NEWSLETTER (2)

ANTI BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT ACTION:-

LADBROKES AND CORAL OWNER TO PAY £585M TO SETTLE HMRC

BRIBERY INQUIRY

HTTPS://WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM/BUSINESS/2023/NOV/24/
LADBROKES-AND-CORAL-OWNER-TO-PAY-585M-TO-SETTLE-HMRC-
BRIBERY-INQUIRY

The owner of Ladbrokes and Coral has agreed to pay almost £600m to settle an investigation
into alleged bribery at a business it owned in Turkey.
Entain said it had reached an agreement with HM Revenue and Customs which will make the
gambling giant pay a total of £585m in the form of a financial penalty and a “disgorgement of
profits”.
Under the terms of the agreement, the penalty, which includes an extra £20m charitable
donation and a contribution of £10m towards the costs incurred by HMRC and the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS), will be paid in instalments over four years.
“This legacy matter concerns a business which was sold by a former management team six
years ago,” said Barry Gibson, the chair of Entain. “The group has changed immeasurably
since these events took place.

“We are committed to continuing our journey towards operating only in regulated markets,
and are now widely recognised as a best-in-class, responsible operator with the highest levels
of corporate governance across all aspects of our business.”

HMRC originally launched an investigation in 2019 into “potential corporate offending” by a

Turkish-facing online betting and gaming business that Entain owned between 2011 and
2017, as well as the activities of third-party suppliers and former employees of the group.
Entain – formerly known as GVC – is accused of failing to have the correct procedures in
place to stop people taking part in bribes that benefit the business.

Entain said in August it was likely to have to pay a substantial penalty to settle the
investigation, setting aside £585m.
Entain said it reached, in principle, a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the CPS
during a hearing at the royal courts of justice on Friday. It needs final court approval at a
hearing to be held on 5 December.

Under a DPA, a company is charged with a criminal offence but the proceedings are
automatically suspended if the DPA receives approval from a judge. They must then adhere
to strict rules. DPAs have been used in instances of alleged bribery and corruption with
companies including the jet engines maker Rolls-Royce.

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS :

1) THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE FINES MARIAGE FRÈRES

TEAS FOR HINDERING ITS DISTRIBUTORS’ COMMERCIAL
FREEDOM (FRANCE)
December 11, 2023

HTTPS://WWW.AUTORITEDELACONCURRENCE.FR/EN/ARTICLE/AUTORI
TE-DE-LA-CONCURRENCE-FINES-MARIAGE-FRERES-TEAS-HINDERING-
ITS-DISTRIBUTORS-COMMERCIAL?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-
PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

Following a report prepared by the local network of the Minister of the Economy and
submitted by the Directorate General for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud
Control (DGCCRF), the Autorité de la concurrence has imposed a €4 million penalty on the
Mariage Frères group – one of France’s leading producers of premium teas – for hindering
the commercial freedom of its distributors for almost 15 years by forbidding them to sell its
branded products online, on the one hand, and to resell its products to other retailers, on the
other. These practices, which limited intra-brand competition and partitioned markets,
constitute a cartel.
In a sector where online sales are enjoying strong growth, the ban on selling the products
concerned on the Internet was likely to restrict the development of distributors’ business. By
coupling this practice with the ban on reselling to other distributors, Mariage Frères also
deprived end consumers of the possibility of enjoying better prices as a result of effective
competition between all distributors.

A BAN ON ONLINE SALES OF MARIAGE FRÈRES PRODUCTS

The general terms and conditions of sale governing relations between Mariage Frères and its
distributors prohibited the latter from selling Mariage products over the Internet. Mariage
Frères therefore reserved the exclusive right to the online and distance selling of its products.
While distributors were allowed to indicate on their website that they sold the brand’s
products in their stores, they were not allowed to sell them over the Internet, nor to use the
brand’s logo. Mariage Frères meticulously monitored compliance with these rules, asking
distributors who offered its products for sale online to remove them from their websites
immediately.
Many distributors, often small or very small businesses, suffered from this ban, which
hampered the growth of their business. For example, one business stated during the
investigation, “I THINK THAT ONLINE SALES OF MARIAGE FRÈRES PRODUCTS
COULD GENERATE AT LEAST A 30% INCREASE IN MY TURNOVER.”
At the same time, between 2013 and 2021, when retailers were faced with this ban, the
Mariage Frères group’s share of online sales (mainly via its website or Amazon) more than
tripled.
Mariage Frères justified the ban on its distributors by its desire to preserve the prestigious
image of its products. According to its CFO, “WE COULD NOT CONTROL THE WAY
OUR PRODUCTS WOULD BE MARKETED OR THE QUALITY OF THE WEBSITE,
AND THIS WAS LIKELY TO DAMAGE THE BRAND.”
However, according to decision-making practice and settled case law, this objective does not
justify the absolute neutralisation of the online distribution channel.
THE BAN ON RESELLING MARIAGE FRÈRES PRODUCTS TO OTHER
RETAILERS

The clauses of the general terms and conditions of sale also prohibited distributors from
reselling the premium tea products to other retailers. This restriction gave Mariage Frères
exclusive rights to wholesale sales and limited the commercial scope of its distributors to
sales to individual consumers. According to one of the distributors, “I CAN CONFIRM
THAT MARIAGE FORBIDS ME FROM SELLING MARIAGE PRODUCTS TO
OTHER RETAILERS. THIS WAS MADE CLEAR TO ME ONE MONTH AGO BY
TELEPHONE (NOT IN WRITING, OF COURSE).”
This practice, which restricts the clientele to which a buyer can sell goods, constitutes, by the
harm caused, a restriction of competition by object.
Compliance
While a supplier is free to organise its distribution network as it sees fit, this organisation
must not give rise to anticompetitive practices.
The principle of the free organisation of the network cannot authorise a manufacturer to
restrict the commercial freedom of its resellers. Reserving the manufacturer’s exclusive right
to sell its products online distorts the competition in which resellers should normally engage,
not only between themselves but above all with regard to the manufacturer in the online sales
distribution channel.
2) THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE FINES ROLEX €91,600,000
FOR PROHIBITING ITS AUTHORISED RETAILERS FROM SELLING
ITS WATCHES ONLINE (FRANCE)
HTTPS://WWW.AUTORITEDELACONCURRENCE.FR/EN/COMMUNIQUES-
DE-PRESSE/LAUTORITE-DE-LA-CONCURRENCE-SANCTIONNE-ROLEX-
DUNE-AMENDE-DE-91-600-000-EUROS

Background

Following referrals from the Union de la Bijouterie Horlogerie and Pellegrin & Fils, as well
as dawn raids, the Autorité de la concurrence has fined Rolex France (jointly and severally
with Rolex Holding SA, the Hans Wilsdorf Foundation and Rolex SA) for prohibiting its
retailers from selling Rolex watches online for more than ten years.
The Autorité considers that the terms of the selective distribution agreement between Rolex
France and its retailers constitute a vertical agreement that restricts competition.
The Autorité rejected Rolex France’s argument that the ban on online selling was justified by
the need to combat counterfeiting and parallel trade. Finding in this respect that Rolex’s main
competitors, who face the same risks, authorise the online selling of their products under
certain conditions, it considered that these objectives can be achieved by means that are less
restrictive of competition.
It has imposed a penalty of €91,600,000 on Rolex France SAS, together with a disclosure and
publication injunction.
However, the Autorité rejected the objection concerning the resale prices imposed on its
retailers, which had been notified to Rolex. It considered that the evidence in the case did not
prove that Rolex France had restricted the pricing freedom of its authorised retailers.

Rolex’s selective distribution model

The Rolex group is a Swiss group founded in 1905 that designs, manufactures and markets
luxury watches and components under the Rolex and Tudor brands. In France, imports are
handled by a French subsidiary of the Swiss company Rolex Holding SA, Rolex France SAS,
the sole importer of the brand’s products.
Rolex is active in the French luxury watch distribution market and, by virtue of its reputation
and market share, is, according to several concordant sources, the largest player in the
market. The company exclusively uses a network of authorised independent retailers to
market its watches. It sells its watches to watch and jewellery retailers, to which it grants the
right to distribute its products under a “Rolex selective distribution agreement”.

Rolex prohibits its authorised retailers from selling its products online

The selective distribution agreement governing relations between Rolex and its retailers
prohibited the latter from selling the brand’s watches by mail order and, a fortiori, via the
Internet. In a letter to one of its retailers, Rolex acknowledged this ban: “we confirm that
under no circumstances can our Authorised Retailers, who are the only parties authorised to
sell our products, do so via the Internet or by mail order. Any sales via the Internet
contravene the provisions of Article IV.3.b of the Selective Distribution Agreement signed by
all our Authorised Retailers.”
The Autorité and case law consider this type of clause to be inherently restrictive of
competition.
Furthermore, the Autorité’s investigation of Rolex’s retailers confirms the practical
application of this ban.
As justification, Rolex argued that the ban on online selling was intended to preserve its
image and enable it to combat counterfeiting and off-network sales. While the Autorité does
not dispute the legitimacy of these objectives, it found that prohibiting online selling is not a
proportionate measure. It points out that Rolex’s main competitors, who themselves face this
type of risk, have implemented (primarily technological) solutions to reconcile online selling
with the fight against counterfeiting and off-network sales. In addition, Rolex, in conjunction
with one of its retailers, has developed a programme for the online purchase of pre-owned
watches, whose authenticity it guarantees. An absolute ban on the online selling of its
products cannot therefore be justified.

The Autorité fines Rolex €91,600,000

The Autorité considers these practices to be serious, as they amount to closing a marketing
channel, to the detriment of consumers and retailers, when the online distribution of luxury
products, including watches, has been booming over the past 15 years. Given their duration
(more than ten years) and nature, the Autorité is imposing a penalty of €91,600,000. Because
of the capital, organisational and legal links between Rolex France and Rolex Holding SA,
Rolex SA and the Hans Wilsdorf Foundation, the Autorité holds the latter companies jointly
and severally liable for the payment of the fine.

3) THE AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE FINES SONY €13.5 MILLION

FOR ABUSING ITS DOMINANT POSITION IN THE MARKET FOR
THE SUPPLY OF VIDEO GAME CONTROLLERS FOR PS4 (FRANCE)
Published on December 20, 2023

HTTPS://WWW.AUTORITEDELACONCURRENCE.FR/EN/PRESS-
RELEASE/AUTORITE-DE-LA-CONCURRENCE-FINES-SONY-EU135-
MILLION-ABUSING-ITS-DOMINANT-POSITION
BACKGROUND

Following a referral from Subsonic, a French manufacturer of video game controllers,

the AUTORITÉ has fined Sony (four group companies, including the Japanese parent
company) for abusing its dominant position in the market for the supply of video game
controllers for PlayStation 4 (PS4) consoles for more than four years.
The AUTORITÉ has sanctioned two practices:

 First, Sony’s use, from November 2015, of technical countermeasures, allegedly

implemented to combat counterfeiting, which affected the proper functioning of third-
party video game controllers (produced by manufacturers other than Sony and without
an official Sony licence), regularly leading to them being disconnected during console
operating system updates.

While the AUTORITÉ stresses the legitimacy of the objective of combating counterfeiting, it
points out that such measures were disproportionate, since they affected all “unlicensed”
controllers indiscriminately.

 Second, an opaque licensing policy, which in several cases prevented rival companies
that wanted to market PS4-compatible controllers from joining the OLP partnership
programme, which is the only way for third parties to obtain an official licence and
unique identification numbers. The AUTORITÉ found that by refusing to
communicate the OLP access criteria to manufacturers who requested them, Sony
applied the criteria in a discretionary manner, even though access to the programme
was the only way to avoid disconnections.

The AUTORITÉ considers that the combination of these two practices significantly damaged
the brand image of the third-party manufacturers affected, with regard to both players and
distributors, slowing down their expansion in the market and leading to their possible
foreclosure.
The fine, amounting to €13,527,000, is imposed jointly and severally on three subsidiaries
and the parent company of the Sony group:

 Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited (in charge of the licensing programme
in Europe);
 Sony Interactive Entertainment Inc. K.K (responsible for rolling out operating system
updates for the PS4 console);
 Sony Interactive Entertainment France (responsible for marketing controllers in
France);
 Sony Group Corporation (parent company).

THE PS4 CONTROLLER PRODUCTION MODEL

The PS4 is Sony’s 8th-generation console. On sale since 2019, it comes with a PS4 controller
called a DualShock 4, designed by Sony. This same controller is also sold separately, as
video game controllers are the best-selling console accessory.
There are three different types of PS4 controllers:

 controllers produced by Sony;

 controllers produced by manufacturers under licence from the Sony group;
 controllers produced by third parties that do not have an official licence.

With its brand image, reliability and quality and the perfect, long-lasting compatibility of its
controllers with the PS4 console, Sony is in a dominant position in the market for the supply
of PS4 controllers.

THE BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND EXPANSION ERECTED BY SONY

The AUTORITÉ found that Sony had abused its dominant position by implementing two
practices simultaneously: technical countermeasures aimed at disconnecting controllers not
produced and licensed by Sony from the PS4 console, and an opaque licensing policy, under
the OLP[1]partnership programme alone, which is difficult to integrate in practice.

 Technical countermeasures

The controllers produced by Sony and by manufacturers that are members of the OLP
programme, and which thus have an official licence, are fitted with a chip containing a
unique identification number that Sony can, in principle, use to identify them.
The AUTORITÉ found that, during certain updates to the PS4 console, Sony caused
controllers without an identification number or controllers with a number duplicated on a
large scale to be disconnected. As a result, all the controllers produced by third parties
outside the OLP programme were affected. While the AUTORITÉ found that manufacturers
were able to respond to these disconnections, A POSTERIORI, by giving their users
“corrective patches”, it points out that these patches were not immediately available and not
always easy to install. As a result, some users could reasonably have believed that the
disconnections affecting their controllers were attributable to the manufacturers of these
controllers and their lack of quality.
To justify these countermeasures, Sony claimed that they were taken to combat the
infringement of its intellectual property rights. While the AUTORITÉ considers that Sony
was pursuing a legitimate objective in taking measures to combat counterfeiting, it points out
that these measures were not proportionate with this objective. The disconnection of video
game controllers other than those sold by Sony and those under licence affected all third-
party controllers, whether counterfeit or not. In the AUTORITÉ’s view, the absence of a
licence is not sufficient to prove that the controllers are counterfeit. As a result, Sony took
deactivation measures that affected both infringing controllers and unlicensed but non-
infringing controllers.
The AUTORITÉ recalls that the French system for protecting intellectual property, and in
particular patents, relies first and foremost on legal recourse. By taking technical
countermeasures against companies that it had not been able to convict of counterfeiting
before the French courts, Sony went further than was strictly necessary to achieve its
objective, such that the restriction of competition resulting from its practices cannot be
justified.

 AN OPAQUE LICENSING POLICY

In parallel with these technical countermeasures, Sony made access to its OLP partnership
programme opaque. In particular, the AUTORITÉ noted that Sony limited both the licensing
of its intellectual property and the granting of unique identification numbers for avoiding
disconnection to the members of this partnership programme.
The AUTORITÉ found that the criteria for accessing the license and the identification
numbers were not communicated to all manufacturers who requested them, and were
imprecise enough to lend themselves to discretionary application. As a result, Subsonic, like
other manufacturers, was never able to obtain Sony’s membership criteria.
The AUTORITÉ therefore considers that Sony’s licensing policy was opaque, difficult to
understand and therefore difficult to integrate in practice.
As a result, these unlicensed companies had to cope with the untimely disconnections
implemented by Sony as part of software updates, without being able to join the licensing
programme.
These practices damaged their brand image. In this respect, the AUTORITÉ found that
dissatisfied users were discouraged from buying controllers from third-party manufacturers
without a licence, but also that their negative comments dissuaded other users from buying
them, with the result that these new buyers logically switched their choice to a Sony
controller or one approved by Sony as part of the licensing programme.

SONY FINED €13,527,000

The AUTORITÉ considers that Sony abused its dominant position for more than four years,
between November 2015 and April 2020, i.e. for most of the life of the PS4 console. For this
reason, it has jointly and severally fined four Sony group companies: Sony Interactive
Entertainment Europe Limited (in charge of the licensing programme in Europe); Sony
Interactive Entertainment Inc. K.K (responsible for rolling out operating system updates for
the PS4 console); Sony Interactive Entertainment France (responsible for marketing
controllers in France) and Sony Group Corporation.
Furthermore, the AUTORITÉ found that Sony implemented the measures constituting the
infringement at a time when this market was opening up to competition, and continued to do
so throughout the period during which this market was able to allow competitors to flourish.
While Sony claimed that the unlicensed controllers were inevitably trademark or patent
infringements, the AUTORITÉ rejected this argument, pointing out that the patents invoked
by Sony expired or were about to expire during the period of the practices. The technical
countermeasures could, therefore, have the effect of extending the exclusive rights conferred
by the patents, even after the invention had fallen into the public domain.
Accordingly, the AUTORITÉ considers Sony’s anticompetitive behaviour to be particularly
serious and, applying the methodology set out in its procedural notice on fines, has imposed a
fine of €13,527,000.

4) ACM IMPOSES FINES ON FOUR COMPANIES FOR ILLEGALLY

SHARING THE MARKET FOR CARROTS (NETHERLANDS)

HTTPS://WWW.ACM.NL/EN/PUBLICATIONS/ACM-IMPOSES-FINES-FOUR-
COMPANIES-ILLEGALLY-SHARING-MARKET-CARROTS-0?
TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

The Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has imposed fines, totaling
over 2.5 million euros, on four companies that shared among each other the production,
processing, and sale of different types of carrots. The agreements between Laarakker,
VanRijsingen, Veco, and Verduyn had been made for ten years. Competition between these
firms was thus restricted. Laarakker and Verduyn had notified ACM of their illegal conduct,
and were thus given reductions of their fines. All companies have acknowledged the
violation, and have cooperated with the procedure after ACM had conducted dawn raids
following various indications it had received.

Martijn Snoep, Chairman of the Board of ACM, explains: “Businesses that share the market
among each other deny their buyers the benefits of competition. It is good that these
agreements have come to an end, and that these companies wanted to make a clean sweep by
actively cooperating with the investigation and acknowledging the violation.”

WHAT WAS THIS CASE ABOUT?

These four companies sell carrots and Parisian carrots to businesses in the canning and
frozen-food industries in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. In the canning industry,
carrots are predominantly used in combination with green peas. Unlike regular carrots,
Parisian carrots are spherical in shape, and are preferred on the German market.
In a 2008 written agreement, Laarakker, VanRijsingen, Veco, and Verduyn agreed that, for a
period of ten years, Veco would refrain from producing, processing, and selling carrots.
Laarakker, VanRijsingen, and Verduyn would refrain from producing, processing, and selling
Parisian carrots. It was also agreed that Veco would be financially compensated.
Compensation payments were actually made. In addition, Laarakker and Veco made
additional arrangements on the supply of Parisian carrots to German buyers. VanRijsingen
and Verduyn were not involved in this agreement.

ACM AND COMPETITION OVERSIGHT

ACM ensures that markets work well for people and businesses. That is why ACM enforces
compliance with competition rules. Businesses that make illicit price-fixing agreements,
market-sharing agreements, or that exchange other competition-sensitive information are
liable to punishment. These kinds of agreements lead to higher prices, reduced quality, and
less innovation. In its oversight efforts, ACM also uses tip-offs and reports submitted by
consumers and businesses about possible violations. That is how ACM was able to track
down this case.

5) RECORD PENALTY FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE CONDUCT

BY POWER TOOL SUPPLIER TECHTRONIC (AU)
1 December 2023

HTTPS://WWW.ACCC.GOV.AU/MEDIA-RELEASE/RECORD-PENALTY-FOR-
RESALE-PRICE-MAINTENANCE-CONDUCT-BY-POWER-TOOL-SUPPLIER-
TECHTRONIC?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-
BLOCK

Power tool supplier Techtronic has been ordered to pay penalties totalling $15 million after
admitting it had engaged in resale price maintenance conduct in relation to Milwaukee
branded products, including power tools, hand tools and accessories.

The total penalties, ordered by the Federal Court, are the highest imposed for resale price
maintenance in Australia. Resale price maintenance (also known as RPM) occurs when a
supplier of goods specifies a minimum price below which a reseller must not supply, offer to
supply, advertise, or display those goods for sale.

“The ACCC submitted to the Court that this level of penalty was appropriate given the
seriousness, duration and extent of Techtronic’s conduct. It sends a strong signal to deter
others from engaging in RPM, and should serve as a warning for all other businesses,” ACCC
Deputy Chair Mick Keogh said.
“Resale price maintenance is illegal because it is harmful to price competition, which may
mean consumers pay a higher price than they would in a truly competitive market.”

Techtronic admitted that, between January 2016 and July 2021, it entered into 97 agreements
with retailers and dealers which restricted the sale of Milwaukee products below a specified
minimum price.

Techtronic also admitted it enforced the restrictive RPM provisions in its contracts 29 times
between December 2016 and May 2020, for example by issuing warnings to dealers who
offered to sell, or sold, Milwaukee branded products below the specified minimum price, or
by withholding supply from two dealers.

The Court also ordered Techtronic to post corrective notices on its website and to its dealers,
implement a compliance program and pay part of the ACCC’s costs. The Federal Court will
publish its written reasons at a later date.

Techtronic admitted to engaging in resale price maintenance, and cooperated with the ACCC.
The parties filed joint submissions, a statement of agreed facts, and joint proposed orders.

6) ADC SANCTIONS LUSOPALEX - PRODUTOS DE SAÚDE

UNIPESSOAL FOR GUN-JUMPING (PORTUGAL)

December, 19, 2023

https://www.concorrencia.pt/en/articles/adc-sanctions-lusopalex-produtos-de-saude-
unipessoal-gun-jumping

The decision
The AdC fined the company Lusopalex with €75,000 for having carried out a merger before
prior notification.
The merger should have been notified to the AdC before it took place, since it met the
notification threshold for market share, set out in Article 37(1)(a) of the Competition Law.
The Competition Law establishes the obligation of prior notification to the AdC of mergers
that fulfil certain thresholds linked to the market share and/or turnover of the companies
involved and imposes an obligation to suspend the implementation of operations until a final
decision of non-opposition is obtained.

The settlement procedure

The company has shown full cooperation with the AdC, both during the phase of analysing
the merger, which was notified a posteriori, and also during the course of the proceedings,
which have now concluded with the payment of the fine imposed by the AdC.
In setting the amount of the fine, the AdC took this collaboration and the fact that the
operation in question had been notified, although a posteriori, into account.
The settlement procedure established in the Competition Law, which the companies in
question used to conclude the process, depends on the confession and assumption of
responsibility by the companies in question, which renounce litigation in court and benefit
from a reduction in the fine.
This procedure allows for procedural simplification and celerity, making it an instrument at
the service of procedural efficiency by optimising the application of competition law.
The AdC continues to be active in detecting gun-jumping, providing companies with a
confidential prior assessment mechanism, which they can use to clarify whether or not certain
concentration operations should be notified to the Competition Authority.
You can find out how to access this prior assessment on the AdC's website if you have any
doubts.
This was the first fine imposed by the AdC that will revert in full to the Treasury, namely to
the recently created Fund for the Promotion of Consumer Rights, as part of the amendment
made by Law 17/2022 of 17 August.

7) CONSTRUCTION CARTEL: AFCA APPLIES FOR THE IMPOSITION OF

A EUR 5.8 MILLION FINE ON LEYRER + GRAF (AUSTRIA)

18.12.2023

HTTPS://WWW.BWB.GV.AT/EN/NEWS/DETAIL/CONSTRUCTION-CARTEL-
AFCA-APPLIES-FOR-THE-IMPOSITION-OF-A-EUR-58-MILLION-FINE-ON-
LEYRER-GRAF?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-
BLOCK

As part of its investigations into the Austrian construction industry, the Austrian
Federal Competition Authority (AFCA) filed an application with the Cartel Court on 14
December 2023 to impose a fine of EUR 5.8 million on Graf Beteiligungs OG, Graf
Holding GmbH as well as Leyrer + Graf Baugesellschaft m.b.H (hereinafter referred to
jointly as “Leyrer + Graf”).

In line with the regional focus of their activities, Leyrer + Graf were directly involved in
illegal price fixing, market divisions and the exchange of information with competitors in
relation to public and private construction tenders, in the province of Lower Austria in
particular. The infringements occurred from at least January 2007 until May 2017. Some
construction projects in Upper Austria, Carinthia, Styria and Burgenland were also affected.
Due to the comparatively shorter period and the regional focus of their activities, Leyrer +
Graf have been classed as joint participants in the overall infringement.
Leyrer + Graf’s actions are part of the wider infringement of cartel law that has occurred
across the whole of Austria. The large number of arranged construction contracts cover both
building construction and civil engineering projects throughout Austria, with road building
projects predominating. The collusive behaviour was aimed at reducing or excluding
competition, helping each other to win construction contracts and thus securing market
shares. Numerous companies were involved in the cartel, but to varying degrees. The AFCA
applied to the Cartel Court for a fine of EUR 5.8 million to be imposed on Leyrer + Graf.

Leyrer + Graf cooperated with the AFCA outside the leniency programme to fully clarify the
facts of the case, acknowledging the infringement for use in proceedings before the Cartel
Court. The AFCA therefore applied for a reduced fine, with the involvement of the Federal
Cartel Prosecutor. With regard to the amount of the fine, the company’s extensive efforts in
relation to compliance were also taken into account.

Background

The uncovered cartel relates to the economic sector of construction, with a focus on road
building projects.

The infringement covers the entire Austrian territory, albeit to varying degrees depending on
the company involved. Both public and private clients were affected by these practices, as
were a large number of construction projects. The investigations are still ongoing, while some
of the proceedings have been finally concluded.

The companies involved in the infringement engaged in concerted action in order to help
each other to win construction contracts, thereby securing market shares and utilising their
capacities accordingly, among other things. To reach this common goal, they engaged in
illegal price fixing and market divisions, exchanged competitively sensitive information –
relating for example to agreements on future behaviour when submitting bids – and in some
cases formed anti-competitive working groups and bidding consortia.

The involved companies also agreed on which bidder should win the contract, the price to be
offered and the submission of bogus offers, as well as arranging that certain competitors
would not submit any bid at all.

8) CONSTRUCTION CARTEL UPDATE: AFCA APPLIES FOR THE

IMPOSITION OF A EUR 1.1 MILLION FINE ON KONRAD BEYER AND
MANDLBAUER (AUSTRIA)

06.12.2023
HTTPS://WWW.BWB.GV.AT/EN/NEWS/DETAIL/CONSTRUCTION-CARTEL-
UPDATE-AFCA-APPLIES-FOR-THE-IMPOSITION-OF-A-EUR-11-MILLION-
FINE-ON-KONRAD-BEYER-AND-MANDLBAUER?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-
FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

As part of its successful investigations into the Austrian construction industry, the
Austrian Federal Competition Authority (AFCA) filed another application with the
Cartel Court on 4 December 2023 to impose a fine on Konrad Beyer & Co Spezialbau
GmbH and Mandlbauer Bau GmbH (hereinafter referred to as “Beyer/Mandlbauer”).

In line with the companies’ regional focus of activities, Beyer/Mandlbauer were directly
involved in anti-competitive price fixing and price coordination, market divisions and the
exchange of information with competitors in relation to public and private construction
tenders in Carinthia and Styria in particular. Some construction projects in Lower Austria,
Salzburg and Burgenland were also affected by these infringements. Due to the
comparatively shorter period and the regional focus of their activities, Beyer/Mandlbauer
have been classed as joint participants in the overall infringement.

Beyer/Mandlbauer are two of the companies to have been involved in the infringement of
cartel law that has occurred across the whole of Austria. The large number of arranged
construction contracts cover both building construction and civil engineering projects
throughout Austria, with road building projects predominating. The collusive behaviour was
aimed at reducing or excluding competition, helping each other to win construction contracts
and thus securing market shares. Numerous companies were involved in the cartel, but to
varying degrees. The AFCA applied to the Cartel Court for a fine of EUR 1.1 million to be
imposed on Beyer/Mandlbauer.

Beyer/Mandlbauer cooperated with the AFCA outside the leniency programme to fully
clarify the facts of the case, acknowledging the infringement for use in proceedings before
the Cartel Court. The AFCA therefore applied for a reduced fine, with the involvement of the
Federal Cartel Prosecutor.

Background

The uncovered cartel relates to the economic sector of construction, with a focus on road
building projects.

The infringement covers the entire Austrian territory, albeit to varying degrees depending on
the company involved. Both public and private clients were affected by these practices, as
were a large number of construction projects. The investigations are still ongoing, while some
of the proceedings have been finally concluded.
The companies involved in the infringement engaged in concerted action in order to help
each other to win construction contracts, thereby securing market shares and utilising their
capacities accordingly, among other things. To reach this common goal, they engaged in
illegal price fixing and market divisions, exchanged competitively sensitive information –
relating for example to agreements on future behaviour when submitting bids – and in some
cases formed anti-competitive working groups and bidding consortia.

The involved companies also agreed on which bidder should win the contract, the price to be
offered and the submission of bogus offers, as well as arranging that certain competitors
would not submit any bid at all.

9) COMMISSION FINES RABOBANK €26.6 MILLION OVER EURO-

DENOMINATED BONDS TRADING CARTEL (EU)

22nd Nov 2023

HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/PRESSCORNER/DETAIL/EN/
IP_23_5960?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

The European Commission has fined Rabobank €26.6 million for participating in a cartel
concerning the trading of certain Euro-denominated bonds, together with Deutsche Bank.
Deutsche Bank was not fined as it revealed the cartel to the Commission under the leniency
programme.

The infringement

The products concerned by the cartel are Euro-denominated SSA bonds (Supra-Sovereign,
Foreign Sovereign, Sub-Sovereign/Agency bonds) and Government Guaranteed
bonds traded in the European Economic Area (‘EEA').

The Commission investigation revealed that between 2006 and 2016 the two banks, through
some of their traders, exchanged commercially sensitive information and coordinated
their trading and pricing strategies.

The traders operated at Deutsche Bank's EUR SSA desk in Frankfurt and at Rabobank's
Investment Grade Bonds desk in London. They used Bloomberg emails, instant messages and
online chatrooms to exchange information concerning: (i) prices, volumes as well as current
and future trading strategies and positions; (ii) the counterparties' identities; and (iii) their
requirements for buying or selling bonds. Traders adjusted their price levels and trading
strategies based on these exchanges. This included inter alia coordination on prices to be
offered and displayed on Bloomberg AllQ (all quotes for bonds) screens, which is a dealer-
to-client electronic trading platform, and mutual warnings when the other bank's indicative
price on screen was considered to be too low or too high.

Fines

The fines were set on the basis of the Commission's 2006 Guidelines on fines (see
also MEMO).

In setting the level of fines, the Commission took into account, in particular, the value of
sales for the products in question achieved by the cartel participants in the EEA, the serious
nature of the infringement, its geographic scope and its duration.

Deutsche Bank cooperated with the Commission under the leniency programme (2006
Leniency Notice) and therefore received full immunity from fines for revealing the cartel,
thereby avoiding a fine of almost €156 million. Rabobank received a fine of €26.6 million.

Background on bond markets

Bonds are debt securities paying a defined rate of interest, which enable entities to raise
funding in international financial markets, and which are subsequently held as investments or
traded like any other financial instrument.

Bonds are first issued for sale on the “primary market”, mainly via auctions or syndicates.
Subsequently, bonds are traded between banks, brokers and investors on the “secondary
market”. Bonds can be distinguished by the identity of the issuer, the currency in which they
are denominated or even by the type of guarantor (government authority or financial
institutions or other corporations).

Euro-denominated SSA bonds include three types of bonds: (i) Supra-Sovereign

bonds issued by supranational institutions whose mandate extends across national borders,
such as the European Investment Bank; (ii) Foreign Sovereign bonds issued by governments
under a law different from their own and/or in a currency different from their own(e.g., Euro-
denominated bonds issued by Sweden or Denmark); (iii) Sub-Sovereign/Agency
bonds issued by governmental or government-related entities below the level of the central
government, such as regions or municipalities, government-owned banks, infrastructure
development bodies or social security facilities.

Government Guaranteed bonds offer a secondary guaranteed interest where principal

payment will be made by a government authority upon default of the issuer. These bonds
were issued for a limited period of time in response to the market conditions associated with
the 2008 global financial crisis.
Procedural Background

Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU') and Article
53 of the EEA Agreement prohibit cartels and other restrictive business practices, including
collusion on selling and purchasing prices.

The Commission's investigation started in May 2017 following an immunity application

under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice submitted by Deutsche Bank.
In December 2022, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to both banks detailing its
competition concerns.

Fines imposed on companies for breaching EU antitrust rules are paid into the general EU
budget. This money is not earmarked for particular expenses, but the contributions of all
Member States to the EU budget for the following year are reduced accordingly. The fines
therefore help to finance the EU and reduce the burden for taxpayers. In accordance with
Article 141(2) of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, this case is a “continued competence
case”. The EU shall therefore reimburse the UK for its share of the amount of the fine once
this has become definitive. The Commission will take care of collecting the fine, calculating
the UK's share and reimbursing it.

More information on this case will become available under the case number AT.40512 in
the public case register on the Commission's competition website, once confidentiality issues
have been resolved. For more information on the Commission's action against cartels, see
its cartels website.

10) STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ADMITS LIABILITY TO

CURRENCY MANIPULATION CASE, AGREES TO PAY R42M FINE
(SOUTH AFRICA)

15TH Nov 2023

HTTPS://WWW.COMPCOM.CO.ZA/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2023/11/
MEDIA-STATEMENT-COMMISSION-SETTLES-WITH-STANDARD-
CHARTERED-BANK-15-NOVEMBER-2023.PDF?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-
FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

The Competition Commission (Commission) has reached a settlement agreement with UK-
based multinational bank, Standard Chartered Bank (“SCB”). In terms of the settlement
agreement, SCB admits liability to the manipulation of USD/ZAR currency pair, and agreed
to pay an administrative penalty of R42,715,880 (forty-two million, seven hundred and
fifteen thousand, eight hundred and eighty Rand).

SCB participated in the manipulation of USD/ZAR currency pair by fixing bids; offers; bid-
offer spreads; the spot exchange rate; and the exchange rate at the FIX. Further, SCB
participated in dividing markets by allocating customers in terms of which one trader
withholds or pulls his/her existing bid or offer from the market to allow the other trader to
execute and complete his/her trade. This conduct contravenes section 4(1)(b) (i) & (ii) of the
Competition Act, 89 of 1998, as amended.

The settlement comes at a time when respondent banks are currently appearing before the
Competition Appeal Court (“CAC”) seeking an order to set aside a Competition Tribunal
(“Tribunal”) order of 30 March 2023 which ordered respondent banks to file their answers to
the complaint referral. The hearing for the appeals and reviews before the CAC is set down
from 13 to 16 November 2023.

SCB is one of the 28 banks that are prosecuted by the Commission for manipulating the
USD/ZAR currency pair. This settlement ends an eight-year-long litigation between the
Commission and SCB over the currency manipulation allegations. Citibank N.A already
settled the same conduct with the Commission in 2017.

The SCB settlement agreement has been filed with the Tribunal for confirmation, which is set
down for hearing today, 15 November 2023.

“The Commission welcomes SCB’s decision to reach a settlement on this matter and
encourages other respondent banks to consider settling the complaint against them. Further,
this settlement affirms the Commission’s pursuit of allegations related to the manipulation of
the USD/ZAR currency pair, given the ultimate impact of the currency manipulation on the
value of the South African Rand," said Competition Commissioner Doris Tshepe.

11) COMMISSION SENDS STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS TO SIX

COMPANIES AND ONE TRADE ASSOCIATION IN AUTOMOTIVE
STARTER BATTERY CARTEL CASE (EU)

30th Nov 2023

HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/PRESSCORNER/DETAIL/EN/
IP_23_6146?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK
The European Commission has informed automotive starter batteries manufacturers Banner,
Clarios (former JC Autobatterie), Exide, FET (and its predecessor Elettra), and Rombat as
well as trade association Eurobat and its service provider Kellen of its preliminary view that
they have breached EU antitrust rules by colluding to increase the prices of automotive starter
batteries sold to car producers in the European Economic Area (‘EEA').

Automotive starter batteries provide an electric current to the starting motor, which starts the
engine in cars powered by traditional combustion engines. They also supply power to the
electrical equipment of cars.

The Commission has concerns that between 2004 until 2017 the five starter batteries
manufacturers created, published and agreed to use new indices in their price negotiations
with car producers (the so-called ‘Eurobat Premium System'). The aim of this alleged
conduct was to fix an important element of the final battery price.

The Commission is also concerned that Eurobat and its service provider Kellen were aware
of the alleged conduct and actively contributed to it by assisting the battery manufacturers in
creating and running the Eurobat premium system.

The alleged conduct concerns automotive starter batteries sold to car producers in the EEA
for use (i) in new cars; and (ii) as replacements (but only if sold via the car producers' service
network of authorised repairers).

If the Commission's preliminary view is confirmed, this conduct would infringe Article
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU') and Article 53 of the
EEA Agreement, which prohibit cartels and other restrictive business practices. This
prohibition includes anticompetitive conduct by associations of companies.

The sending of a Statement of Objections does not prejudge the outcome of an investigation.

Background on procedure

A Statement of Objections is a formal step in the Commission's investigations into suspected

violations of EU antitrust rules. The Commission informs the parties concerned in writing of
the objections raised against them. The parties can then examine the documents in the
Commission's investigation file, reply in writing and request an oral hearing to present their
views on the case before representatives of the Commission and national competition
authorities.

If the Commission concludes, after the parties have exercised their rights of defence, that
there is sufficient evidence of an infringement, it can adopt a decision prohibiting the conduct
and imposing a fine of up to 10% of a company's annual worldwide turnover.

There is no legal deadline for the Commission to complete antitrust inquiries into
anticompetitive conduct. The duration of an antitrust investigation depends on a number of
factors, including the complexity of the case, the extent to which the companies concerned
cooperates with the Commission and the exercise of the rights of defence.

The Commission has carried out a series of major investigations into cartels in the automotive
sector. The Commission has already fined suppliers of automotive bearings, wire harnesses in
cars, flexible foam used (inter alia) in car seats, parking heaters in cars and trucks, alternators
and starters, air conditioning and engine cooling systems, lighting systems, occupant safety
systems to certain Japanese and European car manufacturers, braking systems and spark
plugs. The Commission also fined car manufacturers €875 million for restricting
competition in emission cleaning for new diesel passenger cars.

12) COMPETITION APPEAL BOARD DISMISSES WATER FEATURE

MAINTENANCE CONTRACTOR’S APPEAL AGAINST CCCS’S
FINANCIAL PENALTY FOR BID-RIGGING (SINGAPORE)

21ST Nov 2023

HTTPS://WWW.CCCS.GOV.SG/MEDIA-AND-CONSULTATION/
NEWSROOM/MEDIA-RELEASES/CAB-DISMISSES-WATER-FEATURE-
MAINTENANCE-CONTRACTOR-APPEAL

The Competition Appeal Board (“CAB”)[1] has published its decision dismissing the
appeal by CU Water Services Pte. Ltd. (“CU Water”) against the penalty of $308,680
imposed by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (“CCCS”) for CU
Water’s bid-rigging conduct which spanned close to a decade.

Background

2. CCCS issued an infringement decision on 14 December 2020, where it found that

CU Water engaged in a record 521 instances of bid-rigging in tenders for the provision
of maintenance services for swimming pools, spas, fountains and water features. CU
Water was involved with two other parties in a systemic pattern of requesting support
quotations from one another, where the support quotation was intentionally priced higher
to increase the requesting party’s chances of winning the tender. The infringing conduct
was a breach of section 34 of the Competition Act 2004 (the “ Competition Act”)[2] and
affected at least 220 privately-owned property developments in Singapore, including
condominiums and hotels.

3. CCCS imposed the maximum allowable financial penalty on CU Water [3] while
lower penalties were imposed on the other two parties [4] as they had, amongst other
things, applied for leniency under CCCS’s Leniency Programme [5] and participated in
CCCS’s Fast Track procedure [6]. Only CU Water appealed against the quantum of its
financial penalty.

CAB’s Decision

4. In its decision, the CAB noted the anti-competitive harm that bid-rigging has on
markets, which includes giving customers a false sense of competition in their
procurement process and reducing the number of competitive bids received by the
customers. It concluded that the maximum financial penalty imposed by CCCS was just
and proportionate taking into account, amongst other things, the number of
infringements by CU Water and the seriousness of the bid-rigging conduct.

5. Significantly, the CAB noted CCCS's shift in policy, since its earlier cases, to
consider higher penalties in respect of serious infringements such as bid-rigging and
other cartel activity This move is in line with Singapore's maturing competition
enforcement policy in view of increased market awareness of the anti-competitive harm
of cartel activity.

6. Finally, the CAB also acknowledged CCCS’s discretion in determining an

appropriate financial penalty on the facts of each case. The CAB cautioned that any
future appellants must show how CCCS’s penalty calculation framework was flawed or
applied erroneously, and that it is not sufficient to simply assert that the financial penalty
was excessive.

7. “The CAB’s decision affirms CCCS’s penalty calculation framework as an

objective basis to determine financial penalties that reflect CCCS’s twin objectives of
punishment and deterrence. The CAB’s decision also reinforces CCCS’s firm stance
against cartel agreements which are the most egregious types of anti-competitive
agreements,” CCCS Chief Executive Sia Aik Kor said. “Businesses should review their
practices to avoid engaging in collusive conduct and ensure that they comply with
competition law. CCCS will not hesitate to take appropriate enforcement action if there
are reasonable grounds to suspect that an infringement has taken place.”

13) COMMISSION FINES ETHANOL PRODUCER LANTMÄNNEN

€47.7 MILLION OVER ETHANOL BENCHMARKS CARTEL (EU)

7th December 2023

HTTPS://EC.EUROPA.EU/COMMISSION/PRESSCORNER/DETAIL/EN/
IP_23_6372?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK
The Commission has fined Lantmännen ek för and its subsidiary Lantmännen Biorefineries
AB (formerly named Lantmännen Agroetanol AB) (together ‘Lantmännen') around €47.7
million for participating in a cartel concerning the wholesale price formation mechanism for
ethanol in Europe. This decision follows the adoption of a settlement decision against
Abengoa in 2021 and the closure of proceedings against Alcogroup in 2023.

The infringement

Ethanol is an alcohol made from biomass (such as wheat, maize or sugar beet) that, when
added to gasoline, can be used as biofuel for motor vehicles. The port of Rotterdam and the
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp barge market were the most important trading locations for
ethanol in the European Economic Area (‘EEA') at the time of the infringement. S&P Global
Platts (‘Platts'), a company that provides price assessments for different commodity markets,
used a price assessment process called ‘Market on Close' (‘MOC') to establish its ethanol
benchmarks, which were widely used as reference prices in the industry. The key period for
Platts' price assessment process was the time between 16:00 and 16:30 London time (called
‘the MOC Window).

Lantmännen is the largest ethanol producer in the Nordic region and referenced most of its
ethanol sales contracts to the monthly average of Platts' ethanol benchmarks during the
infringement period. Therefore, the level of Platts' ethanol benchmarks could directly
influence the revenues that Lantmännen received from its ethanol sales during that period.

The Commission's investigation revealed that Lantmännen, together with two other
companies:

 Coordinated its trading conduct on a regular basis before, during and after the
MOC Window.
 Agreed to limit the supply of physical ethanol in the Rotterdam area that could end
up in the MOC Window.
 Exchanged commercially sensitive information in order to implement the
coordinated behaviour.

This conduct was based on a common plan aimed at artificially increasing, maintaining
and/or preventing from decreasing the level of Platts' ethanol benchmarks. Lantmännen
expected that this would lead to higher prices for its ethanol sales under the ethanol supply
contracts that were referenced to those benchmarks. Illegal contacts took place between
traders typically in the form of chats.

The Commission's investigation showed that Lantmännen participated in a single and

continuous infringement of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (‘TFEU') and Article 53(1) of the Agreement on the ‘EEA, which covered the entire
EEA. Lantmännen's involvement lasted from 14 November 2012 to 25 March 2014.

Fines
The fine was set on the basis of the Commission's 2006 Guidelines on fines (see
also MEMO).

In setting the level of the fine, the Commission took into account, in particular, the sales
value achieved by Lantmännen in the EEA based on certain sales of physical fuel-grade
ethanol referenced to Platts' ethanol benchmarks, the serious nature of the infringement, its
geographic scope and its duration.

The fine imposed on Lantmännen totals around €47.7 million.

14) FINES TOTALING €105,772.66 IMPOSED ON UNDERTAKINGS

ACTIVE IN THE SUPPLY OF TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
AND INTERNET TELECONFERENCING [GREECE]

14th December 2023

HTTPS://WWW.EPANT.GR/EN/ENIMEROSI/PRESS-RELEASES/ITEM/2768-
PRESS-RELEASE-FINES-TOTALING-105-772-66-IMPOSED-ON-
UNDERTAKINGS-ACTIVE-IN-THE-SUPPLY-OF-TELECOMMUNICATION-
EQUIPMENT-AND-INTERNET-TELECONFERENCING.HTML?
TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK

Subject: Fines totaling €105,772.66 imposed on undertakings active in the supply of

telecommunication equipment and internet teleconferencing (through VoIP and SIP)
following decision adopted under the Settlement Procedure (SP).

The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC), by its unanimous Decision no 834/2023

adopted in plenary, in the context of the simplified Settlement Procedure as provided for in
Article 29A of Greek competition act - Law 3959/2011 and according to its Decision no
790/2022, accepted the settlement proposals submitted by the Chinese company : “厦门亿联
网 络 技 术 股 份 有 限 公 司 ” under the English name “YEALINK NETWORK
TECHNOLOGY Co. Ltd” and Greek company “Allwan - Epikoinonies Dedomenon Ltd.”,
following the relevant Statement of Objections, and imposed reduced fines totaling
€105,772.66 for the infringement established, according to the grounds of the Decision, of
Article 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU.

The above undertakings involved in the infringement, for which sufficient evidence was
collected to establish an infringement of Article 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU in the
context of a vertical agreement, expressed in writing their interest in the application of the
Settlement Procedure and submitted a relevant request, in accordance with para. 16 of HCC
Decision No. 704/2020 on the Settlement Procedure.

According to the grounds of the Decision, the evidence available shows that the above
undertakings infringed, by Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU and that such vertical
agreements constitute restrictions of competition by object,. Yealink has engaged in the
practice of setting minimum advertised prices (MAP), on Internet sales, in the context of a
selective distribution network in the telecommunications equipment market (communication,
via VoIP and SIP, telephone devices, accessories, spare parts, etc.) through its commercial
policy, through supervision and compliance actions to retailers, in the Greek territory.
Allwan, the distributor of the above equipment, participated supportively, for the purpose of
implementing the specific policy of determining minimum advertised prices on the internet,
which was imposed by Yealink. Setting resale prices and/or minimum advertised prices is by
object a restriction of competition. It is considered by its nature to be capable of having a
negative impact on the relevant market. As it harms competition between resellers by
eliminating price intra-brand competition, while acting as a disincentive to lower selling
prices for the product. The infringement lasted: (a) in relation to Yealink, from 05.03.2015 to
11.06.2021 and (b) in relation to Allwan, from 01.09.2017 to 11.06.2021. Finally, from the
available evidence, Yealink also engaged in a practice of prohibiting active and passive sales
within a selective distribution network, in the context of a vertical agreement, in violation of
Articles 1(1) of Law 3959/2011 and 101(1) TFEU, lasted from 05.03.2015 to 31.12.2021.

It is noted that for the case in hand, that the agreement to determine minimum advertised
prices on the internet, as well as the related agreement prohibiting active and passive sales
(which was not implemented in practice) , are applied within the Greek territory – and, by
extension, within the EU despite the fact that the main involved company, Yealink is based
outside the EU and specifically in China, and therefore HCC has jurisdiction.

The Grand Chamber of the HCC, by virtue of para. 35 of its Decision no. 790/2020, accepted
the Settlement Proposals submitted by the above undertakings, according to the reasoning of
the Statement of Objections, and decided as follows:

Finds that the companies “YEALINK NETWORK TECHNOLOGY Co. Ltd” and “Allwan -
Epikoinonies Dedomenon Ltd.”,infringed Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU due to
their participation in prohibited vertical agreements through the practices outlined in the
Statement of Objections, in the context of the Settlement Procedure.

Orders the above undertakings to cease, if they have not already done so, and refrain in the
future from the infringements of Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU found.

Imposes a fine amounting to €83,002.59 on “YEALINK NETWORK TECHNOLOGY

Co. Ltd” and a fine amounting to €22,770.07 on “Allwan - Epikoinonies Dedomenon
Ltd.” . The total amount of the fines imposed on the two (2) settling parties
is €105,772.66 for committing the established infringements of Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011
and 101 TFEU.

Finally, it is noted that this is the first case of extraterritorial application of Greek and
EU competition law by the Hellenic Competition Commission and also the first time,
here in the context of a settlement procedure under Article 29A of Law 3959/2011, that fines
were imposed to both suppliers and retailers participating to a vertical restriction that
falls under the scope of the prohibition under Article 1 of Law 3959/2011 and/or Article 101
TFEU .

15) FINE AMOUNTING TO €278.648 IMPOSED

ON ANUNDERTAKING ACTIVE IN THE MARKET OF LARGE/WHITE
DOMESTIC ELECTRIC APPLIANCES, FOLLOWING DECISION
ADOPTED UNDER THE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE (SP) [GREECE]

6th December 2023

HTTPS://WWW.EPANT.GR/EN/ENIMEROSI/PRESS-RELEASES/ITEM/2757-
PRESS-RELEASE-FINE-AMOUNTING-TO-278-648-IMPOSED-ON-AN-
UNDERTAKING-ACTIVE-IN-THE-MARKET-OF-LARGE-WHITE-
DOMESTIC-ELECTRIC-APPLIANCES-FOLLOWING-DECISION-ADOPTED-
UNDER-THE-SETTLEMENT-PROCEDURE-SP.HTML?TRK=ARTICLE-SSR-
FRONTEND-PULSE_LITTLE-TEXT-BLOCK
Subject: Fine amounting to €278.648 imposed on an undertaking active in the market of
large/white domestic electric appliances following a decision adopted under the
Settlement Procedure (SP).

By its unanimous Decision no 832/2023, adopted in plenary, in the context of the Settlement
Procedure laid down in Article 29A of Law 3959/2011 and according to its Decision
no 790/2022, the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) accepted the settlement proposal
submitted by the undertaking “Pyramis Metallourgia S.A.’’, following the relevant Statement
of Objections, and imposed a reduced fine amounting to €278.648 for the infringement of
Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU, as established according to the grounds of the
Decision.

The case in principle concerned the import, wholesale and retail markets of large/white
domestic electrical appliances. The above-mentioned undertaking involved in the
infringement, for which sufficient evidence was collected to establish an infringement of
Article 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU in the context of a vertical agreement, expressed
in writing itsinterest in examining the possibility of its placement under the Settlement
Procedure and submitted a relevant request, in accordance with para. 16 of HCC Decision
No. 790/2020 on the Settlement Procedure.
According to the grounds of the Decision, the evidence available shows that the
above mentioned undertaking infringed Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU –
by imposing minimum advertised prices, which constitute an indirect form of resale price
maintenance, to which retail stores complied with regard to advertised prices on online price-
comparison channels. The ensuing infringement of Αrticles 1 (1) of Law 3959/2011 and 101
(1) TFEU lasted from 03.05.2018 to 06.09.2022. Furthermore, it is noted that such vertical
agreements constitute by object restrictions of competition.

By virtue of para. 35 of its Decision no. 790/2020, the Plenary of the HCC accepted the
Settlement Proposal submitted by the above-mentioned undertaking, according to the
reasoning of the Statement of Objections, and decided as follows:

Finds that the undertaking under the name “Pyramis Metallourgia S.A.’’ infringed Articles 1
of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU due to its participation in prohibited vertical agreements
through the practices outlined in the Statement of Objections, in the context of the Settlement
Procedure.

Orders the above-mentioned undertaking to cease, if it has not already done so, and refrain
in the future from the infringements of Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU found.

Imposes on the undertaking the above-mentioned fine for committing the established
infringement of Articles 1 of Law 3959/2011 and 101 TFEU.

NOTE : NO IP ENFORCEMENT ACTION