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Mckinsey Global Private Markets Review 2024
Mckinsey Global Private Markets Review 2024
Mckinsey Global Private Markets Review 2024
A slower era
McKinsey Global Private Markets Review 2024
March 2024
Copyright © 2024 McKinsey & Company.
All rights reserved.
1 2 3
Private markets in 6 Private equity down 18 Real estate recedes 32
a slower era but not out Closed-end funds 33
Fundraising 7 Fundraising 19 Open-end funds 36
AUM 12 AUM 23 Deal activity 38
Performance 14 Performance 24 US markets by sector 41
Spotlight on secondaries 15 Deal activity 26 Transforming real estate with 43
Spotlight on non- 16 generative artificial intelligence
institutional capital
4 5 6
Private debt pays 44 Infrastructure and natural 51 Private markets make 55
dividends resources take a detour measured progress in DEI
Fundraising 45 Fundraising 52 Representation of women 57
AUM 47 AUM 54 Ethnic and racial representation 59
Performance 47 Performance 54 The path forward 60
Deal activity 48 Looking ahead 54
Private debt’s expanding footprint 49
Authors 62
Further insights 62
Acknowledgments 63
Executive summary
Welcome to the 2024 edition of McKinsey’s annual in line with global totals, while in Europe, fundraising
review of private markets investing. Our ongoing proved most resilient, falling just 3 percent. In
research on the industry’s dynamics and performance Asia, fundraising fell precipitously and now sits
has revealed several insights, including the 72 percent below the region’s 2018 peak.
following trends:
Despite difficult fundraising conditions, headwinds
Macroeconomic challenges continued. If 2022 did not affect all strategies or managers equally.
was a tale of two halves, with robust fundraising and Private equity (PE) buyout strategies posted their best
deal activity in the first six months followed by a fundraising year ever, and larger managers and
slowdown in the second half, then 2023 might be vehicles also fared well, continuing the prior year’s
considered a tale of one whole. Macroeconomic trend toward greater fundraising concentration.
headwinds persisted throughout the year, with rising
financing costs and an uncertain growth outlook The numerator effect persisted. Despite a marked
taking a toll on private markets. Full-year fundraising recovery in the denominator—the 1,000 largest
continued to decline from 2021’s lofty peak, weighed US retirement funds grew 7 percent in the year ending
down by the “denominator effect” that persisted September 2023 after falling 14 percent the prior
in part due to a less active deal market. Managers year,1 for example—many LPs remain overexposed
largely held onto assets to avoid selling in a lower- to private markets relative to their target allocations.
multiple environment, fueling an activity-dampening LPs started 2023 overweight: according to analysis
cycle in which distribution-starved limited partners from CEM Benchmarking, average allocations
(LPs) reined in new commitments. across PE, infrastructure, and real estate were at or
above target allocations as of the beginning of
Performance in most private asset classes remained the year. And the numerator grew throughout the
below historical averages for a second consecutive year, as a lack of exits and rebounding valuations
year. Decade-long tailwinds from low and falling drove net asset values (NAVs) higher. While not all
interest rates and consistently expanding multiples LPs strictly follow asset allocation targets, our
seem to be things of the past. As private market analysis in partnership with global private markets
managers look to boost performance in this new era firm StepStone Group suggests that an overallocation
of investing, a deeper focus on revenue growth and of just one percentage point can reduce planned
margin expansion will be needed now more than ever. commitments by as much as 10 to 12 percent per
year for five years or more.
Global fundraising contracted. Fundraising fell
22 percent across private market asset classes Despite these headwinds, recent surveys indicate
globally to just over $1 trillion, as of year-end reported that LPs remain broadly committed to private markets.
data—the lowest total since 2017. Fundraising in In fact, the majority plan to maintain or increase
North America, a rare bright spot in 2022, declined allocations over the medium to long term.
1
“U.S. retirement plans recover half of 2022 losses amid no-show recession,” Pensions and Investments, February 12, 2024.
If private markets investors entered 2023 hoping for a return to the heady days of 2021, they
likely left the year disappointed. Many of the headwinds that emerged in the latter half of 2022
persisted throughout the year, pressuring fundraising, dealmaking, and performance. Inflation
moderated somewhat over the course of the year but remained stubbornly elevated by recent
historical standards. Interest rates started high and rose higher, increasing the cost of financing.
A reinvigorated public equity market recovered most of 2022’s losses but did little to resolve
the valuation uncertainty private market investors have faced for the past 18 months.
Within private markets, the denominator effect remained in play, despite the public market
recovery, as the numerator continued to expand. An activity-dampening cycle emerged: higher
cost of capital and lower multiples limited the ability or willingness of general partners (GPs)
to exit positions; fewer exits, coupled with continuing capital calls, pushed limited partner
allocations higher, thereby limiting their ability or willingness to make new commitments. These
conditions weighed on managers’ ability to fundraise. Based on data reported as of year-end
2023, private markets fundraising fell 22 percent from the prior year to just over $1 trillion, the
largest such drop since 2009.
The impact of the fundraising environment was not felt equally among GPs. Continuing a trend
that emerged in 2022, and consistent with prior downturns in fundraising, LPs favored larger
vehicles and the scaled GPs that typically manage them. Smaller and newer managers struggled,
and the number of sub–$1 billion vehicles and new firm launches each declined to its lowest level
in more than a decade.
Despite the decline in fundraising, private markets assets under management (AUM) continued
to grow, increasing 12 percent to $13.1 trillion as of June 30, 2023. 2023 fundraising was still
the sixth-highest annual haul on record, pushing dry powder higher, while the slowdown in deal
making limited distributions.
Exhibit 1
Asset class
Infrastructure
Private and natural
markets Private equity Real estate Private debt resources
North America Total, $ billion 681 424 84 117 55
2022–23, $ billion –191 –83 –49 –20 –38
YoY change, % –22 –16 –37 –15 –41
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 2of <44>
<2>
1,348
1,234
1,120 1,149 2022–23
1,046 growth, %
1,005
899 Total –22.4
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit 3
Exhibit <3> of <44>
Average allocations for private equity and real estate exceeded average
target allocations in 2023.
Difference between effective and policy allocations by private markets asset class by year,1 %
1.5
Overallocation Private equity
Real estate
1.0
Infrastructure
Private debt
0.5
0.0
–0.5
–1.0
Underallocation
–1.5
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
1
Data as of the beginning of the year.
Source: CEM Benchmarking
2
“U.S. retirement plans recover half of 2022 losses amid no-show recession,” Pensions and Investments, February 12, 2024.
3
McKinsey GP-LP Private Markets survey, January 2024.
14 12 15 15 10 13 14 11 12 10 11 12 13 10 12
16 16 17 16 17 17 16 Top 5
23 18 6 5 6 5 6
7 7 5 7 6 7
9 8 7 7 9 10 5
11 10 8 12 9 13 11 12 11 10 10 Top 6–10
13 11 13 10 15
9 14 13 10
14 14 13 14
16 15 13 16 15 Top 11–25
20
18 27 24 22 21 20 22
27 26 23
30 25 23
29 26 24 25 25
24 28 24 Top 26–100
30 17 18
32 18 17 16 17
29 21 16 16
22 21
19 18 20 17
21 25 20 16 16 Top 101–250
18
20 33 34 33 29 32 35
16 20 27 30 27
18 19 21 18 20 22 22 21 19 Long-tail
13 13 13 managers
7 5 5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
2023
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit 5
Exhibit <5> of <44>
Real estate, private debt, and infrastructure raised their largest funds
on record in 2023.
Largest fund by asset class Private equity Real estate Private debt Infrastructure and
and close year,1 $ billion natural resources
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 20182 2021 2023
1
Excludes secondaries, funds of funds, and co-investment vehicles.
2
For scale purposes, the chart excludes a $98.5 billion PE fund that closed in 2018.
Source: Preqin
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 6of <44>
<6>
486
135
213
242
North 1,047
2,393 989
America
725
625
1,079
4
Due to a lag in reported data, market dynamics in the second half of 2023 are not reflected in reported AUM figures.
Exhibit 7
6.4 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.7 7.1 7.5 8.5 10.1 Private equity
6.4 6.4 6.9 7.3 7.0 7.3 7.3 7.0 6.6
3.5 3.6 3.9 7.8 Real estate
1.0 1.0 4.4 4.6 5.0
1.1 5.2 5.1 5.4
3.9 4.0 1.2 1.3
4.4 1.6 2.0 1.8
4.2 4.0 2.1 6.4 Infrastructure2
4.2 4.0 3.5 3.2
2.7 Private credit3
3.3 Multi-asset strategies
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Closed-end real estate funds also lost money in PE remains the best-performing private markets
2023, producing a net IRR of −3.5 percent amid asset class over the long run. The median net
slowing rent growth and cap rate expansion. The IRR for PE funds raised between 2011 and 2020 was
performance decline occurred across sectors, 16.4 percent as of September 30, 2023, which
including in multifamily and industrial. These two exceeds the top-quartile return of all other private
sectors had outperformed in the prior year, asset classes. At the same time, the spread between
which helped offset the broader decline resulting top- and bottom-quartile PE funds of the above
from poor performance of the office sector. vintages was 15 percentage points, 300 basis points
in spread more than any other asset class (Exhibit 8).
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 8of <44>
<8>
24.0
15.2
16.4 15.7
14.1 13.5
12.2 12.0 5.0 8.2
9.8 10.2
8.8 9.0 11.9
7.0 7.6
5.9
3.5
1.6
1
IRR spreads calculated for separate vintage years for 2011–20 and then averaged out. Median IRR was calculated by taking the average of the median IRR for
funds within each vintage year. Net IRR to date through Sept 30, 2023.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Markets chapter>
Exhibit 9
Exhibit <9> of <X>
+92% 29.6
48.5
43.7
39.7
34.6 35.8 19.3 33.3 73.2
25.5 26.9 28.0
12.9 11.7
21.8 33.1 29.0
5.3 17.6 46.5
16.6 3.9 14.6
13.3 14.5
6.6 29.2
5.1 21.8 21.7 24.0
17.9 15.7 13.4
10.0 8.3 11.0 10.6 10.7
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
5
Global secondary market review, Jefferies, January 2024.
6
McKinsey’s Performance Lens Global Growth Cube.
7
CEM Benchmarking.
8
Cerulli; GP annual reports.
Despite the difficult fundraising context, a subset of strategies and managers prevailed. Buyout
managers collectively had their best fundraising year on record, raising more than $400 billion.
Fundraising in Europe surged by more than 50 percent, resulting in the region’s biggest haul
ever. The largest managers raised an outsized share of the total for a second consecutive year,
making 2023 the most concentrated fundraising year of the last decade.
Despite the drop in aggregate fundraising, PE assets under management increased 8 percent
to $8.2 trillion. Only a small part of this growth was performance driven: PE funds produced a net
IRR of just 2.5 percent through September 30, 2023. Buyouts and growth equity generated
positive returns, while VC lost money. PE performance, dating back to the beginning of 2022,
remains negative, highlighting the difficulty of generating attractive investment returns in
a higher interest rate and lower multiple environment. As PE managers devise value creation
strategies to improve performance, their focus includes ensuring operating efficiency and
profitability of their portfolio companies.
Deal activity volume and count fell sharply, by 21 percent and 24 percent, respectively, which
continued the slower pace set in the second half of 2022. Sponsors largely opted to hold assets
longer rather than lock in underwhelming returns. While higher financing costs and valuation
mismatches weighed on overall deal activity, certain types of M&A gained share. Add-on deals,
for example, accounted for a record 46 percent of total buyout deal volume last year.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit 10
Exhibit <10> of <44>
300
200
100
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
1
Excludes secondaries, funds of funds, and co-investment vehicles.
2
Includes turnaround, PIPE, balanced, hybrid funds, and funds with unspecified strategy.
Source: Preqin
9
Preqin.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 11of <44>
<11>
9 10 12 13 13 13 11 10 10 9 8 8 9 10 10 9 8 9 8 9 Top 5
13
6 5 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 6 Top 6–10
7 7 7 7
7 9 9 8 10 11 10
13 9 10 10 10 9 10 10 11 11 10 Top 11–25
14 13 11
14 13 13 13
20 19 20 19 20 22
23 23 22 21 20 20 Top 26–100
24 21 23
24
23 23 22 22 22
14 14 14 14 14
16 14 14 15 Top 101–250
17 17 17
17 17
19 16 15 15 15
18 16
41 43 42 42 43 41 39 Long-tail
40
34 35 35 37 39 managers
28 26 26 28 28 29 30 33
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 10-year
2023 average
Exhibit 12
14 12 15 15 10 11
19 16 17 15 15 16 17 16
21 20 22 21 20 24 24
31 26 26 25 7 8
10 9 8 6 7
8 7 9 10 8
12 7 14 12 12
11 11 11 13 6
12 15 12 15 13 13
16 11 13 13 13 14 14 14
12 16
12 18
16 16 17 16 21
16 17 17 24
15 19 25 21 22
31 29 20 24 23
30 22 28 31 22
24 26
31 31 26 24 22 23 18 16
18
18 17
32 25 15 15 15 16
23 21 18
20 17 21 19 15
18 16 15 14
30
17 18 13 24 27 27 23 22 25 21 23
12 14 16 13
10 9 11 9 5 11 12 12 11
4 4 8
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 10-year
2023 average
Source: Preqin
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
13 12 13 17 24 20 10 17 19 18 18 30 9 9 9 5 6
1
Excludes secondaries, funds of funds, and co-investment vehicles.
Source: Preqin
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 14of <44>
<14>
Larger buyout funds have smaller performance spreads between top- and
bottom-performing funds.
Global buyout fund performance,1 IRR for 2000–20 vintage funds, %
50 Top 5%
Top quartile
40
Median
52% 46% Bottom quartile
30 37%
Bottom 5%
35% 25%
20 18% Difference
between top
10 and bottom 5%
–10
–20
Venture Small cap Mid cap Large cap Mega cap Super cap
capital (< $1 billion) ($1–3 billion) ($3–5 billion) ($5–10 billion) (> $10 billion)
1
Fund performance assessed using IRR calculated by grouping performance of 2000–20 vintage buyout funds during 2000–23. Some data not available for
certain periods.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 15of <44>
<15>
3-year trailing
3.0
2.0
1.0
0
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
1
Capital committed but not deployed, divided by equity deal volume. Equity deal volume estimated using transaction volume and leverage figures for the full year.
Dry powder for 2023 is based on figure as of June 30, 2023.
Source: PitchBook; Preqin
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 16of <44>
<16>
50 Buyout
Growth
40
Venture capital
30
20
10
–10
–20
–30
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
1
Fund performance assessed using IRR calculated by grouping performance of 2000–20 funds during 2000–23. Some data not available for certain periods.
IRR for 2023 is YTD as of Sept 30, 2023.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
10
As of September 30, 2023.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 17of <44>
<17>
Buyout funds have higher average returns and lower dispersion than
venture capital.
Performance by private equity strategy, median IRR and
quartile spreads for 2011–20 vintage funds,1 % Top 25% Median Bottom 25%
25.4
24.0 23.7
13.6
18.1
15.2 16.9
16.4 16.0
15.7
11.8 11.5
9.8
8.8
7.7
5.4
1
IRR spreads calculated for funds for separate vintage years from 2011–20 and then averaged out. Median IRR was calculated by taking the average of the
median IRR for funds within each vintage year; net IRR to date through Sept 30, 2023.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
11
MSCI Private Capital Solutions.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit 18of <44>
Exhibit <18>
1.0× 3.0×
0.7× –0.3×
–0.2×
2.0×
0.2×
0.7×
1.0×
Deal volume decreased 23 percent in North Deal volumes in the information technology and
America, to just under $1.1 trillion, and 19 percent energy sectors declined the most year over
in Europe, to $740 billion. The steepest decline year, decreasing by 38 percent and 31 percent,
was in Asia, where deal volume decreased 26 percent respectively. Meanwhile, deal volume grew in
to $200 billion. two sectors: materials and resources and financial
services (Exhibit 20).
Global buyout deal volume declined 19 percent to
$1.5 trillion, while growth equity fell 14 percent Non-platform (also known as add-on) deals have
to $240 billion. VC deal volume declined the most consistently grown in popularity as a means for
among PE strategies, dropping 36 percent to established portfolio platforms to accelerate growth
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit 19of <44>
Exhibit <19>
Global private equity deal volume,1 Global private equity deal count,1
$ billion number of deals, thousands
3,500 80
3,405
75.5
70 70.9
3,000
–17.1
2,687 (–24%)
60
2,500
–576 53.8
(–21%)
50
2,110
2,000
40
1,500
30
1,000
20
500
10
0 0
2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2023 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020 2023
1
Includes buyout/LBO (add-on, asset acquisition, carve-out, corporate divestiture, debt conversion, distressed acquisition, management buyout, management
buy-in, privatization, recapitalization, public-to-private, secondary buyout); growth/expansion (recapitalization, dividend recapitalization, and leveraged
recapitalization); platform creation; angel; seed round early-stage VC; later-stage VC; restarts (angel, early-stage VC, later-stage VC).
Source: PitchBook
1,775
675
1,627 492
520
423 736
1,356 473
641
415 456
370 409
452
305 391
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit 21of <44>
Exhibit <21>
58 56 57 54 Platform
68 66 62 64 63 59 59
72 69 68
42 44 43 46 Non-platform
32 34 38 36 37 41 41
28 31 32
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Non-platform
49 53 52 54 55 56 57 57 60 63 65 68 72 70 deals, % of
deal count
Source: PitchBook
12
PitchBook.
13
Ibid.
14
StepStone Group.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Equity chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 22of <44>
<22>
15x 14.6
12.3 12.6
11.8 11.9 11.7 11.7 11.9 12.1
11.3 11.5 11.3
10.7
11.1 11.0 11.3
10.6
10.1 9.9 10.0
10x 9.7 9.4
8.7 8.7
8.3
7.7 7.5 7.7 7.5
6.6
5x
0x
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 20231
1
Global buyout and MSCI World data as of Sept 29, 2023.
Source: Bloomberg; SPI by StepStone
8x
–1.2×
6x
–0.9×
4x
2x
0x
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
US buyout leverage declined by roughly one turn for buyout deals from 2010 to 2021, according
in 2023, falling from 7.1 to 5.9 times EBITDA for to the StepStone Group. Reduced use of leverage
large corporate deals, and from 5.0 to 4.1 times for in the current environment, combined with the
middle-market deals (Exhibit 23). Higher financing higher cost of financing, will have a mitigating effect
costs and lower valuation multiples contributed on investment returns for the current vintage of
to a marked decline in the use of leverage from the deals, all else equal. This trend, combined with lower
previous year’s record high. exit multiples (should they sustain), will make
operational improvements within portfolio
Historical PE performance has been driven companies critical for investment outperformance
significantly by leverage, which accounted for in the current environment.
approximately 50 percent of investment returns
Managers faced one of the toughest fundraising environments in many years. Global closed-end
fundraising declined 34 percent to $125 billion. While fundraising challenges were widespread,
they were not ubiquitous across strategies. Dollars continued to shift to large, multi-asset class
platforms, with the top five managers accounting for 37 percent of aggregate closed-end real
estate fundraising. In April, the largest real estate fund ever raised closed on a record $30 billion.
Capital shifted away from core and core-plus strategies as investors sought liquidity through
redemptions in open-end vehicles and reduced gross contributions to the lowest level since
2009. Opportunistic strategies benefited from this shift, as investors turned their attention
toward capital appreciation over income generation in a market where alternative sources of
yield have grown more attractive.
In the United States, for instance, open-end funds, as represented by the National Council of
Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Fund Index – Open End Equity (NFI-OE) Index, recorded
$13 billion in net outflows in 2023, reversing the trend of positive net inflows throughout the 2010s.
The negative flows mainly reflected $9 billion in core outflows, with core-plus funds accounting
for the remaining outflows, which reversed a 20-year run of net inflows.
As a result, the NAV in US open-end funds fell roughly 16 percent year over year. Meanwhile,
global assets under management in closed-end funds reached a new peak of $1.7 trillion as of
June 2023, growing 14 percent between June 2022 and June 2023.
15
Based on NCREIFs NPI index. Hotels represent 1 percent of total properties in the index.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit 24of <44>
Exhibit <24>
194 71 191
164 47
153 156
68 –34%
143 2018–23 2022–23
132 CAGR, % growth, %
41 56 125
52 77
115 39
108 Total –5.2 –34.3
41 37
85
89 28 33 Value added –7.7 –44.6
49 67
70 22 53 42
70 42 Opportunistic2 0.4 –18.4
11 40 51 55
51 27
44 29 Debt –9.7 –30.5
35 39 28
33
27 17 22 20 Core and –8.5 –51.1
10 18 36 46
13 33 28 core-plus
14 17 18 24 21 14
11 13 11
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
16
CBRE; Real Capital Analytics.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 25of <44>
<25>
Top 5
Top 6–10
18 19 18 19 17
21 20 22 22 22 25 23 23 Top 11–25
25 24 25 27 27 27 Top 26–100
32
36 37 Top 101–250
39
45 8 9
10 9 9 Long-tail
10
11 9 9 managers
14 12 10 12 8
10 8 9 9
19 17
16 16 19
17 15 15
24 18 15 16 17
11
15 19 19 19 17 15
22 21
19
17
17
29 20
34 33
35 33 32
24 31
38 34 34 28 30
32 33 40 32
31 44 36
26 37
28
27
27 25 20 19 18 19
17 18 16 17
15 14 14 16 14 15
11 13 10
8 7 7 5
4 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 3
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
2023
18.6
11.9
–12.6
10.1 –13.9 9.7
8.3
3.4
1.9
> $5 billion $1–5 billion < $1 billion
Net IRR of funds through Sept 30, 2023. IRR spreads were calculated for funds within vintage years separately and then averaged out. Median IRR was
1
calculated by taking the average of the median IRR for funds within each vintage year.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
(Exhibit 26). Large managers leverage their scale to the change in the overall trend was driven by net
attract and retain talent, acquire diverse portfolios, outflows from core-plus vehicles that experienced
engage in systematic joint ventures with operators net outflows for the first time in two decades.
(or acquire operating companies in their entirety),
and invest in digital capabilities to enhance efficiency Returns
and gain valuable insights. Open-end fund performance declined considerably,
and the category fared worse than closed-end
funds. NFI-OE funds returned −12.2 percent on a net
Open-end funds basis, the first annual decline since the global
Within open-end funds in the United States, as financial crisis and a marked drop from the strong
represented by the NFI-OE Index, distributions and performance in 2021 and 2022.
redemptions exceeded contributions, reversing
the 2022 trend. Nearly $13 billion in capital flowed Given elevated interest rates and uncertain demand,
out of US open-end funds in 2023, compared cap rates expanded approximately 60 basis
with net inflows approaching $3 billion in 2022 points to reach 5.1 and 5.7 percent in industrial and
(Exhibit 27). The reduction in net inflows mainly multifamily sectors respectively, while the office
resulted from a 74 percent ($23 billion) reduction in sector expanded by roughly 300 basis points,
gross contributions, which had reached a record reaching almost 11 percent (Exhibit 28). Unlike last
high during the prior year. While dollars have flowed year, rent growth did not offset cap rate expansion
out of core funds for five consecutive years, contributing to lower returns in most sectors.
Net outflows for US open-end funds reached $13 billion, the lowest
level on record.
Open-end real estate investor cash flows,1 $ billion
40 15
30 10
20
5
10
0
0
–5
–10
–20 –10
–12.6
–30 –15
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2023 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2023
1
NFI-OE includes real estate open-end vehicles across all strategies.
2
Contributions less distributions and redemptions.
Source: National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 28of <44>
<28>
12
10
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Exhibit 29
500
400
300
200
100
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
17
CoStar.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 30of <44>
<30>
Real estate deal volume declined across every major sub-asset class.
Global deal volume by sub-asset class,1 $ billion Hotel
Multifamily
1,464
Industrial
77
Retail
Other
1,215
Office
1,112 1,137 78
488
1,036 84
1,012 86 –56%
91 951 70
907 367
71 253 272 876
68 33
212 215
155 211
238 307
125 164 186 645
103 146 254
109 52
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
1
Commercial deal volume; excludes residential.
Source: CBRE; Real Capital Analytics
18
Erik Sherman, “The many implications of the narrowing bid–ask gap,” GlobeSt, January 16, 2024.
The behavioral changes caused by the in the most heavily affected city. Similarly, the pandemic. That said, the demand for
pandemic—lower office attendance, demand for retail space in the superstar residential space in urban cores will remain
accelerated migration out of cities, and less urban cores could be lower in 2030 than it higher than it was in 2019 in every city
shopping in office-heavy neighborhoods— was in 2019. In San Francisco’s urban studied, except San Francisco and Paris.
will reduce demand for real estate in most core, for example, the moderate scenario That estimate rests on the assumption
superstar cities (those with a disproportion- forecasts demand being 17 percent that, although the wave of residents who left
ate share of the world’s urban GDP and GDP lower (exhibit), and the severe scenario urban cores may not return, population
growth). In a moderate scenario modeled forecasts a 26 percent decrease. growth in each city will return to its prepan-
by the McKinsey Global Institute,1 demand demic rate by 2024. If population growth
for office space in the median city studied Demand for residences in superstar urban remains depressed longer, the impact on
is expected to be 13 percent lower in 2030 cores, before accounting for price adjust- demand could be bigger.
than it was in 2019. In a severe scenario, ments, could be up to 10 percent lower by
demand is expected to fall by 38 percent 2030 than it would have been without
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit <sidebar> of <44>
In a moderate scenario, demand for office and retail space falls sharply
from 2019 to 2030.
Change in demand for real estate before Change resulting from factors unrelated to the pandemic
prices adjust, 2019–30, % Change resulting from pandemic-driven behavior
Office space Residential space in urban cores1 Retail space in urban cores
–20 –10 0 10 0 10 20 30 –20 –10 0 10
San
Francisco −20 −2 −17
London
−11 6 −22
Houston
2 26 −3
Paris
−13 −4 −9
Munich
−16 8 −4
Tokyo
−9 12 −2
Beijing
2 5 −9
Shanghai
−14 3 1
Note: For more information about the scenario, see the technical appendix.
1
Demand for residential space in superstar cities is highly price elastic, so in the long run, these shifts would probably lead to a rebalancing of prices rather than
an actual reduction in demand.
Source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics; BNP Paribas; Colliers; Commercial Real Estate Intelligence Solutions; CoStar; Department for Levelling Up,
Housing and Communities (United Kingdom); E&G Real Estate; E-Stat (Japan); Eurostat; EW & Associates Realty; Federal Statistical Office (Germany); German
Property Partners; Kastle; Ministry of Beijing; Mitsui Fudosan; National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (France); National Statistics Institute (Spain);
Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom); RealAdvisor; Sanko Estate Company; Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics; Statistics Bureau of Japan; Tokyo
Metropolitan Government; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; US Census Bureau; McKinsey Global Institute analysis
1
For the full McKinsey Global Institute report and to read more about the pandemic’s effects on real estate and the implications for global demand, see “Empty spaces and
hybrid places: The pandemic’s lasting impact on real estate,” McKinsey Global Institute, July 13, 2023.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Real Estate chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 31of <44>
<31>
Deal volume declined across all real estate sectors in the US.
Multifamily Industrial Retail Office Hospitality
1
Average of 12-month occupancy for hospitality.
2
Revenue per available foot.
3
Net residential units absorbed, thousands of units.
Source: CoStar; Green Street; National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Property Index; Real Capital Analytics
19
National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF).
20
CoStar.
21
Ibid.
22
The markets are Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle, and Washington, DC.
23
CoStar.
24
Ibid.
Already, real estate players can enable several key use cases for gen AI:
— Sifting through mountains of leasing — Enabling visualization and creating — Drawing architectural plans known to
documentation. Gen AI can analyze new revenue streams. Gen AI tools can create desired outcomes. A gen-AI-
complex lease documents, making it help potential tenants visualize exactly assisted process can introduce Internet
easier for property owners and investors what an apartment would look like in, of Things sensors and computer vision
to find information at scale. The tool can say, their preferred midcentury modern algorithms that collect data points on
summarize key themes, such as monthly style or in cherrywood versus walnut space use, such as how customers move
rent and market factors, and generate finishes. This data can then be fed back through a store before purchase or
tables of information based on specific into a model to predict which types of when conference rooms are used in an
parameters, like rent price per square furnishings and finishes work best for office. The gen AI tool can then help
foot. Professionals can then review the different customer segments, which develop architectural plans that are
compiled information provided by could improve prospect-to-lease optimized to create desired outcomes in
the AI tool. conversion and shape future capital a space. Human architects and designers
expenditure decisions. can work from these plans to ensure
— Copiloting real estate interactions. Gen art and emotion in the design with less
AI can be used to create a powerful — Making faster, more precise investment guesswork over whether a space is
copilot―an AI-powered bot for various decisions. Today, investment decisions purpose driven.
real estate interactions, including are often informed through individual
tenant requests and lease negotiations. analysis of bespoke data pulls across Gen AI will not replace analytical AI; for some
The copilot can handle simple tenant sources. Gen AI can overlay this multi use cases (such as producing a rent forecast
requests such as routine maintenance faceted analysis on a list of properties or a retention prediction), more traditional
by directly contacting the building’s for sale to identify and prioritize machine learning excels. Rather, gen AI is
maintenance staff. For more complex specific assets meeting criteria for opening up never-before-possible use
questions, the copilot can flag tenant manual investigation. cases relevant to portions of the real estate
needs for a specialist at a property value chain that technology did not
management company. previously touch.
25
For more about gen AI and its potential role in the real estate industry, see Matt Fitzpatrick, Vaibhav Gujral, Ankit Kapoor, and Alex Wolkomir,
“Generative AI can change real estate, but the industry must change to reap the benefits,” McKinsey Quarterly, November 14, 2023.
For more about its potential impact across industries, see “The economic potential of generative AI: The next productivity frontier,” McKinsey,
June 14, 2023.
Private debt’s risk/return characteristics are well suited to the current environment. With interest
rates at their highest in more than a decade, current yields in the asset class have grown more
attractive on both an absolute and relative basis, particularly if higher rates sustain and put
downward pressure on equity returns. The built-in security derived from debt’s privileged position
in the capital structure, moreover, appeals to investors that are wary of market volatility and
valuation uncertainty.
Direct lending continued to be the largest strategy in 2023, with fundraising for the mostly-
senior-debt strategy accounting for almost half of the asset class’s total haul (despite declining
from the previous year). Separately, mezzanine debt fundraising hit a new high, thanks to the
closings of three of the largest funds ever raised in the strategy.
Over the longer term, growth in private debt has largely been driven by institutional investors
rotating out of traditional fixed income in favor of private alternatives. Despite this growth in
commitments, LPs remain underweight in this asset class relative to their targets. In fact, the
allocation gap has only grown wider in recent years, a sharp contrast to other private asset
classes, for which LPs’ current allocations exceed their targets on average. According to data
from CEM Benchmarking, the private debt allocation gap now stands at 1.4 percent, which
means that, in aggregate, investors must commit hundreds of billions in net new capital to the
asset class just to reach current targets.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Debt chapter>
Exhibit
Exhibit 32of <44>
<32>
75 72
65
41
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Private Debt chapter>
Exhibit 33of <44>
Exhibit <33>
8
Top 5 17 17 17 19 19 20 6
9 11
Top 6–10 10 10 8 11 11
16 16 17 16 22
Top 11–25 17 17
14
31 31 30 29
Top 26–100 28
29
18 17 18 39
19 17 16
Top 101–250
Long-tail managers 8 9 9 9 9 7
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2023
Exhibit 34
14
12
10
7.0
6 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.5 6.3
6.1 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.1
5.7 5.9
4
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
26
MSCI Private Capital Solutions.
Exhibit 35
14.4
12.0 6.2
11.6
10.7
5.0 10.0 5.0
9.0 3.5 8.8
8.0 8.2
7.0
6.5 6.4
1
IRR spreads calculated for funds within vintage years separately and then averaged. Median IRR was calculated by taking the average of the median IRR for
funds within each vintage year; net IRR to date through Sept 30, 2023.
Source: MSCI Private Capital Solutions
27
LSEG LPC.
28
S&P Global as of January 1, 2024. Includes nonfinancial corporate loans and bonds rated BB+ or lower by S&P Global Ratings.
224
–16%
187
148
131
121 124 119
130
90
80 76
65 82
49 57 118
38 93
30 58
33 41 48 37
20 27
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Private debt’s expanding footprint of total real estate AUM and 12 percent of total
The principal narrative underlying private debt’s infrastructure AUM, respectively—their share
rapid growth over the past decade has been that of is growing: the comparable figures in 2012 were just
private lenders stepping into the void created by 8 and 5 percent.29 Growth in these real assets
banks’ exodus from the financing of highly leveraged financing strategies has been driven by many of the
businesses. Direct lenders have been the primary same factors as growth in corporate private debt,
beneficiary of this trend, with AUM in the strategy including bank retrenchment (to a lesser extent thus
growing a remarkable 15-fold, more than 30 percent far) and LPs’ quest for higher returns among their
per year, over the last ten years. Direct lending has yield-oriented investments. Furthermore, as interest
been so newsworthy, in fact, that the term is now rates have increased, so have absolute returns
often used interchangeably with private credit as a available in real assets debt. Although these returns,
whole, despite the latter encompassing a much due to the tangible nature of the collateral, are
broader set of strategies. generally lower than those for corporate private
debt, they have become more likely to clear GPs’
While the preceding pages detail several of these return hurdles.
strategies (mezzanine, distressed, special situations),
at least two are captured in other chapters of this Private debt GPs are also extending into various
report: private real estate debt and private infra forms of asset-based lending, including consumer
structure debt. Though these strategies are small credit, equipment leasing, and a wide range of
relative to their equity counterparts—16 percent other tangible and intangible asset types. Most of
29
Preqin.
While there is little doubt that the broader fundraising headwinds discussed elsewhere in this
report affected infrastructure and natural resources fundraising last year, dynamics specific to
the asset class were at play as well. One issue was supply-side timing: nine of the ten largest
infrastructure GPs did not close a flagship fund in 2023. Second was the migration of investor
dollars away from core and core-plus investments, which have historically accounted for
the bulk of infrastructure fundraising, in a higher rate environment.
The asset class had some notable bright spots last year. Fundraising for higher-returning
opportunistic strategies more than doubled the prior year’s total. AUM grew 18 percent, reaching
a new high of $1.5 trillion. Infrastructure funds returned a net IRR of 3.4 percent in 2023; this
was below historical averages but still the second-best return among private asset classes. And
as was the case in other asset classes, investors concentrated commitments in larger funds
and managers in 2023, including in the largest infrastructure fund ever raised.
The outlook for the asset class, moreover, remains positive. Funds targeting a record amount of
capital were in the market at year-end, providing a robust foundation for fundraising in 2024
and 2025. A recent spate of infrastructure GP acquisitions signal multi-asset managers’ long-
term conviction in the asset class, despite short-term headwinds. Global megatrends like
decarbonization and digitization, as well as revolutions in energy and mobility, have spurred new
infrastructure investment opportunities around the world, particularly for value-oriented
investors that are willing to take on more risk.
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—Infrastructure and natural resources chapter>
Exhibit 37of <44>
Exhibit <37>
72 77
90 58
53
55 53 82
77
62 43
73
46 25 55
22 63
41 37 31 39 41
15 41
20
21
17 31 15
4 12 22 12 10 11
6 20
8 6 8
7 17 15 13 14 13 14 2
5 6 8 9 9 8 5
2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
Exhibit 38
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
1
Excludes secondaries, funds of funds, and co-investment vehicles; excludes funds with undefined strategy (approximately 1 percent of fundraising).
Source: Preqin
30
MSCI Private Capital Solutions.
31
Ibid.
32
US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
In 2023, McKinsey surveyed 66 global private markets firms that collectively employ more than
60,000 people for the second annual State of diversity in global private markets report. The
research offers insight into the representation of women and ethnic and racial minorities in private
investing as of year-end 2022. In this chapter, we discuss where the numbers stand and how
firms can bring a more diverse set of perspectives to the table.
33
“The state of diversity in global private markets: 2023,” McKinsey, August 22, 2023.
Exhibit 39
Women 2021 33
2022 35
100
100
1
Across all role types (investing, operating, non-investing).
2
Across investing roles.
3
Based on data provided by 41 PE firms. Responses cover more than 22,000 employees. Unique firm count by region: Americas = 37, Europe = 24,
Asia–Pacific = 16.
Source: McKinsey’s 2022 and 2023 State of Diversity in Global Private Markets
Web <2024>
<Global Private Markets Review 2024—DEI chapter>
Exhibit 40
Exhibit <40> of <44>
48 48
41 40
36 36
33
28 27 28
20
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
C-suite
Managing director
Principal
Vice president
Associate
Entry level
All
1
Based on data provided by 41 PE firms. Responses cover more than 22,000 employees. Unique firm count by region: Americas = 37, Europe = 24,
Asia–Pacific = 16.
Source: McKinsey’s 2023 State of Diversity in Global Private Markets
representation at the managing-director level went milestones as their male colleagues. Globally, men in
up to 15 percent. Although women’s representation investing roles were about 50 percent more likely,
in investment committees also has improved in on average, to be promoted than their colleagues who
recent years, women still made up only 12 percent are women. Turnover is also higher among women,
of IC members in 2022. whether for lack of promotion or other reasons. The
global attrition rate for investing positions was
Manager size appears to play a significant role in 16 percent for women, four percentage points above
gender diversity. Firms with more than $100 billion the rate for men.
in AUM are leading the charge toward gender
parity in investing roles. Roughly 27 percent of their Differences early in the funnel can often result in a
investing professionals are women, slightly above “broken rung” that makes it harder to achieve parity
the global benchmark of 25 percent. These larger at higher levels on the corporate ladder. So as the
firms also have a much higher proportion of women pipeline for the next generation of women leaders
in entry-level investing roles than those with grows, external hiring will continue to be an important
$5 billion to 25 billion in AUM (38 percent versus lever for reaching gender parity. On average,
26 percent). 34 percent of investing-track external hires into
PE firms globally in 2022 were women (ten
At almost every level, women in investing roles were percentage points higher than female representation
promoted at significantly lower rates than men in investing roles at the start of the same year),
(Exhibit 42), and they continue to find themselves signaling that a lateral hiring approach is helping
navigating a longer route to reach the same to spur progress.
At every level of seniority, women in investing roles are less likely than men
to be promoted.
PE investing role promotion rate by gender,1 % Women Men
41
1.5×
28
24
1.5× 22
19 1.1×
1.5× 2.8×
16
13 13 14
Ethnic and racial representation There are also significant variations among Asian,
across private markets Hispanic, and Black professionals. Among racial
Overall representation for ethnic and racial minorities, Asian professionals held the largest share
minorities increased one percentage point from (20 percent) of all investing roles but just 12 percent
2021 to 2022, though certain ethnic and racial of senior roles. Hispanic professionals held only
minority groups continue to be underrepresented 4 percent of all investing roles, and Black investing
in the private markets. Over the past year, the professionals—one of the most underrepresented
most progress was made in the representation of ethnic and racial minorities—held no more than
ethnic and racial minorities on investment com 4 percent of investing roles at any level.
mittees, which grew from 9 percent to 18 percent.
Representation at the principal level also increased Promotion and attrition rates also vary by ethnic
ten percentage points year over year. and racial group. White professionals are promoted
the most across every level except principal.
Similar to women, ethnic and racial minorities have At the managing director level, for example, White
better representation in entry-level positions than professionals are over 2.3 times more likely to be
in senior roles. In the United States and Canada, promoted than any other race or ethnicity. Meanwhile,
ethnic and racial minorities accounted for 30 percent Black PE investing professionals have the highest
of all investing roles in 2022 but just 19 percent rates of attrition, especially in the junior roles, and
of investing roles at the managing director level are over 50 percent more likely to leave their
(Exhibit 43). organizations than their White and Asian colleagues,
which underlines long-term challenges with
All investing 3 4 3 20 70
Entry level 3 6 4 25 62
Associate 5 1 4 4 27 60
Vice president 5 3 3 18 70
Principal 8 1 18 72
1
Managing director 2 3 3 12 81
attracting and developing Black talent in the address this variance in the coming years by
industry. implementing standardized, apples-to-apples
approaches by which DEI progress can be tracked.
External hiring has a positive effect on increasing the
representation of ethnic and racial minorities. In More importantly, it is crucial for firms to embed and
2022, 33 percent of external hires at the managing promote diversity and inclusion practices in all levels
director level and 31 percent at the principal level of the organization. Private markets firms seeking
were ethnic or racial minorities—in both cases, to continue improving representation of women and
higher percentages than the existing representation racial and ethnic minorities have several levers
levels (19 and 28 percent, respectively). they can pull:
34
“The state of diversity in global private markets: 2023,” McKinsey, August 22, 2023.
Further insights
McKinsey’s Private Equity & Principal Investors practice publishes frequently on issues of interest to industry executives. All of our
publications are available at: McKinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights
“Seizing opportunities amid the agtech “Solving the climate finance equation for “Discussing the state of diversity in global
capital drought” developing countries” private markets”
March 2024 December 2023 November 2023
“Five considerations for software private “The secrets of outperforming family- “Five paths to TSR outperformance”
equity in 2024" owned businesses: How they create October 2023
March 2024 value—and how you can become one”
November 2023 “Applied AI: Six growth considerations for
“Ten considerations for private markets private markets”
in 2024” “A new way to decarbonize buildings can July 2023
January 2024 lower emissions—profitably”
November 2023 “Performance edge: Investors hone their
“A force for good: Japan’s private equity strategies for a new era”
opportunity” “Generative AI can change real estate, July 2023
January 2024 but the industry must change to reap
the benefits” “Where could $374 billion in dry powder
November 2023 go? Six themes to watch”
July 2023
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