Petitioner TC-03

TEAM CODE: TC-03
V.M. SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION , 2022
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. _________ OF 2022

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF HINDUKUSH
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HINDUKUSH
IN THE MATTER OF –
ASIFA STATE OF VAIGA
(PETITIONER) V. (RESPONDENT)
CLUBBED WITH
THE PROGRESSIVE STUDENTS UNION STATE OF VAIGA
(PETITIONER) V. (RESPONDENT)
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF HINDUKUSH

MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATION…………………………………………………………….II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………….III-IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………...…………..…V
SUMMARY OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………VI
STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………………………….…………………...VII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………………………………VIII-IX
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………..1-14
1. Whether wearing of Hijab is an essential religious practice of Islam religion?……..1-4
2. Whether disallowing wearing of hijab within the college violates freedom of religion of
the Muslim girls?.......................................................................................................5-6
3. Whether uniform dress code violates the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Articles
14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution?.................................................................7-11
4. Whether the Government Order and the school circular violates secularism, which is a
basic structure of the Constitution?..........................................................................12
5. Whether the government order and the school circular violates the petitioner’s article
15 of the Constitution?.............................................................................................13-14
PRAYER…………………………………………………………………………………..X
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Anr Another
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
ERP Essential Religious Practise
GO Government Order
Hon. Honorouble
IC Indian Constitution
IPC Indian Penal Code
J. Justice
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCI Supreme Court Of India
Sec. Section
UOI Union Of India
V. Versus
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
S.NO CASES PAGE NO
1. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, 03

AIR 1984 SC 51.
2. Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat Stainislaus, 12

(1974) AIR (SC) 1389.
3. Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education, 2016 03
(2) KLT 601.
4. Antony v. Governing Body, 2002 (4) 739 (C). 06
5. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1. 09,14
6. Gullam Abbas v. State Of UP, (1981) AIR 2198 05
7. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 03

1.
8. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; AIR 1973 11

SC 1461.
9. KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, (‘Puttaswamy 07,09

1’).
10. Lt Col Nitisha and Ors v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261. 14
11. Madras v. Shrilakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt, 1954 03

AIR 282.
12. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 11

353 .
13. Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1969) 1 SCC 853. 11
14. Mohini Jain (n 171) [13], Unni Krishnan (n 147) [183]. 09
15. Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666. 09
16. Nalsa v. Union of India,[(2014) 5 SCC 438]. 10
17. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321. 07,13
18. Rev v. State of MP, 1977 SCR (2) 611. 12
19. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SCC (3) 1. 12
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]
20. Sardar Syedna Teher Saifuddin v. The State of Bombay, 1962 AIR 06
853.
21. Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M, (2018) 16 SCC 368 [84], 08
(Chandrachud J).
22. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC). 06
23. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India 11

(2012) 6 SCC 1.
24. Subramanian Swamy v. Director CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682. 14
25. Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 [149], 08

[171].
26. Valsamma Paul (Mrs) v. Cochin University (1996) 3 SCC 545. 11
STATUTES & RULES
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1950
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860
MADRAS HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ACT,

1951
SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013
BOOKS
3 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 2695 (4th ed. 2008)
5 D. D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 5579 (8th ed.

2009)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009)
V.N Shukla, The Constitution of India, 13th edition, EBC Books
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2013)
M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1415 (8th ed. 2018)
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution of Hindukush for
the violation of fundamental rights enumerated in part III of the Constitution. the respondent
maintains that no violation of rights has taken place. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Hindukush
has jurisdiction to hear the instant matter under Article 32 of the Constitution of Hindukush.
Article 32 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [SUMMARY OF FACTS]
SUMMARY OF FACTS
BACKGROUND OF NURA
The Hill district of Nura, in the state of Vaiga is known to be the epitome of culture, and
diversities, while known for its resident Arabic settlement comprising of around 100 families,
following their traditional style of dressing, practices, belief and cuisine, since 1920. Nura is
also known as the kaleidoscope of Hindukush.
INCIDENT IN THE HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL, NURA
A student committed suicide because of her poverty-stricken background, which her inferiority
and self -esteem affected her mental health during a Christmas program held at school
comparing other students with rich outfits.
CIRCULAR ISSUED
Committee of Maharaja’s Higher Secondary School – a prime government school in Nura –
issued a circular notifying that the students shall follow a uniform dress code. The circular
dated January 25, 2022 stated to wear the dress code consisting of a Uniformity among boys
(Navy Blue trousers and white shirt), girls(Navy Blue kurta, white salwar and waist coat) and
transgender students (either of them) within school premises. The objective of the circular
was to promote integrity , equality and public order.
BRIEF FACTS
The issuance of the said circular had a huge impact on the student community, regarding the
sudden imposition of uniforms on the students. The Muslim students who wore Hijab was
restricted and was not allowed resulting to a political unrest that nominated different opinions
from liberals as a clear-cut insinuation toward supressing a particular religious practice.
THE PETITIONERS
The petitioners in this case are Asifa and the Progressive Students Union, aggravated by the
hefty actions by the school, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court contending that the ‘hijab
ban’, denial of entry and removal of such dress code at schools which directly violates their
fundamental rights.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (RESPONDENTS)
The contention of the State Government was that they have not interfered with the freedom
of religion at all. The objective behind prescribing the dress code was to maintain equality
among the students and maintain dignity, decorum and discipline in the institution. The matter
has been clubbed by the Supreme Court and it has come up for the final hearing.
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [STATEMENT OF ISSUES]
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I
WHETHER WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE IN ISLAM RELIGION?
ISSUE II
WHETHER DISALLOWING WEARING OF HIJAB WITHIN THE COLLEGE VIOLATES FREEDOM

OF RELIGION OF THE MUSLIM GIRLS?
ISSUE III
WHETHER UNIFORM DRESS CODE VIOLATES THE PETITIONER ’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
UNDER ARTICLE 14,19(1)(A) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ORDER AND THE SCHOOL CIRCULAR VIOLATES SECULARISM ,
WHICH IS A BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE V
(ADDITIONAL ISSUE RAISED)
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ORDER AND THE SCHOOL CIRCULAR VIOLATES PETITIONER ’S
ARTICLE 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION ?
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE: I
WHETHER WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE IN ISLAM RELIGION?
The petitioner contends to the honourable court that wearing of hijab is an essential religious
practice in Islam religion as the verses in the Qur'an that particularly mention women's
clothes are those that promote modesty, ordering women to cover their private parts and pull
their scarves over their breast areas while they are in the company of males. The essentialism
of hijab in Islam religion is also supported by theology as well as judicial precedent on the
doctrine of essentialism.
ISSUE: II
WHETHER DISALLOWING WEARING OF HIJAB WITHIN THE COLLEGE VIOLATES

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OF THE MUSLIM GIRLS?
The petitioner contends to the honourable court that disallowing wearing of hijab within the
college violates the freedom of religion of the Muslim girls in the state of vaiga, district of Nura
as article 25 deals with the freedom of religion and that freedom of ‘practice’ means one’s right
to worship in private or public, restricted their freedom of religious practice that was stripped
and hindered by the state, whom was to protect such cause.
ISSUE: III
WHETHER UNIFORM DRESS CODE VIOLATES THE PETITIONER ’S FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 14,19(1)(A) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The petitioner contends to the honourable court that uniform dress code violates the petitioner’s
fundamental right under article 14,19(1)(A) and 21 of the Constitution of Hindukush as the
choices expressed in public regarding faith and modes of dress are a part of decisional
autonomy and protected by the fundamental right to privacy. The choice to wear a hijab in
public place is a facet of the right to privacy and wearing it is not an irreversible choice which
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
inhibits the continuance of an autonomous life. Therefore, banning of hijab in school is a

violation of dignity and arbitrary in nature.
ISSUE: IV
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ORDER AND THE SCHOOL CIRCULAR VIOLATES SECULARISM ,
WHICH IS A BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The petitioner contends to the honourable court that the Government order and the school
circular did violate the essence of secularism on religious constricts, by banning the girls
observing the practice of hijab in Islam which is one of the essential practices among Muslims
as showing reverence and submitting toward God almighty in all branches of spirituality in
relation with the judicial precedents. The secularism neither means anti God nor pro God, and
nobody shall be discriminated against based on religion held under Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s
College v. State of Gujarat Stainislaus, whilst the Government of Vaiga has failed its
fundamental duty to protect its citizens.
ISSUE: V
(ADDITIONAL ISSUE RAISED)
ARTICLE 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The petitioner contends to the honourable court that the GO violates the prohibition on direct
discrimination on grounds of religion, and on grounds of religion intersecting with sex under
Article 15 (1). The government order is not saved by article 15 (3) and is not otherwise
justified. Article 15(3) encapsulates the notion of ‘protective discrimination’. The
constitutional guarantee in Article 15(3) cannot be employed in a manner that entrenches
paternalistic notions of ‘protection’. indirect discrimination perpetrated by the GO, the state
has to show that the measure is necessary to meet educational objectives, and that it is not
possible to substitute the measure with less discriminatory alternatives. Since these elements
of justification are part of the structured proportionality analysis.
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MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE: I
WHETHER WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE IN

ISLAM RELIGION?
1. HISTORIC AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ISLAMIC BELIEFS REGARDING HIJAB IN THE STATE OF

VAIGA
(¶ 1.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon. court that hijab is an essential religious practise
in Islam religion. It has been beautifully cited in several Quranic scriptures. The truth within
the Hijab tradition and providing historical analysis among all Qur'anic verses is when God
revealed a covering that was a necessity to be worn by women among the consequences and
circumstances they were in because constant crimes against women were a commonality at the
time, and to protect them from sexual predators.
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HIJAB AND THE USE OF HEADCOVER
(¶ 2.) The verses in the Qur'an that particularly mention women's clothes are those that
promote modesty, ordering women to cover their private parts and pull their scarves over their
breast areas while they are in the company of males. The "verse of the hijab" dropped upon the
community around 627 CE, giving rise to the modern notion of the hijab. "And when you ask
[his women] for something, ask them from behind a barrier," the scripture says in Sura 33:531.
That is healthier for both your and their hearts. A partition is referred to as a hijab. It's a barrier
that separates one person from another. It is obligatory; even the Prophet's wives would wear
it. To maintain modesty and privacy, hair, face, and chest must be covered. Women who believe
in Allah must wear khimar and cover their chests. Only the head, hair, and chest should be
covered.
1 Abdel Haleem, M. A. S., translator, The Quran: English Translation and Parallel Arabic Text, Oxford UP,
(2010).
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3 . THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF HIJAB
(¶ 3.) Sunan Abu Dawud 32:40952, A narrative explaining and observing the manner in which
women should dress, as prescribed by Prophet Muhammad, and moreover, it denotes the
protection of women and other men from being psychologically afflicted by sexual cravings,
as the prophet of Islam indicated throughout his lifetime. The philosophy is rendered through
the usage of the hijab as a spiritual and pure garment, and as a test of whether personal
convictions restrict religious beliefs. Hijab is encouraged by the Islamic religion, and it is stated
in the Quran and Hadiths. Hijab, or head covering, is a notion that exists and has been practised
by Muslims in Islamic nations. This raises problems about not just essentialism, but also what
constitutes essentialism in the context of a cult.
4. ESSENTIALISM IN ISLAM AND ITS AMBIT UNDER ARTICLE 13
(¶ 4.) Essentialism itself a very philosophical concept to which, the question raises that
whether the Islamic culture to practice their religious faith by wearing hijab a mandatory one
or without hijab by the woman counterparts of the religion be a blank space for Islam? It can
be observed as an affirmative context because the essentialism or whether Islamic traditions
promote such values to which and how women should wear and more over its mentioned over
Quran and Hadiths to which by Islamic scholars and Muslims to consider it as quintessential
within religious norms and such practices were practiced and had a heavily religious context
for the women to wear such garments. Moreover, Islam is divided and subdued with different
practices and considerations while they believe one thing which is that “Allah is their God and
Muhammad is their prophet and Quran is the ultimate word of God which is not defiled and
corrupt but pure”
(¶ 5.) The Govt. of Vaiga, not only expressed the reasons for why it was not essential, and to
the reason why such hefty action against women wearing hijab in schools, especially there was
no parent act to which the state relied on making such order, or any precedents of earlier
interpretation as such. Therefore, the wearing of hijab by the women can be considered as a
valid custom and essential in nature because of the common practise to many and it is one of
the long and established practises considered as unwritten law which is repeated in nature. It is
also a tradition that has been passing from one generation to another which is habitual in nature
. While Hijab segments all fulfilments stating that it was a heritage long customary practice
2 AbuSa'id al-Khudri, M. A. S., translator ,Sunan Abu Dawud, 32.

from the dawn of Islam. While violating the essence of “Doctrine of Accommodation”, where
when a religious practice which is followed for ages, and which is indeed mentioned in Quran
and does exist within its texts, while emphasising on its particularity in Quran and Hadiths,
while it’s a God given revelation to the Prophet. The Quran is the most sacred object in the
daily lives of Muslims, and burning it would be considered an offense against God.
(¶ 6.) Islam teaches that the holy book is the direct word of God, received by the prophet
Muhammad through the angel Gabriel, and it defines the belief and conduct for followers of
the religion. The Quran is so important in the faith that Islamic teaching spells out how it should
be handled, including directing anyone who touches it to be in a state of purity. Muslims can
only burn or bury Qurans that have been damaged or corrupted to prevent God's word from
being defiled. And the practice of Hijab being worn is Indeed an essential practice in Islam.
Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. It is
upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the superstructure of a religion is built,
without which a religion will be no religion. Test to determine whether a part or practice is
essential to a religion is to find out whether the nature of the religion will be changed without
that part or practice.3 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala4 , That a practice
claimed to be essential to the religion has been carried on Since time immemorial or is grounded
in religious texts per se does not lend to it the Constitutional protection unless it passes the test
of essentiality as is adjudged by the Courts in their role as the guardians of the Constitution. In
the case of Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education5 it was not a case
of school uniform as part of Curricula as such. Students were taking All India Pre- Medical
Entrance Test, 2016 as a onetime affair and not on daily basis, unlike in schools. No Rule or
Regulation having force of law prescribing such a uniform was pressed into service. To define
the essential elements of religion, the SCI laid down the “essential element of religion”
doctrine. Before this, the supreme court had to define what exactly is religion, resolve the
appeals against the legislations which were labelled as controlling religious institutions, and
delimit the boundaries of religious institutions. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Songs
Endowments, Madras v. Shrilakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt6; A line was
drawn between what were matters concerning religion and what was not7. It was laid down
3
Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1984 SC 51.
4
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.
5
Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education, 2016 (2) KLT 601.
6
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Songs Endowments, Madras v. Shrilakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri
Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282.
7
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Songs Endowments, Madras v. Shrilakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri
Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282, 1954 SCR 1005.

those religious opinions and the acts done in pursuance of those opinions, are religious
practices.. These have to be protected to the extent that they are within the limits of Art. 25 and
26 of the Const. of Hindukush. Seventy years ago, the Supreme Court was called to define the
constitutional scope of religious freedom in a dispute over the extent to which the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 8could control the management
of the Shirur Mutt at Udupi. The apex court responded with the ERP doctrine that has been the
touchstone on which religious freedom has been judicially demarcated since. However, the
doctrine is vague with different courts expressing starkly opposed opinions on what it should
mean.
(¶ 7.) However, as the hijab has brought Vaiga in the district of Nura to a boil, the young
women at the centre of the dispute have a limited legal toolkit to defend their preference –
legally authorised Islamic doctrine. That is, the legal framework of essential religious practice
plucks at the diverse world of disposition and preference in which women adopt the hijab by
examining only whether the practice forms a part of Islamic legal doctrine. In turn, the
questions that are brought to bear on the dispute are whether the practice is demanded by the
Quran, the Hadith and so on. These are peripheral questions if one looks at religion as life
worlds that practitioners deem significant and which are almost never tied to the iron cage of
text and doctrine.
(¶ 8.) Art. 13 lays down the supremacy of the Const. , making it clear that in case of conflict
between fundamental rights and any other right, the former would prevail. It also gives clarity
on the validity of post-constitutional laws. Scrutinizing these concepts deeply, clause 3 of
art.13 comes into the realm. Laws in force are those laws that are passed by a legislative body
or any other competent authority. The uncodified personal laws do not fall within this domain.
Following this logic, the personal laws of any religion do not fall under “laws in force” as
provided under clause 3 of art. 13. Therefore, according to what is written in art. 13, we can
observe that personal law even if in contravention to the fundamental rights are not void, as
they do not fall under any clause of Art. 13.
8 Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.

ISSUE: II
WHETHER DISALLOWING WEARING OF HIJAB WITHIN THE COLLEGE VIOLATES

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OF THE MUSLIM GIRLS?
(¶ 9.) It’s Humbly submitted before the court that, the GO of Vaiga disallowed the Muslim
women to wear hijab and was withheld from school premises, whilst it was indeed promulgated
to such scenario that paved a way to a notice that violated art. 25 of the const., restricted their
freedom of religious practice that was stripped and hindered by the state, whom was to protect
such cause.
(¶ 10.) Art. 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience, the freedom to profess, practice and
propagate religion to all citizens. Whilst Art. 25 is not subject to general reasonable restrictions
like in Art. 19. The restrictions which can be imposed is mentioned in Art. 25 itself while
protects the integral parts of any religion on the basis looking up to the matter that emphasises
public order, morality, health. Thereby, the action of the government to state its vitality toward
a particular practice of religion was indeed an act of the aftermath of an unrest and distortion
of public order that juxtaposes to government’s action similar to HECKLERS VETO. A
former reaction to which the school and the public order was completely distorted because of
they wore Hijab and was restricted from the school premises, and to that there rendered series
of unrest that lead to the promulgation of the order which interpreted its religious sentimentality
that justified the ban of Hijab in the school. However, wearing a hijab, which is a sincere
practice of one’s religious practices, does not affect public order in any way. However,
assuming without admitting that the exercise of the right led to a disturbance of public order,
it wasn’t due to the student who chose to wear a hijab, but rather, due to unruly elements who
sought to illegally prevent the students from exercising their rights.
(¶ 11.) It was held Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P9, was a conflict between Sunni and Shia sects
of Islam, where Sunni’s intolerance to the customs which practiced by Shia community was
hindered by the executive magistrate to the fear of distortion of public unrest by the Sunni
community , to which the court stated that executive magistrate has no authority to supress
their freedom of expression and practice while the same held in Indibily Creative Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of W.B10, to which In Indibily Creative, the court was dealing with a petition under Art.
32 of the Const. by film makers who had produced a film and had revived the requisite
9 Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P, 1981 AIR 2198.

10
Indibily Creative Pvt. Ltd. v. State of W.B, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 564.

certification from the Central Board of Film Certification. Unless we were to read a positive
obligation on the State to create and maintain conditions in which the freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution can be exercised, there is a real danger that art and literature would become
victims of intolerance, while the court protected their rights and restored them to play the
movie.
2. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE EMPHASIS ON IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE 25
(¶ 12.) There is a specific injunction based on verse 31 of the Quran, as per which modesty has
to be protected If a believer thinks a practice is essential to his faith and that practice is
innocuous and does not infringe on anyone's freedom, then in that context, the test of essential
religious practice will not arise. And they have been wearing it of same colour as uniform.
School Management Committee of Maharaja’s Higher Secondary School has no statutory
basis. It is formed under circular which does not pass muster for restricting public order, as far
as Art. 25(2) exception is concerned, the Management Committee has no statutory basis.
(¶ 13.) The question arises whether every tenet prescribed in Quran is ERP because it does not
arise for consideration of The Supreme Court in that judgment held that what is bad in Quran
cannot be good in Sharia, Since the Quran itself says so as far as hijab is concerned, we need
not go to any other authority, the Judgement supra-Shayara Bano11 case Justice Kurian Joseph
emphasised on allowing a belief if the scripture.
(¶ 14.) Neither under Art. 25(2)(a) or (b) can ERP be curtailed except under public order,
morality or health: There is indeed some amount of guidance on how State has to exercise its
powers to restrict ERP. As per the guidance of Supreme Court, if a religious practice is
abhorrent then State on ground of public order, health or morality can stop it. But in this case,
this is an Indeed a harmless, innocuous practice, not only a mere display, but a practice of faith.
To counter that, nobody wears a shawl. The essence of Art.25 is it protects any practice of faith
(¶ 15.) In the Antony v. Governing Body12, the petitioner embraced an African faith of
Rastafari which required her to grow dreadlocks, the judgment said that even though there was
a prescribed uniform, the person who asked for exemption from the same should be
accommodated and not punished. But in this case, it is not even about exemption to uniform
but just about an additional head scarf of same colour.
11
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC).
12
Antony v. Governing Body, 2002 (4) 739 (C).

ISSUE: III
WHETHER UNIFORM DRESS CODE VIOLATES THE PETITIONER’S

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 14,19(1)(A) AND 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
(¶ 16.) It’s humbly submitted before the honourable. court that the uniform dress code violates
the petitioner’s fundamental rights under art. 14,19(1)(A) and 21 of the const. of Hindukush.
A nine-judge bench of the SCI affirmed that the fundamental right to privacy is "protected as
an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Art. 21 and as a part of the
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Const." in K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India
('Puttaswamy I.)13 Individual autonomy, or an individual's freedom to make choices and select
how to develop their personality, is at the heart of the idea of privacy, according to
Chandrachud J, speaking for four judges in Puttaswamy I. Misra CJ, for example, concluded
14
in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India ('Navtej Singh Johar') that individual autonomy
cannot be limited by societal morality or compliance expectations. Any attempt to impose
uniformity and homogeneity across society would jeopardise this promise. Secondly,
individual dignity is tied to the protection of autonomy. The inextricable linkages between the
two notions, as well as how one is a "facilitative instrument to attain the other," are noted by
Chandrachud J. Non-recognition of an individual's identity degrades dignity. Because religion
is such an important part of people's identities, their inability to express it violates their right
to dignity and privacy.15
1. CHOICES EXPRESSED IN PUBLIC REGARDING FAITH AND MODES OF DRESS ARE A PART OF
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY AND PROTECTED BY THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY .
A.The choice to wear a hijab or other religious clothing in public spaces is a facet of the
right to privacy.
(¶ 17.) Art. 19 freedoms can be exercised when a person is free to choose his or her own
choices. When read in conjunction with Art. 21, liberty allows an individual to choose their
preferences in a variety of areas of life, such as what and how they eat, how they dress, what
13 K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

14
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321.

faith they follow, and a plethora of other areas where autonomy and self-determination
necessitate a decision to be made in the privacy of one's mind. The right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by Art. 25 of the Const. includes the opportunity to select a faith and the freedom
to express or not express such choices to the rest of the world.
(¶ 18.) The SC reaffirmed in Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M16 that an individual's right to
"decide on features that determine one's individuality and identity" is guaranteed by the
constitutional protection of individual liberty and autonomy. The court also noted that Art 21
of the Constitution provides every individual the freedom to make intimate personal decisions
on "matters important to the pursuit of happiness," such as belief and faith, clothing, food,
philosophies, love, and relationship. The ability of each individual to follow a way of life or
faith to which she or he choose to adhere is protected by the Constitution. The major parts of
identification are clothing and food, thoughts and ideologies, love and relationship, and love
and partnership. As a result, a complete ban on religious clothing as part of the uniform within
school and college premises, including the headscarf or hijab worn by Muslim women, imposed
by various pre-university Government colleges and schools in Karnataka prior to and in
compliance with the Govt. of Vaiga order, infringes gravely on individual decisional autonomy
guaranteed by the fundamental right to privacy.
B. In arguendo, unlike certain other harms, wearing a hijab or other religious clothing is
not an irreversible choice which inhibits the continuance of an autonomous life.
(¶ 19.) The refusal to accommodate religious apparel such as the hijab leads in Muslim women
and other religious people being excluded from educational institutions. This has a number of
harmful consequences. Individual autonomy can only be meaningfully developed if education
is made available. Individual agency is vital to our position as human beings, and human rights
are primarily intended to defend our distinctive personality. This generally entails numerous
elements, such as autonomy, which is defined as the freedom to select one's own route through
life without being dominated or influenced by others. True autonomy, on the other hand,
necessitates the capacity to select among a sufficient number of possibilities.17 This, in turn,
necessitates a minimal degree of education and information, as well as the means necessary to
put our decisions into action, as well as the freedom to do so in Unni Krishnan v. State of
Andhra Pradesh18, the SCI recognised that education is one of the essential needs for ensuring
a decent existence for an individual. In the instance, the court ruled that the plaintiff had the
16 Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M, (2018) 16 SCC 368.

17
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (OUP 1988) 426.
18
Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645.

right to sue. The right to life and personal liberty entrenched in Art. 21 of the IC is inherent in
and follows immediately from the right to education.
C. Dignity is recognised as another key basis of the fundamental right to privacy.
The banning of the hijab and other religious clothing is a violation of dignity.
(¶ 20.) The links between autonomy, privacy and dignity were drawn by various judges in
Puttaswamy I. , the ability of an individual to make autonomous choices allows them to develop
their personalities, which in turn is a ‘postulate of human dignity itself.’19 As a result, it is
impossible to argue that the hijab ban is an attempt to protect Muslim women's dignity. This
understanding of dignity is founded on social morality, which states that dignity necessitates
consistency and homogeneity, and that what constitutes dignified dress is determined by
society standards. Such arguments based on homogeneity and romantic paternalism have been
firmly rejected by the SCI in favour of an approach which favours and affirms the agency of
women.20 The SCI has, in its conceptualisation of dignity, reaffirmed an autonomy-based
approach to dignity rather than a communitarian one. A ban on wearing the hijab or other
religious clothing is therefore an assault on the dignity of women because it treats them as non-
agents in the matter of choosing what to wear. Dignity requires that it must be left to individual
women themselves to decide how they want to exercise their freedoms.
2.VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION UNDER ARTICLE 21
(¶ 21.) In Mohini Jain and Unni Krishnan, the Supreme Court recognised the right to
education as part of the right to a dignified life under Art. 21.21 In both cases, the Court
recognised the importance of the right to education for the realisation of all other rights under
Part III of the IC.22 Art. 21A explicitly recognises the right to free and compulsory education
for all children between the ages of 6 and 14 years. 23 The inclusion of an explicit right to
education under Art. 21A does not extinguish the implicit right to education under Art. 21. The
residue of the right not covered within Art. 21A, including the right to education for persons
above the age of 14, such as pre-university education provided at PU College, are included
within the right to education under Art. 21.
19
K.S Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
20
Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.
21
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666.
22
Mohini Jain (n 171) [13], Unni Krishnan (n 147) [183], as cited in Sanya Samtani, ‘The Right of Access to
Educational Materials and Copyright:
International and Domestic Law’ (University of Oxford 2021) 271.
23
Constitution of India, 1950, art 21A.

3. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
(¶ 22.) Clothing as a means of expressing one’s identity was recognised and protected under
Art. 19(1)(a) by the Supreme Court in Nalsa v. Union of India24. Expression of identity under
Art. 19(1)(a) was also accepted as a ground in Navtej Singh Johar to invalidate Sec. 377 of the
IPC . It is now clear that the protection under Art. 19(1)(a) is not restricted to verbal speech but
also covers forms of expressing one’s identity. The hijab is a means of expressing religious
identity that individuals can choose. Once the freedom is recognised under Art. 19(1)(a), any
restriction on it would have to be in compliance with the provisions of Art. 19(2). There are
very specific grounds on which reasonable restrictions can be imposed under Art. 19(2) and
the basis for the actions by the state or the schools/ colleges clearly do not satisfy any of the
grounds in that constitutional provision. The petitioners in the case at hand demand a right to
access education without giving up wearing the hijab. In furtherance of the relevant GO,
schools and PU colleges in Vaiga required Muslim girls to remove their hijab and burqa to
attend the class or write exams. Thus, a barrier was created for Muslim students to access their
education. arbitrary. When reading the requirements of non-arbitrariness under Art. 14 together
with the right to education under Art. 21, it follows that creation of arbitrary barriers to
education for Muslim students violates the requirement of access to education without
imposition of arbitrary barriers.
4.VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
(¶ 23.) At the outset, the intentions of the Order becomes clear from its implementation, where
Muslim schoolgirls have been particularly singled out to abide by the strict dress code. One
wonders whether the same strictness will follow with Sikh students donning turbans, Christian
students wearing crosses, and Hindu students wearing tilak. Such exclusion of Muslim girls
stands in sharp contrast to the equality doctrine enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution that
guarantees every individual equality before the law and equal protection of laws. In order to be
valid, the law/order in question must make a reasonable classification between similarly
situated people, and the classification must bear a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved. Neither of the two requirements is met in excluding school girls wearing headscarves
from attending schools, wherein such clothing has nothing to do with equality, integrity, or
public order. Rather, the order seems to forcefully impose uniformity amongst diverse sections
24
Nalsa v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.

of people in the garb of equality and integrity. The government and the schools should promote
plurality, not uniformity or homogeneity but heterogeneity in all aspects of lives as opposed to
conformity and homogeneity consistent with the constitutional spirit of diversity and
inclusiveness vide Valsamma Paul (Mrs) v. Cochin University25, Society for Unaided Private
Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India26.
5. DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY
(¶ 24.) The government of Vaiga assuming that it has power to prescribe and enforce uniform,
where is the power to deny their education or stop them from entering the students from school
because they have not adhered to that uniform, The doctrine of proportionality will come in.
The action of the State and the schools suffers from the violation of ‘doctrine of
proportionality’ inasmuch as in taking the extreme step of banning the hijab within the campus,
the possible alternatives that pass the ‘least restrictive test’ have not been explored vide
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh27 and Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya
Pradesh28.
25 Valsamma Paul (Mrs) v. Cochin University (1996) 3 SCC 545.

26
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1.
27 Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.
28
Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 853.

ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT ORDER AND THE SCHOOL CIRCULAR

VIOLATES SECULARISM, WHICH IS A BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
(¶ 25.) It's Humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the state of Vaiga with its unique
cultural diversities religious and ethnic diversities while implementing the district Nura as a
kaleidoscope in the whole of Hindukush, stating its significance of religious tolerance and
various identities that is spread across the region.
(¶ 26.) By banning the girls observing the practice of hijab in Islam which is one of the essential
practices among Muslims as showing reverence and submitting toward God almighty in all
branches of spirituality. Secularism indeed constructed within the constitution grants certain
rights to which state violates on the basis, In this case the main subject to the hinderance of
secularistic beliefs were government taking hefty actions on religious beliefs and understanding
and more over has infringed not only by intervening someone’s personal beliefs to be partaking
within state’s affairs which is diabolically infringing someone’s right to religious practice
,which violates art. 14 art. 15 and art.19, while it was held in SR Bommai29 Case to which held
and emphasised “religious freedom is indeed a state of contrary toward a positive secularism
which is embedded under the constitution” which was also held in Praveen Bhai Thogida
case30 . While art. 25 and art. 26 been violated on person’s right to religious freedom and
practice, and the state has failed to ensure freedom and rights conferred upon the government
to ensure and protect the rights of religious freedom and harmony, whilst the state has
encountered, interfered in religious matters. The case that followed by a suicide of the child
due their economic conditions given a catalyst to make such order to function the uniform dress
code; When girls who practiced Islam and their essential observation toward hijab when
subjected to school authorities were not given permission because it violated the uniform dress
code: even when they tried to bring in the hijab cloth that resembled the school uniform
procedure, to which was obstructed the basic structure under kesavanada Bharati Case31. In
secularism neither means anti God nor pro God32.
29
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SCC (3) 1.
30
State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684.
31
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
32
Rev v. State of MP, 1977 SCR (2) 611.

ISSUE V (ADDITIONAL ISSUE RAISED)
ARTICLE 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION ?
1. ARTICLE 15 (1) PROHIBITS DIRECT AS WELL AS INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION. THE GO

VIOLATES BOTH PROHIBITIONS.
(¶ 27.) It’s humbly submitted before the honourable court that the GO violates the prohibition
on direct discrimination on grounds of religion, and on grounds of religion intersecting with
sex. While the operative part of the school circular does not mention religion or sex in the
context of the dress code, the GO makes it explicit that the aim of the GO is to target head
scarfs worn by Muslim women. The GO states that “hijab is not an essential practise in Islam.”
Thus the concern of the govt. in promulgating the GO is the headscarf or head covering worn
as part of religious attire. As such, the GO is expressly targeted at persons belonging to religions
that mandate the wearing of headscarves and head coverings as part of their attire.
(¶ 28.) It could be argued that a measure that targets persons belonging to religions that expect
head coverings is not discrimination “on grounds only of religion.” Rather, this measure is
based on grounds of religion plus attire since members of such religions who do not choose to
wear head coverings are not being discriminated against. This position is not in consonance
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the guarantee under Art. 15 (1). In the context of
sex discrimination under Art. 15 (1), the Court has stated in Navtej Johar v. Union of India33.
(¶ 29.) Taken together, the explicit intent of the GO and the Academic Reform Committee ,
and its focus in restricting the dress code is to discriminate on grounds of religion, and in
particular to target Muslim girl students who wear the headscarf to their educational
institutions. The GO seeks to prescribe a common uniform and restrict Muslim girls from
“following practices as per their religion” and wear a headscarf or head covering. This GO
violates the prohibition in Art. 15 (1), Const. of Hindukush against discriminating on grounds
of religion, and on grounds of religion coupled with sex since the GO, by its express reasoning
and by government admission, seeks to impose restrictions along prohibited grounds.
33
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321 (n 21).

2.THE GOVERNMENT ORDER IS NOT SAVED BY ARTICLE 15 (3) AND IS NOT OTHERWISE
JUSTIFIED
(¶ 30.) A law that restricts women’s access to education or denies them the right to assert their
religious identity cannot empower women or strengthen their status. In Anuj Garg v. Hotel
Association of India,34 the Supreme Court struck down a provision that prohibited women
from working in places that served liquor. Rejecting the argument that such a provision was
protected under Art. 15 (3), the Court held that
“It is to be borne in mind that legislations with pronounced “protective discrimination” aims,
such as this one, potentially serve as double edged swords. Legislation should not be only
assessed on its proposed aims but rather on the implications and the effects. No law in its
ultimate effect should end up perpetuating the oppression of women. Personal freedom is a
fundamental tenet which cannot be compromised in the name of expediency until unless
there is a compelling state purpose. Heightened level of scrutiny is the normative threshold
for judicial review in such cases”.
(¶ 31.) This framing conflates discrimination and non-arbitrariness which are distinct facets of
the guarantee of equality under the Indian Constitution.35 Art. 15(3) encapsulates the notion
of ‘protective discrimination’. The constitutional guarantee in Art. 15(3) cannot be employed
in a manner that entrenches paternalistic notions of ‘protection’. This latter view of protection
only serves to place women in a cage. Art. 15(3) does not exist in isolation. Neither Art. 15(1),
nor Art. 15(3) allow discrimination against women. Discrimination which is grounded in
paternalistic and patriarchal notions cannot claim the protection of Art. 15(3). Thus, Art. 15 (3)
cannot be used to justify a law that imposes restrictions on women in the exercise of their rights
(such as to education, privacy, autonomy, and religious freedom) in the guise of benefiting
them.
(¶ 32.) Likewise, indirect discrimination can be justified if the impugned measure pursues a
legitimate aim through proportionate means. In Lt Col Nitisha and Ors v. Union of India,36
the SC stated that while assessing the justifiability of measures that are alleged to have the
effect of indirect discrimination, the Court needs to return a finding on whether the narrow
provision, criteria or practice is necessary for successful job performance.
34 Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1.

35 Subramanian Swamy v. Director CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682.
36
Lt Col Nitisha and Ors v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261.

MEMORANDUM for PETITIONER [PRAYER]
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court, that it may be pleased to declare
that:
Petitioner -I , ASIFA
1. Wearing of hijab by Muslim girls is an essential religious practise in Islam.
2. Disallowing wearing of Hijab within the college violates the freedom of religion of the
Muslim Girls.
3. The uniform dress code violates the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 14.
Petitioner-II , THE PROGRESSIVE STUDENTS’ UNION

1. The government order and the school circular violates the secularism which is the basic
structure of the constitution.
2. The Government order and the school circular violates the petitioner’s Article 15 of the
constitution.
3. The uniform dress code violates the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1) (A).
And for this act of kindness the petitioners as are duty bound shall ever pray.
DATE: 12/04/2022 (S/d)
PLACE: THE SUPREME COURT OF HINDUKUSH (Counsels for the Petitioner)
V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE | X

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TEAM CODE: TC-03

V.M. SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT

W.P. (CIVIL) NO. _________ OF 2022

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HINDUKUSH

ASIFA STATE OF VAIGA

THE PROGRESSIVE STUDENTS UNION STATE OF VAIGA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

THE SUPREME COURT OF HINDUKUSH

1. Whether wearing of Hijab is an essential religious practice of Islam religion?……..1-4

the Muslim girls?.......................................................................................................5-6

14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution?.................................................................7-11

basic structure of the Constitution?..........................................................................12

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| I

AIR All India Reporter

ERP Essential Religious Practise

IPC Indian Penal Code

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCI Supreme Court Of India

UOI Union Of India

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| II

S.NO CASES PAGE NO

1. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, 03

2. Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat Stainislaus, 12

4. Antony v. Governing Body, 2002 (4) 739 (C). 06

5. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1. 09,14

6. Gullam Abbas v. State Of UP, (1981) AIR 2198 05

7. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 03

8. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; AIR 1973 11

9. KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, (‘Puttaswamy 07,09

11. Madras v. Shrilakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt, 1954 03

12. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 11

14. Mohini Jain (n 171) [13], Unni Krishnan (n 147) [183]. 09

15. Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666. 09

16. Nalsa v. Union of India,[(2014) 5 SCC 438]. 10

18. Rev v. State of MP, 1977 SCR (2) 611. 12

19. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 SCC (3) 1. 12

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| III

22. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC). 06

23. Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India 11

25. Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 [149], 08

STATUTES & RULES

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1950

THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860

MADRAS HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ACT,

3 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 2695 (4th ed. 2008)

5 D. D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 5579 (8th ed.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009)

V.N Shukla, The Constitution of India, 13th edition, EBC Books

CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2013)

M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1415 (8th ed. 2018)

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| IV

Article 32 of the Constitution reads as follows:

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| V

INCIDENT IN THE HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL, NURA

V.M.SALGAOCAR MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022 PAGE| VI

WHETHER WEARING OF HIJAB IS AN ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTISE IN ISLAM RELIGION?

WHETHER DISALLOWING WEARING OF HIJAB WITHIN THE COLLEGE VIOLATES FREEDOM

WHETHER UNIFORM DRESS CODE VIOLATES THE PETITIONER ’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

UNDER ARTICLE 14,19(1)(A) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

WHICH IS A BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?

(ADDITIONAL ISSUE RAISED)

ARTICLE 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION ?