear Deal
with the U.S.,” Asian Age, January 5, 2008, http://chellaney.net/2008/01/05/why-indias-
powerful-anti-deterrent-lobby-supports-nuclear-deal-with-the-u-s/.

36
Brahma Chellaney, “Mortgaging Nuclear Crown Jewels,” Hindu, September 17, 2008,
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/mortgaging-nuclear-crown-
jewels/article1339684.ece. Also see Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 15; Ashok
Mehta, “Nuclear Doctrine Must Reflect Ground Reality,” Pioneer, April 16, 2014,
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/nuclear-doctrine-must-reflect-ground-
reality.html; Brijesh D. Jayal, “A Nation and Its Toothless Doctrine,” Telegraph, October 2,
2008, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081002/jsp/opinion/story_9909629.jsp#; and
Pravin Sawhney, “Areas the DRDO Should Work On,” Pioneer, April 24, 2014,
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/areas-the-drdo-should-work-on.html.
Other than Chellaney, the others are all former senior military officers.

37
Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, 85–86.

38 Subrahmanyam, “No Second Thoughts.”

39
Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 583.

40
Ibid., 578.
41
Ibid., 604.

42 Ibid., 604–8.

43
R. Rajaraman, “The Fizzle Doesn’t Really Matter,” Hindu, September 16, 2009,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/oped/thefizzledoesntreallymatter/article20870.ece?
css=print.

44
Satish Chandra, “Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is it Necessary?,” IDSA Issue Brief,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, April 30, 2014, 3.

45
Satish Chandra, “Prepare Against Pakistan Nukes,” Vivekananda International
Foundation, September 1, 2012,
http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/september/01/prepare-against-pakistan-nukes.

46
B. S. Nagal, “Checks and Balances,” Force, June 2014, 13.

47
B. S. Nagal, “Perception and Reality: An In-Depth Analysis of India’s Credible Minimum
Deterrent,” Force, October 2014, 9.

48
Ibid., 13.

49
Ibid., 12.

50
Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 127–28.

51 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is a Review Necessary?,” CLAWS Issue Brief

no. 43 (December 2014): 4.

52
Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, 86.

53
Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra, Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts (New
Delhi: Routledge India, 2014).

54
Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 10.

55
Raja Menon, “A Mismatch of Nuclear Doctrines,” Hindu, January 22, 2014,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-mismatch-of-nuclear-
doctrines/article5602609.ece.

56
Raja Menon, “Reflections on India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control,” USI
Journal 133 (April–June 2003): 196–214; Menon, “ Mismatch.”

57
Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 12.

58 Ibid., 14.

59
Menon, “Mismatch.”

60
Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 15.

61
W. P. S. Sidhu, “Updating India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Livemint, April 27, 2014,
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/rkEybO3sf1wA2vWbxXr0GM/Updating-Indias-
nuclear-doctrine.html.

62
Arun Viswanathan, “India’s Missile Modernization and Credible Minimum Deterrence,”
South Asian Voices, December 5, 2013, http://southasianvoices.org/indias-missile-
modernisation-and-credible-minimum-deterrence/.

63
Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 593–4.

64
Raja Menon, “Boxed In by Pakistan,” Indian Express, September 6, 2014,
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/boxed-in-by-pakistan/; Kanwal,
“India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” 4.

65
Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 117–20.

66
Koithara, Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, 244–45.

67 Bharat Karnad, “India’s Nuclear Amateurism,” New Indian Express, June 28, 2013,

http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Indiasnuclearamateurism/2013/06/28/article
1655987.ece.

68
Ibid.

69
See, for example, Bharat Karnad, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Deterrence
Theory,” India Review 4, no. 2 (2005): 190.

70
“Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear
Doctrine,” press release, Press Information Bureau, January 4, 2003,
 http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html.

71
Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 138–39.

72
Arundhati Ghose, “Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament:
Evolving Policy Challenges,” India Quarterly 65, no. 4 (2009): 437.

73
Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, 504–10.

74
K. Subrahmanyam, “Generally Speaking,” Indian Express, January 8, 2010,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/generally-speaking/564862/0.

75
Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, eds., Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons:
Conflict Redux (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2014).

76
Bharat Karnad, “Scaring Up Scenarios: An Introduction,” in Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear
Weapons, eds. Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria (New Delhi: Knowledge World,
2014), 1–18.

77 Vijay Shankar, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer to the Abyss,” in Pakistan’s

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, eds. Kanwal and Chansoria, 19–35.

78
Kapil Kak, “Rationale and Implications,” in Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, eds.
Kanwal and Chansoria, 63–84; Manpreet Sethi, “India’s Response Options,” in Pakistan’s
Tactical Nuclear Weapons, eds. Kanwal and Chansoria, 215–32. Also see Gurmeet Kanwal,
“India-Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Implications of Hatf-9,” Institute for Peace
and Conflict Studies, November 2013, http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/india-pakistan-
and-tactical-nuclear-weapons-implications-of-hatf-9-4169.html; Menon, “Boxed In”; Vijay
Shankar, “India-Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer to the Abyss,”
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, November 2013, http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-
pak/ipcs-debate-special-commentary-india-pakistan-and-tactical-nuclear-weapons-
4202.html; Varun Sahni,“Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Inevitability of
Instability,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, September 2014,
http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-the-
inevitability-of-instability-4670.html; Amit Gupta, “India, Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear
Weapons: Irrelevance for South Asia,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2014,
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/ipcs-debate-india-pakistan-and-tactical-nuclear-
weapons-irrelevance-for-4239.html; and Jacob, “On the Desirability of NFU.”

79
Sawhney, “Revisiting Our Nuclear Doctrine.”

80 Indian Pugwash Society, “Future of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Indian Pugwash Society,

April 25, 2016, http://pugwashindia.org/pdf/Report-Final-panel.pdf.

81
Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 3
(Summer 2013): 143–57.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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