British J Social Psychol - March 1996 - David - Studies in Self Categorization and Minority Conversion Is Being A Member

British Journal of Social Psychology (1996),3 5 , 179-199 Printedin Great Britain 179
0 1996 The British Psychological Society

SP014
Studies in self-categorization and minority

conversion: Is being a member of the
out-group an advantage?
Barbara David* and John C. Turner

Department of Psychology, Australian National University, GPO Box I , Canberra, A C T 2601, Australia
The finding that minorities may tend to produce conversion whereas majorities may
tend to produce compliance is an extremely important one for the study of social
influence. Most research into minority conversion has been based on conversion theory
(Moscovici, 1980) which, we would claim, rests on the notion that the ‘true’ influence
exerted by minorities is possible only because they are essentially different from self.
This paper reports two studies in a programme of research testing an alternative expla-
nation, based on self-categorization theory, which assumes that perceived similarity to a
potential source of influence will be the key to its deep and lasting success. Both studies
employ a full majoritylminority X in-group/out-group design, socially significant real-
life in-groupout-group memberships and measure attitudes directly relevant to these
social identities. Study 1 uses immediate and delayed and Study 2 , public and private,
responses as the measures of, respectively, compliance and conversion. The results
support self-categorization theory in that, when exposed to both majority and minority
out-group sources, subjects exhibited an immediatdpublic polarization away from
the sources, towards a more extreme in-group position, and there was no diminution
of the extremity of their position on delayed/private measures. The classic pattern of
majorities bringing about greater compliance than conversion and minorities greater
conversion than compliance was evinced in the in-group conditions of both studies,
although this tended to be comparative rather than absolute. The implications of the
results for the conflict between self-categorization theory and conversion theory are dis-
cussed and the future direction of our research indicated.
The general aim of this paper is to report two in a series of studies testing an analysis of
minority conversion in terms of self-categorization theory (see David & Turner, 1992,
1994). We will not be addressing theories which concentrate on differential manifartations
of conversion, for example the divergent-thinking rather than message-related shift sug-
gested by Nemeth (1986), but rather on the minority influenceprocessas outlined in con-
version theory (Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici & Mugny, 1983). Our specific focus is on the
fundamental conflict between conversion theory and self-categorization theory (Turner,
1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). The former we understand to
be based on the notion that minorities convert because they are ‘deviant’ and ‘contrary to
the norms respected by the social group’ (Moscovici, 1980, p. 21 l b r , to put it another
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180 Barbara David andJohn C. Turner
way, different from self-while the latter claims that all positive influence flows from oth-
ers who are categorized as similar to self.
In an influential paper, Moscovici (1980) suggested that majority and minority
influence differ in kind, that there is a ‘privileged’ effect of majorities on compliance and
of minorities on conversion. That is, minorities tend to produce more latent than mani-
fest influence-influence that is delayed and lasting rather than immediate and tem-
porary, private rather than public and indirect rather than direct-whereas majorities
tend to do the opposite.
The evidence does not in fact support the idea of any kind of exclusive connection
between minorities and conversion or majorities and compliance. It is clear that under
various conditions majorities can produce conversion (e.g. Doms & Van Avermaet, 1980;
Mackie, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1986, majority-only condition), under other conditions
minorities may fail to convert (e.g. Clark & Maass, 19886; Mackie, 1987; Sorrentino,
King & Leo, 1980) and in still other conditions majorities and minorities may produce
manifest influence as well as conversion (e.g. Maass & Clark, 1986, majority-only con-
dition; Personnaz & Personnaz, 1992).
However, there are experimental conditions under which the ‘dual-process’ pattern
appears very clearly (e.g. Maass & Clark, 1983; Moscovici & Lage, 1976). Focusing on
minority conversion for brevity, it appears beyond doubt that a minority which induces
negligible compliance may nevertheless have more effect than a majority in private, at a
later date or indirectly (see Maass & Clark, 1984; Turner, 1991, for reviews). This is an
original, important and unexpected finding in the study of social influence. It was not
anticipated (as far as we are aware) by any earlier theory and requires explanation.
So far, the explanation offered for the phenomenon has been in terms of conversion
theory (Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici & Mugny, 1983) and related ideas developed by
Mugny, Perez and others (e.g. Mugny, 1984; Mugny & Perez, 1987; Perez & Mugny,
1987; Perez, Mugny, Butera, Kaiser & ROW, 1994). In our understanding, the gist of
conversion theory is that the social and cognitive rejection of a deviant, incorrect, nega-
tive minority frees one from social comparisons with it in terms of one’s overt responses.
One simply assumes that the minority is wrong. Freedom from comparison and
behavioural conflict allows one to engage in ‘validation’of the minority position, an active
consideration of the minority’s views in terms of their informational content and rela-
tionship to reality. In thinking about why the deviant, negative minority adopts wrong
views, uncontaminated by social comparison and the concerns it induces, one slowly
begins to adopt their core values and to see things from their point of view. By the same
token, conflict with the correct, socially positive majority is unexpected and disturbing,
requiring social comparison in order to explain it. Social comparison produces immediate
compliance but inhibits validation and therefore conversion. In summary, social compari-
son leads to compliance (majority influence) and validation to conversion (minority
influence), and since social comparison blocks validation, compliance and conversion are
inversely related or, as the authors of conversion theory state, mutually exclusive: ‘. . .
majority and minority influence are different processes, the former producing mostly
public submissiveness without private acceptance and the latter producing primarily
changes in private responses. These processes, called compliance and conversion, are
mutually exclusive’(Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980, p. 280).
An important implication of this analysis is that the in-groupout-group membership
Self-categorization and minority conversion 181
of the minority should affect conversion, since it will directly influence the processes of
comparison and validation. In-group membership should encourage comparison and
reduce validation and out-group membership should inhibit comparison and enhance
validation. Therefore conflict with an in-group minority should lead to a greater tendency
to comply and a lesser tendency to be converted than conflict with an out-group
minority.
In fact, there are a number of reasons why an in-group minority might be more likely
than an out-group minority to induce compliance. One version of the social comparison
argument (Mugny & Perez, 1987; Perez & Mugny, 1987; cf. Martin, 1988a,b) adapts
social identity theory to suggest that conformity to a positively valued in-group minor-
ity and rejection of the negatively valued out-group minority will produce a more posi-
tive social identity for subjects in terms of the available intergroup comparisons.
At the same time, if it is conflict with, and social rejection of, the deviant, negatively
valued, incorrect minority which leads to validation, then a minority socially categorized
as out-group might be expected to gain these paradoxical ‘advantages’. Social categoriz-
ation of a minority as an explicit out-group should intensify the social rejection which
facilitates validation. Just as, for example, a ‘rigid’ minority tends to be overtly rejected
and perceived more negatively than a ‘flexible’ one (as extreme, dogmatic, antagonistic)
and yet in consequence has more indirect than direct influence (see Moscovici, 1980), so
too should out-group membership produce more latent than manifest influence.
In summary, it seems to follow from conversion theory that the social categorization of
a minority as an out-group should increase its latent influence (Martin, 1988a,b; Mugny
& Perez, 1987; Mugny, Perez & Sanchez-Mazas, 1993; Perez & Mugny, 1987). In a strong
form, it could be argued that just as minorities have an advantage over majorities in pro-
ducing conversion, so for the same reasons out-group minorities should have an advantage
over in-group minorities. While an unequivocal correspondence between majorities and
social comparison, minorities and validation is not commonly discussed in current
approaches, the theory underlying the correspondence has not, to our knowledge, been
challenged; neither has an alternative explanation of minority conversion been offered.
The implication of the correspondence (i.e. that out-group membership facilitates conver-
sion) is in fact stated very clearly by Moscovici’s colleagues in their recent formulation of
conflict elaboration theory: ‘. . . we hypothesize that shared social identity actually
reduces true influence while categorization of others as out-group actually may increase
it’ (Mugny et al., 1993 p. 10).
This implication was of special interest to us since it conflicts directly with the unam-
biguous prediction of self-categorization theory that true influence (as opposed to com-
pliance) is based on shared social identity, the social categorization of others as similar to
self. Self-categorization theory is a general analysis of group processes in terms of the dis-
tinction between personal and social identity (Turner, 1982; Turner et al,, 1987). It has
been applied in some detail to the explanation of social influence more or less contempor-
aneously with conversion theory. It supposes that one only expects to agree with people
categorized as similar to self, and that only disagreement with similar people produces
uncertainty (Turner,l991). To reduce such uncertainty one can recategorize self and
others (as different in relevant respects), redefine the objective stimulus situation as one
that is not shared (i.e. as one that varies with the perceiver) or engage in mutual influence
to produce the expected agreement (i.e. persuade and/or be persuaded).
182 Barbara David andJohn C . Turner
Where one disagrees with people categorized as out-group members, their perceived
difference from self explains and justifies the disagreement, no uncertainty arises and
there is no psychological pressure for mutual influence. No cognitive pressure for unifor-
mity arises with different people, since their very difference explains why they are wrong
and why one should not be persuaded. Why, for example, would one feel a need to agree
about politics with people whose political values were fundamentally opposed to one’s
own or about social psychology with people who rejected the value of science?
The theory is therefore explicit that persuasion can only be effected by people who are
psychological in-group members (by some relevant criterion). Any evidence that psycho-
logical out-group membership can produce influence is contrary to the theory. The social
categorization of others as out-group members is an alternative to being influenced, since
if one can reject and derogate others as different, there is no uncertainty to be resolved.
Moscovici’s colleagues acknowledge the fundamental conflict between self-categorization
theory and their own in a preamble to the earlier quotation: ‘Supporters of the theory of
self-categorization and those of minority influence [sic] hold diametrically opposed views:
self-categorization theory assumes that shared in-group identity is the basis of private
acceptance . . . we hypothesize that shared social identity actually reduces true influence
while categorization of others as out-group actually may increase it’ (Mugny et al.,
1993, p. 10).
This theoretical conflict about the role of social identity in conversion raises several
interesting questions and issues that we set out to address through our programme of
empirical research. In a number of studies to be published in the future we provide and
test a self-categorization alternative to Moscovici’s ( 1980) explanation of minority con-
version. In the current paper we begin by addressing the question: ‘Does out-group mem-
bership confer any kind of advantage on minorities in producing conversion?’If it does
not, we suggest that the liberating role played by the ‘deviance’ of a minority source is
called into question and, with it, the explanatory value of conversion theory.
The evidence seems overwhelming that in-group minorities produce more manifest
influence than out-group ones, but what about at the latent level? The results here seem
more ambiguous (e.g. Martin, 1988a,b and PCrez & Mugny, 1987 versus Clark 8z Maass,
1988a,b and Volpato, Maass, Mucchi-Faina & Vitti, 1990). We set out in the present
studies to examine this issue employing significant, real-life social identities directly
relevant to the attitudes being measured and employing the full conceptual design of
confronting subjects with a message from either a majority or a minority belonging to
in-group or out-group and using measures of both compliance and conversion.
Our reason for employing the full design is that we believe some of the findings of out-
group influence may be the result of using only a partial design (the danger of this was
illustrated by Volpato et al., 1990, who found a significant out-group minority effect in
Study 1 which employed a reduced design and no significant out-group minority effect in
Study 2 , employing the full design). Our reason for employing social categories which are
salient in the context of the attitudes being measured is that we believe that many previ-
ous studies showing ‘out-group’ minority influence have done so because the categoriz-
ation used in the design is what Clark & Maass refer to as a ‘prepackaged surrogate
variable’ (19886, p. 348) rather than one which is psychologically valid. If, for example,
a female university student was listening to someone arguing against the introduction of
university fees, and the self-category which was made salient for her by the topic of the
message was ‘university student’, the only psychologically valid categorization of the
source of influence would be on the same dimension. Since self-categorization is dynamic,
fluid and context dependent, one person may be out-group in a particular context (a male
would, for example, be out-group to a female if context made gender salient for her) and
in-group in another (the same male could be in-group if he was the same nationality as
the subject in a context where nationality was salient). To claim our university student’s
subsequent agreement with the source as evidence of out-group influence on the grounds
that he was male (or indeed as evidence of in-group influence on the grounds that he was
the same nationality, or shared a liking for Beethoven) would be misleading. In a desire
for methodological rigour (i.e. the non-confounding of categorization with message) we
believe that some researchers have used psychologically empty categorizations which, in
practice, have confounded interpretation of their results.
Thus the current studies will employ in-groupout-group categorizations on the
dimension directly related to the influence message: the message will be either pro-con-
servation or pro-logging (i.e. anti-conservation) and the source of influence will be either
pro- or anti-conservation. The issue of logging rain forest areas is a current topic of heated
debate in Australia with, generally speaking, the large city populations of Sydney and
Melbourne supporting the conservationist position while rural populations, particularly
communities which rely on logging for their livelihood, support the timber industry. The
issue receives constant media attention due to frequent confrontations between loggers
and protesting conservationists, and to an increasing number of challenges to traditional
conservative political candidates from Green Party contenders. Most Australians are very
sure on which side of the issue they stand. Thus in the current studies subjects will
initially be asked to indicate the extent to which they are ‘on the side of the loggers or
conservationists’ and there will be no subsequent confusion as to whether the source of
influence is in-group or out-group to them on the salient dimension. To further clarify the
identity of the source of influence, it will be labelled as either ‘Friends of the Forest’ or
’Friends of the Timber Industry’. The vital nature of the issue will also ensure that sub-
jects care how they respond, avoiding the problems that arise when studies employ issues
about which subjects are indifferent (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1981 and Maass & Clark,
1983, for the connection between issue relevance and attitude change). We will not have
conditions where ‘Friends of the Forest’ give a pro-logging or ‘Friends of the Timber
Industry’ give a pro-conservation message. As well as creating an unwieldy number of
conditions, we believe that the psychological effect of giving a categorical label to con-
tent which totally contradicts it would be to introduce such effects as amazement, disbe-
lief, suspicion, etc. and reduce the salience of the categorizations (Oakes, 1987; Oakes,
Haslam & Turner, 1994).
In the present studies, the source of influence will be defined as majority or minority
by informing subjects that it represents most, or only a few, conservationists/loggersbut
since for us the important feature of the majority and minority is not their purely numer-
ical definition but that they are, respectively, similar to subjects (normative) or different
from subjects (counter- or anti-normative) the majority will also be described as being ‘an
ordinary, moderate group’ and the minority as ‘an extremist, radical group’. This, as well
as being ecologically valid, is in line with Moscovici’s observation that the majority is
‘common and less extreme’ while the minority is ‘less familiar and more extreme’ (1976,
p. 13).
184 Barbara David andJohn C. Turnw
Subjects will complete a questionnaire on their attitudes to conservation and from this
be given a conservation score which indicates a pro-logging through neutral to pro-
conservation attitude. They will then receive a pro-conservation or pro-logging message
purportedly from either a majority or minority of Friends of the Forest or Friends of the
Timber Industry, and again complete the questionnaire. In the first study our measures of
compliance and conversion are temporal. Subjects will complete the questionnaire a third
time after a month’s delay. The difference between pre- and immediate post-test conser-
vation score will be the measure of compliance and the difference between pre- and
delayed post-test conservation score will be the measure of conversion. Since some doubt
has been expressed that temporal measures alone are sensitive enough to detect latent
effects (see Mugny, Rilliet & Papastamou, 198l), our second study employs the same basic
design as the first but uses public and private post-test responses as the measures of com-
pliance and conversion.
We are not at this stage proffering an explanation for minority conversion; neither are
we denying its existence. What we are addressing-in fact disagreeing with-is the
notion that minorities are able to convert because they are essentially different from sub-
jects. Thus we predict that the traditional pattern of conversion will be evinced only by
in-group minority sources. This is in opposition to what we have argued is the logical
implication of the conversion theory ‘freedom from social comparison’argument: the pre-
diction that out-group minorities, being quintessentially different from subjects (and
therefore evoking not the slightest tendency to indulge in social comparison), should con-
vert more strongly than in-group minority sources.
STUDY 1
Method
Pilot and valihtion studies
Prior to the first study, separate pilot and validation studies were conducted. In the pilot study subjects gen-
erated their own statements about logging and conservation and categorized given statements as pro-conser-
vation or pro-logging in nature. Using this information, a conservation questionnaire (to be used in
determining a conservation score, the dependent measure) and pro-conservation and pro-logging ‘policy
statements’ (to be used as the influence messages) were constructed. In the validation study, a different
sample of subjects completed the conservation questionnaire and their scores were correlated with the degree
to which they rated themselves as pro-conservation. The internal consistency of the scale, which ranged from
1 (extremely pro-logging) to 9 (extremely pro-conservation) yielded .90 (Cronbach’s alpha) and subjects’ atti-
tude scores correlated at .87 Cp < .Ol), with the extent to which they reported themselves to be ‘on the side
of the conservationistslloggers’.Subjects also indicated the degree to which they thought the policy state-
ments were pro-conservation or pro-logging. The Friends of the Timber Industry policy statement was placed
at 2.5 (SD = .87) on the conservation scale (strongly to moderately pro-logging) and the Friends of the Forest
policy statement was placed at 8.6 (SD = .63) on the conservation scale (strongly to completely pro-
conservation). A related sample t test on ratings of the two statements found them to be significantly
different (r(59)= 12.30,p < ,001).
Subjects
Subjects came from scouting and church youth groups and all were still attending high school.
Approximately half came from the New South Wales country towns of Eden and Bega, which are in areas rely-
ing heavily on logging for their livelihoods. The other half came from metropolitan areas of Sydney. Seven
potential subjects from the country towns declined to participate because they were, as one boy expressed it,
‘sick of all this greenie business’ and two teenagers from Bega who actually participated in the first session
declined to come back for the second session because they ‘thought the conservation stuff was stupid’.
Thirteen potential urban subjects declined to participate because they weren’t interested. Final numbers were
186 (92 city and 94 rural) subjects. Gender and age composition in both groups was approximately the same
with, overall, 103 boys and 83 girls and ages ranging between 15 years two months and 18 years six months,
with an average age of 17 years 10 months.
Design
The design was a 2 (message: pro-conservation versus pro-logging) X 2 (source identity: in-group versus out-
group) X 2 (source status: majority versus minority) X 2 (influence: immediate versus delayed) factorial with
the last factor being a repeated measure. Initially a control condition was included to ensure that any changes
in conservation score were due co the nature of the source of influence and not to simple repetition of the
measure.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly allocated to either the control condition or one of four experimental conditions
(influence source: Friends of the Forest, majority; Friends of the Forest, minority; Friends of the Timber
Industry, majority; Friends of the Timber Industry, minority).
Potential subjects were told that they were about to participate in a study which was investigating the ways
in which different styles of language were more or less effective in conveying information. They were told that
this would involve filling out a number of questionnaires and evaluating a policy statement and that they
would be required to attend the current session and one other session, three weeks later. If they agreed to par-
ticipate, they filled in a consent form and the session began. Subjects were tested in groups of between 10 and
15 persons per group. They were seated at a distance of two metres from each other and did not communi-
cate with each other during the study.
Pre-test
To reinforce the cover story and to make the nine-point Likert-type scale familiar, subjects were initially asked
to read five statements about language style and to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with
each statement, by circling a number on the scale beneath the statement.
To make their relevant social identities salient and also to act as a validity check on the subsequent con-
servation scores, subjects were then asked to indicate what side of the rainforest logging issue they were on.
They were then presented with the 20 statements chosen in the pilot study and tested in the validation phase:
six pro-conservation target items, six pro-logging target items and eight neutral distracter items. They were
asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each item, by circling a number on the
nine-point Likert-type scale beneath the item (believing that the experimenter’s interest was in the style of
the message rather than its content).
Znfzuence messuges. In two of the four experimental conditions subjects were handed a policy statement from a
group purportedly called Friends of the Forest, in two a policy statement from a group purportedly called
Friends of the Timber Industry. Controls received a policy statement on the issue of university fees suppos-
edly from a students’ union. Since it only mattered that this statement was not relevant to the issue of con-
servation, it was not pilot tested or validated.
Majority conditions. In one Friends of the Forest and one Friends of the Timber Industry condition, subjects
were told:
You are now going to be asked to read and evaluate a policy statement from a group called Friends of
the ForestlFriends of the Timber Industry. They are an ordinary, moderate group and represent most, or
about 85 per cent, of conservationists/loggers.
186 Barbara David andJohn C. Tumw
Minority conditions. In one Friends of the Forest and one Friends of the Timber Industry condition, subjects
were told:
You are now going to be asked to read and evaluate a policy statement from a group called Friends of
the Forest/Friends of the Timber Industry. They are an extremist, radical group and represent only a few,
or about 8 per cent, of conservationists/loggers.
Control Condition. Control subjects were told:

You are now going to be asked to read and evaluate a policy statement from the New South Wales
Combined Students’ Union.
All subjects silently followed the written words while the pre-recorded policy statement was played on a
tape recorder. In keeping with the cover story, they were then asked to rate the statement as a whole on the
effectiveness of its expression.
Post-test
Immediately after receiving and evaluating the policy statement, subjects were told:
One of the things we are examining is whether particular ways of expressing thoughts and beliefs have
a lasting effect or whether their effect is merely transitory. To test this you will be asked to fill out a ques-
tionnaire which is fairly similar to the one you filled out at the beginning of the session.
Subjects again filled in the questionnaire for the five language style and the 20 rainforest logging state-
ments.
Delayed post-test and manipulation checks

Subjects met no less than three weeks and no more than one month after the initial session. They were told:
As you may remember, one of the things we are looking at is whether some ways of expressing thoughts
and feelings are more memorable than others. To test this, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire
which is fairly similar to those you filled out in the first session and we will also be asking you a few
other questions.
Subjects completed the questionnaire containing the five language style and 20 conservation items and
answered a number of questions concerning the manipulations (the name of the source of influence, what it
was advocating, whether it was ordinary or extremist and whether it represented a large or small number of
people).
Results
Manipulation checks
All subjects correctly identified the source of influence and its nature (whether ‘ordinary,
moderate’ or ‘extremist, radical’ and whether representing a large or small number of
people on the same side of the issue).
Self-categorizationand validztion of conservation score

From the question which asked subjects to indicate their position on the conservation
issue (i.e. their self-categorization, where 1 indicated totally pro-logging, 5 indicated
neutral and 9 indicated totally pro-conservation), subjects who circled 5.5 or higher were
designated pro-conservation and subjects who circled 4 . 5 or lower were designated pro-
logging. This categorization correlated perfectly with the rurakity categories, city sub-
Self-categurizationand minurity conversion 187
jects being mildly to moderately pro-conservation (M = 6.20, SD = .76) and rural sub-
jects being moderately to strongly pro-logging (M = 2.87, SD = .31).
An independent groups t test on answers to the self-categorization question showed
that the two groups were significantly different (t(186) = 31.77,p < .001). Scores corre-
lated at .91 <p < .Ol), with pre-test conservation scores indicating that the conservation
scores were a valid indication of attitudes to logging and conservation.
Pre-test conservation scores

To ascertain that, apart from the difference in subjects’ pro-conservation or pro-logging
identities, there were no initial differences between groups, a 2 (subject identity) X 5
(source of influence: Friends of the Forest, majority/Friends of the Forest, minority/
Friends of the Timber Industry, majority/Friends of the Timber Industry, minority/con-
trols) ANOVA on pre-test scores yielded a highly significant main effect for subject iden-
tity (F(1,176) = 811.262, p < .0001). The sample means were 6.32 (SD = .97) for
pro-conservation subjects and 3.35 (SD = 1.12) for pro-logging subjects, placing both
subject categories in the mild to moderately in-group range.
When this was broken down for each subject category in separate one-way ANOVAs
on pre-test scores by source of influence, there were no significant effects.
Controls
Controls were tested separately in a 2 (subject identity) X 3 (time) MANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor. This yielded significant main effects for subject iden-
tity (F(1,34) = 234.84, p < .0001) and time (F(2,49.391) = 5.40, p < .05) and a
significant interaction of subject identity X time (F(2,49.39) = 9.93,p < .OOOl).
The interaction appears to be due to the fact that pro-conservation controls remained
unchanged in their attitude to conservation (pre-test M = 6.36, post-test M = 6.44,
delayed post-test M = 6.54) while pro-logging controls took an increasingly pro-logging
stance over time (pre-test M = 3.26, post-test M = 2.84, delayed postest M = 2.44).
For multiple comparisons, Bonferroni t crit. with a significance level of .05 was 3.14.
t tests confirmed the patterns observed in the previous paragraph, with no significant tem-
poral differences being found for pro-conservation controls, and for pro-logging controls
a significant pre-test versus delayed post-test difference (t = 5.13). Thus subjects who
were in favour of logging needed no explicit influence message to become even more
favourably disposed to logging.
I nfaence
The differences between pre-test and post-test and between pre-test and delayed post-test
were calculated for experimental subjects to determine immediate and delayed influence
scores. Shift in the direction of the position advocated by the source was positive, shift
which moved subjects away from the position advocated by the source was negative.
A 2 (message: pro-conservation/pro-logging) X 2 (source identity: in-group/out-
group) X 2 (source status: majority/minority) X 2 (influence: immediate/delayed)
factorial ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was performed. There was a
significant main effect for message (F(1,140) = 885.18, p = < .0001) which was sub-
sumed by the significant interactions of message X source identity (F( 1,140) = 11.26,
p = .001), source status X influence (F(1,140) = 84.90,p < .0001), message X source
status X influence (F(1,140) = 4.01, p < .047),source identity X source status X in-
fluence (F(1,140 = 6 4 . 7 6 , ~<.0001), and message X source identity X source status X
influence (F(1,140) = 20.98,p <.OOOl).
Examination of Table 1 shows that, while immediate influence was significant for all
subjects, i.e. all subjects evinced a significant pre-test to post-test shift, this was in the
direction of the source when it was in-group for subjects, and away from the source
when it was out-group for subjects. Thus immediate in-group influence was positive and
immediate out-group influence was negative.
For subjects in the out-group source conditions there was no diminution of their imme-
diate negative influence on the delayed measure, while in all in-group source conditions
there was a significant difference between immediate and delayed influence. Examination
of Table 1 shows that, for subjects in the in-group majority conditions, immediate
influence was greater than delayed influence while, for subjects in the in-group minority
conditions, delayed influence was greater than immediate influence.
In summary, the superordinate interaction can be explained by the fact that out-group
subjects moved away from the source of influence immediately and retained their polar-
ized stance while in-group subjects moved towards the source of influence, with subjects
in the in-group minority conditions evincing greater delayed than immediate influence
and subjects in the in-group majority conditions evincing greater immediate than
Table 1. Mean influence scores for two types of message by source of influence (SD in
parentheses)
Message
Pro-conservation Pro-logging
Source Influence
Identity Status Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed
In-group Majority 1.94 0.42" 1.66 1.28

(.60) C71) C56) (.74)
Minority 0.74 2.02 0.90 1.71
(.75) C77) C61) 059)
Out-group Majority -1.34 - 1.23' - 1.69 - 1.go6
C57) (.46) C87)
Minority -1.20 - 1.25' -1.94 - 1.73'
C46) (.65) C72) (.91)
Notes. Comparisons exceeded Bonferroni t crit., alpha .05 = 3.15 for 24 comparisons with 140 d.f. except where otherwise
indicated. All immediate influence is significant (post-test significantly different from pre-test).
Non-significant delayed influence (delayed p t - t e s t not significantly different from pre-test).
Delayed influence not significantly different from immediate influence.
Self-categorization and minority convwsion 189
delayed influence. For subjects receiving a pro-conservation in-group majority message,
the diminution of immediate influence was so great as to return them to a position which
was not significantly different from their pre-test position.
Discussion
Our prediction that the ‘classic’patterns of majority compliance and minority conversion
would apply only to in-group sources was upheld. The prediction which we have argued
can be derived from conversion theory-i.e. that out-group minorities would convert
more strongly than in-group minority sources-was not supported.
In fact, when we note that in-group influence was positive and out-group influence was
negative, we understand that subjects took up a more extreme in-group stance no matter
what the source of influence. Subjects in the out-group source conditions took up their
extreme in-group position immediately and maintained it over time and in this there was
no difference between majority and minority sources. For subjects in the in-group min-
ority source conditions, adoption of the extreme in-group position was more gradual,
being significant at the post-test and significantly greater again at the delayed post-test.
Subjects in the in-group majority conditions immediately adopted an extreme in-group
position which was significantly less extreme by the delayed post-test. For in-group
majority subjects who initially identified with the conservationists, delayed post-depo-
larization was so great as to return them to their initial position.
We might suggest that had not the issue been so salient for pro-logging subjects, those
in the in-group majority source condition might also have completely depolarized over
time. However, pro-logging controls, whose message concerned the introduction of ter-
tiary fees, showed that for pro-logging subjects the issue was highly salient since it was
not even necessary to present a relevant message to induce shift in the in-group direction.
Perhaps this should not be surprising since all subjects, including controls, were required
to indicate the extent to which they were in the logging or conservation ‘side’, which not
only puts both relevant categories on the agenda but implies conflict. Added to this, the
questionnaire which all subjects were required to complete was composed of pro-logging
and pro-conservation statements which had been intentionally chosen for their extreme
nature. Given that all subjects categorized themselves on a conflictual dimension and that
the response measure kept attention focused on the extreme characterizations of in-group
and out-group, relevant social identity would presumably have been highly salient for
both pro-conservation and pro-logging subjects. As outlined in the self-categorization
explanation of polarization (Turner, 1991; Turner et a / . , 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986;
Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989), when social identity is salient people move towards
the extreme in-group (prototypical) position. Thus perhaps what is surprising is not that
pro-logging controls did polarize but that pro-conservation controls did not.
One explanation for the different reactions of pro-logging and pro-conservation con-
trols and in-group majority subjects is that the issue, and therefore the relevant self-cat-
egorizations, while salient for both, were not of equal salience for the two groups. Two
predictors of the salience ofa category are its relative accessibility and the ‘fit’between the
features of the stimulus and one’s internalized stereotype of the category (Bruner, 1957;
Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1986). While the fact that
our questionnaire items were taken from the popular media would presumably have
ensured that they fitted both groups of subjects’ stereotypes of the categories, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that the categories were more accessible for, more part of the everyday
repertoire of, rural subjects. Conservation is relevant for city dwellers but it is not as
immediate an issue as it is for people who derive their living from the timber industry.
The extreme ‘in-groupyness’ of pro-logging subjects in fact raises the possibility that
they may well have perceived themselves as a minority in Australian society. A number
of recent studies suggest that social identity is more salient for minorities than for
majorities (Mullen, 1991;Simon & Brown, 1987). The self-categorization explanation for
this is that ‘asa group becomes smaller within a given comparative context . . .’ andto this
one might add ‘morembattfed’‘it will tend to be making more intergroup comparisons than
intragroup ones, whilst the reverse is true for majorities’ (Haslam, Turner, Oakes,
McGarty & Hayes, 1992, p. 5). Since, in accordance with the meta-contrast principle (see
Hogg & Turner, 1987; Hogg, Turner & Davidson, 1990; Turner, 1991; Turner et af.,
1987; Turner & Oakes, 1986, 1989), intergroup comparisons stress the large differences
between categories and the small differences within, minorities are more likely than
majorities to perceive themselves as a unified group and, one might assume, to act in
terms of prototypical in-group norms. The fact that, in response to the question ‘which
side are you on?’, pro-logging subjects indicated that they were moderately to strongfy in-
group while pro-conservation subjects indicated only mild to moderate in-groupyness, plus
anecdotal evidence from rural non-participants who were ‘sick of all this greenie stuff’ and
urban non-participants who were simply ‘not interested’, all supports the suggestion that,
while the issue was relevant for pro-conservationists, it did not evoke as important a social
identity for them as it did for pro-logging subjects.
If categorization alone can be so powerful as to cause people to polarize in the in-group
direction and since all subjects (bar pro-conservation controls and pro-conservation in-
group majority subjects) ultimately took a more extreme in-group stance than their pre-
test one, is it possible that this study is an illustration of nothing more than polarization
induced by introduction of the salient issue?
The main evidence against an explanation of our results as simply a category-induced
shift towards the in-group prototype is the fact that the patterns of influence from out-
group sources and in-group majority sources (immediate, sustained polarization in the
first case, immediate then declining polarization in the second) were distinctive and con-
sistent and bore no resemblance to controls’ slight graded increase in ‘in-groupyness’. The
graded increase in the in-group minority conditions, while the same ‘shape’as that of con-
trols, was considerably more dramatic. Thus it seems clear that something more complex
than a spontaneous shift towards the in-group prototype is occurring and that this ‘some-
thing’ is connected with the identity of the would-be source of influence.
We shall further consider this issue in the General Discussion following Study 2. At
this point we will simply reiterate that this study does not support the notion that out-
group minorities have a conversion ‘advantage’. The following study attempts to extend
these findings into the public and private domains.
STUDY 2
Study 2 follows the same conceptual design as Study 1 but will employ public measures
as an index of compliance and private measures as an index of conversion. Since the pre-
Self-categmization and minority conversion 191
vious study made it clear that both pro-logging and pro-conservation messages were
potentially influential, and that any effects observed could therefore not be attributed to
differentially persuasive rhetoric or content, it was considered unnecessary to use two
groups of subjects. Since controls in the previous study showed that the issue itself
induced polarization for subjects who identified with loggers, but not for those who
identified with the conservation movement, the subjects used in this study were univer-
sity students from Sydney, hence presumably pro-conservation.
The hypotheses being tested are the same as in the first study with the addition of the
hypothesis that the effects of public and private measures will produce patterns of
influence similar to those produced by, respectively, immediate and delayed measures. If
public measures produce influence patterns similar to immediate measures and private
measures to delayed, we will expect that subjects exposed to majority and minority out-
group sources will polarize away from them both in public and in private. We will expect
that subjects in the in-group majority conditions will be more strongly influenced in pub-
lic than in private while those in the in-group minority condition will be more strongly
influenced in private than in public. If the correspondence between the different types of
measure is perfect we will expect that the in-group effects will be absolute for subjects in
the majority condition (they should evince no private influence) and comparative for sub-
jects in the minority condition (they should evince both public and private influence, but
private influence should be greater than public influence).
Method
Subjects
One hundred and twenty-eight subjects, 81 female and 47 male behavioural science undergraduates from
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, participated in order to gain points towards course requirements.
Ages ranged from 19 years to 52 years with an average age of 20 years three months. Results from three sub-
jects were not used in the analysis (see results).
Design
The experiment was a 2 (response: public versus private) X 2 (source identity: in-group versus out-group) X
2 (source status: majority versus minority) factorial on the dependent variable of influence (post-test-pretest
conservation score).
Pilot and pre-testing

See Study 1 for development and testing of questionnaire and policy statements.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly allocated to one of eight conditions: either private or public response conditions for
in-group majority source, in-group minority source, out-group majority source or out-group minority source.
All subjects were told that they were about to participate in a study which was investigating the ways in
which different styles of language were more or less effective in conveying information. They were told that
this would involve filling out two questionnaires and evaluating a policy statement .
Private conditions. Subjects were told that all responses would be confidential. Since they would be performing
a number of different tasks and it was necessary for the experimenter to collate all the responses from one per-
192 Barbara David a n dJohn C. Turner
son, subjects were asked to invent their own code word or number and place it at the top of all their response
sheets. This way, not even the experimenterwould be able to link names to responses and complete anonymity
was assured.
Pubhcoditions. Subjects were told that once they had filled in all response sheets and been given the chance
to think about their attitudes, response sheets would be read aloud to the whole group and a recorded group
discussion would follow. (Note that while the responses were actually made in private in both conditions, in
public condition subjects expected that responses would be subsequently read aloud.)
If subjects agreed to participate, they filled in a consent form and the session began. Subjects were tested
in groups of 16 . They were seated at a distance of two metres from each other and did not communicate with
each other during the study.
Pre-test a n d post-test
As for Study 1, except that the post-test included the manipulation checks previously administered during
the delayed post-test in the previous study.
Results
Manipulation checks
All subjects correctly identified the source of influence and its nature (whether ‘ordinary,
moderate’ or ‘extremist, radical’ and whether representing a large or small number of
people on the same side of the issue).
Self-categorization a n d validztion of Conservation score

To the question ‘to what extent are you on the side of the loggers or conservationists?’(i.e.
self-categorization, where 1 indicated totally pro-logging, 5 neutral and 9 totally pro-
conservation), three subjects responded that they were mildly to moderately pro-logging
( M = 3.6). Since this was not a large enough number to constitute a separate subject
group and since their results could not logically be grouped with those of pro-conser-
vation subjects, they were excluded from further analysis, leaving 125 subjects. Since the
remaining subjects all indicated that they were pro-conservation ( M = 6.34, SD = .68)
and their self-categorizationanswers correlated at .87 (p < .01)with pre-test conservation
scores, the conservation scores were assumed to be a valid measure of conservation
attitudes.
Pre-test conservation scores

In order to confirm that there were no initial group differences, a one-way ANOVA on
pre-scores by response (publidprivate), source identity (in-group/out-group) and source
status (majority/minority) yielded no significant effects. The total group mean was 6.13
(mildly to moderately pro-conservation) with a standard deviation of .77.
lnjuence
The difference between pre-test and post-test conservation scores was calculated to create
an influence scorce. When shift was in the direction advocated by the source, influence
Table 2. Mean public and private influence scores of influence (SD in parentheses)
Source Measure
Identity Status Public Private
In-group Majority 1.88 0.48*

C51) (.93)
Minority 0.80 2.09
(.65) C78)
Out-group Majority - 1.88’ - 1.48’
C54) (.61)
Minority - 1.61‘ -1.51‘
C46) (S7)
~ ~~
Note. Comparisons exceeded Bonferroni t crit., alpha .05 = 2.9 for 12 comparisons with 117 d.f. except where otherwise
indicated.
“Non-significant difference between pre and post.
Non-significant difference between public and private majority conditions.
“on-significant difference between public and private minority conditions.
was positive; when shift was away from the position advocated by the source, influence
was negative.
A 2 (source identity: in-grouplout-group) X 2 (source status: majoritylminority) X 2
(response: public/private) ANOVA was performed on influence scores. There was a
significant main effect for source identity (F(1,117) = 4 5 . 6 3 , ~<.0001) which was sub-
sumed by the significant interactions of response X source status (F(1,117) = 22.15,
p < .0001) and response X source identity X source status (F(1,117) = 35.34,
p c .0001).
For multiple comparisons, Bonferroni t crit. with a significance level of .05 was 2.90.
Examination of Table 2 shows that, for out-group sources, influence was equally negative
in public and private conditions. In the in-group source condition, there were significant
differences between public and private conditions with private influence being greater
than public in the minority condition (t = -6.73) and public influence being greater
than private in the majority condition (t = 8.51). In fact, for subjects in the in-group
majority private condition, the mean shift of .48 between pre- and post-tests was not
significant.
Discussion
In seven out of eight conditions, subjects moved in the in-group direction, regardless of
the identity of the source of influence. Only when confronted by an in-group majority and
believing that responses would be private were subjects unmoved.
Identity of the source of influence and believed nature of response (whether public or
private) did, however, affect the magnitude of pre-test to post-test changes. In the in-
group source conditions, the majority had greater public than private influence and the
minority had greater private than public influence. This supports the hypothesis that
public measures evoke the same kind of responses as immediate temporal measures while
private measures evoke the same kind of responses as delayed temporal measures: in Study
1 the in-group majority had greater immediate than delayed influence and this was par-
alleled in Study 2 by the in-group majority having greater public than private influence;
in Study 1 the in-group minority had greater delayed than immediate influence and this
was paralleled by the in-group minority in Study 2 having greater private than public
influence.
Results from the out-group source conditions in the first study were also replicated in
the second study: in Study 1 subjects moved immediately in the in-group direction and
evinced no long-term decline in influence; in Study 2 subjects moved in the in-group
direction and the magnitude of their move was not affected by whether they believed their
responses would be public or private. In both studies the majority or minority status of
the out-group source had no bearing on results.
That the parallel between effects of immediate/delayed and publidprivate measures
was exact was supported by the fact that in Study 1 pro-consenration subjects in the in-
group majority condition evinced no significant delayed influence and subjects in the same
condition in the present study evinced no private influence.
Thus Study 2 provides support for and strengthens the findings of Study 1. Both
studies strongly support our hypothesis that majority compliance and minority conver-
sion are in-group phenomena and fail to support the idea that out-group membership
confers a conversion advantage on a minority source of influence.
General discussion
Our finding that different measures of compliance and conversion can produce the same
patterns of influence is, it should be emphasized, a matter of ‘all else being equal’. We are
not claiming that immediate influence is the same thing as public, or delayed influence the
same thing as private influence. Clearly there are many variables which might affect the
measures differentially: features of a message which make it more or less memorable
would presumably have a greater effect on delayed measures than on private; features of
the ‘audience’, such as power or expert status, would presumably have a greater effect on
public measures than on immediate. The closer examination of such variables is not a con-
cern of the current study.
Our reason for using two different measures of influence was to underscore that certain
social psychological variables will determine whether or not influence-in any form-
will occur, and we have shown that perceived similarity to a source of influence is necess-
ary for immediate, delayed, public and private manifestations of influence. Perceived
difference from a source of influence results not in any sort of positive influence, but in a
spontaneous shift away from the source. This we believe is our most important finding
and we shall return to it shortly.
We must first however address that aspect of our studies which makes them different
from many others in the field: the highly salient and conflictual nature of the dimensions
of categorization and of the influence topic used (which is not to say that we are com-
pletely alone in this-see, for example, Paicheler, 1976, 1977, 1979, who addressed atti-
tudes to feminism; Clark & Maass, 1988a, who addressed attitudes to gay rights, and
PCrez, Mugny, Llavata & Fierres, 1993, who addressed discrimination against an ethnic
minority). Petty & Cacioppo (1981), in their ‘elaboration-likelihood model’ of attitude
change, suggest that an enduring internalized attitude change will only occur if one is
highly motivated (and able) to think about a communication. Clark & Maass (1988a)sug-
gest that lack of motivation to attend to a message from a source, the social identity of
which is not relevant for subjects, is a methodological limitation in influence studies
which employ ‘prepackagedsurrogate variables such as sex, race or social class . . . as inde-
pendent variables’ (p. 348). Thus we aimed to employ categorizations which were highly
salient. It appears that we succeeded in that subjects all indicated identification with one
side or the other of the bipolar issue of conservation versus logging and, with two excep-
tions, all groups of subjects showed a significant attitude change.
The very immediacy of the issue and salience of the self-categorizations evoked by it,
however, may have mitigated against positive out-group influence: being pro- or anti-
conservation may have been such an important part of subjects’ self-concepts that to shift
in the out-group direction was out of the question for them. In fact the relevant categories
were not merely salient but could be argued to stand in a condition of negative inter-
dependence to each other: if conservationists get their way, loggers will lose their
livelihoods; if loggers get their way, there will be nothing left to conserve. Even if this is
not true, Mugny, Sanchez-Mazas, Roux & Perez (1991) have shown that a belief that the
in-group will suffer from the out-group’s gain results in heightened in-group bias.
Just as loggers and conservationists could be seen as negatively interdependent, they
could both be seen to be acting out of self-interest (and the influence messages actually
stressed this). Extrapolating from Kelley’s (197 1) discounting principle according to
which a perceived cause for an event will be given less weight when other plausible causes
are present Maass & Clark (1984; Clark & Maass, 1988a) suggest that the validity of an
out-group message may be discounted if the source is perceived as self-interested.
Thus the self-categories evoked for subjects in our studies were apparently highly
salient, the in- and out-groups could be seen as negatively interdependent and the
influence messages stressed the out-group’s self-interestedness. We believe that these
things will be true, to greater and lesser extents, for all psychologically meaningful social
categorizations. More importantly, however, they do not mitigate against the self-categor-
ization hypothesis but rather against the competing prediction: the clarity of the in-
grouplout-group division should have liberated subjects from any suggestion of the need
for social comparison and given the out-group an unquestionable conversion ‘advantage’.
In discussing the results of Study 1 we raised the question of whether they could be
interpreted, in the main, as category induced shifts in the extreme in-group direction.
The out-group data, where subjects reacted to the source by shifting away from it, could
be seen as a very clear illustration of the self-categorization explanation of polarization-
the notion that, when in-group membership is salient, people move beyond the mean in
contrast to the out-group (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987;Turner & Oakes, 1986,1989).
How, then, do we explain the shift in the extreme in-group direction from subjects in the
in-group conditions? We might suggest that, since the normative position is the in-group
prototype, ‘the position that best defines what a group has in common in contrast to other
groups’ and that this position ‘tends to be more extreme than the pre-test mean in the
same direction, i.e. polarized’ (Turner, 1991, p. 77), subjects were simply stating what
they perceived to be normative. Could, then, our results be said to be simply a normative
reaction to identity and to involve no processing of the influence messages?
First, we should be quite clear that we believe the normativehformational distinction
to be a false dichotomy and that to speak of ‘purely’ normative effects is to accept im-
plicitly the dichotomy. This aside, the strongest evidence against the notion that our sub-
jects may not have processed the influence messages remains the fact that, although most
of them ultimately held a more extreme in-group stance after the influence message than
before it, different sources stimulated different patterm of response (and in-group
majority subjects for whom the topic was less vital, i.e. pro-conservation subjects,
ultimately returned to their pre-test position). To further support our belief that our
influence messages had effects which involved them being processed and were more com-
plex than simply making the in-group norm salient, future studies will need to show suc-
cessful sources of influence who do not present an extreme in-group position (the position
which the meta-contrast principle would suggest represents the in-group prototype and
towards which subjects could therefore be expected to polarize), and subjects moving
in a conservative rather than extreme direction (where they &polarize). Perhaps most
importantly, future studies need to include an independent measure of cognitive
processing.
At the beginning of this paper we said that we do not deny that majorities and min-
orities can produce different outcomes and we stressed that our immediate aim was not to
explain the phenomena but to show that they apply only to the in-group since it is
counter to self-categorizationtheory that any positive influence can be exerted by the out-
group. Our theoretical focus has been on what we believe to be the keystone of conversion
theory: the idea that minorities are able to convert because they are essentially different
from subjects and therefore free one from the need for social comparison which, in the
majority situation, inhibits validation and hence conversion. The fact that pro-conserva-
tion subjects in the in-group majority conditions of our studies evinced a very clear com-
pliance effect (i.e. were influenced in public but not in private, immediately but not at a
temporal delay) might seem to support Moscovici. However, if disagreement with people
who are similar to self evokes social comparison and blocks validation, why did not the
in-group minority sources in our study elicit compliance? Is it because in-group min-
orities are not a3 similar to subjects as in-group majorities? Absolute difference from self
is obviously not the key or our out-group sources would have converted. Is conversion,
then, a product of sources who are somewhat, but not too, dissimilar to subjects? If this
is the case, we need to quantify or in some way be able to determine the boundaries of
‘somewhat’and ‘too’.
The present studies, we believe, clearly define the boundaries of ‘too’different: a source
is too different from subjects to convert them when it represents an out-group on the
social categorical dimension which is salient in the context of the influence attempt. As
well as being evidence against the assertions currently made by Mugny, Perez and their
colleagues (Mugny & Perez, 1987; Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas& Perez, in press; Perez
& Mugny, 1987, in press; Perez eta!., 1994),we believe that our results have implications
for previous research in the area. For example, Volpato et al. (1990) suggest that an out-
group minority may influence when it is ‘dissident’(i.e. is in conflict with its own major-
ity). Our current findings would lead us to suggest that the effect of such dissent is to
redefine the source as in-group, on the grounds that ‘my enemy’senemy is my friend’. Our
findings would lead us to warn that when a dissident out-group minority’s conflict with
its majority puts it at a greater remove from the in-group, such that it cannot be redefined
Self-categoriution and minority conversion 197
as belonging, it will not influence (for example, if a minority of Nazis espouse a particu-
larly extreme Fascist viewpoint they will not influence a group of civil libertarians
simply because they are in conflict with the majority of Nazis).
We also believe that our findings make it important to state the social categorical rela-
tionship of sources to targets of influence in influence research which does not focus on
categorization. Such research implicitly uses in-group sources. For example, in her work
on creativity and divergent thinking, Nemeth suggests that one reason minorities liber-
ate people from convergent thinking is that they do not induce the level of stress which
is the product of disagreement with a majority (and leads people to ‘narrow the focus of
attention and increase the probability of the strongest or most dominant response’,
Nemeth, 1986,p. 25). This analysis cannot be applied to majoritiesperse since one would
not presumably be stressed by disagreement with even a very large number of people if
one did not expect to agree with them (i.e. if they were not similar to self on the relevant
dimension). Similarly why would conflict with a minority lead, as Nemeth suggests it
does, to consideration of multiple perspectives if the conflict is an expected part of the
relationship (i.e. if the source represented the wrong-by-definition out-group)? Thus we
might expect a discrepant minority to induce divergent thought in such situations as a
jury deliberation or a staff meeting, where there is no reason for participants to perceive
themselves as different from each other in any relevant way, but when the minority rep-
resents a nomic social group which differs from one’s own, it would be unduly optimistic
to suggest that they will induce anything but a more intransigent embracing of one’s
existing perspective.
At this point we believe that we can say with some confidence that being a member of
the out-group does not impart an advantage on would-be ‘evangelists’. This, as we have
already suggested, means that the liberating role played by the ‘deviance’of a minority
source is called into question and, with it, the explanatory value of conversion theory.
However, we are still left with unanswered questions. We accept that only in-group
minorities influence but we still have not explained why their influence is stronger at a
temporal remove and in private. If they influence because they are perceived as similar
to self, why is their influence so comparatively small in the present and in public? The
question will be pursued in future research (David & Turner, 1995, in submission; 1995,
in preparation).
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British Journal of Social Psychology (1996),3 5 , 179-199 Printedin Great Britain 179

0 1996 The British Psychological Society

Studies in self-categorization and minority

Barbara David* and John C. Turner

* Requests for reprints.

Control Condition. Control subjects were told:

Delayed post-test and manipulation checks

Self-categorizationand validztion of conservation score

Pre-test conservation scores

Identity Status Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed

In-group Majority 1.94 0.42" 1.66 1.28

Pilot and pre-testing

Self-categorization a n d validztion of Conservation score

Pre-test conservation scores

Identity Status Public Private

In-group Majority 1.88 0.48*

Made available electronicallyJanuary 1996

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