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MILITARY MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES 269

THE OTTOMAN ARMY
1914-18

IHYID :\"ICOLLE PIID IUFF\ELE RUiGERI

 EDITOR: LEE JOHNSON

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES 269

THE OTTOMAN ARMY
1914-18
Text by
DAVID NICOLLE PHD
Colour plates by
RAFFAELE RUGGERI
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 THE OTTOMAN ARMY 1914-18
INTRODUCTION
The Ottoman Turkish Empire was one of the leading
protagonists in the First World War of 19Q-18, and
the stolid courage of !.he individual Ouom:lR soldier-
'Johnny Turk', as he was to his enemies, was
recognized by 211. Yct the army in which Johnny
Turk served is, like the Ottoman Empire itself,
generally little understood. The Empire had already
been in existence for six centuries and was still a
formidable force. Although it was app:uently totter-
ing towards its fin.al collapse, it W:lS not, 2S is so often
thought, :already finished.
O\'cr the four years of the 'Great War', the
Ottoman Army, Navy and two tiny air services
fought on 6\-c major fronlS (GaUipoli, Sinai-
Palestine, Arabia, Iraq and the Caucasus). Ottoman
troops also sen'cd in many other war zones (Romania,
Galicia, on the Eastern front, the Salonika front,
Libya, Arabia, Yemen and Iran). In addition, Ott~
man agents stirred up trouble for the Allies, much
further afield, in the French Saharan territories,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Oman, Afghanistan, Rus-
,I
Cemal PaiR at his
headquurlers on the
Palestine front, conferring
with his ChicfofSwff,
Colonel Ali FUaf Bey. On
fhe left is his AVC, a na,·al
officer, and a Cireassian
bodxguard with
traditional cartridge
pod:ets on the breast ofhis
runie and a long dagger in
his belt. (Imperial War
Museum (h5JJ9J'
sian Central Asia and c\'en the East Indies - no small
feal for an Empire which had been called the 'Sick
Man of Europe' for almost a hundred years!
The Olloman Army of the Great War, is, like the
Olloman Empire itself, oflen wrongly seen as being
entirely dominated by Imperial Germany. Most
works on the Ottoman Army of the period were
written by German officers and advisors; few Turkish
accounts have b«n translated into Western lan-
guages and as a rcsult the Ottoman Army has too
often been seen as little more than an extension of the
Imperial Germa!:l Army. This was far from true: the
foundations of the Ottoman Army remained Turkish
and Islamic, as did the attitudes and aspirations of
most of its officers and men. Of course German
influence was strong, especially after Germany won a
concession to build the famous 'Berlin to Baghdad'
railway, but this aspect must not be allowed to
obscure the important independent role that the
Ottoman Empire played in the Greal War. The
Ottoman government maintained its own war
policies which conflicted in many ways wilh those of
Germany.
The Ottoman Turks had recently been virtually
,
 OTTOMAN EMPIRE
1914

.... " --
'-- PERSIA
.......
£Gypr
•••••••• Y<J~d •••••
' . D'"

. --. ....
---

- __. IIlflrnll'OIIl,1 front .. n

____ Oilputld fronti.rl
____ Turkilh fronll" I9H
h.lltr. doff.rlntl

...., ............
.,.•_._ Zonll 01 Inllu.nu l
t',but.. , arlU
_ _ R.il ... yl
_ Nhig.bll rlverl '.
:t Ottoll.n n....1 bUll -.\ BRITISH
SOI'fALItANO
•
•
Otto•• n IIr 11I1,onl
Ollo•• n .,nll,.ld,
""" ..... .. .....
ABrSSlNIA

•
driven out of Europe in the First Balkan War
(1912-13) fought against Serbia, Bulgaria and
Greece. But the Empire still held huge territories in
Asia including almost all of the Arab Middle EaSt,
and these the Ottomans were determined to keep.
They also had their eyes on the \'ast, ethnically
Turkish lands in the Caucasus and Centrod Asia.
Lying behind the apparently reckless Ottoman deci-
sion to enter the Great War was a dream of imperial
re\'ival - of a new pan-Turkish empire in the east to
be can'ed out at Russia's expense.

PRELUDE TO THE
GREAT WAR
In 1908--() a revolution led by army officers overthrew
Sultan Abdiilhamit II, the last autocratic absolute
ruler of the Ouoman dynasty, and although Ottoman
sultans remained on the throne for another 14 years,
real power fell to the Committee of Union and
Progress, the so-called 'Young Turks'. Rule was
shared betwcx:n Talat Pa~ as Minister of the Inter-
ior, Enver Pafl as Minister of War and Chief of the
General Staff, and Ahmet Cemal Pafl as Minister of
Marine - a triumvirate which soon became:l sh2fed
dictatorship.
The 'Young Turk' revolution ignited a period of
violent upheaval. At the same time reforms were
made in most aspects of the Ouom:ln state; these were
barely underway before the Ottoman Empire faced
blatant aggression from Italy in Libya, followed by Offlccrcoder, FeyV offlccrcorpstiS R whole
twO Balkan Wars. The year t914 saw the Empire ,Henguf. AfWN (rom the before the chtlngcs
newknlpak lamb's 111'001 introduced by the Young
shorn of almost all its European territory, and hlH, the uniform worn by l'uri..s Revolution. (Askeri
effectively reduced to Anatolia and the Arab pro- rndets seems ro be closer Aljj~,'Si, Isranbul)
to thlH of,he Ortomlln
\'inces. Not only were large numbers of Balkan
l\oluslims massacred in these wars but the now
shrunken Ottoman Empire had to absorb a massive Russia; but this was denied, and the Young Turks
influx of refugees fleeing \'arious spates of 'ethnic had to fall back on Germany. Russia's ambitions in
cleansing' by Greeks, Serbians, MOnlencgrans and eastern Anatolia were, howe\'er, opposed by the other
Bulgarians. During these bitter years the new 'nat- powers. Naturally they were seen by the Ottoman
ionalist' ideology of Pan-Turkism gained suppon gO\'ernment as the first steps towards the annexation
among the Turkish majority population of the of the eastern provinces. Ne\'ertheless, the Ottoman
Empire. Army gained \'aluable experience in these troubled
Immediately after the cat<istrophic Balkan Wars years, particularly in defence of the Libyan coast
the Ouoman government turned for suppon to against It<ilian naval att<ick - experience which was to
Britain and the other entente powers, France and be put to good effect at Gallipoli four years later.
s
 Army Reforms
During its decadent period in the 19th century, the
Ottoman Empire had often tried to reform its armed
forces by hiring European officers. At the time of the
Crimean War there had been strong French in-
fluence, but by the late 19th century the Army was
modelling itself almost entirely upon German lines.
This was largely the resull of a number of Gennan
military missions, chiefly those of Von der Goltz
(1886-1&)5) and Liman von Sanders (1913-1918).
Abdiilhamit II fnoured Gennan advisors and Ger-
man armaments for the simple reason that Germany
seemed to have fewer vested interests in the Middle
EaSt. The imporr:ance of these missions can hardly be
overestimated, especially in the education of a new
class of junior and middle ranking officers. both
Turkish and Arab, who would make their mark
during the First World War.
Sultan Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) had taken a
keen interest in his Annyand, in particular, had made
great efforts to make conscription fairer: all Muslim
males became eligible except those from the tra-
ditionally exempted areas of Istanbul, Albania, ajd
and I-lijaz in Arabia, Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya,
together with a number of nomad groups. Students in
higher education were also exempt for the term of
their studies. Muslim refugees from European perse-
cution now became an important source of educated
and highly motivated recruits. Under the new con-
Above: $cI"O:; Be)', CO of
'.'fth Arm)' Corps in
Ga/icia photognlphcd on
I ' September 1916.
Ottoman troops scm co
support the Germans lind
Austro-Hungurisln$ Oil the
fllstern from >l"erc
sOlllc/hing of an elire.
Thcirki/ >l"as, lit first, the
bcst II vIIi/lIb/e. (Askeri
Miizcsi, Istanbul)

Left: Turkish infantr),

awaiting the first Allied
landings on the GaJlipoli
peninsu/a.IUost still lI'car
rhe white summer
uniforms that "'ere being
phased out as the Grcat
War bcg:an. Equall}'
obvious is the lad: of
defensil'e trenches in this
sector.
6

scription system a man served only three years on
active duty, much less than in the past, followed by
six years in the ihtiyot active reseTve, ninc in the redif
inactive resen'c and two in the tnuslahfiz homc-
guard.
However, improvements to the Onoman Army
were morc obvious in the European than in the Asian
provinces, which rcm:lincd somewhat backward and
c,"en retrograde. Under the despotic rule of Sultan
Abdiilhamit II, energetic young officers were often
objects of suspicion. During the final years of
Abdiilhamit's reign reforms were neglected, and no
large military manoeuvres were held. Consequently
the Army lacked training and capable senior officers
until the revolution of 1909.
After II}09 increasingly urgent efforts were made
to modernize the Army and the Navy, and much new
equipment was ordered. A military advisory council
drew up new administrative systems and despite the
opposition of a conservative bureaucracy, the Army
reserves were reorganized. Medical and veterinary
services were created along with new training centres,
the most effective being those for NCOs and infantry
riflemen. More revolutionary were the new conscrip-
tion laws which declared for the first time that all the
sultan's subjects, including non-Muslims, were liable
for military service.
First Balkan War
Despite the Young Turks' best endeavours much of
the Anny had yet to be trained to use its new
equipment when four BaI.k:m st:ues turned on the
;.
OtfQm:1n infantr)' iVesuninSlcr DrolfOOns
encnmpcd at Uccrshcbn in .Museum Trust;
S()uthcrn Pll!csfine in phofQgrnph supplied by
October '9'7. Nr)lj: Ihe the Niltionlil Army
multi-rncifll nature ofthe Aluscum, London)
troops. (Cop)'righl
Ottoman Empire, prompting the First Balkan War of
1912-13. Despite minor success in regaining Edirne
in the Second Balkan War of 1913, the previous
o\'erwhelming defeat of Onoman anns made the case
for military reform indisputable. German officer
advisors were now given greater scope, the old
Imperial Arsenal in Istanbul was modernized and
new military factories established. I-Iundreds of
senior officers were retired, and replaced by younger,
German-trained men.
In December 191] the mOSt famous of all
German advisors arri\'ed in Istanbul - Liman von
Sanders, a member of a converted Prussian Jewish
family, and a man who was to prove his military skill
against the British in Gallipoli and Palestine. Von
Sanders and about 40 other Germans took service in
the Ouoman Army in the winter of 191]-14 to
further reorganize and reform the Sultan's troops,
but their efforts made little progress before the Great
War engulfed the region.
The outbreak of World War One
On 4 April 1914 Talat Pa~, Minister of the Interior,
said !.hat Turkey was like a man attacked by robbers
in a forest, Such a man, he said, would happily give
up his money, his goods, e"en his clothes if only his
life and perhaps his shirr was spared. Less than three
months later a Serbian terrorist gunned down an
7
 NeGs training with a large
.."OOden p-enade-throwing
ollapuit. Naval illS ..-dl as
tlrmy personnd appear in
another photograph taken
at the SliIme tinlc,
indicating that part ofthe
OHoman Na1'Y ,,'IU'
involw:d in coastal
defence. (Aslr.eri MiJ:u:si,
Ismnbul)

Austrian archduke in Bosnia and the world was when the Great War started. The British Admiralty's
driven towards the worst war it had yet known. On 1 seizure of these ships for the Royal Navy had a
August, even as the war clouds gathered, German devastating impact in Istanbul, even among pro-
and Ottoman representatives proposed rn:H the British groups. Within a few days two large German
Ottoman Empire muster an army of 120,000 men in warships, the cruisers Coden and Br~slau, arrived off
Thrace. rC2dy for a joint Ottoman-Bulgarian attack the Dardanelles seeking sanctuary from a pursuing
on southern Russia, with another force of 90,000 British fleet. They were permitlcd 10 enter Otloman
troops available a month laler. The following day waters where they were soon tr:tnsferred, by a
Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a secret fictitious sale, to thc Ottoman Navy, becoming the
alliance, though this did not commit the OUomans to baulecruiscr SlIllan Seti", Yavuz (normally short-
declaring immediate war on Germany's enemies. ened to Yavuz) and the light cruiser Midilli. Their
Acutely aware of its military weakness, the OUoman erews put on Ottoman uniform and their comman-
government remained neutral for se,'eral months der, Admiral Souchon, became head of the Ottoman
after the outbrC2k of war, the only member of the avy.
ruling 'Young Turk' triumvir:ue to favour action British \'essels patrolling offthe Dardanelles then
being Enver Pa~. A Turkish colonel was also sent to g:a\'e notiee that henceforth any warships venturing
Sofia to discuss:l possible pact with Bulg:aria ag:ainst a into the Aegean Se:a would be regarded as hostile.
feared Serbian-Greek alliance. The Ottoman Navy promptly closed the straits to
The narrow straits that linked the Aegean Sea to foreign shipping and laid further mines. Even so the
the Black Sea - the Dardanelles in the south and the Ottoman Empire remained neutral, until 29 October
Bosphorus in the north - were among the most 1914, when the Yavuz. Midi/li and other Ottoman
strategically important waterways in the world. They warships suddenly opened fire on Russian naval bases
also led directly to the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. in the Black Sea.
lot surprisingly, the Ottoman I avy laid a minefield Though it is unlikely that the Ottoman Empirc's
to prOtect the Dardanelles as earlY:ls 3 August. strategically important position would have allowed
For sever:tl years the Ottoman go\'ernmenl had it to remain neutral for long, the re:asons for the att:lCk
been m:lking efforts to strengthen the ill-equipped on Russia are still a matter of debate. The main
and outgunned Ouom:ln 'avy. Two modern battle- responsibility lay with Enver Pa~a, supported by a
ships, the Sultan Osman I and the R~sadjye partly pro-German faction within the ruling Committee of
paid for by public subscriptions, had been ordered Union and Progress. But it is not e"en certain that the
from British shipyards and were nearing completion Germans wanted such precipitate action by a mili-
8
tarily weak ally at such an early point in the war. In
the end the bombardmems were made on the
authority of Enver Pa$a as Minister of War, without
the knowledge or consent of the Sultan's Grand
Vizier and most other government ministers. Yet
doubts remained almost to the last moment.
The German crews of the Yavuz (Coden) and
A1idjl/i (8m/au) would naturally do what they were
ordered, but would Turkish laval officers, many of
whom had been trained by the British, take such
controversial orders from a German admiral? On 29
October 1914the die was cast and the Ottoman I avy
shelled se\'eral Russian Black Sea ports, following an
almost certainly false claim that a Russian ship had
been caught trying to mine the entrance to the
Bosphorus. On 2 'ovember, Russia declared war on
the Ottoman Empire, followed three days later by
Brirain and France. Even before this, British ships
had sunk an Ouoman minelayer in the Gulf of Izmir
and bombarded Aqaba in the Red Sea. The shelling
of the Dardanelles fortresses by an Angl~Freneh
fleet on 3 November merely confirmed that the
Ottomans were now at war with the world's three
largest empires.
A conference on I August between Ottoman and
German representativcs had proposed that the On~
mans adopt a strictly defensive posture toward the
Russians on the Caucasus from while seizing naval
domination of the Black Sea. But all such plans were
It Turkish$(}ldicronguurd AnRlQJian peasants sin« at
academic while the positions of Bulgaria and in the snow ofthe Easrern leasr the 6th century. lIS
Romania remained undecided. Meanwhile Front, Galicia 19,6. He ...el/ lIS large fur ove....
Germany's Austr~Hungarian allies got into diffic- wears the huge shuUY fur boots. (Askeri lUiizcsi,
coat used by ellstern Istanbul)
ulty on the Galician from and requested an urgem
Ottoman seaborne invasion of the Ukraine to divert the hands of Envcr, Talat and Cerna!. Enver Pa$a ran
the Russians. The German High Command, how- the Ottoman war effort almost single-handedly as a
ever, preferred an Ottoman strike against the Suez military dictator; Cernal Pa$a took comrol of Syria
Canal to disrupt Britain's communications with its and became its effective ruler; and Talat Pa$a
Indian Empire. The Germans also promised the concentrated on civil maners in the capital. Pro-
Ottomans huge territories in the Russian-ruled vincial governors ran their regions with differing
Caucasus and Cemral Asia, not (0 mention neutral degrees of autonomy and apparently differing en-
Iran. In the event the plan to attack the Suez Canal thusiasm for the war. In Izmir, for example, Rahmi
won the day and the invasion of the Ukraine was Bey behaved almost as if his pro\!ince was a neutral
called off. zone between the warring states.
The outbreali: of war was greeted in Istanbul with Finally, of course, the entire Ottoman state was
deep gloom. Cavit Pa$a, one of four ministers to defeated in 1918. This effectively signalled the end of
resign in disgust at their country's entry into the war, the ancient Ottoman Empire though its last \'estiges
declared: 'I t will be our ruin -even ifwe win.' For the were not buried until the declaration of the Turkish
remainder of the war, real power was rosray locked in Republic in 1923.

CHRONOLOGY
The Ottoman Army fought on scveral fronts during
the First World War. Events in one region naturally
affected those elsewhere, but poor communications
within the Empire meant that the Turks were often
fighting three or four separate wars.
19 14
2 Aug. Ottoman-German treaty of alliance.
I I Aug. German warships Gotbm & Brtslou reach
Turkey.
September Russia seizes control of nonh-west
Inn.
26 Sept. Britain declares Ottoman warships out-
side the D:udanclles hostile.
28-9 Oct. Ouom:m 2\'Y bombards Russian b2SCS
in Black Sea.
November British Navy bombards Yemen coast.
I Nov. Russian troops invade eastern Turkey.
2-5 Noy. Russia, Britain & France dcdare war on
Ottoman Empire.
q. 'ov. Sultan declares Jihad against Russia,
Britain & France.
22. av. British occupy 8251"2 in southern Iraq.
30 Nov. Ottomans invade British-occupied Egypt.
Deeember Ouoman offensive against Russians on
Caucasus front results in disaster.
Winter 1914-15 Britain occupies Aegean islands
outside Dardanelles. . & Armenians.
10
19 15
January Ouomans enter Tahriz in north-west Iran
after Russian withdrawal & attempt to
take oil-fields in south-west Iran.
2-3 Feb. Ouoman auempt to cross Suez Canal
fails.
19 Feb. Allied (British & French) Navies bom-
bard Dardanelles.
" Mar. Allied marine landing on GaJlipoli Penin-
sula driven off.
18 Mar. Allied (British & French) lavies auempt
to break through Dardanelles, driven off
with heavy loss.
28 Mar. Russian Navy bombards Turkish pons in
Black Sea, further bombardments later in
year. Ottoman forces in Yemen inVlide
British-ruled Aden Protectorate.
April Armenian rebels seize Van in eastern
Anatolia, British occupy oil-fields in
south-west Iran.
Allied landings on Gallipoli Peninsula &
Asiatic shore of Dardanelles.
May Russian ad\tancc in eastern Anatolia
reaches Lake Van, reoccupy north-west
Iran. British begin advance up Tigris in
Iraq.
July Ottomans defeat British force outside
Aden.
August Ottoman forces retake Van from Russians
Flag Tllwal$ ceremony af
Mwina in the Hijaz, '9'7.
The long ribbons being
riw to the top ortheflag-
pole represenr plJantry
aWJfrds given to the unir liS
a whole. (Askcri MUzesi,
Istanbul)
GJvalry recruited from the
Turkish parts ofthe
Ottom.lln Empire riding
through Tkersheba on
their ....y to the southCfTI
Palestine front in April
'9'7. The men "'car
assortedkabalak hats
"'hile theirofticer has an
aJrO€ether fincr unifOnD.
But all ride small horses or
ponies. (Imperial War
M~um Q;~744)

6 Aug. Additional Allied landings on Gallipoli
Peninsula.
29 Sept. British occupy Kut in Iraq.
22-25 Nov. Ottomans defeat British at battle of
Ctesiphon in Iraq, British retreat towards
Kut.
7 Dec. Ottomans besiege British in Kul.
19 16
8 Jan. Final Allied withdra.....al from GallipoLi
Peninsula.
14 Jan. Sun of large Russian offensive on Cauca-
sus front.
15 Feb. Fall of Erzerum to Russians.
18 Apr. Russians seize Trabzon on Black Sea
coast.
29 Apr. British surrender at Kut.
6May Ottoman combined operation retakes
Uzun island in Aegean from British.
May-June Ottoman counter-Qffensive in eastern
Anatolia.
27 Jun. Arab Revolt against Ottoman Empire
proclaimed in western Arabia.
July Renewed Russian offensive in eastern
Anatolia.
August Small Ottoman counter-Qffensive in east-
ern Anatolia.
4 Aug. Ottoman thrust aeross Sinai Pensinula
defeated at Romani.
Summer Ottoman Expeditionary Force is sent to
help Germans, Austr()-Hungarians &
Bulgarians in the Balkans & on the East-
ern Front.
18 Sept. & 3 Nov. Ottoman naval raids agamst
Greek. 'pirate' islands off Aegean &
Mediterranean coasts.
1917
Winter Outbreak of typhus on Caucasus front.
25 Feb. British retake Kut in Iraq.
March Russian Revolution, Russian Army ceases
offensive operations.
10-11 Mar. British occupy Baghdad.
26---'27 Mar. Ottomans defeat British at First Battle
ofGaza.
April Russian Army starts retreat from eastern
Anatolia.
19 Apr. Ottomans defeaf British at Second Battle
ofGaza.
25 Jun. Last Ottoman-Russian naval clash in the
Black Sea.
Summer Creation of new Y.ldmm Army intended
to reconquer Iraq from British.
6 Sep. Huge explosion in Istanbul destroys
much ofYlldlTlm Army's equipment.
31 Oct. British defeat Ottomans at Third Battle of
Gaza.
December Ottoman & German naval blockade
imposed on Russian Black Sea coast.
8 Dec. British occupy Jerusalem.
18 Dec. Ceasefire agreed between Ottomans &
newly independent TranscauC2sian Re-
public (Armenia, Azarbayjan & Georgia).
28 Dec. Armistice signed at Brcst-Litovsk ends
fighting between Ottoman & Russian
forces.
11

19 18
20 Jan. urge Ottoman navOII r.lid mto Aegean
from Dardanelles.
:11 feb. British occupy Jericho.
26-31 Mar. Ottomans defeat British in first Battle
of Amman.
26 Apr. Ottomans retakc Kars on Caucasus front.
30 Apr-3 May. Ottomans defeat British in Second
Battle of Amman.
May-June Transcaucasian Republic fragmcnts
into three states (Armenia, Georgia,
Azarbayjan)
28Jun. Death of Sultan Mehmct V, succeeded by
MehmCI VI.
August British occupy Baku oil-fields on Caspian
coast.
14 Sep. Onomans & Azarbayjan forces drive Brit-
ish from Baku oil-fields.
17 Scpo Troops of Arab Revoh scvcr Ottoman
communications on Palestine front.
19 Sep. British break through Ottoman front in
Palestine.
1 Ocl. Troops ofArab Revoh occupy Damascus.
25 Oct. British occupy Aleppo.
30 Oct. Ottoman government signs Armistice
with Allies at Mudros. Followed by
occupation of most of Anatolia & Thr.lce
by British, French, Italian & Greek
forces.
12
Ottom/In ArnbCHvalryon
thcir WRy to R military
rel'icw in Damascus, April
191].OthcrphQtogruphs
tnkcn on rhc samc (J(Xasion
show rhrlf rhc)' wcre"
ru:c:omprlnicd by a
'dcrvish' band. (Imperial
War Museum Qlo]p6)
19 19
January Ottoman garrison in Medin.a fin..aJly sur-
renders to forces of Ar.lb Revolt.
April Beginning of Turkish 'War of Liber.ltion'
against Allied armies of occupation in
Anatolia.
THE ARMY
The OUoman Army was mobilized in August 1914,
immcdiately after war broke out in Europe, and three
Armics were cstablished. The First and Second were
based west and east of the capital Istanbul, while the
Third faced the Russian frontier in the Caucasus. In
November '914, after the Ottomans entered the war,
a Fourth Army was crcated in Syria. A Fifth Army
was cstablishcd in the spring of '9'5 to defend the
southern approaches to Istanbul; and the Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Armics were set up
during the course of the conflict.
The scalc of mobilization was very large in
proportion to the size of the Ottoman Empire's
population. Losses, too, were high compared to other
statcs-some 4,500,000 Turks alone dying during the
conflict from war-action, disease, st2r\'ation and
massacre. E"en before entering the war there was a
massive call-up of reserves which put a great strain on
resources. The harvest was severely disrupted and
this caused a ncar famine. Ne\'ertheless several new
Armies were established following massive troop
movements across huge distances; the 6th Army
Corps ncar Aleppo in Syria, for example, joining the
First Army outside Istanbul.
Foreign observers were impressed by the quality
of the First Army outside the capital although more
distant Armies had lower efficiency with some infan-
try companies consisting of no more than 20 ill-
equipped men. The First Army was based in the
remnants of the Empire's European provinces (East-
ern Thrace), the Second on the Asiatic side of the
Bosphorus, nOt far from Isunbul, and the Third at
Erzerum in eastern Turkey, By the end of the war
nine numbered armies were in existence throughout
the Empire. plus the special Yddlnm Army and
several separate corps serving in Europe. The large
number of these armies W:l:S criticized by German
ad\'isors who believed they required too many staff
Ottoman Turldsh field The reMr-I'ielf' orthe
and support facilities which could have been better arrillery on rhe Gallipoli kabalak orthe man on the
used:lt the front. rront in '9t5. ThelQIJdcrs ri,hr sholf"5 how the clod!
collar has the Arabic co,'cringorthis headgear
During the months of Ottoman neutrality Tur- number; (a small V) was normally lfv~lnd.
kish W:l:f :lims changed significa.ntly, the westwud indicating his regiment, (Askcri Muzcs;, lsranbul)
:lmbitions being abandoned in fnour oflibcrating of
the Muslim-Turkish peoples of the Cauca.sus and ing. Onl}' in the summer of 1917, with the proposed
Centr.11 Asi:l: from Armenian and Russi:ln domin- Yldlflm camp2ign, were these southern fronts uken
ation. More immediately, Enver Pa~'s first plan was seriously, but by then it was too latc.
a compromise between Ottom:l:n 2nd Germ2n prior-
itics, with the pre-emptive strike 2gainst the Russian Morale
Black Sea fleet followed by defensivc operations in Amazingly, the morale of what cven the most
the Cauca.sus and 2n offensive against the British- sympathetic modern military historian has called the
held Suez Canal while the bulk of the Army stood 'rugged hut gimcrack Ottoman Army' remaincd high
ready for possible aclion in the Ukr2ine. almost to the end. Thc dedica.tion of Turkish units
Soon, the drcam of liberating eastern Turkish like the 57th Infantry Regiment, whieh was almost
peoples developed into an obsession. Enver drew up wiped out while stopping an Australian advance from
an extraordinary plan for a winter offensive against ANZAC Cove during the Gallipoli campaign, is
Russian forces in the Caucasus, a plan that Liman known, but not widely. Whal is Icss remembered is
von Sanders considered impossible and which ended
in disaster in January 1915" The defeat deprived the
Ottomans of reserves of trained troops badly needed
on other fronts. Such Pan-Turkish dreams diverted
attention away from the Ottoman Empire's Arab
provinces and evcntually ca.used the Empire's undo-
Turkish officers captured officcrs ha l'e disti"ctiw'
by the 5th Auslralia" Light hats !hat lool.· like deep-sea
Horse during the rail or fishermen s 'soU'lf·cstcr:s'.
Damascus, JO St'prembcr (Imperial War Museum
1916. Mosr If"nlr the lambs QUJ5J)
rur kalpak but nnj ClH"alry

Il
 ()(ll'111.111 \nll~ (h~.llll ....lIl"ll IlJr~ IIJIS

0... Loarjon AjrSupt-T

GHQ.
19 14 Istanbul
19 15 Istanbul
19 16 Ig:anbul

19 17 Istanbul
19 18 Istanbul
Finn Anny
19 14 10= FOl'1I'ltd 5 Aug. 19'4
19' S Wtilern iho~ OfSlrailS
11),6 Thratc:
'9 1 7 Th",tc: znd Na ...1Sq. &: Gern\lln ",""plane uni! 1\"0 Corps liCnllO norlhern S)'ria;
(as Slraits IXfeocc: Comnu.nd) therafter link morcc lhan 'name-pl.le'
Thraee ~noJ Na.-al Sq. &: German Kaplan\" unil LillIe more than 'name-pia Ie'
(as Slr.lilS IXfcna: Command) Disban<kd 17 Feb. 1918
Reformed 1.4 Scpc. 1918
Disban<kd II Oct. 19,8

Fonnal 5 Alii, '9L.

Disbanded ,8N"... ")'4
Reformed 5 Dco;. '9'4
Eastern ihoraofStraiIS
Soulh<aslern Anaullia loth Sq. (from Alii.) Mon:d elSl Ap.-Aug. combined ..-ilh
Jrd Ami}' IS Caucasus Army Group
SClIlIh-c:aslall Analolia, Q'lO\"«! elSl ,oth Sq. Part of CaUCII"US Arm)' Group (one
afltt Russian Ruolulion Corps !"C'!\Irnc:d 10 Istanbul, rf5I of Ihis
Cor""altaehed 10Sixth Arm,.)
CauaSU5 &: norlh-"'tsl Iran 71h Sq.• 8th Sq., ,Oth Sq., Imh Sq., Pan ofCaua....... Army Group (onl)'
lnl N..,.l Sq. &: 171h Sq. (name-plale $C'-en ban. lions).
only) Di~banded 15 Dec:. 1918
Third Army
11)14 Nonh-tllSl AnOloli. Formed 5 Aug. '9'4
1St Exped. Force sem 10 norlh-IO·tslcrn
Iran late '9'4
1915 Norlh-nSl Analolia 51h F..llped. Iioo:e sent 10 soulh-easl
Annolia earl)' 1915
1916 Nonh-<ul Analolia 71h Sq. &: 8th Sq. (namc:-plaleonly) Combined ..-ilh Second Army as
Cauo;aa... Army Group
.•.I
19'
Unlnl &< north-c:asl A...loIia
Nonh-<ul Anatola..loGcorFa
ph Sq. &: 8th Sq.
(I« under Seoond Anny)
Part ofCaua~usArmy Group
Pm ofCauaosus Arm~' Group
(Bo.rum) &: Aurbaypn (Bolli) IlTl'JIIlar Wid)' Azeri 'Islamic
Army' altadlcd.
~ 15 NO\'. 1918
N~ThirdAnny beina formed in '51h Sq.
Thraa:. Sooft' only, '~le'
Fourth Army
1914 S)"ria. Palalint &< Arabia (Hiju&< Formcd7!kPC·19'4
Ytrntn) SlIQ Canal Expecl. Formed lale 19'4
19' 5 S)'ria, P.le5line &< Anbia (Hijaz&< Part of Canal Erpc:d. Force 10 Gallipoti
Ycmtn) arl)' 1915 Hiju Exped.
'9,6 Cilicia, S)'ria, Paleslin\" &: .o\nbia 41h Sq., Jrd Sq. &: JOQlh Pa~ Southern put ofHiju. Expcd. Foret
(German) Sq. "'ithdl'lllO'n imo Madina May (rccmain
to Jan, '9'9), nonhern pari in
nQl'\hern Hiiu &: $(lutll/:rn Jordan
(unlil '9,8). Sennlh Corps (in Asir,
Yernt:n &: Aden) i§olalCd (rom Fourlh
Army aflu Al'lIb Revoll.
1917 Cilicia, Syria, Pakstinc: &: A",bia Danu.scus Aircraft Park, Jrd Sq., 4th Disbanded 16 Sepl. '917
Sq., '41h Sq., JOOIh, JOIA. Joznd, Sevenlh Corps (in Asir. Ytrntn &<
lOyd &: lCl.flh ~ (Gn-man) Sqs. Adm) isolated from Founh Army

that a regiment of Arab reinforcements then drove
the Australians back to the coast. Only later in the war
did the morale of such non-Turkish units decline
with the spread of the Arab Re\'olt. Victory in the
GaUipoli campaign also boosted morale, this being
the firsl time in li\'ingmemory thai an Otloman Army
had defeated a major European power.
As Mustafa Kemal Ataturk laler wrote, the
greatest monument (0 such successes was the
Mdmel(ik himself - the affectionate nickname given
 0.« I-O.:"t;01I AirSupporr Commcnt...
Fif,h Arm)'
19 15 Slrll'lS (lJoiphoru' & I)nd.Ml1l$) 'Si Sq. (from Jul),)
19 16 Slro,lS (lklsphoru, & I)...bndle'§), .nd lSI Sq., 6th Sq_, 5th Sq. & tSI N.,·.I
"-e'§lem An.,ol" Sq.
We'§tCTn & SOUlh.,,<'SICTII Ana,oIi., & lSI Sq., 6th Sq., 5th Sq., 11th Sq. &
Cilicia 1M NlI."&I Sq. Only rilht "'cok di.-wons
SlrailS (Bmphorus & Dnd.ncUe'§). .nd 1st Sq., W. Sq., 3th Sq., 12th Sq., 1st Disbanded 11 No... 1918
"-o;tCTII Anatalia 1'1.'"'11 Sq., & lSI:, 2nd, Jrd Bolloon
S«<....
Sixlh Ann)'
'9'5 Iraq Formed 5 Sep'. 1915 from unilS
Ilrcad)' in lnoq
"16 lroq 2nd Sq. & I1lh (bier rnlIlOCd '3Ih) Mowl Group formed Jul)' to COUnter
Sq. RuSiion mrelilo Mosul
I'll Ccn'ral&nonhcmlnq Ibghcbd Aircrafl Pork (IOO\"N 10 Sc:paratc Euphr:IlCI & TiFis Groups
Samarn & bier MowIl, Ind Sq.. luh formed bc:ause of dillku.11
Sq.. IJlh Sq. & 1St Balloon Sq. (non- oommUNo:alionJ
opmIrionIl)
"18 Nonhern Iraq M05U1 AilUlfi Port., 2nd & IJlh Sq. Still """ttl )In, 19"
Sc:"enth Arm)·
1"1 G1icio Formed 11 AlIJ. 1911. Inlcnckd fOif
Inq fronl, di,-cnnllo Pak:$tinc
"18 P.lcIline & S}'rio (see ur>dCT Ytld1rltt'l Anny Group) Unda- Ylldlnm Ann)'Group
t'OOUIUnd, Disbanded IJ N~. 1918
Eilhth Ann)'
1'16 Pak:$tine Formed 2 Oa. "16{doIC 1lftC'I:fUin)
I'll Pak:$tine
1'18 Palc:Rinc&S)rio (I« under Ylldlnm Anny Group) Indudinl GnTnan Mia Corps
UIMJa Ylld.nm Anny Group
oonunand. Disbondnl 1-4 N~. "18)
Ninth Anny
1818 &Ibns Formed 'June 1'18 (flall>l>pbl~only)
incorponoli.. Rumeli Field
Dmchmmt (I« European Franu)
51ill nisIN Jan. 1'19
Ylld,r,m Arm)' Group
1'17 Northern S)rio & nonhcTn Iraq Slalffonnnl Ql"ly 1'17 (Ihromically
inwtjHK.1inl Fourlh, Sc:"mlh &
Eilhlh Annica. Ind German Asia

3rd Sq.,.fth Sq., 14th Sq. & JOOlh,

301Sl, j02nd, JOJrd. J04lh, J051h
(rnunc..pblc only) PliP Sqs.• Ind
"""'"
Inrorpuruillf Ammon Expnl. FOf"c:e
(fomKd Mlrch incorponlillf 1\1o'.n
Expnl. FOf"c:e pre~iousI)' rtprdtd 15
Gcnnon JISlI IF pari ulHijn t:xptd.. Fora)
European Front":
Rumdi Field r>.:1""hment l71th Inf. R"l' only
''I' 5 Throce Formc:d Jo'c '915
'9,6 W(Slern Mo«donio Sent 10 Ililol~ corl)' 19,6
1917 \\'alern Mo«doni~
1918 We'§lcrn Mo«doni~ lororporotcd imo N,mh AmlY earl)'
'9 18
61h Army Corps Three Dj,-isions
'9,6 G~lici. Undcr comn"nd ofGcrman Gen_ Von
Mackcnsc:n
'9'7 G.lici.
",8 G.lici.
151h Army Corp"
'9,6 WllIlKhi.& Dobruj~
'ljl1 WlIlIKhi~ & Dubruja
wth Army Corp" T,,-o Di.-isi~
"'1 F..as,crn ~hc:edoni~ AUlched to Ilulg.ri.n 2nd Army on
Suumo fronl

to the bra \'e but unpretentious Turkish infantryman,
The courage of A1~ltm~/(ik was recognized by allies
and foes alike. In the Middle East, where the Arab
peoples have little reason to be nostalgic about
Onoman rule, the Turkish soldieroflhe Great War is
still remembefed as Abu Shuja'a, the 'Father of
Courage', while his British opponent is remembered
as Abu AifAfiJfah, the 'Father ofa Thousand Guns',
On the other hand most observers recognized that the
uneducated Onoman ordinary soldier was lost with-
IS
out good leadership and that any breakdown of some senior commanders. Fahri Pa~a, the Ottoman
command weakened his morale. At Gallipoli leaders Commander in the Muslim Holy Cily of Medina for
like Mustafa Kemal understood the capabilities of example, had becn CUI off from support for years and
such troops when well commanded by officers who only surrendered in 1919 after receiving specific
led by personal example. There were many examples orders from the Ouoman sultan. He then left his
of silent pre-dawn attacks in which officers with sword on the Prophet Muhammad's grave and
drawn swords wen! ahead of men who were ordered retired as a hero to Turk.ish Muslims. Throughout
[0 charge only when they saw their officers raise their the Ottoman Army Muslim imams served much as
whips and only to shout their banle-cry of Allahu Christian chaplains did in European armies. They are
Akbar when they had actually reached the enemy's recorded reading the Qur'an 10 soldiers as they served
trenches. The close relationship between officers and their guns under na,·al bombardment al Gallipoli and
men was, however, gradually undermined. By the later reportedly took. over the leadership of some
end of 1917 a frequent reshuffling of Armies, the
bre2.L:ing up and re-forming of units, meant that
officers hardly knew their men, let alone had time to
earn their respect.
Not surprisingly Arab units were the first to show
signs of decay. Turkish (essentially anti-Arab) na-
tionalism grew quickly within the Ottoman Army
and had undermined the morale of many Arab
officers e,·en before the war began. According to
Liman ,'on Sanders the Arab was JUSt as good a
soldier as the Turk - when treated fairly - but by
t917 this was no longer the casco By 1918 most Arab
troops were held back as an unreliable reserve.

Islam
Competing nationalisms may have influenced the
Ottoman Army's officer corps but it was the Muslim
faith which underpinned the morafe of the ordinary
Ottoman soldier. It also had a powerful influence on

/tool'C: Turkish anti-

-. .-
.
airernn gun camouflaged
to 'OQ'" /ikc II smll// bush.
Thc offiecrs in from
include bf}/h Turks and
Germans. (Cross &
CocliRde lntcrmuional)

Gunners with a tOS mm

howirzcr, in action /918.
Thc gun was II standard
Germ/III field piece. White
uniforms In~reofrcn lI"orn
by artillcr)'mcn in hot
M'cluhcr, but less usual arc
the mcn S Slllldals. Once
spin their officer M'ears II
quite distinctil·c uniform.
(Imperial War,Uuseum
Qsnp)
16
infantry platoons after all the officers had been killed.
The Bektasi dervish organization had a particularly
close connection with the Ottoman Army that went
right back to the founding of the state. Supposedly
suppressed in 1826, it had enjoyed a revh'al in the
early 20th century and during the Great War played
its traditional religious role, supporting the men's
morale. Being regarded by Europeans as the most
reformist of such dervish 'sects', the Bekusi went on
to support Mustafa Kemal's Turkish Nationalists
against the Ottoman Sulun after the war. Volunteer
military units were also recruited from other dervish
sects such as the Mevle\'i (Whirling Dervishes) and
the Qadariya (Faulist) orders.
Morale was one thing, standards of training quite
another, and it was clear that these \'2ried between
Armies in different parts of the Empire. In Gallipoli
Ottoman marksmanship, particularly that of sharp-
shooters, was generally superior to that of the
invaders. Standards declined considerably towards
the end of the war but even as late as April and May
1918, in what is now Jordan, pony-mounted Turkish
cavalr}' succeeded in driving back larger numbers of
superbly mounted troopers from the Australian
Mounted Division.
To compound these problems, the lure of east-
ward expansion led 10 some extraordinary schemes in
the War Ministry back in Istanbul. One of Enver
,\lachine gunners in action,
Palestine front. The
officers ha\"C~ pc)' collars
on their tunics while the
mcn's uniforms carry no
distinguishing marJ.:s.
(Imperial War Museum
Qs664,)
Pa~a's more fanciful plans was to send three regi-
ments through nemrallran to slir up an anti-British
revoir in India. In 1917, as British pressure mounted
in both Iraq and Palestine, Turkish officers were still
being offered promolion and increased pay if they
volunteered for service on the Caucasus front. E\'en
as late as 1918, in the very closing stages of the war,
Turkish trOOps and senior officers were still being
withdrawn from Syria to reinforce a thrust through
the Caucasus. Meanwhile entire battalions of unwil-
ling Arab conscripts were deserting before they e\'en
reached the fronts. The Onoman High Command's
decision to send many of its best units to various
European fronts was, however, a purely political
decision to show solidarity with Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria. Liman \·on Sanders consi-
dered it correct to send such troops against Romania,
which could ha\'e threatened Ottoman Thrace, but a
mistake to send others to Galicia or to the Bulgarian
front in nonhern Greece.
Desertion
By 1918 desertion had become a serious problem. At
the beginning of the war many Armenian soldiers
deserted to the Russians, and then re-enlisted as
fanatically anti-Turkish volunteers. As a result most
of the remaining Armenian troops in the Ottoman
Army were disarmed and converted into poorly fed,
17
 • Section from
harshly treated labour batulions. Troops of Arab
origin were me next to start deserting in some
numbers, but by late 1917 when rations on the
Caucasus, Syrian and -Iraqi fronts had deteriorated to
almost below subsistence level, even Turks were
doing so. Frequem amnesties were announced from
the Sultan's palace in attempts to bring troops back to
the I1inks, much to the disgust of German advisors
who argued in favour of salutary executions to
discouI1ige further desertion.
Even in 1914some Ottoman Armies had not been
up to full strength and as the WOlr dragged on several
of those in quiet areas were reduced to little more
than 'number-plates'. The Fifth Army in western
Anatolia had, after the end of the GOllLipoli campaign,
only about one-mird of its proper artillery, virtually
no transport, and almost no machine-guns; some of
its troops e\'en lacked rifles. By 1917 most military
foonations were only at one-fifth paper strength, and
even me best units were losing half their new recruits
mrough desertion or sickness before they reached
their regiments. Most of the remaining troops wetC
raw recruits conscripted as young as 16 years of age.
In isolated locations such as the scattered garrisons
defending the Hijaz I1iilways, however, numbers
were actually above the official strengths as 'unlisted',
unpaid stI1igglers were attI1icted by the chance of
food.
The morale of the civilian population, parti-
cularly in Istanbul, endured remarkably well. Every
student of modern Turkish history knows how
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk forced 'modernization' and
'Westernization' on his people after the First World
WOlf. Yet the war irselfhad already seen considerable
libeI1iJization. These were most obvious in the role of
18
II mounred
mllch;n~undetachment
;n action II t B«rsheba.
Such units up;n rcflC1:ted
the morc mobile charllcter
ofthe GraH War in the
Middle East. (CoPJright
lVesuninstcr DrIlgoons
Museum Trust;
photograph supplied by
the Natiomll Army
Museum, London)
women and, unlike some ideas subsequently forced
on the people by Atatiirk, this earlier relaxation
geneI1illy remained within Islamic codes of
behaviour. During the war, for example, many
Turkish women in Istanbul discarded the veil in
public - to the horror of ultI1i-traditionalists. Yet
mey almost invariably retained the headscarf, this
being all that the Prophet Muhammad had originally
insisted upon. More importantly, Ottoman women
played a prominent role in offices, factories, relief and
medical work just as women did in other countries
caught up in the Great War.
UNIFORMS
AND EQUIPMENT
One of the most visible results of the Young Turk
Revolution of I~ was in Ottoman Army uni-
forms, although these reforms took seveI1i1 years to
complete. During the previous hundred years the
Ottoman Empire had often tried to modernize the
appearance as wen as the organization of its armed
forces. At the time of the Crimean War there had
been a strong French influence but by the late 19th
century the Army was modelling itsclfalmost entirely
upon German fashions.
A basic khaki uniform was introduced in 11)09 to
replace the old dark blue, although mese remained
for an officer's full-dress uniform. The red larhush or
'fez' with its dark blue taSsel, the tI1idemark of the
Turkish soldier for almost Ol century, "i'as replaced by
the /tuba/alt. This unique form of military headgear
consisted of a long c10m wound around a wickerwork
base and resembling a solar topee or sun-helmer. The On campaign equipmenl could often not be
kabo/d had apparently been devised by Enver Pa~a replaced so that soldiers were secn with their feet
himself and was often known as an Enveri)'e. Officers bound in cloth and their worn leather equipment held
wore the sheepskin ka/pok but this was normally together with string. During the appalling weather of
replaced by a kob%k on active service. Later in !.he Nm'embcr '9'5 Ottoman troops at GaUipoli were
war a simplified form of kabo/ok was introduced for also supplied with a strange assortment of warm
officers, with a plain khaki covering and a single strip clothing donated by the people of Istanbul, including
of cloth wound once around the helmet. Troops of unsuitably fashionable underwear and gentlemen's
Arab origin generally wore their traditional kufi),o lightweight shoes. Footwear was to become a real
headcloths. problem for the Olloman Army and by the summer
The quality of uniforms worn by officers and of t9'7 eycn some officcrs had not got proper boots.
other ranks seems to have differed el'en more in the On the other hand certain details of insignia had a
Ottoman Anny than elscwhere. M:my officers, parti-
cularly those of senior rank, had their dress as well as
!.heir personal weapons made in Germany. Some
ordinary soldiers' kit was also manufactured by the
Ottoman Empire's central Europe:m allies but the
bulk of uniforms sccm to hne been made in Turkey
itself. Towards the end of the war the quality ofthcse
ranged from moderately good to simply appalling.
Colours as well as quality of cloth varied consider-
ably. The same applied to boots and other leather
Items.
" unit ofmcvlavi dervish IIlongdouble-billded axe,
,·oluntet.,rs in ISfanbul, a weapon associared with
t9t5. They IJrc led by thc Ouoman Empire's
drummers IJnd are fllnlQusjaniSSSlry infll.ntry
distinguished by II special and sriJl uM:d as a mart of
form offJat-roppcd cap nmt by dervish 'Volunteer
with a smlllJ turblln 'ot-ound units during World lV.lIIr
llroundit.Oneofthemen One, (AsKeri Miizesi,
standing guard also carries Isranbul)
 cated by the number of pips and the degree of
bf3iding on shoulder-boards; NCO ranks by simple
stripes around the sleeve.
At about the same time as the simpler form of
officer's kabalok was being introduced for the Army,
the Ouoman Navy brought in new headgear reflect-
ing German influence. This was essentially a normal
European naval ap, but it lacked a peak in deference
to Islamic tradition, so that a man might touch his
forehead to the ground while making his salOL or
ritual prayer without removing his hat. This was an
extremely importam consideration: only a few years
later Turkey's fanarial1y secular new lcader, Kemal
Atariirk, insisted that men wcar European peaked
'flat caps' as a direct challenge to Islamic tradition - a
large number of people were killed in the ensuing
nots.

The CallCll$ll$ front in hIlS his slain f.ther's rifk
'9'7. A sr.l1'otIicrr is .nd his medal. (Askeri
pholopllphed with a 1m- Milzesi, Istanbul)
)-cu-oJd boy soldier who
long pedigree and an still be seen in the Turkish
Army of today. Br:mches ofservice were indicated by
coloured collars for officers, collar patches for other
ranks, repeated in the edging of officers' kalabak
covering; infantry - olive green, machine--gun com-
panies - grass green, avalry - ligh.t grey, artillery-
dark blue, engineers - mid-blue, railway troops- sky
blue, gendarmerie - scarlet. In 1915 the Ottoman Air
Service was sepaf3ted from the Engineers and
changed from blue collar patches to red. Officer and
warf3nt-offieer ranks were, as in most armies, indi-
Logistics
The Ottoman Empire was ill-prepared for a pr~
longed war effort, with almost no munitions indus-
tries ofits own. Huge armies and their material would
have to be mo\'ed along tarth roads, tracks and
incomplete single-line railways O\'er vast distances
through exceptionally difficult terrain and extreme
climatic conditions. The Ottoman Armies remained
hcavily dependem on supplies from their German
and Austr~Hungarian allies throughout the war.
Stockpiles of munitions had largely been used up
during the Balkan Wars; in 1914 the most pressing
shortages were of artillery shells and naval mines.
Within a few days of signing the secret treaty with
Germany, Enver Pa~ told his new allies that he
needed 500,000 shells and 2.00,000 rifles, Late August
and carly September saw further requests for 200
mines, then howitzers, trucks, electrical equipment,
tools, uniforms, boots, blankets and canned food,
Only a fraction of this materiel arrived before the
Ottoman Empire entered the war, whereupon ship-
ments through neutral Bulgaria and Romania became
almost impossible. Once Bulgaria joined the German
alliance, followed by the conquest of Serbia and
Romania however, the shipment of supplies became

Turl&ish nservisls ~inK reillSOn:M ble equiprncnr

ad/ed ro the cololJT$ in
AntHOJi:M, Af:Mrch '9'7. The
OrrorniIUI tinny was .bJe to
provide irs reservisrs with
20
./rnosr to the end ofthe
Greiff W.r. (Imperi:MI W:Mr
Museum, Q60J~J)
easier. Germany, and to a lesser extent Austria- swords, though these were not generally carried in
Hungary, began sending vitally nceded guns, ammu- action, and they generally purchased their own
nition, communications equipment, aircraft and pistols of European commercial design. The infantry
other high-technology items. They also had to supply rifle was the Turkish Mauser, ofeither Modell8<)J or
coal after the Russian fleet disrupted seaborne Modcll903 (for short'M.I&}3' or 'M.I903'). Later
supplies from the Ottoman Empire's own mines in supplies included German M.1888 rifles, the so-
northern Anatolia. called Commission Rifle, and apparently some Ger-
During the course of the war, German experts man Mauser M.1898s while the Austrians sent
tried to improve the chaotic Ottoman logistical adapted Russian Mossin-Nagant M.I&}t rifles.
system, but with little success: most Ottoman Armies Some reservists may even have carried the obsolete
had to live off the land much as they had done for black-powder Turkish Mauser M.1887. Bayonets
centuries. The Ottoman Army was not, of course, were made by a number of German companies in
entirely dependent on outside help. Though even Solingen and Suhl. Some Ottoman infantry also seem
traditional craftsmen had largely been ruined by to have carried lighting knives in their boots, just as
che:.tp foreign imports, a number of government their medieval predecessors had done. Cavalry were
factories had been established for basic military items armed with a rifle or carbine, the latter usually being
such as uniforms and packs. More technical produc- the Turkish Mauser M.I90S. They also carried a
tion facilities also appe2red during the war, a German sword or lance o~ both, the sword being either the
naval captllin named Pieper Pap helping set up M.IC)09 made by Carl EicL:hom of Solingen or an
munitions factories while Austro-Hungarian techni- earlier model. The supply situation could be very
cians supervised a new propeller-making workshop.
Of more immediate concern W;lS the effect that
massh'e mobilization had on food production, with
famine as the inevitllble result. During the war,
supplies of draft horses also slumped to 40 per cent,
oxen and buffaloes to tS per cent. The shomge of
draft animals, and disease among the remainder (the
country only had 250 vets), was a serious problem for
the Ottoman Army which had constantly to requi-
sition more from the peasants - disrupting agricul-
ture even further. Even when beasts of burden were
available they were not always suitable for the
conditions in which the Ottoman Armies fought. In
eastern Anatolia during win(er, animals could not get
through the snowbound mountains and ammunition
had to be brought to the frOn( on the shoulders of
peasant women volunteers.

Small arms
The personal equipment of the Ottoman soldier was
essen(ially German in design, though reduced to the
barest essentials, while weapons were almost all of
German manufacture. Officers were armed with

Colours ofan unknown ribbons hanging from the

regiment IUId its colour Ilaptaffrepresent medals
guard during 8 meda/- gil'en to this unit.as a
pving CCI Clliony on the whole. (Askeri Mazesi,
Palestine front. The lsumbul)
21
different on each of the fronts, particularly in the
latter part of the war when one unit of8,000 men was
recorded as only having 1,000 rifles.
Artillery and other weapons
Despite scvere losses during the Balkan Wars, the
Ottoman Army still possessed German, British,
French and other artillery in t9t4. During the course
of the war new guns came from German or Austr~
Hungarian manufactUrers. Krupp was the most
import:mt supplier, though at first demanded im-
mediate cash paymenl.
The almost complete lack of heavy guns was the
Ottoman Army's greatcst problem. During the
Angl~French naval bombardmenl of the Dardan-
elles dummy ballerics were set up; thesc were
allegedly m:mned by two old reservists each armed
with a length of stO\'e-pipe and sc\'eral smoke
cartridges which they lit at random inlervals before
SOIimpering bad: inlo shallow dugouts. During the
Gallipoli campaign the Ottomans pressed into service
ccnfur)'-old mortars from the Army Museum in
Istanbul. Fortunately the collapse of Serbia opened
up a direct supply route, allowing sc\'eral big howit-
zers to arrive from Austria, along with a quantity of
mountain artillery. Nevertheless Ottoman Armies on
the Caucasus front were always chronically short of
artillery.
There was always a dearth of machine-guns, the
Ottomans only having a handful of Maxims and
Hotchkiss at the start of the war. As far as other
weapons were concerned, the Ottoman Navy's mines
included Russian examples rctrieved from the sea
outside Trabzon, French from off Izmir, and even
old Bulgarian mines from the previous Balkan wars,
A lad: ofland-mines meant that lorpcd~heads were
used in the shore defences of the Dardanelles while
ordinary garden wire from ncarby (:arms was
L~rt: A Turkish heavy backp-ound It-~ars th~
artillery ""((~rylit whit~ shiN with m,ntis of
GallipoJi in '9'5. Th~ p-ouped naITOit' black
lllr;r~guns fought o1fth~ titjtching orren It-om
fir5t Allied attempt to ~th a soldi~r's tunic.
fortt a lt7fy through the (AsJ.;eri Miizcs;, Istanbul)
StraitS by na,..1polt'u
alon~. The man;n the

An o.\"-drnwn heavy gun on

the march. '9'7. probably
an lIustro-Hunlfllrill1l-
madeSkodll '49mm
howitzcr. Several
onlookcr5 appear to wear
A ustro-HungJlri/ln
umTorms and the
buildings in thc
bacliKfOundsU/(gCSt that
this photograph was takt:n
on thc Ga/ici:l1l front. It
certainly illustrates the
logistical difficulties faced
by (he Turb in
mountainous te~in
lacking proper roads.
(lJnperigl mrr Museum
Q60J40)

u
stretched underwater ncar vulnerable beaches. Otto- In the autumn of 1917, however, the relationship
man forces were similarly shoTt of sandbags, many of changed. The German military mission was replaced
these being used by the soldiers to patch their tattered by a German-Quoman military convention. Under
uniforms. So short were the soldiers of entrenching this new arrangement many Turkish officers were
tools that they captured these from the enemy sent to Germany for ad\'anced training while there
whenever possible. Their officers, meanwhile, found was less direct German supervision of basic Ouoman
that maps they captured from the British were Army training. Ottoman divisions were reconstruc-
superior to the Ba~d~k" 'tourist guides' on which ted along German lines, though it remains unclear
they had often had to rely. how far these changes were carried through in
practice. The Germans complained about what they
saw as an unnecessary volume of Ottoman paper-
GERMAN work, though the records show that Turkish and
Arab officers were also often less than impressed by
INFLUENCE their German colleagues. The Germans, with few
exceptions, failed to understand the Turkish men-
Since most European and American historians base tality or to show sensitivity to the Ottoman Empire's
their work on German rather than untranslated proud Islamic heritage, often making it all too
Turkish sources, there has been widespread exagger- obvious that they saw themselves as superior to both
ation of the role of the Germans in the Ouoman war Turks and Arabs. On the Ottoman side young
effort, There were, in fact, around 500 German officers, particularly those who favoured the new
officers in the Ottoman Empire when war broke out Turkish nationalism, resented being treated as
and some were immediately put in command of second-class soldiers.
Ministry of War departments including Operations, In terms of broad war aims the Ottoman and
Intelligena:, Railways, Supply, Munitions, Coal and German High Commands had been at odds since the
Fortresses. Once direct overland communications war began. After the Russian Remlution the Turks
with German)' were opened a great many more found themseh'cs facing e\'en greater opposition
German offia:rs and NCOs were sent to scn'e in the from Germany than from Russia in attempts to
Ottom:m Army, Navy and Air Forces. Towards the regain eastern territory. In the meantime Germans,
end of the war relati\'ely large German combat units British and Turks all had their eyes on the Baku oil
also arrived, most importantly in Palestine. fields of Azarbayjan.

German oDicer inspecting

a company ofTuriish
srorm-trOOpers in
Palestine, probabl}' in
1918. The S()ldiers l'tId
their commander l ...~ar the
special Turkish SIW
helmet which differed
sJiXhliy from that of
Gcrm:m troops. (bnperial
War Muscum Q/Joo.u)

TRANSPORT
The very inadequacy of the Ottoman Empire's
communications gave them a special significance
during the First World War.
Rail
The only proper modem railway service was in the
Balkans, but most of this had been lost in 1913. The
railways system in the Asian provinces was \'ery
limited, single track and fragmented. Within Ana-
tolia some incomplete lines were linked by narrow-
gauge track while a third gauge was used in Lebanon,
sixty soldiers being allocated to every freight car for
the frequent transloading. The stations were tiny and
could not cope with large volumes of military traffic
while the limited rolling stock meant that only a
hundred small trains could be made up. Even Major
Kiibel, the German military transport expert at-
tached to the Ouoman nil.....ay service, criticized the
German-controlled Anatolian and Baghdad Railwa}'
Company for not providing the services that the
Ottoman Army was entitled to, criticism repeated by
his successor Lt. Col. BOurich. The fact th:u most
nilway technicians were militarily unreliable non-
Turks merely compounded such problems. Then
. there was the question of fueL South of the Taurus
mountains locomotives used wood instead of coaL
This required o\'er 31,000 soldiers and devastated
the forests of surrounding provinces. By 1917
engines were fuelled with cotton seed,liquorice, olive
branches, vines and even camel dung! South of the
Taurus the single-track railway also ran close to the
Gulf of Iskenderun where it was vulnerable to naval
gunfire, This area was also a nodal point in the entire
system and as such the Ottoman Army had to
be on guard against possible Allied landings. Con-
stant attacks on the railway lines through Syria,
Jordan and Anbia by the Hashemite Arab Army not
only interrupted schedules but were increasingly
difficult to repair due to a shortage of materials.
Road
Military historians have gi\'cn less attention to the
Ottoman road system which was e\'en weaker than
the rail network. The Empire was actually in the
process of a large road-building scheme in 1914,
though the projects so far completed were all in
western provinces and so only influenced the Galli-
poli campaign. The first eight months of the war saw
a huge repair and road-building effort by military
labour battalions, continuing until February 1916 in
Syria, Jordan and Palestine where sections of the
resulting well-paved roads are still visible. The role of
animal power can hardly be exaggerated and the
Ottoman Army's efforts in the Great War have been
described as a losing battle between the Turkish
A Turkish miliTAry' standard inf.mry
poliettnan with the crewof uniforms p!us. I.rge brass
me ClJprurcd British gorget inscribed with the
subrruuineE15 whic:hran M'ordKanun, maning
.pound in me 'La w', and yelloM'
Dtudanelleson .]A-prj! aiguilleue cords on the:
'9'5. Th~men M'ore right breast.
Senior officers & ceremonial dress
I: Mustafa Kemal Be}', General Staff service dress, 1915
2: Em'e:r Pasa. dre" unifonn c.l917
3: Standard bearer with regime:ntal flag, Nisanci (Rifle:) Battalion

A
 Infantry
I: Turkish line infantryman, marching order, c.1914
2: Infantryman, off duty, Galicia c.l917
3: Arab bicycle infantry, Arabia 1915

B
 2
•

ea"*'ry
1: Cavalry officer
2: NCO of. Turkish cavalry regiment., <:.1911
I 3: Kurdish irTeplaT officer

r.
 •

3
2

SpeciAlist Troops
1 I: Auault part}., 1918
2: Ski-hOOPS NCO. CauCS$UI c.I917
3: Officer, machine-gun detachment

o
Artillery
1: Artillery officer, GaUipoli t91S
2: Artillery officer, Galicia
3: Artillery Sergeant, Galicia
 Air Forces
I: Naval Pilot Engineer MUlazim (Lieutenant) Ahmet of the Naval Flying School, Yesilkoy, dress uniform
2: Army Air Force Obsenrer MUlazim (Lieutenant) Sitlci, No.... Squadron, southern Anatolia 1917
3: Gennan volunteer Pilot K1einehayk of No. 10 Squadron, southem Anatolia., summer 1917

F
N."
I: Sailor or naval landing party, Palestine
2: Able seaman
1 Commander, winter uniform 1915
 Miscellaneous b'OOps
1: Infantryman, Istanbul Fire Brigade
2: Allied Mghan Prince, c.l917
3: Boy soldier, volunteer bomb thrower at Ga1lipoli, 1915

H
kagni or ox-eart and the enemy's railways, steamships the effectiveness of the submarine war to have been
and motor lorries. On the Caucasus front even the exaggerated by British naval historians.
rugged kagm could not be used and here Onoman The Ottoman Empire also had a remarkably
troops were often supplied by caravans of pack effective Ielegraph servia: operating over huge dis-
animals. Add to this a lack of maps for many areas, tances but the country had no wireless before the war,
the destruction of bridges by winter wcather, snow in nor were there any telephones outside Istanbul. The
the mountains from September to May, a nearCSt Ottoman Sultan could lelephone the Kaiser in Berlin
railhead over six hundred miles away, and it seems but, frustratingly, nOI his o"'n commanders at the
hardly surprising that munitions took six wed:.s to front.
reach the Caucasus. Evenlually German engineers
built a motor road as far as Si"as but the Onoman
Army had no mawr transport, other than a few staff THE NAVY
cars, and so could provide no tet:hniCilI support for
trucks when these arrived. E"en in the relatively kind The Ottoman Navy played only a minor role in the
conditions of GaUipoli teams of buffaloes hauled the First World War for the simple reason that it was not
heavy artillery and if hills got in the way hundreds of designed to face the British and French neelS.
soldiers pulled these guns with ropes. Considerable effort had been put into strengthening
the Navy betwee~ 1()09 and 1914 bUI the foes
Sea envisaged at thai time were Greeks and possibly
Before the war, maritime communications had been Russians. A British Rear Admiral also supervised a
vital for theOuoman Empire. Dna: war broke our the m.ajor naval reorganiz.ation. In fact British Royal
Red Sea, castern Mediterranean and Aegean were Na.vy innucncc was so strong thai, from 1910, not
closed by the overwhelming power of enemy navies. only were Ouoman ships painted the same colours as
The Turks and their Yemeni sympathizers could use those of Britain but officer insignia also mirrored
small dhows along the Red Sea coast and such vessels those of the Royal Na,'y. Turkish technical officers
even maint;l;ined contact with Onoman allies in had the same colours between their slee,"e ranking
Somalia and Eritrea. Smugglers continued to ply the
Mediterranean and Aegean coasts of Anatolia despite
British, French and Italian patrols. From the sum-
mer of 1915 until the Revolution of '917 the Russian
neet prevented large Ottoman ships from sailing the
Black Sea, and strangled vital shipments of coal from
Zonguldak to Istanbul. Small amounts were still
moved in sailing ships, the Russians claiming to have
sunk about a thousand of these during the war. The
Black Sea was opened once more after the Russian
Revolution but before then the Ouoman state ran
short ofcoal, much of which had to be brought by rail
from central Europe. Even the almost enclosed Sea of
Marmara was made haz.ardous by enemy submarines,
supported as they were by Greek sympathizers living
on the coast, although Liman von Sanders considered

Orron1an U'OOp$t:rossing hC8dkufiya cloth while thc

the Tigris or £upht'fltC$ in
a gufa, a typeofprimirive
birumen-covcred reed bmft
that had ~n used in It'flq
for thoUSMnds of)·eJlT$.
Onc msn "'caT$ the At'fIb
others ha "e rhe old-
fashioned soft feZC5 still
,,'om b)' Turkish troops
when ofTdury.

l3
stripcs as did the British. Orders were placed in laying and approximatcly elevcn lightly armed motor
Britain and Frnnce for new vessels rnnging from launches. Support vcsscls includcd a torpedo depot
battleships to gunboats; and the Ottoman yards at ship, a hospital ship, four troop transports and a naval
Samsun, Izmir, Beirut and Basra competed to see transport, a naval rcpair vessel, threc smaller dc-
who could makc thc beSt small ships in the shortest spatch \'csscls, and an Imperial yacht. During or
time. The Navy was a popular arm of service, thc immediately prior to the war a minelayer was added
exploits of the ex-American cruiser Hamidiy~ under to this fleet. Construction of six small German-
Hiiseyin Rauf in the Aegean and Adriatic having designed destroyers was belie\'cd to have been started
been a great boost to public mornle during thc in Istanbul during the war and although none arc said
otherwise catastrophic First Balkan War. to have becn completed, the Ottoman Navy did end
During the months of Ottoman neutrality the the war with :In extT2 dcstroyer in :lddition to
Fleet steered well clear ofaction. In the meantime the survi\'ing pre-war vcssels. It also ended up with an
influence of the British naval advisory mission extT2 torpedo-boat. Therc arc also rcports that
collapsed, and its personnel were replaced by Ger- attempts were made during the war to refit two
mans. The main arsenal was in Istanbul and, with derelict German submarines, though without much
around 6,000 personnel, the Navy's primary role was success.
to survive as a threat to any cncmy attacking the In the face of o\'crwhelmingly morc numerous
capital. It also had to protect supply convoys in the enemics, the Ottoman Na\')' attempted few offensive
Sea of Marmara and, as f:lr as possible, the Black Sea. opeT2tions, although HMS Galiath was sunk by the
By the outbreak of war the Ottoman Navy Ottoman torpedo boat Muavmd Milli under Com-
consisted of three :lrchaic pre-dreadnought banle- mander Ahmet Efendi on 13 May 19'5. The navy's
ships, HaJ'ruddin Barbar()ssa (1893), TurKut R~ij
(1894) and MtJuJiy~ (1874), to which were added the
Germ:ln b:lttlecruiscr G()~bm renamed as the Sullan
Stlim Yavu.:::: (1912) :lnd the light cruiser Bmlau now
called A1idilli (1912). In support was the e\'en older
coastal defence pre-dreadnought battleship Afuin-i-
ZQf~r (1869) :lnd the slightly more modern light
cruisers Hamidi)'~ (1903) and M(('idi)'~ (1903). The
Ottoman Navy also had eight 'destroyers, seven
torpedo-boats, threc torpedo-gunboats, perhaps nine
other gunboats, an old gunboat converted for mine-
Alxn'c: Pcuy·officus ofLhe
O,tom:1lI N,nml Air
$erl'icc. These men were
IImlerg-oing tcchniclll
tmining'H che Yesilkoy
flying scht)()1 1I(.'"r ISlIInbul
in '9' 7, (H,IVllell,k AWzcsi,
fst:mblll)

Midshipmen in their whire

Slimmer uniforms under
insrruction by an officcron
bo:lrd:l Turkish gunboac.
l'hc officer Illso 1f'C.'Uf'S his
summer sen'ice uniform
with rhe c)'pial Ottom:1n
pcaJdcsscap. (Deniz
,\lUzesi, IstvnbuJ)

Turkish M • ." officials
no 'cur/' on his single
insp«r rhe captured sl«.·(, ring. In the dist:l1JCf:
British submarine £'5 on rhe left is. COlnTl1l1ndcr
w"hich ran ap-ound in April wi,h three rings and ·cur/'.
'9'5. Theofficcron the Next to hilll $t:lnd scH~rlll
right w'ith II note-pad is II
sulrlicutcnllnt from u
sailors in thcir durk bluc
w'intcr uniforms.
technical b,...mch Rnd h;u
main role was convoy protection, particularly in the
Sea of Marmara. The second British submarine to
enter this area, E IS, was sunk by the Ottomans,
followed by the Australian AE 2 which was also
destroyed by a torpedo-boat. The £ 14 next got into
the Marmara, where il sunk the transport ship Ciil
C~mal, though during a later auempt to penetrate the
Dardanelles in 1918 the £ 14 was itself destroyed by
an Ottoman vcssel. Torpedo boats were particularly
important, escorting con\'oys which stuck close
inshore so thai the Navy only had to protect onc flank.
The OUoman Navy's own most serious losses
were during coastal protcction duties. The old
battleship Mwldiye was torpedoed by submarinc B
11 in the Dardanelles on 13 Deccmbcr 1914, the
Hayruddit, Barbarossa by E II in thc Sca of Marmara
on 8 Augusl 1915, though thc Turgul Reis survived.
All three of these were used as floating batteries
during thc Gallipoli campaign. The Ouoman Navy
and Army combined in various small offensivcs
againsl Aegean islands. Here captured documents~
suggested that Greek piratcs were directed by Allied
intelligence to raid the Turkish mainland for booty
and to carry off women, children and cattle. Despite a
lack of proper minelaying vessels the Ottoman Navy
laid at least 423 mines during the war, more than
France and ncarly as many as Italy. Isolated from the
rest of the Ottoman Fleet several river gunboats
operated in Iraq, two being captured by the British.
By the end of the war the Ouoman Navy had lost,
in addition to the two old prc-dreadnought banle-
ships, the new German light cruiser Midilli/Breslau
mined off Imbros in 1918. The smaller protected
cruiser !I1uidjye had been sunk by a mine in the Black
Sea in 1915. raised and repaired b)' the Russian Navy
only 10 be retaken by the Onomans in 1918. Two
lorpedo gunboats claimed sunk by the British in
1915, the PeyJ:-i-SroJ:el torpedoed by £2 and the
Burf-i Sa/vet torpedoed by E14, had in fact been
beached :IOd repaired. Another torpedo gunboal had,
however, been sunk while :ll least three ordin:u)'
gunboats were lost along with three destroyers and
three lOrpedo boats.
THE AIR FORCES
In 1914 the Ouoman air ann was founded under the
guidance of a French officer, Captain Dc Gays.
During the war he was quickly replaced by a Gennan,
Major Erich Sarno. When the Onom3ns entered the
W;Ir they had six landplancs, four of which were
operational; in addition lO four ground instruction
aircraft, two seaplanes and an observation balloon.
There were only ten qualified pilots, who were
supported by a small number of mechanics of whom
many were Amlenians of doubtful loyalty.
Even before hostilities broke out one Nieuporr
seaplane was sent to support thc Dardanelles de-
fences, and another soon followed. Two Bleriots were
intended for the Caucasus front but instead patrol-
led the northern entrance lO the Bosphorus. A newly
arri\'ed and relatively modern Rumpler biplane was,
meanwhile, sent to Syria. The OtlOman's first oper-
ational flight of the Greal War was probably a
seaplane reconnaissance off the Dardanelles on 17
August 1914 - shordy before the Empire actually
entered the conflict. This Nieupon seaplane was
replaced by a Bleriot on 5 November, and this solitary
monoplane nick-named Erlugrul, made several flights
over the British and French fleets during the build-
up to the Gallipoli campaign. The first Onoman
l5
Aircrew under trainingar
the OUQlJJan Air Forces
trainingsehool, J'esilkiiy,
probably in '9'1. The
Ottoman personnel
included Army and ",.,..1
olIicers bur this 8"Oup also
includes two Iranians,
Ahrnet Han standinK on
the left and Hussain Han A poup ofpilots, trainees
behind him to the left. and insCTUCtlHS in front of
Both ""ent on to fly as oneofrhe OrromanAir
observers in the Ortoman Force's few 81eriot )(1-:1
Air Forces No. '4 monoplanes at the
SqWldron~ar l'esilkiiy flying school ncar
Amman in present-day Istanbul. Pilot First Lt.
Jordan. (Hlwaed,k Miizesi, Cern1l1 Durusoy, $Ojted on
Istanbul) thcporr winK ofthis
aircra.fr (nicknamed
ErlugrulA flcw sc"':ral
hazardous reconnaissance
missions O"er the British
fleet as it bombarded the
Dardanelles forts in /Han;:h
'9'5./1'1 Turkey Cernal
DurusoYlindthe~~I ..1
Lieutenant, lIiisc}'in Scdat,
lire rrprded lIS thc om
most important flyinK
hcrocsofthe Gallipoli
campaign. (lIal"ae,hk
Mikc:si, Istanbul)

vicwry in air combat came on 30 November 1915

when Ll. Ali Riza and LI. Orhan in an Albatros CI
shot down a French Farman near the Dardanelles.
Delh'eries of new German aircraft started by air in
March 1915 and, in addition to the five German
aircraft sold before the war, Germany wen! on to
supply o\'er 260 aircraft though not all had arrived
safely or emered service before the war cnded. The
OHoman Air Force also added 12 aircraft captured
from the Russians and British, several of which were
flown against their original owners.
The first numbered OHoman Air Force squad-
ron was formed at Galata and Canakkale in January
1915, and as the war continued many more were

Pilot Lt. Orhan ofthe where it WlIS thrown into

Ottoman Air Service's No.
J Squadron with his Pfalz
A /I monoplane in '9,6.
FollowinK the suddcn lirob
Rel·olt, this squlldron ,,'as
hurriedly transfcrred from
the UI.ICJISU$ to the lIi;az
b/lttlc upinst Lall7cncc
and his Arob gucrrilla
forces. Lt. Orhan "'CIU-S
nonnal service uniform,
wirh AirForcc winpon his
kalpak. (lflwac./,k Miizesi,
Isranbul)

36
created. In 1917 Ouoman squadrons varied from a
single aircrafl with two pilots and two observers to 22
aircraft with 13 pilots and 13 obsef\'ers. By the end of
the war there were 18 squadrons in existence, varying
in strength from a single pilot and no observer, to 12
pilots and 18 observers. The Ottoman Air Force
operated from 66 airfields during the war, seven of
them in occupied neutral or enemy territory (four in
Iran, onc in Egyptian Sinai and two in what had been
the Russian Empire). Although German personnel
played a \'ital role in de\'e1opment, technical support
and oper.uions, this should not be exaggerated. Most,
though not all, fighter pilots werc German; but men
of Turkish, Arab and e\'en Iranian origin dominated
the observation squadrons. By the end of the war,
follo\\'ing determined efforts to train Ottoman per-
sonnel, all three Naval squadrons as well as fh·c Army
squadrons were commanded by Ouoman officers;
four squadrons were under joint command, and only
six remained under German officers.
AUXILIARIES
AND ALLIES
(Nou: Some of these groups werc covered in MAA
208: Larurenu and Iht Arab Rtvoll, including pro-
Ouoman Arab tribes in Arabia and Yemen, the
Sanussi in Libya, the Tuareg, various Saharan
peoples and the 'Ali Dinar revolt in Darfur.)
European concepts of nationalism had been feh in the
Ottoman Empire for at least a century; first among
the Greeks, then Serbs and Bulgarians, then amongst
Armenians, Macedonians and even the Turks them-
selves, and finally the Arabs. Wars of 'national
libcration', massacres and counter-massacres had
characterized Ottoman history throughout the 19th
century and extreme nationalists were indulging in
horrific acts of violence - guerrilla resistance to their
supporters, terrorism 10 the Ottoman authorities. In
1C)09 the 'Young Turk' government banned the
carrying of arms in mixed Slav, Greek and Albanian
Macedonia and in the partially Armenian eastern
provinces of Am.talia while the Army set up special
anti-terrorist 'pursuit battalions'.
Within whancmained of the Olloman Empire in
A parrol orTud:ish s/ii IflUsnowbound for many
soldiers in the Caucasus.
Such nwunlllin tTQOPS
If'CI'(' essential in 11
months. Each man uses
only a single ski~polc.
(Asktri MiUesi, Istanbul)
mountainous region If-hich
t9'4- there were many competing nationalisms, some
highly developed, others only stirring. The Arabs, for
example, were the second most numerous people
after the Turks, and although Arab nationalism had
existed among the educated urban elite for gener-
ations, it only took rOOt among ordinary people in
reaction to the Turkish nationalism of the Young
Turk government. During the early part of the Great
War the authorities tried to Turkify the Arabs of
Syria, but this proved to be impossible and by 1918
some Turk nationalists were even advocating Arab
independence wilhin a new federated state - too late
ofcourse.
There were many Turkish-speaking Orthodox
Christians in Anatolia, some of whom identified
themselves with the Greeks. They tended to keep a
low profile, however, and were little affected by the
war. The Jews ofthe Ottoman Empire were generally
very loyal, those from long-established Shephard;
communities outside Palestine (where the status of
the recenl Zionist colonizers was more sensitive)
often enjoying a prosperous position in a state with no
tradition ofanti-semitism.
37
 from uncaring Incompetcnce on thc part of local
Armenians authorities.
Armcnians, howcvcr, werc in a very difterent situ- When the Great War broke'out, it was immedi-
ation. Unbiased estimatcs number the Armenian ately appatent that most Armenians both inside and
population of the Ottoman Empire at almost outside Ottoman territory sympathized with the
1,250,COO. But these Armenian Christians were Allied causc. In August 19t4 the senior Armenian
themselvcs divided amongst Orthodox, Catholic and religious leader resident in Russian-ruled territory
Protestant groups. They were also very seanered and proclaimed it a sacred duty for all Armcnians to
nowhere formed a majoriry except in a tiny corner of support the Russians. Inevitably most Armenian
eastern Anatolia. Elsewhere in Anatolia they com- soldiers in the Ouoman Army wcre disarmed and
prised '5 to 25 per cent of the population. The details sent to work in labour battalions. Armenian. revo-
ofthe Armeni:m massacres that took place during the lutionary cells already existed but there is disagree-
First World War are hotly disputed by historians ment about how far they fought in support of Russia.
with differing sympathies. All, howe\'er, tend to agree Armenian volunteers certainly started killing Muslim
that they resulted from the 19th eentury spread of the civilians as soon as Russian troops crossed the
European concept of nationalism in an area previ- Guoman frontier. At the same time large numbers of
ously noted for centuries of relative harmony be- Annenian deserters from the Ottoman Army were
tween linguistic, cultural and religious groups. It is enlisted as allies and auxiliary forces by the Russians.
also clear that aU sides were guilty of the most The rest of this sad Story is one of massacre and
appalling barbarity during the Great War, some counter-massacre by and upon Kurds, Armenians,
carried out with the full knowledge of a political or Turks, Christian and Muslim Gcorgians, as well as
military leadership, other resulting from banditry or the uprooting and deportation of entire populations
by both Ottoman and Russian authorities. l':uropean
and American sources sympathetic to the Armenians
estimate that 600,000 Armenians died. Turkish
sources put the deaths at 300,000 and maintain that at
least as many Turks and other Muslims were
Ya\'cr Hayri PafB, a senior slaughtered - not to mention half a million CenlT2l
Turkish offlccr in the
Medinain 19,a. (Askeri
Asian Turks massacred by Russian troops before the
MiJ7.esi, Istanbu/) Russian Rc\'olution.

An O,toman Army cook·

house on the Gill/ipoli
frollt, '9'5. This is t;/car/y
an Amb unit, one ofthosc
which played a sipi/kant
role in the Turkish victory
lit Gallipo/i. The large
ste...··pot is remarkably
similar to th~ used by
the famousjanissaries
ellrlicr in Ottoman history,
and whieh became as
much a focus Qfunit
/o)'8lty IJ$ the Ilncient
Roman legionary eagles
had done.

38
 being commissioned as majors in the Asirtl HaftJ
Kurds Suvar; AlayJtm. Arms and uniforms would be
To a great extent intermingled with the Christian supplied by the government but men had to find their
Armcni:ms were the Muslim Kurds who had a own horses and harness. II remains unclcar how far
tradition of resistance to central go\'ernment control. this new organiZlluon actually developed during the
At this time they had linle sense of Kurdish war, but between 20,000 and 30,000 tribal cavalry
'nation3Iism' but had dcveloped a deep antagonism to were already in the field against the Russian Army by
their more advanced Armcnian neighbours. In I&)I the end of 1914. The importance of Kurdish irregular
Sultan Abdlilhamit raised a force of mostly Kurdish auxiliaries may actually have increased as regular
but also Turcoman and Ar.lb tribalauxiliarics which Ouoman units were scattered across so many distant
came to be known 3S the Hamidiyr ClV:llry. This was fronts.
intended 10 counter Russia's famous Cossacks, and
control the eastern parts of Anatolia. After 11)08," Thc Caucasus
however, the Hamidiyt dispersed until, around 1914, The Ottoman Army could rely on the support of
:I. military commission started planning a new force Turkish-speaking Muslims in the Russian-ruled
from the same sources to be known as the Asirtl HaftJ
Siivari Alayftm or 'Tribal Light Cavalry'. It was Kurtlish IrreglllllN>' ill the COSCUIIII: though firmed by
Dllrsi"rrllnt,:c1i Ilre!l or the stntt'. The ofliccr
supposed to consist of 24 regiments in four brigades. easterll Amltoli;1 ill 19'7. SClllCd 011 the right M"ellrs
Service was to be between the ages of 18 and 45: three Dilly offlccrs in thl:' the broild-brimIllt'd
Kurdi!ih irrt'glll:lr I\sirct 'sou'l4"('Ster'sccn 011 other
years as a recruit, twelve years as a trooper, twelve Ib.fifSuvari Alayari Turkish cs\·alrYfflell. He
years in the reserve. All units were be commanded by auxiliary all'alry appcOlr ro also has II JQng-bJlldcd
hal'e ..·om IIniromls, their s ..·ord rrom the CRucasus
regular cavalry officers while tribal chiefs would be men being dressed in IIIQUnlllins 011 his hip.
given proper tr.lining in regular regiments before traditional Kurdish (AdcriMOzcsi, Istanbul)

Caucasus. Traditional antagonism between Sunni
and Shia Muslims was disappearing in the wake of
massacres by Russians and their Armenian aux-
iliaries. Local volunteers played a particularly im-
portant role on the extreme left flank of the Ouoman
front, in the mountainous Artvin area near the Black
Sea. Later in the war the Ouom2on Army also tried to
fill its depleted ranks by enlisting Turks from the
Russi20n Gucasus but the m20in milit20ry contribution
of these people was in the 'lsl2om Army' raised in
Azarbayjan after the Russian Re\·olution. This drew
in non-Qttom2on Muslims from throughout the
Gucasus and operated largely in(lependently, just
like similar forces raised by Georgi2o and Armenia.
Though never officially recognized by the Ottoman
government, the 'Islam Army' was given consider-
able help. Many Turkish Ottoman officers \'olun-
tcered to serve in its ranks, the most famous being
Enver's brother Nuri Pa~a. As early as 1916 a
Georgian Volunteer Legion had been raised, largely
from the Muslim Georgian area of Lazistan, to fight
alongside the Ottoman Army. Originally intended to
promote a revolt in Russian-held Georgia, this
Volunteer Legion remained under Germ20n control
while the Ottomans wanted to use it as a normal
battllion. In the end it took very liule part in the
fighting, being stationed on the Black Sea coast at
Giresun until disbanded in January t917.
Balkan Muslims
.
Other assorted forces lacking permanent or official
MilicRr)' band pinyinI' on
the parsldc ground ac
Damascus during a
mi!iclIry re"iew in April
'9'7. Thebandapin M'c#r
Anrb kufi)'a hc#dc1orhs
lind then: 1IT'C rnusicsd or
rncdiCIII symbols on their
collar patches. (Imperial
WlIrMuseUrrJ Q9!J.4u)
Army structures were raised during the war, often
being known as miiretub units. Another group of
irregulars were thefedais who, mostly being of Balkan
Muslim refugee origin, had been raised during and
since the disastrous Balkan War. Often motivated by
religious zeal or a desire for vengeance on the Balkan
Christians, they were consequently reprded as fana-
tics by their foes. Thousands more were recruited in
1914, many being sent to the Caucasus front and
north-western Iran in an effort to stimulate anti-
Russian revolts there. Several hundred were also
reported in Syria in b.te 1914. Later in the war the
Ottomans apin tried to recruit from the remaining
Turkish population in Macedonia following the
Austr~German-Bulgarian occupation of this area,
though with little success.
Persia
Iran, or Persia as it was then known, was one of the
most anarchic areas of the Middle East in 1914.
Though independent in theory, it had been divided
into British and Russian spheres of influence.
Whereas the army of the Ottoman Empire could fight
on half a dozen fronts and keep various numerically
superior foes at bay, and Afghanist20n could rely on its
rugged terrain and warlike people to dissuade in-
vaders, the Iranians had few such advantages. Efforts
had been made to create a properly equipped regular
army but all failed to produce b.sting results. By 1914
some 13,000 infantry were scattered about the CQun-
tty, unpaid, untrained, badly clothed and led by an
officer corps of staggering incompetence and corrup-
tion. The 38,000 or so cavalry were rather more
effective, being recruited on a tribal basis under their
own leaders, but e,'en they formed lillIe more than
local militias defending only their own areas. Irre-
gular cavalry were drawn from the Kurds, Lurs,
Turcom:ms :md Arabs though rarely from the
majority Farsi (Persian) community, and such forces
owed loyalty to their tribal leaders rather than to a
central government. The artillery arm had 5-6,000
men with about 50 breech-loading guns, plus twice as
many muzzle-loading field and mountain guns, only
half of which wcre fit for service.
Two othcr military forces played a role grcater
than their numbers would suggest. One was the
Russian-offieered Persian Cossack Brigade which
consisted of a little over 3,500 mcn in four cavalry
regiments, four infantry companies, one horse and
two mountain artillery batteries plus a machine-gun
dctachment. With modern equipment, discipline and
training it was by far the best miliury force in pre-
war Iran. Unforrunately it also suffercd from con-
fused loyalties, serving as an instrument of Russian
influcnce and ncver being allowed to endanger
Russian military domination. The second 'modem'
force was the so-called Swedish Gendarmerie which
had been reorganized by Swedish mercenary officers
in 1911. It now consisted of six regimentS, about
6,000 horsemen and infantry armed with Mauser
rifles, mostly recruited from the Persian-speaking
population. Unforrunalely its Persian officers dis-
liked their over-enthusiastic S.....edish colleagues
while the entire force suffered from the hostility of
Russia and of the Persian Cossacks. As a result the
Swedish Gendarmerie had developed pro-German
sympathies.
Prey to internal dissension and foreign manip-
ulation, Iran was clearly not in a position to defend
itself when invaded by Russian, Ottoman and British
forces during the Great War. In fact widespread anti-
Russian feeling lay behind strong pro-Ottoman
sympathies during the early part of the war. In
November 1915 anti-Russian feelings ran so high
Ouoman AmlYCllmcl Arabillll CIImel, This was
rnmsport on the Iraqi from ..,.·cJl-biown to rhe Twks,
in 1916. No bcastofburdcn though their British f~
could opt:rale as effecti ~'cJy rook some rime to rekarn
in the dcsvot liS II sillGle- the lesson. (Asl'm !I1(izcsi,
humpuJ dromcdllry or lsrsmbul)
that the Swedish Gendarmerie turned on the Persian
Cossacks, forcing those in Hamadan to surrender.
Interestingly enough the Gendarmerie were helped
by a band of German and Austro-Hungarian POWs
who had escaped from Russian camps in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia. Ottoman and German involve-
ment in Iran was ne\'ertheless often in competition.
The Ottomans, for example, tried 10 organize a new
Iranian arm)' under a Persian General, Nizam al
Saltaneh, who hoped to drive both the Russians and
the British from his country. BUI Ihis rudiment2ry
force collapsed when the Russian Army in north-
western Inn suddenly advanced south, itS few
infantry battalions simply deserting before the Rus-
sians arrived.
The Germans also set up their own puppet
Persian government and army at Kermanshah, which
in turn led to increased British intervention in
southern Iran, In· January 1916 a new pro-Russian
government in Inn tried to reduce the numbers of
Swedish Gcndarmeric and increase those of the
Persian Cossacks, the latter being placed under
Russian control whilc the Russian Army moved to
occupy a large part of western Iran. This did not,
howc\'cr, end pro-Ottoman sentiments in the area
and as late as 1917 the jangali tribe under Kuchik
Khan anempted to slOp an Anglo-Russian army
m.arching through their forested mountain homeland
south of the Caspian Sea. One of the few positive
results of this confusion was the training of a handful
of Persian officers by thc Ottoman Air Force at
Ycsilkoy near Ist2nbul. Since their own country had
no aircraft, two of these men subsequently served as
obscrvers in the Ortoman 14th Squadron in 1918.
 Into this real-life version of John Buchan's
'Great Game' rode a number of Turkish, German
and Austrian agents, thc most effective being Dr.
Wassmuss the one-time German Consul at Bushire.
With his colleagues he organized tribal forces in
many regions, damaging not only British and Russian
influence butthrcatcning a full-scale rising. The king
ofAfghanistan managed to control the excesses of the
most fanatical anti-British clements but Britain still
feared that Or. Wassmuss aimed at India itsclf. The
most successful period for these agents was 1915 and
as a result mutually hostile bands of tribesmen and
their mentors were soon chasing each other around
much of Iran, Afghanistan and o,'er the border into
what is now Pakistan.

Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia

\Vhile Germans, Austrians and Ottomans were stir-
ring up trouble for the British in and beyond Iran, the
Ottomans also stoked the embers of anti--<:olonial
resentment against British, French and lulian forces
in the Hom of AfriCli. The man at the centre of this
trouble was Muhammad Abdullah Hasan, a resis-
unce leader and poet who, known to his foes as the
'Mad Mullah', was neither mad nor a Mullah
(religious teacher). SaY}'id Muhammad Hasan, as he
was more properly called, led his first rebellion
against British rule in 1S99 and by the outbreak of the
Great War, British authority reached no further than
the walls of a few coastal towns. But in November
1914 the British went on to the offensive while to the
south, in what had recently become Italian Somali-
land, there was also a build-up of troops, many drawn
from Italian-ruled Eritrea.
The third Empire to be ruling Somali peoples
was that of Ethiopia but in the immediate pre-war
years this Christian kingdom was having its own
internal problems. A new Emperor named Lij Jasu
had come to the throne in '913 and was attempting to
reverse a thousand years of Christianity in Ethiopia
by pursuing a pr~lslamic policy. In 19t5 he became
a Muslim and opened negotiations with the 'Mad
MulLah' Sayyid Muhammad Hasan. Many also de-
clared Lij jasu to be mad but in fact he was a shrewd
politician who hoped to win Ottoman military sup-
port to crush the rebellious Ethiopian nobility. Lij
Jasu scnt the Ollom.an Sultan an Ethiopian flag
bearing 2 crescent 2nd QUT:l:nic declaT:l:tion of faith,
.,
Said Idris, R pro- Turkish ofa ~'cry senior Onoman
milirat"J' leader in/ron, Turkish officer. (Asker;
19,6. His uniform is MiJzcsi, Istanbul)
";rrual/y identical ro Mllr
placed himself bene2th the religious - though not
political- authority of Istanbul and began rccruiting
an army in the largely Muslim southern lowlands.
Fearing a mass rising the three European colonial
powers sent extra troops to their rcspcctivc colonies.
In the end, though, it was the Ethiopians themselvcs
who ended Lij jasu's ambitions. In September 1916
the leading Rases or nobles ofShoa marchcd on Addis
Ababa and, with the support of the Ethiopian
Church, deposed Lij jasll who fled to the wild coastal
territory of the Danakil. Ethiopi::tn troops sub-
sequently took part in operations against Sayyid
Muhammad Hasan's 'Dervishes', winning a bloody
victory in August 1917.
Meanwhile the Ottoman consul at Harar, Mazar
Bey, had been serving as Sayyid Muhammad Hasan's
m2in contact with the outside world, particularly
with GeneT:l:1 AJi Sait Pa~ who commanded Ottoman
forces in Yemen. In '917 the General declared
Sayyid Muhammad Hasan 1'0 be the OUoman-
approved governor of all Somalia. By that time,
however, the Arab Revolt prevented OUoman forces
in Yemen from giving pT:l.ctical help, aside from a few
Mauser and captured French Lebel rifles that were
smuggled to the Somalis in return for food supplies.
Sources
Ahmad Emin (Yalman), Turluy in the World War
(Newha\'en 1930)
G.M. Bayliss, Operations in Persia t9t 4-t9t9 (re-
prim London 1987)
T.N. Barker, Double Easle and Cmunt (New York
1957)
A. Djemal Pa$3, "1tmoirs of a Turkish Statesman,
1911-1919 (19 22 )
Sayed Ali EI-Edroos, The Hashemitt Arah Army
1f)08-1979 (Amman & London 1980)
H. Kannengeisser, TIlt Campaisn in CaJJipoli (1927)
Lord Kinross, Ataturk. The Rehirth of a Nation
(London 1964)
K. Klinghardl, DenJ:IPiirdiskeittn des MarschaJJs
j"'''".et Pasda (Leipzig 1927)
M. Larcher, UJ Cuene Turquc dans la Client
Mondiale (Paris 1926)
A. Moorhead, CaJJipoli (London 1956)
C.C.R. Murphy, Soldius of the Prophet (London
192 7)
C.C.R. Murphy, 'The Turkish Army in the Great
War' ,Journal o/tht Royal Unittd Services Institutt
LXV (1920) pp. 90-104
R. de Nogales, Four Years heneath the Crescent (1926)
J. Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Ollomall-
ischetl Re;ches (Leipzig, Zurich, Vienna 1928)
O. Liman von Sanders, Five Years ;11 Turkey
(Annapolis 1927)
U. Trumpener, CermollY o'id the OUoman Empire
1914-1918(Princeton 1968)
J.L. Wallach, Anatomie einer M jJitiirhi/ft (Dusseldorf
'97 6)
War Office, Handbook of 'he Turkish Army (Cairo
19 15)
Turkish Army nu~ in which. undcr 1sllll11ic ll1w.
'9'5. Their uniforms lire hlld TO CO\·U thc hair
basically thc SSiI11C liS th~ cntirely. (Aslu'ri MiJzcsi.
of£uropclln nurses cxccpt Istllnbul)
for their hcad<1oths
THE PLATES
A: Senior oBJcers and ceremonial
A,: Alustaf.'J Kemal Bey, General Sraffscr"ice
dress, 1915
Mustafa Kernal, who bIer adopted the family name
of Atatiirk, is shown here in the uniform he wore
during the GalLipoli campaign. Although a colonel
auached 10 the General Staff he wears a uniform
typical of most field officers. This includes that most
chaT:l.creristic item of First World War Turkish
military costume, the kobo/uk, a hat formed of a strip
of fabric wound around a semi-stiff frame. Koholalu
could be wound in various ways, but the one worn
here was the most common. I-Ie also wears the
Imtiyaz (distinguished service) medal, the Liyakat
(merit) medal an~ the ribbon of thc Turkish War
Medal twice. His pistol is probably a ~l:auser
,M.19 IO!I4.
A2: Enver Pap, dress unifonn, C.1917
As Ministcr of War and Vice-Cornmander-in-Chief
of the Ouoman Armed Forces, Enver Pa$3 wears the
dress uniform of a general, though without the
doubled red trouser stripes normal for generals. He
also has a black lambskin kalpal: hat. In addition to
the Turkish Order of Osman, his medals include the
Prussian Order of the Red Eagle with sash, the
Prussian Order Pour Ie Merite, the Prussian Iron
Cross, the Bulgarian Order of Merit and the Austrian
Military Cross of Merit.
A3: Standard bearer with regimental flag, Army) Mauser rifle M.I8<)3. By 1918 a vanety of
Nisanc, (Rifle) Biltmlion different riOes werc also in usc.
Apart from the unusual loose winding of his kaba/ak,
this standard bearer wears ordinary infantry uniform Hz: Infantryman, offduty, Galicia c.'9'7
plus the olive-green collar patches worn only by This man has been almost entirely re-cquippcd by
sharp-shooter units. The visible side of the Oag bears the Austrians or Germans and has been issued with a
the Muslim Declaration of Faith: fA ilaha i/f A//ah, captured Russian Mossin-Nagant M.1891 riOe. His
rI1a Muhammad rasu/ A//ah, 'There is no god but God, tunic is one of several much cruder patterns intro-
and Muhammad is the Prophet of God'. Thc othcr duced during the course of the war. Notc thc
side of the flag bore the Ottoman Empire's coat of strengthening patches added on the knees and el-
anns. bows. Towards the end of the war a variety of
diffcrent, and perhaps locally made, cartridge belts
B: Infantry were also in use. Surviving photographs show that
HI: Turkish line infnntryman, marching order, the old-fashioned soft red fez, supposedly phased out
C.19 14 before the Great War started, was sometimes still
The ordinary Turkish infantryman of 1914 was well worn when men wert off duty.
equipped and well dressed. Only whcn large numbers
of reserves were called up did the standard of H3: Arab bicycle infantry, Ambia 1915
unifonns deteriorate. This man carries full marching At the start of the First World War a large proportion
equipment, as hc might ha\·e appeared at the start of of the Ottoman Armies in Syria and Iraq were
the Great War. While his simple but practical recruited from the local Arab populations. They
unifonn is purely Turkish, the rest of his cquipment fought with distinction at Gallipoli but many later
is Gennan in style. He is armed with a 'Turkish' joined the Arab Revolt and fought as allies of the
(meaning made specifically for the Ottoman Turkish British. Othc.rs remained 10)'21 to the Ottoman
Empire until the end of the war. Most were uni-
formed and equipped in the same way as Turkish
infantry, except that they wore the Arab kufiya
headcloth and 'oqa/ camel hair ring instead of the
Turkish kaba/ok hat. But somc wore white uniforms
like this man stationed in the Muslim Holy City of
Medina. He is armed with the German M.1888 rifle.
There were supposed to be four cyclists in each
infantry battalion at thc starl of the war; but the only
other complete bicycle-mounred unit in the Olloman
Army was an infantry company far away at Edime
ncar the Bulg.trian border.

C: Cavalry
CI: CnvaJryofflccr
The most notable feature of this man's uniform is the
very large form of kobo/ok with upturned brim and a
long rear part to shade his neck. Otherwise his dress is

A Turkish officer I'nd his and Libyan Arab ~ueriIJa

Africun balnlan in Libya,
'918. The bridle, saddle
and stirrups ofthe officer's
ho~a~ofa typicul
North African or Libyan
rype. Ottoman Turkish
forces maintllinoo their
resistance throughout the
war, effectively penning
the invading Italians
apinsr the coaSt. (Askeri
Miizcsi, Istanbul)
that of a typical Ouoman officer. He carries an
M.1909 cavalry sabre with the Turkish crescent and
star cut through its guard. On his chest he wears the
ribbon ofthe Turkish War MedaL
0: NCO ora Turkish cavalry regiment. C.'9'7
The cavalryman's saddle and harness are essentially
the same as the officer's, though non-commissioned
ranks had to carry more equipment. This man wears a
cavalry version of the Turkish ;aba/d. (Arab cavalry
units were similarly dressed except for their ;ufiya
head-cloths.) The grey collar patches identify him as
a cavalryman and on his back he curies a 'Turkish'
Mauser M.1905 cavalry carbine. Turkish cavalry
horses were generally wugh but small ponies, often
better able [0 cope with harsh Middle Eastern terrain
though less formidable in a charge.
C3: Kurdish irregular officer
The Ouoman Empire's auxiliary cavalry consisted of
tribal auxiliaries, mostly recruited among the Kurds
of eastern Anatolia. Uniforms were supposed to be
provided by the government, but available phot~
graphs indicate that el'en some officers still wore
traditional Kurdish costume. This man does, how-
el'er, have a Turkish Army gTeatcoat and boots. The
rest of his clothes, and his probably Martini rifle, are
his own.
D: Specialist troops
D,: Assau/t party. 1918
Towards the end of the Great War some Ottoman
infantry were issued with steel helmets which dif-
fered from the German type in several respects.
Among the first units to be so equipped were 'storm-
troopers', comparable [0 those seen on the European
fronts; these served in Palestine and in Trans-
caucasia. Over his left shoulder this man carries a bag
of grenades and he is armed with the German rather
than 'Turkish' Mauser M.1898 rine. This may
suggest that he was attached to the recently formed
Y.ldmm Army in Syria and Palestine.
D2: Ski-troops NCO. Caucasus c.1917
Turkish formations of sid-troops evolved under
Austrian or German direction and reflected Austr~
German mountain troops. This man is well equipped
for the rigours' of an eastern Anatolian winter
Turkish ski-troops wellf'iflg fllCCS, t9'5. Thcy WQuid
complete white !,mow- probably opc.rnlC as
camoufltlgc, including snipers. (Asked Milzcsi,
8"3 uzc sct"CCns IlCrQSS their Isranbul)
campaign. His skis have simple foot or ankle bindings
rather than the modem form of boot clips, and he
uses only a single ski pole. Photographs of Turkish
ski-troops show some with very light-coloured collar
patches. These havc been hypothetically shown as
white on this reconstruction.
DJ: Officer ora machine-gun detachment
Beneath his long overcoat this officcr would wear a
uniform similar to that ofMustafa Kemal in Plate AI,
although his kohu/ak is different in both shape and
winding. Only officers wore this style, though not all
of them did so. The grass-green collar indicates his
branch of the service and is repeated in the narrow
edging of the cloth around his kaha/d. The man is
also armed with a revolver, probably of Austrian
manufacturc.
£: ArriJJery
£1: ArtiJJcry officer, GaJJipoli 1915
Some Turkish artillerymen continued to wear white
uniforms in summer, as Ottoman troops had done for
almost a century. This officer also wcars a ltaha/ak
with blue cdging indicating his branch of service, and
with its leathcr chin-strap pushed up on top. On his
hip is a large artillery-type Parabellum pistol in its
holster.
£2: ArtiJ/cry omccr, GllUcilJ
Ahhough the units that the Ouoman Empire sent 10
Galicia were well equipped and generally uniformed
in the usual fashion, they were often resupplied by
their German or Austrian allies. The leather braces to
this man's belt also appear to have been characteristic
of the Galician fronl. He wears a standard officer's
uniform, his branch of service being shown by his
blue collar. and he has the ribbon of the Turkish War
Medal.
E]: Artillery Sergeant, GaUcja
This NCO is basically dressed in the standard
uniform for his rank, which is indicated by both
shoulder markings and rings on his slee\'es. His tunic
and lTousers arc once more ofa very rough and poorly
made type seen later in the war.
F: Air Forces
FI: Naval Pilor Engineer MiiJaZIm
(Lieutenant) Ahmet ofthe Na val Flying
School. Ycsilkoy, dress uniform.
Most Ottoman aircrew were recruited from the
Turkish he2rtland or from Turkish or other Muslim
refugees from the Balkans; others came from the
Arab provinccsofthe Ottoman Empire as far south as
Yemen, or even from neuml Iran. Captain Ahmet
was of Arab-African origin and may ha\'c been the
first 'black' Air Force pilot in aviation hislOry, having
received his 'wings' in 1914-15. I-Ie wears the
...
standard dress uniform of an Olloman naval officer,
although as a technical officer the rings on his sleeves
lack the loops worn by combat officers. The scarlet
between the rings also idenlifies him as an engineer.
F2: Army Air Force Observer kliilaZlm
(Lieutenant )S,,1.:1. NO.4 Squadron. southern
AnaroUa 1917
Lt. SItk1 was a Turkish officer who qualified as an
observer at Yesilkoy outside Istanbul in 1917. He first
served on the southern coast of Turkey, then in what
is now Jordan and finally in southern Syria agajnst
Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab Revoh. Here he
wcars the full uniform of an Onoman flyer, distin-
guished by his red collar, the winged device on his
kafplJltand the Air Force badge on his left breast. The
flying coal, helmet and goggles he carries are all of
German make.
F]: Gennan volunteer Pilot Klcinchuyk ofNo.
10 Squadron, southern AnatoUa. summer 1917
K1einehayk was a German reserve officer seconded 10
the Turkish Air Force, where he served for several
months in 1917. Here he wears a kabafd with
Turkish Air Force wings on the fronl. I-Ie is also
shown with a German 13-18 em aerial camcra.
G:Navy
GJ: Sailor ofnavlJllanding parry
The ovcrwhelming might of the British and French
Ouomlln Army mccJicnl
orderlit"S with /l 't'/lcolcr',
orc:u.mcl Jitter, in 19,6.
Such littcrs ",cre also USt'd
by AI/it-d /lrmies in thc
Middlc EnSt /lnd though
excruciatingly
uncomfortablc ",crc oftcn
thc only mcans of
cvacu/lting thc 'I·ounded.
Notc the/arge Rc<i
Crescent arm·bands 'I'orn
by onc orderly and the
officer. fAderi ,\luzes;,
Istanbul)
The fimcrnl orSulran
Rcsnt in Isrnnbul in 19,8.
Thc oorr4c is cscorred by
troops from !he pnlaec
guard ""caring ",-hite lamb-
sl.:in kalpaJ..-s with plumes
at !he front. Othcr
photographs show I.hat the
route orrhe funeral WlIS
guarded by men from !he
Istanbul F;re Brigade,
itselfIf regular Anny un;I.
(Asleri Muzes;, Isranbul)
navies meant that large Turkish ships couJd almost
never \'enture into the Aegean or Mediterranean
Seas, though the)' were active against the Russians in
the Black Sea. Instead the Turkish Navy concen-
trated on small C02stal operations against enemy (and
pirate) bases on islands offthe Anatolian C():lst. Here 2
petty officer with such a landing party wears the white
summer uniform worn by all Turkish seamen, plus a
distinctive white kobalok. On his legs he has canvas
gaiters O\'er stiff anvas boots with leather soles.
G2: Nav:J} ablc scaman
British influence was widespread throughout the
modernized Ouoman Turkish N.avy: Turkish ships
were painted in the same colours as those ofthe Royal
Navy. Naval uniforms of men and officers reflected
British influence and officer insignia also mirrored
that of the Royal Navy. Only the shape and design of
this sailor's cap is distinctly Turkish for, like the
Ottoman officer's peakless hat worn by Naval Pilot
Ahmet (Plate FI), it lacks any protuberance which
would prevent a Muslim's forehead from touching
the ground as he prayed.
GJ: Naval Comnl.'lndcr, winter uniform 1915
The fact thaI this senior naval officer still wears an
old-fashioned stiffform of red fez, supposedly phased
out when the Onoman Navy was modernized, might
suggest that he was a member of the naval reserve.
The Commodore's three rings and loop on his slee\'cs
are virtually identical to those of the Royal Navy.
Meanwhile his leather boots and gaiters suggest that
he has a shore posting.
H: ftlisccllancous
HI: IsCt.mbul Fire Brigade Infantryman
The Istanbul Fire Brigade constituted a regular
Army infantry' regiment. When serving in that
capacity its uniform was identical to that of other
infantry regiments except for a special collar badge.
This man is shown in his fireman's uniform which
has the same collar badges, including the Arabic
number 12 which might refer to his fire station in
Istanbul.
H2: Allied Afghan Prince, C.'917
Among the many Muslim nations where the OUoman
Empire tried to foment anti-British, anti-Russian,
anti-French and anti-I taJian risings was Afghanistan,
which was at that time under a large degree of British
control. In 1917 a delegation of pro-Ottoman Afghan
leaders visited Istanbul where they met senior mili-
tary officers at the Flying School at Yesilkoy. The
very Onoman-style uniforms worn by a prince in this
delegation suggests that they had travelled incognito
from Afghanistan, and were given suitable clothes
when they arrived.
HJ: Boy soldier, voluntccr bomb thrower tJt
Gal/ipo}i,1915
Under the Ottoman conscription syStem a son
sometimes served in place of his father. Such
youngsters oflen fought hard and could become
NCOs. This boy is a sergeant, as shown by his
shoulder-boards. The slippers on his feet might
indiate that the Army had no bootS small enough or
that his military role necessitated stealth.
NOles sur Ics plnnchcs en coulcorli forblnfcln

A 0l'I>citfs <Ie ~uc lTa<k .. Cbimoni.l. AI ;\IlI$Ur. Ktmal daM 101I u"ironn~<Ie A 0l'IU:je,.., hOheo'm Ran.. und 7.cf('ftMlilitl1. Al ~I f. 1' 1 in ";n"
Ia campa,... <Ie Gallipol;' II porI~ un unir_ CIM"" d·officic:, ..., I< '<lni.. <Ionc G.mpoli-f.ldu ..'f....... f.. I..... d;' Iypd(h<: u .. ironn ti Sc.booIIU; mi' de'"
I< ch:aP<"'u bboaLok dis'i....ir. Son piOlole! eM ..... dou,~ un ~bu<cr ;\IocICl< "h:ara~I.,;.tiocht:n K.baolal.Hu'. Kri ooi l'locolo: h:andc:h .. 1icta hncilei..lich
19lo-H. A2 1':"," ,,_. ;\I"••,,.., de .. G...,.,..,. pon~ I'u"ir_ <Ie .......ia d'un wn tine: .\b-., Mode" 1910 I., AIO Knopm'....... £ft,..,. "III c.... die
ome....J u ....... douw.. ... ,,,tt> .....
Itloundafd ...' k pontalon. I.·on!", p.....-.. Dinuo..Difoi'm rincs GcMnIa
... den liottn. Oct p"",1Iiocht: Orde
<lie ndo,d....1lism doppo:lc... rot... Slmfcn
llOica Mien "'il Scharp<:. dot; pi'Cu8iochc
<Ie l'AicIe R~ ._"" tanlllK all_.1a Cnli. de r.. pnuaimM. I"()rd,.., pnuaim
Pou, k ;\Im,~. 1'On!", bulprio.. <I.. M"',~ .... Ooi~ ",i~ta;"" aulridtienM d.. r........ K~ ..... .P'!':"1lia<h<: Orden """, It Mmle...... tau nach<: \'..dit.... oo,_
;\Iml~. AJ PunoCtnKbnl r.'".nl u" bbaoLaL lieht: d IQ m.- _ttl oli~ d'un deft wad du iSPtfI'ridIisclw ~1il fftI'dic-rwk<C1lL AJ SUflCb, nlt:l..... m" riJac-m
lirnt' d·.Ii<~. Le dnP<"'u 'I" il porI~ Ollmpon~ Ia Dkb.ral;o. de Foi "'.....Ittunr.. ..... ~bunclencn K.bobk wad oli>ynuan Aufnahcr SdwfJehumn. A.. f
81"w...n.. 01 F... lAYUI.ws19l •• _tilde .... rd>o ..... pIon. Sont utOfi.....u:M
.... ~1aJIo. dit .. In.....e11l du tSlanaiocht: G1aul>oaabtk lnia IUl'hriobeoa.
II.''' ..... It """~ do_ kil eM "'.yk:ollrnwad. IA r..a1 eM ... ~bll5tt Ml89J B llOfaJacm.. Bl Fddinfanl..... Ulil 1'1. in ta uwiocu"'. $riM
.....". C'IIn\'II ~ pou. I· twq"" OIIto1lUM. 81 I.e fa _ _ lillifonn is< liidiadatt'.krkunf't. doda ...... ReM A_ is< Scil ....,.,
mo;t;q"" 'I"" ~ oold.al...._ 19l7. '·eM pal ttl ....... KIt. .i-ftIi par IQ dna....... Beim. Gc--da. ha aidI Ulil 'I.. rl*tac· 10 MIlI9J. die
•.au id.ie,. D1110s allan:mda. il. u.. rullil MOIIia-S.,...e. Sa I.. niq"" at ......sn, riF- lW die iirUclat A....- tiIl.. orrn. .."n:Ic. H1 Am ....,......
phaa ..... pIe. ;"Irodun pc11da..,1a I""lTC. OJ Soldat be d·;..ra i bicydtclCc. . - . ~... "" 1- . da. d...- SoIdao 1917•• ultt 0....0 ... f _on
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bh&bll .... rc: .. po.u fIIttl aIImauad M 1888, :,Oloasift..:-.: -Go:.. dar. SaM U jad:~entspidM ......~ "." M...........
C c.,-.I<ne. CI (IIliaer ......,..Imc pona.,
u.. u....r_ IYJIO'IIIO of'olficicr "'""mad des KnqeI ~..M OJ Anboothcr I ...... FaIarnd-
I.r......... Arabim. 1.1S.Aaocdlt rbacIltn K.h&bll lnI' .. dw ... t.dw
" " - bon qvc _ bt-bl aoit ~ puG. II pone boc de
Cl .cp
......... -ad<lo 1909 n«'" aoiaoa........ n...r""l0 _ _
M""" I"CO._.1917pone . . bbaobk
p ....
nIori<.11
KopIbcdcd.UiII mil K
C Kant..... CI 1'
Ihaandota""'" u.... Iaol ti
iii "'piIda
Grcodar M1
~
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...,.......b.-. """I'" d'. _brt • to
MI'IOi. Cl~uftIIlitr K
d . . bona. r................ Ie ""IC~.'"
.~_6ou<c.
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llparW ... _ _
hnil M.naai .....
..olwi _ Kah&bll "",",oltaID
M..... _ ...............oUdor H.albnoooad
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Icncbbolal. Er
'luruIdMOa' M
sn- Ktaf<SM\IOCk
Er"1 - . . Ka
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1917
u
bd des 19090rr
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Kant-
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DJOlIicocr • •",d..
1tIoac _--. II pon~ ulatbk • •)k~ .. _coI
pon~ ...
a11eoaaaJad plaril
1.17. St:su._
"N'"
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.... _KIead""" ...... _~~ ........ ~_odbat.
I) So
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E AtU1Iene. EIOII'iatt d·anlIleno. GaIlipoli 1.IS Pone tOr...- bbao: Sl.......... D3Ql1iaxr "1M' iI2:..~ Et lnI' riaea w.,aa
.-.... los uou",," 01"" . _ ........., r.. tndn d I'm. SOB
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TnlPP"'P''-'" Er ...................-.. bn-alliwo,
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pone r - r - d'c6xr owadanl Sa laraoadw • ....-itt eM' 1 . 1..... pat_col EAndrrio. EI A~.G.Pipoli 1'15, Er,.... tIic-'lcU.u.-. .....
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r I jl ........... lei .....daa. Sa " _ w. _ If"" .... Parabchm-l'iatolr . . And Y ~..~.-...,. U ArteIIocoico-
~rc: CfIb I'ut ",ii_ rot-lAfd .........11a JUttft. Ofiricr.C.I; ~" r SaatT"'pptiIpi'.....
wird b1a K.... ~btn........... I RancI ..... "'rliadatn
f F _ . I ·... fll.caopllaUl<'A1aMto _oriJ-aftUint.lUII'...
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" iIIe. FJ Andler-Fdd.dld. G.1Wn. Sunoiudouuf<lnft o.nD<S
R~ duodI die Sd"'.lo~ rilde Stftiral .'\...-1 ~'-' .
d·..... ,.;,a.,. ...,..t 011 1..- r F' I 'k oacha li1Ilio:!.--1 ",,'i1 e<t SmwU.. di:ornIjade ..... d.. II rc-Iali_ acIoleclu... So.... <kr no .....
"'anw.
oftIci,., ledanaqui'
F! IA Lt. Sid pon~ I'.Dit'<armo ......
.-eICe ......e.... 1 _
'*'
, inriaoe enl'ft Ia ,...poilo nwIiq"" qu'il ....
d'"" .,-utew OItoma11l. Sa
_c r.briq.... en A1Iema..... F'J 0lIici0r
o.palttnl Kriopjahmo .utUlIChtc.
F' L..r.~ FI llou"' Ahmei boda... rriu....,hcr Abourn",...., .....
•
oIIemuad .rbcn~diudWi r IIM 1""1"" 1I ... nl.abatol.," .... aika .... rifttt Cf$Ittl l'iloi ,n Gad"",hl~ ..... L..r.r.hn. Er c""ll
i I·..........11C",,,,", aOricn"'" a1lttnalKlt U-llknt. ..... owadon:l 1lism D;mu ci _nilrdan ~ I ~ . 0;., Slmr...
an ooirwn Amad. ~cnO>;ei<b""", ill.. ala lCChraixM. Off...... u.... <Iiio: .,har1adarole
G .\bn"",. GI Sou>.-olIlcacr d'..... _ , . . _ de d<bao.-q n' qu, pon~ un
..,.;r....... bl..", d''' •• Ull ....balal b1aM"
..ide i .....die: de CIIi. Glc.. ..... ~Iot de Ia
del...., de wile: flO'
ri... Oil
bon"" ok ,.. Ie
c.. ....,d<k
Farbc ...·iadatn den IIii'll" d<u<...... daB~, I..,.......' .01. F! I Sill, , .... dit
lOtJlplonu linir.................... oM:httI ~' orin f'lcice el. dit Flin¥r-
brillc .. nd dtt I kim lind okUllCho:r l.uftnllC: u c1h ..,.. rdc, I ti..... K.bala~
pt1",itaio que rim "" puOtM f;'IItpklatr Ie frono "' !nun ok 10tIChn" Ie: 101 dutUl' mic dc:nt l'iloi....bl>tkhcn an <kr V",dc:neiC' u..d .... dc:uu;chcs II 18 "'"
... priCrct. GJ c.. com.... ndo"l ,..1en u..ir d,.i,·., pon~ UM r......... ide:
l..nbild' L
1lCm~ de rel ...... ~. 1_ btlal 100 ,.mblkn en "'"' """,,",,I qu';1 • u.. """~ i
,= G Mori GI ;\1.., ci.... 1..ndu"pr...1'l'O' ," ... 11<, .som........... ironn. eint1tl
.. ti8tn Ka,,"lok und Sq.Il~ma.. hcn lab...uir." Sud.l.. mi. l.Nerwlllen.
II l)j,-CfI. III S<>Idal d·,nr,"IU;' dco PIlttIJ"or" d·I ...",bIll. I:unir........... G! Dicot. \'011.....« * 1""11 do< ch.rall.... ';,.,h< '"'~ildloo< Mu'-"", ..... """.ni_
idenl'9"" i fflui d·uI'" ,q;...... c. d·i.. f... I.... lOur""", Ie bad,. .pfcial.u col, ........ ~hri.... Du"'h dM:sc Form ..., .. de" M... i<nta moslith. ",i, dc:' Slim bei'"
III Pnllff .f,h:an .11ie ouI"". <Ie 1917. IA I'rillff porle u.. unif.......... ",).", Gebtt un~chindUi dtn Oodtn .U bttuh,.",. GJ l>ieoc-r Mo,i""k"",,,,andeu. i......
OiComan ind;quanc qu'.1 • pcuc-n", 'Q,.. ~ ill<qi:.. ilO depllil r Ar,,,",,i.c.n. UJ 1....- Wi"lcru",ronn In,l cint .hmodilch<:••Idr. ~.""" des I'OIcn rta, I)~ l..(tk."itkl
ipaukll" plac.. de I·.."ir....... de« "1'(01'I
i.. diqu~"c qu'il e<t .." 1. 11 pori. u"d G.nullChc.. l~" ".h<:, daB .. an l....d poalitn ilc.
dco ..... c""""" <Oil paru 'I"" r Arm<e" ·.,..il par. de bool.....
lui. soil pal'« qu'il de,.. i. 1'....;11<' i 1.lItrobtt.
Ifu;o"'' ' '
i'.. ""'"
II l)i\'~""" IIlI"f,,,c.rill dc:. I..."bulu ~·.u....,.h,. 0 .. u";r",,,, IIei.h,
.bcQ<hal .."" beoondc"'" " .. ~b'~ith... d... dc:' a"dere"
I.. fa"c.no,,,,,i,,, c III AlI~n" .f.,,""'lI<lau rn........ 1917. Iln Prinx lrill
.i... U..if...... """, iIdI.n Slih...... "urllCbei"lkh bcd.U'~I. daB.r inl"llnllo all'
ArC"""iI..,, 0"1."'''' iOl. IU o.c SChuJI ....""le." d.. U..if...", diaa Ju.., ...
u"lWOChMn ihn .Ia Scrica"c~", .:, Ir••c l"ralofl'~I .. u"d " ... ' en'..·.de' ·<il dit
A....... ltine Slitfcl h.ne. dit llei" ....u....."'... ode' .-cil., bei oc; AurlraC
IChIcich<:n ",u60~ .