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Cognitive Theory and Therapy of Emotional Disorders: A Lay Epistemic

Reconstruction?

Article in Psychological Inquiry · July 1990

DOI: 10.1207/s15327965pli0103_2

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 Psychological Inquiry

ISSN: 1047-840X (Print) 1532-7965 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20

Cognitive Theory and Therapy of Emotional

Disorders: A Lay Epistemic Reconstruction?

Lyn Y. Abramson , Lauren B. Alloy & Benjamin M. Dykman

To cite this article: Lyn Y. Abramson , Lauren B. Alloy & Benjamin M. Dykman (1990) Cognitive
Theory and Therapy of Emotional Disorders: A Lay Epistemic Reconstruction?, Psychological
Inquiry, 1:3, 198-200, DOI: 10.1207/s15327965pli0103_2

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0103_2

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 Psychological Inquiry Copyright 1990 by
1990, Vol. 1, No. 3, 198-219 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

COMMENTARIES

Cognitive Theory and Therapy of Emotional Disorders:

A Lay Epistemic Reconstruction?

Lyn Y. Abramson
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Lauren B. Alloy
Downloaded by [Temple University Libraries] at 09:43 30 March 2016

Temple University

Benjamin M. Dykman
University of BritishColumbia

How do humans acquire, and sometimes modify, their
personal knowledge about the world? Kruglanski's theory of
lay epistemology provides a novel answer to this question
and has provocative implications for understanding and mod-
ifying maladaptive thinking among emotionally disturbed
people. In this commentary, we focus on these implications
and evaluate Kruglanski's lay epistemic reconstruction of the
cognitive theory and therapy of emotional disorders.
Overview of the Theory of Lay Epistemology
Kruglanski's theory of lay epistemology rests on the non-
justificationist philosophy of knowledge (see Kruglanski &
Jaffe, 1988). Nonjustification emphasizes that infinite pieces
of evidence are relevant to evaluating the validity of any
theory, hypothesis, or proposition. Insofar as it would seem
to be impossible to examine all relevant evidence for a given
theory, we never can be certain of the theory's validity. Thus,
according to nonjustification, all our inferences are based on
incomplete evidence and there is no logical basis for absolute
certainty about the truth of any theory, hypothesis, or
proposition.
According to the theory of lay epistemology, people's
knowledge consists of propositions (theories, hypotheses,
etc .) in which they have a given degree of eonfidence. People
are said to have definite knowledge on a topic when they
assume their propositions are valid (Kruglanski & Jaffe,
1988). Lay epistemic theory postulates that to acquire knowl-
edge on a topic, a person engages in the two interwoven pro-
cesses of hypothesis generation and hypothesis validation.
An exciting and novel feature of Kruglanski's theory is
that it recognizes that, in principle, a person could generate
an infinite number of hypotheses consistent with a given
piece of evidence (the problem with induction). Yet, people
often do possess definite knowledge on many topics. Thus,
hypothesis generation usually comes to a halt, and people
"freeze" on a particular hypothesis despite the logical im-
possibility of knowing for certain that the frozen hypothesis
is the correct one. Just as cognitive capability (availability
and accessibility) and motivational factors influence the ini-
tiation of hypotheses, they also govern their cessation.
We now review, elaborate, and evaluate Kruglanski's lay
epistemic reconstruction of the cognitive theory and therapy
of emotional disorders.
Cognitive Theory and Therapy of
Emotional Disorders
Both beck (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and
Ellis (e.g ., 1980) suggested that dysfunctional cognitions
cause emotional distress. They further emphasized that such
distress-producing cognitions are distorted, inaccurate, or
irrational. By contrast, nondistressed individuals (i.e., "nor-
mals") are hypothesized to think in a nondistorted, accurate,
and rational manner.
Perhaps Beck's and Ellis's focus on cognitive distortion
and irrationality reflects their psychoanalytic heritage which
emphasized difficulties in "reality testing" among disor-
dered individuals. It is of interest that although Freud placed
great emphasis on motivational determinants of cognition,
both Beck and Ellis generally have ignored, or even es-
chewed, possible motivational influences.
The goal of therapy for Beck and Ellis is to rid the patient
of cognitive distortion and rationality. Beck et al. (1979)
wrote, "The therapeutic techniques are designed to identify,
reality test, and correct distorted conceptualizations and the
dysfunctional beliefs (schemas) underlying these cogni-
tions" (p. 4). The major therapeutic method used by Beck
consists of collaborative empiricism whereby patient and
therapist formulate the patient's automatic thoughts, in-
ferences, and assumptions as hypotheses and then design
experiments testing the validity of these hypotheses against
the patient's experience. Ellis (1980) argued that although
his rational-emotive therapy utilizes the empirical techniques
developed by Beck and colleagues, the preferred technique is
philosophical disputing, intended to rid patients of their irra-
tional beliefs and assumptions.
Lay Epistemic Reconstruction of Cognitive
Theory and Therapy
Consistent with Beck and Ellis, Kruglanski asserts that
maladaptive cognitions cause emotional distress. However,
Kruglanski emphasizes that such distress-producing cogni-
 COMMENTARES
tions are not necessarily distorted or irrational. In this regard,
he contends that there is no relationship between the ver-
idicality or accuracy of a belief and the amount of distress it
produces. Indeed, the theory of lay epistemology further
implies, contrary to the apparent assumptions of Beck and
Ellis, that it is logically impossible for a therapist to know
whether or not a given patient's cognitions are distorted or,
for that matter, whether the therapist's own cognitions are
distorted. All that can be determined is whether or not the
patient's beliefs agree with those of the therapist or some
other current criterion-setter. Finally, Kruglanski again dis-
agrees with Beck and Ellis and argues that no one group of
people is likely to be more accurate than another, on average.
Consistent with Beck and Ellis, Kruglanski's goal for ther-
apy is to rid the patient of distress-causing cognitions. How-
ever, at odds with Beck and Ellis, Kruglanski emphasizes
that the lay epistemic therapist focuses on altering the content
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rather than the accuracy, veridicality, or rationality of the
patient's cognitions. The strategies and techniques available
to a lay epistemic therapist follow from the postulates of lay
epistemic theory about how knowledge is acquired and mod-
ified. For example, the therapist might rely on the patient's
motivational needs. If the patient were motivated to believe
he is fair to other people, the therapist might point out that his
belief that all other people find him repulsive and his accom-
panying withdrawal from them might not be giving other
people a fair chance to demonstrate their appreciation of him.
Alternatively, the therapist might make use of cognitive ca-
pability principles by having the patient list instances in
which people have shown interest or liking for him over the
past year. Presumably this would facilitate the accessibility
of more positive cognitions. As the previous example shows,
the lay epistemic therapist may use standard cognitive-thera-
py methods such as collaborative empiricism or disputation
but would construe them as being in the service of changing
the content rather than the accuracy or rationality of the
patient's cognitions. Lay epistemic therapy would be consid-
ered successful when the patient abandoned the frustrative
hypothesis (the belief that one has failed or will fail) and
froze on a more positive belief.
Evaluation of the Reconstruction
We are genuinely excited by the lay epistemic reconstruc-
tion of the cognitive theory and therapy of emotional disor-
ders. Kruglanski's suggestion that emotionally disturbed
people may be no more inaccurate or irrational than non-
disturbed people is consistent with work showing that de-
pressives often are more accurate (at least by current criterion
setters' standards) than nondepressives who often show
positive biases (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Dykman,
Abrarnson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989). Similarly, this aspect
of the reconstruction is consistent with much basic research
in. social cognition documenting pervasive biases in normal
cognition. We previously have argued that an important
shortcoming in Beck's theory is his apparently erroneous
portrayal of the normal, nondistressed individual as unbiased
and accurate. Thus, an advantage of the lay epistemic recon-
struction is that it makes the theory and practice of cognitive
therapy more consistent with basic research in social, person-
ality, and cognitive psychology (cf. Dykman & Abramson,
1990).
Focusing on the content rather than the veridicality or
rationality of patients' beliefs has additional positive im-
199
plications not addressed by Kruglanski. First, we have al-
ways felt a bit uncomfortable when cognitive therapists tell
patients that their beliefs are distorted or irrational. We can-
not help but wonder whether at least some patients are dis-
turbed (e.g., hurt, shamed, insulted) by such comments from
their therapist. Such patients may voice agreement with the
therapist's beliefs during the session to avoid being called
inaccurate or irrational but still subscribe to their original
distress-producing cognitions in private. Little therapeutic
progress would be made. The lay epistemic focus on content
rather than veridicality or rationality avoids this problem.
Second, the lay epistemic focus on content may also be
more likely to lead patients to change their problematic en-
vironments, rather than just think more "accurately" or "ra-
tionally" about them, and thereby be more empowering than
standard cognitive therapy. For example, a woman who is
told repeatedly by her abusive husband that she is worthless
may come to believe this and, in turn, develop depressive
symptoms. A standard cognitive therapist might use the
method of collaborative empiricism to help the woman test
whether her cognition of worthlessness is accurate. This ther-
apist might also emphasize to the patient that it doesn't fol-
low logically that you are worthless just because someone
important to you says you are. Although such therapy might
modify the woman's belief and, in turn, lessen her depressive
symptoms, it nonetheless leaves her in a depressogenic en-
vironment in which she probably will have to work exceed-
ingly hard to avoid becoming depressed again.
The lay epistemic therapist, on the other hand, may
achieve more far-reaching therapeutic success with the wom-
an. For example, this therapist may work with the woman to
help her leave (or change) the abusive relationship. This
therapeutic move would be based on the epistemic idea that
removing " the woman from the source of the worthlessness
cognitions (or stopping the source) may make these distress-
producing - cognitions
- less accessible to her. Thus, whereas
conventional cognitive therapy did little to change a bad
situation, lay epistemic therapy led to environmental change
which is likely to make it easier for the patient to think more
positively about herself and avoid depression. We suspect
that if the lay epistemic therapist additionally incorporated
the two standard cognitive-therapy techniques already de-
scribed (but conceptualized them differently), therapy would
be most beneficial to the woman. Thus, more so than tradi-
tional cognitive therapy, the lay epistemic reconstruction
promotes a merger between environmental (Coyne, 1976)
and cognitive approaches to emotional disorder.
The inclusion of motivational constructs in cognitive ther-
apy is sorely needed. As Kruglanski has shown, they greatly
increase the therapeutic arsenal. In addition, they allow cog-
nitive therapy to benefit from recent work in social cognition
underscoring the need for integration of cognition and moti-
vation in understanding people's inferences.
We agree with Kruglanski that the lay epistemic analysis
provides an alternative account of what cognitive therapists
actually do in therapy as well as suggesting new therapeutic
methods. Kruglanski's analysis points to the importance of
examining the process by which cognitive therapy works, as
well as evaluating its outcome.
Although we generally find the lay epistemic reconstruc-
tion of cognitive theory and therapy compelling, we note two
problems. First, we are not convinced that Kruglanski's as-
sertion that veridicality of beliefs is uncorrelated with the
emotional distress they produce can be derived strictly from
 200 COMMENTARIES
the theory of lay epistemology. Insofar as social criteria for
accuracy may shift over time, Kruglanski is correct in infer-
ring that the same distress-producing idea could be pro-
claimed as veridical at one time and as nonveridical at an-
other time. However, this does not imply that there is no
relationship between the "objective reality" of beliefs and
their affective consequences. (Our understanding is that
Kruglanski believes there is an objective reality but that we
never can be certain of our knowledge of it.) Thus, although
there may indeed be no correlation between veridicality (i.e.,
objective reality) of beliefs and distress, this is not a strict
deduction from Kruglanski's theory.
Similarly, we are not convinced that it follows from
Kruglanski's theory that no particular group of people gener-
ally will be more accurate than another. Certainly, this con-
clusion does not follow from the Dykman et al. (1989) study
cited by Kruglanski. As Dykman et al. pointed out, the find-
Downloaded by [Temple University Libraries] at 09:43 30 March 2016
ing that both depressives and nondepressives were accurate
(and inaccurate) in some laboratory situations does not imply
that both groups are necessarily equally accurate over the
course of their everyday lives. Dykman et al., in fact, al-
lowed for the possibility that one group could be more accu-
rate than the other over the long run and provided mecha-
nisms for such an occurrence. For example, members of the
more accurate group may routinely have a better match be-
tween the content of their cognitive schemata and the infor-
mation in their everyday environments. Alternatively, vari-
ous information processing strategies and/or motivational
factors may give one group a processing advantage over the
other. Of course, Kruglanski's analysis implies that even if
one group were more accurate than the other, we never could
know for certain which group it was, because we never could
have certain knowledge of the true state of affairs in our
subjects' worlds.
In conclusion, we find Kruglanski's lay epistemic recon-
struction provocative and believe it has powerful and impor-
tant implications for the conceptualization and conduct of
cognitive therapy. We must confess, however, that even after
10 years of work on depressive realism and being generally
persuaded by Kruglanski's analysis, there is still something
Kruglanski's Lay Epistemic Theory: When Rules Describe but Do Not Regulate
Reuben M. Baron
University of Connecticul
Before examining its liabilities, let us begin by looking at
what lay epistemology theory accomplishes. First, and I re-
gard this as its major contribution, it weds cold cognition
conceptions derived from the rules of propositional logic, as
well as accessibility concepts in priming, to a hot cognition
perspective involving both general and specific needs for
attaining and avoiding closure. Moreover, the application of
this approach really does wonders in the attributional realm
by reframing Kelley's covariation and discounting concep-
tions while at the same time incorporating the gist of Jones
and Davis's (1965) hedonic relevance. Using lay epistemic
conceptions, Kruglanski is able to move away from the ster-
ile debate about the relative importance of motivational ver-
sus information processing models of attributional activity
by seeing them as part of one integrated epistemic process
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unsettling about the idea that being more accurate in our
personal and social judgments may not, on average, promote
our emotional well-being. By analogy to the physical world,
many would agree that greater visual acuity, on average,
probably increases our chances of survival (those who see
better are less likely to be eaten by saber-toothed tigers or hit
by cars). If accuracy in personal and social beliefs does not
promote emotional well-being, what does it promote? A
most unsettling, but perhaps not implausible, answer would
be that in many cases accuracy promotes hopelessness and
depression (see Alloy & Clements, 1990).
Note
Lyn Y. Abramson, Department of Psychology, University
of Wisconsin, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison,
WI 53706.
References
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1988). Depressive realism: Four the-
oretical perspectives. In L. B. Alloy (Ed.), Cognitive processes in
depression (pp. 223-265). New York: Guilford.
Alloy, L. B., & Clements, C. M. (1990). The illusion of control: Invul-
nerability to negative affect and depressive symptomsfollowing labo-
ratory and natural stressors. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive
therapy of depression. New York: Guilford.
Coyne, J. C. (1976). Toward an interactional description of depression.
Psychiatry, 39, 28-40.
Dykman, B. M., & Abramson, L. Y. (1990). Contributions of basic re-
search to the cognitive theories of depression. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 16, 42-57.
Dykman, B. M., Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Hartlage, S. (1989).
Processing of ambiguous feedback among depressed and nondepressed
college students: Schematic biases and their implicationsfor depressive
realism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5p, 431-445.
Ellis, A. (1980). Rational-emotive therapy and cognitive behavior thera-
py: Similarities and differences. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4 ,
325-340.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Jaffe, Y. (1988). Curing by knowing: The epistemic
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involving consistencies within and between causal hypoth-
eses in different content domains. Similarly, in the attitude-
change area, by using epistemic motivation principles
Kruglanski is able to break down rigid dichotomies between
central and peripheral routes to attitude change. For exam-
ple, he proposes that extensive processing of source charac-
teristics may occur if the source motivates a fear of invalidity.
Problems in the Epistemic Paradise
These and other reinterpretations are very impressive as an
intellectual tour de force (cf. Kruglanski's reinterpretation of
consistency theories, accuracy, and cognitive therapies); but
are they too impressive? Can lay epistemology ever be dis-
confirmed? If not, why not?