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IMS UNISON UNIVESITY, DEHRADUN

MOOT COURT EXERCISE

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF –

BAKO CHARITABLE TRUST & ORS. ...... PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDIANA ...... RESPONDENT

Memorandum on Behalf of the Petitioner

PALAK SRIVASTAVA (IUU18BBL012)

ANANYA TRIPATHI (IUU18BBL032)

NISHTHA KAJLA (IUU18BBL004)


(XTH SEMESTER)
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................ 6-7

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ........................................................................................... 8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ................................................................................. 9-10

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................ 11-19

1. Whether the speech made by Ms. Arya Stark is violative of Article 19 (1)(a) of the

Constitution of Indiana?

2. Whether the State of North Pradesh was justified in withdrawing the prosecution

against Ms. Stark?

3. Whether the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir in
question?

4. Whether the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana?

PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 20

2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS WORDS

& And

Acc. According

AIR All India Reporter

Anr Another

COI Constitution of Indiana

HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable

Ors. Others

P Petitioner

R Respondent

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec. Section

SLP Special Leave Petition

V. Versus

FIR First Information Report

I.P.C Indiana Penal Code

UOI Union Of Indiana

3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LIST OF CASES

• A.K Kaul & ors. v. Union Of India (1995 AIR 1403, 1995 SCC (4) 73)
• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27)
• Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1997) 7 SCC 431)
• Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar ( (1987) 1 SCC 288)
• Abdul Karim v. State of Karnataka ((2000) 8 SCC 710)
• Rajendra Kumar Jain V. State through Special Police Establishment (AIR 1980 SC
1510 (1980) 3 SCC 435)
• S.K. Shukla v State of U.P. ((2006) 1 SCC 314)
• M Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors (9 November, 2019)
• Mohan Kumar Singhania V. Union of India (1992 (1) SLR 77)
• Aruna Roy V. Union of India & Ors (AIR 2002 SC 3176)

STATUTES

1. Constitution of Indiana, 1950;

2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

3. General Clauses Act, 1977

4. Indiana Penal Code, 1860

5. Places of Worship Act, 1991

OTHER COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

1. The Hindu Newspaper

2. Manupatra

4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court Has Extraordinary Original Jurisdiction To Hear The Instant Matter
Under Article 136 Of The Constitution Of Indiana, 1950.

136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. –

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause
or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of Indiana.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or
made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

5
SATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

Indiana is a sovereign, democratic and republic country which was ruled by Nitishers for the past
two decades and exploited the residents of Indiana. The religious demographic of Indiana was
quite diverse. Indo religion followers comprised of almost 85% of population of Indiana whereas
Bako Religion comprised of 9 % of the total population. Post-Independence the drafters of
constitution laid a special emphasis on the fundamental rights of citizens of Indiana and the term
Secularism was added in the preamble of the Constitution of Indiana. The Preamble itself
advocates about liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, religion and worship. Indo
democratic party (IDP) was formed to represent the followers of Indo religion whereas Bakoian
league used to represent the followers of Bako religion. Bodhya a state in North Pradesh in
which IDP is in power is believed to be a place of immense religious significance for the
followers of Indo religion.

At the said site there existed a Bako Shine (holy place of worship of the followers of Bako
religion) in 1991 Indo people assembled there and demolished that structure which resulted in a
nationwide spread of communal violence. At the same year Indo priest filed a petition to pray in
Shanwapi shine complex claiming that this shine was built illegally by demolishing a part of
their Tashmath Nir (a religious place of worship of followers of Indo Religion). The issue over
the ownership of land reached the Supreme Court of Indiana. IDP came in power in 2014 with its
agenda to construct Sama Nir as it was alleged that IDP was staunch believer of rightwing
politics. IDP came in power in 2019 for the second time. And in 2019 Supreme Court gave its
judgement that the land belongs to lord Sama.

INCIDENT

After this decision the case pertaining to Shanwapi Shine revived, the archeological survey was
conducted in the shine and the report mentioned that Indo deity idols and symbols were found
inside it. The Bako Charitable Board challenged the proceedings before High Court of Ballabad
claiming that proceeding regards Shine are violative of Places of Worship Act, 1991. John Snow
a social worker challenged the constitutional validity of place of Worship Act, 1991. Mr. Snow
further contended that the choice of date adversely impacts the followers of Indo and
otherminority religions as from the year 1192 onwards, it was either the Bako Rulers or the
Nitisher’s ruled Indiana and destroyed Nir belonging to Indo and other religions. By freezing the
date in 1947, it does not allow these communities to restore their places of worship. On 17-05-
2022 a debate was held on mee news attended by miss Arya Stark and Genghiz. Ms. Arya stated
that members of Indo religion have been suppressed by the followers of Bako religion since

6
centuries. Statement made by Ms. Arya resulted in nationwide communal Riots. FIR’s were
registered against her. Ms. Arya filed the petition to transfer her FIR in state capital Bucknow.

AFTERMATH

The prosecuting officers filled application for withdrawal of prosecution in all cases resulting in
the acquittal of Ms. stark from all criminal Cases. It was alleged that speech by Ms. Stark is
directly in violation of A/19(1)(a). Further, the news channel Mee News also came under
scrutiny for its repeated telecast of the clip of Ms. Arya Stark despite the ongoing societal unrest.
Ballabad High Court clubbed the petition filled by Mr. John Snow and the Bako Charitable
Trust, dismissed the petition of Bako Charitable Trust stating that Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the
Place of Worship Act, 1991 were ultra vires of the Constitution of Indiana. Aggrieved by this
judgement Bako Charitable Trust filled a SLP before the Supreme Court of Indiana. Mr. Tom
Riddle aggrieved by the acquittal order of Ms. Stark filled an SLP before the honorable Apex
court of Indiana. The SC clubbed both the SLP’s and the matter is listed for final hearing.

The laws of Indiana are pari materia to that of India.

7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

• Whether the speech made by Ms. Arya Stark is violative of Article 19 (1) (a) of the
Constitution of Indiana?

• Whether the State of North Pradesh was justified in withdrawing the prosecution against Ms.
Stark?

• Whether the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir in question?

• Whether the Places of Worship Act, 1991 is ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana?

8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE SPEECH MADE BY MS.ARYA STARK IS VOILATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (A) OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the statement given by Ms.
Arya Stark during a debate show Aapki Nazar is of voilative nature under Article 19(1) and
the statement given by her has affected a large segment of society resulting in the
nationwide spread of communal violence and riots. For hampering the security of the state,
public order and incitement to an offence she must be held liable.

II. WHETHER THE STATE OF NORTH PRADESH WAS JUSTIFIED IN WITHDRAWING THE

PROSECUTION AGAINST MS. STARK?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the state of North Pradesh
was not justified in withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Arya Stark asthe court did not
considered the after impact of the acquittal of Ms. Stark from the caseand the prosecuting
officer has not given any justified reason for the withdrawal.The court has a responsibility
to carefully consider any removal requests to ensure that they are not being made for
illegitimate or otherwise unjust reasons. The acquittal caused societal unrest and went
against the rules of justice.

III. WHETHER THE PLACE OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS APPLICABLE ON THE SHINE AND NIR IN
QUESTION?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Place of Worship Act,
1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir in question as under sec. 2 of Places of Worship Act,
1991 it defines the place of worship which means any location or any other place of public
religious worship of any religious denomination or any sectionand under sec. 3 of Places of
Worship Act, 1991 it that no person shall convert any place of worship of any religious
denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same
religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof which
states thatPlaces of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir.

9
IV. WHETHER THE PLACE OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF

INDIANA?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Places of Worship Act,
1991 is not ultra vires of the Constitution of Indiana as the Places of Worship Act, 1991is
framed regarding the fundamental values and under Art. 51 of the Constitution of Indiana
which states promotion of international peace and security which is one of the basic
fundamental duties.

10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE SPEECH MADE BY MRS. ARYA STARK IS VOILATIVE OF ARTICLE 19


(1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the statement given by Ms.
Arya Stark during a debate show AapkiNazar is of voilative nature under Article 19(1) and
the statement given by her has affected a large segment of society resulting in the nationwide
spread of communal violence and riots. For hampering the security of the state, public order
and incitement to an offence she must be held liable.

Under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of Indiana, it is stated that citizens have the right to
freedom of speech and expressions and Under Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution of Indiana, it is
stated that nothing in the Art. 19 (1) (a) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the Interests of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt Of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence and Art. 19 (2) imposes reasonable restrictions on Art. 19 (1) (a) which means the
statement made by Ms. Arya Stark has caused inhampering the security of the state, public
order and spread of communal violence and riots.

In the case of A.K Kaul & ors. v. Union Of India1, the court held that Article 19(2) of the
Constitution permits the State to impose, by law, reasonable restrictions in the interests of the
security of the State on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression
conferred by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19.

So, in this case, the decision was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the expression
“Public Order” was added to Article 19(2) to impose certain restrictions on the freedom of
speech and expression.

In the given facts the statement made by Ms. Stark sparked nationwide communal riots and
the word “Riots” means a violent public disorder andthis restriction on the freedom of speech
of any citizen may be imposed as much by an action of the State as by its inaction. Thus,
failure on the part of the State to guarantee to all its citizens the fundamental right to freedom
of speech and expression would also constitute a violation of Article 19(1) (a).

1
1995 AIR 1403, 1995 SCC (4) 73
11
It is important to note that liberty of one must not offend the liberty of others. In the case
of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras2, the Court observed, “man as a rational being desires to
do many things, but in a civil society his desires will have to be controlled with the exercise
of similar desires by other individuals”. It therefore states that every citizen of this country
has the right to air his/her views through the printing or the electronic media subject of
course to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

Various FIRs were registered against Ms. Stark for instigating riots which goes against public
peace and tranquility in several districts of North Pradesh. Hence, in the instant case the
statement of Ms. Stark has hampered the public order.

According to General Clauses Act, 1977 under Sec. 28 offence is defined as an act or
behavior prohibited by law and therefore punishable by lawfor the time being in force and
the word incitement means to provoke or instigate. The interpretation of incitement to an
offence marks out to provoke or instigate for an act or omission that is punishable by law.

The counsel humbly submit to the Hon’ble court that Ms. Stark has made a hate speech
against the followers of Bako religion by stating “the members of the Indo religion despite
being in majority have been suppressed by the followers of Bako Religion since centuries
and now it is necessary to undo the wrong”, and these statements should be considered as an
instigating statement to the followers of Indo religion.

In this case the phrase which was uttered by Ms. Stark in front of a whole gathering attracts
the very definition of hate speech. Furthermore, it also attracts the penal provision 153(A)
and 295(A) of IPC.

Section 153A of the Indiana penal code states promoting enmity between different groups on
ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to
maintenance of harmony.In the case, Section 153A imposes criminal liability upon Ms. Stark
who spread enmity and disharmony between different groups of people through her
instigating statement and the offence committed under Section 153A is a cognizable offence,
thereby allowing the police officers to arrest the accused without a warrant.

While referring to Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh3the Court remarked that, it
is important to have at least the reference of two religions in the alleged hate speech or
literature. Mere inciting the feeling of one community without any mention of another group
or community cannot attract the offence under Section 153A.In this case Ms. Stark had made
a reference of both Indo and Bako religion in the statement “the members of the Indo religion
despite being in majority have been suppressed by the followers of Bako Religion since
centuries” and criminalizes creating enmity between two different committees members.

2
AIR 1950 SC 27
3
(1997) 7 SCC 431
12
In the case of Amish Devgan v. Union of India4 , the Court interpreted the scope of the term
‘public tranquility’ under Section 153A IPC and also stated that it is important that misuse and
abuse of this provision is prevented at all costs. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section
153A can be summarized as follows:

• The words, statements, or signs must cause enmity, hatred, and disturbance of harmony
between different racial, religious, and language groups.
• The alleged enmity must be caused among two or more communities
• The words, spoken or written, must be of a serious nature and must directly hurt the deep
religious sentiments of the group or community.

All the ingredients mentioned above are present in the case of Ms. Stark and the words and
statements stated by her causes hatred between Indo and Bako religion and is serious in nature as
statement was mentioned in a debate on the Shanvapi Shine controversy which sparked
nationwide communal riots.

Section 295A of Indiana Penal Code states Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage
religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. It simply states that
any act is done by a person which results in defamation and destruction of any worship place or
with a sole intention of insulting their religion, then that person shall be held liable under the
Section 295 and shall be punishable with imprisonment, or with fine, or both. Here, Ms. Stark
shall be liable for the statement given by her which defames the Bako religion committee as
dominant in nature.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the statement given by Ms. Arya
Stark during a debate show AapkiNazar is of voilative nature under Article 19(1) and the
statement given by her has affected a large segment of society resulting in the nationwide spread
of communal violence and riots.One should use freedom of expression in such a way that it
should not provoke any person or incite violence and this right is not absolute but comes with
certain restrictions. For hampering the security of the state, public order and incitement to an
offence she must be held liable.

II. WHETHER THE STATE OF NORTH PRADESH WAS JUSTIFIED IN WITHDRAWING THE

PROSECUTION AGAINST MRS. STARK?

Acc. to the given facts, Ms. Stark filed a Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Ballabad to
transfer all the FIRs to the State Capital of Bucknow. The Hon'ble High Court of Ballabad,

4
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 160 of 2020

13
allowed the Petition and ordered that all FIRs registered in the state of North Pradesh would be
transferred to Bucknow vide its order dated 06.06.2022. Vide the same order; the Hon'ble High
Court directed that the charge sheet in all the cases be filed before 20.06.2022. On 18.06.2022,
the Police filed the charge sheet in all the cases, Even after Ms. Stark’s statement led to the
societal unrest and riots in several districts, the Prosecuting Officers filed application for
withdrawal of the Prosecution in all the cases, which were allowed by the Respective trial Courts
of Bucknow, resulting in the acquittal of Ms. Stark from all the criminal cases.

Any crime is said to be devoted now not towards just the man or woman but the complete
society. For the reasons that complete society are injured by the act of the accused and because
the whole society cannot nearly sue the accused man or woman, the nation arrogates the power
and responsibility to initiate prosecution towards the prosecutor. Prosecutors are accountable for
representing the interests of society, however also the ones of victims of crimes.

Sometimes the State itself fails to perform their role diligently and honestly without being
influenced by any outside extraneous reasons. The provision granting this power to state flows
from section 321 of Criminal Procedure Code 1973 with the only rider that the court had to pass
order upon an application to withdraw a case pending before it.

Section 321 of CrPC 1973, deals with the power of Public Prosecutor to withdraw case of which
he is in-charge after obtaining written permission from the state government and that permission
is required to be filed in Court. The power of withdrawal can be invoked by the Public
Prosecutor in the interest of public policy and justice and not to frustrate or throttle the process of
law.

In the case Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar5, it was held “that the withdrawal should be in
the interest of administration of justice, and it is the duty of the court to see that the public
prosecutor applies his free mind and not just act as mere mechanical agent of the State
Government”.

Further, Section 321 CrPC enables the public prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution any
person in respect of the offences for which he is tried, with the consent of the Court wherein he
or she thinks that such withdrawal will lead to a larger public interest.

Although, the section provides no grounds on which withdrawal from prosecution can be filed by
the Public Prosecutor, the essential inherent condition read into the section by the SC is that
withdrawal should be in the interest of administration of justice.

It can be evaluated in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. If the public prosecutor
concludes that the prosecution should be withdrawn, then it is incumbent upon him to apply in
the court with adequate and tangible reasons spelled out in the application. Moreover, if he

5
(1987) 1 SCC 288
14
defers from the decision of the State Government and concludes that the case ought not to be
withdrawn, then he has got two options: (a) either to ask the State Government to relieve him
from a particular case, or least he shall have to resign or (b) to forward the application by giving
his own reasoning with the considered opinion that such application is not sustainable on the
ground set out by him in the application.

The Court is also free to assess, whether a prima facie case is made out or not and if the Court is
satisfied then after assigning a reason, it can reject the same, but it cannot be said that the public
prosecutor’s action will be illegal, if he receives a communication/instruction from the State
Government.

The Court further took note of the rulings in Abdul Karim v. State of Karnataka6, wherein it
was held that “an application under section 321 CrPC could not be allowed only on the ground
that the State Government has taken a decision for withdrawing the prosecution and such an
order could not be passed after examining facts and circumstances of the case”, thus, observed
that the Court must see as to whether the application has been made in good faith and in the
interest of public policy and justice and not to thwart or stifle the process of law. Further, the
Court, after considering the facts and circumstances of each case, must see whether the
application suffers from improprieties or illegalities as would cause a manifest injustice, if
consent was given.

In the case of Rajendra Kumar Jain V. State through Special Police Establishment7, The court
further observed that when deciding between going forward with prosecution and withdrawing
from prosecution in cases which threaten the peace of public, the state government is right in
withdrawing from the prosecution.

In S.K. Shukla v State of U.P. 8 , the court observed that the office of public prosecutor is
important and cannot be used by the state government to fulfil their political desires as per own
whims and fancies. The public prosecutor being an officer of the court has to act on his free mind
and decide on the issue of withdrawal of application.

The Court observed that the application given by the public prosecutor in the court must show
his non-application of mind and that he has applied an independent mind, and this is simply a
farce hoax and mirage to cover up the mandatory requirement of the law, that the public
prosecutor shall apply his judicial mind while filing application under section 321 CrPC. If he
decides to withdraw, then he must give reasons to the court and prove that he applied his free
mind on to the pertinent case. On the other hand, if he decides to continue with the prosecution
then he is not left with any other option but to resign from his post.

6
(2000) 8 SCC 710,
7
AIR 1980 SC 1510: (1980) 3 SCC 435
8
(2006) 1 SCC 314.
15
In the case of Ms. Stark, a petition has been filed to transfer the petition to the State Capital,
and the prosecuting officer has not mentioned any appropriate reason for withdrawal of all
the cases and the court also has acquitted her without scrutinizing the reason behind the
withdrawal and without even checking whether the prosecuting officer had applied his free
mind or withdrawn under the pressure of the state government.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the state of North Pradesh was
not justified in withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Arya Stark asthe court did not
considered the after impact of the acquittal of Ms. Stark from the case and the prosecuting
officer has not given any justified reason for the withdrawal.The court has a responsibility to
carefully consider any removal requests to ensure that they are not being made for
illegitimate or otherwise unjust reasons. The acquittal caused societal unrest and went against
the rules of justice.

III. WHETHER THE PLACE OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS APPLICABLE ON THE SHINE AND

NIR IN QUESTION?

The Places of Worship Act.1991 aims to maintain the status quo between religions and was
introduced at a time when the leader of political party and Ram Janmabhoomi movement was
gaining momentum and leading to incidences of violence in Uttar Pradesh.
Sec 2(c) of the Place and Worship Act, 1991 defines that, “place of worship means a temple,
mosque, gurudwara, church, monastery or any other place of public religious worship of any
religious denomination or any section thereof, by whatever name called”. In the present case
the Nir is the place of worship of the followers of Indo religion and the shine is the place of
worship of the followers of Bako religion.

Section 3 of the Places of Worship Act explicitly bars the conversion, in full or part, of a
place of worship of any religious denomination into a place of worship of a different
religious denomination. The section also bars conversions even within different sects of the
same religious denomination.The survey report cleared that the idols and symbols of Indo
religion were found inside the shine, which leads to the fact that it was a place of public
religious worship and this bars the conversion, of a Nirs place of worship of Indo religious
denomination into Shine place of worship of Bako religious denomination.

According to Section 4(1) of the Act, the religious character of a place of worship “shall
continue to be the same as it existed” on August 15, 1947.As per the survey report Indo
religion idols found from Shine state that Nir shall continue to be the same as it existed.

16
In the case of M Siddiq vs. Mahant Suresh Das &Ors9judgment, the court maintained that as
per the Places of Worship Act, all places of worship places henceforth will be treated as per
the law and left in the same condition as they were in 1947. The five-judge bench headed by
then Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi had lauded the Places of Worship Act in its 2019
Ayodhya judgment as “a legislative instrument designed to protect the secular features of the
Indian polity, which is one of the basic features of the Constitution”.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Place of Worship Act,
1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir in question as under sec. 2 of Places of Worship Act,
1991 it defines the place of worship which means any location or any other place of public
religious worship of any religious denomination or any sectionand under sec. 3 of Places of
Worship Act, 1991 it that no person shall convert any place of worship of any religious
denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same
religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof which
states that Places of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir. Thus, it is clear
that the Places of Worship Act is applicable on the Shine and Nir in the question.

IV. WHETHER THE PLACE OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991 IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIANA?

It is humbly submitted that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 supports and protects the
fundamental values of the COI and thus doesn’t ultra vires the COI. The court stated: “In
providing a guarantee for the preservation of the religious character of places of public
worship as they existed on 15 August 1947 and against the conversion of places of public
worship, Parliament determined that independence from colonial rule furnishes a
constitutional basis for healing the injustices of the past by providing the confidence to every
religious community that their places of worship will be preserved and that their character
will not be altered. The law addresses itself to the state as much as to every citizen of the
nation. Its norms bind those who govern the affairs of the nation at every level. Those norms
implement the Fundamental Duties under Art. 51A and are hence positive mandates to every
citizen as well. The State, has by enacting the law, enforced a constitutional commitment and
operationalized its constitutional obligations to uphold the equality of all religions and
secularism, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution”.

Article 51-A(e) states that, “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to promote harmony
and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious,
linguistic and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity
of women;

9
9 November, 2019
17
The Places of Worship Act, which was enacted in 1991 by Parliament, protects and secures
the fundamental values of the Constitution as the Act is a constitutional basis for healing the
injustices of the past by providing the confidence to every religious community that their
places of worship will be preserved and that their character will not be altered. The Preamble
underlines the need to protect the liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. It
emphasizes human dignity and fraternity. Tolerance, respect for and acceptance of the
equality of all religious faiths are a fundamental precept of fraternity.

Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act were enacted to fulfill two purposes. First, it
prohibits the conversion of any place of worship, and in doing so, speaks to the future by
mandating that the character of a place of worship shall not be altered. Second, the law seeks
to impose a positive obligation to maintain the religious character of every place of worship
as it existed on August 15, 1947.

In the case of Mohan Kumar Singhania V. Union of India10, the court held that statues made
according to Article 51(A) of our Constitution are valid. Thus, from this we can clearly see
that Fundamental Duties help in interpreting the constitutional provision.

Also in a very famous case of Aruna Roy V. Union of India &Ors11, a PIL was filed in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. It has been contended that the National Curriculum Framework for
School Education (NCFSE) which was published by NCERT is against the constitutional
mandate, anti-secular and without consultation with Central Advisory Board of Education
(CABE) and therefore it needed to be quashed. The implementation of NCFSE was
challenged as it did not get the approval of CABE. Also, NCFSE was found to be against the
constitution as it violated the basic principle of secularism.

Ayodhya judgment underscored the significance of the Places of Worship Act, as it


encompassed a message against attempts to alter the religious nature ofa place of worship
and about “non-retrogression” and emphasized that “historical wrongs cannot be remedied by
the people taking the law in their own hands. In preserving the character of places of public
worship, Parliament has mandated in no uncertain terms that history and its wrongs shall not
be used as instruments to oppress the present and the future, the five judge bench held.

According to the Ayodhya judgment, the Places of Worship Act is a legislative instrument
designed to protect the secular features of the Indian polity, which is one of the basic features
of the Constitution. When a right is defined as a basic feature of the Constitution or an
extension of it, it affords the protection of the constitutional court, like all fundamental rights.

10
1992 (1) SLR 77
11
AIR 2002 SC 3176
18
Hence, it is submitted to the Hon’ble court that the Places of Worship Act, 1991 doesn’t go
beyond the established values of constitution rather it protects and supports the basic features
mentioned in COI.

19
PRAYER

In the light of issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the Counsel on behalf of
the Petitioner humbly requests that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare
that:

1. The speech made by Ms. Arya Stark is violative of Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of
Indiana.

2. The State of North Pradesh wasn’t justified in withdrawing the prosecution against Ms. Stark.

3. The Place of Worship Act, 1991 is applicable on the Shine and Nir in Question.

4. The Place of Worship Act, 1991 is not ultra vires the Constitution of Indiana.

And/ Or

pass any such order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the light of equity, justice and good
conscience, for this act of kindness, the Counsel on behalf of Petitioners shall be duty bound
forever.

PLACE: SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA (Counsels for the Petitioner)

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