Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VishiShTAdvaita vishleShaNa Vivechanam
VishiShTAdvaita vishleShaNa Vivechanam
Even an insignificant being like me can see and point out some of the
deficiencies in other philosophies, but that is based on the
wonderful works of Sri Madhvācārya and his glorious parampara. So, an
effective rebuttal of Sri Parakāla yati was accomplished by Acharya
Madhva and the Guru parampara and I am only pointing out those
points.
1. Advaita says that the jīva and Brahman are same or non-
different in the sense that they are identified as one.
Viśiṣṭādvaita says that the jīva and Brahman are same or non-
different in the sense that they are equal.
2. Advaita says that they appear to be different because of
vyāvahārika satya of jagat - that is before liberation.
4. Advaita says that the jīva needs the grace of the Lord in
vyāvahārikatva, but in mokṣa, the jīva is the God.
Viśiṣṭādvaita says that the jīva needs the grace of the Lord for
making its dharma bhuta jnana expand infinitely in mokṣa, where
the jīva has six qualities like jñāna and Ananda equal to God.
Pūrvapakṣa:
However, the dvaitins in later times were not so friendly towards
Viśiṣṭādvaita. Beginning from Jaya Tirtha, dvaita launched a number
of attacks on Viśiṣṭādvaita, attempting to refute our tradition.
Siddhānta:
This person writes elsewhere in glorifying Viśiṣṭādvaita -
Quote:
Swami Rāmānuja showed how the teachings of other darśanas were invalid, and that Viśiṣṭādvaita was
the true import of the Veda. In this respect, our Swami had numerous advantages over the founders of
other darśanams, such as Advaita.
Unquote:
Based on the former statement, does the latter statement mean that
Viśiṣṭādvaitins are not friendly towards the followers of other
darśanas? Does this also mean that beginning from Swami Rāmānuja
himself, Viśiṣṭādvaita launched a number of attacks on other
darśanas, attempting to refute their tradition?
Isn't the root cause of all this a mix-up between a person and a
thought, a darśana and a dārśanika, a philosophy and a philosopher, a
tradition and a follower of that tradition, a school and a
follower/founder of that school?
There are others who think that the elasticity of Sanskrit language
is the root cause for multiple schools, all of which are based on
Vedic sources and brahmamīmāMsa/brahmasūtras. So, how can any one
philosophy claim that it alone is accurate in every respect? Some
aspects are accurate in some philosophies and each philosophy has
something to offer and no philosophy has every thing to offer.
Both of the above are not tenable positions. The latter is perhaps
more confusing than the former. Which points are to be taken from
which philosophy and what are the reasons behind each of those? It
boils down to personal likes and dislikes of each individual and
prone to changes based on the changing likes and dislkes of that
individual thus making the philosophical journey an aimless one.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The followers of Dvaita are also dualists, who believe in the reality
of Sriman Narayana as saguna brahmam...
Siddhānta:
Just a clarification. The term dualist is meant to believe in the
difference between jīva and Paramātma, but not to believe in two
Brahmas - saguṇa Brahma and nirguṇa Brahma. There is only one Brahma.
The word guṇa has multiple meanings. The same Brahma is sometimes
referred as saguṇa and sometimes as nirguṇa. When the word saguṇa is
used, guṇa means "auspicious quality". So, saguṇa means One who has
all the auspicious qualities. When the word nirguṇa is used, guṇa
means "prākṛtika guṇa (gross quality)". So, nirguṇa means One who is
devoid of any "prākṛtika guṇa (gross quality)". He is nirdoṣa jñāna
ānandātmaka (flawless personification of knowledge and bliss).
Pūrvapakṣa:
Dvaitins on the net have been vigorously asserting that they have
'vanquished' Viśiṣṭādvaita (refer the official Dvaita website), and
have compiled refutations of our tradition on their sites. The famous
Dvaitin 'catchphrase' is that 21 bhashyas have been refuted by them,
and they include EmperumAnAr's Sri Bhashyam in that. Now, we need not
invite debates, but when we are challenged, it is but proper that we
come up with a suitable response. There is a dearth of articles on
Dvaita as pUrvapaksha in Sri Vaishnava sites. We can remedy this. The
other reason is that we need to popularize the great mahAns who have
toiled to refute the Dvaita Siddhantha, and have authored great
works.
Siddhānta:
We have discussed earlier that refutations of philosophies has been
on-going across the time horizon. And the purvapaksin points out that
such has been on-going between the vishitadvaita and dvaita
traditions as well from both sides.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Another primary motivation for this article is the fact that many
Dvaitin scholars are not above personal insults and sometimes speak
derogatory things about our great acharyas. While we shall not
indulge in such mudslinging (I have the utmost respect for Madhva),
it is necessary to counter this.
Siddhānta:
There is no second opinion that one must avoid derogatory remarks
about acharyas of other schools, mudslinging of any kind and personal
attacks of any kind in establishing a school or answering a set of
objections. Such acts might show up in email chains, but scholarly
works, meant to establish a philosophical position normally do not do
that. See the works of Sri Jayatīrtha, Sri Vyāsatīrtha and Sri
Vijayīndra. They did not do any of those. Even the most recent
scholars, who wrote commentaries (Sri Satyadhyānatīrtharu) never did
any of those. I will be curious if any one points to any commentary
that has such derogatory remarks.
Siddhānta:
It is not just Dvaita, indirectly Viśiṣṭādvaita also is forced to
accept this. There is no escape for them. Why? Very simple. With
their understanding that jīva is the śarīra of Iśvara and that Iśvara
is aware of the difference between Him and his śarīra, there is
difference between Iśvara and jīvas. Iśvara and jīvas are sentient
and prakṛti is jaḍa or inert and so they must accept 2) and 3). They
must be accepting 4) as well as there is difference between one jaḍa
and another no matter how similar they are. The difference between
individual jīvas is our anubhava and I am sure that they will not
seek identity between their jīvas and the jīvas of their gurus. When
they are forced to accept all these, why are they trying to raise
objections against these? If the objections are not for these points,
then why bring these as objectionable points?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Bimba-Pratibimba
The MAdhvAs explain that IsvarA is completely independent and each
Jiva is dependent. However, rather than adopting the SarirAtma bhava
for explaining the difference, they postulate a theory called Bimba-
Pratibimba vada. According to this theory, the jivAs are as dependent
on Sri Hari as the image in a mirror is dependent on the real object.
In this way, each Jiva exists solely due to Sriman Narayana, just as
an image does not exist without the object. Furthermore, just as an
image in a mirror does not possess all the qualities of the object,
the JIvA does not possess all qualities of IsvarA, but are inferior
in all respects.
(Eg. A mirror reflection looks like the real object, but cannot do the
things that the object does. This should provide an indication of how
inferior the JIvAs are, compared to paramAtmA).
The pramāṇa-s given for this theory by MAdhvA, are Sruti statements such as
the one below:
Just as fire, though one, having entered the world, assumes separate
forms in respect of different shapes, similarly, the Self inside all
beings, though one assumes a form in respect of each shape; and yet,
it is outside
A few Gita slokas are also given in support of this view.
Curiously, these pramAnAs, according to Vishishtadvaitins, talk about
the SharIrAtmabhava. For instance, the KatOpanishad vAkyA, ie,
Bhagavan, possessing the JivA as His body, enters the Universe after
Srushti, and assumes different forms based on karmA , yet, Bhagavan
remains detached from all this, since it is His body (namely, the
JivA) that is enjoying the merits and demerits of karma.
Siddhānta:
The assertion that Bhagavān has jīva as His body is apramāṇika. Not
only is there no pramāṇa for that, it even goes against all pramāṇas.
More over not even a tiny trace of sharIrAtmabhAva is present in the
verse.
yathA = just as
agniH = fire god or agni deva(presiding deity of fire)
ekaH = only one
bhuvanam prviShTo = entered the world
rUpaM rUpam = every form (of fire)
pratirUpo babhUva = became pratibimba (of fire)
tathA = similarly
sarva-bhUtAnatarAtmA = One who is inner-controller(Lord) of all
beings
ekaH = only one
rUpaM rUpam = every form (of Jiva)
pratirUpo babhUva = became pratibimba (of Lord)
bahishcha = also outside (meaning different)
(A is outside B means A is different from B)
It is a straight forward thing.
Where did "assumes separate forms in respect of different shapes"
and "assumes a form in respect of each shape" come from?
Further, "this assuming a form with respect to shapes" has nothing to
do with shariratmabhava. Atma does not have a shape. So, sharIra does
not assume a form in respect of Atma. SharIra has a shape, but Atma
does not assume a form in respect of sharIra.
In addition, one can note the following logical issues as well in
their approcah.
Let us list four possibilities -
1. Bhagavān has one extra layer than jīva and so is worse off.
Even granting that Bhagavān does not have any abhimāna for his
body (namely jīva and other bodies of jīva), nevertheless, He is
equipped with the bodies.
2. While going to mokṣa, jīva has cast off all his bodies, but
Bhagavān has jīva as His body and so in a way He has eternal
bondage of the bodies. That too in mokṣa itself, He has as many
bodies as the jīvas in mokṣa.
4. Not only jīva, but the Viśiṣṭādvaitins also claim that Jagat
is the body of Bhagavān. That means when the Jagat is destroyed
during Pralaya, that also is effectively dehanāṣa for Bhagavān.
5. Their argument is that Bhagavān is inside the jīva and so
jīva is the body. By such an argument a person who is inside the
house should be taken as having the house as the body.
ा
अवज नन्ति र र रढ ा रा नाश्रितर ।ा
ा र तन
र नषुषी
ा वरज न्ति्तो रर भतरहमश्वरर ॥
परर भ ा गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत -९-११
Here if the Lord is embodied one and jīva is the body of the
eternal Lord, then this word would imply that the jīva (which is
the body of the Lord) becomes destructible. But the intent of
the verse is to say that the bodies of the jīva are
destructible, but jīva is eternal. That means this verse will
result in self-contradiction that the eternal jīva is
destructible.
Let us grant that in all the above cases, He has no attachment to any
of His bodies. That will only put Him in "jīvanmukta" state, but will
not take away any of those flaws.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Madhva's intention was to show the complete and absolute difference
between JivA and ParamAtmA. He could not tolerate even the
inseparability, ie, Aprtak SiddhI, between JivA and ParamAtMa, as a
result of the SarirAtma bhava. This is the reason for the unique
theory of Bimba Pratibimba Vada.
Siddhānta:
Let us first discuss the confusion between absolute difference and
separability.
While commenting the above mentioned Gīta verse 2-18, our Acharya
says -
"darpaṇanāśāt pratibimbanāśavat ātmanāśa ityata āha - nityasya iti |
śarīriṇaḥ iti īśvaravyāvṛttaye | na ca naimittikanāśa ityāha - anāśina iti
| kutaḥ aprameya īśvarasarūpatavāt | nahyupādhi bimbasannidhyanāśe
pratibimbanāśaḥ sati ca pradarśake | svayameva atra pradarśakaḥ | citvāt |
nityaścopādhiḥ kaścidasti | " - Gītābhāṣya - 2-18
ा
"दपणः । || न श त प्रनतनरतिबिम्बन ा
शवत आत्मन श इत्यत आह - ननत्यस्योक इनत। शरुषीनरणः । || ्यस्योक्ताः इनत ईश्वरव्य वःत्तयम ।
न च न ैनरनत्तकन श इत्य ह - अन नशन इनत । कात्यस्योक्ताः अप्ररमय ईश्वरसरूपतव त ।ा नहपा नध
नरतिबिम्बसनसन्निध्यन शम प्रनतनरतिबिम्बन श्यस्योक्ताः सनत च प्रदशकम । स्वयरमव अत्र प्रदशक्यस्योक्ताः । नचत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप त ।ा ननत्यश्च्तोप नध्यस्योक्ताः
कनश्चदनदस्ति । " - गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत भ ष्य - २-१८
ा
अन्नियथ ैक्तो भवनर ा
प्रनतष्ठो्तो ा
रूपर रूपर ा
प्रनतरूप्तो रतिबिभव।
ा
एकदस्तिथ सव-भत ्तिर त्म रूपर रूपर ा
प्रनतरूप्तो रतिबिनहश्च ॥
- कठोपनिषत्) says ्तोपननषत -ा २-२-९
"The deity Agni enters all the worlds and performs all activities of
the fire. All the inert fires are but reflections of this unique
sentient God of fire, Agni. Likewise, the Supreme Lord is the unique
sentient being that pervades as the indwelling independent force of
all the Jivas. Hence the jīvas are different from Lord.
The deity Vāyu enters all the worlds and performs all activities of
the fire. All the inert Life-forces are but reflections of this
unique sentient God of Life, Vāyu. Likewise, the Supreme Lord is the
unique sentient being that pervades as the indwelling independent
force of all the Jivas. Hence the jīvas are different from Lord."
janmādyasya yatonvayāditarataścartheṣvabhijñassvarāṭ
tene brahma hṛdā ya ādikavaye muhyanti yam sūrayaḥ
tejo vāri mṛdāṁ yathā vinimayo yatra trisargo mṛṣā
dhāmnā svena sadā nirasta-kuhakam satyam param dhīmahi - Bhāgavata - 1-1-
1
ātmasṛṣṭi (आत्मसःन`) - The Lord creates His own forms - which is like
lighting one lamp from another - every lamp is full and so every
avatāra of Lord is full. When one lamp is lit from another lamp, the
prior one does not diminish.
"The tiny jīva is alpa cetana and just reflection of paramacetana Sri
Hari, because He is independent. Due to His independence, even though
He is present inside the jīva, He is untouched by the flaws like
sorrow."
"brahmādiguṇavaiśeṣyādānandādiḥ parasya ca |
pratibimbatvamāyāti madhyoccādiviśeṣata ||" - Varāha purāṇa
ा वश
ब्रह्म नदगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soणः । || म द नन्दाद नद्यस्योक्ताः परस्योक च।
ै ष्य
प्रनतनरतिबिम्बत्वात् । नित्यश्चोपर य नत रध्य्तोच्चादिव नदनवशमषत॥ - वर ह परा णः । ||
"brahmādīnām ca muktānām sukham viṣṇusukhasya tu |
pratibimbastu vipluṭko viṣṇoreva param sukham ||" - Varāha purāṇa
ा रक्ताः श
ब्रह्म दुषीन र च ा नरस ा खर ा
ा नवष ा खस्योक
स ा त।ा
ा खर
प्रनतनरतिबिररतिबिदस्ति ा नवप ाट्को ्तो नवष्तोरवम परर स ा ॥ा - वर ह परा णः । ||
"The deities like Brahma, are but reflections of the Supreme Lord Sri Hari.
Their bliss is very little compared to the infinite bliss of the Lord."
(Note that this not only tells bimba-pratibimbabhāva, but also refutes
Ananda sāmya, more about that later.)
ॐ आभ स एव च ॐ - ब्रह्मसत्र २-३-५०
"The jīva is pratibimba of the Lord only."
On the other hand, there are no scriptural statements that say that
Lord has jīva as the body or the universe as the body and there are
scriptural statements that contradict the Lord literally having a
body different from him. Thus trying to treat the Lord as "śarīri" by
using statements quoted before will go against many scriptural
statements and also turns out to be illogical.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Jiva Bheda
Furthermore, the outcome of Bimba Pratibimba is extended to the jīva
bheda as well.
Siddhānta:
The outcome of Bimba Pratibimbabhāva bhāva does not have to be
"extended" to the jīva bheda. The jīva bheda is pratyakṣasiddha. And
also it is Agama siddha. And also it is anumānasiddha.
1. Pratyakṣasiddha:
The people that we see in this world are all different. If the same
jīva is present in all the people, then the pain that is felt by any
jīva should be felt by every other jīva in this universe. That is
unseen and unsupported. Thus they have to be different.
2. Agamasiddha:
ा स्वभ वज ।
नत्रनवध भवनत ाश्रिद्ध दमनहन र स
ा ॥
स न्त्विकुषी र जसुषी च ैव त रसुषी चमनत त र शृणः । || ा गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १७-२
sattvānurūpā sarvasya śraddhā bhavati bhārata |
śraddhāmayo'yaṁ puruṣo yo yacchraddhaḥ sa eva saḥ || Gītā - 17-3
ा
स्त्वि नरूप सवस्योक ाश्रिद्ध भवनत भ रत।
ाश्रिद्ध रय्तोऽयर पा रुष्तो
ा य्तो यच्छ्रद्ध्यस्योक्ताः स एव स्यस्योक्ताः॥ गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १७-३
ा रत ।
दैवुषी सम्पनपद्विर्तोक्ष य ननरतिबिन्धाय य सरुषी
र शच ा वुषीरनभज त्तोऽनस प णडव॥
ा ्यस्योक्ताः सम्पदर दै गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १६-५
In His Viśvarūpa, The Lord shows Adityas, Rudras, Vasus and all kinds
of jīvas.
ा
ॐ अदृ` ननयर त ॐ - ब्रह्मसत्र - २-३-५१
If a doubt arises that since all the jīvas are pratibimbas of the
Lord, they all must resemble one another and must be the same, this
sūtra answers that doubt saying that the difference is due to
difference in their inherent svabhāva, samskāras and the consequent
anādi karma, which are ādṛṣṭa.
2. anumānasiddha:
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs argue that all JivAs are not the same. JivAs can be sattvik,
rajasic and tamasic. This difference is basically due to the SvarUpa
itself, ie, their essential nature.
Sattvik JivAs get liberation, whereas tamasic jivAs get eternal hell,
ie, their stay in samsArA is permanent.
Siddhānta:
Mādhvās clearly point out these well established facts from the
scriptures. In simplest terms, one can go thru Gīta and see them for
themselves. Some of these Gita verses are pointed below.
Please note that eternal hell is not "permanent stay in saMsāra". If
those two are the same, then our saMsāra must be termed as "short
term super-hell".
Pūrvapakṣa:
The cruel fate of the tamasic jivAs is not attributable to partiality of
Sriman Narayana, because the difference in SvarUpa is the JivA's own
nature, and as such, Bhagavan is not responsible, since He did not create
JivAs. The pramAnAs for this is:
"Those who are hateful towards me, are cruel and the worst humans in the
world; them I forever hurl only into demonic species. Having reached evil
species in birth after birth, the fools; completely failing to reach me,
only, they then go to the lowest state. " - Gita 16.19-20.
Siddhānta:
Ofcourse. And not just these verses, there are many verses, which
describe the variation of the jīvas and the difference in
destinations.
The following verses mention eternal hell and mokṣa and instructs
what to do to get to mokṣa.
COMMENT: In fact the last three chapters of the Gita, the daivasura sampat
vibhaga yoga, the shraddha traya vibhaga and the moxa sannyasa chapters
clinch the issue of the jiva traividhya and by extension jiva jiva bheda
for the informed reader
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvA gives a unique interpretation of Gita 9.32, According to him,
all the IthihAsAs and PurAnAs talk of men becoming women in their
next birth, but there is absolutely no instance of a woman becoming a
man in her next birth. For instance, the rishis of DandakAranyA
became gopis, but AmbA only became a eunuch, ie, Sikhandi, and did
not become a man. This is due to intrinsic differences in the gender
of JivAs. A very radical theory of gender bheda is also postulated by
MAdhvA.
Siddhānta:
Achārya Madhva never said that all the men become women in their next
birth. If that were the case all the male devatas would have been
born as women.
ा
नद्वारैस्त्रिय्यस्योक्ताः वैश्यय ्यस्योक्ताः शद्र ्यस्योक्ताः च प पय्तोनय्यस्योक्ताः अनप र र व्यप ा नतर य
नाश्रित्य पर र गीता -९-११ 5 possesses so ा न्ति। ा ष्य
- र र नजभ
"The women, artisans, and serfs and other evil birth ones attain the
supreme state of blissful liberation state".
नकर पा नब्र
ा ह्मणः । || ्यस्योक्ताः पणय
ा भक्ताः श र जषयदस्तिथ ।
That means both of them indicated that the women and śūdras can never
be puṇyayoni ones.
ा भ नवक अनप।
ा र स्व
प प नदक नरत श्च ैव प ् संस
ा ्यस्योक्ताः स्व भ व्य एव रनक्ताः शगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so
नवप्रत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप द दस्तित्र पणय ा ्यस्योक्ताः॥
य न्ति द्वारैस्त्रिुषीत्वात् । नित्यश्चोपर पा रा ् संस्तोऽनप प पत्यस्योक्ताः क रत्तोऽनपव ।
ा र ता ा स्वभ व दमव य ्यस्योक्ताः नद्वारैस्त्रिय्यस्योक्ताः॥
न नद्वारैस्त्रिय्तो य न्ति प ् संस्त्व
ा सहैव प ् संदा हम म नस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iनत्यस्योक्ताः स्योक द ा वरद नत्यस्योक्ताः।
प ् संस
तज्जननन वर ्यस्योक्ताः प पज त भ्य्तो ननजसन निजसत्स्त्रिय्यस्योक्ताः॥
सवाष रनप जुषीव न रन्त्यदमह्तो यथ ननज्यस्योक्ताः।
रक्ताः श्वौ ा
ा च ननजभ व्यस्योक्ताः स्योक त करभ्तो गीता -९-११ 5 possesses so ् संदस्तित्तोऽनप च ॥
Sudyumna was born as woman due to sinful act. Agniputras were born as
women due to kāma or desire.
The wrong information that śikhanḍi is a eunuch is based on TV shows
and video shows. The misinformation is a product of absence of
knowledge from the scriptures. It is a shame that they project him as
eunuch and it is worse that people take that as authority.
Note the following information from Mūla Mahābhārata itself.
Bhīṣma narrates to Duryodhana the episode of śikhaṇḍi.
ा र स द प नथव।
तत्यस्योक्ताः नशखणडुषी प ् संच ल्यस्योक्ताः प ् संस
ा
नववमश नगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soरर हृ`्यस्योक्ताः ा सर सदत॥ा
नपतरर च रह भ रत - ५-१९२-१०
"O Bharata, the Yakṣa Sthūṇa took upon himself the feminity and
śikhaṇḍi obtained the effulgent Yakṣa male form.
Thereupon the Pānchāla prince śikhaṇḍi, acquiring the manhood, entered
his city with great joy and went to his father."
ा नवरशयक्ताः श
तत्यस्योक्ताः स र ज द्रापदस्योक ाश्रित्वात् । नित्यश्चोप ा ्तो यवा तुषीवनर` ।
ा ुषीपरा न्वमनत वमत्तरा ॥ा
ा रुरूप ्यस्योक्ताः नशखनणडणः । || र द्वारैस्त्रि
सममषय र स सच
- रह भ रत - ५-१९२-२८
tāḥ preṣitāstattvabhāvam viditvā prītyā rājñe tacchaśaMsurhi sarvam |
śikhaṇḍinam puruṣam kauravendra dāśārṇarājāya mahānubhāvam ||"
Mahābhārata - 5-192-29
ा
त ्यस्योक्ताः प्रमनषत दस्ति्त्विभ वर नवनदत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप ा सवर।ा
प्रुषीत्य र ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Updम तच्चादिवश् संसनह राज्ञे तच्चशंसुर्हि
नशखनणडनर पा रुषर
ा ा रवमन्द्र द श णः । || र ज य रह नभा वर॥ा
क्वौ
- रह भ रत - ५-१९२-२९
"Thereupon that king(The father of śikhaṇḍi's wife is the king of
dāśārṇa), hearing the words of Drupada, critical of the situation,
sent forth best of the damsels, who were beautiful, to test whether
śikhaṇḍi is man or woman.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Please refer Sri Tirukallam Swami's Gita Saram to get a comparison of
Sri Rāmānuja's and Sri Madhva's views (Sri Sankara's interpretation
is also given). The sloka simply states that Brahmanas have both
Bhakti Yoga and Prapatti as paths, whereas women, vaishyas and sudras
perform prapatti to attain him. These people lack VedhAdhikArA. The
Vaishya cannot perform the rite called satra yagna. This is Sri
Rāmānuja's viewpoint.
Siddhānta:
All three commentaries were given above and they are pretty much
self-explanatory.
The śloka uses the words "pāpayonayaḥ", "striyaḥ", "Vaiśyāḥ" and
"śūdrāḥ".
By extension, one can imagine S-K-P and S-K-Q for Kṣatriayas, etc.
A birth in a yoni itself does not give pāpa, but certain type of pāpa
can give birth in a yoni.
COMMENT: The fact that the jivas have a gender is sufficient to point
to a jiva-jiva bheda, a point sometimes missed if this is not well
understood.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Nature of IsvarA - Doctrine of Visesa
IsvarA is accepted as the possessor of all auspicious qualities. But
MAdhvAs differ from Vishishtadvaitins on the issue of the identity of
substrate and attributes.
Siddhānta:
It is scriptures, which differ from Viśiṣṭādvaitins.
ा
The śrutis declare "ānandam brahmaṇo vidvān"(आनन्दादर ब्रह्मणः । || ्तो नवपद्वि न )ा ,
"atha eṣa eva parama ānandaḥ" (अथ एष एव परर आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः) ,
Pūrvapakṣa:
According to MAdhvAs, the attributes of IsvarA are not distinct from Him,
and constitute His essential nature. This is because when we say that there
is a difference between substrate and attribute, it can be argued 'what is
the difference between this difference and the substrate?' and so on ad
infinitum. To avoid this regress, visesa is postulated. Essentially, it
states that a thing and its qualities are identical, but can be spoken of
as different things. Eg: We say Viṣṇu's Lotus Feet. This implies a
difference between Bhagavan and His Lotus Feet. However, if we just say
'Viṣṇu', it includes everything, such as His lotus feet. Hence, we speak of
the lotus feet as though it is different from the entity, but in actuality,
it is identical to the entity.
Vishishtadvaitins argue that a substrate and its attributes are different
from each other. More on that later.
Siddhānta:
The logical inconsistency thru infinite regress is given as an additional
proof only.
There are many scriptural statements as indicated above. Please take a look
जुषीव्यस्योक्ताः ईश्वरस्योक ् संश्तो भनवतरा हनत यथ ्निमनवषानलङ्ग्यस्योक्ताः। अ् संश इव ् संश्तो। न नह ननरवयवस्योक रख्योऽंशः सम्भ
ा ्तोऽंशः सम्भवति। ् संश्यस्योक्ताः सम्भवनत।
- शन्करभ ष्य
The commentator Bhāmatīkara further comments -
"The jīva can be amśa of the Lord just like the the spark of the
fire. It only means jīva resembles the amśa, but in reality it is not
amśa as it is impossible to be an amśa of "niravayava" Lord - Lord
can not be split into parts.
"Because jīva is controlled by Brahman, it is called as amśa, but in
reality
it is not an amśa".
Pūrvapakṣa:
Loose Ends
All important points have been covered. A few extras:
1) MAdhvAs do not accept the theory of Nitya Suris. Only Lakṣmi is
Nitya Mukta (because of Her intrinsic nature) but no-one else. So,
this means for MAdhvAs, Adi Sesha and Garuda are Baddha JivAs.
Siddhānta:
The Viśiṣṭādvaita position of Nityasuris will lead to lot of
difficulties. It will also be explained later. It is not "for
Madhvas", but it is as per the pramāṇa-s.
Pūrvapakṣa:
2) MAdhvAs do not accept the Sat KhyAti VAdA theory of error, as
propounded by Vishishtadvaitins, but endorse AnyathA KhyAti. More on
that later.
Siddhānta:
The Viśiṣṭādvaita position of Khyāti Vāda will lead to lot of
difficulties. It will also be explained later.
Pūrvapakṣa:
3) MAdhvAs do not accept the theory of avEsha avatara. Vyasa, for
instance, is a purna avatArA.
Siddhānta:
This indeed, is a strange argument. This is like saying "Mr. X does
not believe in any flying objects. He makes his living by working as
a pilot of an airplane". How can any one say " MAdhvAs do not accept
the theory of avEsha avatara. Vyasa, for instance, is a purna
avatArA" ?
Mādhvās not only accept the theory of āveśa and avatāra, they are
very precise and give enormous weightage to it.
In fact, they explain āveśa and avatāra of the Lord and also other
deities. For other deities, the avatāras can be just amśa. In case of
the Lord, as He is always "pūrṇa", His amśa is also pūrṇa as His
avatāra. But when it comes to āveśa (which is just lending some
special power), just āveśa need not be avatāra.
ा त्पणः । ||
पणः । || रद्यस्योक्ताः पणः । || नरदर पणः । || ा रदा च्यतम।
Pūrvapakṣa:
They also do not accept that the archa thirumeni of the Lord is
Suddha Sattvam.
Siddhānta:
The Viśiṣṭādvaita believes in "archa avatāra" and they think that the
icon of the Lord is an incarnation of the Lord. Dvaita position is
that the icon can have special sannidhāna and be a special adhiṣṭhāna
of the Lord in the same space that the icon is occupying. In other
words, the Lord's special presence is there and this varies based on
many factors like the icon being svayambhū, the tapaśśakti of the one
doing pratiṣṭha, the place, the process of pratiṣṭha using mantras,
the devotion of the devotees coming and praying, etc. Of course, all
these are as per the will of the Lord.
Let us look at what makes sense and what does not.
Firstly, we know that as the sculptor is making the icon, he may sit
on it, he may step on it and treat it as if it is a toy in his hand.
For him it is an important task to be completed. So, does that mean
he is actually doing all this to avatāra of the Lord. Let us assume
that after the pratiṣṭha, it suddenly becomes the avatāra. Then we
also saw that during Muslim regime, the muslims broke many icons.
Does that mean that they broke the "avatāra-s of the Lord"? If one
thinks that they are not avatāra-s, but just "śuddha satvam", do the
muslims have capacity to destroy "śuddha satvam"? Otoh, if we think
of "sannidhāna" as per the will of the Lord, then there can be two
possibilities
1. There was no sannidhāna of the Lord already and the muslims could
break them.
2. There was sannidhāna of the Lord, but before the act of muslims,
the Lord took out the sannidhāna and allowed the muslims to cause the
destruction.
Do they think that the icon was "śuddha sattva" from the beginning
(meaning the stone was made of śuddha sattva and the icon was made
from śuddha sattva or it becomes śuddha sattva at the time of
"pratiṣṭha"? In either case, they face the following difficulty.
If they think that the icon is not avatāra, but just "śuddha sattva",
even then, how can the muslims or other vandals have the capacity to
destroy "śuddha sattva"?
We must not get mixed up between sannidhāna and avatāra and śuddha
sattva.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The Vijayindra ParAjayA is a wonderful work in defense of
Vishishtadvaita. It has 5 chapters, but is extremely rare. Adiyen
possesses the english translation of 2 chapters, one refuting visesa
and another refuting ananda tAratamya. SrinivAsAchAryA has also
authored Ananda TAratamya Khandana, but this is a more comprehensive
work. The period of VijayanagarA was extremely interesting. The
debates between the three schools were fierce. There were 3 major
scholars - Appayya Dikshitar for Advaita, ParakAla Yati for
Vishishtadvaita and Vijayindra Tirtha for Dvaita. The headquarters of
the latter two was in KumbakOnam, near our ArAvamudhan koil.
Vijayindra Tirtha was leading the MAdhvA population of Tamil Nadu at
the time. He is also reported to have settled a dispute when the
Saiva temple in KumbakOnam claimed that the pushkarini of SArangapAni
belonged to their temple. The debates between these three were
wonderful and triangular. Each scholar attempted to refute the other
two simultaneously, which lead to some very interesting debates. All
3 were well matched, but in the end Appayya Dikshitar was defeated by
both Vijayindra Tirtha and ParakAla Yati (later on by DoddAchAryA).
ParakAla Yati also refuted Vijayindra Tirtha's objections to
Vishishtadvaita.
Siddhānta:
These false stories against the historical truth are spread
needlessly. Sri Vyāsatīrtharu successfully refuted in his work
Candrika a few positions taken by Viśiṣṭādvaita. They attempted
criticisms of that work. Sri Vijayīndratīrtha
Siddhānta:
What an argument? Just because Sri Parakāla yati wrote a work named
"Vijayīndra Parājaya" and a false claim that there had not been an
effective rebuttal, one tries to conclude that Sri Vijayīndra
tīrtharu was defeated, then look at the following. Sri Vijayīndra
tīrtharu wrote a work called "Appayya-kapola-capeṭika" (which means
"a slap on the cheek of Sri Appayya Dīkṣita"). Saying that there is
no effective rebuttal, can we conclude that Sri Vijayīndratīrtha went
and physically slapped Sri Appayya Dīkṣita? In spite of such vigorous
philosophical exchanges, they maintained a very cordial relationship
till end on personal level.
Siddhānta:
I don't know if this person is misquoting Sri Parakāla Yati or if Sri
Parakāla yati himself says that. It sounds more like the latter as
confirmed by another statement given further below. It is a clear
misrepresentation of the whole thing. Acharya Madhva clearly and
emphatically explains visesa in the Gitatatparya great yatis of the
tradition such as Sri Jayatīrtha, Sri Vyāsa Tirtha and Sri
Rāghavendra Swamy have followed the same and it is pratyakṣasiddha
and drives home the point very clearly.
First of all, one must differentiate between cetana(sentient) and
jaḍa(inert).
In case of cetana, everything that is inherent of cetana is non-
different from cetana as that cetana is "acchedya (Note the Gīta
verse)". In case of jaḍa, the attributes are of two kinds -
Pūrvapakṣa:
This is refuted as follows. A normal (colorless) jug may assume a
blue color on heating or by any treatment, so we know that the
quality stands out from the jug, and hence is different from the jug.
Siddhānta:
There is no need to go thru that much trouble to give an example,
where an "inseparable attribute" is getting destroyed. Take a green
banana or a green mango. As they become ripe, the greenness vanishes
and they assume yellowness (just like the jug assuming blueness). The
Pūrvapakṣa claims
3. There are bananas and mangoes which are not green. There are
also bananas and mangos which are not yellow. There are jars
which are blue and there jars which are not blue.
4. This means these colors and these objects are different. They
can not be said to be non-different.
1., 2. and 3. are true. 4. has to be analyzed properly.
When the colors are present, can the color alone be separated from
the object. Surely, one can destroy the colors, but not give a
separate existence to those colors of those objects, as and when they
are in the inherent nature of the object.
One agrees that jarness cannot be separated from jar. Banana-ness
cannot be separated from Banana and mango-ness can not be separated
from mango just as cow-ness cannot be separated from cow.
Suppose a jar had a handle. The handle was part of the jar. The
handle is not different from jar and at the same time the handle is
not same as the jar. The handle is part of the jar and at the same
time the handle is different from the jar. It only depends on how one
looks at it. Suppose the handle broke. Still one calls the jar "a
jar" (It is just that it does not have a handle any more).
The concept can be seen even more clearly with cloth and its threads.
Are the threads same as the cloth or different from the cloth. One
tends to say "thread is not same as the cloth. They are different".
Then take away all the threads, the cloth is also gone. Suppose one
says they are the same. Then put just a pile of threads - one doesn't
call it a cloth. There is kāryakāraṇabheda(one is a product produced
from other), but not "vastutaḥ bheda". This is the case for jaḍas.
The total aggregate of the attributes makes up the object. Each
attribute is an amśa of the object and is inseparable from that.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The quality of color has the jug as its support and hence, may flow
into it or not depending on circumstances.
Siddhānta:
The color never flows into the object. It is either integral part or
external (like one wraps an object with a color paper, then one can
remove the paper so the color is gone, but there it is not integral
part of the object.)
Pūrvapakṣa:
It is wrong to state that the inseparability of the jug from the
color is the essential nature of the jug that determines the incoming
quality, for the present dispute is ABOUT the existence of such an
inseparable association.
Siddhānta:
This is incorrect. If it is the quality, how can it come in. The
quality is inherent for an object. If the quality is external to the
object and some X1 brings an association between the quality and the
object, then they needs another entity (say X2) that brings
association between the object and X1. Then they need another X3 that
brings association between X2 and the object. Thus they will end up
in infinite regress. They are forced to accept viśeṣa to extricate
themselves from infinite regress.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The MAdhvAs may argue that such an inseparable association between
substance and attributes is admitted by Sri Rāmānuja, but ParakAla
Yati argues that it is only during the time of union of the quality
and the substance that such an inseparability is admitted.
Siddhānta:
First of all Madhvas do not talk of association between substance and
its attributes. Secondly, how can there be union of the quality and
substance when they are inseparable. It is mistake after mistake.
Thirdly, assuming that the Madhvas are not aware of the transience of
some of the attributes is incorrect, when
Pūrvapakṣa:
In which case, the MAdhvAs themselves do not say blueness and jug is
same, leading to the acceptance of the jug being qualified by the
quality of Blueness. (Special Note: Only when blueness is with jug do
we say its inseparable. Inseparability is not there when jug is not
blue. Hence, we cannot say inseparability is the essential nature of
the jug, resulting in identity of blue color with the jug)
Siddhānta:
That is precisely what is "ayāvaddravyabhāvi" (some attributes that
don't last as long as the object itself - like greenness of banana,
yellowness of mango, etc.).
Perhaps meant to say "we cannot say blueness is the essential nature
of the jug, resulting...". Of course we cannot. Same way we cannot
say yellowness is essential nature of Mango. One of the differences
is in the duration of their stay.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Some MAdhvAs argue that there is both difference and identity,
but upon observation, no-one can differentiate between a substance
and its qualities, so difference between substance and qualities
cannot be made.
Siddhānta:
That is identity - difference between substance and qualities cannot
be made.
They do not last the same, one cannot make jug out of blueness alone
- that is the difference.
So, mādhvas say that there is both difference and identity. They also
prove and demonstrate. But, then Viśiṣṭādvaitins, intending to attack
mādhvas charge out and say that it is wrong and without even their
own realization conclude exactly the same "upon their own
observation"
Pūrvapakṣa:
However, Sri ParakAla Yati states that this theory is invalid because
a proper definition of reality must be non-contradictory and
invariable at all times.
Siddhānta:
If some one says "Mr. X is tough with bad guys and soft with good
guys", no one will argue "How can Mr. X be both tough and soft - he
should be non-contradictory and invariable at all times." Two
different things in two different contexts. Same way here - two
different ways - different in some respect and inseparable in another
- exactly as per their own observation.
Pūrvapakṣa:
"Blueness of Jug" and "Blue Colored Jug" are also phrases that
differentiate blueness and jug. Hence, it would be incorrect to
attempt a definition based on the phrase "blue jug" only. The jug
appears qualified by "blueness" here. Hence, it is distinct from the
quality that qualifies it.
Siddhānta:
In case of "pratyakṣasiddha" objects, one coins/builds the phrases
based on the facts, truths and thoughts. The converse is not true -
namely one will not modify or change the facts, truths and thoughts
based on the phrases. So in an effort to find the facts, why should
one chase the phrases?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Furthermore, substances are differentiated from one another only
basis of their individual qualities.
Siddhānta:
Precisely. That is why Viśeṣa is useful not only as bhedapratinidhi,
when abheda is there, but also as the differentiator with respect to
others. The individual qualities of a jug not only helps to know
about that jug, but also helps to differentiate from another (say)
identical jug, which may have 'same color, same weight, same texture,
same shape, etc.'. Both jugs may be blue, but we do not say that
blueness of one jug is non-different from blueness of another jug.
Each one is its viśeṣa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
If all qualities are identical with their respective substances,
there would be no way to differentiate the substances from one
another.
Siddhānta:
Quite contrarily, that is how we differentiate. Let [Q1] be the set
of all the qualities of jug J1 and [Q2] be the set of all the
qualities of jug J2. Even though the jugs J1 and J2 look identical,
[Q1], which is inseparable from J1 helps you to differentiate J1 from
J2. Similarly [Q2], which is inseparable from J2 helps you to
differentiate J2 from J1.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Perception does not reveal the svarUpa as such, but only reveals the
qualities of a substance, which is different from the qualities of
another substance.
Siddhānta:
Perception does not reveal the svarūpa - this is a vague statement.
For the second part, please see the above.
Pūrvapakṣa:
(Special Note: Blue Colored Jug implies difference and Blue Jug
implies identity. So, one contradicts the other. Hence, it is wrong
to say the blueness and jug are identical taking only the latter
definition as authority. The jug is qualified by the blue color, and
hence, the two are different from each other.)
Siddhānta:
Expressions do not make defintions and definitions do not make
conclusions. Conclusions make some of the definitions and definition
make some of the expressions. Whether people use the expressions
"Blue colored Jug" or "Blue jug", they mean the same thing. It is
meaningless to argue that they mean difference in the former and
identity in the latter. Authoritativeness r conclusions are not drwan
from the expressions, but from the facts.
Pūrvapakṣa:
In addition, there are a number of qualities besides blueness
possessed by the jug and it cannot be said that the jug is identical
simultaneously with all its qualities.
Siddhānta:
Of course not. The jug is blue and smooth. Blueness and smoothness
are inseparable from the jug simultaneously. By some chemical
process, both blueness and smoothness can be made to go. So, they
are "ayāvaddravyabhāvi" and so simultaneously, blueness and
smoothness are different from the jug.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Furthermore, the qualities themselves are distinct from one another.
Siddhānta:
Of course. From the above example, the blueness is different from
smoothness. Suppose both the jugs are made of iron. The ironness is
"yāvaddravyabhāvi".
So, the ironness is non-different from the jug. The blueness is also
different from the jug and so the blueness is also different from
ironness.
Pūrvapakṣa:
A blind man can touch the jug and understand its texture, but he
cannot see the color. So, even the quality of color is different from
the quality of texture.
Siddhānta:
Even a person who can see knows that the color is different from
texture. They are "ayāvaddravyabhāvi" and so they are different from
elephant and they are also different from one another.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati also states that we need to say "The Jug HAS color" and
not "The Jug IS color". Hence, MAdhvA‟s theory is illogical.
Siddhānta:
It is a double whammy. Firstly one can say "The Jug is Blue".
Secondly, on one side they are saying that we should not use
expressions to judge identity or difference and on another side, they
are doing exactly the same. In matters of pratyakṣa, one should not
run after the expressions. Only for tatvas that are beyond pratyakṣa,
one is obliged to use śabda pramāṇa, but for that apauruṣeya vedas
and all the scriptures that support them are the pramāṇa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ADIYEN'S COMMENTS:
Later on, it is said that ParakAla Yati gives a number of Upaniṣadic
statements which suggest a difference between substance and
attributes, and which would be rendered absurd if the MAdhvA theory
was upheld. Adiyen does not have a copy of the rest of the work, but
I can hazard a guess as to what those vAkyAs may be. The Anandavalli
praises the kalyAna gunAs of Brahman more than Brahman itself. The
Chandogya Up. states in the Dahara Vidya section,
"There is in this city of Brahman an abode, the small lotus of the
heart; within it is a small akasa. Now what exists within that small
akasa, that is to be sought after, that is what one should desire to
understand."
Sri Ranga Rāmānuja Muni translates akasa as Brahman, and what is
within that akasa as the kalyAna gunAs of Brahman. This is mentioned
in the next verse as "It contains earth, heaven, fire, air, etc…"
meaning, "all objects of enjoyment are these gunAs, contained in this
akAsA. So, this in adiyen's opinion, indicates a difference between
Brahman and its qualities. Plus, the statement also indicates that
the gunAs are so desirable, that they are praised more than Brahman
Himself in this context. But this does not denigrate Brahman's
greatness, as the gunAs are inseparable from Him and constitute His
essential nature.
Siddhānta:
The biggest blunder they are committing is not even differentiating
the jaḍa and cetana in this analysis, which is one of the main
reasons for their untold miseries and troubles. They face the
apasiddhānta endlessly by presuming that Brahman and His guṇa-s are
different.
ा
ॐ अथ यनददरनस्मन ब्रह्मप रमा दहरर पा णडरुषी
ा कर वम ा
ा श्यर। दहर्तोऽनस्मसन्नि्तिर क श्यस्योक्ताः। तनस्मन यद्ति्यस्योक्ताः तदन्वम`व्यर।ा
तपद्वि व नवनजज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नसतव्यनरनत। ž न्दाद्तोŸय ८-१-१
"A small abode in the form of the Lotus-heart takes refuge in the
All-pervading, Ever-auspicious and Ever-full Lord, pervading this
body. In this abode resides a small dahara-ākāśa. In that one must
seek that - that alone which is to be sought and known."
"You told that A small abode in the form of the Lotus-heart takes
refuge in the All-pervading, Ever-auspicious and Ever-full Lord,
pervading this body. In this abode resides a small dahara-ākāśa. In
that one what else can exist? What is there that is to be sought and
known?" (perhaps raising a small question as to how can the all-
pervading Lord be present in such small place)
ा
नवदसन्निक्शत्र नणः । || यच्चादिव स्योकमह नदस्ति यच्चादिव न नदस्ति सवर ा
तदनस्मन्सर नहतनरनत। - ž न्दाद्तोŸय ८-१-१
"For that the teacher replies - ākāśa nāmaka parabrahma is present in
that small abode in the form of the Lotus-heart. Just as the Lord
pervading outside the dahara-ākāśa is infinite by space, time and
auspicious qualities, the same Lord, who is present in dahara-ākāśa
is also All-infinite. (He is to be sought and and contemplated upon.)
In Him seeking his support reside the mukta(liberated) and amukta
(non-liberated) abhimāni devatas of svarga, bhūmi, agni, vāyu, Surya,
lightning, stars and all others devatas as well. The amuktas are
useful for the jīva to do sādhana and so their presence is fruitful.
The amuktas are as good as not there for the jīvas as they are not
useful for the jīva to make the sādhana. Nevertheless, they are all
there inside the Lord."
If guṇa-s are praised more than Brahman Himself in this context, why
is that not mentioned? Praising one more will never denigrate the
other. That worry need not be there at all. The question is what are
we seeking?
Further look at this self-contradiction in one breath and one
sentence -
"the gunAs are inseparable from Him and constitute His essential
nature"
They talk of inseparability of guṇa-s along with the assumption that
they are different and also claim that they constitute His essential
nature. If they are different, then they do not constitute His
essential nature. One can easily see the self-contradiction.
Since this is such a messy position, one can see how they have to
wriggle, jiggle, and struggle to get out of this mess.
Pūrvapakṣa:
(EDIT: Some queries were raised about what I meant when I stated,
"But this does not denigrate Brahman's greatness, as the gunAs are
inseparable from Him and constitute His essential nature". I did not
phrase this sentence properly. What I meant is that, glorification of
Brahman's attributes, which are inseparable from Brahman, and which
arise as a consequence of His essential nature being jñānAnandamayam,
ultimately culminates in the glorification of Brahman Himself, and
hence, praising the gunAs over Brahman is not a defect. This is
explained by Sri Ranga Rāmānuja Muni in the Taittiriya Bhashya. The
gunAs are different from His essential nature, inseparably linked to,
and arise from His essential nature as well.).
Siddhānta:
What a mess! When pushed to corner, what people do is mix up some
valid statements with their invalid statements and if anyone
questions, then project that they are questioning the valid
statements. One must have the ability to separate the wheat from the
chaff.
One must also note that the example of Jadas cannot be used to
justify their position in explaining the cetanas. The same kind of
rules need not apply for both these. Further for cetanas, a big help
comes from the scriptures and a proper logical thinking must be
clubbed with that. In matters that are inconceivable, sheer logic
cannot be applied. But for matters, which need logic, we must think
logically. Otherwise, we will be ending up in self-contradiction
only.
To start with, assuming that the Lord's guṇa-s are different from the
Lord is abhyupagama vāda. After assuming that, one will pose the
question - are they separable from Him or not? They are separable
from Him leads to a ridiculous position. And so they conclude that
they are inseparable from Him. But the issue is the first step
itself. How can one conclude that the Lord's guṇa-s are different
from the Lord? It is against scriptures and against logic. See
"ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa"(अनहकाणडल नधकरणः । || ) in Brahmasūtras.
ा
ॐ उभयव्यपदमश त्त ा अनहकाणडलवत ॐ - ब्रह्मसत्र - ३-२-२८
Scriptures mention Brahman is bliss and Brahman's bliss - both such usages
can be there. But both are the same. There is no difference between the two
- like the coil of the snake and snake-coil. There cannot be snake-coil
without the snake. That is the closest jaḍa example that can be given.
If the bliss and Brahman are different, there is no need for this sūtra.
And the sutras before and after set a stage for this concept.
ा ा वः`र पवतम
यथ्तोदकर दुगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so ा ष ा नवध वनत।
ा न पःा थक ा पश्यय् संदस्ति न मव ननवध
एवर धर ा वनत॥ - कठोपनिषत्) says ्तोपननषत -ा २-१-१४
"On the mountains, in hard-to-reach peak places, when the rain falls,
slides down fast; just like that one, who sees difference between God
and His guṇa-s and one guṇa and another guṇa of the Lord goes to the
nether worlds, flowing down fast."
Hence one must not see any diference between the Lord and His guṇas.
The right knowledge that there is no difference between the Lord and
His guṇa-s/dharmas will rule out their DBJ concept.
Now let us reason that out. They are claiming that they are
inseparably linked. What links them and Who links them and when the
link was made. Does another sentient substance links or non-sentient
substance links? Why Should God link to the guṇa-s and before
linking, were they lying around somewhere? In jaḍa substances, one
can see the inseparability as non-difference like "mango-ness" and
mango". One can speak of inseparability in case of non-difference and
in case of difference also. The mangoness and mango are non-different
and inseparable. The jīva and Paramātma are different and inseparable
in one way that jīva cannot exist without Paramātma. Where ever jīva
is there Paramātma is there, but we cannot say that wherever
Paramātma is there, that particular jīva is also there.
How can one conclude that the Lord is different from His qualities
from the above?
How can one conclude that the Lord's difference from His qualities
culminates in the above? This is another case of
"pṛṣṭatāḍanāddantabhaṅgaḥ".
and hence, praising the gunAs over Brahman is not a defect. --- The
question of praising one over the other arises only after it is
established? Why indulge in abhyupagamavAda?
The gunAs are different from His essential nature, inseparably linked
to, and arise from His essential nature as well.) - This is a self-
contradiction.
Pūrvapakṣa:
In addition, Brahman is defined by the qualities of Satyatvam,
jñānatvam, Anantatvam, Anandatvam and Amalatvam.
Siddhānta:
It is not possible to define Brahman as defining an entity is putting
a limitation to that. Brahman is beyond any definition. Note -
Also, one must note the difference between sentient (cetana) and non-
sentient (jaḍa). The qualities of sentient and the qualities of non-
sentient will be different. No one will say that a stone has jñāna or
Ananda. No one will say that so and so jīva is hard, soft, wet, dry,
green, yellow or pink, etc.
That is why for Brahman, one may say "Brahman is jñāna and Ananda" or
"Brahman has jñāna and Ananda". Both are correct.
Pūrvapakṣa:
If He is identical to these qualities, then there is no way to get a
grasp of the nature
Siddhānta:
Quite contrarily, if identical then only one can get grasp. If not
identical, one should ask oneself - Is the jñāna of Brahman sentient
or non-sentient? If it is sentient, who is that sentient? If it is
non-sentient, how can a sentient entity have a jaḍa as its quality?
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs, on the basis of Visesa, argue that the body of Sriman
Narayana is His svarUpa as well, and no difference between rupam and
svarUpam exists.
Siddhānta:
The viśeṣas is a process of explaining. The basis is śāstras and
Brahmasutras. Also the reasoning will also lead to that only. Please
see ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The SubhAsrayam chapter of Viṣṇu PurAnA is useful in this regard to
differentiate Brahman and its body, refuting the MAdhvA conception.
Siddhānta:
That is an empty claim. There is nothing that differentiates Brahman and its body. That is
attributing flaws to the Brahman. And also that goes against the scriptures, as will be
shown later on.
Further, the quotes from Viṣṇu purāṇa that they use go against their own claims.
ा त-तत्रैव
नवष्तो्यस्योक्ताः सक श दुदतर जगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so ा च नस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iतर।ा
नदस्तिनथस् संयरकत ऽस्वौ जगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soत्तोऽस्योक जगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soच्चादिव स्यस्योक्ताः ॥ नव प ा १-१-३५
where 'jagat cha saḥ'(जगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soच्चादिव स्यस्योक्ताः) directly equates Viṣṇu with the world.
Their position -
Since Viśiṣṭādvaita takes all these literally, Brahman is equated with His body and also differentiated
from His body. One can see an obvious self-contradiction.
Otoh, if they understand the following basic concept and do not take things literally, they will be free
from these terrible difficulties.
When the Lord is equated to another deity like Brahma, Rudra, Vāyu, Indra, et al, there are atleast three
ways, one can undrestand that.
I-1a. The Lord is also known by those names and those names describe the Lord and etymologically
they may have different roots. Or even if the roots are the same, in case of the Lord, the referred
qualities bear full potency and in case of the others, they don't.
I-1c. The Lord fully controls them bearing the very same names.
We say "The king is a lion in the battlefield". Here the comparison is in the ferociousness, but not in all
the qualities. One would not expect the king to walk on his fours.
In case of I-2, when we hear expressions like "The king's sword is Vajrāyudha only", we know that the
king's sword is like Vajrāyudha.
In case of I-3, it will be like this. If cetana C is in control of a jaḍa J, we tend to use expressions that
equate C and J. Suppose a person X is fully in charge of an organization G, we may say X is G. What
we mean is X fully controls G.
परर थस्त्वरमवक
ै ्तो न न्याय)". ्तोऽनदस्ति जगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soत्यस्योक्ताः पतम।
तवैष रनहर यमन व्य प्तरमतच्चादिवर चरर॥ा नव प ा १-४-३८
"You alone are Paramartha. Oh, Lord of the universe, there is no one else, who is Paramartha. Your this
mahima or glory pervades this entire universe of moving and non-moving entities."
There is no indication that the universe is described as His body. In fact the two attributes - Lord of the
universe and One who pervades this entire universe of moving and non-moving entities indicate that
the Universe is not described as His body.
ा
एक सरदस्तिर यनदह ा ऽन्याय)". त ा
नदस्ति नकन किञ्चित्तदच्यता ्तो न नदस्ति परर तथ्तो
ा च त्वात् । नित्यश्चोपर स
स्तोहर स ा च सवरमतद त्मस्वरूपर त्यज
ा भमदर्तोहर।ा नव प ा २-१६-२३
which they mistake as an identity connecting Brahman, selves and
jagat.
"All this is One. What ever exists here, every tiny bit is that Achyuta. Nothing is more important than
that. I am Him. You are that. All of this is Atmasvarūpa. Give up the illusory difference."
The above verse means "He alone is the most important one in all things that exist. He is present in
everything nad controls everything. He is called Achyuta as He is Indiminishable and undisplaceable.
Nothing other than Him is independent and nothing is more important than Him. He is inside me and
controls me and He is inside you and controls you. Thus He is Atma meaning Inner controller of all
this. Stop seeing difference in His various forms. The illusory thinking that something other than Him
can b independent has to be forsaken.".
नवद नवनयसम्पसन्निम ब्र ह्मणः । || म गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soनव हनदस्तिनन।
शना न च ैव श्वप कम च पनणडत ्यस्योक्ताः सरदनशन्यस्योक्ताः॥ - गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - ५-१८
"The wise ones perceive non-difference among various forms of the Lord be it in the Brāhmaṇa,
rich in knowledge and humility, or the cow, or the elephant, or a dog
or a dog-eater."
The Lord is always full, Independent and Immutable. Though the potencies of all the things and beings
vary, His poetency is same in all - ever full.
tadbhāvabhāvamāpannastatho'sau paramātmanā
bhavatyabhedi bhedasca tasyājñānakṛto'bhavat | (Vi Pu 6.7.95)
ज्य्तोतुषीनीष नवषभा वन
ा नन नवषवा न नन नवषना गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soरय्तोनद राज्ञे तच्चशंसुर्हिशश्च।
ा
नद्यस्योक्ताः सरद्रा श्च स एव सवर यदनदस्ति यसन्नि नदस्ति च नवप्रवय॥ नव प ा २-१२-३८
jñānasvarūpo bhagavānyato'sāvaśeṣamūrtirna to vastubhūtaḥ |
tato hi śailābdhidharādibhedān jānīhi vjñānavijṛmbhitāni | Vi
Pu 2.12.39
ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नस्वरूप्तो भगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soव न्याय)". त्तोऽस वशमषरनतन त्तो वदस्तिभा त्यस्योक्ताः॥
ा नुषीनह वज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd ननवजःनम्भत नन॥
तत्तो नह शैल न्धिधर नदभमद न ज नव प ा २-१२-३९
yadā tu śuddhaṁ nijarūpi sarvaṁ karmakṣaye jñānamapāstadoṣam |
tadā hi saṁkalpataroḥ phalāni bhavanti no vastuṣu vastubhedāḥ | Vi
Pu 2.12.40
यद त ा शद्ध ा
ा र ननजरूनप ा
सवर करक्षयम ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नरप दस्तिद्तोषर।ा
तद नह सीकल्पतर्तो्यस्योक्ताः फल नन भवन्ति न्तो वदस्तिषा ा वदस्तिभम
ा द ्यस्योक्ताः॥ नव प ा २-१२-४०
vastvasti kim kutracidādimadhyaparyantahīnam satataikarūpam |
yaccānyathātvaṁ dvija yāti bhūyo na tattathā tatra kuto hi tattvam |
Vi Pu 2.12.41
ा
रहुषी घटत्वात् । नित्यश्चोपर घटत्यस्योक्ताः कप नलक कप नलक चणः । || रजदस्तित्तोऽणः । || ्यस्योक्ताःा ।
ा
जन ै्यस्योक्ताः स्वकरनदस्तिनरत त्मननश्चयरै लक्ष्यतम ब्रनह नकरत्र वदस्ति॥ नव प ा २-१२-४२
Some of the apparent meanings are like "Viṣṇu is jyotirmandalas, Viṣṇu is the worlds, Viṣṇu is the
forests/gardens, Viṣṇu is the mountains, Viṣṇu is the directions, Viṣṇu is every thing that exists and
every thing that does not..."
Obviously this is an elaboration of
ा दर सर
इनतह सपरा णः । || भ्य र वम ा परतिबिः
ा म्हयमत।ा
The following vedic (śruti) statement -
ा
"सवर खनखल्विदर ा "
ब्रह्म - ž न्दाद्तोŸय उपननषत ा - ३-१४-१
is elaborated by statements like the above Gita verse and the above
Viṣṇupurāṇa
lines. Similar concept can be seen in many other places as well.
All these extoll the Lord with no trace of śarīra śarīri bhāva(शरुषीर शरुषीनर भ व).
sarvagatvādanantasya sa evāhamavasthitaḥ
mattaḥ sarvamahaṁ sarvaṁ mayi sarvaṁ sanātane | Vi Pu 1.19.85
सवगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप दन्तिस्योक स एव हरवनस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iत्यस्योक्ताः।
ा
रत्त्यस्योक्ताः सवरहर सवर ा
रनय ा तन म॥
सवर सन नव प ा १-१९-८५
The apparent meaning is
"Due to the all-pervasiveness of the endless one, I exist as that only, Everything springs from me. I am
every thing. Every thing is in me, the ancient one."
Even Viśiṣṭādvaita will not go with the apparent meaning. This is like Advaita only and in this prayer of
Prahlada, the prior and latter verses and the context clearly indicate that it is not so. The real, correct
and beautiful meaning is this.
"Due to the Omnipresence of the Eternal one, He alone can exist as 'ahaṁ' śabdavācya. All this springs
from Him, created by Him. He alone is the indweller and controller of every thing. He exists before
deluge, during deluge and after deluge (hence known as sanātana) and everything resides in Him,
seeking His support. In other words they take refuge in Him."
Pūrvapakṣa:
There are some articles in various Sri Vaishnava sites on how Brahman
is different from its body and kalyAna gunAs. Please search them out
if you are interested.
Siddhānta:
If wishes were to become horses, the beggars would ride. Brahman is
different from various objects and He is different from the universe,
but none of these are His body. At the same time, He is non-different
from His kalyāṇa gunās. Otherwise what is God without those
auspicious qualities? He need to be dependent on those.
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs have refuted archa avatara on the basis of their own
assumptions that Brahman and its body are identical.
Siddhānta:
There are no assumptions. That is śāstra-siddha.
ा
अवज नन्ति र र रढ ा रा नाश्रितर।ा
ा र तन
र नषुषी
ा वरज न्ति्तो रर भतरहमश्वरर॥ा
परर भ गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत ९-११
"The ignorant, not knowing my form correctly and not knowing that I
am the embodiment of knowledge, bliss and full of attributes,
disregard me thinking that like humans, I also acquire a body."
Pūrvapakṣa:
So, they ask, "How can you say the deity in temples is the Lord
Himself, its equating matter with IsvarA". What they have failed to
understand is that we differentiate between the Lord and His body.
Siddhānta:
From all the above śāstra pramāṇa-s, the Lord is to be taken as non-
different from His body. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins claim that the icon is
actually the avatāra of the Lord and hence the icon is His body.
Based on the above pramāṇa-s, when a question is put as to how can
the jaḍa icon be equated to the Lord sinc e He is same as His
body, they counter it by saying that they differentiate between the
Lord and His body and so they are not equating the jaḍa icon with the
Lord. That is like going from frying pan to fire. Now they have to
answer all the above objections and also the objections that ensue
(given further down).
Pūrvapakṣa:
The body is Suddha Sattvam, and such a Tattvam is not comprehended by
MAdhvAs. The Kaushitaki Upanishad mentions Sri Vaikunta as a real
place with trees, palaces, etc. These are made of suddha sattvam.
Suddha Sattvam is also matter, but it is non-material matter, not
prakrtic.
Siddhānta:
It is complete misconception on their part that either Madhvas have
no concept of śuddha satva or they do not agree that śuddha satva
exists or they have no comprehension of śuddha satva. In several
places such śuddha satva in vaikuṇṭha has been extensively referred.
It is described as "aprākṛtika" and "divya".
Pūrvapakṣa:
Sri Pillai LokAchAryA has mentioned that regarding the thirumeni of
the Lord in temples as prakrtic is a great sin.
Siddhānta:
Thinking that the God has a body, be it śuddha satva, is much greater
sin.
There is no scope for "svakapolakalpita" thoughts. Further look at
the following problems they face. If vigraha is Lord's body, then
Stage1: They faced the issue that Paramātma is jaḍa since there is no
difference between Lord and His body.
To get around that problem, they claimed that the Lord and His body
are different and still the vigraha is His body.
Stage2: Then they faced the issue that the vigraha, which is pancha
bhūtatmaka prākṛtika jaḍa is His body.
That is not acceptable and to get around that problem, they claimed
that the vigraha is śuddha satva. Now this is worse, as they have to
answer all the pramāṇa-s that declare that the God is non-different
from His body and also they face the jaḍa being the body of the Lord.
Stage3: Now they face the issue that the vigraha is still jaḍa (only
relief that they get is that it is not prākṛtika). It is like saying
"I dont want to be hit by a metal rod, but I want to be hit by a
golden rod".
Now they have to answer all the pramāṇa-s that declare that the God
is non-different from His body and still answer how Lord can have a
jaḍa body (a special jaḍa, surely). And this is still worse, because
now they face the following issues as well.
3. Let us not even ask that question. Let us assume by some hook or
crook, it became śuddha satva. Then we came across the instances,
where muslims and other vandals destroyed the vigrahas. How were they
able to destroy the śuddha satva vigrahas?
4. śuddha satva is aprākṛtik and so no one should be able to see it.
Let us assume that the Lord is so gracious that He allowed his
devotees to see that. But then how could the vandals see it?
5. Are the vigrahas of Viṣṇu alone are śuddha satva or are the
vigrahas of other deities also śuddha satva?
7. How come the Lord, with śuddha satva body does not even move
around. Even the ordinary jīvas like all kinds of animals, humans and
birds are able to move around with prākṛtik bodies, but the Lord with
aprākṛtik body does not move around?
8. Mahāvarāhapurāṇa says the following -
anityatvam dehahāniḥ duḥkhaprāptirapūrṇatā |
nāśaścaturvidhaḥ proktaḥ tadabhāvo hareḥ sadā |
tadanyeṣāṁ tu sarveṣāṁ nāśāḥ kecidbhavanti hi || - Mahāvarāhapurāṇa
12. If the śarIra of Brahman has to be śuddha satva, then as per them
the jīva is śarIra of Brahman and so the jīva must be śuddha satva,
meaning the jīva must be jaḍa according to them.
Apart from lack of any pramāṇa (except their own works), the enormous
inconsistencies they face just debunk their statements of this kind.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The difference between a substance and its qualities does not regress
to infinity because Sri Rāmānuja has stated that difference is an inherent nature of
an attribute itself.
Siddhānta:
Sure. That is what is called viśeṣa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Vijayindra ParAjayA - Refutation of Ananda TAratamya
Siddhānta:
That is wrong understanding. Madhvas believe "svatantram asvatantram
cha dvividham tatvamiṣyate | svatantro bhagavān viṣṇuḥ"
ा
(स्वतन्त्रर अस्वतन्त्रर ा नपद्विनवधर तत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप
च ा
ा नरष्यतम। स्वतन्त्र्तो भगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soव न नवष ्यस्योक्ताःा )
Pūrvapakṣa:
Hence, they attempt to refute Vishishtadvaita as follows: The MuktAs
do not have all the bliss that the Lord has. Each individual Self
gets AnandA based on its own capacities. The MAdhvA provides the
following example: just as by performing different sacrifices,
different fruits are obtained, similarly, the JivAs, by performing
different sAdhanAs, attain different types of pleasures in mokṣa. If
Sri Rāmānuja admits Prapatti as an easier alternative to Bhakti, then
the individuals attaining mokṣa by Bhakti would have greater anandA
as compared to prapannas.
Siddhānta:
It is very important to understand that be it Bhakti or Prapatti,
they are all tools for jñāna. The mokṣa comes only thru jñāna. The
true jñāna will lead to proper bhakti and prapatti, etc. There is no
objection to Bhakti or Prapatti, etc. The problem is if one claims
that there is no need for jñāna; prapatti alone is sufficient to get
mokṣa, that is objected to.
"nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate |" (न न्याय)". ्यस्योक्ताः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते ।) : A non-e अयन य नवदतम ।)
Anandatāratamya(आनन्दादत रतम्य).
"tadbhaktitāratamyena tāratamyam vimuktigam|"(तदनक्ताः शत ा नक्ताः शगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so
रतम्यमन त रतम्यर नवर ा र।ा )
No other way out.
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs further assert that if the Vishishtadvaita view of equal
AnandA is followed, then it means the JivA has equal status to
Brahman. This is against the ShAstrAs.
Siddhānta:
Ambiguity and onfusion can corrode correct knowledge. Please consider
the following
What does “This” in S5 refer to? If “This” refers to S2, then what is
S2?
COMMENT: Are the purvapaxins just doing anuvada of the Dvaita side?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Furthermore, how can the JivA have equal AnandA with Sri Hari when
the Brahma SutrAs say it does not possess some powers such as
creation, etc. which Sri Hari possesses?
Siddhānta:
Again a wrong vyāpti. It is not -
Jīva does not possess powers such as creation, etc. ==> Hence jīva
cannot have equal Ananda.
The reasons for jīva not having equal ananda arises from scriptures
itself. Also that is the most logical thing.
Not only that, creation, maintenance, destruction, control, giving
knowledge, ignorance, bondage, liberation are additional tasks.
So, the Lord does all this and gets certain Ananda. Then the mukta
jīva does not do any of these, but still gets same Ananda as Brahman.
This is like saying one person toils day and night and gets a salary
of million dollars. Another one does not do anything, but still gets
a million dollars. Then the situation of the latter is much better
than the former. Is it not? That is weird too.
COMMENT: Are the purvapaxins just doing anuvada of the Dvaita side?
Pūrvapakṣa:
The PramAnA for the gradation in mokṣa for MAdhvAs is the Anandavalli
of the Taittiriya Up., which measures the bliss enjoyed by manushyAs,
GandharvAs, DevAs, etc.
Siddhānta:
And also Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat. This will be discussed in detail later
on.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati refutes this view. Based on their Seshatva SvarUpa, the
jīva does not enjoy its own bliss. It enjoys the bliss of Brahman.
The state of mokṣa is not Self-Realisation (called Kaivalya ) but
it‟s the realization of Bhagavad SvarUpa.
Siddhānta:
That goes against the following pramāṇa-s.
ा
ॐ सम्पद नवह य स्वमन शब्दात त ॐ - ब्रह्मसत्र ४-४-१
Having reached Parabrahman, the jñāni, without leaving Him(the Lord),
by His own inherent self, enjoys the bliss - thus proclaim the
śrutis.
ा
रनक्ताः शनह राज्ञे तच्चशंसुर्हि ा
त्वात् । नित्यश्चोप अन्याय)". थ रूपर स्वरूपम
न व्यवनस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iनत्यस्योक्ताः। - भ गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soवत २-१०-६
The mukti is nothing but forsaking what is not inherent and enjoying
one's own inherent nature (without forsaking the Lord).
ा द क श तरत्थाय प
तदथ ैत न्याय)". रष्म ा नतरुपसम्पद स्वमन रूपमणः । || नभननष्पद्तिम॥
ा य परर ज्य्तो
ž न्दाद्तोŸय - ८-१२-२
"Just like the four Vāyu, Brahma, Bhārati and Sarasvati, the jīva
forsakes his body by the grace of the Lord, reaches the Paramjyoti
Paramātma and attains svarūpAnanda āvirbhāva".
Note that when it is said that the jīva enjoys its own inherent
bliss, even that svarūpa ānanda āvirbhāva happens only from the grace
of the Lord. Kaivalya or Self-realization is "Realization of the
Supreme self". The mukta jīva revels in the darśana ānanda of the
Supreme Lord. That itself is inherent to the mukta jīva.
The jīva can comprehend the Lord to the extent of its ability. But
the jīva can not have the entire bliss of the Lord. The jīva cannot
also comprehend the Lord completely (yato vaacho nivartante aprāpya
manasā saha) - this is applicable in mokṣa also. If the jīva cannot
comprehend the Lord fully, then where is the question of having the
same bliss as the Lord?
They should have atleast read the commentary of their own Acharya.
While commenting on the verse 15-16 of Gīta, Sri Rāmānuja says -
The jīva enjoys the bliss thru the Lord - the bimba-pratibimba bhāva
continues even in mokṣa. The jīva does not enjoy the bliss of the
Lord. One must be careful in using proper expression.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati states that the Taittiriya Upanishad refers to BaddhAs
with difference in dharma bhūta jñānA while declaring their relative
anandA. Therefore, the MAdhvA theory that such differences in AnandA
pertain to mokṣa is wrong.
Siddhānta:
Both Taittirīya Upaniṣat and Chāndogya Upaniṣat clearly say that it
pertains to mokṣa only. Even simple common sense and logical thinking
will tell that it can only be in mokṣa. It cannot refer to baddhas.
It will be explained later on in detail. The kind of DBJ (dharma buta
jnana) spoken of is non-existent, anti-scriptural and irrational and
so cannot be supported and is to rejected completly.
The Vrittijñāna that is pertinent to saMsāra is quite acceptable, but
that will be cast off at the time of liberation.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Since the dharma bhūta jñānA is expanded infinitely for all Jīvas in
mokṣa, there is equal cognition of Brahman‟s kalyAna gunAs for all,
and hence, equal enjoyment, implying also that all JivAs are
identical in SvarUpA.
Siddhānta:
To start with there is no scriptural statement that supports "dharma-
bhūta-jñāna" (DBJ). Further there is no scriptural statement that
speaks of its expansion. Much less is the scope for "infinite
expansion". There is no end to the assumptions. Next assumption is
that a mukta jīva gets the cognition of Brahman's kalyāṇa guṇa-s
completely (as much as Brahman Himself or else there is no scope for
ānanda sāmya). Next assumption is that all the mukta jīvas get equal
cognition of Brahman's kalyāṇa guṇa-s implying all get full cognition
of all the kalyaṇa guṇa-s of the Lord. Next assumption is that all
the mukta jīvas get equal enjoyment. Next assumption is that this
enjoyment of all the jīvas equals that of Brahman Himself.
For accomplishing this impossible thing, a non-existent dhama bhūta
jñāna is used. It is supposed to continue into mokṣa to accomplish
the above impossible things. This is akin to bringing lot of hare’s
horns, then paint them with different colors and then using them to
build the machines that make all the humans equally strong.
Pūrvapakṣa:
To quote from the Vijayindra ParAjayA,
Siddhānta:
A non-existent, anti-scriptural and irrational concept of
DBJ is used in an irrational, anti-scriptural and inconsistent way
(expansions and contractions of DBJ, leading to variations of bliss
in saMsāra, but equality of bliss in mokṣa) to force-fit a ridiculous
and anti-scriptural concept of ānanda-sāmya in mokṣa, by ignoring the
explicitly stated expressions in scriptures that emphatically declare
that the discussion is for muktas only.
ा
In Taittirīya Upaniṣat (त ैनत्तरुषीय उपननषत)-
तम यम शतर दमा वगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soन्धायव णः । || र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः। स एक्यस्योक्ताः नपतःणः । || र नचरल्तो
ा कल्तोक न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः। ाश्रि्तोनत्रयस्योक च क रहतस्योक॥
te ye śataṁ pitṛṇāṁ ciralokalokānāmānandāḥ | sa eka ājānajānāṁ
devānāmānandaḥ | śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya ||
ा णः । || र नचरल्तो
तम यम शतर नपतः ा कल्तोक न र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः। स एक आज नज न र दमा व न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः।
ाश्रि्तोनत्रयस्योक च क रहतस्योक॥
te ye śataṁ ājānajānāṁ devānāmānandāḥ | sa ekaḥ karmadevānāṁ
devānāmānandaḥ| ye karmaṇā devānapiyanti | śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya ||
ा
तम यम शतर आज नज न र दमा व न र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः। स एक्यस्योक्ताः करदमव न र दमा व न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः। यम करणः । || दमव ननपयन्ति।
ाश्रि्तोनत्रयस्योक च क रहतस्योक॥
te ye śataṁ karmadevānāṁ devānāmānandāḥ | sa eko devānāmānandaḥ |
śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya ||
तम यम शतर रतिबिःा हस्पतमर नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः। स एक्यस्योक्ताः प्रज पतमर नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः। ाश्रि्तोनत्रयस्योक च क रहतस्योक॥
te ye śataṁ prajāpaterānandāḥ | sa ekaḥ brahmaṇa ānandaḥ |
śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya ||
One hundred bliss units of Mukta Manuṣya Gandharvas = one bliss unit
of mukta Deva Gandharvas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full
śravana phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they
have become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta Deva Gandharvas = one bliss unit of
mukta pitṛ devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravana
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta pitṛ devatas = one bliss unit of
mukta ajānaja devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravaṇa
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta ajānaja devatas = one bliss unit of
mukta karmaja devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravaṇa
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
परर आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः ।
atha ye śataṁ manuṣyāṇāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ pitṝṇāṁ jitalokānāmānandaḥ |
ा ष्य
अथ यम शतर रन ा णः । || र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः स एक्यस्योक्ताः नपत पितॄणः । || ् सं नजतल्तोक न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः ।
atha ye śataṁ pitṝṇāṁ jitalokānāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ gandharvaloka ānandaḥ |
ा णः । || ् सं नजतल्तोक न र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः स एक्यस्योक्ताः गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soन्धायवल्तोक आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः ।
अथ यम शतर नपत पितॄ
atha ye śataṁ gandharvaloka ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ karmadevānāmānandaḥ | ye
karmaṇā devatvamabhisampadyante |
ा न्धायवल्तोक आनन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताःस एक्यस्योक्ताः करदमव न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः । यम करणः । || दमवत्वात् । नित्यश्चोपरनभसम्पद्तिम ।
अथ यम शतर गीता -९-११ 5 possesses so
atha ye śataṁ karmadevānāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ ājānadevānāmānandaḥ | yaśca
śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahataḥ |
ा
अथ यम शतर करदम
व न र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः स एक्यस्योक्ताः आज नदमव न र नन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः । यश्च ाश्रि्तोनत्रय्तोऽवःनजन्तोऽक रहत्यस्योक्ताः।
atha ye śatamājānadevānāmānandāḥ sa ekaḥ prajāpatiloka ānandaḥ | yaśca
śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahataḥ |
अथ यम शतर ज नदमव न र नन्दाद ्यस्योक्ताः स एक्यस्योक्ताः प्रज पनतल्तोक आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः । यश्च ाश्रि्तोनत्रय्तोऽवःनजन्तोऽक रहत्यस्योक्ताः।
atha ye śataṁ prajāpatiloka ānandāḥ sa ekaḥ brahmaloka ānandaḥ | yaśca
śrotriyo'vṛjino'kāmahataḥ |
Even if this wish be granted for just a minute to see if that helps
them in any way. If the above only applies to amukta/baddha jīvas,
then the very next question that comes to our mind is - "OK, this
account is for all amukta jīvas - why should the śrutis come and tell
us what happens in amukta state, which can be gauged much more easily
than in mukta state? Ok, let us say that Vedas wanted to express this
amukta position any way. Then right after that to remove all the
confusion, the śruti vākyas can say one most important and most
required statement "...but in mukti, the levels of ānanda of all the
mukta jīvas are equal and equal to that of the Brahman.".
No such statement can be seen, not right after those statements and
nowhere in śrutis. Truly their position is untenable.
Another big problem with that assumption that the śruti vākya is
saying ānanda tāratamya for amuktas is this. The joy for amuktas is
ever-fluctuating and so what point of time is that tāratamya
addressing? After Vritrāsura vadha, Indra was highly depressed. At
that point of time, some other insignificant jīva may be having a
great joy. So, the joy of that insignificant jīva is higher than
Indra at that point of time. So, how will that śruti statement apply?
It does not make any sense if that statement speaks of a situation,
where there is lot of fluctuation. It makes lot of sense when that
speaks of a situation where a "level of constancy" is reached. That
happens only in mokṣa. If the gradation is for muktas, there is
absolutely no difficulty.
And the Brahman has to do all the activities and yet the mukta jīvas,
who dont do any thing will reap the same bliss of the Lord, who does
all the work. It is not ānanda sāmya, but ānandavaiṣamya. The Brahman
is much worse off than all the mukta jīvas. What is worse, according
to Viśiṣṭādvaita, even those who hate the Lord all the time obtain
mukti only. So, even they get the same ānanda as the Brahman. The
ānanda or bliss experienced by their own Acharya after he goes to
mukti is same as the ānanda reaped by "Kalipuruṣa" and the jīva in
the grass and in the ant after they go to mokṣa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
{Special Note: MAdhvA recognizes only the knower and the object of
knowledge.
Siddhānta:
Completely wrong. Can they show any statement that supports their
position. Do they really claim that Madhvācārya knows only jñātṛ and
jñeya, but has no awareness of jñāna? I don't know what they are
trying to say?
Pūrvapakṣa:
But Sri Rāmānuja recognizes 3 entities - knower, the attribute 'to
know' and the object of knowledge'.
Siddhānta:
Multiple problems in their approach. This kind of arguments are
called "run-away arguments or wandering arguments or strawman
arguments". They make claims that cannot be justified. Secondly even
those claims do not come to their rescue as will be proved later on.
Just because there are jñātṛ, jñeya and jñāna, that will not help in
claiming DBJ. If they are referring to 'indriya janya or
antaḥkaraṇastha vṛtti jñāna", then such is extensively mentioned and
held in Madhva Siddhānta. But that Vritti jñāna goes away when one
goes to mokṣa, as the jaḍa indriyas are gone. Svarūpajñāna alone
remains.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Example: A gem possesses innate radiance. This is svarUpa jñānA. But
it also has a radiance that spreads from it, illuminating other
objects. This is called dharma bhūta jñānA. When the gem is covered
by dust, the spread of radiance will be less, but its innate radiance
is intact.
Siddhānta:
Let us eliminate confusion here. The diamond has the following
property. All these are inherent to it.
It has innate radiance. This innate radiance itself has the following
properties -
Pūrvapakṣa:
Similarly, a JivA (analogous to gem) under karmA (analogous to dust),
has less dharma bhūta jñānA (analogous to spreading radiance), but
its svarUpa jñānA (innate radiance) is intact. In the state of mokṣa,
karma is cleansed just like dust is removed from a gem, and all jivAs
have their dharma bhūta jñānA expanded infinitely.
Siddhānta:
The light of this gem will not exceed the light of the Sun. (note
that even the light of the Sun is not infinite and it relies on the
Lord)
yadādityagataṁ tejo jagadbhāsayate'khilam |
yaccandramasi yaccāgnau tattejo viddhi māmakam || Gītā 15-12
Pūrvapakṣa:
This is supported by Upanishadic vAkyAs like Svayam PrakAsatvam of
AtmA, ie, AtmA reveals itself by itself (svarUpa) and illumines other
objects (dharma bhūta jñānA.
Siddhānta:
If jīva has svayam prakāśatva, that is fine. If there is a claim that
jīva is jñāna ānāndātmaka, that is accepted. If there is svarūpa
ānanda abhivyakti in mokṣa, that is fine. Where is the usage of DBJ
in Upaniṣats? What other equivalent word is used? If such DBJ makes
jīva become equal to Brahman, there must have been several statements
explaining that, since that is an extra-ordinary claim. Where are
those bold statements?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Also, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'. Here, JivA is called
Brahman because of its great dharma bhūta jñānA, expanded on knowing
ParamAtmA. 'Brahman' means that which grows great, and the jivA's
jñānA is great.}
Siddhānta:
If some one says that a person who joins Micrsoft becomes a micrsoft
person, it is pretty obvious that every employee will not become the
"Microsoft company" itself or become equal to the "microsoft
company". That being the case, where is the question of a jīva that
reaches Brahman (in mokṣa) become Brahman Himself or become equal to
Brahman? One must arrive at the meaning based on the context.
goes against scriptures. "na pretya samjñā asti"(न प्रमत्य सीज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd अनदस्ति)
(Nothing other than svarūpajñāna, is carried to mokṣa).
Atharvaṇopaniṣat or Muṇḍakopaniśat
sa yo ha vai tatparaṁ brahma veda
brahmaiva bhavati nāsyābrahmavit kule bhavati |
tarati ṣokaṁ tarati pāpmānaṁ
guhāgraṁthibhyo vimukto'ṁuto bhavati || - Muṇḍakopaniśat - 3-2-9
ा वमद
स य्तो ह वै तत्परर ब्रह्म
ा ा लम भवनत।
ब्रह्म ैव भवनत न स्योक ब्रह्मनवत क
ा
तरनत ष्तोकर तरनत प प नर ा
गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soहा ग्रनीथभ्य्तो नवरक्ताः श ा भवनत॥
ा ्तोऽरउत्तो - रणा डक्तोपननषत -ा ३-२-९
The meaning hidden there has to be understood properly. While
Advaitins interpreted this to mean that jīva becomes Brahman,
Viśiṣṭādvaitins interpreted that to mean that jīva becomes equal to
Brahman.
One can get proper meaning from skaṁdapurāṇa (स्कंदपुराण) words (as quoted by Acharya). Note ् संदपरा णः । || ) words (as
quoted by Acharya). Note that one does not become Brahman nor become
equal to Brahman.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati asserts that only the baddhAtmAs show gradations and
differences in enjoyment due to the contraction and expansion of the
dharma bhūta jñānA.
Siddhānta:
It has been described extensively how śrutis clearly indicated that
gradation of enjoyment pertains to muktātmās only, but not
baddhātmās. Also it was explained earlier how the assertion that it
pertains to baddhātmās leads to absurd conclusions. How can any one
claim that the śruti speaks of gradation of ānanda in an ever-
fluctuating saMsāra that too of the devatas and keeps completely
silent of what happens to muktātmās, when actually a constancy
(steady state) is reached?
Pūrvapakṣa:
The muktAs are constantly under the control of Sriman NArAyaNa and
they derive their bliss only from Sriman NArAyaNa by doing kainkaryam
and experiencing His kalyAna gunAs.
Siddhānta:
Sure. Muktas are under the control of Sriman Nārāyaṇa. They derive
their bliss only from Sriman Nārāyaṇa by doing kainkaryam. Sure. What
does it mean by "experiencing His kalyāṇa guṇa-s". Does it mean they
meditate upon those and derive bliss? Then that is fine too. How will
any of these help? As stated earlier, it appears that this mixture of
good and bad ideas is to support an ultimately incorrect concept.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Also, BhagavAn has infinite dharma bhūta jñānA as well.
Siddhānta:
Where is this mentioned? It is obvious that the jñāna of the Lord is
infinite. That is His svarūpajñāna itself. Why does he need this
ever-dubious, non-existing and never-mentioned jñāna? Is thsi jñāna
pertinent to saMsāra? If so, the Lord never has any saMsāra?
Obviously this is not same as svarūpajñāna. What is it? Where is it
mentioned? An imaginary role of making the non-existent dharma bhuta
jnana as an equalizer between jīva and Brahman is incredulous.
Pūrvapakṣa:
But for him, there is no contraction or expansion of His jñānA, and
he is eternally free of karma.
Siddhānta:
To illustrate the mixyure of good and bad ideas, consider that this
is like saying "He brought the hare's horn and put it on his table."
The hare's horn is non-existing, but the table is real. In the same
sentence, imaginary and real thngs are spoken of.
Pūrvapakṣa:
His svarUpa jñānA and dharma bhūta jñānA both are all-pervading.
Siddhānta:
Again, one real and one imaginary thing are brought in. DBJ is non-
existent. if the dhama bhūta jñāna of the mukta jīva is also
infinite(because of infinite expansion), then like DBJ of Paramātma,
the DBJ of every mukta jīva must also be all-pervading. That is
totally wrong and not mentioned in any scripture.
Pūrvapakṣa:
And while BhagavAn is 'avikArA' and His svarUpA does not undergo any
changes, being Satyam, jñānam, Anantam, Anandam and Amalatvam, the
dharma bhūta jñānA of bhagavAn undergoes transformations and
manifests itself as the kalyAnA gunAs we know and love.
Siddhānta:
Let us review this conglomeration. One needs to separate the wheat
from the chaff.
"while Bhagavān is 'avikārA' and His svarūpa does not undergo any
changes, being Satyam, jñānam, Anantam, Anandam and Amalatvam" -
Absolutely fine.
"the dharma-bhūta-jñānA of bhagavān undergoes transformations" -
First of all where is this DBJ mentioned? Secondly, the danger in
bringing all these concepts which have absolutely no support in any
scripture is that more often than not, they fail to handle these
extraneous concepts and end up losing consistency.
It was mentioned earlier -
"there is no contraction or expansion of His jñānA" - this is an
indication of absence of Vikara.
(1) links them with Svarupa jñāna and (2) links them with DBJ
(dharmabhūtajñāna).
"the kalyAnA gunAs we know and love." - Surely we Love. One good way
to know them properly is not to link them with DBJ, which is like a
hare's horn. They must first come to a conclusion as to where the
seat for these kalyāṇa guṇa-s is - Svarūpa jñāna or DBJ ?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Hence, the auspicious attributes of Brahman are simply different
states of His dharma bhūta jñānA.
Siddhānta:
All the auspiciousness is shattered by calling them to be the states
of an unsupported, non-scriptural and non-existing entity. When we
know them to be auspicious, it is highly desirable to discard such
dangerous assignments.
Pūrvapakṣa:
SrinivAsAchAryA explains it in Yatindra Mata DIpikA.
Siddhānta:
Why is not mentioned in śāstras.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Furthermore, having shown that the object of enjoyment is Brahman and
not the intrinsic bliss of the Self (as imagined by the mAdhvAs),
Siddhānta:
When ice cream is the object of enjoyment for a person, no one thinks
that the ice cream is the person. If they think like that or if they
think that others think like that, the problem only lies with them.
Surely, the person gets the joy, not the ice cream. It is high-time
to snap out of all this confusion.
"naija sukhānubhūti" means that anubhava is for the jīva only. Is
there any doubt about that? There are extensive descriptions of mokṣa
in Madhva śāstra. Is it mentioned anywhere that the muktas do not
enjoy Brahman's company?
Pūrvapakṣa:
it is impossible to state a gradation in bliss because Brahman by His
very nature is homogenous and cannot be divided into parts (Neha
NAnAsti Kincana).
Siddhānta:
If "Brahman by His very nature is homogenous and cannot be divided
into parts (Neha NAnAsti Kincana)", how and why will the bliss of all
the other jīvas become equal to that of Brahman ?
Isn’t it also important to realize that the Lord is greater than all
the akṣaras also?
Pūrvapakṣa:
Hence, enjoyment of Brahman would result in equal AnandA for all.
Siddhānta:
This is like saying "It is impossible to state a gradation of
financial strength of all Microsoft employees, because Microsoft is
financially strong. Hence employment in Microsoft would result in
equal financial strength for all its employees and each employee will
have same fiancial strength of Microsoft."
The example is only to drive the pint. The flaw in the conclusion
like that is very obvious. But to understand the flaw in things that
are beyond pratyakṣa, the scriptures are the guide. If one starts
discarding the scriptures by saying things like "oh, those statements
are for baddha jīvas.", that is simply disastrous.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Lastly, the objection that jivAs have limited capacities and hence,
cannot enjoy Brahman's infinite gunAs to maximum extent is negated by
the fact that dharma bhūta jñānA is infinitely expanded in mokṣa.
Siddhānta:
By waving the magic wand of DBJ made of hare's horn, if such
impossible conclusions are drawn, then there is no end to such wild
conjectures at all. If this magic wand can be used to draw an absurd
conclusion that all the mukta jīvas have the same ānanda, the same
magic wand can be used by some one to draw more absurd conclusion
that "DBJ expands in reverse of svarūpa jñāna and so the most
insignificant creature in saMsāra will have greatest bliss in mokṣa
and the greatest being in saMsāra will have the least bliss in mokṣa,
which is lot more than the bliss of the Lord as His DBJ will contract
maximum" - real crazy approach - but where is the end for such wild
conjectures? In matters of such great importance, let us not bring in
concepts that are not supported in scriptures, that too that go
against common sense as well as against scriptures.
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati gives an analogy. Just as a wife who is totally
dependent on her husband and enjoys whatever her husband does, the
JivA enjoys Brahman's svarUpa-rUpa-gunA-vibhUti. He adds that since
Brahman enjoying His own gunAs as well, there is sAmyam in AnandA
between Brahman and JivA.
Siddhānta:
The more the attempt at justification, the deeper th trouble. Too
many flaws.
1. It is hard to find a wife, who enjoys what ever her husband does.
Let us assume that there is some wife, who actually enjoys what ever
her husband does.
2. It is against our pratyakṣa that both of them will have same joy.
There is no mandate that any two individuals must have same joy.
3. The husband also should enjoy what ever his wife does. That is
just as the wife is pativrata, the husband must be a patnivrata. Even
then there is no guarantee that their joys will be equal or same.
4. How can the joy of doing an action and the joy of approving that
action be the same?
5. Here the example has another huge flaw in that, it is taking into
account two almost similarly placed beings. That does not expose the
seriousness of the situation. Then?
Even assuming (just for a minute) that they get their joys from the
same source, how can one conclude that they get equal joy? Just
because an elephant and a tiny animal get the water from the same
lake, would any one conclude that they drink same amount of water?
What kind of logic is that?
Where is it mentioned that every mukta jīva gets knows every thing
about every guṇa of the Brahman?
ा नरर्तिर ब्रह्म।
सत्यर ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd ा
vijñānamānandam brahma |
ा
नवज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नर नन्दादर ब्रह्म।
yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayam tapaḥ | (for Brahman)
ा ।
य्यस्योक्ताः सवज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd्यस्योक्ताः सवनवद ा यस्योक ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नरयर तप्यस्योक्ताः
there should also be following expressions -
ा ।
य्यस्योक्ताः सवज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd्यस्योक्ताः सवनवद ा यस्योक ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नरयर तप्यस्योक्ताः
They are just not there,
Pūrvapakṣa:
(Special Note: This also refutes the MAdhvA's view that
Vishishtadvaita believe in equal 'status' of JivA with Brahman in
mokṣa.
Siddhānta:
Jñāna and ānanda are indicative of status and the status is
indicative of jñāna and ānanda. How can the jīva be much less in
status and still have jñāna and ānanda equal to Brahman? Even
granting that such is possible, the problem is not with the status.
The problem is that in any guṇa, the jīva cannot even come any where
near to God. That is given.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The paramam sAmyam sruti states that JivA becomes equal in 6 gunas
with Brahman. jñānA and AnandA, as explained here, are two.
Siddhānta:
This is another wild conjecture - the śruti vākya goes -
Pūrvapakṣa:
The JIvA is also Satya Sankalpan, since he only wants to serve
Brahman,
Siddhānta:
Not just because he wants to serve Brahman, the jīva becomes "Satya
Sankalpa". If that were the case, then many amuktas/baddha jīvas, who
want to serveBrahman wouldhave become "Satya sankalpa". The jīva
becomes Satya sankalpa because he/she completed the sādhana and the
Lord found the right time to grant mokṣa and the "satya sankalpatva".
Still this "satya sankalpatva" of the jīva is dependent on the Lord.
Pūrvapakṣa:
and Brahman is also Satya Sankalpan, since he has taken a vow to
protect JivAs.
Siddhānta:
Not just because the Lord has taken a vow to protect jīvas, He
becomes "Satya Sankalpa". He is independent and eternally He is satya
sankalpa and sarva svatantra.
One should not have such mix-ups.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The JivA is also Satya KAman, since all his desires are fulfilled by
Brahman. The desire is merely kainkaryam and anubhavam of BhagavAn.
Brahman is, naturally, Satya KAman.
Siddhānta:
Just because both are satyasankalpa, just because both are jñāna
ānanda ātmaka, concluding that they have equal bliss is similar to
the following.
X says "I and Y bot of us have bank accounts and so we are equal
financially". In reality X has a few bucks in the account and Y has
several billion dollars in the account. So, what is there in the
account matters and not just the name or kind.
Can every mukta jīva because of "satya kāmatva" and his desire to do
kainkaryam, wish for the opportunity to do the 8 kinds of vyāpāra
"jagat sriṣṭi, sthiti, laya, niyamana, etc" as kainkaryam of
Bhagavān?
Pūrvapakṣa:
The JivA is also decorated with BrahmAlankAram, as described by the
Kaushitaki Upanishad, hence, this is another sAmyam.
Siddhānta:
Sure. That is another similarity. Four kinds of mukti are described
in śāstras -
Pūrvapakṣa:
Note that in all cases, the jivA does not achieve anything by his own
will or effort. Everything is given by Brahman to the jivA, making
the jivA totally dependent on Brahman. Hence, no sAmyam in 'status'
as alleged by MAdhvAs.)
Siddhānta:
In the above example of X and Y, X may say "I am always dependent on
Y and so we are not equal in status, but we are equal financially",
despite X having just a few dollars and Y having several billion
dollars.
Let them forget about the status. It is perfectly fine, if they also
agree that the Lord is much above the jīva in status. The question is
about the absurd claim that the mukta jīva equals Paramātma in six
qualities.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The MAdhvAs believe that there are different kinds of AnandA, and
hence, grades of enjoyment in mokṣa. The Vijayindra ParAjayA refutes
this view, stating that only Brahman and nothing else is enjoyed in
mokṣa.
Siddhānta:
Bhagavata does speak of kinds of mokṣa like Sāyujya, sārūpya, sālokya
and sāmīpya.
The śruti vākyas that speak of gradation of bliss pertains to muktas
only, but not baddha-s.
ा त्स्तननयत
अशरुषीर्तो व यरा भ्रर नवद ा ा
रशरुषीर णयमत नन
ा द क श तरत्थाय प
तदथ ैत न्याय)". रष्म ा नतरुपसम्पद
ा य परर ज्य्तो
एवरमवषै समस द्तोऽस्म च्छरुषीर तरत्थाय प ा नतरुपसम्पद स्वमन रूपमणः । || नभननष्पदतम स उत्तरपरुष्यस्योक्ताः
ा य परर ज्य्तो ा स तत्र
ा डन ररर
पयानत जक्षन कुषी ा ा
णः । || ्यस्योक्ताः द्वारैस्त्रिुषीनभव य न ैव ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नतनभव ऽज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नतनभव न्तोपजनर स्मरनसन्निदर ा रर स
शरुषी ा यथ
Pūrvapakṣa:
The Vijayindra ParAjaya goes on to state that the example of
different sacrifices yielding different pleasures cannot be compared
to mokṣa. Because the objects of those sacrifices are different from
one another and also are attained by performing bodily acts. Whereas
the object of all upAyAs here is Brahman only, achievable only by
bhakti and hence, there cannot be any grades in degree of bliss due
to "less bhakti" or "more bhakti" since Brahman is homogenous. Mukti
is available for all, and only Brahman is the source of enjoyment for
all as well.
Siddhānta:
Why can't the 'example of different sacrifices yielding different
pleasures be compared to mokṣa' ? Isn't the object of all the
sacrifices God? That being the case, how can the objects of those
sacrifices be different? Aren't the sacrifices based on vedas? They
have to note the Kaṭhopaniṣat vākya -
Do they think that Bhakti is not needed for performing the sacrifices
?
No matter what their claim is (one of them is hetu, some of them are
hetu, all of them are hetu), there is no correlation between hetu and
sādhya.
Then they claim that the mukti is available for all. This means that
they are claiming that Lord Krishna is a liar as He clearly says in
Bhagavadgīta -
ा
त नहर नपद्विषत्यस्योक्ताः कर न्स् संस रमष ा नर धर न।ा
नक्षप म्यजस्ररशभा न सरुषी ा
ा ष्ववम य्तोननष॥ गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १६-१९
āsurīṁ yonimāpannā mūḍhā janmanijanmani |
māmaprāpyaiva kaunteya tato yāntyadhamāṁ gatim || Gītā - 16-20
"These cruel haters, worst of men, I always throw them into saMsāra (cycles
of birth and death) and into demonical wombs.
Then O Kunti's son, these fools, having acquired the demonical wombs,
recursively every birth, never reach me and attain the abysmal hellish
realms."
Then as usual they just throw a statement that need not be objected
to -
ा
ॐ वःनद्धह सभ क्त्वर्तिभ व दुभयस र् संजस्योक दमवर ॐ - ब्रह्मसत्र - ३-२-२०
"There is increase and decrease (gradation) in bliss due to
difference in jñāna and bhakti, for only then impartiality of the
Lord towards both would be seen".
When a question comes "Why is that so?", that is answered by the next
sūtra -
Pūrvapakṣa:
In other words, bhakti, whether done in less quantity or more,
results in only one end, namely mokṣa. Vedic yajnAs are many, have
different results and require bodily means. But BhagavAn is one and
the same for all.
Siddhānta:
Again a typical conglomeration.
Vedic yajnAs are many, have different results and require bodily
means. - If a point is made that the subject of Bhakti is God and so
the bliss in mokṣa is same, then by the same logic, since the subject
of yajñas is God and that too requires bhakti, then the fruits of all
vedic yajñas must be the same. Are the Viśiṣṭādvaitins aware that the
mokṣa sādhana also requires bodily means? Even they wont speak of
mokṣa sādhane after reaching mokṣa.
But BhagavAn is one and the same for all. - Isn't Bhagavān propounded
by the Vedic yajñas ? There is double trouble here. It is a big
logical loop-hole that 'Bhagavān is one and the same for all' does
not imply that the outcome of bliss should be the same for all.
Secondly accepting that just for a minute will lead to other
difficulties like the Vedic yajñas should also yield the same result.
Further such a weird claim attributes vaiṣamya doṣa to the Lord. The
worst thing is this. The greatest sinners also get the same bliss as
Chaturmukha Brahma. And all of them get the same bliss as Bhagavān.
And the reason is given that it is so because the source is the
same !!
Pūrvapakṣa:
(Special Note: It is my observation that MAdhvA‟s assumption that
Prapatti being easier than Bhakti is wrong as well. PrapannAs also
have to follow a code of conduct, far beyond the reach of baddhAtmAs
like ourselves. PrapannAs need a thorough knowledge of rahasyas, and
have two options, to either spend their life propagating Ubhaya
VedAntA, or indulging in Yoga for Bhagavan‟s sake. Note that Yoga is
not done as UpAyA by prapannAs, but as a kainkaryam to Bhagavan. This
was explained by Sri Velukkudi Swami in a UpanyAsam.
Siddhānta:
Suppose a person gives a statement - "Having a gun alone is not
enough to go to a battle field; one must also have the training how
to use the gun, must also strategize how to fight, etc."
Then it is not wise to say the person is asking not to take the gun
to the battle field.
Also look at the kind of argument that is being made.
It is my observation that MAdhvA‟s assumption that Prapatti being
easier than Bhakti is wrong as well. - This is an extremely flawed
observation.
There are two parts here.
1. Prapatti is wrong.
2. The reason for that is because it is easier than Bhakti.
First of all, he never said 1.
Secondly, 2. is even more flimsy and he never said 2.
It is this writer's assumption that Acharya Madhva assumed that.
Pūrvapakṣa:
But this does not indicate partiality on the part of brahman, ie
giving equal mokṣa for all.
Siddhānta:
It does indicate partiality. Also it goes against many scriptural
statements and it is irrational as well.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The PancarAtrA quotes PerumAl saying, 'I accept Bhakti and Prapatti.
For differences in the two paths, please refer articles on the net or
consult a vidwAn.)
Siddhānta:
Referring articles on the net or consulting a vidwān or referring
some works are truly necessary acts, but not sufficient.
It is natural that other schools get perturbed when they hear that
Acahrya Madhva refuted 21 schools, the main ones that came until
then. But proof of the pudding is in its eating.
(nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate |) ( न न्याय)". ्यस्योक्ताः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते ।) : A non-e अयन य नवदतम।)
कारु कर ...)
(jñānayogena sāMkhyānām karmayogena yoginām) (ज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd नय्तोगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soन ा
म स ् संख्योऽंशः सम्भ न र करय्तो गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soनम
य्तोनगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soन र)ा
Pūrvapakṣa:
ParakAla Yati states that BrahmAnandam is not exclusively enjoyed by
Brahman only.
Siddhānta:
"BrahmAnandam is not exclusively enjoyed by Brahman only" - This is a
meaningless statement because of the inherent ambiguity. What is
meant by the expression Brahmanandam ? In case of Brahman, it is
Brahmaṇaḥ Anandam. It is His own bliss. In case of others, it can
mean the bliss obtained by thinking about Brahman and also that is
also controlled by Brahman, given by Brahman, brought to experience
by Brahman, etc. The Lord does not give His own bliss to others. The
jīva does not have the capacity to experience his own bliss without
the grace, control and approval of the Lord.
People have to have some basic understanding of the qualities like
jñāna and ānanda, as to how they function, regarding giving, taking,
sharing, etc.
Thirdly, the gradations take effect every step of the way. The
following explanation of knowledge holds good to bliss as well.
If we take persons say X1, X2, X3, X4, etc, each will have different
levels of knowledge (the subjects or kinds itself varies so much and
to make it a little simpler, let us restrict to the spiritual
knowledge and spiritual joy alone).
Thus the Lord makes the jīva experience the jīva's inherent bliss,
when it is right time(that is after mukti). Even materialistic joy is
given by Him only. He alone is svatatntra and every one else is
dependent on him.
Pūrvapakṣa:
He provides examples once again such as the wife enjoying her
husband‟s gunAs, the student enjoying his teacher‟s and the son
enjoying his parent‟s.
Siddhānta:
Any school of philosophy that wishes to establish advocate a major
philosophical principle has to resort to one of the three pramāṇa-s -
pratyakṣa or anubhava (pratyakṣa has to be parīkṣita or verified) ,
āgama (nirdoṣa śabda is āgama) anumāna (logic utilizing pratyakṣa
and/or āgama). The apparent meanings of āgama are as misguiding as
the apparent appearances of things. While Advaita has found its
strength (or weakness so to speak) in superficial meanings of āgama
vākyas, it resorted to second level of defense by desperately
searching for examples, by which they were equally misguided if not
more.
Firstly examples are never a prof for any philsophical principle.
Secondly the more we analyze those examples, the more evident the
weakness turns out to be.
It is very strange that Viśiṣṭādvaita, which quite successfully
pointed out many flaws of Advaita, is trying to take much weaker
approach than Advaita. Without even the support of atleast a few
glaringly apparent āgama vākyas (except for only one apparent
statement "paramam sāmyamupaiti"), they are trying to advocate a
major concept of equal bliss as the Lord for every jīva including the
eternal haters of the Lord. That statement not only has other meaning
like 'just similarity', but not equality, the equality interpretation
goes against many other pramāṇa-s. The examples that they have chosen
are more damaging to their position itself.
I have elaborately pointed out the flaw in wife and husband example.
The same kind of flaw decorates student-teacher example and son-
father example. Heavy confusion is introduced by using expressions
like one enjoying the other's guṇa-s. In an eagerness to justify the
example, one enjoying the other's guṇa-s is interpreted as one
approving the other's guṇa-s.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The muktA realizes that he is the SarIrA (and hence, SeshA) of
Brahman, and this alone is enough to give him infinite AnandA.
Siddhānta:
There is not a single pramāṇa that says that jīva is the śarIra of
Brahman. Added to that as poiinted out earlier, that leads to several
flaws. Again what has such a realization to do with infinite ānanda?
That alone is enough? Where is the pramāṇa? That too that alone is
enough ? Then the following question arises.
Does a jñāni in baddha state realize that he is the śarIra of
Brahman. In particular, does their own Acharya and other glorious
ones in their parampara realize that? If they don't without any āgama
pramāṇa how are they claiming that? If they do, then in amukta/baddha
state itself they must be getting infinite ānanda, as that alone is
enough (meaning there is no need for prārabdha to be completed, etc.)
Pūrvapakṣa:
This does not decrease the status of Brahman in anyway.
Siddhānta:
This is what is called straw man argument. The reason for rejecting
their position is not that 'it is going to decrease the status of
Brahman in anyway'. The reasons for rejecting their position is
absence of any valid pramāṇa and also that it goes against many other
pramāṇa-s. One cannot argue - "This does not decrease the status of
Brahman in anyway and so let us accept it". Such an approach is
invalid. For accepting any position, it must have valid pramāṇa-s and
it should not go against other valid pramāṇa-s. Their position lacks
both. It does not have valid pramāṇa-s and it goes against other
valid pramāṇa-s.
Pūrvapakṣa:
(Special Note: Perumal is described as "Madhu", "Annam", "AramudE", etc. He
derives anandA from His own nature, but we can enjoy it as well, just as we
enjoy the qualities of Madhu, Annam and "Aramudham". 'Unnum ChOru, Parugum
Neer....' is a famous pAsuram). This, in brief, is a refutation of the
Ananda TAratamya. Let us note that our pUrvAchAryAs‟ interpretation of
AnandA in mokṣa is based completely on Nammazhwar‟s "Uyarvara Uyarnalam"
pathigam.
Siddhānta:
Very strange argument in deed. Let us list what is being said
1. Perumal is described as "Madhu".
2. He derives anandA from His own nature
3. But, we can enjoy it as well
4. just as we enjoy the qualities of Madhu
Pūrvapakṣa:
Also, an interesting point to note is that Sri ParakAla Yati has not
only refuted the idea of gradations in bliss, but has also refuted
jiva bhedA
Siddhānta:
What is interesting is to note that just as the effort to refute the
idea of gradations in bliss fizzled out, so also the refutation of
the jīva bheda will fizzle out. What they mean is actually
jīvatraividhya as they also have to believe in jīva bheda otherwise
there will not be a debate/argument/discussion between two persons,
two groups, etc.
Pūrvapakṣa:
by explaining that the difference in anandA in samsAris is due to
expansions and contractions of dharma bhūta jñānA.
Siddhānta:
First of all, there is no such thing as " dharma-bhūta-jñānA" of
their interpretation. It is not Vritti jñāna as they claim that it
will continue into mokṣa. It is not svarūpa jñāna as they themeselves
claim so. Like hare's horn, it is non-existent. Talking about its
contraction and expansion is same as talking about the color of
hare's horn.
Pūrvapakṣa:
This effectively quells the MAdhvA argument that JivAs are
intrinsically different because they have different likes and
dislikes.
Siddhānta:
No one has to quell these arguments. They have all been self-
destructive.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The Sruti 'Yasya AtmA SarIram' and numerous other Vedic/PurAnic
vAkyAs assert that JivA is the body of BhagavAn, and hence,
subservient to BhagavAn.
Siddhānta:
There is absolutely no regard for context, no regard for consistency.
We cannot take superficial meanings for vedic statements. Just as
mahavakyas do not speak of identity of Jiva and Brahman, the
statements saying somethingas shrIra of God do not literally mean
that the God has them as His sharIra. We have to take them "like
sharIra only". Just because we are inside a vehicle and control the
vehicle, the vehicle does not become our body.
ा
य्यस्योक्ताः पःनथव्य र नतष्ठोन पःा नथव्य अ्तिर्तो यर पःा नथवुषी न वमद यस्योक पःनथवुषी शरुषीरर य्यस्योक्ताः
ा पःनथवुषीर्तिर्तो यरयनत एष तम
ा
य आत्मनन नतष्ठोन आत्मन्तो ा
ऽ्तिर्तो यर आत्म न वमद...।
In MahamīmāMsa, the abhimāni devatas are explained. Pṛthivi - Pṛthu =
pūrṇa Hari
vāti = carries around; Hence Garuḍa is also known as Pṛthivi.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Therefore, all jivAs are subservient.
Siddhānta:
Of course. This is slipping in a valid statement, that gives no
support to their position. If the jīvas are subservient to God, they
must have the basic awareness that they are inferior to God in every
respect, including the jñāna, ānanda and every guṇa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Since a body serves a soul willingly,
Siddhānta:
A big fall. The body is jaḍa. How can a jaḍa have willingness?
Pūrvapakṣa:
all jivAs possess the essential nature to serve Him willingly.
Siddhānta:
Then Lord Krishna must have had some kind of delusions or
hallucinations, when He condemned the tāmasik souls in Bhagavadgīta
in several instances. Those who do not believe that Krishna had
delusions must reject this position of Viśiṣṭādvaita.
Not only Gīta, there are other sources that support the position that
there are inherently tāmasik souls. Apart from several Gīta sentences
supporting jīva traividhya and tāmasik souls, there are also several
Bhagavata and other purāṇa statements, there are Vedic statements,
there are Mahabharata and Ramayana statements that support this
position.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Hence, there can be no 'tAmasic' or 'rAjasic' jivAs when they all
have the same intrinsic nature to serve Sriman NArAyaNa willingly.
Siddhānta:
See above for the total rejection of this position.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Swami Desikan gives the following pramAnAs to show that JivA is
omniscient in mokṣa due to expanded dharma bhūta jñānA: CU 7.26-2:
Sarvam ha pasya: pasyathi SarvamApnOthi Sarvasa: (Meaning): Muktha
Jeevan sees every thing in parama padham and through or h the power
of his own sankalpam enjoys every thing at all times and is immersed
in ParipoorNa BrhmAnandham
Siddhānta:
Here Sarva does not mean "every thing". That is not even the purpose.
Here Sarva refers to the Lord. Note that Viṣṇu Sahasra nāma also has
"sarvaḥ śarvaḥ śivaḥ sthāṇuḥ.."(सव्यस्योक्ताः शव्यस्योक्ताः नशव्यस्योक्ताः स्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta i णः । || ्यस्योक्ताःा ...). Secondly, the
context also calls for such an interpretation - the jīva seeing the
Lord, obtaining/reaching the Lord.
Pūrvapakṣa:
(Sa vaa yEsha yEthEna dhivyEna chakshushA manasaithAn kaamAn pasyan
RAMATHE , ya yEthE Brahma lOkE:CU 8.12.5).
Siddhānta:
It is shocking that they think that this statement refers to jīva.
How could they ignore the very next statement ?
ा एतर दमा व आत्म नरपा सतम।) (The gods
tam vā etam devā ātmānamupāsate | (तर व
worship such Lord as the controller of all indriyas).
If their interpretation means that it is jīva, that would imply that
the next statement indicates that all the gods worship the jīva. That
is terrible.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The following Sruti VAkyA shows that JivA enjoys Brahman in mokṣa:
"yO vai bhUmA thath sukham yathra nAnyath paSyathi nAnyath SruNOthi
nAnyath vijAnAthi sa bhUmA".
Siddhānta:
What is the context for this and how does this entire portion of
śruti vākya runs and what it means - we will see further down. Even
before that, with their own interpretation, let us see if they achive
what they like.
Pūrvapakṣa:
"The bhUmA is the greatest.
Siddhānta:
Since jīva is not the greatest, naturally they also mean that bhūmā
refers to God.
Pūrvapakṣa:
It pervades everywhere and is sarva-viSishtam. It is bliss-self and
thus everything.
Siddhānta:
That should also be fine - He is everything means that He controls
everything.
Pūrvapakṣa:
He who enjoys this, never sees other things…"
Siddhānta:
Surely, having reached Paramātma, the mukta jīva sees Paramātma
everywhere and also is not interested in anything else. One sees only
Lord never has to mean that One knows the Lord completely or knows
everything completely.
It is very clear that they lost the whole flow and purpose. They keep
ending up self-contradicting as well.
ा
तदमष श्तोक्यस्योक्ताः - न पश्यय्तो रःत्यरा पश्ययनत ा त दु्यस्योक्ताःखत र।ा
न र्तोगीता -९-११ 5 possesses soर न्तो
सवर हा पश्यय्यस्योक्ताः पश्ययनत सवर प्तोनत सवश इनत।
ा ैक दश्यस्योक्ताः स्मःत्यस्योक्ताः।
स एकध भवनत नत्रध भवनत प किञ्चिध सप्तध नवध च ैव पनश्च
ा दश च ैकश्च सहस्र नणः । || च नव् संशनत्यस्योक्ताः।
शतर च ž न्दाद्तोŸय - ७-२६-२
"As support for the above, this śloka goes -
The mukta does not see the anarthas like death, disease, and despair.
He sees the activities of the Lord, he obtains the sarva nāmaka
Paramātma. He fulfills all of his own deires. He takes one, three,
five, seven, nine, eleven, hundred and eleven, thousand and twenty,
etc forms."
It is quite evident that none of these point out any thing even
remotely that the jñāna and ānanda of the jīva equals that of
Brahman.
Pūrvapakṣa:
With infinite jñānA, JivA is omniscient and enjoys Brahman. This
means, JivA has infinite anandA.
Siddhānta:
A blind repetition of the same phrase without any supporting evidence
will not make that statement true. Only Brahman is omniscient and the
jīva is not. jīva enjoying Brahman is not like a boy enjoying a toy.
One must have the realization that the expression "jīva enjoys
Brahman" means that the jīva enjoys thru the Brahman, from the grace
of the Brahman, by seeing Brahman and experiencing the company of the
Brahman and especially in mokṣa to the fulll extent of the jīva's
capacity. If the expression "X enjoys Brahman" implies that X is
omniscient and has equal ānanda as Brahman, then all the "Nanda vraja
people" must also be omnixcient and have ananda equal to that of
Brahman. Then to avoid such a mess, a bigger mess is brought in thru
"DBJ", which is not there any where in the scriptures and which is
like a magic wand in the hands of Viśiṣṭādvaita, by waving which all
kinds of claims are made going aginst the scriptures.
Pūrvapakṣa:
It should be noted that jivA, though having infinite dharma bhūta
jñānA still is anU with regards to svarUpA. Just as sun is localised,
but sun rays can spread everywhere, JivA is anU, but it radiates
knowledge.
Siddhānta:
This is due to the confusion between jñāna and prakāśa. If they think
that prakāśa itself is jñāna, then a tube light or a burning candle
will have to be considered as having jñāna. jñāna is not visible to
the eye, Prakāśa is. jñāna does not pervade into space, Prakāśa does.
So bringing jñāna into picture and talking about size, shows heavy
confusion. Also what is this DBJ? Is it same as Vritti jñāna or
different? If it is different, then every living being has three
kinds of jñāna - Svarūpa jñāna, Vritti jñāna and DBJ. And their
contention is that this DBJ is carried into mokṣa as well. Where is
this located? If it is in Svarūpa, then its contraction and
expansion, etc indicate the vikāra for the svarūpa. If it is not in
Svarūpa, how can it be carried over into mokṣa?
Pūrvapakṣa:
This knowledge allows cognition of BhumA (Brahman) and enjoy its
infinite qualities.
Siddhānta:
Then what is the role of Svarupa jñāna? The svarupa jñāna does not
allow the cognition of Brahman, but DBJ does ? So the Svarupa jñāna
in mokṣa is significantly useless compared to DBJ !!
Pūrvapakṣa:
Other pramAnAs for dharma bhūta jñānA are the vAkyAs like 'He becomes
one-fold, three fold....many fold', in Chandogya Up., which state
that the muktA can assume multiple bodies at once. MuktA is anU, so
the only way for him to assume so many bodies is by his jñānA.
Although the AtmA remains localised, it can control several bodies by
its jñānA.
Siddhānta:
Another quagmire. If the muktas assuming multiple bodies in mokṣa is
an evidence for DBJ expanding to infinity in mokṣa, then those "some
ṛṣis" (It is actually Soubhari) also must be considered as having
this DBJ expanded to infinity in saMsāra itself (no need to wait till
mokṣa).
This DBJ acts like an equalizer - making each one's DBJ expand in
succh a way that they equal the ānada of Brahman.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Additional Notes from Sri Ranga Rāmānuja Muni's BhAshyA on Anandavalli of
Taittiriya Upanishad
Siddhānta:
This is a complete loss of ground! Only one thing is meaningful here
that 100 is just symbolic only and it signifies just several fold.
The śruti vākyas were given and explained earlier in this write up.
One hundred bliss units of Mukta Manuṣya Gandharvas = one bliss unit
of Mukta Deva Gandharvas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full
śravana phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they
have become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta Deva Gandharvas = one bliss unit of
Mukta pitṛ devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravana
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta pitṛ devatas = one bliss unit of
Mukta ajānaja devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravana
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
One hundred bliss units of Mukta ajānaja devatas = one bliss unit of
Mukta karmaja devatas, who are śrotriyas (obtained the full śravana
phala and also devoid of kāmajanita upadravas, meaning they have
become āptakāmas).
Possibility-1 :
100 bliss units of of Amukta chakravartis = 1 bliss unit of Amukta
Manuṣya Gandharva = 1 bliss unit of Mukta Manuṣya Gandharva
Possibility-2 :
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs unfortunately, have not comprehended the intent of Ananda
MimAmsA.
Siddhānta:
Unfortunately only a poor understanding and a weak position could
lead one to a conclusion that the Madhvas have not comprehended !!
Especially since the the intent and the words of the Shruti are both
very clear and loud. One has to just pay attention to understand this
basic concept.
एष ऽस्योक परर गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soनत्यस्योक्ताः। एष ऽस्योक परर स् संपत।ा
एष्तोऽस्योक परर्तो ल्तोक्यस्योक्ताः। एष्तोऽस्योक परर आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः।
ा वन्ति॥
एतस्योकवै ऽऽनन्दादस्योक न्याय)". नन भतनन र त्र रपजुषी - रतिबिःहद रणयक्तोपननषत -ा ४-३२
"Lord Viṣṇu pervades the entire universe. His sampat is infinitely
complete. His jñāna is all complete. His bliss is infinitely
complete. Other muktas experience an infinitesimal amount of His
bliss."
Pūrvapakṣa:
The whole purpose is to celebrate BrahmAnandA and its incalculable
nature,
Siddhānta:
Their interpretation is no celebration, but just the opposite. How
can equating the bliss of an ordinary jīva with that of Supreme Lord
be called a celebration. It is totally rejecting the supremacy of the
Lord.
Pūrvapakṣa:
but instead, they think its purpose is to enumerate the AnandAs of
baddha and mukta jivAs, based on their status of Indra, Brahma,
Manushya, etc. which are permanent.
Siddhānta:
One has to call a spade a spade. Calling by any other name will not
make a spade a non-spade.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Note that manushya AnandA is not followed by 'Shrotriya'.
Siddhānta:
Of course not. One must have a basic understanding of the whole
thing.
When an invisible aspect of ānanda MīmāMsa of Muktas (liberated) is
enlisted, it must have a starting point that we can comprehend.
"tasyeyam pṛthivI sarvā vittasya pūrṇā syāt | sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ
|..."
तस्योकमयर पःा नथवुषी सव नवत्तस्योक पणः । || स्योक त।ा स एक्तो र नषा आनन्दाद्यस्योक्ताः।...
When we want to start the basic unit of Mukta chakravarti, how do we
go about? How much is 1 unit of bliss of Mukta chakravarti? Before
going to mokṣa (i.e. in saMsāra), in Tretayuga, when the Earth is
full of prosperity, and the chakravarti rules this entire Earth, what
ever bliss he gets - multiply that by 100 and that will be 1 unit of
his bliss, when he goes to mokṣa. So,
Pūrvapakṣa:
The same vAkyAs appear in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣat as well.
Siddhānta:
Of course it does. But that still did not help them. As strange as
it may sound, they still did not get it, despite the clear cut
message in the śruti.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The major tenets of the MAdhvA VedAntA have been refuted in the
Vijayindra ParAjayA.
Siddhānta:
Firstly, the objections to Viśiṣṭādvaita are not major tenets of
Mādhva Vedanta. Secondly, Viśiṣṭādvaita is trying to defend its
position by answering the objections of 'Madhva Vedanta'. Thirdly, in
that process, they are exhibiting their weak process much more
emphatically. The ridiculousness of their position will be proven
even more in what follows.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Khyati Vada
Just because my shirt is green and the leaf is green, one cannot say
that a tiny amount of leaf is in my shirt or a tiny bit of my shirt
is in the leaf.
Let us get to the root of their confusion and resolve it once for
all.
1. Physical properties
2. Chemical properties
Atomic structure, bonding, eletrons, etc that give potential for the
chemical change. It is rather difficult to define chemical property
without talking about change. The properties that are exhibited by
reacting to other things - like potential to ignite and explode or
reacting to acids, etc.
Suppose the water is frozen into ice. The water is liquid and the ice
is solid. The physical property is different, yet because the
chemical properties (Hydrogen and oxygen in certain ration) are the
same the ice is non-different from the water.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The error is the lack of perception of the shell properties, and
perceiving only a minimal property of silver in the shell.
Siddhānta:
That is totally wrong. Both the shell and the silver are having the
same physical properties (only some, like both are solid, both have
the silver color and both have silver luster/shine.) So we are
PERCEIVING THE SHELL PROPERTIES THAT ARE EXACTLY SAME AS THE SILVER
PROPERTIES AND SO SOME GET THE ILLUSION THAT IT IS SILVER. There is
no such thing as minimal property, maximum property, etc. The
commonness of some physical properties is the root cause for the
illusion.
If we take the mirage, the ludicrousness hits one's face, if any one
makes a claim that there is a tiny amount of water in the mirage.
There is some common property between mirage and water in terms of
appearance.
So, let us leave the illusion as illusion and real as real, rather
than making one's own unsustenable judgement.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Another example is that a person sees a boulder in the night and
thinks it is a person. This error is not due to quintuplication, for
we cannot say that a bit of the person was in the boulder. However,
this is due to cognition of attributes in boulder that can be seen in
the person, and neglecting to see the entire boulder. For instance,
we see yAnamalai and say it looks like an elephant. So, there is a
common property between yAnamalai and elephant, ie, the shape. Hence,
something real is perceived here and nothing unreal. The error in
perception is the lack of cognition of features such as the fact that
the boulder is inert and not sentient, made of stone, etc.
Siddhānta:
Firstly any theory can not be proven with examples. Secondly, when
the theory is dead wrong, the examples themselves reveal the
invalidity of the theory. Thirdly, it is shocking that the believers
of those wrong theories present those same ridiculous examples like a
parrot, without realizing that the examples do in fact debunk their
theories.
First of all quintuplication or panchikarana has nothing to do with
sat khyāti at all. I dont know why a desperate attempt is made to
make some connection. Also, they get dragged towards the truth "we
cannot say that a bit of the person was in the boulder". Then as if
there is a reluctance to see the truth, a weird statement is given -
"However, this is due to cognition of attributes in boulder that can
be seen in the person, and neglecting to see the entire boulder."
The cause of the illusion is the similarity of appearance. The viewer
has seen lot of persons, but very rarely a person shaped boulder.
Same is the case with the other example like elephant shaped boulder.
In most of these examples, the root cause is the similarity in the
appearnce. The supporting causes are like insufficient light, or
bright light (like for shell-silver), frequency of viewing or fear or
apprehenson (like rope and snake), etc. All these examples are
perfect cases of illusion. Surely the shell is real, the rope is
real, the stone/boulder is real. Even in case of mirage, the sand, or
the road or the fields are real, the sun is real. The illusion
happens only when there is similarity and when there is knowledge of
things, which we mistake for (Absence of knowledge of snake, silver,
person, water) will not lead to the kind of illusions mentioned. Of
course absence of knowledge of the latter two is unthinkable.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Sri Rāmānuja gives the example that Putika can be used as a
substitute in sacrifices if Soma is not available. This is because
Putika possesses a few traits of Soma.
Siddhānta:
A substitute is not an illusion and not even a topic for Sat khyāti
vāda. What a confusion !? It is talking about the substitute in case
of unavailability of Soma. There are also instances where the
substitutes may not even possess a close resemblance.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Jaya Tirtha argues stating that there is no proof that a remote
causal phenomenon would cause one substance to possess quantities of
the other. Shell does not contain Silver. If so, how did the person
perceive the small amount of silver in shell and leave out the major
portion, namely, the shell part?
Siddhānta:
A good question and no answer. Or rather an attempt is made, but in
futile, as shown below.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Similarly, if Putika contained some proportion of Soma, why recommend
Putika as a substitute, when you can use it anyway?
Siddhānta:
Another good question and no answer. Or rather an attempt is made,
but in futile, as shown below.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The above refutation is baseless, if you can see it clearly. Jaya Tirtha does not understand
that Sri Rāmānuja‟s position is different from what he is saying. We do not say silver, in
its entirety, is present in shell. But a few attributes of silver, namely, its luster, is
present in shell, and as such, we say a bit of silver, namely, its luster is present in
shell.
Siddhānta:
The real issue is that they dont understand the basics of properties
of the substances. The sugar block is white, the lime stone is white
and so, will they say that a bit of limestone is in sugar block or
vice versa? Cant they understand that the similarity in appearance is
caused by both having same kind of luster. See above for more
details. When the luster is same, it is puerile to say that "a bit of
silver is present". Only small children, who do not have sufficient
vocabulary will use one set of words for another set. Only a
highlevelof pūrvāgraha makes them justify their mistake by using
evenmore ridiculous arguments ike - 1% silver and 99% shell is
present in the shell, but the viewer does not see and the viewer sees
the silver even though it is 1% but does not see the shell even
though it is 99% !
And then hand wave - "The refutation is baseless. Jayatīrtha does not
understand."
"a bit of silver, namely, its luster" is an indication of poor vocabulary or
heavy confusion or relucatnce to accept the truth..
Pūrvapakṣa:
This luster overwhelms the other properties of shell and causes
error. It is not that a bit of silver in its entirety itself is
present in shell. Swami Desikan makes it clear in Tattva Mukta
Kalapa. Only the bit of silver elements responsible for lustre are
present in shell. The lustre itself is an overpowering attribute in
the shell, which is cognised over other properties of shell, and
hence is responsible for error.
Siddhānta:
There is no such thing as "overwhelm". The silver-like-shell is more
rare than silver. Even if it is not rare, no one carries a lab
chemicals to perform a chemical test on that. If a person is seeing
the shell-silver for the firts time and is quite unaware of the
existence of such a shell makes the rror of mistaking it for silver.
The luster makes the viewer cognize the shell as silver. Appearance
is only one of the physical properties and there is illusion.
Pūrvapakṣa:
In other cases like the yAnamalai, the quintuplication theory is not
needed. It is straightforward in itself, vis., lack of cognition of
some attributes.
Siddhānta:
A needless repetition. This example has been discussed earlier on.
Pūrvapakṣa:
For instance, a jaundiced person sees everything as yellow. This is
not because a bit of yellow is in the object, but rather, yellow bile
is only perceived, and due to its preponderance, it hides the true
nature of the objects. So, while a jaundiced person cognises some
attributes of the object, eg: round table, he does not see other
attributes, eg: white table, because he sees the yellow superimposed
on the table. This results in error (yellow table).
Siddhānta:
The yellowness is not there in the table, but he sees the yellowness,
as simple as that. Every thing that is very obvious is masked out. A
lot of noise is created. The cause for perceiving the yellowness
(like jaundice, bile) is mentioned. When he sees yellowness, he does
not see whiteness, naturally. Right? How can a person see both
whiteness and yellowness in the same object at the same time, when he
is jaundiced? he will see only yellowness, even though it is white.
The yellow tableand the white table appearing yellow have same
attributes for the jaundiced person. Seeing yellowness that is not
there, seeing silver that is not there, seeing water vapor that is no
there are all clear-cut examples of illusion and giving the causes or
giving the common properties will not mask the truth of their being
illusory phenomena.
Shake off and see the truth rather than vehemently arguing with more
and more mistakes. One can come up with a billion examples, but none
of them can go against the truth, simply because it just can't. That
will only increase the frustration and stunt the thinking process.
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvA's theory is that a person sees unreal silver due to memory of
a prior cognition (similarly, unreal yellow table instead of white
table), but later on finds out it was a shell or white table. By
Occam's Razor, this theory is eliminated as it makes one extra
assumption about the cognition of an unreal entity.
Siddhānta:
One gives a gun to a child, who does not know how to use a gun and
the child shoots its own foot, without the realization that it is
going to hurt him only.
What Madhvācārya and his followers are saying in case of matters like
"perception of yellow table by a jaundiced person, when it is white",
is not much different from what a westerner or any person with common
sense says. Even Viśiṣṭādvaitins go 80% in the right direction, then
they see the opposite camp and so run in a wrong direction and end up
in a quagmire.
4a. X thinks that it is some color, but has no clue (in the first
option).
4b. X thinks that it is an yellow table (in the second option).
1 to 3 still hold.
One brings in Occam's razor. That will debunk their whole theory.
Pūrvapakṣa:
YathArtha KhyAti/Sat KhyAti states that whatever is perceived is
real, and nothing unreal is perceived.
Siddhānta:
The perception is real, of course. The perceived object does not
exist there. For ex, it is true that X mistook that the silver is in
the shell. But there is no silver in the shell (not tiny bit). X
perceived is true. X was illusioned - that is real. The silver is in
the shell - that is unreal. One has to separate the wheat from the
chaff. Apply the same approach in all the examples.
A person (say X), who has no knowledge of silver does not mistake it
for silver. A person(say Y), who has knowledge of silver and also
who has knowledge of absence of silver in the shell also does not
mistake it for silver. Though both X and Y do not mistake, we say
that X has no proper knowledge, where as Y has.
In fact from time to time, people had raised question about this
satkhyāti and also Nitya Suris. Some urls are as follows -
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
June/003830.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
June/003832.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
June/003833.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
June/003834.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
July/003838.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
July/003839.html
-thru -
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
July/003854.html
http://dvaita.info/pipermail/dvaita-list_dvaita.info/2009-
July/003860.html
Pūrvapakṣa:
For a detailed explanation, Swami Desikan‟s Tattva Mukta Kalapa and
SrinivAsAchAryA‟s Yatindra Mata Dipika can be consulted. I am not
sure, but I believe DoddAchArya addresses this issue as well.
Siddhānta:
Of course, they have to. Arguing against pratyakṣa sidhha matters can
only be futile and unfortunate.
There have been lot of discussions on this topic and I just give the
url's and the interested readers can go thru if interested.
If any one has any question on any of these topics, I will be more
than glad to explain and elaborate.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Nitya SUris
Siddhānta:
Before any position is given, one must be clear of what one means.
The word "Suri" means jñāni. If they claim that there are
Nityajñānis, surely there are. If they claim that Suri refers to
aparokṣa jñāna and Nityasuris are nitya aparokṣajñānis, that is fine
too.
If they claim that Nitya Suris refer to Nityamukta-s and that they
would like to categorize certain devatas as Nitya muktas, they have
to come up with the following pramāṇa-s -
1. They have to come up with the usage of the term "Nitya sūri".
2. They have to come up with the pramāṇa that says that "Nitya sūri"
refers to "Nitya mukta", but not just "Nitya jñāni" or "Nitya
aparokṣin".
3. They have to come up with the pramāṇa-s that tells that "Nitya
sūris" are the ones, whom they categorize as such.
It simply means that the jñānis always witness that supreme abode of
the Lord after being graced from the Lord.
The terms "sadā (always)" and "nitya (eternal)" are not identical.
Suppose X says to Y "you can always use my car", it only means that
as long as the car is there and usable and as long as the person is
alive, he can use the car. Neither the car is permanent, nor the
person is. So, how can this "always" be
eternal? The word "always" is always used in the sense of "relative
always" only.
"yatendriyamanobuddhirmunirmoxaparāyaṇaḥ |
vigatecchābhayakrodho yaḥ sadā mukta eva saḥ ||" Gītā 5-28
ा ननररिसर्गो
यतमनन्द्रयरन्तोरतिबिनद्धर ा क्षपर यणः । || ्यस्योक्ताः।
We always have to see the context. If the nitya suris have already
obtained mukti, then they should never take birth here. Except
Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmi, no other devata comes to this earth and performs
the acts that are visible to others. Lakṣmi and Nārāyaṇa do not bear
physical body and they have jagadvyāpāratva. The mukta jīvas do not
have jagadvyāpāratva and do not perform any activity physically and
visibly.
Why should one, who is mukta, take up this physical body again (even
if it were for the sake of others) and perform any jagadvyāpāra?
They are not nitya muktas. sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ can also simply mean
"aparokṣa jñānis" (seeing the Lord in their heart). However even in
case of aparokṣa darśana, there is tāratamya and not always an
aparokṣajñāni can see the Lord.
The śruti can mean "limied always" and also it can be after attaining
mukti. It can also just mean bimba darśana.
Further, Lakṣmi says (in AmbhraNIsUkta)
"yaṁ kāmaye tam tamugraṁ kṛṇomi tam barhmāṇam tam ṛśim tam sumedhāṁ..."
ा रयम तर तर
यर क ा ग्रर
ा कःा णः । || ्तोनर तर रतिबिह्म
ा णः । || र तर
ा ऋनषर
ा ा स
तर ा रम
ा ध र...ा
If there are nitya suris (in the sense of VA), then the question of
Lakṣmi "making them into suris" does not arise.
When people point out the flaws in them, people take refuge in
statements like "Even Rama said that he is merely son of Daśaratha",
"Nityasuris can pretend that they have flaws", "Nityas and Lord can
easily lie, no doubt about it". This kind of approach is dangerous,
as people can claim any one they like as Nityasuri and keep on
justifying such statements.
" The pramAnA for Adi Sesha's baddha status is that BalarAmA
protested the marriage of Subhadra with Arjuna, going against the
Lord..." - All this is true. But VA my do some gymnastics like saying
that it is all pretence, etc. But one thing that they cannot deny is
that they are still in saMsāra. Nitya mukta being in saMsāra is like
a cold fire or weak Paramātma, etc. Thus they face a double whammy -
absence of pramāṇa-s for their position, presence of pramāṇa-s that
refute their position.
Pūrvapakṣa:
MAdhvAs interpret Sankarshana as Adi Sesha and padam as position.
However, I know for a fact that this verse talks about the stage of
Bhakti Yoga presided by the vyUha murthy Sankarshana. Padam here
denotes state and not position. It simply talks about Rudra's
advancement in bhakti yoga and not about Adi Sesha. Sri Rāmānuja has
equated the 4 stages of bhakti yoga with the 4 vyUha mUrtis. As such,
the sankarshanA mentioned here is the vyUha murthy and not Adi Sesha.
Siddhānta:
This kind of explanation can not be applied. Why? Let us see the
quote from Garuḍa purāṇa -
ा
नस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iतप्रज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd्तोऽनप यदस्तिध्व्यस्योक्ताः प्र प्य र्वौद्रर पदर ा ।
तत्यस्योक्ताः
ा
स ङ्कार ). 5 Vijayindra ParAjayA - Refषणः । || र तत्तो ा
रनक्ताः शरगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so द ा नवषप्रा स दत्यस्योक्ताः॥
yaḥ ūrdhvaḥ tu sthitaprajñaḥ api raudraṁ padaṁ prāpya tataḥ sāṅkarṣaṇaṁ
(padaṁ prāpya) tato viṣṇuprasādataḥ muktim agāt |
ा
य्यस्योक्ताः ऊध्व्यस्योक्ताः त ा नस्थालीपुलाकन्याय)". The Bhagavadgīta iतप्रज्ञान ). X ! vnd.sun.Upd्यस्योक्ताः अनप र्वौद्रर पदर प्रा प्य तत्यस्योक्ताः स ङ्कार ). 5 Vijayindra ParAjayA - Refषणः । || र (पदर
ा प्रा प्य ) तत्तो नवषप्रा स दत्यस्योक्ताः रना क्ताः शर ा
अगीता -९-११ 5 possesses so त ा |
Now the obvious meaning -
Even though one who is known as ūrdhva (He is also known as Ugratapa)
is sthitaprajña (jñāni), first obtained Rudra Padavi, then Saṅkarṣaṇa
(śeṣa) padavi and thereafter from the grace of Lord Viṣṇu obtained
mukti.
When this meaning is straight forward and does not go against any
pramāṇa-s, there is no need and purpose to give some round about
explanation. Secondly, let us grant their wish and make an attempt to
go their route.
According to them, padam does not represent padavi, but some state of
Bhakti yoga, attached to a vyūha murthy of Viṣṇu.
So, sāṅkarṣaṇaṁ padaṁ is bhakti yoga attached to vyūha mūrthy Sankarshana.
Then what is Raudra padam ? What Bhakti yoga is it and which vyūhamūrthy is
that attached to?
They ignore the context, they ignore the purpose and they do all kind
of gymnastics to support a position that is untenable.
So much for knowing for a fact. pūrvāgraha will not leave so easily.
It does not leave great scholars, it does not leave middle tier ones
and it does not leave beginners.
Pūrvapakṣa:
BalarAmA was an avEsa avatara of perumAl as well as an avatarA of Adi
Sesha. That explains why he sometimes objected to Krishna, as the
amsam of Viṣṇu was just playing a leela. Dvaitins refuse to accept
the concept of avEsa, but ParAsara Muni has stated in Viṣṇu PurAnA
that he himself was the VyAsA before Krishna DvaipAyana. Hence, that
proves that VyAsA is not paramAtmA, but an avesa avatara.
Siddhānta:
Firstly there is no such thing as "āveśa avatāra". That is like
saying "round square" or "square circle". It is either āveśa or
avatāra. āveśa means a special presence of power of the deity is
there and that varies as per the need.
Pūrvapakṣa:
RAmAyaNa has a stotra by Brahma on RAmA, which states "Lying on the
causal ocean, you created me eons ago". This is quoted by Sri
ParAsara Bhattar in the Sahasranama Bhashyam. Hence, BhagavAn created
Brahma while lying down, which is obviously on Adi Sesha. So, Adi
Sesha existed before the first created entity, namely, Brahma,
subject to karma.
Padma PurAnA states that the seat is Naga ParyankA as well.
Siddhānta:
If the argument "Brahma was created after ādi śeṣa, as he was created
while the Lord was lying on ādi śeṣa and so ādi śeṣa is nitya Suri",
then as we all accept Lakṣmi is greater than Brahma, we will have
following contention -
"Lakṣmi was created after the gods and demons during samudra mathana
by those gods and demons, and so all those gods and demons are nitya
Suris". Another factor is that the Viśiṣṭādvaitins should not have
any difficulty with this as they believe that every jīva is eligible
for mukti, what is the big issue in making those gods and demons as
nitya sūris !! It is one disaster after another !
And If śeṣa was there at all times, what happens to following shruti
vākya
"vāsudevo vā idamagra āsīnna brahmā na ca śaṅkaraḥ"
Some may tend to argue "Brahma and Shankara were mentioned, but not śeṣa;
means śeṣa was there" - but that does not hold as one must note the word
"agra", meaning no one else was there. Brahma includes Brahma and Vāyu and
similarly Rudra includes Rudra and śeṣa and Garuḍa. By kaimutya nyāya all
the other gods are also implied. No one existed at that time.
If that does not convince, one is advised to note following shruti vākyas
If they think that śeṣa existed at all times, what about when the
Lord lies down on Banyan leaf during Pralaya. śeṣa was lying
somewhere during Pralaya and the Lord did not want to use śeṣa !?
Siddhānta:
What is the reason for guessing? Perhaps, a compelling desire to
stick to pūrvāgraha. Mahabharata is given the status of shruti even
though it is smṛti. It is called Panchama veda. "mahatvāt
bhāravatvācca mahābhāratamucyate"
ा रवत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप च्चादिव रह भ रतरच्यतम
(रहत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप त भ ा )(It is called Mahabharata because of its
mahatva and bhāra or weight in terms of its meaning). Secondly, it
does not go against any shruti vākya and there is no need to discard
it. There is no shruti vākya that says that Garuḍa is nitya mukta.
Pūrvapakṣa:
If so, we have to say Sita was a samsAri considering that she behaved
like a normal queen. But even Dvaitins accept her as a nitya muktA,
though not for the reasons we do.
Siddhānta:
People cannot have their own reasons for accepting a deity as
nityamukta or not. Whether it is Dvaitins or Viśiṣṭādvaitins, there
can be only one reason - do śāstras says so or not. There is no rhyme
or reason to make guess work. The matters like those, which are
beyond pratyakṣa, cannot spring from the whimsical or wishful
attitudes or thoughts of any individual or group.
All the others do one of those mistakes (Opposing the Lord, like what
Rudra did, ahaMkāra pradarśana towards the Lord like what Garuḍa did
and mistaking the Lord like what Balarāma did) at some point of time.
That is aparādha towards the Lord and totally different from behaving
like an ordinary person. One must think as to which of these can
come as a role model structure.
"yadyadācarati śreṣṭhastattadevetaro janaḥ |
sa yatpramāṇaṁ kurute lokastadanuvartate || Gītā - 3-21
For the sake of one's own convenience, some people may ignore the
Mahabharata vākya, which is panchama veda. It is akin to sacrificing
a cow (the goshabda also means a śruti vākya) go-sadṛśa mahābhārata
vākya to what one worships like a deity, the ideal (the idol) of
pūrvāgraha. "pūrvāgrahavigrahāya mahābhāratavāggāM balimāvahanti".
Pūrvapakṣa:
Sri ParAsara Bhattar quotes the suparna suktam of Veda, which states
that Garuda is VedAtmA. He embodies the Veda, ie, Seshatvam. This
implies omniscience. Hence, the Udyoga Parva can be dismissed as a
leelA of Garuda. No other devatA is called 'VedAtmA'.
Siddhānta:
Sure, Garuḍa is abhimāni devata of Veda. In fact it is even stated
that the wings of Garuḍa emanate sāmaveda when he flies. He is a
great deity and saying that he is not nitya mukta will not bring down
his status.
Let me give an example - there are many who believe that Lord Shiva
is the most Supreme deity. When one says that Lord Viṣṇu is the most
Supreme and Shiva himself will not approve attributing all-supremacy
to him, then they start quoting scriptural statements describing the
greatness of Shiva. Surely Shiva is great. The question is not about
the specific quotes of greatness, but it is about his "all-
supremacy". When one says that Shiva is not all-supreme, instantly
they react "you are insulting Shiva", etc. Just as Shiva is very
great, but not all-supreme, same way Garuḍa is very great,
vedābhimāni, great devotee of the Lord and yet he is not nitya mukta.
This is as per the scriptural statements and there is not a single
statement that speaks of nitya muktatva of Garuḍa or śeṣa or any
Deity other than Sri Hari and Lakṣmi. Further labelling the removal
of ahankāra of Garuḍa can be labelled as Leela of Sri Hari, but not
Leela of Garuḍa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
The theory of Nitya Suris is supported by Sruti.
Siddhānta:
This has been discussed in this article above. There are two issues.
First of all the shruti vākya does not tell about "nityamuktatva".
Secondly, it does not speak of nityamuktatva of Garuḍa and śeṣa.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Sri Ranga Rāmānuja Muni provides many pramAnAs in his bhashyas.
Siddhānta:
They will all be refuted as shruti vākyas cannot destroy one another.
Sarva Upaniṣatsāra Bhagavadgīta cannot and will not misguide people
(yadgatvā na nivartante taddhāma paramam mama).
Pūrvapakṣa:
Chandogya Upanishad states that the AmAnava Purushan unites us with
Brahman, implying that he is a nitya suri.
Siddhānta:
atha yadu caivāsmiñchavyaṁ kurvanti yadi ca nārciṣamevābhisaṁbhavanti |
arciṣo'haḥ | aha āpūryamāṇapakṣam | āpūryamāṇapakṣādyān ṣaḍudaṅ eti māsān
tān | māsebhyaḥ saṁvatsaram | saṁvatsarādādityam | ādityāccandramasam |
candramaso vidyutam | tat puruṣo'mānavaḥ sa enān brahma gamayat| eṣa
devapatho brahmapatha etena pratipadyamānāḥ imaṁ mānavamāvartaṁ nāvartante
nāvartante || Chāndogya - 4-15-5
ा
अथ यदु च ैव नस्मन शव्यर ा ा वन्ति यनद च न नचषरमव नभसम्भवन्ति। अनचष्तोऽह्यस्योक्ताः। अह आपयर णः । || पक्षर।ा
क
ा ादङ ा एनत र स न ता न।ा र समभ्य्यस्योक्ताः स् संवतरर।ा स् संवतर द नदत्यर।ा आनदत्य च्चादिवन्द्ररसर।ा
आपयर णः । || पक्ष द न षड
ा ।ा तत पा रुष्तो
चन्द्ररस्तो नवदतर ा गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soरयत।ा एष दमवपथ्तो ब्रह्मपथ एतमन प्रनतपदर न ्यस्योक्ताः इरर ा
ा ऽर नव्यस्योक्ताः स एन न ब्रह्म
Pūrvapakṣa:
Kaushitaki Upanishads talk about 500 apsara stris, Dwara Palakas,
etc. in Sri Vaikuntam. These are not posts occupied by muktAs, but
are Nitya Suris since everything the Upanishad states is anAdi.
Siddhānta:
Kāṭhaka Upaniṣat speaks about Nachiketa going to Yama's abode. Since
Veda is anādi, did Nachiketa stay in Yama's abode from anādi?
Veda is ananta also - that means, which ever deity is mentioned as
amukta in Upaniṣats were never in mukti and will never go to mukti!!
Now their conclusion is that if any one is mentioned as mukta, he/she
is nitya mukta and so by the same conclusion, every one else must be
nitya-amukta.
If they did not understand the "pravāhataḥ anāditva", their problems
will be endless. They seemed to have no concept of "mukta and amukta
vaikuṇṭha" as well. Otherwise the incident of Jaya and Vijaya coming
down to earth by the curse of Sanakādi kumāras will go against
"yadgatvā na nivartante taddhāma paramam mama".
ा
यद्गत्वात् । नित्यश्चोप न ननवत्तिम तद्ध र पररर रर।
Pūrvapakṣa:
It is only in leelA vibhUti that we have posts like BrahmA, SivA,
etc. which are occupied by different jivAs during different yugAs.
Siddhānta:
Irrespective of what Leela Vibhuti there are talking about and what
posts they are talking about, the very basics are missing in VA
argument.
There are two kinds of sāttvika mukta/mukti yogya jīvas - muktas and
amuktas.
Among muktas, Lord Viṣṇu is svatantra nitya mukta and Lakṣmi is Hari-
adhIna nityamukta. All the other muktas were amuktas at some point of
time and from the grace of the Lord obtained mukti at some point of
time. After reaching mukti, there is no question of rebirth as the
prakṛti-bandha is gone. Lakṣmi is cetana prakṛti and she controls
Jada parkṛti by the grace of the Lord and hence Jada prakṛti has no
influence on Sri Hari and Lakṣmi. So, they operate in both mukta
world and amukta world (Without Sri Hari's Ichchha tṛṇamapai na
chalati. Lakṣmi is 'samana' meaning she has same pervasion of the
Lord - deshataḥ and kālataḥ - meaning at all times and in all places
she accompanies the Lord). The mukta jīvas are free from prakṛti
bandha and they don't operate in amukta world. Since they have no
prakṛti bandha, they never do the any of the following 3 mistakes -
Among the devatas, that are seen in amukta world, only three
categories of people also qualify for not doing any of the above
three errors at any time (avatāra or mūlarūpa) -
1. Lakṣmi (who is nityamukta),
2. Brahma and Vāyu (and the other jīvas in Rujugaṇa, who are
eligible to become Brahma)
3. Their wives (Sarasvathi and Bharati and the other Ruju patnis).
If a question arises, whether there are mukta Garuḍas and Mukta śeṣa-
s, certainly there are. In fact there are infinite number of mukta
Brahmas, Mukta, Garuḍas , Mukta śeṣa-s, etc. and only one amukta
Brahma, one amukta śeṣa, amukta Garuḍa, etc. at any given point of
time (like present instant). When they go to mukti, the next in line
will come to that position.
Pūrvapakṣa:
Other Issues
- Some MAdhvAs argue that Swami Rāmānuja did not provide a sufficient
proof for Narayana paratvam as compared to Madhva, and that he did
not elaborate on the role of Sri properly. These petty complaints are
of no value. I have read their arguments, and they are simply
misunderstandings rather than refutations. No need to go into detail.
Siddhānta:
Vague statements or random statements are worth ignoring. Who argued
and what is the basis of the argument? Unless the specifics are
known, this issue can not be addressed.
Pūrvapakṣa:
- VyAsa TirthA has attempted to refute the 'equality' of JivA with
Brahman in the NyAyamrtA. He criticises the vishishtadvaitic
interpretation of paramam sAmyam sruti. This has already been
refuted. There is no equality in mokṣa between jivA and paramAtmA.
Sri ParakAla Yati mentiones clearly in the vijayindra parAjaya that
all jivAs are under the control of Brahman.
Siddhānta:
This is what is called self-contradiction.
Quote:
The paramam sAmyam sruti states that JivA becomes equal in 6 gunas
with Brahman. jñānA and AnandA, as explained here, are two. The JIvA
is also Satya Sankalpan, since he only wants to serve Brahman, and
Brahman is also Satya Sankalpan, since he has taken a vow to protect
JivAs. The JivA is also Satya KAman, since all his desires are
fulfilled by Brahman. The desire is merely kainkaryam and anubhavam
of BhagavAn. Brahman is, naturally, Satya KAman. The JivA is also
decorated with BrahmAlankAram, as described by the Kaushitaki
Upanishad, hence, this is another sAmyam. Note that in all cases, the
jivA does not achieve anything by his own will or effort. Everything
is given by Brahman to the jivA, making the jivA totally dependent on
Brahman. Hence, no sAmyam in 'status' as alleged by MAdhvAs.
Unquote.
The rest of the points again lack any specifics and are very vaguely
placed. Unless the specifics are known, those issues can not be
addressed.
One must note that the Dvaita tradition does not oppose every
principle of every religion. It opposes only the points that are
against scriptures and against pratyakṣa and against anumāna (not dry
logic, but logic in accordance to Pratyakṣa and āgama). Sri
Kanakadāsaru has not sung any thing that is against shaastra. So
claiming his allegiance to Viśiṣṭādvaita all thru is a wasted effort.
It is possible that he was Viśiṣṭādvaitin and later was changed over
to Dvaita (just like Trivikrama paṇḍitācārya changing from Advaita to
Dvaita).
Final Conclusion
The following are some of the issues that Viśiṣṭādvaita has with
scriptures. A brief reason is also given as to why it is against the
scriptures. Some of them have been discussed in depth inside this
article.
Siddhānta (The true message from the scriptures): The root cause
for their confusion is getting mixed up between visual similarity and
existence of actual thing itself. They think that some mistake a
silver colored shell to silver itself because a small amount of
silver is in the shell. The cause for the illusion is not because a
small amount is there, but because there is visual resemblance. The
absurdity of their argument can easily be seen this way. If a tiny
miniscule amount of silver can become the cause for illusion, then a
substance known to have lot of sliver must definitely become the
cause for illusion and must have much higher resemblance. The product
silver oxide, which actually contains silver, does not resemble
silver at all. It is dark brown. So, it is a misguided notion that a
small amount of presence is needed for resemblance or a resemblance
indicates a small amount of the substance being there. A mirage does
not contain small amount of water.
3. Pūrvapakṣa (The position of VA) : Accepting that Garuḍa, śeṣa,
Viṣvaksena, et al are nityasuris or nityamuktas.
ा
ॐ तनपद्विष्तो्यस्योक्ताः पररर पदर ा
सद पश्ययन्ति सरय्यस्योक्ताः ा क्ताः श ऋŸवमद
- नवषस
they try to make all kinds of conclusions. It has been shown in the
main body of this write-up as to how that position leads to many
difficulties.
Even the above quote does not indicate that nityasūris refers to
nityamuktas. There are no śruti vākyas or smṛti vākyas that indicate
who the nityasūris are.
ा
सवधर न पनरत्यज्य ा
र रमकर शरणः । || ा
र व्रज।
ा सवपपमभ्य्तो र्तोक्षनयष्य नर र शच
अहर त्वात् । नित्यश्चोप ा ॥ गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १८-६६
The superficial meaning "Forsaking all dharmas, just surrender to me.
I will liberate you from all the sins and so do not grieve.".
If that were true, then Sri Krishna preaching entire Gita becomes
futile. Lord Krishna preached Yuddhadharma to Arjuna in all the 18
chapters and why would he say at that point "forget about all the
dharmas"? It is like saying "Forget about what all I taught".
Saying "One does not have to follow any dharmas and surrendering to
the Lord is sufficient" is not consistent with any śāstra, leave
alone Gita.
This means "Forsaking all dharmas of others". One has to follow the
dharmas that are natural to oneself and not the dharmas of others.
One can appreciate this interpretation by seeing the verses 45-48 in
chapter 18 of Gita itself. The verse from Gita says
b. dharmatyāgaḥ = phalatyāgaḥ
karmaphalatyāgi is known as tyāgi
This is evident from the words of Sri Krishna Himself and has been
told in verse 2 of the same chapter 18.
सवकरफलत्य गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soर प्रा हुस्त्या गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soर नवचक्षणः । ||
ा ्यस्योक्ताः - गीता -९-११ 5 possesses soुषीत - १८-२
This means that one has to give up all the desire for the fruits of
the action and perform all actions with the understanding that Lord
owns it all. What one must have is "rakṣatītyeva viśvāsaḥ tadiyo'hamiti
smṛtiḥ"
रक्षतुषीत्यवम नवश्व स्यस्योक्ताः तनदय्तोऽहनरनत स्मःनत्यस्योक्ताः
(Firm belief that the Lord will protect and the awareness that I belong to
Him), by giving up all the anyadharmas and the desire for the fruits of the
action.
ा त्पणः । ||
पणः । || रद्यस्योक्ताः पणः । || नरदर पणः । || ा रदा च्यतम।
No such thing as andham tamas. No Jiva goes to andham tamas. All the
Jivas eventually go to mokSha and enjoy the bliss equal to that of
the Lord.
(Those who upāsana of avidya reach andham tamas (the deepest of the
hells)
There is no Tāratamya.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass–energy_equivalence
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equivME/
http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/ast123/lectures/lec09.html
That is why for Brahman, one may say "Brahman is jñāna and Ananda" or
"Brahman has jñāna and Ananda". Both are correct.
ा ख्योऽंशः सम्भ
अथ ह य एव यर र ा थरपा स ् संचनकरम तर हा सरा
ा ्यस्योक्ताः प्र णः । || दस्तिरद्गुषी
ा ाश्रिमष्ठोर च
य्तो ह वै ज्यमष्ठोर च ा वमद ज्यमष्ठोश्च ह वै