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W20757

GROCERMAX: THE ONLINE GROCER1

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Krishna Akalamkam and Varun Kannan wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish

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materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

Copyright © 2020, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-09-11

In 2016, the food and grocery category was one of the largest in India’s consumer market. Indians spent
over half of their monthly household income on food and grocery items.2 India was also one of the largest
grocery markets in the world. However, most of the Indian food and grocery market was captured by
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unorganized retailers working with traditional retail formats. Although online grocery was very small, it
was believed to have huge growth potential.3 To capture a slice of this lucrative market, GrocerMax, an
online grocery start-up, began operations in early 2015. From the beginning, the firm witnessed slow but
steady growth, and by the middle of 2016, the company was averaging about 350 orders per day (or more
than 10,000 orders per month). 4 While the average order value for most online grocery stores was between
₹3005 and ₹500, GrocerMax enjoyed an average order value of ₹1,450.6
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The fledgling company, however, was facing a number of challenges. First, the online grocery market was
extremely competitive, with almost 50 active start-ups in the market.7 Hence, it was critical to increase the
visibility of GrocerMax’s website. The company had yet to achieve profitability at the operational level; it
needed to increase the number of orders per month to more than 15,000 to become profitable. 8 Therefore,
it was important to increase both the number of site visits and of conversions. The firm, which operated in
Gurugram, a suburb near Delhi, was planning to increase its reach to a wider catchment area in Delhi and
to enter other cities such as Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and Pune by the end of 2017.9 What could GrocerMax’s
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management team do to draw more traffic to its site and gain more business?

INDIA’S FOOD AND GROCERY MARKET

India was the sixth-largest grocery market on the planet.10 According to The India Food Report 2016, the
food and grocery market in India was estimated to be worth US$455 billion11 and was projected to grow 15
per cent per year.12 The food and grocery segment also dominated the Indian retail market, accounting for
more than two-thirds of overall retail sales in 2014.13 It was projected that the food and grocery segment
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would continue to dominate the Indian retail market for the near future (see Exhibit 1).

The food and grocery category mainly consisted of food products, beverages, household products, personal
care products, and tobacco products. Food products, consisting of both packaged and unpackaged foods,
cornered the majority of the overall food and grocery market. Among food products, dry food grocery,
which consisted of cereals, grains, pulses, sugar, edible oils, and dried fruit, accounted for close to 35 per
cent of the total food market. The dry food category was followed by fresh produce, which mainly consisted

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of fruits and vegetables, with close to a 17 per cent share of the total food market.14 This was followed by

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milk and dairy foods, with 16 per cent; perishables, which included seafood, meat products, and poultry,
with close to 9 per cent; spices, with 6.5 per cent; beverages, with 8 per cent; and processed foods, such as
ketchup and biscuits, with another 9 per cent of the overall food market. 15

THE DOMINANCE OF UNORGANIZED RETAIL STORES

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Food and grocery retail in India could be divided into organized and unorganized sectors. The unorganized
sector, or traditional retail, included small, local convenience stores, street vendors, and handcart hawkers. 16
Most of the unorganized retailers were not registered and did not pay taxes. The organized sector, or modern
trade, consisted of hypermarkets, supermarkets, and retail chains, backed by corporate houses, convenience
stores, and specialty stores. The online retail of food and grocery was in a nascent stage. Although
supermarkets and hypermarkets accounted for more than 50 per cent of food sales globally, 17 unorganized

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retail dominated food and grocery sales in India. India had between 8 and 9 million food and grocery stores,
most of them in the unorganized sector.18 Reports indicated that only 2 per cent of food and grocery was
sold through organized retail in India.19 There were a number of reasons for this.

Convenience stores were conveniently located in neighbourhoods and were easy for buyers to reach. Many
local vendors developed relationships with customers over long periods of time and remained customers’
preferred choice. Store owners often even offered credit to regular customers.20
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Moreover, many consumers in India bought food items such as milk, fruits, and vegetables multiple times
per week. 21 Some consumers, particularly daily wage earners and those belonging to low-income groups,
purchased food items in small quantities on a daily basis.22 Neighbourhood convenience stores were best
suited to serve the needs of such consumers.23 Modern or organized retail was preferred by affluent
consumers who made bulk purchases on a monthly basis, but even these affluent consumers preferred local
convenience stores for top-ups and perishable products, as these stores offered greater convenience. 24 Many
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of these stores also delivered products to consumers’ homes without any additional charge.

In addition, modern or organized retail formats were predominantly located in metropolitan cities and large
urban areas.25 People from rural areas and smaller towns had no choice but to rely on local traditional stores.
High real estate costs, a poor supply chain, inadequate cold storage space, and infrastructural problems
acted as major constraints for the development of modern retail in India.26
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However, with rising income levels and a growing inclination toward branded products, a consumer
preference for organized retail was expected to increase. Moreover, young and educated urban consumers
were more inclined toward malls and modern retail than were their parents. It was, therefore, projected that
the share of organized retail in food and grocery could reach between 8 and 9 per cent by 2025.27

ONLINE GROCERY RETAILING IN INDIA

Technology had affected many businesses in India, and online grocery retailing was one of them. Grocery e-
tailing was one of the fastest-growing businesses in the country. India was the fourth-largest grocery e-tail
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market in the Asia-Pacific region, with sales of $135 million, standing just behind countries such as China,
Japan, and South Korea.28 Given India’s large population and rising technology adoption by consumers, this
sector promised huge growth potential. Some reports indicated that the e-grocery market registered a growth
rate of 44 per cent in 2016 alone.29 It was estimated that the Indian e-grocery market would reach $2.7 billion
by 2019.30 The promise of lucrative growth rates attracted a number of entrants to the market. According to
certain reports, as many as 74 start-ups had ventured into e-grocery retailing by August 2016.31

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E-GROCERY BUSINESS MODELS

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The Indian e-grocery market was still in a nascent stage, and a number of start-ups were experimenting with
different business models. Some start-ups operated only through mobile applications (apps) and did not have
dedicated websites. These models could be broadly classified as inventory, hyperlocal, and hybrid models.32

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Inventory-Based Model

The firms that followed this model owned and managed their own inventories. They procured goods directly
from suppliers, stored them in their own warehouses, and delivered products to customers using delivery
carriers. The main advantage of this model was that consumers could know the availability of products.
Firms could also facilitate multiple large orders with ease. This helped to reduce delivery and operational
costs, which led to higher margins. These firms also enjoyed higher-value orders compared to firms that

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followed other models.

This model, however, required large capital outlays initially, as companies needed to set up their own
warehouses and cold storage facilities. In addition, the absence of certain products in store inventory might
lead to the loss of customers and potential business. Innovative Retail Concepts Private Limited
(Bigbasket.com), a successful e-grocery firm, followed this model. 33
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Hyperlocal Model

The firms that followed this model did not own any inventory; after an order was placed, these companies
procured the items from neighbourhood convenience stores and delivered them to the customer. This model
was less capital intensive, as no inventory holding was required. Moreover, as these firms’ procurement of
products was demand driven, there was no wastage of unsold inventory.
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This model, however, was not suitable for delivering bulk or large orders, as it required procuring items
from multiple vendors and then repacking and delivering these items to customers. Companies that followed
this model mainly relied on smaller-value orders and suffered from the absence of economies of scale.
These firms also operated on wafer-thin margins, as they procured goods from neighbourhood grocers
instead of large suppliers. Their customers were also often inconvenienced, as these firms could check the
availability of the goods ordered only after an order was placed. Companies such as Grofers and
LocalBanya followed this model. 34
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Hybrid Model

The firms that followed this model used a combination of the above two models. This mixed model allowed
firms to maintain a smaller inventory than did those companies that followed the inventory model, helping
to reduce costs. However, firms that followed the hybrid model had to invest in both inventory and
personnel who could buy, curate, and deliver products to customers. GrocerMax followed this model. 35
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CHALLENGES OF GROCERY E-TAILING IN INDIA

In spite of its lucrative growth potential, the industry had its share of problems. In Indian households, much
of the grocery shopping was carried out by women. Many women, particularly those who belonged to low-
income households, were not technologically savvy and were averse to using mobile apps or e-commerce
sites for shopping.36 Moreover, many women had the habit of physically inspecting the quality and cleanliness
of grocery items such as grains and pulses at neighbourhood convenience stores before purchasing them. The

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same habit prevailed when purchasing perishable items such as fruits and vegetables.37 In addition, most

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women also enjoyed the act of shopping, which often included bargaining with vendors and talking with
friends.38 These consumer habits made it difficult for e-grocery firms to expand their footprints.

Perishable food items, such as fruits and meat products, were more difficult to retail online than were non-
perishable goods and durables. Selling groceries and perishable items required heavy investments to build

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high-end information technology infrastructure, an efficient supply chain, quality warehousing and storage
facilities, and an efficient delivery system. 39 The challenges associated with selling perishable food items
made many online grocers restrict themselves to selling pre-packaged foods and consumer goods. Along
with high investments, online grocers also had to deal with poor margins, as most food and grocery products
worked on single-digit margins.40

To attract customers, many e-commerce firms that sold electronic items, mobile phones, and apparel offered
free shipping, and customers started to expect free shipping for grocery items as well. To gain customers,

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many e-grocers started offering free shipping for orders as low as ₹500.41 However, the weight-to-value
ratio was much higher for grocery products, which made transportation of these products more expensive.
This put further pressure on the margins earned by e-grocers.

Another typical challenge in the Indian market was low credit card penetration and a consumer preference
for cash transactions. To overcome this difficulty, online retailers started offering cash on delivery (COD).
Some reports showed that 78 per cent of consumer payments in India were made in cash, whereas in
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countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, cash accounted for only 3.5 to 8 per cent of
all payments.42 In spite of government initiatives to promote digital payments, cash still ruled the Indian
market, and COD was still the most popular payment choice for many customers. This, however, led to
added costs for online retailers, as they had to pay courier companies to collect cash from customers and
then transfer it to the company. 43

Online grocers faced stiff competition from neighbourhood grocery stores that had developed long-term
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relationships with customers. Most of these local grocery stores took orders over the phone and delivered
products to customers’ homes, which substantially increased customer convenience. Most of these local grocers
took advantage of proximity to consumer homes and delivered products within an hour of order placement. In
metropolitan cities such as Mumbai, more than 40 per cent of grocery orders were placed over the telephone. 44
Most online grocers could not match the local grocers’ speed of delivery due to logistical challenges.45

Online grocers had to incur substantial costs in the way of incentives and discounts to change entrenched
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buying habits and attract customers. Reports indicated that most online grocery firms offered a 20 per cent
discount on first purchases, hoping to make profits on subsequent purchases from these customers. 46
However, discount-hungry customers shopped on multiple sites, looking for the best deals, without loyalty
to any particular seller.47 Many start-ups also spent heavily on other promotions and marketing activities to
attract customers. Bigbasket.com, for example, hired Shah Rukh Khan, a leading Bollywood actor, to
endorse its brand. The company claimed that it had signed a long-term contract with the actor and planned
to air television (TV) commercials to promote the brand.48

Selling food and grocery items online was a more complex process than was selling other products online in
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India, as food consumption patterns differed widely in different parts of the country. For example, rice was a
commonly used staple food in many parts of India; however, North Indian states mainly preferred a rice
variety called basmati rice, while South Indian states preferred other varieties, such as Sona Masuri rice in
Andhra Pradesh, Ponni rice in Tamil Nadu, and Palakkadan Matta rice in Kerala.49 Hence, creating economies
of scale at the national level was not feasible. Online grocers had to keep assortments and manage supplies

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according to the requirements of each region and, sometimes, each city.50 Warehousing and procurement also

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had to be managed at the city level to ensure faster deliveries and to minimize shipping costs.51

GROCERMAX

GrocerMax was founded by K. Radhakrishnan and Gaurav Juneja. A veteran in the retail industry,

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Radhakrishnan had held senior positions in grocery and retail businesses, such as Parry Agro Industries
Limited, 52 and had been the chief executive officer of Future Group’s Future Fresh Foods and Reliance
Retail Limited (Reliance Retail).53 Juneja, in contrast, came from a finance and consulting background.
After completing his Master of Business Administration degree in finance and strategy from the Indian
Institute of Management, Lucknow, he worked in various positions at Standard Chartered and Lehman
Brothers and as executive director at Bryan, Garnier & Co.54 He also had a short stint at Reliance Retail,
where he met Radhakrishnan. One day, in 2013, several years after leaving Reliance Retail, Juneja had a

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chance encounter with Radhakrishnan on a flight. 55 The old friends discussed many things, including the
retail industry. They realized that they were both passionate about the emerging online grocery market,
which promised great potential, and so they decided to join forces and create GrocerMax.56

GrocerMax was formally launched with a beta version in February 2015.57 The site offered 8,000 items across
categories such as staples, packaged foods, beverages, fruits and vegetables, dairy products, frozen items, non-
vegetarian items such as meat and poultry, family care, and home care.58 The company started its operations
as a pilot project in Gurugram, wanting to prove itself before expanding to other cities; it took the company
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about 18 months to establish itself in Gurugram and fine-tune its business model.59 GrocerMax chose to adopt
a hybrid model instead of the more popular hyperlocal model. It stocked only 10 per cent of items that were
sold as inventory and sourced other items from wholesalers as and when the orders were placed by
consumers.60 Fruits and vegetables were purchased from a large wholesale market in Delhi, which helped to
minimize wastage and to save costs. The company followed an asset-light model, which helped it to do the
same amount of business with a 5,000-square-foot warehouse that other e-commerce firms required 10,000-
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to 20,000-square-foot warehouses for; this model enabled the company to bring in monthly sales of more than
$200,000 with a stock of less than $30,000. If a consumer ordered products by noon, the items were delivered
between 5:00 PM and 10:00 PM on the same day, depending on the customer’s preference; orders placed after
noon were delivered the next day.61 For orders below ₹500, the company charged a nominal delivery fee of
₹50, and for orders over ₹500, the company did not levy any shipping charges.62

Similar to other online grocers, GrocerMax relied heavily on promotions and discounts to attract customers.
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For example, it offered ₹200 off a minimum first purchase of ₹1,000. It also offered a 10 per cent discount
for 12 months to its first 1,000 customers. Considerable discounts were also offered on a variety of products
and combination offers to gain and retain customers.

The hybrid model enabled the company to keep costs down and make decent margins, which was difficult
in the online grocery business. GrocerMax had a profit margin of more than 16 per cent (excluding
marketing expenses) on inventory-led products and of about 5 per cent on products sourced from
wholesalers, while on fruits and vegetables, the margins exceeded 30 per cent.63 It used a third-party fleet
for shipping and incurred ₹73 in shipping charges for each order delivered.64
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Apart from its e-commerce website, GrocerMax also developed mobile apps for both Android and iOS
operating systems to help buyers place orders with greater convenience. The mobile apps enabled buyers
to place orders, schedule delivery times, track the status of orders, and view their order history to budget
monthly expenses; the app also displayed the most frequently purchased products to help users track their
dietary habits and speed up the ordering process.65 GrocerMax also made good use of technology to improve
efficiency in its operations. It used enterprise resource planning software developed by the technology firm

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Prolitus Technologies Private Limited (Prolitus). Prolitus helped GrocerMax in developing a mobile-

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friendly e-commerce site as well as in just-in-time inventory management. 66 Mobile apps developed by
Prolitus aided GrocerMax in logistics and delivery and included such features as route plans and the ability
to track orders remotely. These mobile apps also enabled GrocerMax to obtain digital proof of delivery
through smartphones and to secure data storage in the cloud. 67

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GrocerMax used social media to reach out to customers. It ran promotional campaigns on Facebook, such
as offering 25 per cent off fruits and vegetables.68 It also tied up with mobile wallets such as Paytm and
MobiKwik, offering promotions such as 10 per cent cashback for shopping with Paytm and getting ₹150
off purchases over ₹1,000 when shopping with MobiKwik; such promotions were actively promoted on
GrocerMax’s Facebook page.69 GrocerMax also created Facebook posts to celebrate events such as
International Women’s Day and Maha Shivaratri (a popular festival in India). But despite these efforts,
GrocerMax only had 186 friends and 15 followers on Facebook.70

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The company also used Twitter to promote deals and offers such as “Grocermax Rs.1000/- Cashback on a
bill of Rs.1000/- + Extra 10% Off ”71 and “Get FREE 2KG ONION Fruits & Vegetables (Minimum Buy
₹399).”72 Some customers used Twitter to air their grievances.

COMPETITION

The online grocery market was highly fragmented and competitive. The market primarily consisted of three
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types of players. The first type included firms such as the Indian arm of Amazon.com Inc., Amazon India
(Amazon), and Flipkart Private Limited (Flipkart), which sold in multiple categories but showed strong
interest in grocery and household items because of this category’s huge potential. Amazon, for example,
started Amazon Pantry to push sales of grocery and household items through its online marketplace.
Through this service, customers could fill a shopping box with goods up to 15 kilograms in weight and
have the box delivered to their home the following day for a nominal shipping fee of ₹20.73 Amazon offered
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close to two million fast-moving consumer goods products on its marketplace. 74 Amazon also offered
another service called Amazon Now, through which it promised the delivery of grocery items within two
hours. Amazon handled the delivery itself but tied up with local vendors and third-party stores for sourcing
products.75 Amazon—whose largest active customer base, after the United States, was in India—had
committed to invest more than $5 billion in its Indian arm.76

In 2015, Flipkart experimented with grocery delivery in Bengaluru through its Nearby app, promising to
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deliver fruits, vegetables, and groceries within an hour of the customer placing the order. The company,
however, decided to close its app within five months of its launch due to poor margins and low customer
demand. 77 Flipkart re-entered the grocery market by launching its Supermart app in 2017. Flipkart worked
on building a dedicated supply chain for grocery operations and planned to provide options such as open-
box delivery, which would enable customers to verify products before delivery.78

The second type of player consisted of offline organized grocery chains, such as Reliance Retail and
Nature’s Basket Limited (Nature’s Basket), owned by Godrej Group (Godrej), which began offering
products online as well. Reliance Retail started Reliance Smart to offer a variety of household items online,
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including fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products, and frozen foods. Reliance Smart offered four delivery
slots to customers, and buyers could choose which slot they preferred. It charged a nominal shipping fee of
₹25 for orders under ₹750. Shipping was free for orders over ₹750.79 Reliance Smart started its operations
in Mumbai, Pune, and Bengaluru and was planning a national rollout.80

Godrej was one of oldest and best-known business houses in India, with a history of more than 100 years.
Godrej started Nature’s Basket as a single store in Mumbai in 2005, expanded the operations to other major

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cities, and transformed Nature’s Basket into an omni-channel retail business with an online portal and

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mobile app. Nature’s Basket offered a variety of products, including fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy, and
bakery products. It also owned two private labels—L’Exclusif and Nature’s. It was estimated that these
private labels accounted for more than 15 per cent of Nature’s Basket’s sales.81 Like Reliance Retail,
Nature’s Basket also offered several delivery slots from which customers could choose. It charged a
shipping fee of ₹40, irrespective of the size of the order. Nature’s Basket also compensated customers for

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orders that could not be delivered or were delayed. 82

The third type of player consisted of pure play e-tailers, such as Bigbasket.com and Grofers, who focused
only on the grocery segment. Bigbasket.com was an early entrant to the online grocery business. The firm
was founded by V. S. Sudhakar, Hari Menon, Vipul Parekh, Abhinay Choudhari, and V. S. Ramesh in 2011.83
Bigbasket.com carried more than 1,000 brands and offered more than 18,000 products. Bigbasket.com did not
charge a shipping fee for orders over ₹1,000 but charged between ₹20 to ₹50 to ship smaller orders, depending
on the size of the order and the city to which it needed to be shipped.84 It also offered convenient time slots

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and same-day delivery for its entire product range. Through its BB Speciality Stores service, Bigbasket.com
delivered, within 90 minutes, a limited variety of products, such as cakes and bakery items, meat and fish,
sweets and savouries, and nuts and chocolates, from neighbourhood speciality stores.85 This service was
available only in select metro cities. With an average daily order volume of 50,000, Bigbasket.com was one
of the largest players in the online grocery market.86 Bigbasket.com also invested heavily in private labels and
drew a substantial chunk of its revenues from its own brands. It sold fruits, vegetables, fresh meat, and bread
under the Fresho brand, and staples under the BB Royal and BB Popular brands.87
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Grofers was one of the largest hyperlocal delivery firms in India that enabled customers to order grocery items
via a mobile app or web browser. Grofers was initially launched as a fleet management firm in 2014 by
Saurabh Kumar and Aibinder Dhinsa to help merchants deliver products ordered by their customers.88 The
founders later changed their business model to become a business-to-consumer mobile-commerce
marketplace. Customers could choose from more than 120,000 products from categories such as grocery,
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beverages, bakery items, fruits and vegetables, and personal and baby care products.89 Customers could
schedule deliveries for a time that was convenient for them. Grofers offered 20 per cent cashback on a
customer’s first order, subject to a maximum cashback of ₹250.90 Although Grofers did not prescribe a
minimum order value for free shipping, each partner store had its own minimum order value. Customers had
to pay nominal shipping charges if the order value was less than the minimum order value.91 Grofers had an
estimated average of 25,000 orders per day, and its 2017 annual revenue was expected to reach $145 million. 92
GrocerMax also faced competition from other online grocery start-ups, such as ZopNow and AaramShop.
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Most of these online grocers were also very active on social media platforms. For example, in addition to
offering deals and discounts, Bigbasket.com and Grofers ran online contests on Facebook that attracted
young adults. One contest ran by Grofers tried to connect cricket (by far the most popular sport in India)
with food: “Choose your favourite products and add their prices to come up with a score that you think
India will make against Sri Lanka. #INDvSL #CT17.”93 Grofers also offered recipe tips on Facebook, such
as, “Give the traditional spinach soup a desi twist by tempering it with these quintessentially Indian spices.
Serve with chaat masala and cottage cheese croutons. #SuperMrsKiSuperRecipe. Go here to get the
ingredients you need: bit.ly/ShopWithGrofers.”94
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Bigbasket.com ran contests connected to cooking and recipes, such as, “Here’s your time to shine! Just get
India Gate Foods’s Quinoa and start cooking! :) Submit your lip-smacking recipes.”95 Bigbasket.com also ran
contests connected to Indian festivals. One such contest was, “It’s Holi96 and it’s #CONTEST time! Send us
your video, dancing to your favorite Holi song or tune, [and] stand a chance to win exciting gift vouchers!”97

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In addition, Bigbasket.com ran successful campaigns on YouTube to encourage people to buy groceries from

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its website and using its mobile app. The YouTube videos focused on problems that people encountered while
shopping for groceries, and Bigbasket.com was shown as an easier option.98 The idea behind the campaigns
was to show that, irrespective of the constraints people had, good-quality grocery products could be quickly
bought online on Bigbasket.com.99 Some of these videos received more than one million views.100

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THE WAY AHEAD

Although it had huge potential, the online grocery business was tough and competitive. The shutdown of
e-grocers such as PepperTap, LocalBanya, and many similar start-ups clearly indicated the challenges
involved in the e-grocery business.101 The Indian market also witnessed a number of mergers and
acquisitions in the e-commerce space, as some of the struggling companies preferred to be acquired rather
than shut down completely. In 2016 alone, 18 deals worth a total of $2.2 billion were announced. 102

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As a new company, GrocerMax’s familiarity and awareness among consumers would be lower than that of
more established competitors. While GrocerMax averaged about 350 orders per day, its rivals
Bigbasket.com and Grofers, which had a presence in multiple locations, averaged 50,000 and 25,000 orders
per day, respectively. Grofers managed to deliver a daily average of 3,000 orders in Delhi alone. 103
GrocerMax needed to attract more traffic to its website and to gain sales using its limited resources. Many
grocery start-ups, such as Bigbasket.com and Grofers, used traditional media, such as TV and print, as well
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as online channels to increase their visibility and promote themselves. Bigbasket.com, a key competitor to
GrocerMax, launched TV commercials featuring Shah Rukh Khan, one of the most popular film actors in
India.104 However, a fledgling company like GrocerMax could likely not afford to advertise through
traditional media, particularly print and TV, because of the higher costs associated with these media. Digital
media, however, could provide a cheaper option. But although GrocerMax had some presence on Facebook,
it needed further work in this area to ensure the best use of online media.
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The online grocery industry operated on extremely thin margins, which put the sustainability of many start-
ups at risk. To overcome this challenge, some players launched their own private label brands. It was
reported that private labels could help retailers garner 25 to 30 per cent higher gross margins compared to
the gross margins gleaned from manufactured and national brands.105 Private labels could also help retailers
in offering differentiated products and in building customer loyalty.106 Some online grocers, such as
Bigbasket.com, had already chosen to invest heavily in private labels.107 However, gaining consumer trust
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for a start-up’s private label brands could be very challenging.

As part of its expansion strategy, GrocerMax could focus on the main metro markets for the following two
to three years; each of these cities had the potential to become a profitable market, and, put together, they
could help the company bring in close to $145 million in sales. After stabilizing the business in these
markets, the company could foray into Tier 2 cities. 108 In order to cover operating expenses, the company
had already raised $2.5 million in venture capital.109 However, more funding would be required to compete
and survive in the market. To fuel its expansion plans, GrocerMax was planning to raise another $10 million
from private equity funds and strategic investors.110
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How could GrocerMax increase its reach? What promotional activities and marketing strategies could
GrocerMax’s management team adopt to drive more traffic to GrocerMax’s website and increase sales
while keeping costs under control?

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EXHIBIT 1: INDIAN RETAIL INDUSTRY (%)

os
69 66.3

rP
8 8.7 8

yo
6 6 5.2 3.6 6 5.4
2 2.7 2 1 1.2

Food and Apparel Jewellery Consumer Pharmacy Furniture and Footwear Other
Grocery Durables and Furnishing
Information
Technology
2014 2020 (Estimated)
op
Source: India Brand Equity Foundation, Retail, 16, January 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, www.ibef.org/download/Retail-
January-2016.pdf.
tC
No
Do

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ENDNOTES

os
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of GrocerMax or any of its employees.
2
“Why India’s Online Grocery Battle Is Heating Up,” Knowledge@Wharton, April 26, 2018, accessed January 9, 2019,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/indias-online-grocery-battle-heating/.
3
Nakkyun Chong, “How Indian grocery business is becoming big?,” IndianRetailer.com, July 11, 2018 accessed September 2,
2020, www.indianretailer.com/article/sector-watch/food-and-grocery/How-Indian-grocery-business-is-becoming-big.a6147/.

rP
4
Jai Vardhan, “How GrocerMax Figures Out the Right Unit Economics in Online Grocery Retailing,” YourStory, September
10, 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, https://yourstory.com/2016/09/grocermax/.
5
₹ = INR = Indian rupee; US$1 = ₹67.2282 on July 1, 2016; All currency amounts are in INR unless otherwise specified.
6
Arti Singh, “How GrocerMax Is Doing Things Differently in India’s E-grocery Space,” TechCircle, May 6, 2016, accessed
January 9, 2019, www.techcircle.in/2016/05/06/how-grocermax-is-doing-things-differently-in-indias-e-grocery-space.
7
Meha Agarwal, “The Secret behind Cracking the Indian Online Grocery Segment – Why It’s Not Enough to Bring the Bazaar
to the Door,” Inc42, August 5, 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, https://inc42.com/datalab/online-india-grocery-market/.
8
Vardhan, op. cit.
9
Charu Lamba, “GrocerMax to Expand Services to Five New Cities in Next Three Years,” Indiaretailing.com, April 25, 2017,

yo
accessed January 11, 2019, www.indiaretailing.com/2017/04/25/food/food-grocery/grocermax-expand-services-five-new-
cities-next-three-years/.
10
Amy Kazmin, “India’s Fledgling Online Grocery Sector Faces Shake-Up,” Financial Times, April 11, 2016,
www.ft.com/content/d415261a-fbf2-11e5-a31a-7930bacb3f5f.
11
All dollar amounts are in US dollars.
12
Indiaretailing Bureau, “7 Categories Driving Growth of Indian Food & Grocery Retail Market,” Indiaretailing.com, June 13,
2016, accessed February 17, 2017, www.indiaretailing.com/2016/06/13/india-food-forum-food-grocery/7-categories-driving-
growth-of-indian-food-grocery-retail-market/.
13
India Brand Equity Foundation, Retail, January 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, www.ibef.org/download/Retail-
op
January-2016.pdf.
14
Indiaretailing Bureau, op. cit.
15
Ibid.
16
Deloitte, Competitiveness: Catching the Next Wave, November 2014, accessed December 2, 2019,
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-india-competitiveness-report.pdf.
17
Baqar Iftikhar Naqvi, Avnish Malhotra, and Varun Chugh, India Food Report 2015, accessed March 1, 2017,
http://wazir.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Wazir_Food-Grocery-Retail.pdf.
18
Ibid.
19
tC

Ibid.
20
Nakkyun Chong, op. cit.
21
Sandeep Puri and Brij Mohan Taneja, “Food Retailing In India – The Way Forward,” Indiaretailing.com, February 13, 2018
accessed September 2, 2020, www.indiaretailing.com/2018/02/13/food/food-grocery/food-retailing-india-way-forward/
22
N Md Faiyaz Ahmed, “Rural Marketing Mix,” International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development
(IJTSRD), 1(5): 384-387.
23
Nikhilesh Dholakia, Ruby Roy Dholakia, and Atish Chattopadhyay, “India’s emerging retail systems: coexistence of tradition
and modernity,” Journal of Macromarketing, 32(3): 252-265.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
No

26
Anasua Chakraborty, Retail Industry, info.shine.com, accessed September 1, 2020,
http://info.shine.com/industry/retail/7.html.
27
Baqar Iftikhar Naqvi, Avnish Malhotra, and Varun Chugh, India Food Report 2015, accessed March 1, 2017,
http://wazir.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Wazir_Food-Grocery-Retail.pdf.
28
Shabori Das, “Indian Online Grocery Retailing Will Grow despite Challenges,” ETRetail.com, November 28, 2016,
accessed January 16, 2017, http://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/re-tales/indian-online-grocery-retailing-will-grow-
despite-challenges/1959.
29
Ibid.
30
“Online Grocery to Hit Rs 2.7 Mn by 2019; Why One Should Invest Here,” Indian Retailer, August 30, 2016, accessed
September 28, 2017, https://retail.franchiseindia.com/article/sector-watch/food-and-grocery/Online-grocery-to-hit-Rs-2-7-mn-
by-2019-why-one-should-invest-here.a5273/.
Do

31
Meha Agarwal, “The Secret behind Cracking the Indian Online Grocery Segment – Why It’s Not Enough to Bring the Bazaar
to the Door,” Inc42, August 5, 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, accessed February 17, 2017,
https://inc42.com/datalab/online-india-grocery-market/.
32
Das, op. cit.; Kishore Ganji, “Online Grocery Business in India- Which Model Will Succeed?,” Iamwire, May 28, 2016, accessed
September 29, 2017, www.iamwire.com/2016/05/online-grocery-business-india-blending-convenience-swiftness/136812.
33
Abhinay Choudhari, “Shifting to inventory model was BigBasket’s click moment”, Livemint.com, July 26, 2018, accessed
September 2, 2019, www.livemint.com/Companies/rK9uCo2wJvspMwGLhhKa8M/Shifting-to-inventory-model-was-
BigBaskets-click-moment.html.

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34
A Junior VC, “Grofers’ Rise and Fall (And Rise Again)”, ajuniorvc.com, November 4, 2018, accessed September 3, 2020,
https://ajuniorvc.com/grofers-unicorn-bigbasket-
softbank/#:~:text=Grofers%20believed%20that%20the%20marketplace,nearby%20grocery%20store%2C%20and%20deliver;
Tejinder Pal Singh Oberoi, “Four Reasons Why Indian Hyperlocal Startups Failed,” Gadgets3600, September 16, 2016, accessed
September 3, 2020, https://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/opinion/four-reasons-why-indian-hyperlocal-startups-failed-1459404.
35
Jai Vardhan, “How GrocerMax Figures Out the Right Unit Economics in Online Grocery Retailing,” YourStory, September
10, 2016, accessed February 17, 2017, https://yourstory.com/2016/09/grocermax/.

rP
36
Rashika Daga, “Top 15 Challenges Faced by Online Grocery Startups in India,” The Hacker Street, July 25, 2016, accessed
August 5, 2017, https://in.thehackerstreet.com/challenges-online-grocery-startups/.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Rohin Dharmakumar, “ZopNow Takes a Crack at Online Grocery,” Forbes India, August 20, 2013, accessed September 30,
2017, www.forbesindia.com/article/big-bet/zopnow-takes-a-crack-at-online-grocery/35899/1.
41
Daga, op. cit.
42
Karan Kashyap, “India’s Fintech Startups Will Cause a Cashless ‘Payment Revolution’ by 2023,” Forbes, August 18, 2016,

yo
accessed September 4, 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/krnkashyap/2016/08/18/indias-fintech-startups-will-cause-a-cashless-
payment-revolution-by-2023/#303337642b42.
43
Morgan Hartley and Chris Walker, “The Growing Pains of Indian E-commerce: What You Need to Know,” Forbes, January
1, 2013, accessed March 19, 2016, www.forbes.com/sites/morganhartley/2013/01/24/the-growing-pains-of-indian-e-
commerce-what-you-need-to-know/#19f1c1ba126c.
44
Daga, op. cit.
45
Venkat Ananth, “Startups fight big global e-commerce firms to win online grocery battle,” The Economic Times, July 13,
2018, accessed September 3, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/startups-fight-big-
global-e-commerce-firms-to-win-online-grocery-battle/articleshow/64955391.cms?from=mdr.
46
Ibid.
op
47
Ravinder Singh, “Busting the discount myth on building brand loyalty,” ET Retail.com, March 13, 2019, Accessed September
3, 2020, https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/re-tales/busting-the-discount-myth-on-building-brand-loyalty/3471.
48
Varun Jain, “Online Grocery Store BigBasket Ropes in Shah Rukh Khan as Brand Ambassador,” Economic Times, August
31, 2015, accessed October 13, 2017, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/online-grocery-store-
bigbasket-ropes-in-shah-rukh-khan-as-brand-ambassador/articleshow/48737280.cms.
49
Ashwin Rajagopalan, “Types of Rice: 5 Popular Rice Varieties from the South Indian Kitchen,” NDTV FOOD, September
29, 2017, accessed January 11, 2019, https://food.ndtv.com/food-drinks/types-of-rice-5-popular-rice-varieties-from-the-south-
indian-kitchen-1638114.
tC

50
Daga, op. cit.
51
Harsimran Julka, “11 reasons why online grocery startups are failing in India’s small towns,” TECHINASIA, April 27, 2016,
accessed February 18, 2017, www.techinasia.com/11-reasons-online-grocery-startups-failing-indias-small-towns.
52
Vardhan, op. cit.
53
Singh, op. cit.
54
“Gaurav Juneja,” LinkedIn profile, accessed January 10, 2019, https://in.linkedin.com/in/junejagaurav.
55
Vardhan, op. cit.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
No

58
“Online Hypermarket in Delhi NCR – GrocerMax,” Rohit Dassani (blog), June 6, 2015, accessed January 11, 2019,
www.rohitdassani.com/2015/06/online-hypermarket-in-delhi-ncr-grocermax.html.
59
Lamba, op. cit.
60
Sagar Malviya and Chaitali Chakravarty, “Tata Group to Enter Online Grocery Business by Acquiring Gurgaon-Based
GrocerMax,” Economic Times, June 26, 2017, accessed January 11, 2019,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/tata-group-to-enter-online-grocery-business-by-acquiring-
gurgaon-based-grocermax/articleshow/59315251.cms.
61
Lamba, op. cit.
62
Brightlin, “GrocerMax,” customercare.gen.in, accessed January 1, 2019, www.customercare.gen.in/4006.html.
63
Singh, op. cit.
64
Lamba, op. cit.
Do

65
“Grocer Max – Online Grocery,” Brancosoft, accessed January 14, 2019, www.brancosoft.com/case-study-detail-online-
grocery.html.
66
Nidhi Chamria, “Acquisition of GrocerMax by Tata,” Prolitus, February 7, 2018, accessed January 14, 2019,
www.prolitus.com/blog/acquisition-grocermax-tata/.
67
Nidhi Chamria, “’LOGISTICS IN REAL-TIME’ – How a Mobile App Can Aid a Logistics Company?,” Prolitus, January 30,
2017, accessed January 14, 2019, www.prolitus.com/blog/logistics-real-time-mobile-app-can-aid-logistics-company/.
68
Grocer Max, “About Grocer Max,” Facebook profile page, accessed April 30, 2019,
www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010206603448.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.

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71
Shakydeals (@shakydeals), “Flat Rs.100/- off + Rs.1000/- Grocermax Cashback (Valid for ALL users!),” Twitter post, August
2, 2016, accessed May 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/search?q=Grocermax%20-%20Rs.1000%2F-%20Cashback&src=typd.
72
Couponhaat (@Couponhaat), “Get 2 Kg #Onion Free Grab: https://goo.gl/uVM6x5 #Grocermax #Couponhaat,” Twitter post,
June 14, 2016, accessed May 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/search?q=Grocermax%202%20kg%20onion&src=typd.
73
Writankar Mukherjee, “Amazon Starts Amazon Pantry to Push Sales of Grocery and Houselold [sic] Essentials,” Economic
Times, July 29, 2016, accessed April 26, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/amazon-starts-
amazon-pantry-to-push-sales-of-grocery-and-houselold-essentials/articleshow/53442628.cms.

rP
74
Ibid.
75
Reuters, “Amazon India Expects Groceries, Household Products to Account for 50% of Biz in 5 Years,” Brand Equity, April
23, 2018, accessed April 26, 2018, https://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internet/amazon-india-expects-
groceries-household-products-to-account-for-50-of-business-in-5-yrs/63875058.
76
Ibid.
77
Mihir Dalal, “Flipkart Shuts Grocery Delivery App Nearby,” LiveMint, February 26, 2016, accessed September 30, 2017,
www.livemint.com/Companies/HtDM8KSQDcIktzXurKAnTI/Flipkart-shuts-grocery-delivery-app-Nearby.html.
78
Varsha Bansal, “Flipkart Does a Soft Launch of Its Grocery Category under Supermart in Bengaluru,” Economic Times,
November 6, 2017, accessed April 26, 2018,

yo
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/flipkart-does-a-soft-launch-of-its-grocery-delivery-service-in-
bengaluru/articleshow/61524227.cms.
79
RelianceSMART.in (website), accessed April 26, 2018, www.reliancesmart.in/.
80
Writankar Mukherjee, “Mukesh Ambani's Reliance Retail takes fight to Flipkart, Amazon doorsteps,” The Economic Times,
July 13, 2018, accessed September 3, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/reliance-retail-
takes-fight-to-flipkart-amazon-doorsteps/articleshow/65191502.cms?from=mdr.
81
ET Bureau, “Private Labels to Power the E-commerce Cart,” Economic Times, December 31, 2017, accessed May 16, 2018,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/62310767.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_cam
paign=cppst.
82
“Frequently Asked Questions,” Nature’s Basket, accessed April 26, 2018, www.naturesbasket.co.in/HTML/FAQ.aspx.
op
83
Dipti Gore, “Everything You Wanted to Know about India’s Largest Online Supermarket – Bigbasket.com!,” TechStory.in,
June 14, 2017, accessed April 27, 2018, http://techstory.in/bigbaske/.
84
“FAQs,” Bigbasket.com, accessed April 27, 2018, www.bigbasket.com/faq/?nc=bt.
85
Ibid.
86
Radhika P. Nair, “Amazon India Starts Hyperlocal Grocery Deliveries from Own Stores,” YourStory, January 24, 2018,
accessed April 27, 2018, https://yourstory.com/2018/01/amazon-hyperlocal-grocery-stores/.
87
Nikita Garia, “Private Labels Pack a Punch for Online Food and Grocery Stores,” LiveMint, July 14, 2014, accessed May 16, 2018,
www.livemint.com/Industry/J139YQVFwoEjsEqJ5SpP9K/Private-labels-pack-a-punch-for-online-food-and-grocery-stor.html.
tC

88
Jubin Mehta, “Grofers’ More than $100 Million Valuation May Not Sound Crazy After All,” YourStory, June 8,2015, accessed
April 28, 2018, https://yourstory.com/2015/06/grofers-9-cities-growth/.
89
“FAQs,” Grofers, accessed April 28, 2018, https://grofers.com/faq.
90
“About Us,” Grofers, accessed April 28, 2018, https://grofers.com/aboutus.
91
“FAQs,” Grofers, op. cit.
92
Sharmila Das, “Grofers Rakes in Rs 1000 Crore Annual Revenue in 2017,” ETRetail.com, December 27, 2017, accessed
April 28, 2018, https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/food-entertainment/grocery/grofers-rakes-in-rs-1000-crore-
annual-revenue-in-2017/62193693.
93
Grofers, “Choose your favourite products and add their prices to come up with a score that you think India will make against
No

Sri Lanka,” Facebook post, accessed May 2, 2019,

www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=grofers%20india%20srilanka%20ct17&epa=SEARCH_BOX.
94
Grofers, “Give the traditional spinach soup a desi twist by tempering it with these quintessentially Indian spices. Serve with
chaat masala and cottage cheese croutons,” Facebook post, accessed May 2, 2019,
www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=give%20the%20traditional%20spinach%20soup%20desi%20twist&epa=SEARCH_BOX.
95
Bigbasket, “Got an amazing Quinoa recipe? Here’s your time to shine! Just get India Gate Foods’s Quinoa and start cooking!
:) Submit your lip-smacking recipes here,” Facebook post, accessed May 9, 2019,
www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=bigbasket%20india%20gate&epa=SEARCH_BOX.
96
Holi was a popular festival, particularly in North India.
97
Bigbasket, “It’s Holi and it’s #CONTEST time! Send us your video, dancing to your favorite Holi song or tune, stand a chance
to win exciting gift vouchers! :),” Facebook post, accessed May 9, 2019, http://go.ivey.ca/5zyD.
Do

98
“Bigbasket.com Revisits Everyday Grocery Shopping Hassles in New Campaign,” FishSenseDQ, December 18, 2017,
accessed May 10, 2019, www.fishsensedq.com/bigbasket-com-revisits-everyday-grocery-shopping-hassles-in-new-campaign/.
99
Ibid.
100
“bigbasket - Grocery Shopping Vs. Basket Ball Time,” YouTube video, 0:20, posted by “Bigbasket. com [sic],” December
6, 2017, accessed May 10, 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjjzupzC7es.
101
Shilpa S. Ranipeta, “Hundreds of Online Grocery Startups Shut Shop since 2015, Why Are Unicorns Now Betting Big?,”
The News Minute, November 11, 2017, accessed January 14, 2019, www.thenewsminute.com/article/hundreds-online-
grocery-startups-shut-shop-2015-why-are-unicorns-now-betting-big-71477.
102
India.com Business Desk, “E-commerce Market Saw Merger and Acquisition Deals Worth $2.1 Billion in 2017. Flipkart and
Walmart Could Be the Largest Deal Ever,” India.com, May 17, 2018, accessed September 2, 2019, www.india.com/business/e-

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commerce-market-saw-merger-and-acquisition-deals-worth-2-1-billion-in-2017-flipkart-and-walmart-could-be-the-largest-deal-ever-
3038895/#targetText=Flipkart%20and%20Amazon%20are%20the,invest%20%24%205%20billion%20in%20India.
103
Taslima Khan, Goutam Das, and Nevin John, “The Perishable Business,” Business Today, January 31, 2016, accessed April 30,
2019, www.businesstoday.in/magazine/cover-story/online-grocery-is-hot-hundreds-of-players-have-jumped-in/story/227960.html.
104
“Shah Rukh Khan is a bigbasketeer. Are you?,” You Tube video, 0:45, posted by “Bigbasket. com [sic],” September 8,
2015, accessed September 16, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mXHDISW3kg.
105
Nirmalya Kumar and Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp, Private Label Strategy: How to Meet the Store Brand Challenge

rP
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2007).
106
Ibid.
107
Nikita Garia, op. cit.
108
Vardhan, op. cit.
109
Ibid.
110
Singh, op. cit.

yo
op
tC
No
Do

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617.783.7860