COUNTRY: BRUNEI

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Geographical Context:
o Brunei Darussalam is an independent Islamic sultanate located on the northern
coast of the island of Borneo in Southeast Asia.
o The Limbang valley, part of the Malaysian state of Sarawak, separates the eastern
and western territories of Brunei.

2. Population and Citizenship:

o Brunei has a population of approximately 414,000.
o About 65% of the total population holds citizenship.
o Most citizens are of Malayan descent, while an estimated fifth belongs to
indigenous groups.
o The remaining population includes permanent (8%) and temporary residents
(27%).

3. Religion and Ethnicity:

o Islam is the official state religion, with Muslims (mostly followers of the Shafi’i
school) constituting 75% of the population.
o Christians and Buddhists represent 9.4% and 8.5%, respectively.

4. Political Structure:
o Brunei is an absolute monarchy, with the Sultan (Yang Di-Pertuan) serving as
both the highest religious and political authority.
o The constitution, drafted in 1959, provides no separation of powers, and the
Sultan’s authority remains undiminished by parliament.

5. Founding Myth and Ruling Dynasty:

o According to the national founding myth, the Sultanate’s political history began
when Sultan Awang Alak Betatar converted to Islam in 1363.
o He established the ruling dynasty that continues to shape Brunei’s governance
today.

6. Sultan Hassan al Bolkiah:

o Ascended the throne in 1967 as the 29th member of the House of Bolkiah.
o During its peak between the 15th and 17th centuries, the Sultanate ruled over
Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan.

7. Colonial Influence and Treaty:

o European colonial powers arrived in the 16th century, leading to a gradual
decline in Brunei’s influence over maritime trade.
o In the 19th century, the Sultan had to relinquish control over much of Borneo,
eventually ceding external sovereignty to the British through the Anglo-Bruneian
Treaty of 1847.
8. British Protection and Residency System:
o Threatened by internal strife, Brunei was saved when the British offered a
“Treaty of Protection” in 1888 and installed a Resident in 1905.
o The 1906 Supplementary Protectorate agreement made recommendations of
the British Resident binding on all matters except religious affairs.
o The residency system remained until 1959, paradoxically allowing the ruling
dynasty to consolidate power and diminish competing nobles’ influence.

9. Oil Discovery and Economic Transformation:

o In 1929, Royal Dutch Shell discovered substantial petroleum reserves in Brunei.
o Brunei became the third largest source of petroleum in the British
Commonwealth.
o Offshore oil and natural gas production began in the 1950s, fueling Brunei’s
transition from an agrarian-based economy to a “rentier state”.
o With abundant natural resources and a small population, Brunei boasts one of the
highest GDP per capita levels in Southeast Asia.

10. Emergence of Pan-Bornean Movement:

o The birth of the sovereign Federation of Malaya in 1957 and the impending end
of British control over Sarawak and Sabah sparked a pan-Bornean movement.
o Led by the Brunei People’s Party (PRB), founded in 1956, the movement
demanded the formation of the Federated States of Borneo under the nominal
leadership of the Sultan of Brunei.

11. Divergent Views:

o Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and the aristocratic elite favored closer
association with Malaysia.
o They opposed expanding popular participation and democratic rights.
o A new Treaty of Protection (1959) granted Brunei almost complete political and
administrative autonomy, with the British High Commissioner retaining control
over foreign policy, internal security, and defense.

12. Bruneian Constitution and Legislative Council:

o The first Bruneian constitution, established in 1959, created a consultative
assembly called the Legislative Council.
o In the 1962 popular vote, the PRB secured all 16 elected seats out of the council’s
33 total seats.
o When the Sultan excluded the PRB from decision-making, the national movement
radicalized.

13. Uprising and Emergency Rule:

o In December 1962, PRB cadres and the pro-Indonesian National Army of North
Kalimantan (TNKU) initiated an uprising.
o British troops swiftly suppressed the uprising.
o The Sultan used this opportunity to establish emergency rule, dissolve the
legislative council, and ban all political parties.
 o ltinational corporations, and a new Chinese-Malay business elite centered around
the Brunei Shell Petroleum conglomerate.

14. Failed Federation Negotiations:

o Brunei’s negotiations with the Malayan government for accession to the
Federation failed due to disagreements over oil and gas revenue allocation and
the constitutional status of the Sultan relative to other traditional Malay rulers.
o By not joining Malaysia, the Sultan retained full control over oil revenues and
faced no pressure to introduce more representative political institutions.

15. Abdication and Sovereignty:

o In 1967, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III abdicated in favor of his son, Hassanal
Bolkiah, avoiding British pressure to return to a constitutional regime.
o The renewed Brunei-British Treaty in 1979 paved the way for full national
sovereignty, realized on January 1, 1984.

16. Stability Pillars:

o Legitimation of Absolute Monarchy (MIB): The concept of Melayu Islam
Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy) legitimizes the absolute monarchy.
o “Soft Repression”: Measures are in place to prevent public criticism and
opposition.
o International Cooperation: Brunei secures national sovereignty through
membership in ASEAN, the UN, and the OIC, along with bilateral defense
cooperation with the UK and Singapore.
o Resource Abundance and Oil Revenues: These allow Brunei to co-opt Malay
elites and middle classes in an “authoritarian bargain”, where citizens trade
political rights for economic security and benefits.

17. Oil and Gas Industry:

o Brunei is the fourth largest producer of liquid gas worldwide.
o Oil and gas deposits are exploited through a joint venture involving the state,
multinational corporations, and a new Chinese-Malay business elite centered
around the Brunei Shell Petroleum conglomerate.

The Revenue Division within the Ministry of Finance and Economy in Brunei Darussalam is
responsible for formulating tax policies, administration, and the collection of income tax. The
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Economy serves as the Collector of
Income Tax, and the division is led by the Director (Revenue)1.

Brunei’s revenue primarily stems from the oil and gas sector, which has significant implications
for the country’s governance and stability. Let’s delve into some of the mechanisms at play:

1. Taxation Effect:
o Due to substantial oil and gas revenues, the government can forgo imposing an
income tax on individual citizens. This absence of direct taxation reduces
demands for greater political participation.
 2. Spending Effect:
o The government allocates oil and gas revenues to finance a comprehensive
welfare system, often referred to as “shellfare.” This system includes subsidies for
fuel, housing, staple foods, free education, university stipends for citizens
studying abroad, and access to quality healthcare.
o By providing material benefits, such as healthcare and education, the government
depoliticizes the public and fosters loyalty.

3. Modernization Effect:
o Brunei’s oil wealth has facilitated the creation of a sizable public sector. This
sector offers more generous health benefits, old age pensions, and higher incomes
compared to the private sector.
o Patron-client relationships and rent-seeking behaviors are prevalent among the
Malay middle class and Chinese-speaking entrepreneurs. Loyalty to the ruling
monarchy is thus reinforced.

4. Repression Effect:
o Oil and gas revenues also fund a substantial security sector, ensuring regime
stability.
o Brunei’s per capita military spending ranks high in the region, second only to
Singapore. The Global Militarization Index places Brunei at 14th position among
150 countries.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

 Founding Documents:
o Constitution of 1959: The foundational legal document for Brunei’s governance.
o Succession and Regency Proclamation (1959): Another critical document
shaping Brunei’s constitutional framework.

 Pseudo-Constitutionalism:
o While Brunei has had a written constitution since 1959, it primarily formalizes
the Sultan’s absolute sovereignty.
o The constitution was created under external pressure from the British and the PRB
(Partai Rakyat Brunei) but lacked meaningful participation from social groups.

 Sultan’s Central Role:

o Instead of establishing a parliamentary regime, the Sultan remains the center of
political gravity in Brunei.
o He possesses exclusive government authority, and the absolute sovereignty of
the Sultanate serves as Brunei’s “Grundnorm.”

 Constitutional Text:
o Comprises a preamble and eleven sections with a total of 87 articles.
o Includes preliminaries on basic concepts and appendices not part of the core
constitution.
  Sultan’s Power:
o The constitutional text affirms the Sultan’s absolute power.
o His authority is not limited or bound by basic or human rights.

 Reforms:
o 2004-2006: Introduced the free exercise of religious beliefs as the sole basic
right.
o Mid-2000s: Confirmed the Sultan’s prerogative to wield executive and
legislative powers.
o Legislative Council: Restricted from discussing matters that might reduce the
Sultan’s rights, powers, or the national doctrine of the Malay Islamic Monarchy .

 Suspension of Constitutional Review:

o The constitutional review of laws and royal decrees has been suspended under
emergency rule since 1962.
o Explicitly banned by Article 84c.

 Legal Immunity:
o The constitution now grants complete legal immunity to the Sultan and any
government official acting on behalf or under the authority of the Sultan.
o Stipulated in Article 84b.

 Official Religion:
o The amendments clarified that Brunei’s official religion is Islam, following the
interpretation of the Shafi’i school (one of the four schools of legal thought in
Sunni Islam).

 Malay Muslims in Government Offices:

o Changes to the appendix constitutions specify that several influential government
offices can only be held by Malay Muslims:
 Auditor General
 Chairman of the Public Service Commission
 Cabinet ministers
o Referenced in Article 3, V.

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

 Constitutional Status: Brunei is a hereditary constitutional monarchy in theory, but

functions as an absolute monarchy in practice.
 Sultan’s Role: The Sultan has absolute sovereignty and serves as head of state, head of
religion, prime minister, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
 Current Sultan: Hassanal Bolkiah has been the Sultan since 1967.
 Succession: Succession is regulated by the Succession and Regency Proclamation of
1959. The Sultan usually appoints a crown prince, but a Council of Succession can
designate an heir if none is appointed.
  Council of Regency: Manages government affairs until the heir comes of age, formed
from Brunei’s hereditary nobility.
 Government Structure: The Sultan is assisted by five constitutionally mandated bodies
and presides over the Council of Ministers. He has been his own minister of defense since
1986 and minister of finance since 1998.
 Ministerial Eligibility: Ministers must be Bruneian citizens, but the Sultan can make
exceptions. Important cabinet posts often held by royal family members.
 Privy Council: Advises the Sultan on constitutional matters, honorary titles, succession,
and regency.
 Religious Council: Advises on matters related to Islam and drafts religious laws.
 Adat Istiadat Council: Assists in matters of Malay traditional rights and customs.
 Legislative Council: Has no binding power on the Sultan, who can enact laws and
budgets without its consent and issue emergency decrees.
 The Sultan has the power to suspend or dismiss any councilor at will (Article 31).
 The Legislative Council originally had 33 members, with 16 via indirect elections.

 Members not elected were appointed by the Sultan or were ex officio members as
government heads.
 From 1970 to 1984, and again from 2004, the Sultan appointed councillors.
 The Council was suspended between 1984 and 2004.
 Post-constitutional reforms, the Council is capped at 51 members.
 The prime minister, foreign affairs minister, and Crown Prince are ex officio members.
 The Sultan can appoint up to 30 members; elections can determine up to 15 members.
 The first election since 1965 occurred in 2011, electing nine members via an electoral
college of village elders and district heads.
 Currently, the Council has 35 members, all Bruneian citizens and at least 20 years old.

Legal and Judicial System

 Legal Framework: Combines British common law with Shafi’i Islamic law, the latter
being predominant.
 Court Structure: Divided into Islamic courts for personal and Sharia criminal law, and
secular courts for other matters.
 Judicial System: Consists of lower magistrate courts, intermediate courts, and the
Supreme Court.
 Sharia Courts: Hold exclusive jurisdiction over Islamic law matters, affecting all
citizens and residents.
 Judicial Independence: Non-existent, as the Sultan holds ultimate executive, legislative,
and judicial power.
 Judicial Appointments: Judges are appointed by the Sultan and serve until age 65, with
possible extensions.
 Judicial Oversight: The State Judicial Department monitors court administration, under
the Prime Minister’s office.
 Professionalism and Integrity: Bruneian courts are noted for their professionalism and
low corruption levels.
 Political Parties and Elections

 Elections: Brunei does not conduct representative national elections for its legislature.
 Constitutional Provision: Allows for some elected legislative councilors, but no popular
election since 1962.
 First Political Party: The Pan-Bornean PRB, established in 1956, is the first and only
party with a developed ideology and membership base.
 PRB’s Ban: Participated in the 1962 elections but was banned following an antiroyal
uprising.
 Legalization and Regulation: Parties were legalized in 1985, regulated under the
Societies Order of 2005, requiring Ministry of Interior authorization.
 Membership Restrictions: Only full citizens can join political parties; public service and
armed forces personnel are excluded.
 Candidate Nomination: Political parties cannot nominate candidates; positions are filled
by individual elections.
 National Development Party (PP): The only party to somewhat navigate the restrictions
without collapsing.
 Other Parties: BNDP lost its permit for criticizing the government; PPKB and PAKAR
were largely inactive and removed from the registry.
 Party Functions: Most parties have minimal membership and no governmental or
electoral role.
 Government Benefit: The existence of parties provides a facade of political reform,
mitigating some international criticism.

CivilMilitary Relations and the Security Sector

 Budget Allocation: Brunei allocates about 15% of its total budget to security and
military defense.
 Military Expenditure: Relative spending decreased from over 6% to 2.5% of GDP, due
to GDP growth from oil revenues.
 Security Personnel: The sector employs 11,400 personnel, considered part of the
“shellfare” system.
 Main Services: Comprises the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF), Gurkha Reserve
Unit (GRU), and Royal Brunei Police (RBP).
 Spending Focus: Approximately 80% of defense spending is on the RBAF and GRU.
 RBAF Composition: An all-volunteer force, primarily Malay, with modern equipment
investments.
 International Operations: Bruneian troops participate in multinational peace operations
and support civilian government in various capacities.
 British and Singaporean Presence: Hosts a British Army Gurkha Battalion and
Singaporean military training camps.
 Domestic Security: The RBP and GRU maintain domestic security and protect the
regime.
 Police Force: The RBP, with a high officer-to-population ratio, focuses on public order
and counterterrorism.
 Internal Security Act (ISA): Allows detention without evidence or warrant, though
seldom used recently.

 The Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) in Brunei varies in strength from 400 to 2000 troops
and officers, tasked with protecting oil fields, public facilities, and providing security for
the Sultan.
 Brunei’s civil-military relations are characterized by:
o Legal and political constraints that limit nonhierarchical interaction across
ethnic and social lines.
o The Societies Order of 2005, which restricts freedom of association and requires
organizations to register with the government.
o A ban on unionism for government employees and the prohibition of the Brunei
United Labor Front since 1963.
o Foreign workers in key industries on temporary visas, contributing to weak
union traditions.
 Media and freedom of expression are tightly controlled, with:
o Government-linked ownership of newspapers and media outlets.
o Self-censorship among journalists due to permit requirements and government
monitoring.
o Brunei ranking 156th out of 180 countries in the Press Freedom Index.
 Political culture and attitudes are under-researched due to:
o Restrictions on data collection for both international and local researchers.
o A narrow empirical base for analysis, leading to limited understanding of the
population’s political attitudes.
 In rural areas, conservative attitudes influenced by Islam and a lack of political
participation opportunities have limited the politicization of society.

 Origin:
o Developed by Ustaz Badaruddin, first mentioned during Brunei’s independence in
1984.
o Officially proclaimed in 1990 on Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s 44th birthday.

 Key Elements:
1. Monarchy as the guardian of Malay language, culture, and tradition.

2. Monarchy as the protector of Islam and Islamic law.

3. The Malay Sultanate is seen as an absolute monarchy ordained by God.

 Contrast to Past:
o Represents a shift from the Sultan’s previous subordination to British authority.

 Legitimation Strategy:
o Uses the sanctity of tradition to legitimize absolute monarchy.
o Emphasizes the Sultan’s role as “Head of Religion” since 2004.

 Islamization Efforts:
 o Ongoing Islamization of public life.
o MIB is now included in educational curricula.
o Government supports Islamic institutions and practices, like Sharia courts and
hudud laws.

 Overall Goal:
o MIB portrays the Sultan as a pious ruler focused on the welfare of his people.

COUNTRY: CAMBODIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

 Postwar Reconstruction: After the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) facilitated the transition from civil war to
postwar order.
 Political System Evolution: The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) one-party state
transitioned to a multiparty system with regular elections and emerging civil society.
 Economic Shift: Cambodia moved from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy.
 Political Debate: Scholars debate the classification of Cambodia’s political regime, with
terms like “unconsolidated democracy,” “dominant party illiberal democracy,” “electoral
authoritarianism,” “competitive authoritarianism,” and “semi-democracy” being
proposed.
 Historical Context: The Khmer Empire of Angkor, the precursor to modern Cambodia,
was a powerful entity until 1431 when it fell to Siam.
 Colonial Influence: French colonization began in 1860, leading to the establishment of
the Indochina Union in 1887, with Cambodia under the nominal rule of a resident
general.
 Economic and Social Changes: The French abolished debt slavery and feudal
landholding but did little to develop Cambodia’s economy, leading to a plural society
with significant immigration from other parts of French Indochina.
 Administrative Control: French nationals dominated the colonial bureaucracy, limiting
opportunities for Cambodians, who were often passed over for administrative positions in
favor of Vietnamese.

 Rise of Nationalism: Emergence of national consciousness among the educated elite in

the 1930s.
 Japanese Occupation: During WWII, Japan occupied Cambodia and encouraged
independence, which was short-lived after their surrender.
 Path to Sovereignty: Post-war, Cambodia gained self-rule, a new constitution, and full
sovereignty by 1953.
 Sihanouk’s Regime: King Sihanouk’s resignation in 1955 led to his authoritarian rule,
suppression of opposition, and use of Cambodia as a refuge for Vietnamese Communists.
 Khmer Rouge Era: The 1970 coup against Sihanouk led to civil war and the brutal
Khmer Rouge regime under Pol Pot, resulting in extensive purges and genocide.
 Vietnamese Intervention: Vietnam’s invasion in 1978 ended the Khmer Rouge’s reign.
  Continued Conflict: The People’s Republic of Kampuchea faced opposition from the
CGDK, leading to a military stalemate and eventual peace talks.
 Paris Peace Accords: In 1991, the Paris Accords were signed, establishing UNTAC to
transition Cambodia towards peace.

 UNTAC’s Indirect Executive Power: UNTAC supervised Cambodian authorities but

did not directly execute power, relying on existing CPP-dominated bureaucratic
structures.
 Supreme National Council (SNC): The Paris Accords created the SNC, a power-sharing
body of all four warring parties, with Norodom Sihanouk as the nominal head.
 Partial Disarmament: Disarmament measures affected mostly FUNCINPEC and
KPNLF combatants, with the Khmer Rouge abstaining from the peace process.
 1993 Constituent Assembly Elections: Despite Khmer Rouge boycott, the elections saw
high voter turnout and a FUNCINPEC victory, leading to a coalition government with the
CPP.
 Fragile Power-Sharing: The coalition was unstable, leading to violent conflicts in 1997,
often labeled as a coup by Hun Sen against Ranariddh.
 Hun Sen’s Authoritarian Regime: Post-1997, Hun Sen established a regime with tight
control over the electoral process and state institutions, co-opting various groups for
loyalty.
 Institutionalized Nepotism: Hun Sen’s personal control over key aspects of governance
has led to a concentration of power and authority, ensuring his political dominance.

 Repression and Co-optation: The government employs repression against opposition

and tolerates human rights violations for political consolidation.
 Legitimation Efforts: Hun Sen’s regime seeks to legitimize its power through stylized
economic and social peace promises and regular elections.
 International Relations: The regime balances its image internationally, with declining
Western aid but increased support from China and South Korea.
 Electoral Dynamics: Competitive elections offer the opposition a chance to challenge
the regime, as seen in the 2013 National Assembly elections.
 Civil Society and Media: A growing civil society and independent media serve as
watchdogs, despite government pressure and restrictions on communication.

 Information Control: The government restricts citizens’ access to alternative

information and media to maintain political control.
 Co-optation and Legitimation: Strategies of co-optation and legitimation limit the
government’s options for suppressing dissenting voices.
 Economic Incentives for Loyalty: The regime secures the loyalty of elites through
access to private goods, monetary benefits, and impunity from legal repercussions.
 Economic Vulnerability: Cambodia’s reliance on the textile and tourism sectors for
economic growth makes it susceptible to external economic shocks.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
  Origins: The constitution was drafted following the 1991 Paris Agreement, which ended
Cambodia’s civil war and mandated the creation of a new constitution.
 Drafting Committee: A committee with members from FUNCINPEC, CPP, and BLDP
was formed, reflecting the parties’ representation in the Constituent Assembly.
 Limited Participation: NGO and assembly member involvement in the drafting process
was minimal, and deliberations were confidential.
 Criticism and Revision: The initial draft faced criticism for lacking judicial
independence and human rights protections, leading to revisions by Hun Sen and Prince
Ranariddh.
 Adoption: The constitution was adopted on September 21, 1993, after a brief
consultation period.
 Content: It combines elements of the 1947 constitution, socialist reforms of 1989, and
international human rights principles.
 Monarchy: The King’s role is ceremonial, with no governing power.
 Constitutional Court: Cambodia’s court is unique in Southeast Asia, modeled after
France’s Conseil constitutionnel.
 Amendments: Amendments have been made in response to political crises, adjusting the
powers of the government, king, and opposition.
 Prime Minister Election: Changes in 2004 and 2006 altered the election process for the
prime minister, empowering the parliamentary majority and reinforcing the CPP’s
position.

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

 Government Structure: Cambodia operates as an elective constitutional monarchy with

executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
 Monarchy: The king has a ceremonial role and is the head of state, with no governing
power.
 Executive Branch: Led by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers, who are
formally invested by the National Assembly and confirmed by the king.
 Legislative Branch: Comprises a popularly elected National Assembly and an indirectly
elected Senate, along with local commune Councils.
 Judicial Branch: Includes the Constitutional Council, Supreme Council of the
Magistracy, and lower courts.
 Royal Privy Council: The king, prime minister, and other high officials are members,
with the king serving as a stabilizing figure in politics.
 Recent Political History: Since 1993, Cambodia has seen a transition from co-prime
ministers to a single-party government led by the CPP after FUNCINPEC did not secure
seats in the 2013 election.

 1993 Power-Sharing Formula: Created a CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government,

integrating various political groups into the government and bureaucracy.
 Cabinet as Spoils System: The Prime Minister uses cabinet positions to maintain a
network of patronage, resulting in one of the world’s largest cabinets.
  Administrative Fragmentation: The proliferation of cabinet posts serves the Prime
Minister’s political survival, while the political functions of ministries are often limited to
routine operations.
 Weak Bicameralism: Cambodia’s legislative branch exhibits weak bicameralism, with
the National Assembly being directly elected and the Senate indirectly elected, largely
controlled by the ruling party.
 Senate’s Role: Established to expand patronage opportunities, the Senate holds less
constitutional power than the National Assembly and serves as an extension of the ruling
party.
 National Assembly Powers: Leads legislation, elects the Prime Minister, holds the
government accountable, and has the authority to initiate a vote of no confidence against
government officials.

 Legislative Process: The National Assembly initiates and debates bills, which then move
to the Senate for further debate. The king signs bills into law unless the Senate objects or
amends them.
 Executive Dominance: The parliament is often subordinate to the government, with
limited checks on executive power.
 Weak Parliamentary Oversight: Parliamentary committees are underutilized, and the
government frequently bypasses parliament with decrees.
 Electoral System Influence: Party leaders have significant control over
parliamentarians, discouraging defections and ensuring discipline.
 Partisan Leadership: Opposition rights are often denied, weakening the parliament’s
role as a counterbalance to the government.
 Legislative Immunity: Constitutional amendments have reduced MPs’ immunity,
increasing their vulnerability to prosecution and influencing their voting behavior.
 Opposition Tactics: The opposition’s efforts to challenge the government have
sometimes led to gridlock and have been used by the government to justify further
consolidation of power.
 Patronage Network: The ruling party maintains a patronage system, distributing state
spoils to secure loyalty from key sociopolitical groups.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM

 Historical Foundations: Initially based on customary law influenced by Buddhist and

Khmer traditions.
 French Colonial Influence: Adopted the French civil law system during colonization
and post-independence.
 Khmer Rouge Disruption: The legal system was destroyed during the Khmer Rouge
era, with arbitrary justice by party cadres.
 Reconstruction Post-Vietnamese Invasion: Rebuilt from scratch due to the decimation
of legal professionals by the Khmer Rouge.
 Current Legal System: A mix of Cambodian customs, French civil law, Japanese civil
law influences, and remnants of socialist law from the Vietnamese model.
 Judicial Structure: Includes the Supreme Court, Appellate Court, lower courts, military
courts, the Constitutional Council, and the ECCC.
  Supreme Council of the Magistracy (SCM): Once responsible for judicial
appointments, now most functions are transferred to the Ministry of Justice.
 Constitutional Council: Ensures constitutional adherence, with members selected by the
National Assembly, king, and SCM.
 Judicial Review: The Constitutional Council can conduct abstract and concrete reviews,
but judicial independence is compromised by political influence.
 ECCC Establishment: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was set
up to try serious crimes from the Khmer Rouge era.
 Public Trust: The judiciary is perceived as corrupt and ineffective, leading to low public
confidence.
 Rule of Law: Governance indicators show that the rule of law in Cambodia is weaker
than in most Southeast Asian countries.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS

 Early Suffrage: Universal suffrage was introduced in 1946 for men and in 1956 for
women.
 Historical Elections: From 1946 to 1992, Cambodia held ten parliamentary elections,
one presidential election, and five national referenda.
 UNTAC Reforms: Post-1993, regular multiparty elections were institutionalized,
including five general elections for the National Assembly.
 Electoral Controversies: Criticisms have been raised about the integrity of the electoral
process and the lack of a level playing field.
 Proportional Representation: Introduced by the UN, this system is used for both the
National Assembly and local councils.
 Senate Elections: Established in 1998, the Senate is indirectly elected by Commune
Council members.
 Electoral Districts: Each of Cambodia’s 24 provinces/municipalities serves as an
electoral district with seat allocation based on population.
 Allocation Formulas: Initially used the “greatest remainder” formula, later switched to
the “highest average” (d’Hondt) formula.
 Malapportionment: The small size of the National Assembly and the minimum seat
allocation lead to disproportionate representation.
 d’Hondt System: Tends to favor larger parties, although it can also benefit opposition
parties under certain conditions.

 Preventing Fragmentation: The electoral system has been effective in reducing the
fragmentation of parties at the national level.
 D’Hondt System: This system tends to disadvantage smaller parties, leading to a higher
concentration of votes for the larger parties.
 Party Unification: The merging of smaller opposition parties into larger coalitions, like
the CNRP, has been a response to the electoral system’s bias.
 Closed Party-List System: Strengthens the control of party leaders over candidates,
potentially marginalizing dissent within parties.
 Competitive Elections: Unlike some neighboring countries, Cambodian elections are
competitive, allowing voters to influence the political direction.
  Malapportionment and Disproportionality: While present, these do not severely
undermine the competitive nature of elections.
 Electoral Integrity Concerns: Issues with voter registration, misuse of state resources,
and media environment challenge the fairness of elections.
 NEC Criticism: Doubts about the National Election Commission’s impartiality and
effectiveness have been raised by observers.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM

 Early Parties: The Democratic Party, Liberal Party, KPRP, and Sangkum were
established between 1946 and 1951.
 Post-UNTAC Changes: Noncommunist parties from the CGDK and Khmer Rouge
remnants merged with CPP.
 FUNCINPEC’s Decline: Once a credible CPP alternative, FUNCINPEC became part of
CPP’s patronage network and lost all seats in 2013.
 Rise of CNRP: The SRP and HRP merger formed CNRP, the main opposition, despite
being personalistic and facing challenges in policy alternatives.
 CPP’s Evolution: The CPP, successor of the PRPK, has distanced itself from Marxism-
Leninism but remains intertwined with state institutions.
 Leadership Consolidation: Hun Sen has strengthened his position by neutralizing rivals,
leading to a large but expendable group of supporters within the CPP.
 Party Expansion: The CPP’s Central Committee and Politburo have significantly grown
in size, reflecting an increase in the party’s internal support base.
 Local Control: Despite weak party structures outside the capital, the CPP has maintained
strong control over local political arenas since the 1980s.
 State and Party Fusion: The CPP has integrated many state functions into its operations,
blurring the lines between the party and the state apparatus.

State Administration and Decentralization

 Mandala System: Precolonial Cambodia operated under a mandala system with the king
controlling the central area and local power holders tied by loyalty.
 French Influence: The French established municipalities and appointed local
administration heads, extending the central power’s reach.
 Current Structure: Cambodia is divided into 21 provinces, Phnom Penh, and three
municipalities, further subdivided into districts, communes, and villages.
 Governance and Elections: Governors and district heads are government-appointed,
while local councils are elected every 5 years, with the CPP dominating the elections.

 Decentralization Efforts:
o Inspired by international donors, not a domestic coalition.
o Aimed to legitimize the state locally post-conflict.

 Political Dynamics:
o Rural areas are the CPP’s stronghold.
o Direct election of Commune Councils since 2001 boosts CPP’s local control.
  Policy and Fiscal Authority:
o Limited transfer of powers to subnational units.
o Central government retains control, with local units implementing directives.

 Legal and Financial Framework:

o Gaps in legal accountability for provincial and district councils.
o Ministry of Economy and Finances oversees subnational finances.
o Provinces rely on local taxes; districts depend on central government transfers.

 Government Service Quality:

o Hindered by financial constraints, lack of coordination, and weak monitoring.
o Low salaries and lack of accountability affect official performance.
o Recruitment and promotion not incentive-based, affecting employee quality.

CivilMilitary Relations and the Security Sector

 Security Sector Size: As of 2014, Cambodia had 8.2 military personnel per 1000 people,
a higher ratio than neighboring countries.
 Military Command:
o The king is the constitutional Supreme commander-in-chief of the RCAF.
o Actual command lies with the military Commander-in-chief and the Minister of
Defense.

 Police Forces:
o National Police controlled by the Interior Ministry.
o Military Police serves both military and civilian roles, similar to a Gendarmerie.

 Special Units:
o Gendarmerie reports directly to the Prime Minister, enforcing court orders and
supporting the penal system.
o Prime Minister Bodyguard Unit (PMBU) separated from RCAF in 2009,
equipped with heavy weapons.

 Intelligence Services:
o A network of intelligence services, including anti-terror units and organized crime
bureaus, controlled by the Central Security Department.

 Personnel and Ratios:

o Police and Gendarmerie have about 67,000 troops; 400 police officers per
100,000 inhabitants.
o Armed forces total strength is 124,000, with a significant number of generals.

 Civil-Military Relations:
o Armed forces not primarily for internal security; this role is filled by the police,
intelligence, and PMBU.
 o Post-1993, many civil war combatants, including the Khmer Rouge, were
integrated into the armed forces or police.
o RCAF has a bloated officer corps with a high ratio of generals to regulars.

 Defense Budget:
o One of ASEAN’s lowest in absolute numbers.
o Increased by over 56% from 2010 to 2014.
o For 2016, the budget was USD383 million, 17% higher than in 2015.

 Government Expenditure:
o Defense spending is about 9% of total government expenditure and 2% of GDP.
o Combined military and internal security expenditure was 15.4% of total
government spending from 2002 to 2014.

 Corruption and Oversight:

o Lack of transparency in defense budget disclosure.
o Transparency International rated Cambodia an “F” in anti-corruption for defense
in 2015.
o Little parliamentary oversight due to CPP control.

 Military Economic Activities:

o Allegations of senior officers involved in illegal activities like logging and land
grabbing.
o Lower ranks supplement income through private security and other illicit trades.

 Civil-Military Relations:
o No interest from military leaders in democratic civilian control.
o Military and CPP cadres benefit from economic activities and use security forces
for political repression.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

 Civil Society Space: Limited due to the authoritarian nature of CPP rule, similar to other
Southeast Asian electoral autocracies.
 NGO Sector: Largely a product of international intervention rather than grassroots
movements, with limited impact on developing a vibrant civil society.
 Government Tolerance: The Cambodian government tolerates NGO growth to maintain
access to development aid and because NGOs relieve pressure by fulfilling basic state
functions.
 Legal vs. Political Conditions: Cambodia’s legal framework for NGOs is less restrictive
than some neighboring countries, but political conditions have become increasingly
difficult.
 Freedom of Assembly: There has been a steady erosion of core rights, including freedom
of assembly and associational rights.
 Rural vs. Urban NGOs: Rural areas face more constraints, protecting the CPP’s rural
electorate, while urban areas like Phnom Penh offer more freedom for NGO activities.
  Categories of Civil Society Activities: NGOs in Cambodia are categorized into
democracy and human rights, development, support, community-based, and
research/advocacy groups.
 Protection from Repression: Internationally connected NGOs with professional
structures have some protection, while development organizations and CBOs can operate
with less interference.
 Challenges for Advocacy NGOs: Perceived as overly critical of the government,
especially in human rights, and face more challenges.

 Pagoda Associations: Traditional volunteer and social service groups, not fully
integrated into modern development or government structures.
 Civil Society Development: Hindered by regulatory constraints and a lack of social
resources, such as human and social capital.
 Public Opinion on Democracy: Support for democracy is lower than the Southeast
Asian average, with stronger support for the current political system.
 Performance-Based Legitimacy: The government has linked the provision of public
goods to political support, but this could lead to a “performance dilemma” if expectations
are not met.
 Economic Development and Political Demands: Economic growth may increase
societal demands on the government, leading to a desire for more participation and higher
expectations.
 CPP’s Electoral Performance: The CPP’s poor performance in the 2013 election
indicates pressure to address socioeconomic issues and political discontent.
 Demographic Change: A younger population, with no memory of genocide or civil war,
may be less willing to trade political rights for economic and physical security.

MEDIA SYSTEM

 Media Landscape Post-UNTAC: Significant growth in independent media with a surge

in newspapers and news organizations.
 State vs. Private Media: Over 10 TV stations and 80 radio stations exist, but electronic
media is heavily controlled by the government.
 Press Freedom: Decline in freedom and pluralism due to new legal and informal
government constraints, affecting the electoral process.
 Journalist Safety: Reports of intimidation and violence against journalists, with 13
murders and disappearances from 1994 to 2014.
 International Rankings: Cambodia ranks low in press freedom, similar to Singapore and
Malaysia.
 Internet and Social Media: As of 2017, internet access at 25.5%, with social media
becoming a key platform for information dissemination.
 Legal Concerns: New Telecommunication Law and potential “Cybercrime Law” could
threaten freedoms and target civil society activists.

COUNTRY: INDONESIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
 Archipelagic State: Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago with over 13,000
islands.
 Population: It is the most populous Muslim-majority country and ethnically diverse in
Southeast Asia.
 Economy: Indonesia has the largest economy in the region and is considered a stable
democracy.
 European Arrival: The Portuguese and Spanish were the first Europeans to arrive in the
16th century, followed by the Dutch VOC in 1595.
 Dutch Control: The VOC gained control over the Spice Islands and sea lanes, initially
ruling through local agreements rather than direct control.
 British-Dutch Treaty of 1824: This treaty defined Dutch control areas, shaping modern
Indonesia’s borders.
 Cultivation System: Introduced in the 1830s, it required villages to dedicate land for
export crops as land rent, benefiting colonial finances.
 Expansion of Dutch Rule: Dutch control expanded to more regions, including
Kalimantan and Bali, over several decades.
 Ethical Policy: Launched in 1901, it aimed to improve health, education, and the rural
economy in the Dutch East Indies.
 Rise of Nationalism: Education access created an elite that led nationalism, spread
Bahasa Indonesia, and formed the independence movement.
 Organizations and Parties: Groups like Muhammadiyah (1912), NU (1926), and PKI
(1924) emerged, promoting organized nationalism.
 Japanese Occupation: The Dutch were ousted by the Japanese in 1942, who were later
resisted by Indonesian nationalists.
 Proclamation of Independence: Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence
on August 17, 1945, after Japan’s surrender.
 Struggle for Sovereignty: Indonesian fighters waged guerrilla warfare against the Dutch
attempting to reclaim their colony.

 Recognition of Independence: The Netherlands acknowledged Indonesian independence

on December 27, 1949, after a brutal counterinsurgency campaign.
 Political Landscape: Post-independence Indonesia was marked by diverse political
forces: PNI under Sukarno, PKI, NU, Masyumi, and the military (TNI/ABRI).
 Guided Democracy: Sukarno established “Guided Democracy” in 1957, aligning with
various political groups, including the military and PKI.
 Economic and Political Crisis: By 1965, Indonesia faced a severe crisis, leading to a
failed coup attempt by left-leaning officers on September 30 to October 1, 1965.
 Anti-Communist Purge: Major General Suharto led a violent anti-communist purge,
resulting in over 500,000 deaths and the elimination of PKI.
 Suharto’s New Order: Suharto assumed power, transforming “Guided Democracy” into
the “New Order” government, emphasizing military control and personalistic
authoritarian rule.
 Military and Golkar: The military initially held significant influence, but Suharto
shifted power to loyal officers and integrated the military into his patronage system
through Golkar.
  Economic Growth and Corruption: Suharto’s regime saw economic growth due to oil
and gas production but was marred by corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN).
 Asian Financial Crisis: The 1997 crisis exposed the regime’s economic vulnerabilities,
leading to mass protests and Suharto’s resignation on May 21, 1998.
 Democratization (Reformasi): Suharto’s successor, Habibie, and later Abdurrahman
Wahid, initiated the reformasi era, transitioning Indonesia towards democracy.

 Transition to Democracy: Post-Suharto, Indonesia transitioned from dictatorship to

democracy, known as the reformasi era.
 Political Crises: The early years of democracy were marked by communal conflicts and
Islamic terrorism, which have since diminished.
 Democratic Stability: Despite challenges, democracy has been maintained, surviving the
impeachment of President Wahid in 2001 and passing the “two turnover test” with
peaceful power transitions in 2004 and 2014.
 Challenges to Democracy:
o Elite Influence: The old autocratic elites have reestablished themselves in the
democratic system, affecting transitional justice and the rule of law.
o Rule of Law and Corruption: Endemic corruption and a weak rule of law hinder
structural reforms and democratic accountability.
o Social and Economic Justice: Despite reduced poverty, significant inequalities
and regional disparities remain, affecting perceptions of democracy.
o Religious Freedoms: Achievements in various freedoms are overshadowed by
concerns over religious intolerance and sectarian violence.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

 Initial Constitution (UUD 1945):

o Drafted in April 1945, anticipating Japanese defeat.
o Established Pancasila as the guiding principle.
o Emphasized a unitary republic and social justice for all Indonesians.

 Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference (1949):

o Ended the conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.
o Sovereignty transferred to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS),
leading to a new federal constitution.

 Return to Unitary Republic (UUDS 1950):

o Suspecting Dutch intentions, Indonesia quickly replaced RIS with UUDS 1950.
o Abolished federalism, adopted a unitary republic, and included basic rights from
KRIS.

 Constituent Assembly Failure (1955):

o Aimed to draft a permanent constitution but failed due to disagreements over
Islam’s role.
o President Sukarno decreed a return to UUD 1945, enabling strong presidential
rule.
  Post-Suharto Constitutional Revisions:
o After Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the decision was made to revise, not redraft,
the 1945 Constitution.
o Between 1999 and 2002, the MPR adopted four amendments, altering most of the
constitution.

 Current Constitution Features:

o Preamble includes Pancasila and the unitary state concept.
o Bill of rights and rule of law provisions added, but lacks some basic rights.
o Introduced direct presidential elections and detailed presidential powers.

 Impeachment Procedure Revision:

o In response to criticism, the impeachment process was clarified and revised.

 Strengthening of Parliament:
o The legislative and budgetary powers of the parliament were enhanced.

 Establishment of New Institutions:

o A constitutional court and other watchdog agencies were established for the first
time.

 MPR’s Authority:
o The MPR was granted the power to amend and enact the constitution.
o Amendments can be initiated by one-third of MPR members and enacted by a
majority vote.

 Article 37 - Unitary State:

o Art. 37 ensures the unitary character of the state cannot be altered.

 Constitutional Reform Completion:

o The MPR ratified all constitutional amendments in 2003, marking the end of the
reform process.

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

 Form of State:
o Indonesia is defined as a “unitary state in the form of a republic” (Art. 1,1
UUD45).

 Legislature:
o Comprises two houses: the People’s Representative Council (DPR) and the
Regional Representative Council (DPD).
o Legislative power primarily resides with the DPR.

 Executive:
 o The President holds the main executive power and plays a significant legislative
role.

 Judiciary:
o Organized as a separate branch of government.
o Led by the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court (Art. 24C).

 Independent Government Bodies:

o The Central Bank (Bank Indonesia, BI; Art. 23D).
o The Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK; Art. 23E).

 Watchdog Agencies:
o Established by law, including:
 The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
 The General Election Commission (KPU).
 The Election Monitoring Body (Bawaslu).
 The Judicial Commission (KY).
 The Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM).

HEAD OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

 Election Process: Since 2004, the president and vice president of Indonesia are popularly
elected together on a “party ticket” for a 5-year term, renewable once. A party or
coalition needs 20% of seats or 25% of votes in the DPR to nominate a ticket. If no ticket
wins a majority and 20% of votes in half the provinces, a runoff is held.
 Presidential Accountability: Post-1999 reforms made the president accountable to the
DPR, introduced a two-term limit, and specified impeachment procedures. The DPR can
initiate impeachment, and with a two-thirds majority, the case moves to the
Constitutional Court and then to the MPR, which can remove the president with a three-
fourths majority.
 Vice Presidential Role: The vice president is the first in the presidential line of
succession and can have significant influence with strong parliamentary support. The vice
presidential candidate is often chosen to balance the ticket politically and regionally.
 Cabinet Structure: The president is assisted by the Council of Ministers, including
resort and coordinating ministers, and cabinet-level officials. Parliament must approve
major changes to ministry responsibilities. Cabinets tend to be large to establish
patronage and reward allies, with technocrats often holding key portfolios.

 Presidential Powers: The president retains significant authority, including being the
commander-in-chief, invoking states of emergency, and overseeing government policies
and foreign affairs.
 Legislative Role: The DPR must ratify international treaties affecting legislation and
confirm presidential nominations of ambassadors, military, and police chiefs.
 Executive Orders: Presidential executive orders require parliamentary confirmation.
“Government decrees in lieu of law” (Perpu) need unanimous DPR approval to resolve
legislative deadlocks.
  Legislative Power: Article 20.2 requires mutual agreement between parliament and
government for bill enactment. The president signs bills into law only if they align with
prior presidential or cabinet approval.
 Budget Process: The government proposes the national budget, which is subject to
parliamentary negotiation and approval. Without mutual agreement, the previous year’s
budget remains effective.
 Presidential Authority Rating: According to Shugart and Carey, the Indonesian
president scores 8 in legislative and 11 in non-legislative powers post-1999 amendments,
making them more powerful legislatively than the U.S. president but weaker in
appointing authority compared to the Philippines’ president.

PARLIAMENT AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Here’s a comprehensive summary of the Indonesian legislative system in bullet points:

 MPR’s Role: Until 2004, the MPR was the highest constitutional body, but post-2002
amendments, it lost legislative and electoral functions, ceasing to be a second chamber.
 DPR and DPD: The legislative branch now consists of the DPR (560 members) and the
DPD (136 members, four from each province). Elections for both are held 3 months
before presidential elections.
 Incompatibility of Office: Membership in DPR or DPD is incompatible with any other
government office, requiring retirement from the armed forces or national police before
running for office.
 DPD’s Function: The DPD has deliberative functions, can initiate bills on regional
affairs, and must be consulted on parliamentary bills concerning provincial matters.
 DPR’s Authority: The DPR has the authority to pass legislation, the national budget, and
hold the government accountable. It has strong budgetary and monitoring powers.
 Committee System: The DPR operates through 11 standing committees, a budget
committee, and two steering committees. Special committees can be formed for
investigative purposes.
 Parliamentary Work: The “balkanization” of parliamentary work due to distinct
committee procedures makes the legislative process complex and challenging for external
influence.

 MP Composition: Most MPs are former government officials or businessmen, with an

increasing number of military retirees playing significant roles.
 Legislative Efficiency: The DPR has been relatively inefficient, with only half of the
prioritized legislative processes concluded between 2005 and 2009.
 Prolegnas: The National Legislative Program identifies priority bills, with initial drafts
mostly developed by government ministries.
 Bill Development: Parliamentary initiatives require at least ten signatures to proceed.
Bills from the DPD must be adopted as DPR initiatives.
 Legislative Process: Once a bill is assigned to a committee, the government can delay
deliberations. Bills are passed usually without a formal vote, following a consensus norm.
 Government Veto: The government has an effective veto over legislation, with special
interests sometimes using this to maintain the status quo.
  Final Stages: In the second stage, formal votes are rare and party discipline is low. If no
agreement is reached, the bill fails; if passed, it becomes law after the president’s
signature or 30 days without it.

Other Agencies of Horizontal Accountability

 Horizontal Accountability: Includes the Audit Board (BPK), Judicial Commission

(KY), and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which have emerged as key
institutions to check government power.
 Vertical Accountability: Comprises the General Election Commission (KPU), Election
Monitoring Body (Bawaslu), National Ombudsman, and National Human Rights
Commission (Komnas HAM), overseeing elections and protecting political rights and
civil liberties.
 Constitutional and Supreme Courts: The Constitutional Court (MK) and the Supreme
Court (MA) bridge horizontal and vertical accountability, interpreting laws and
overseeing justice.
 KPK’s Role: Established in 2002, the KPK is an autonomous body with significant
public attention, empowered to investigate corruption and bypass issues in the criminal
justice system.
 KPK’s Impact: Initially focused on mid-ranking officials, it expanded to high-ranking
figures since 2009, working with Anticorruption Courts (Tipikor) which have a high
conviction rate.
 Challenges to KPK: Faced with political pushback, the DPR limited its decision-making
freedom and increased professional Tipikor judges, while legal loopholes threaten its
independence, allowing police to suspend KPK members under investigation.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM

 Legal Systems:
o Traditional, customary or adat law.
o Islamic law.
o State law based on Roman Dutch civil law.

 Legal Pluralism:
o Integrates diverse communities into the nation.
o Can cause conflicts due to contradictions between adat, Islamic, and state laws.

 Adat Law:
o Lighter sentences can preempt harsher state law penalties.
o Used by judges to prosecute offenses based on personal justice rather than
criminal laws.

 Islamic Law:
 o Incorporated into state law during Suharto’s New Order, mainly for family,
inheritance, and banking.

 Decentralization:
o Since 1999, local Sharia-based regulations (perda) for moral enhancement are
allowed.

 Judicial System:
o State courts (pengadilan negara) at district level.
o Court of appeals at provincial level.
o Religious courts (pengadilan agama) subject to Supreme Court review.

 New Order Government:

o Courts were instruments of power.
o Corruption scandals post-1999 damaged the judiciary’s reputation.

 Recent Developments:
o Specialized courts for administrative, tax, human rights, and labor disputes.
o Institutional friction and jurisdictional disputes.

 International Rankings:
o Weak capacity and corruption reflected in low rankings on World Bank’s Rule of
Law and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.

 Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK):

o Established in 2003, known for independence and efficiency.
o Nine judges selected by the Supreme Court, DPR’s Committee III, and a
presidential commission.
o Judges serve a 5-year term, renewable once, and have full administrative and
budgetary autonomy.

 Roles of the Constitutional Court:

o Judicial review of parliamentary laws.
o Resolution of constitutional disputes among political institutions.
o Oversight of election disputes, party bans, and presidential impeachment
admissibility.

 Case Types:
o Primarily hears election complaints.
o Handles judicial reviews and institutional disputes.

 Constitutional Complaints:
o Allows individuals and entities to seek judicial review if they believe an act of
parliament infringes their constitutional rights.

 Court’s Reputation:
 o Initially established as a guardian of the constitutional order.
o Struck down laws restricting its jurisdiction and annulled repressive criminal law
provisions.

 Significant Rulings:
o Invalidated laws deregulating key sectors like oil, natural gas, energy, and water.
o Declared parts of the national budget unconstitutional.
o Changed the electoral system from closed-party list to open-list PR system.

 Limitations:
o Court decisions don’t affect ongoing proceedings or past verdicts.
o Voiding a law doesn’t impact the government regulation implementing it.

 Supreme Court’s Role:

o Reviews administrative regulations and executive orders.
o Rarely accepts cases on the constitutionality of these regulations.

 Government’s Circumvention:
o Can reintroduce invalidated laws as government regulations.

 Constitutional Court’s Success:

o Used by CSOs to hold government and parliament accountable.
o Acts as a mediator in elite disputes, contributing to political depolarization.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS

 Historical Context:
o Indirectly elected People’s Council (Volksraad) established by the Dutch in 1918.
o First general election held in 1955.
o New Order regime (from 1971) manipulated elections in favor of Golkar party.

 Electoral Reforms (1999-2003):

o Introduced free and fair direct elections for president and parliament.
o Since 1999: Four DPR elections, three DPD elections, and three presidential
elections.

 Voting and Candidacy:

o Minimum voting age: 17 years (married persons can vote regardless of age).
o Military and police personnel cannot vote.
o Candidates must be at least 21, profess a religion, and have a high school
diploma.

 Presidential Elections:
o Candidates run on joint tickets in a two-round system.
 o Parties/coalitions need at least 25% of the national vote or 20% of parliamentary
seats to nominate candidates.

 DPR Electoral System:

o Proportional representation with closed lists (1999), restricted open lists (2004),
and open lists (since 2009).
o Parties must have offices in most provinces and districts to nominate candidates.
o Parties must exceed a 3.5% national vote threshold to enter parliament.

 Seat Allocation:
o Hare quota method used for initial seat allocation.
o Remaining seats distributed based on the largest remainder method.

 DPD Elections:
o Candidates run individually.
o Each province elects four members through a single non-transferable vote system.

 Election Administration:
o General Election Commission (KPU) organizes all levels of elections.
o Approximately 15,000 seats filled on a single election day.

 Challenges:
o Logistical difficulties due to synchronized national and subnational elections.
o Budget cuts and last-minute law revisions impact election organization.
o Issues with illegal political financing and vote buying.

 Electoral Integrity:
o Despite challenges, Indonesia’s elections are rated favorably for integrity
regionally and globally.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM

 Post-1998 Party Foundations: Most political parties were established after 1998,
reflecting changes in Indonesian religious life and a move away from traditional political
alignments (de-aliranization).
 Pre-Suharto Political Streams: Some current parties trace their origins to the politik
aliran of the pre-Suharto era, represented by five main streams:
o Nationalists: National Party of Indonesia (PNI).
o Islam: NU and Masyumi.
o Javanese Traditionalists: Partindo.
o Social Democrats: PSI.
o Communists: PKI (later eliminated by Suharto).

 Suharto’s New Order Regime:

 o Merged Islamic parties into the United Development Party (PPP).
o Merged PNI with other non-Islamic and nationalist parties into the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI).
o Established Golkar as the dominant party with local representation through
government officials.

 Post-New Order Expansion: The fall of Suharto’s regime led to an expanded party
system, including:
o Traditionalist parties like the National Awakening Party (PKB).
o Modernist parties like the National Mandate Party (PAN).
o Moderate Islamist parties like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).
o The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati
Sukarnoputri.

 New Nationalist Parties: Formed or led by former military officers, including:

o The Democratic Party of former President Yudhoyono.
o The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) of Prabowo.
o The Hanura Party of Wiranto.

 Party System Evolution:

o Transition from a hegemonic system under Suharto to a highly fractionalized
multiparty system.
o Increased competitiveness with more evenly distributed voter support among
parties.

 Political Competition:
o The effective number of political parties rose from 1.9 under Suharto to 8.2 in
2014.
o High competitiveness indicated by the narrow vote margin between the strongest
and second-strongest parties.

 Democracy and Party Institutionalization:

o Scholars debate the impact of party evolution on democracy in Indonesia.
o Indonesian parties are considered well institutionalized compared to other
Southeast Asian nations.
o National electoral rules and the prohibition of local/regional parties encourage
broad national campaigning.

 Nationalization of Party System:

o Higher nationalization compared to Thailand or the Philippines.
o Positive impact on the democratic system’s political performance.

 Convergence to Political Center:

o Parties are converging towards the center, leading to broad multiparty coalitions.

 Shift to Personalistic Politics:

 o The 2009 shift to a candidate-centric system has encouraged personalistic
campaigning.
o Direct executive elections have increased focus on presidential races.

 Creation of New Parties:

o Direct elections and decentralization have incentivized the formation of new
parties.
o Empowerment of local actors and increased electoral localism.

 Coalition Politics:
o Existence of an inclusive party cartel to minimize election risks and share power
and resources.
o Contrasting views on whether this benefits or hinders democratic consolidation.

State Administration and Decentralization

 Post-Suharto Challenges:
o The fall of Suharto in 1998 led to a rapid erosion of state capacity.
o Fears of national disintegration were heightened by violent conflicts, both
communal and separatist.
o Horizontal conflicts, often ethnic or religious, persisted until 2001 and
occasionally resurfaced.

 Factors Contributing to Violence:

o Suharto’s transmigration policy favored Javanese migrants over indigenous
populations, leading to land and income conflicts.
o Weakening control mechanisms and an overwhelmed security force allowed
conflicts to escalate.

 Roots of Separatist Conflicts:

o Conflicts in Aceh and Papua had historical roots in colonial and Suharto-era
policies.
o Separatist movements like GAM and OPM intensified their struggles during the
early reformasi period.

 Overcoming Political Challenges:

o Indonesia has rebuilt its administrative state capacity and political order.
o Structural, institutional, and fiscal reforms addressed demands for autonomy,
improving center-periphery relations.

 Democracy’s High Price:

o Concessions to conservative forces have kept the quality of democracy low.
o Power abuse and corruption have decentralized from Jakarta to local levels.
o Critics argue that reforms were extensive but lacked a long-term integrated
solution.
  Historical Context:
o Post-1950s, the New Order re-centralized control to the village level.
o Since 1979, Indonesia has had a deconcentrated structure with provinces, districts,
subdistricts, and villages.

 Decentralization Post-Suharto:
o The transition favored districts, transferring significant civil service employees
and agencies to regional governments.
o Local parliaments gained real legislative power, with direct elections for local
heads introduced post-2004.

 Fiscal Decentralization:
o Subnational expenditure share increased from 15.8% to 39% by 2011.
o Despite this, districts and provinces remain financially dependent on Jakarta.

 Challenges to Administrative Capacity:

o The proliferation of provinces and districts (“blossoming”) has led to inefficient
allocation of underqualified personnel.
o Financial incentives have not encouraged reduction of administrative staff to
sustainable levels.

 Impact on Socioeconomic Landscape:

o Decentralization has not homogenized economic performance across Indonesia.
o Economic growth is concentrated in a few districts despite some convergence at
the provincial level.

CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS

 Origins and Early Role:

o The TNI’s roots go back to the Dutch colonial era and the struggle for
independence (1945-1949).
o Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, the military was crucial in suppressing
regional rebellions and political opposition.

 Territorial Structure:
o The military’s command structure paralleled the civilian administration down to
the village level, enhancing its political influence.

 Dual Function Doctrine:

o Institutionalized during the New Order, it allowed the military to perform
sociopolitical roles alongside traditional defense duties.
o The military held significant power in politics, with reserved seats in parliament
and control over key administrative positions.

 Economic Influence:
 o The military managed state enterprises and established foundations for business
interests, expanding its role in the economy.

 Decline of Military Dominance:

o Suharto’s increasingly personalist rule in the late 1970s reduced the military’s
political clout.
o The military became factionalized due to Suharto’s patronage politics.

 Transition to Reformasi:
o The Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent unrest led to Suharto’s resignation in
1998.
o Habibie took over as interim president, tasked with economic reforms and
democratization, including reducing the military’s power.

 Stalled Military Reforms:

o Progress on military reform has slowed, with key legislation on military justice
and national security stalled in parliament.
o The defense and security legislation restricts parliamentary oversight, and the
Ministry of Defense is not yet an effective civilian policy-making body.

 Democratic Control Challenges:

o The effectiveness of democratic control over the TNI largely depends on the
relationship between civilian leaders and military officials.

 Civilianization of Internal Security:

o Internal security operations are not fully under civilian control due to ambiguous
regulations, leading to conflicts with civilian police forces.

 Pending Law Implementation:

o Laws regulating military businesses and their conversion to civilian businesses are
awaiting implementation, as is the ban on individual military business activities.

 Military Accountability Issues:

o Little progress has been made in improving military accountability or addressing
the military’s “culture of impunity.”
o Reports of violence against civilians and suppression of protests against military
business activities continue, with minimal legal consequences for offenders.

Civil Society and Patterns of Political Orientations

 Deepening Democracy:
o Responsiveness of authorities to social demands could enhance the deepening of
Indonesia’s democracy.

 Emergence of Civil Society:

 o A vibrant civil society has emerged, with a significant increase in civil society
organizations (CSOs), including labor unions and advocacy groups.
o Islamic organizations like Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are pivotal in the
civil society landscape.

 New Order’s Organizational Pluralism:

o The New Order regime allowed some pluralism but suppressed civil society
activism that challenged the government.
o “Self-reliant community institutions” (LSMs) were developed to avoid
confrontation with the regime.

 Civil Society under Suharto:

o Estimated 600-800,000 NGOs and CSOs existed by 1990, with LSMs comprising
about half.
o Golkar’s network incorporated many associations, limiting the rise of civil society
as a political force.

 Post-Suharto Civil Society:

o The fall of Suharto saw a brief resurgence in civil society cooperation, which
waned as political battles moved to institutional arenas.
o Despite new civic associationalism, civil society remains divided between urban,
secular groups and conservative, rural organizations.

 Civil Society’s Influence on Reforms:

o NGOs have forged relationships with political leaders and have been instrumental
in pushing for constitutional and legal reforms, including civil-military relations
and anti-corruption measures.

 Role in Democracy:
o Civil society activists, despite criticism for foreign funding and government
cooperation, have been pivotal in deepening democracy and safeguarding
reforms.

 Peaceful Advocacy:
o Conservative groups, including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), advocate peaceful
engagement and moderate Islamic interpretations, contributing to “Civil Islam.”

 Conflict Resolution:
o Religious organizations have played a role in resolving communal violence by
fostering local concordance democracies.

 Challenges of Uncivil Society:

o Some associations may inadvertently foster exclusion and intercommunal tensions
by reinforcing insular identities.
o Groups like the Islamic Defender Front represent the negative aspects of uncivil
society through vigilantism and intolerance.
MEDIA SYSTEM

 Post-Suharto Media Liberalization:

o Restrictions on media were lifted, and constitutional freedoms for expression and
press were established.
o The print media landscape became pluralistic and free from licensing
requirements.

 Media Regulation and Oversight:

o The Press Council (Dewan Pers) has been adjudicating media disputes since 1999.
o The Ministry for Communication and Information Technology and the
Broadcasting Commission (KPI) oversee broadcast media licensing and
compliance.

 Challenges to Media Freedom:

o Flaws in the implementation of information transparency laws and the prohibition
of blasphemy pose threats to media freedom.
o Press freedom has seen a decline due to media tycoons influencing news and
violence against journalists.

 Media Consumption Trends:

o Television is the primary source of political information for 90% of Indonesians.
o Internet access is growing, with over half of the population now connected.

 Broadcast Media Landscape:

o Ten media conglomerates and two 24-hour news networks compete for
viewership, while the state broadcaster TVRI struggles with low ratings despite
balanced coverage.

 Media Ownership and Political Links:

o Most private media conglomerates are connected to political parties, yet they
manage to maintain balanced reporting.
o Concerns exist about the concentration of media ownership among 12
corporations, which could potentially impact media pluralism and democracy.

 Media Freedom and Reporting:

o Despite fears of self-censorship, Indonesian media has a record of investigative
journalism on sensitive political issues.
o High-profile corruption cases and environmental issues have been subjects of
critical media reporting.

 Media’s Role in Democracy:

o The media sector, more open than in some neighboring countries, plays a crucial
role in voter education and political campaigning.