Review

Author(s): Bernard Gilland

Review by: Bernard Gilland
Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 571-576
Published by: Population Council
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972837
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 BOOK REVIEWS

HERMAN E. DALY AND JOHN B. COBB, JR.

For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community,

the Environment, and a Sustainable Future

Bostoin: Beacon Press, 1989. viii + 482 p. $24.95.

Written by Herman Daly, an economist, and John Cobb, a philosopher-theologian,

this book comprises a critique of neoclassical economics and a set of policy rec-

ommendations for the United States in the fields of international trade, population,

land use, agriculture, industry, labor, taxation, and defense. A review of such a book

in this journal must be selective.

Two of the authors' principal positions concern population and resource coI1-

sumption. They hold that world population growth should be reduced to zero as

soon as possible. Now, it is obvious that population growth must cease sooner or

later; disagreement arises only on when and how it will cease. The most widely held

view is that fertility will reach replacement level in all major regions within the

next 50 years, resulting in a stable population of approximately 12 billion early in

the twenty-second century. Ecologists fear that population will exceed carrying ca-

pacity sometime in the twenty-first.century and that the population peak will be

followed by a decline. The ecologists' scenario is the more plausible, but we must

hope for the best.

Daly and Cobb maintain that the high levels of resource consumption by the

industrial countries are not sustainable. But in the long run, nothing is sustainable.

It is very likely that affluent inidustrial society is a brief historical interlude made

possible by a mineralogical bonanza (as economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegeni has

put it), but this does not constitute a ground for dismantling it. Why should we not

continue the burst of production and consumption as long as we can? The authors

would presuinably reply that excessive reliance on fossil fuels will result in an eco-

nomic collapse as reserves approach depletion; there will simply not be enough time

to replace fossil fuels with other forms of energy. In this they would be justified,

although they fail to appreciate the dynamic nature of reserves. It is generally agreed

that nonfossil energy sources should be rapidly developed. The irony is that ecologists

oppose the development of the two sources that have the highest potentials-nuclear

reactors and large hydroelectric installations. They cannot accept that there is a price

to be paid for everything, and pin their hopes on energy technologies incapable of

covering more than a small fraction of demand.

The book operis by presenting several "wild facts," intended to shock the reader

out of complacency.

Wild fact no. 1: "There is a hole in the earth's protective shield of ozone. More

ultraviolet radiation now reaches the earth and will predictably increase skin cancer,

retard crop growth, and impair the human immune system" (p. 1). The facts are

much more complex than this statenienit suggests. There is n0o "hole" in the strat-

ospheric ozone layer, only a seasonally fluctuating attenuation over Antarctica. There

is evidence, however, that depletion of the ozorne layer at temperate latitudes (30?-

60?) has begun.

POPULATION ANI) D)EVELOPIMENT REVIEW 16, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1990) 571

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 572 BOOK REVIEWS

It is true that increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation of certain wavelengths

(280-320 nmn: UV-B) will have harmful effects on humans and plants. But it will

also have beneficial effects: UV-B destroys bacteria, viruses, and parasites, and ac-

tivates the subcutaneous synthesis of vitamin D3. Failure to note this illustrates the

common tendency to ignore the beneficial effects and stress the harmful effects of

man-induced environmental changes. Nevertheless, in this instance, one cannot deny

that the harmful effects may outweigh the beneficial. It should be noted that the

annual average UV-B intensity at the Earth's surface (expressed as DNA damage

dose) varies greatly with latitude; neglecting cloud cover, the amount received at

the equator is about 25 times that received at the poles.

It is known that chlorine destroys ozone. It is suspected that the chlorine detected

in the stratosphere is a product of the dissociation of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),

although hydrochloric acid from volcanic eruptions is a possible source. The Montreal

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted in 1987, obliged the

signatories to reduce CFC production to 50 percent of the 1986 level by 1998. The

Protocol was made more stringent in June 1990, when it was agreed to phase out

CFCs completely by the year 2000. These substances will be replaced by HCFCs and

HFCs; the former release much less reactive chlorine than CFCs and the latter contain

no chlorine. Both, however-like CFCs-contribute to the greenhouse effect. As

might be expected, certain environmentalists are calling for a time limit on the

production of HCFCs and HFCs.

Wild fact no. 2: "There is evidence that the C02-induced greenhouse effect has

already caused perceptible warming of the globe. As recently as 1983, noticeable

change was not expected for another 50 years. Now the warming is being connected

by careful students to the 1988 drought in the Midwest" (p. 1). When is warming

"perceptible"? When does change become "noticeable"? And why should "careful

students" conclude that the 1988 Midwest drought was caused by the greenhouse

effect when the more severe drought of the mid-1930s obviously was not? The

summer of 1987 was practically as warm as that of 1988, yet there was no drought;

one cannot therefore infer that the 1988 drought was caused by the heat-or by the

greenhouse effect.

Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion and deforestatioll currently

account for about half of the greenhouse effect; other emissions-chiefly methane

and CFCs, and, to a lesser extent, nitrous oxide and tropospheric ozone-account

for the rest. The effect itself is still problematic. The computer simulations of climatic

conditions on which predictions of rises in mean global temperature and sea level

are based are simplifications; all numerical predictions are therefore subject to a wide

margini of error. No matter what the magnitudes of the effects may prove to be, the

replacement of fossil fuels by other energy sources cannot be carried out in less than

a century, and may well take much longer. Even the prevention of further increase

in the annual emission of fossil carbon dioxide would require enormous investments

on the order of one hundred billion dollars per year. Unlike the possible effects of

ozone depletion, possible greenhouse effects cannot be fully insured against-the

premium is much too high.

The authors approvingly cite a passage from a 1979 publication, in which it is

alleged that a nuclear power plant will cause 100 to 800 deaths as a result of radiation

emissions during its service life (p. 153). The allegation is false. The international

Commission on Radiological Protection has estimated that emissions from the 40

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BOOK REVIEWS 573

nuclear reactors operating in Great Britain may be causing a total of one or two

deaths per year.' Each reactor may thus cause one or two deaths as a result of 40

years of operation.

Daly and Cobb describe the development process in Third World countries in the

following terms: '. . . subsistence farming is replaced by commercial farming where

more fossil fuels can be used instead of so much human labor. The workers no longer

needed for agricultural production must move to cities in order to survive. There

they can be employed in factories built by income from agricultural products sold

abroad. The workers both in agriculture and in industry are now more productive,

so the national product rises. This is the fundamental pattern of 'development' " (p.

162). They point out that the process involves disruption of social relationships. No

doubt it does, but they present no credible alternative. Population growth has made

subsistence agriculture no longer viable in most countries of the Third World. Why

blame the development process and not the population growth that has made it the

only avenue of escape from poverty? It is true that the authors blame population

growth for many evils, but their aversion to international trade leads them into

awkward corners, such as their claim that "most countries could feed themselves if

they were not using their land for purposes of international trade" (p. 279). It is

also true that there are many countries where the development process has not

caught on, and which have suffered social disruption without achieving a rising

standard of living. It may not be possible for all agrarian countries to "take off" into

economic growth by investing capital generated by agricultural exports. We do not

know the preconditions necessary and sufficient to start the development process,

and many would doubt whether the preconditions could be specified at all. As Tibor

Mende once suggested, "To proffer any key set of detonators would be very much

like pretending to have an irrefutable answer to the question how to fall in love. "2

Daly and Cobb would like to see every nation become a community (Gemein-

schaft), characterized by Ferdinand Tonnies as "the natural grouping of people based

on kinship and neighborhood, shared culture and folkways" (p. 169). They are

aware that Gemeinschaft is historically associated with cultural, ethnic, and religious

homogeneity, but see no contradiction in the concept of a heterogeneous national

community. They continue: "There can be no effective national economy if a people

cannot feed themselves and otherwise meet their essential needs. Hence a national

economy for community will be a relatively self-sufficient econorny. This does not

preclude trade, but it does preclude dependence on trade . . ." (p. 173). They offer

no criterion by which to distinguish between trade and dependence on trade. Japan,

South Korea, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are dependent on external trade, if

any countries are. Are they thereby precluded from being "effective national econ-

omies"?

The authors favor the breaking up of large countries into self-governinig regions.

Their enthusiasm for the economic and political decentralization of the United States

brings them close to advocating a return to the Articles of Confederation. However,

they stop short of confining the functions of the federal government to defense,

foreign policy, and the postal service; their distrust of the South moves them to

propose that civil rights legislation remain the prerogative of Washington.

Only 15 pages are devoted to population issues, narrowly defined. The authors

are convinced that the scale of the economy in rich countries is ecologically unsus-

taimable. As scale is the product of population and per capita resource consumption,

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 574 BOOK REVIEWS

one or both of these factors must be reduced. In poor countries, increasing per capita

consumption is desirable but is unattainable on a sustainable basis as long as pop-

ulation is increasing; population stabilization is therefore necessary. Neoclassical

economics has nothing to say on the question of scale, concerned as it is solely with

optimal allocation of resources on any given scale. "There is no invisible hand leading

individuals motivated by self-interest toward the social good of an optimum scale"

(p. 241). Government intervention is therefore needed.

Optimum population is "notoriously difficult" to determine, but the authors argue

that we do not need to determine it at present. "Our first goal . . . should be to

stabilize at existing or nearby levels as soon as we reasonably can. Once we have

learned to be stable at some level, then we can worry about moving to the optimum

level.. . . Unless we are willing and able to be stable, there is no point in knowing

the optimum" (pp. 241-242). It is implied that all countries should aim at population

stabilization as soon as possible. The Duke of Edinburgh made this explicit in an

address: "It must be obvious by now that further population growth in any country

is undesirable."3 But is further population growth undesirable in countries that could

support much larger numbers, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, and New Zea-

land? It could be argued that as long as certain countries are grain importers, other

countries must be grain exporters, i.e., have a population smaller than their agri-

cultural resources can support. On the other hand, no country is under an obligation

to continue to export grain indefinitely.

Despite their assertion that estimates for optimum population are not yet nec-

essary, the authors attempt an estimate in a later chapter. They assume that the

optimum population of a given land area is its carrying capacity-the number of

people that the area could support on a sustainable basis at an acceptable standard.

"Sustainable," in the authors' view, implies that all energy is obtained from renewable

sources; an "acceptable standard" is one that "permits a good life for all." The area

selected for evaluation is the Chaco, the region of Paraguay west of the Rio Paraguay.

It is a sparsely populated, inhospitable territory of 247,000 sq. km. (the size of the

Federal Republic of Germany). The most successful colonists in the Chaco are the

Mennonites; they number 6,650 and farm 4,200 sq. km. If the Chaco were fully

colonized by farmers as competent and diligent as the Mennonites, it would have a

population of about 400,000. Even if this estimate were correct, it would not follow

that it is an indicator of the number of people that could or should inhabit the Chaco.

Carrying capacity is a concept that strictly applies only to a closed system, i.e., the

world. There is no reason why the inhabitants of a relatively small segment of the

world land area should live on the agricultural produce of that segment.

Daly and Cobb reject the simplistic idea that development is the best contraceptive;

it is simply not possible to provide sufficient consumer goods for the people of the

Third World to induce them to reduce their fertility to replacement level. They approve

of the Chinese policy of exerting a variety of pressures in favor of one-child families,

but prefer a policy that combines government intervention with market principles.

They advocate the transferable birth quota plan, first proposed by economist Kenneth

Boulding in 1964. In a country where the replacement fertility rate is 2.1, each

woman receives 21 deci-child certificates, 10 of which are required for a legitimate

birth; the certificates are freely transferable by sale or gift. One problem that would

arise in the implementation of such a scheme is that of deciding on penalties for

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BOOK REVIEWS 575

those who have children without sufficient certificates. The possibilities include ex

post facto acquisition of certificates on credit terms and forced surrender of the child

for adoption. Regardless of the penalty imposed, there would be illegitimate births;

if they resulted in fertility remaining above replacement level, the allocation of

certificates would have to be reduced, thereby raising their market price and increasing

the proportion of illegitimate births. The authors admit that there are countries which

lack the infrastructure needed to implement the plan, and that "more moderate"

steps will suffice in others. The United States is among the latter.

Given that fertility in the United States is below replacement level, the discussion

of US population focuses on immigration. "Population growth in the United States

is caused about equally by net immigration and the excess of births over deaths.

Stopping population growth requires changes in both areas. Immigration can further

be divided between legal and illegal. We favor continuing legal immigration close

to its present volume of 600,000, although a gradual reduction may be necessary.

But we also favor current efforts to gain control of our borders and to bring an end

to illegal immigration" (p. 247). Few would dispute that a generous quota for legal

immigration should be maintained in order to accommodate refugees. Bringing an

end to illegal immigration is another matter; it could call for erecting an electrified

fence and watchtowers along the entire border with Mexico as well as intensive

coastal surveillance. Such measures are unlikely to obtain majority support, partly

because of humanitarian sentiment, partly because illegal immigrants are a source

of cheap labor-and possibly to avoid strained relations with Mexico.

Daly and Cobb consider a transformation of US cropland to pasture desirable

since it would reduce the dependence of agriculture on fossil fuels and alleviate "the

enormous suffering now inflicted on livestock" (p. 282). They claim that a fall of

30 percent in the consumption of animal products in the United States-"a fairly

moderate shift in eating habits"-would allow "most of our cropland to be trans-

formed into pasture" (ibid.). The authors admit that their assumptions are "ex-

ceedingly crude," but this is putting it mildly. They assume, for example, that "animals

consume 80 percent of all the crops grown in the United States" (p. 281), when in

fact the percentage is little more than 50; they forget that 30 percent is exported.

An approximate but realistic calculation leads to a very different conclusion. The

arable area of the United States is 190 million hectares (Mha), of which 100 Mha

is harvested each year (all crops, excluding hay). Cereals and oilseeds fed to livestock

amount to 200 million metric tons grain equivalent (Mtge) per year.4 If the con-

sumption of each category of animal product fell by 30 percent, the reduction in

feed crop consumption would obviously be 60 Mtge. The authors assume that the

entire fall would be absorbed by pig and poultry products, in which case the reduction

would be approximately 90 Mtge. As the area on which the cropland feed is harvested

is 40 Mha, the reduction in cropland area would be less than 20 Mha, i.e., less than

one-fifth of the total. Conversion of most of US cropland to pasture is possible only

at the cost of a drastic fall in cereal and soybean exports (which currently require

30 Mha) as well as in consumption of animal products.

"The most fundamental problem in terms of sustainable economic welfare is the

decline in the quality of energy resources as measured by the ratio of energy output

to energy input. As a result of this entropic process, the discovery and extraction of

oil will soon take more energy than is made available, thereby bringing to a close

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 576 BOOK REVIEWS

the era of cheap energy" (p. 455). This may be true of American oil, but the bulk

of the world's oil reserves are located in the Middle East, where the output/input

ratio is very high, and there is no evidence that it has begun to decline. Earlier in

the book the authors are more precise on this point: "Sometime during the next 40

years the cost of oil will necessarily rise to the point where the present agricultural

system will collapse" (p. 273). This prediction would be alarming if there were any

reason to believe it. Proved recoverable reserves of crude petroleum, which have

never been higher, are now 137 billion metric tons.5 If consumption continues at

the present rate of 3 billion tons per year, there will still be a substantial reserve 40

years hence because of the discovery of new oilfields and the use of enhanced recovery

techniques. The ultimately recoverable amount will probably be at least double the

current reserves. The cost of oil in the year 2030 will be determined by several

interdependent factors-economic growth, the cost of other forms of energy, and

increased efficiency of energy use; no forecast can be better than a guess. It is extremely

unlikely, however, that the price of petroleum-based gasoline will exceed the pro-

duction cost of synthetic gasoline from coal, a resource far more abundant than

crude petroleum. Synthetic gasoline could be produced in the United States at a cost

of approximately $600 per metric ton. Agriculture did not collapse in any country

in 1980-8 1, when the price of gasoline on the Rotterdam market averaged $370 per

ton, or about $600 in 1990 dollars.

Nevertheless, the problem of energy supply in the long term is real. There is no

way of meeting demand in the twenty-first century unless fossil fuels, nuclear reactors,

and renewable energy sources each make a substantial contribution.6 If the risks

involved in increasing the use of fossil and nuclear energy are considered unac-

ceptable, the prospect for economic growth is bleak.

Espergaerde, Denmark BERNARD GILLAND

Notes

1 Peter Saunders, "Nuclear benefits and 4 US Department of Agriculture, Agricul-

risks," Atom 365 (1987): 20-21. tural Statistics 1988. Washington, D.C., 1988.

2 Tibor Mende, From Aid to Re-Coloniza- 5 British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review

tion: Lessons of a Failure. New York: Pantheon, of World Ener,gy 1990. London: BP, 1990.

1973.

6 Bernard Gilland, "Energy for the 21st

3 The Duke of Edinburgh, "People and century: An engineer's view," Enideavour 14,

nature," Rafael M. Salas Lecture, World Wide no. 2 (1990): 80-86.

Fund for Nature 1990; reprinted in PDR Vol.

16, no. 2, pp. 387-395.

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