PHILSAT Case (GR No. 230642, Sept.

10, 2019)

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.

7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances

As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series
of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by
requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform
law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT.10

The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and
language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.11 It was designed to
measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.12 Exempted from the
PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service eligibility
and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.13

On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No.
18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018
to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college
with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption
Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to
2020 under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.

Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-2019)
stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements
that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.

The Petitions

Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners Oscar B.
Pimentel (Pimentel)

ETC

Temporary Restraining Order

On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No.
18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year 2018
to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in college
with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption
Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to
2020 under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.

Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No. 27-2019)
stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the requirements
that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment for the academic year 2019 to 2020.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the
Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises
the Court's power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC
additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article VIII 39 of the
Constitution.

The Issues

After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined during
the oral arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and

B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Jurisdiction over legal education;

B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;

1. Reasonable supervision and regulation

2. Institutional academic freedom

3. Right to education

C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of
law; and

D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the
right to education.

1(a). Scope of Judicial Review

To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously alleged
that R.A. No. 7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of judicial
review, resort must necessarily be had to the pleadings filed.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the
admission and practice of law encroach upon the powers of the Court.83 It is their position that the
powers given to the LEB are directly related to the Court's powers.84 In particular, they argue that
the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education under Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662
falls within the authority of the Court.85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the LEB's
powers to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7(c) and
7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02 intrude into the
Court's rule-making power relative to the practice of law.86 They also argue that the PhiLSAT
violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.87 It is their contention that
the LEB is without power to impose sanctions.88 They also question the authority of the LEB
Chairperson and Members to act in a hold-over capacity.89

For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a reduced
number of law student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc. and
constrained said law school to admit only students who passed the PhiLSAT which is against their
policy of admitting students based on values.90 Their co-petitioners are students who either applied
for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or, were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.

The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching
upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and

2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and
minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal
education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive
supervision and control;

2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it
gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar; and

4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it
gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing
lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

 1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and
qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic
freedom on who to admit, particularly:

a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates
or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be
required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law
school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment
as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken
within two years before the start of studies for the basic law course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a

prerequisite for admission to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary
restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The
regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is
left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic
freedom; and

c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications
and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in
violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:

a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:

a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
1

provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to

be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are
void and of no legal force and effect.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

RULING

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer
of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
4

submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As
the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New
York, 291 U.S. 502).

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
7

does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
13

compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision
have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

 MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.