1–22

https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkac008
Philosophia Mathematica

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On Number-Set Identity: A Study
Sean C. Ebels-Duggan∗
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, U.S.A.

A BS T R AC T
Benacerraf’s 1965 multiple-reductions argument depends on what I call ‘defer-
ential logicism’: his necessary condition for number-set identity is most plausible
against a background Quineanism that allows autonomy of the natural number
concept. (This explains his neglect of ‘theoretical-virtue’ arguments.) Stein-
hart’s ‘folkist’ sufficient condition on number-set identity, by contrast, puts that
autonomy at the center — but fails for not taking the folk perspective seriously
enough. Learning from both sides, we explore new conditions on number-set
identity, elaborating a (1983) suggestion from Wright.

1. INTRODUCTION
We have, and have had for millennia, workable means for making and justifying
arithmetic judgments. These means, to some extent, appear to stand on their
own: one need not know physics, biology, set theory, or plumbing to make
such judgments and to make them well. And yet, science appears to be a single
enterprise of understanding all aspects of the world, those treated with numbers
as well as those treated as organisms and those with faucets and pipes. How,
then, should our arithmetical framework be integrated and unified with the
language of our total science?
The present paper concerns the import of [Benacerraf, 1965], and its after-
math, to this question. Benacerraf’s argument is addressed to the logicism of his
day — a logicism inherited and transformed by Quine — which answered that
our means of arithmetic judgment must be assimilated into the more funda-
mental mathematical apparatus of set theory. Set theory boasted an apparent
(if breakable) connection to logic itself,1 and also can subsume other areas of
mathematics essential to science (for example, the theory of real numbers).

∗
Orcid.org/0000-0002-5397-0823. E-mail: s-ebelsduggan@u.northwestern.edu.
1
There is an interesting history of how set-theoretic reductionism manifests in the
subtle views of the logicists of yore — those who think arithmetic is logic. That history
will not be explored in this paper. While now idiosyncratic, for continuity I will follow
Benacerraf in using ‘logicist’ to mean ‘those who, because of foundational considerations,

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• 1
2 • Ebels-Duggan

Benacerraf’s argument takes aim at this answer in light of the fact of multiple
reductions: there are many articulated collections in the universe of sets that
can replace numbers to accomplish our arithmetic tasks. Benacerraf takes this
plurality of reductions to show that numbers cannot be objects — at least if

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he thinks, like his logicists, that all mathematical objects are sets. Benacerraf’s
argument is thus negative; he argues that some necessary condition for numbers
being sets is not met.
One of the many and varied responses to [Benacerraf, 1965] is [Steinhart,
2002], which argues that numbers are sets, and in fact, are the finite von Neu-
mann ordinals (FVNOs). For the FVNOs are the unique sets that are both
required to exist by the natural number concept, and are also isomorphic to
the natural numbers. Steinhart’s is a positive argument, in contrast to Benacer-
raf’s negative. As such, he thinks there is a sufficient condition for number-set
identity that is met.
Obviously, they cannot both be right. My aim in this paper is to look at
several of the conditions that have played supporting roles in the debate con-
cerning number-set identity. Once these conditions are stated, we can examine
what reasons we have to support them.
Whether these principles are plausible depends a great deal on the philo-
sophical stance from which they are evaluated. This paper discusses three such
stances. Benacerraf’s argument, recall, begins with a fable about two ‘mili-
tant logicist’ children, taught that all mathematics they will ever encounter
is ‘really’ about their familiar set theory [Benacerraf, 1965, p. 48]. They are
then taught about another party, ‘the folk’. Among the folk will be anyone who
uses the arithmetic language without first reducing it to something else — so,
number theorists as well as fishmongers. Nothing precludes the folk from also
knowing set theory, as long as they are non-logicists.2 The logicists’ task is to
interpret the folk arithmetic language as being ‘really about’ sets. However, the
two children use incompatible yet equally suitable interpretations. One uses the
FVNOs, the other uses the finite Zermelo ordinals (ZOs). This is what brings
trouble, since both interpretations cannot correctly identify the numbers among
the sets, and there is nothing to decide between them.
Benacerraf’s argument takes the side of the logicists in the fable: it is
from their perspective, with their philosophical commitments, that the mul-
tiple reductions are shown to be a problem. Their reasoning, as I argue in
Section 2, depends on a very particular kind of Quinean logicism for its suc-
cess. One notable feature of this logicism is its deference to the natural number

think arithmetic is set theory’. Of course, even this is a rough approximation: in [Benac-
erraf, 1965], the use sometimes shifts to mean something like ‘one who thinks numbers
are objects’, which appears to be Quine’s usage: ‘Logicism . . . condones the use of bound
variables to refer to abstract entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiable,
indiscriminately’ [1948, p. 14].
2
Some of the folk might additionally be anti-logicists and reject logicism. But we
cannot assume any of this about the folk: all it takes to be among them is arithmetic
competence and non-logicism.
 On Number-Set Identity • 3

concept. Replace that deference with dismissiveness, and the Quinean logicist
no longer has reason to endorse Benacerraf’s necessary condition (as has been
argued by Paseau [2009]).
By contrast, Steinhart’s argument, as I read it, focuses on what follows

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from the perspective of the folk. Given only the conceptual resources needed
for grasping the natural number concept, the folk, it is alleged, can give a
mathematical argument that the numbers are the FVNOs. This is successful
only if the conceptual resources of the folk are adequate to discover sets like
the FVNOs. Section 3 develops an account of these resources, and concludes
(with Ginammi [2019]) they are not adequate.
I then turn to a more neutral perspective. What reason is there for endorsing
the condition (called ‘BNC’) that Benacerraf puts forward? Free from Quinean
attachments, we have reason to expect BNC can be improved (Section 4). This
motivates the search for other conditions, one of which comes from a suggestion
by Wright [1983], treated in Section 5. Wright’s suggestion is only partially
successful for one seeking Steinhart’s conclusion. But considerations raised in
Sections 6 and 7 provide a criterion that does support — or at least does not
contradict — this conclusion.
The hope for this paper is that it will reveal oft-overlooked questions con-
cerning our arithmetic capacities. I hope this will in turn provide more resources
for thinking about how, and whether, the autonomous concepts of arithmetic
should be integrated into a comprehensive scientific theory. The motivating
question for this paper could be put: what is the correct idea of a reduction of
numbers to sets, or of one type of thing to another? I hope to have clarified the
range of answers one might give to this question.3

2. LOGICISTS, DEFERENTIAL AND DISMISSIVE

Benacerraf’s argument from multiple reductions takes as a central premise
Benacerraf’s Necessary Condition:

(BNC) If numbers are sets, then there is exactly one reduction of the former
to the latter.

3
One aspect of Benacerraf’s argument and responses to it is a re-engagement with the
kinds of linguistic considerations Frege brought to bear on the correct treatment of num-
bers in a scientific philosophy of mathematics. Frege, for instance, claims that sentences
such as ‘Six is the number of Henry VIII’s wives’ better represent the nature of numbers
than the formulation ‘Henry VII had six wives’, wherein ‘six’ appears an adjectival modi-
fier of ‘wives’. For his part, Benacerraf examines whether there is linguistic evidence that
would favor one reduction over another, and concludes there is not. Down this road is the
linguistic investigation of arithmetic expressions in natural languages, and whether these
tip the scale in favor of a given reduction. Our animating question starts earlier, when we
try to decide what counts as a reduction. Of course, linguistics and other empirical studies
could contribute to this question as well, but exploration of how is a matter for another
paper.
4 • Ebels-Duggan

The task for this section is to discover why Benacerraf’s logicists would endorse
BNC.
The logicists think set theory is adequate to express whatever counts as
mathematical. They appear to reason that to the extent that arithmetic can

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be expressed in set theory, arithmetic objects must be sets.
But why think, on this basis, that reductions must be unique? The ratio-
nale Benacerraf hints at is a thesis in the philosophy of language, that what
our arithmetic judgments are about is determined by the conceptual resources
enabling those judgments. The two set-theoretic reductions enable those judg-
ments equally: ‘in Fregean terminology, each account fixes the sense of the
words whose analysis it provides. Each account must also, therefore, fix the
reference of these expressions’ [Benacerraf, 1965, p. 56]. Reference is fixed by
the sense of the terms involved. The sense of the folk ‘natural numbers’ is cap-
tured by the uses — or better, capacities — embodied by the folk’s arithmetic
reasoning. If those capacities can be replicated in set theory, then the sense is
also captured therein. Because set theory is successful in capturing the sense
of these terms, their referents must be the referents of the set-theoretic terms.
These referents are clear: the ZO-construction refers to the ZOs, and likewise
with the FVNOs.
This is what gets the logicists into trouble. The ZO-logicists’ interpreted
number terms refer to the same thing as the folks’, as

(∗) The sense of number terms, whether captured via arithmetic or set-
theoretic language, determines just one reference.

So what is referred to by the ZO-logicist’s terms must be the same as what

is referred to by folk’s. Likewise the FVNO-logicists’ terms. So the respective
logicists’ terms refer to the same things.4 And yet they are not the same things,
as {{∅}} = {∅, {∅}}. And so the sense of the number terms — whether given
by the folk or one of the logicists — cannot refer at all.
But the premise (∗) in the above argument can be questioned. Why should
sense captured in either way determine just one reference? Certainly, sameness
of sense in a single conceptual scheme should yield sameness of reference in
that scheme. Could the folk not be talking about objects the logicists fail to
recognize? ‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio . . . ’.
Maybe, but no logicist should admit to it. All anyone can do — logicist or
not — is try to find numbers among the objects they think exist. Consider now
how this might be done by a reader in the general Quinean milieu in which
[Benacerraf, 1965] was written.5 Such a reader might reason: ‘What exists is
whatever my best theory — which includes set theory — requires that I quantify
over.6 Since I can interpret the folk language without loss, I do not need to

4
Note the implicit use of Steinhart’s premise (iii); see Section 3.
5
The ‘heyday of Quine’s influence’ [Paseau, 2009, p. 35].
6
‘Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme
which is to accommodate science in the broadest sense’ [Quine, 1948, pp. 16–17].
 On Number-Set Identity • 5

add numbers to my ontology — I can add, multiply, etc., without them. Do

the numeric terms refer to something already in my ontology? They do if my
interpretation is unique, for then I can generate a definite description for each
such term. But if my interpretation is not unique, there are no such definite

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descriptions, and “17” fares no better than “the writer of the Bible”. So the
numbers can be located amongst the sets if and only if there is an unique
lossless interpretation of numbers in set theory.’
What is meant by a ‘lossless interpretation’ is just the sort of interpreta-
tion that captures the sense of the folk concept. This, in turn, is given by the
kind of reduction described by Quine [1964]. To reduce numbers to sets is to
show that numbers can be coordinated by an injective ‘proxy function’ with
sets. This function must furthermore preserve ‘relevant structure’ [Quine, 1964,
p. 219]: it must make sure that the articulation of the numbers provided by the
primitive arithmetic vocabulary can be replicated, in all relevant contexts, by
set-theoretic definitions.7
This, I think, is what Benacerraf has in mind when deploying the Fregean
language of ‘sense’, and is why the ‘separate ontology’ suggestion is ruled out.
There are two background assumptions operative in Benacerraf’s argument.
The first is a kind of deference to the folk number concept, allowing that it
has a sense to be captured by reductions. The second is that whatever objects
are determined by that concept must be uniquely located in the logicists’ best
theory — within the privileged, logicist ontology.
This accounting of the argument explains why Benacerraf ignores the theo-
retical-virtue arguments one often sees in response, such as are advanced in the
first part of [Steinhart, 2002].8 Steinhart cites reasons from within set theory
that ‘mathematicians’ prefer the FVNOs for representing the natural numbers.
For example, the well-ordering on the FVNOs generalizes to the von Neumann
ordinals, which reach the whole height of the set-theoretic universe. The order-
ing on the Zermelo ordinals cannot be continued beyond the finite. This is taken
to favor the FVNOs, as they have theoretical virtues the other candidates lack.
Benacerraf is hardly unaware of these theoretical virtues, yet they merit
barely a mention in his [1965]. Seemingly, if anyone should be persuaded by
theoretical-virtue arguments, it should be logicists. After all, they are already
convinced that natural numbers can (or must) be located among the sets. Yet
these theoretical virtues are irrelevant to the sense of the number terms, and so
are irrelevant to their reference. They involve features orthogonal to anything
‘connected with the reference of number words’, as determined by ‘our uses of
the words in question’ [Benacerraf, 1965, p. 62].

7
‘[T]o each n-place primitive predicate of [arithmetic] we effectively associate an open
sentence [of set theory] in n free variables, in such a way that the predicate is fulfilled by
an n-tuple of arguments of the proxy function always and only when the open sentence is
fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values’ [Quine, 1964, p. 218]. In model-theoretic
contexts this is equivalent to the ‘commutation’ criterion I give in the text.
8
These are separate from Steinhart’s ‘mathematical argument’ to be treated in
Section 3.
6 • Ebels-Duggan

This highlights the dependence of Benacerraf’s argument on the aforemen-

tioned deference. Theoretical virtues are irrelevant to the reference of folk
number terms if they have a sense. As Paseau [2009] argues, the Quinean can
oppose this deference, and dismiss the folk concept — and the folk ‘number’

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talk generally — as misguided and defective.9 To the extent that we indulge
number-talk we are playing ‘make-believe’ [Quine, 1964, p. 219]. This kind of
Quinean avers: ‘Set theory is the right theory for dealing with matters math-
ematical. If the folk concept doesn’t measure up, so much the worse for it. It
shouldn’t be the responsibility of the enlightened to rescue the concepts of those
still in the dark.’ Accordingly, Benacerraf’s attempts at faithfulness to the folk
concept are wrongheaded. The logicists’ task is not locating the numbers among
the sets, but is rather replacing the misconceived folk notion with something
more scientifically respectable.
Therefore, says Paseau, the logicist is unconstrained by considerations of
what really ‘belongs’ to the natural number concept. She is thus free to choose
number replacements on the basis of their theoretical virtues, or indeed, on the
basis of nothing at all [Paseau, 2009, p. 38]. This dismissive logicist does not
need a sufficient condition for identity between numbers and sets, because until
sets are chosen as the numbers, ‘the numbers’ are just a folkish phantasm.
A more generous but still elitist viewpoint can be advanced by the logicist,
but with a similar response. Here, the folk concept is not so much defective
as benighted. The number concept of the folk works well enough, but largely
in ignorance of the mathematical reality behind the scenes. Nevertheless, said
concepts attach by Ludiviscian ‘reference magnetism’ [Lewis, 1983; 1984]10 to
whatever mathematical objects underwrite successful arithmetical reasoning.
The same, of course, can be said for the logicists. But of course, the logicists,
being more informed (at least by their own lights), have reasons to think that
reality is best captured by whatever ω-sequence is best suited — in light of
all of set theory, not folk arithmetic — to do these jobs. The logicist, then,
has reason to resist the deference Benacerraf shows to the folk concept: while
not defective per se, that concept is only partly informed. It sees through a
glass darkly, and succeeds in spite of its ignorance. The logicists’ glass is less
darkened (again, according to them). They see much more of the reality in
play, and so see considerations the folk will neglect — the kinds described, for
example, by Paseau [2009], Steinhart [2002], Ruffino [2001], or Clarke-Doane
[2008].
But while not denigrating towards the folk concept, in this view the final
word on what is relevant comes, as for Paseau’s Quine, from the logicists, who
are more scientifically informed. And here I think the Benacerraf of his [1965]
can respond as to Quine’s dismissal: this view does not take seriously enough

9
Paseau complains, for example, that though ‘Benacerraf’s article appeared in the
heyday of Quine’s influence, it declined to engage the Quinean position squarely, even
seemed to think it was not its business to do so’ [Paseau, 2009, p. 35]. But in earlier
moments Quine appears more laissez-faire; see [Quine, 1948, pp. 17–19].
10
Lewis cites Merrill [1980] as inspiration for the idea in his [1984].
 On Number-Set Identity • 7

the independence of the number concept from the larger scientific project. The
folk include number theorists as well as haberdashers. What reason could there
be — besides an imperial ideal of scientific unity, of little use to number theo-
rists and haberdashers alike — for thinking that the arithmetical reality bears

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description beyond what the number theorist gives? The ‘mathematician pro-
fesses no interest’ in this mistaken philosophical ideal [Benacerraf, 1965, p. 69]
of discovering ‘more fundamental entities’ [Benacerraf, 1965, p. 47, R.M. Mar-
tin’s words]. To do so is to ‘miss the point of what arithmetic . . . is all about’
[Benacerraf, 1965, p. 69]. Benacerraf’s deference makes a difference because
if, as I read him as saying, the folk do retain some authority on what is and
is not relevant to the natural number concept, then the logicists’ appeals to
theoretical virtues are, as suggested by Benacerraf’s silence, irrelevant.
For our purposes, this will settle matters for Quinean logicists. They can be
elitist, either dismissively or generously, and reason more or less with Paseau’s
Quine. Or they can be deferential and reason with Benacerraf, that numbers
do not belong in their ontology because of multiple reductions. So follows the
conclusion that numbers cannot be sets.

3. STEINHART AND THE FOLK PERSPECTIVE

So much for the perspective of the logicist. Another option is taking the folk
perspective. What for the folk would be an argument that numbers are sets?
What should convince them that the numbers are, e.g., the FVNOs? Steinhart’s
[2002, p. 355] claimed ‘precise mathematical demonstration that the natural
numbers are the finite von Neumann ordinals’ can be read as trying to address
this question. It deploys Steinhart’s Sufficient Condition:

(SSC) Any collection of objects with the natural number structure, if entailed
to exist by the natural number concept, contains exactly the natural
numbers.

This condition comes into play in Steinhart’s argument, which I reconstruct as

follows:

The number concept — or better, the number capacity — has two

distinctive features.

(i) It enables us to determine a wide range of pure arithmetical truths,

and
(ii) it enables us to make finite cardinality judgments about collections
of discrete objects.

Further,

(m) the identities of the numbers are determined by what is ‘metaphys-

ically relevant’ to the number concept.
8 • Ebels-Duggan

So

(iii) any formal structure articulating only what is metaphysically rele-

vant to the number concept (namely, (i) and (ii)) has exactly one

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substructure (N, <) interpreting the pure arithmetic truths.
(iv) Capacity (ii) requires, for each n in N of that structure, the existence
of the set n∗ = {m ∈ N | m < n}. Therefore these sets n∗ are
essential to the natural number concept.
(v) However, the collection N∗ of all n∗ , ordered by ⊂, interprets the
pure arithmetic truths.
(vi) Therefore by (iii), (N∗ , ⊂) is (N, <). This can only happen if each n
is a FVNO.

Premises (i) and (ii), I take it, are meant to replicate Benacerraf’s charac-
terization of the number concept.
The next premise is labelled (m) as it is, perhaps, a metaphysical background
assumption — it is about what is ‘metaphysically relevant’ to the identity of
the numbers [Steinhart, 2002, p. 352]. There is some question what is meant
by ‘metaphysically relevant’. There is some, if small, suggestion that what is
metaphysically relevant is what is essential to the numbers, or at least to the
number concept: the collection of FVNOs is neither ‘external nor incidental
to the analysis of number’. Because we ‘cannot avoid forming all these sets of
numbers’, the set of FVNOs is ‘internal and it is essential’ [Steinhart, 2002,
p. 350].
But I do not think we should take this use of ‘essential’ in a very metaphys-
ically loaded way. Conditions (i) and (ii) are ‘metaphysically relevant’ to the
identity of the numbers in that they ‘determine the boundaries of the natural
number universe’. I take it that the ‘natural number universe’ is what would
exist, and only what would exist, in virtue of realizing the natural number
concept. These two conditions are ‘metaphysically relevant’ in as much as they

determine the boundaries of the universe of objects to which we may

ontologically reduce the natural numbers. Since all and only the NN-
conditions are metaphysically relevant, they and they alone specify the
available existence axioms for the NN-universe. [Steinhart, 2002, p. 352]

Clearly on this reconstruction premise (m) forces the reader to take the
folk perspective. The measuring rod is the natural number concept, not as
reproduced by the logicists, but as had by the folk.
The principle (m) is also meant to underwrite premise (iii), which is quite
close to SSC. While one might be tempted to think Steinhart takes this from
Benacerraf, Ginammi [2019, pp. 283–284] argues effectively to the contrary. One
might quibble with Steinhart’s entitlement to (m), and whether (iii) follows
from it. I will not, for two reasons. First, there is something appealing about
(m), especially from the folk perspective, joining as it does what the numbers
could be with what defines — or is essential to — the natural number concept.
 On Number-Set Identity • 9

But more to the point, we are here exploring the folk perspective — perhaps
the folkist perspective, from which the folk ‘own’ the natural number concept.
Premise (m) seems at home here, and so cannot be readily dismissed. The other
reason I shall not complain about (m) and (iii) is that the argument fails even

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granting them.
The crux of the argument is (iv), on the status of the collections n∗ . I turn
next to two complaints against these sets n∗ : what they are, and that they are.

3.1. The First Complaint: What They Are

Steinhart claims that the sets n∗ as given in (iv) are the only sets required
by the conception of the natural numbers embodied by (i) and (ii). Ginammi
remarks that other set-theoretic resources enable the capacity in (ii) just as
well. For example, one can count using the ZOs if cardinality is defined in
terms of transitive closures. However, there is no ‘clear reason why one should
prefer one [definition of cardinality] over another’ [Ginammi, 2019, pp. 286–287].
D’Alessandro makes a similar point:

Steinhart’s thought seems to be that . . . the existence of N∗ , and only

that of N∗ , is entailed by the existence of N together with the cardinality
conditions. But why should this matter? Given that we accept [set theory],
we have a universe’s worth of sets already at our disposal. It makes little
sense to forgo the use of these other sets, or to pretend they don’t exist, for
the reasons Steinhart gives. [D’Alessandro, 2018, pp. 5072–5073, notation
changed]

This criticism missteps by neglecting the distinction drawn above. Ginammi

and D’Alessandro are right that, if you are looking, as would a logicist, for a
way to articulate capacity (ii), there are many options.11 But assuming the
folk perspective, as (m) necessitates, we must forgo sets not essential to the
folk number concept, and allow just those built into it. So we do not have ‘a
universe’s worth of sets at our disposal’. Likewise, while ‘less than’ is a folk-
arithmetical relation, ‘transitive closure of’ is not, and so is inadmissible. We
‘pretend [other sets] don’t exist’ because they are not available through minimal
possession of the natural number concept. By (m) they cannot determine the
natural numbers’ identity.
But even granting (m), there are problems. Other collections, definable only
from the folk concept, enable cardinality judgments. Why not replace n∗ in
(iv) with what we shall call 2n∗ , the set of even numbers less than 2n? It
does just as well in enabling (ii), without exceeding the conceptual resources
of the set-ignorant folk. If we do take this route, we end up with a repetition

11
D’Alessandro’s reconstruction of Steinhart’s argument makes an assumption of logi-
cism (it assumes ‘reductionism is true’). Clearly I do not read it this way. I do agree that
‘Steinhart’s argumentative maneuvers aren’t always easy to follow’ [D’Alessandro, 2018,
p. 5072].
10 • Ebels-Duggan

of Benacerraf’s problem. By Steinhart’s argument 2 = {0, 1}. By its perversion

2 = {0, 2}. By extensionality 1 = 2, a contradiction.
One might reply that the use of 2n∗ is perverse while n∗ is not. Count-
ing requires a basic collection of enumerators, and the evens are not basic.

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One might therefore reason: ‘So what if one can interpret the numbers within
themselves? Hamlet has a play within the play; sometimes art imitates life.
Problems only arise if we cannot distinguish the original from the copy. Here
we can: one cannot count by evens until one can count by ones.’12 We will
revisit this example in Section 23.

3.2. The Second Complaint: That They Are

A second complaint, also offered by Ginammi, concerns the requirement that
the sets n∗ exist through just the number concept. At step (v) of the argument
one collects the objects n∗ into a structure (N∗ , ⊂) that is then shown isomor-
phic to (N, <). To be collected and corresponded with numbers, each collection
of numbers less than n must be treated, as in (iv), as an object.
This is allowable in set theory, but it does not accord with the restriction in
(m). As Ginammi [2019, p. 283] points out, the folk concept does not require
the existence of the sets n∗ . It is true that Benacerraf talks in terms of equinu-
merosity between these sets and, for example, the set of ducks on the pond. But
the appearance of sets — collections-as-objects — is inessential. We can and
do get by in arithmetic, when reasoning as the folk do, without asserting the
existence of the sets n∗ for each n. In first-order arithmetic, we can talk about
the even numbers without asserting the existence of a set of them. Instead we
just give a description. We talk about ordinals in the same way in set theory.
We can do the same with the collection of numbers less than n when restricting
ourselves to the folk perspective.
One might argue, however, that this is not conclusive. The capacity described
in (ii) requires not just that we can characterize collections (the ducks on the
pond, the numbers less than n) but also that these collections bear a certain
relation — ‘having the same cardinality as’ — to one another. I shall denote this
equinumerosity relation with ‘≈’. But the reader should take care to realize that
here ‘equinumerosity’ and ‘≈’ mean the as-yet unspecified ‘whatever relation
we establish between collections in order to make cardinality judgments’. One
should not take it to mean bijectiveness, whether defined in set theory or second-
order logic, or any other formal relation meant to explicate ‘having the same
cardinality as’.
If one were to think of ≈ in this set-theoretic sense, as a subset of a Cartesian
product, then sets n∗ are part of the folk conception, because they are required
by the use of ≈. A logicist might be entitled to say this, because to a logicist ≈ is
about sets of ordered pairs, and domains and ranges can be separated. But while
Benacerraf does talk of ≈ as a relation between sets, he does not avail himself
of set-theoretic resources for defining ≈. Instead he talks about what we do

12
This point is made in [Wetzel, 1989, p. 276], concerning the same example.
 On Number-Set Identity • 11

(count transitively) to establish equinumerosity, not a formal representation of

the relation itself. Given Benacerraf’s coyness and talk of sets, it is forgivable
that Steinhart might assume the relation ≈ holds between sets even for the
folk. But it is a mistake nevertheless, as Benacerraf could have made his point

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in a weak second-order setting. Capacity (i) requires first-order arithmetic. If
one treats ‘≈’ as primitive, then to realize capacity (ii) one needs only a very
modest fragment of second-order logic, one generating a concept from any open
formula of first-order arithmetic.13 This would allow us to form the concepts
[λx : x < n], under which fall all and only those numbers < n, the set-free
version of Steinhart’s sets n∗ .14 So the folk would not need sets to use ≈.
If this is right, then we can make cardinality judgments in accordance with
(ii) using the following resources. The first-order resources of (i) give us the
pure use of arithmetic, and provide a vocabulary with terms for each natural
number. In (ii) we try to apply the language of pure number theory to our
concepts-at-large — to assign a number to each concept, whether that concept
involves arithmetic terms or not. Given the modest second-order background so
far described, the application described in (ii) amounts to there being a ‘number
of’ operator Num that returns a number when applied to a finite concept (one
under which fall finitely many objects). Which number? This is determined by
the application of the ≈ relation in accordance with the schema:

(Numbers) For any finite concept P and any number n

Num(P ) = n ↔ P ≈ [λx : x < n],

This says that n is the number of P s just if the P s bear ≈ to the numbers
(starting with zero) less than n.
This, I take it, is a plausible representation of the minimal conceptual
resources the folk deploy in grasping the natural number concept. Grant ≈ to be
whatever Benacerraf wants it to be, as long as (semantically) it correlates finite
concepts of the same cardinality. If this is a reasonable approximation of the
folk conceptual resources, then (as Ginammi observes) the capacity (ii) does not
require the existence of the collectable sets n∗ [Ginammi, 2019, pp. 281–282].
The only recourse I can see is if Steinhart’s advocate were to propose that
a recognition of sets is somehow built into thinking about collections. This
would be to suggest that treating collections as objects is itself part of our
basic conceptual apparatus. This thought is not an unfamiliar one, but Frege’s
history with courses-of-values shows it is not an easy one to maintain.15

13
Or even: from any open quantifier-free formula of first-order arithmetic.
14
One can even do without the comprehension resources if ≈ is not a relation between
concepts but a logical operator joining open formulae. See, for instance, Antonelli’s work
[2010a; 2010b] on the numerical quantifier.
15
See, however, [Maddy, 1990].
12 • Ebels-Duggan

4. COORDINATION AND IDENTITY

We have seen the argument through the eyes of the logicists. And we have seen
one attempt through the eyes of the folk. What of a party uncommitted to
either logicism or the strict confines of folkism? Such a neutral observer could

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reason that both set-theoretic and arithmetic languages should be given the
benefit of the doubt. Accordingly, both languages concern ostensibly objectual
subject matters. A neutral observer would be without a prejudice concerning
the direction of reduction, or even that reduction is necessary. What, from this
perspective, might make us think that the numbers are, or are not, sets?
We can start by admitting that the Quinean logicists are on to something:
if numbers are sets, we should be able to coordinate the arithmetic and logicist
languages, so that the functions of numbers can be accomplished by their coor-
dinated proxy sets. So, we need at least one reduction. We can thus endorse at
least this weaker version of BNC, a MINimal necessary condition:

(MIN) If numbers are sets, there is at least one Quinean reduction of numbers
to sets.

What would this involve? We have spelled out the conceptual resources of the
folk. As these need to be coordinated with the logicists’ resources, it behooves
us now to elucidate the latter.
The folk have a pure mathematical theory (arithmetic) and a means (the
principle Numbers) of applying its objects (numbers) to concepts. The logicists
also have a pure theory, which they apply to impure concepts — they talk, e.g.,
of the set of ducks on the pond.
The logicists’ pure theory is set theory (with urelemente, as the logicists
allow non-sets as members of sets). However, this pure vocabulary will not say
what those non-sets are, or how they relate to concepts like [λx : x is a duck
on the pond]. That is the job of the applied vocabulary. As the folk use the
operator Num to assign a pure object (a number) to a concept, the logicists
use a ‘set of’ operator Set to associate sets with (some but not all) concepts.
Likewise the logicists can use a schema, Sets, to move from concepts to sets:

(Sets) For each set s and each P on which the operator Set is defined,16

Set(P ) = s ↔ (∀y)(P y ↔ [λx : x ∈ s]y).

Thus, s is the set of P s just if P is coextensive with the concept is a member

of s. Notice that like Numbers, the vocabulary in the concept all the way to the
right of the equation is exclusively set-theoretic. Both application operators are
used to assign a ‘pure’ object to concepts coming from general contexts.

16
Here, the expression ‘[λx : x ∈ s]y’ indicates that y falls under the concept is a
member of s, the latter indicated by [λx : x ∈ s]. This is of course equivalent to saying
that y a member of s.
 On Number-Set Identity • 13

The coordination needed now is one that will tell whether the universe as
imagined by the folk overlaps with the universe as imagined by the logicists. The
universe (as the folk understand it) includes the numbers N as the mathematical
part of its first-order domain. The logicist universe includes instead the sets,

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V, as its mathematical part.17 We may presume U, the non-mathematical part
of their universes, to be shared. Thus the folk-domain of objects is U ∪ N, while
the logicist-domain is U ∪ V. We will also assume that the concepts of the folk
and of the logicists differ only when it comes to mathematical objects.
What MIN demands is that these imagined universes be coordinated and that
their coordination take the form of a Quinean reduction. To use Quine’s ‘make
believe’ language, a reduction starts with two presumed kinds of objects, in this
case numbers and sets.18 The ‘proxy function’ then assigns to each number in
the folk universe an unique set. (For convenience we will extend this function so
that it covers the whole folk universe, and is the identity function on U.) And
this proxy function must be structure-preserving. This is ensured if we map the
folk universe injectively into the logicists’, so that the map ‘commutes’ with
the primitive vocabulary and the corresponding definitions. For example, if 
is the logicist’s (defined) version of the folk < and g the proxy injection, then to
say g commutes with < and  is to say that m < n if and only if g(m)  g(n).
For the full arithmetic apparatus of the folk to be replicated in the logicist
universe, the operations Num and Set must be treated as well. Their role is
respected just if the map from numbers to sets ‘commutes’ across the operator
Num, and whatever is defined in set-theoretic language to take its place. The
logicists will thus define a set-number application operator Snum. Note that
Snum will need to be defined using Set, since the pure vocabulary of set theory
cannot apply in general contexts without the latter operator. The function g
commutes with Num and Snum just if g(Num(P )) = Snum(g(P )) for any
concept P on which Num is defined. (Here g(P ) is the logicist concept that is
the image of P under g).
Our condition MIN requires at least one coordination as just described;
Benacerraf is of course right that there is more than one (as can be seen by
varying the definition of Snum, as Ginammi [2019, p. 286] notes). The question
is whether neutral observers have reason to move from MIN to BNC, endorsing

17
Of course, V cannot be regarded, at least by the logicists, as a set, since otherwise it
would be the set of all sets. I take it that we, in the neutral perspective, should regard the
collection V similarly — not as a set but as whatever falls under our predicate ‘whatever
the logicists regard as a set’. Were we to worry about similar issues concerning the ‘proxy
function’ soon to be described, we would admit that, at least in some cases (though not
this one), proxy functions also cannot be sets — in cases when their ‘domains’ are too
large to be sets. In such cases the ‘functions’ would be definable correlations. But as noted,
this is not needed here: for the logicists, the collection N is indeed set-sized, since its proxy
injection inverts and its range is a set.
18
I follow Quine’s indulgence in ‘make believe’ by putting things in semantic, rather
than syntactic, terms. There are likely arguments to be had that this distorts matters.
For reasons of brevity, I will leave these arguments for another time.
14 • Ebels-Duggan

the latter as the decisive requirement. To see why this is in question, first note
that BNC is an instance of a General Uniqueness Necessary Condition:

(GUNC) If As are Bs, then there is an unique A-B-correlation such that Q.

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The condition BNC fills in Q by spelling out what it is to be a Quinean
reduction. But why insist on there being exactly one reduction, outside of the
logicist reasons already given? Condition Q might be too ‘loose’ to appear in a
GUNC-instance, given the insistence on uniqueness.
Consider, for a moment, the indiscernibility of identicals as a necessary
condition on identity, and a weaker variant of it:

• Objects a and b are identical only if: any sentence is true of a iff it is true
of b.
• Objects a and b are identical only if: any sentence concerning shoe size is
true of a iff it is true of b.

While both of these principles do state necessary conditions on identity, surely

the former is better because it is more demanding. It is ‘tighter’ in the sense
that it rules out more candidates for identity. Criteria of identity should be as
strict as can be.
When we encounter instances of GUNC, we should ask: is Q narrow enough
to warrant the uniqueness clause? The uniqueness clause in BNC is not met,
but perhaps that is because BNC is the wrong instance of GUNC. Its qualifi-
cation Q — Quinean reducibility — may not be strict enough. After all, such
reductions only show that sets can be made to act like numbers in certain
respects. It might take something more to warrant the conclusion that they are
not numbers because the uniqueness clause is not met. Something else could
be needed to make a decisive necessary condition on identity.
Here the Quinean may protest: ‘Hogwash! The behavior of the numbers is
all we have. It’s not as if we can check their DNA! What else is there in the
number concept that determines what they are?’
Exactly. What else in the concept could determine identity? We have so
far played along with Benacerraf and Quine that a reduction, by preserving
structure, captures the sense of the number concept — and so captures all
that could determine the identity of the numbers.19 From the perspective of a

19
This emphasis on the preservation of structure should raise eyebrows: it begins to
seem like the game was fixed from the start. From the beginning, Benacerraf imported
from Quine a structuralist criterion of identity. The identity of each number is deter-
mined by the general concept of natural number, which in turn was specified by the
structural features preserved in a reductive map. It is no wonder that he ends by sug-
gesting a structuralist ontology for numbers, whereon numbers just are the places in an
arithmetic progression. From the beginning we talked only of the structure and the con-
cept of the natural numbers as a whole. To the extent that we talked of any particular
number (save, perhaps, zero), its characteristics were given in terms of other parts of the
 On Number-Set Identity • 15

Quinean logicist, this might be the right thing to say. But it is not obvious that
there are no other relevant considerations.
It must be acknowledged, as always, that one’s ponens is another’s tollens.
Ideally we strike a balance between adjusting the conditions on identity and

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accepting its failure. There may be reasons to think reductions are the best we
can do in the case of numbers, and the concept offers no more guidance. Presum-
ably, this is where Quine and Benacerraf think we are. But outside of Quine’s
shadow — or his great light — and excluding Benacerraf’s gestures towards
sense, there do not seem to be such overriding reasons. Once the proverbial
hog is washed, neutral parties can still ask: is there anything else that could
determine number-set identity?

5. WRIGHT’S SUGGESTION
One suggestion along these lines comes from Wright [1983].20 Part of the num-
ber concept includes how to distinguish or identify numbers as applied in
cardinality judgments — identity criteria specific to numbers. And we have
the same for the application of sets. What is needed to determine number-set
identity — and indeed any cross-sortal identity — is something that coordinates
the individual conditions of identity for each kind of object. Identity criteria
for the application of sets which are also numbers must be the same as that for
the application of numbers, full stop.
Now, cardinality judgments cannot be made without the one-to-one corre-
lation ≈ between concepts. Because this is definitive of numbers as numbers, it
must also be definitive of numbers as sets. Thus,

no [sets] can be candidates for identity with the natural numbers for
which the relation ‘is the same [set] as’ cannot be determined to obtain,
or not obtain, purely by reflection on whether certain concepts can be 1-1
correlated. [Wright, 1983, p. 122]

In our apparatus, this becomes Wright’s Necessary Condition:

(WNC) If Set(S) and Set(S  ) are numbers, Set(S) = Set(S  ) ↔ S ≈ S  .

Any two FVNOs can be distinguished by WNC; not so any pair of ZOs. So
one can tighten the constraints on g in a non-question-begging way by appeal
to considerations concerning the identity of numbers. Wright’s criterion starts
on the folk side of the divide: it works from analysis of number (how numbers
are distinguished in cardinality judgments) and therefrom generates a condition
on numbers being identical to sets.

structure. (To be fair, Benacerraf [1965, pp. 58–59] does address the Frege–Russell defini-
tion of numbers, but focuses primarily on whether or not ‘number words are really class
predicates’, not on the discrepancy of treatment.)
20
See also [Hale and Wright, 2001b, Essay 14].
16 • Ebels-Duggan

So Wright’s suggestion helps — but only a bit. Though WNC rules out the
ZOs, it still allows too much.21 It does not rule out assigning the number n to
the nth infinite cardinal, ℵn , or assigning numbers to the transitive Zermelo
ordinals (TZOs), the collection of transitive closures of the ZOs.22

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Incidentally, a stronger principle can be gained from the same motivation;
it has more, but still not complete, success. We can reason that the relation
≈ should apply in the application schema Sets as much as it should apply the
identity principle given in WNC. This yields

(WNC+) If Set(S) is a number, then Set(S) = s ↔ S ≈ [λx : x ∈ s],

which rules out the ℵn s, but still not the TZOs.

6. PRIMITIVE OPERATORS REVISITED

Wright’s suggestion makes progress, even if incomplete. The insight can be
put this way: some aspects of the number concept need to be privileged and
preserved in a way that a Quinean reduction does not. Here, it is the aspect that
determines identity and difference between numbers. But what else arguably
needs to be privileged and preserved? I do not have a strong view, but I do
want to explore several options in the remainder of this study, following on our
earlier discussion of the 2n∗ numbers (see Section 3.1).
The logicists’ task includes defining a set-operator Snum that acts like Num.
Consider the analogous case where one defines an operator Enum that acts like
Num: inject the numbers into themselves by g(n) = 2n, ‘push through’ the pure
arithmetic operations and relations, and define Enum(g(P )) by g(Num(P )).23
We get a ‘reduction’ of numbers to evens.
This is hardly convincing, as we remarked earlier. To be defined, Enum needs
the primitive Num. To highlight this Primitive-vs-Defined point:

(Internal PvD) Within sorts of objects, only the primitive application operator
characterizes the sort.

Internal PvD rules out a reduction of numbers to a subcollection of numbers.

This raises the question: can we deploy an external version when considering
reductions of numbers to a subcollection of sets?

21
In the context of Wright’s argument, that even the FVNOs meet it is the problem (as
Wright notes). Wright’s aim is to show that numbers are objects and can be sui generis,
not that they are FVNOs.
22
This is close to, but goes beyond, the suggestion of [Ginammi, 2019, pp. 286–
287], quoted in Section 3.1. Steinhart [2002, pp. 349–350] calls these the ‘van Zermano’
ω-sequence. The TZOs diverge from the FVNOs after 2: 3 = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}}, 4 =
{∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}}, 5 = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}, {{{{∅}}}}}, . . ..
23
This is a version of the ‘push-through’ presentation of Benacerraf’s argument of
[Button and Walsh, 2018, pp. 37–39].
 On Number-Set Identity • 17

(External PvD) Between sorts of objects, identity obtains only if the primitive
application operator for the larger sort characterizes the included objects.

Applied to the case at hand, this means that Snum must be the primitive Set,

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rather than something defined from it.
This is a big move, and risks being ad hoc. Yet there are reasons for it. If
every number is a set, then every applied number is an applied set. So a number
applied within set theory is a set applied within set theory. Hence, numbers
applied within set theory should use the native set application operator, Set.
This reasoning, hasty though it is, does not help the case that the num-
bers must be FVNOs, for no proxy functions meet this requirement. If g is
the required injection, it would need to commute with Num and Set via
g(Num(F )) = Set(g(F )). But then we could reason: Num[λx : x = 1] =
Num[λx : x = 0]; so since g commutes, Set[λx : x = g(0)] = Set[λx : x = g(1)].
By Sets, g(0) = g(1); as g is injective, 0 = 1.24

7. Numbers, DIVIDED
Benacerraf’s criterion generated many reductions of the numbers to sets. Using
Wright’s suggestion, we found another criterion that generated none. One is
reminded of Goldilocks finding one porridge too hot, and another too cold,
before tasting one that was just right. If there is a ‘just right’ option it might
be found by discerning more clearly what elements of the number concept
need to be preserved in accord with Wright’s thought. To this end it is worth
exploring alternate formulations of our arithmetic and set-theoretic conceptual
capacities. Perhaps the formulations given above by Numbers and Sets hide
something important.
Wright and Hale,25 it should be noted, have defended the primacy of a
different characterization of the numbers, known as Hume’s Principle:

(HP) ∀F ∀G(Num(F ) = Num(G) ↔ F ≈ G).

Frege’s Theorem (noted in [Parsons, 1965] and recovered more fully in [Wright,
1983]) interprets second-order Peano Arithmetic in second-order logic plus HP
by an explicit definition of each number: 0 = Num[λx : x = x], and n + 1 =
Num[λx : x = 0 ∨ . . . x = n].
As ever, there is much to say that we will not. I reference this development,
however, to highlight the way it is divided. The principle HP applies to all
concepts with a natural number. The definitions, however, involve concepts
applying exclusively to numbers. This, in effect, divides the operation of Num
into an “at home” part (the definitions), and an “at large” part (HP).

24
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer, who pointed this out when reviewing a
distant ancestor of this paper.
25
See [Hale, 1987; 2016; Hale and Wright, 2001a] in addition to [Wright, 1983].
18 • Ebels-Duggan

There may be many motivations for such a division. Kant, of course, made
much of the division between the forms of intuition (from which arise mathe-
matics), and our empirical concepts (red, heavy, etc.). Imagine an hypothetical
being with different empirical concepts, but the same forms of intuition. Such

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a being would still have arithmetic. If arithmetic capacities are independent of
the concepts to which we apply them, we might want to privilege the ‘at home’
portion of the account, if there is one.
And there is. One can derive from Numbers two schemata, PC and SHP,
which in turn jointly prove every instance of Numbers:

Pure Cardinals (PC) For each n, Num[λx : x < n] = n.

Schematic HP (SHP) Num(P ) = Num(Q) ↔ P ≈ Q, for finite concepts P
and Q.

These together are equivalent to Numbers as theories for the application of

arithmetic. But the joint theory PC+SHP respects the epistemological ordering
suggested by the ‘at home” and ‘at large’ division. At home, PC fixes the Num-
value for certain canonical concepts involving the particular pure relation <.
At large, SHP extends the application of Num to finite concepts from any
vocabulary. Thus, PC can be understood as prior: the first step in assigning
numbers to all concepts will be assigning numbers to the concepts of their pure
domain.
Suppose we take on all of the suggestions of the foregoing: that PC has
epistemological priority, that the at-home/at-large division should be preserved
across sorts, and that something was right in our discussion of PvD. It is a lot
to suppose, but none of it seems obviously implausible.
If we do take on all of it, we can fashion a notion of correspondence that will
yield the numbers as identical to FVNOs. This notion acknowledges the point
made by the PvD discussion, but urges that it should only apply to the ‘at
home’ portion PC. Thus, it will require that for canonical arithmetical concepts
(those of the form [λx : x < n]), the injection g should commute with both
undefined application operators Num and Set.
This notion would continue: SHP is secondary, allowing extension of the
primary definitions given by PC to more general contexts. As such we can
allow Snum, the ‘set-number of’ application operator, to be extended similarly.
This amounts to putting the following restrictions on an interpretation:
where Snum is defined in logicist terms,

1. g(Num[λx : x < n]) = Set[λ : x  g(n)] = Snum[λx : x  g(n)], for each

n. (At home: this respects the priority of canonical concepts.)
2. Snum(P ) = Snum(Q) ↔ P ≈ Q, for all finite logicist concepts P and Q.
(At large: this allows the extension of Snum to all concepts.)

We can now suggest our own necessary condition on number-set identity:

(DNC) Numbers are sets only if exactly one injection g satisfies (1) and (2).
 On Number-Set Identity • 19

This proposal, it happens, isolates the FVNOs as the only set candidate for
the natural numbers. The function Vn(n), sending n to the nth von Neumann
ordinal, is in fact the only function satisfying (1). Define ‘’ by x  y ⇔ x ∈
y&x ⊂ y; as Num[λx : x < n] = n, we have

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Vn(Num[λx : x < n]) = Vn(n) = {a ∈ Vn(n) | a ⊂ Vn(n)}
= Set[λx : x  Vn(n)]
= Set(Vn[λx : x < n]).

We can now use <-order induction to show that Vn and  (defined as above),
are the only injection-relation pair satisfying (1). Suppose h is such an injection
and h is a strict well-ordering, satisfying (1). The inductive hypothesis is
that

(a) for all m < n, h(m) = Vn(m), and

(b) that  and h coincide for all such m.

Now by PC, n = Num[λx : x < n], so

h(n) = h(Num[λx : x < n]) = Set(h[λx : x < n]) = Set[λx : h(x) h h(n)])
= Set[λx : Vn(x) h h(n)])
= Set[λx : Vn(x)  Vn(n)]) = Vn(n).

The transition from the first to the second line is by (a); the last transition by
(b), and since both  and h are well-orderings.
This, by itself, is not enough: we also need to show that it will allow the
logicists to apply their version of arithmetic: that if g is an interpretation sat-
isfying (1) and (2), then g(Num(P )) = Snum(g(P )) for any folk-property P .
First, we have that Snum[λx : x  g(n)] = g(n), by PC and condition (1).
Second, PC+SHP proves Numbers; so if Num(P ) = n, then P ≈ [λx : x < n].
As g is injective, we then have that g(P ) ≈ [λx : x  g(n)]. By condition (2),
Snum(g(P )) = Snum[λx : x  g(n)]. Collecting these two points yields that
g(Num(P )) = g(n) = Snum(g(P )).
This works because of the at-home/at-large division. The earlier, failed pro-
posal motivated by PvD (see Section 6) required that the set-number operator
Snum be the primitive operator Set, on the grounds that if numbers are iden-
tical to sets, then numbers-as-applied must be sets-as-applied. This ensured
that any number be the set of its predecessors. That proposal failed because
Num assigns a single number to several concepts — something Set does not
do. Hence, Snum cannot just be Set, since Snum must act like Num. The key
move in the present proposal DNC is requiring Snum to be Set just on canon-
ical concepts. This still ensures that any number be the set of its predecessors,
but it also releases the ‘at large’ applications of Num from this restriction. It
preserves in set theory the at-home/at-large structure we find in PC + SHP.
This may seem ad hoc, or worse, circular: to require that a number be the
set of its predecessors is simply to require that numbers-as-sets have a defining
20 • Ebels-Duggan

characteristic of the FVNOs. This accusation trades on an equivocation of

‘requires’. Every necessary condition on set-number identity that isolates an
unique candidate collection of sets is subject to this complaint. For if a condition
were to isolate, e.g., the TZOs as the lone candidate, it would require — in the

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sense of entail — that every number is a set of singletons. Just so, our condition
entails that every number is the set of its predecessors. This is only troubling
if there is no separate motivation for the machinery that does the entailing.
Wright’s view is not ad hoc because it is motivated by considerations about
what determines each number qua number. The criterion lately suggested is
motivated by two considerations of identity qua identity. It is motivated first
by the thought that if numbers are sets, then applied numbers are applied sets:
so sets applied as numbers must be applied using Set. The second motivation
was our examination of the at-home/at-large structure of the number concept.
While I have not argued in depth that these are sound, I hope to have said
enough to show they can be grounded in considerations besides those that are,
indeed, ad hoc or circular.

8. CONCLUSION
This study has covered a lot of ground; so let us recapitulate. How convincing
Benacerraf’s argument is depends partly on whether, and how, one is or is not
a logicist. Some logicists — those dismissive of the natural number concept —
need not tremble at the arbitrariness of a choice of number surrogates, and
indeed can decide among surrogates based on reasons internal to set theory.
Others, deferential to the folk concept, are led by Quinean considerations to
Benacerraf’s conclusions, even the stronger one that numbers are not objects.
Steinhart’s argument takes instead the folk perspective. In so doing, it evades
some of the criticisms leveled by Ginammi and D’Alessandro, but crucially falls
to another: the folk cannot be expected to discover sets — collections-as-objects
— just by grasping the natural number concept.
A neutral perspective allowed us to explore alternative necessary conditions
on number-set identity. These conditions would require, like BNC, the existence
of an unique something, but it could be other than a Quinean reduction. But
what? Wright hints that there may be aspects of the arithmetic apparatus
that should be kept fixed in any treatment of numbers as sets. Wright’s own
suggestion does not do enough. Another, motivated by the PvD case of Enum,
does too much. However, applying the PvD argument to just the ‘at home’ part
of our arithmetic resources does just enough to please the FVNOs’ partisan.
I do not claim that this last standard is correct; rather that more standards
can be considered. The larger issue of how seemingly autonomous concepts —
sometimes among them ‘folk concepts’ — and their presumed entities should
be taken up by a comprehensive scientific theory and ontology is a significant
part of the inheritance bequeathed to us by Quine. A clearer picture of the
background assumptions informing the discussion, I hope, gives grounds and
ideas for imagining more options for how to do this than have thus far been
surveyed.
 On Number-Set Identity • 21

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to John Beverley, Christopher Yee, Emma Eder, Maria Galaviz Huerta,
and Julia Leonardis, for helpful discussions and research assistance. Ms Galaviz
Huerta’s assistance was partly funded by an Undergraduate Research Grant

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through the Northwestern University Office of Undergraduate Research. I also
want to thank the editor of this journal and a bevy of anonymous refer-
ees of this paper and its many ancestors. Their commentary both saved me
some embarrassing blunders and evolved the paper from some very primitive
beginnings.
In one of our last conversations before his death, Mic Detlefsen accused me of
having ‘fallen’ into metaphysics for treating this topic, as one would fall into sin,
or off the bandwagon of sobriety. I gratefully acknowledge Mic’s ever-present
welcome, good humor, and patience for the lapsed.

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22 • Ebels-Duggan

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