Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 50, no.

4,
July–August 2012, pp. 64–84.
© 2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com
ISSN 1061–0405 (print)/ISSN 1558–0415 (online)
DOI: 10.2753/RPO1061-0405500403

E.Iu. Zavershneva and M.E. Osipov

Primary Changes to the Version of

“The Historical Meaning of the Crisis
in Psychology” Published in the
Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky

This article contains new information about the manuscript of “The Histori-
cal Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology.” It offers a brief description of the
physical appearance of the manuscript and a list of the primary changes to
the text that was published in the first volume of Vygotsky’s collected works.
This list includes expunged quotations, ideologically motivated substitu-
tions, as well as fragments of elided or distorted text.

A brief description of the manuscript’s appearance

There are two documents stored in the Vygotsky family archive that have direct
bearing on the text of “The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology”
(hereinafter, HMCP): the manuscript (the full version) and a typescript (a text
fragment that corresponds to the manuscript).
The manuscript is the final draft of HMCP and includes a few revisions
and abridgments. There is no doubt that the handwriting is Vygotsky’s. The
author has underscored key words and phrases, but did not write a date on

English translation © 2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text © 2010 “Voprosy
psikhologii.” “Osnovnye popravki k tekstu ‘Istoricheskii smysl psikhologicheskogo
krizisa,’ opublikovannomu v 1982 g. v sobranii sochinenii L.S. Vygotskogo,” Voprosy
psikhologii, 2010, no. 1, pp. 92–102. The authors thank L.G. Vygodskaia and E.E.
Kravtsova for enabling us to conduct research in the Vygotsky family archive and to
R. Van der Veer and A. Yasnitsky for their valuable comments.
Translated by Nora Favorov.

64
 july–august 2012 65

the document. The margins of the first third of the manuscript feature critical
comments written with an ordinary pencil. The author of this marginalia has
not been identified, but it can be stated with certainty that it belongs neither
to Vygotsky himself nor to A.R. Luria. Penciled revisions to the text of the
manuscript were evidently made by the author of the marginalia. There are
also a small number of deletions made with a ballpoint pen. There is no list
of references, and sources are indicated using two numbers in parentheses:
the sequential number of the source and a page number. In some cases the
parentheses contain only one number or have been left blank.
The manuscript consists of four parts.
1. The Title Page. A plain sheet of 22.2 by 35.8 centimeter paper, the left
side of which has been manually torn off and is severely crumpled. The
paper is presumably of the same sort used in parts 3 and 4. There is
an inscription at the top of the page “Beyond the . . . and the Physical.
Article One” (the ellipsis represents a tear in the paper). The word[s]
“Beyond” [Po tu storonu] is barely legible. On the center of the page is
the title “The Meaning of the Psychological Crisis: A Methodological
Study” and the epigraph: “The stone that the builders rejected has now
become the cornerstone.”
2. Pages 5–52. A plain sheet of 21.5 by 30.5 centimeter paper. The
pagination begins with page 5, although no pages numbered 1 through
4 have been found in the archive and, in terms of content, page 5 does
appear to be the beginning of the text (which does not exclude the
possibility that pages 1–4 contained an introduction). Two loose-leaf
binder holes have been punched along the left-hand margin of each
page. The main text of the work is on one side of the page, while the
reverse side features numerous insertions and notes (pp. 9, 14, 20, 29,
31, 34, 35–43, 47), as well as the comments of the anonymous critic.
The handwriting is legible, but much less neat than in the third part,
and there is barely any slanting. A ballpoint pen has crossed out a
reference to a publication in Pravda on page 32 and the beginning of
a sentence—“Bukharin said that”—on page 46 (see below).
3. Pages 53–88. The text has been written onto both sides of folio
sheets. The paper is yellowed and the handwriting is very neat, with a
notable slant to the right. From here on (beginning with chapter 8 of
the manuscript) the paragraphs are separated with a period and a dash
(“.—”).
4. Pages 97–106. The paper is of the same sort as in the third part, but it
is much whiter and the sheets are single-width. The left edge has been
manually torn off. The text is written on both sides of the sheet. The
66 journal of russian and east european psychology

handwriting is similar to the handwriting of the second part. On page

97, the surnames of Leon Trotsky and Karl Radek, as well as several
adjacent words, have been crossed out in ballpoint pen. The original
page 107 has been replaced with a sheet of paper with text written
in ballpoint pen and labeled “manu. 107.” There are a number of
differences between the manuscript’s original ending and the published
version (see below).
The typescript consists of two parts.
1. The title page. A lined sheet of 22 by 15.7 centimeter paper featuring
an inscription written in black ink: “L.S. Vygotsky. Moscow, [illegible]
B[ol’shaia] Serpukhovskaia [St.][,] 17[,] apt. 1. The Historical Meaning
of the Crisis in Psychology. Chapters from the book.—Pp. 105–41.”
The handwriting is Vygotsky’s.
2. The text of the manuscript (pp. 105–41). Written on plain 21.7 by 35
centimeter paper, the left edge of which has been manually torn off. The
top of page 141 is missing. The text is missing a number of surnames
and specialized terms, and there are blank spaces corresponding to text
that is underlined in the manuscript. Empty parentheses take the place
of source references. The text features a few revisions by an unidentified
editor (several paragraphs have been crossed out with a pencil). There are
almost no differences between this text and the manuscript of HMCP.

The main changes to the text of HMCP

The following conventions will be used in this article to represent features of

Vygotsky’s manuscript: italics will be used for underscoring and bold will be
used for text that was either cut or significantly changed by the editors of the
collected works (Vygotsky’s original text will be enclosed in {braces}). Text
absent from the manuscript and added by the editors of the collected works
will be marked with strikethrough. Of all the quotations and references that
we have restored, only those that introduced significant distortions into the
published edition of Vygotsky’s text are reproduced here (instances when
quotes are unattributed or misattributed or publication details are missing or
incorrect or when meaning has been slanted, etc.). Quotation marks present in
the original but omitted in the published text are bold and underscored. With
rare exceptions, the spelling of quotations used in the original is preserved.
Missing punctuation marks are enclosed in brackets.*

*In some cases, the restoration of punctuation could be meaningfully translated

into English.—Trans.
 july–august 2012 67

Page 292. Omitted mention of pedology.

This last psychology—essentially the psychology of the normal adult—
should be viewed as one of the special disciplines on a par with animal
psychology, psychopathology, pedology.
Pages 308–9. Removal of quotation marks from an anonymous quote. We
were unable to confirm whether Vygotsky was quoting something he himself
had written.
Gestalt psychology {Gestalt theory} is told: You have found a very
valuable principle in your area; but if there is no more to thinking than
the aspects of unity and wholeness, that is, the Gestalt formula, and this
formula expresses the essence of any organic and even physical process,
“then in that case, of course, the picture of the world becomes amazingly
complete and simple: electricity, the force of gravity, and human thinking
are reduced to a common denominator.” One cannot throw both thinking
and relationships into the same pot of structures: “let them first prove to
us that it belongs in the same pot as structural functions.” The new factor
governs a vast but nevertheless limited area. But it does not stand up to
criticism as a universal principle. “Even if the thinking of bold theoreti-
cians is driven to strive toward ‘all or nothing’ in attempts to explain; the
cautious investigator, serving as a wise counterpoise, is compelled to take
stubborn facts into account” (38, pp. 11–13).
Page 314. Removal of most remarks tied to criticism of Friedrich Engels.
Engels even, evidently, believes this to be unimportant for science: anyone
who is distressed by this fact is beyond help, he says.
But if we take Engels’s idea further, we are forced to conclude that
this last comment is incorrect. Can we say that we will never find out
how chemical beams appear to ants? In other words, that by the very
nature of our knowledge we will not be capable of knowing this, that this
is an unsolvable problem? This is certainly not the case. Empirically,
it is more or less correct to say this from the perspective of the present
day: never, because we cannot even guess when this will become pos-
sible. But despite all this, it is a question of scientific practice, and not
of the nature of things and knowledge. And consequently, it [would] be
incorrect to say: never. After all, that would require us to a priori put
a limit on our knowledge, that is, to do the very thing against which
Engels is protesting in this example. After all, what he wants to say here
is that “the special construction of the human eye does not constitute
an absolute limit to human knowledge,” but he also says that the same
thing that is said in regard to the eye should also be said in regard to
thinking. After all, “we see that which is discoverable by thinking” is
68 journal of russian and east european psychology

not from a definition of its limits, not from a critique of reason, but from
what thinking “has already discovered and is still discovering every
day.” After all, “in the knowledge of these beams that are invisible to us,
we have gone significantly beyond ants,” who do not see, that is, there
are means of knowledge that are more powerful than immediate vision,
perception. It should therefore have been said: we will never perceive
how they appear to ants, but we will undoubtedly know this sooner or
later, assuming this will be needed by humanity. On the other hand,
many authors believe that the question of perception is also a question
of scientific technology and that we will not only come to know, but
will see the chemical beams in the same way that ants see them. Cf.
Pearson’s opinion in Ch. V (40, p. 179).
Page 323. Editing error.
Arithmetic operates using defined, specific quantities; algebra studies all
conceivable general forms of relationships between qualities {quantities};
consequently, every arithmetical operation can be viewed as a particular
case of an algebraic formula.
Page 333. Removal of quotation marks from a quotation from the book: V.N.
Ivanovskii, Metodologicheskoe vvedenie v nauku i filosofiiu [Methodological
Introduction to Science and Philosophy] (Minsk: 1923), vol. 2.
“For a person unschooled in matters of scientific method,” says Ivanovskii,
“the methods of all sciences look alike” (1923, 249 {58}). Psychology
has suffered the most from this lack of understanding. At one time it was
lumped together with biology, at another, with sociology, but rarely has
anyone approached assessing psychological laws, theories, etc., using a
criterion specific to psychological methodology, that is, with an interest in
psychological “scientific thinking as such, in its theories, its methodology, its
sources, forms, and foundations” (252). Therefore, in our criticism of other
systems, in assessing their veracity, we have been deprived of something
essential: after all, “in order to correctly judge the validity and certainty of
knowledge, one must have an understanding of its methodological sound-
ness” (V.N. Ivanovskii, 1923 {248}).
Page 336. Omission of a reference to a publication in Pravda that criticized
a book by Freud. Information about source no. 60 has not been found.
The judgment of this book by one reviewer from Pravda—who jumped to
the conclusion: where there is Schopenhauer, there must be pessimism—
represents a profound lack of understanding of the methodological problem
involved in this assessment, and by an utter trust in the outward features of
ideas and a naive and uncritical terror of the physiology of pessimism {60}.
 july–august 2012 69

Page 338. Abbreviation of a quote from the book: V.M. Bekhterev, Obshchie
osnovy refleksologii cheloveka [General Principles of Human Reflexology]
(Moscow, Petrograd: 1923). The formulation in the original is more precise:
“catharsis of constricted affect” (catharsis and constricted affect are not
equated, but constricted affect and “inhibited mimetic-somatic impulse” are
equated instead). The quote has been checked, and the page number given
in vol. 1 is correct.
Here the relationship between the two systems is also primarily established
via catharsis—“via constricted affect {of constricted affect}[”] resp.1 an
inhibited mimetic-somatic impulse. [“]Is this not the discharge of a reflex
that, when impeded, weighs down on personality and renders it “bound,”
sick, while with the discharge in the form of a reflex resp. catharsis there
occurs naturally {naturally occurs} a resolution of the diseased state? [[.
. .]] [<. . .>] “Are not tears of grief the discharge of an impeded reflex?”
(V.M. Bekhterev, 1923, p. 380 {18a, p. 388}).
Page 339. Removal of quotation marks from a quote from E. Dale (the
source of the quotation has not been established).
“Before we describe and classify phenomena of the subconscious on behalf
of psychological objectives, we must know whether or not we are operating
with something physiological or mental . . . it is important to prove that the
unconscious . . . is a mental reality in the first place” (p. 290).
Pages 341–42. Removal of quotation marks from quotes from the article:
N.M. Shchelovanov, “Metody geneticheskoi refleksologii” [Methods of
Genetic Reflexology, in Novoe v reflksologii i fiziologii nervnoi sistemy, ed.
V.M. Bekhterev (Leningrad, Moscow: GIZ, 1925), pp. 144–45.
“The psychology of childhood cannot provide anything beside what is al-
ready contained in general psychology.” But general psychology does not
exist as a unified system, and these theoretical contradictions make child
psychology impossible: “theoretical premises in well-disguised form and
unnoticed by the researcher certainly do predetermine the way empirical
data are processed and the interpretation {in the direction of interpreta-
tion} of facts obtained through observation in accordance with the theory
to which a particular author subscribes.”
Page 342. The substitution of a positive with a negative and of the word
“pedology” with “child psychology.”
Groos gave biology a theory of play that was created using psychological
method, rather than borrowing theory from biology; he did not decide {but
he did decide} his problem in the light of biology, that is, addressing as
70 journal of russian and east european psychology

well problems of general psychology {biopsychology}. It is the opposite,

therefore, that is true: valuable results in the theory of child psychology
{pedology} were achieved specifically when it was not borrowing, but
following its own path.
Page 348. A reference to Ivantsov is deleted, possibly the philosopher
N.A. Ivantsov, who studied, among other things, the philosophy of science
(and translated Spinoza’s Ethics into Russian).2 Ivantsov’s name also comes
up in an entry in the notebook Vygotsky kept in Zakharino hospital in 1926:
“analogy—Ivantsov—spectral analysis.”
On this basis, some have rightly defended {Ivantsov has defended} the
legitimacy of analogy as the main method of animal psychology; a priori
this is entirely acceptable—one must simply indicate the conditions under
which the use of analogy will be valid. Up to this point, analogy in animal
psychology has been a source of jokes and amusing stories, but this is
because analogies were being seen in places that, by definition, they could
not be; however, analogy can also lead to spectral analysis (74).
Page 348. Deletion of a reference to the unconscious.
We are forced to continue the sequence we know with a presumed one;
consciousness with the unconscious.
Pages 353–54. Gross substitution error (“consciousness” [soznanie]) for
“suckling” [sosanie]). The editors of vol. 1 cite a 1925 edition as the source, prob-
ably: E. Torndaik [Edward Thorndike], Printsipy obucheniia, osnovannye na
psikhologii [Principles of Learning Based on Psychology] ( Moscow, 1926). This
quote is not found in the book, however, it is present in two English-language
editions of Thorndike’s Educational Psychology (1913 and 1921).3 Probably a
number of fragments from Thorndike’s book were omitted when the Russian
edition was being prepared for publication. It is also probable that Vygotsky
was quoting from memory, which explains the mistaken page number.
Thorndike adds to this devastating argument a comment concerning the
relative differences of order in onto- and phylogenesis of one and the same
biological principle: for example consciousness {suckling} appears very
early in onto- and very late in phylogenesis; sexual drive, on the other hand
appears very early in phylo- and very late in ontogenesis (E. Thorndike,
1925 {64, p. 32}).
Page 354. Epithet substitution.
[T]he author, instead of undertaking to investigate and verify the hypotheses
(66, pp. 58–59), borrows Hall’s approach and interprets child behavior
using very clear {tenuous} analogies.
 july–august 2012 71

Page 355. Omitted mention of pedology.

2) synchronization theory defended in psychology {pedology} by the
Dewey school.
Page 362. Substitution of an adjective for a noun.
[N]either conditioned nor correlative reflexes seem to him to be sufficiently
clear and intelligible {concepts}:
Page 362. Substitution error.
We will find the same pattern in all reflexologists {reformers}—both re-
searchers and theoreticians.
Page 365. Removal of quotation marks from an article by Nikolai Bukharin:
“Enchmeniada. K voprosu ob ideologicheskom vyrozhdenii” [Enchmeniada.
On the Question of Ideological Degeneracy,” in Ataka. Sbornik teoreticheskikh
statei, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1924), p. 153. (Vygotsky either made an error in
indicating the wrong page number or is referring to a different edition of
Bukharin’s works.) The quote matches a fragment from Bukharin’s article
(aside from a few minor discrepancies). The beginning of this excerpt is
thickly crossed out in the original with a ballpoint pen.
{Bukharin says that this} Such a work amounts to the pinning of new
labels that explain absolutely nothing—“since it is not difficult, of course,
to invent an entire catalogue of names: ‘goal reflex,’ ‘god reflex,’ ‘rightness
reflex,’ ‘freedom reflex,’ among others. There is a reflex for everything. The
only problem is that it is all a total waste of time” (87, p. 144).
Page 366. Removal of quotation marks from a quotation from a work by N.N.
Lange: “Psikhicheskii mir” [Mental World], in Itogi nauki v teorii i praktike
[The Outcome of Science in Theory and Practice], ed., M.M. Kovalevskii et
al., vol. 8, pt. 1 (Moscow, 1914), p. 43. Vygotsky quotes the work precisely,
including the spelling.
But the very formulation of questions, the way psychological terms are
used, “always reflect a particular understanding of them that corresponds
to a particular theory and, consequently, the entire factual result of research
survives or perishes together with the validity or invalidity of the psycho-
logical system. What may look like the most precise studies, observations,
and measurements can thus prove, given a change in the meaning of the
main psychological theories {concepts,} false or, at the very least, lose
their significance.”
Page 369. Removal of a reference to a work by I.I. Stepanov (source no.
91 in Vygotsky’s numbering). We have been unable to establish the name and
72 journal of russian and east european psychology

publication details of this work. Volume 1 [of the collected works—Trans.]

contains a reference to the following publication, by Stepanov: Istoricheskii
materialism i sovremennoe estestvoznanie [Historical Materialism and Con-
temporary Natural History] (Moscow, 1924), however, it does not contain the
unidentified quotes. This fragment also offers an example of how references
to Marx and Engels were edited (Vygotsky’s quotes were replaced with quotes
from the second [1961] edition of Marx and Engels’s collected works).
And so, science is philosophical down to its last elements, is saturated in
methodology down to its words, so to speak. This coincides with the Marxist
view of philosophy as “the science of {within} sciences, as a syntheses that
penetrates into science (91, p. 35). In this sense Engels wrote: “Whatever
pose they may have taken {However hard} naturalists {might try to deny
it}, are ruled over by philosophy. . . . Only when natural science and the sci-
ence of history imbibe dialectics, only then all the trappings of philosophy
. . . will become superfluous, will disappear into positive science” {they
are governed by philosophers,” and that natural science and history
must imbibe dialectics and then philosophy will dissolve into a positive
science} (K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, vol. 20, p. 525 {__, p. 191}).
Scientists imagine that they are liberating themselves from philosophy
when they ignore it, but they wind up being slaves in the captivity of the
filthiest philosophy, which consists of a mishmash of fragmentary and
unsystematic views, since researchers {they} “cannot take a step without
thinking,” and thinking demands logical definitions (p. 37). The question
of how to interpret methodological questions “separately from the sciences
themselves” or introduce methodological study into science itself (course,
research), is a matter, as Stepanov rightly remarks, of pedagogical ex-
pediency (91, p. 48).
Page 369–70. Removal of quotation marks from the same work by Stepanov
(no. 91, according to Vygotsky’s numbering).
Let us now undertake to respond to these questions. “Given a degree of
familiarity with the methodology (and history) of sciences, science begins
to appear not as a lifeless, finished, static whole consisting of ready-made
propositions, but as a living, constantly developing and advancing system
of proven facts, laws, suppositions, constructions, and conclusions that is
continually enriched, criticized, verified, partially refuted, and interpreted
and organized in new ways, and so on. Science begins to be understood
dialectically in terms of its movement and from the perspective of its dy-
namics, its growth, development, and evolution” (__ p. 249).
Page 373. Editing error.
 july–august 2012 73

The seriousness of the crisis results from the intermediacy of psychology’s

territory between sociology and biology, between which Kant {Comte}
wanted to divide it.
Page 377. Editing error.
Such thoughts signify a failure to see that sociology has driven a wedge
between the biology of humans and of animals that has split psychology
in two, leading Kant {Comte} to see it as two fields.
Page 382. Omitted reference to Ludwig Binswanger.
Münsterberg has shown that naturalism and idealism are irreconcilable,
which is why he talks about a book of militant idealism, and Binswanger
talks about general psychology in terms of bravery and risk, but does not
speak of agreement and unification.
Page 382. Omitted chapter number (12).
“One is causal psychology, the other—teleological and intentional psy-
chology” (ibid., p. 9).

12. The existence of two psychologies is so obvious that everyone has

accepted it.
Page 386. Omitted mention of Liubov’ Aksel’rod.
How can we reconcile with this assertion the idea that psychology is only
empirical and that by its very nature it excludes idealism and is independent
of philosophy ( )? It is eidetic psychology, a unique brand of neopla-
tonism, that, according to Aksel’rod ( ), excludes idealism!
Page 386. Substitution error.
This, in essence, is that same fact that psychology gravitates toward two
poles, that same intrinsic presence in it of “psychoteleology” {“psychothe-
ology”} and “psychobiology” that Dessoir called the two-voiced singing of
contemporary psychology, which, in his opinion, will never be silenced.
Pages 388–89. Removal of a reference to pedology.
The third aspect of the reforming role played by psychotechnics can be
understood through the first two. It is the fact that psychotechnics is a one-
sided psychology, it provokes a rupture and gives shape to a real psychol-
ogy. In practice, pedology cannot only address the mind of the child; it
extends beyond the boundaries of psychology and incorporates physi-
ology and anatomy. Even if in practice it for now amounts to no more
than a unification of three different sciences under a single name, as
74 journal of russian and east european psychology

a task, as a principle, as an idea, pedology must create a new, realistic

understanding that will form a scientific foundation and that—we can
now say—will not have anything in common with the barren concept
of introspective perception.
Page 390. Removal of references to a book by Hugo Münsterberg, Osnovy
psikhotekhniki. Pervaia obshchaia chast’ [Principles of Psychotechnics: First
general part] (Moscow, 1924), pp. 6, 10–13. The references in vol. 1 of the
collected works mistakenly lists a different edition: Osnovy psikhotekhniki
[Principles of Psychotechnics] (Moscow, 1922), pt. 1.
Psychotechnics is directed toward action, practice, and here “we proceed
in a fundamentally different way than if we had a purely theoretical un-
derstanding {description} and explanation” (6). Psychotechnics therefore
cannot waver in its choice of the psychology that it needs (even if it has
been developed by consistent idealists); it deals exclusively with a causal
psychology, with an objective psychology. Noncausal psychology plays no
role whatsoever in psychotechnics (10).
It is this proposition that has decisive importance for all psychotechnical
sciences (11). It is—consciously—one-sided. It is the only empirical science
in the full sense of the word (11). It—inevitably—is a comparative science
(12). The connection with physical processes for this science is something so
fundamental that it is a physiological psychology (12). It is an experimental
science (13).
Page 390. The inserted editorial clarification “of the experiment” is not
entirely correct, since the reference is to the use of psychology (overall) in
practice.
From this perspective, Münsterberg states that empirical psychology had
barely emerged by the mid-nineteenth century. Even in schools that rejected
metaphysics and investigated {studied} facts, this study was guided by
another interest. Application [of the experiment—Ed.] was impossible until
psychology became a natural science. But the introduction of the experi-
ment brought about a paradoxical situation that was inconceivable within
natural science: apparatuses like the first {steam} engine or the telegraph
were known to laboratories, but were adapted to practice.
Page 390. Removal of references to the 1924 edition of Münsterberg’s
book (Osnovy psikhotekhniki. Pervaia obshchaia chast’).
Not only does life need psychology and everywhere practices it in other
{prescientific} forms, but in psychology too we should expect to benefit
from this contact with life (13–15).
 july–august 2012 75

Page 395. Removal of references to a work by Max Wertheimer. We were

unable to determine the exact source.*
The investigative principle is the same for the mental, the organic, and the
inorganic (17). This means that psychology has been introduced into the
context of the natural sciences, that psychological investigation can use
physical principles. Rather than seeing a senseless combining of an abso-
lutely heterogeneous mental and physical (18), Gestalt theory claims that
they are connected: they are parts of a single whole. Only a late-culture
European can divide the mental and the physical as we do. A person is
dancing. Do we really believe that on one side there is the sum total of
muscle movements and on the other joy and fervor? (25) The two are
structurally related. Consciousness does not bring anything fundamentally
new that demands different means of study. Where is the boundary between
materialism and idealism? There are psychological theories and even
many textbooks that—despite the fact that they talk only about elements
of consciousness—are soulless, senseless, dull, and more materialistic than
a growing tree (20).4
Page 397. Removal of the names G.V. Plekhanov and V.I. Lenin (their
removal may have had something to do with the fact that they come in the
“wrong” order).
. . . after all, it is one thing to examine the Marxist teachings of Plekhanov,
Lenin, etc., from the historical-philosophical perspective and quite another
to study the very issues raised by these thinkers.
Page 397. Removal of an ideologically problematic statement.
If we bring the two together we will be left with a double disadvantage: a
particular author is drawn into addressing a problem, and the problem is
formulated only on the scale and from the angle determined by this author’s

*The quotation is from Max Wertheimer’s programmatic talk “Über Gestalttheorie”

[On Gestalt Theory], which he gave in Berlin on December 17, 1924, at the conven-
tion of the German philosophical society (Kant-Gesellschaft). The following year, in
1925, the text of this presentation was published in the philosophical journal Sympo-
sion, Philosophische Zeitschrift für Forschung und Aussprache, vol. 1, pp. 39–60.
However, Vygotsky might have quoted it from a special twenty-four-page offprint
edition of the talk that came out in 1925 (M. Wertheimer, “Über Gestalttheorie, von
Max Wertheimer. Vortrag gehalten in der Kant-Gesellschaft, Berlin, am 17. Dezember
1924,” Sonderdrucke des Symposion, Hft. 1, Erlangen, Philosophische Akademie,
1925. The editor of this issue of the Journal of Russian and East European Psychol-
ogy was, however, unable to verify and confirm (or disconfirm) this publication as
the definite source of Vygotsky’s quotations.—Ed.
76 journal of russian and east european psychology

treatment in passing and in an entirely different context: the distortion in

the formulation of the question has to do with a random aspect of it that
has nothing to do with its core, that does not break it down in a way that
the essence of the question demands. From there, the problem is always
addressed with a sidelong glance at authorities [on the subject—Trans.],
with a sense of internal constraint, in a way that is fundamentally non-
investigative: constraining oneself in advance and limiting oneself to
someone else’s doctrine instead of drawing on it for help.
Page 398. Editing error (the substitution of “anthology” for “ontology”).*
. . .instead they are seeking a momentous anthological formula that says as
little as possible, is cautious and refrains from deciding anything {an onto-
logical formula that says as little as possible, is cautious, and refrains
from deciding what is most important}.
Page 398. Removal of an ideologically problematic fragment.
In the wrong way, because the thinking is fettered by an authoritative {au-
thoritarian} principle; they are not studying methods, but dogma; they
do not free themselves from the method of the logical overlapping of two
formulas; they do not accept a critical and freely investigative approach
to the matter. It must be understood that not every comma in Lenin
is law ( ); it must be understood that all research has a goal without
which it is senseless, that to discover something new, to enrich, to add
complexity, to add—rather than to contradict—are small virtues. Any
new discovery in the area of investigating nature and society, says
Riazanov,5 imperils many, nonfoundational propositions of Marxism
that will inevitably become obsolete. But Marxism only welcomes this
danger, which forces it to reevaluate its views. The very essence of
Marxism demands such “revision.” Lenin rightly noted that revision
of the form of Engels’s materialism, revision of its natural-philosophy
propositions, is in no way revisionist and is deemed necessary by Marx-
ism (__ p. 32). No investigation is possible without the freedom that is
absolutely essential to both the rank-and-file investigator and the great
thinker. This is doubly true for psychology: within it, everything that
was contemporary to Engels has by now become more obsolete than
is the case for natural science.
Page 400. Change of a negative to a positive.
After all, the mind also has within it its own different qualities: pain is just

*And altering of the grammatical ending—and thus the meaning—of the word
“most important”/”momentous” [vazhneishaia].—Trans.
 july–august 2012 77

as dissimilar to sweetness as shininess is to hardness—another special

property. {?}
Page 403. Removal of a reference to: A. Stoliarov, “Filosofiia ‘kachestva’ i
kachestvo filosofii nekotorykh mekhanitsistov” [Philosophy “of Quality” and
the Quality of Philosophy in Certain Mechanicists], Pod znamenem marksizma,
1926, no. 6, p. 103. The Deborin quotes are reproduced in this article on page
103 in footnote 2 based on: A. Deborin, “Marks i Gegel’“ [Marx and Hegel],
Pod znamenem marksizma, 1926, no. 3, p. 17.
Our Marxists {Stoliarov}, in explaining the Hegelian principle in Marx-
ist methodology, correctly assert {states} that everything can be seen as
a microcosm, as a “universal measure,” in which the entire vast world is
reflected. “On these grounds they say {it is said} that to study any single
thing, to completely exhaust a single subject or phenomenon, is to know the
entire world in all its connections. In this sense it can be said that every per-
son is to some degree a measure of the society or, rather, the class to which
he belongs, since within him is reflected the totality of social relationships”
(__ p. 103). Deborin says the same thing: “Singularity is not a negation of
generality, but rather its realization. A specific singular thing or specific
individual stands on its own, insofar as within it generality is realized as
the real, as generality.” [“]This singular object is at the same time also
special and expresses a general essence.” “The working class of a given
particular environment, being a given[,] that is, a singular phenomenon,
in a specific way, that is, a special way, expresses the general character,
the laws and definitions of the working class in general” (103).
Page 403–4. Editing error.
In fact, when I am experimenting, I study A, B, C . . . , that is, a series of
specific phenomena, and distribute {apply} conclusions to various groups:
to all people, to preschoolers, to activity {Daltonists}, etc. Analysis then
suggests how far conclusions can be applied {How far conclusions can
be applied presupposes analysis}, that is, the identification within A, B,
and C of characteristics common to the given group.
Page 405. Substitution error.
I was basing my assumptions on the idea that developed forms of art offer
the key to underdeveloped {undeveloped} forms, as human anatomy offers
the key to simian anatomy.
Page 408. Removal of a reference to the article by Edmund Husserl: E.
Gusserl’, “Filosofiia kak strogaia nauka” [Philosophy as Rigorous Science],
in Logos. Mezhdunarodnyi ezhegodnik po filosofii kul’tury. Russkoe izdanie
(Moscow: 1911), book 1. Vygotsky’s quote is close to wording found in this
78 journal of russian and east european psychology

Russian translation of Husserl’s article,6 however, the page number indicated

is not correct, so uncertainty about the source of the quotation remains.
The phenomenological method by no means presupposes the being of the
essence it investigates; its object may be pure fantasy, utterly devoid of being
(454); 2) the analytic method studies facts and leads to knowledge that has
the validity of fact. The phenomenological method seeks apodictic truths that
are absolutely reliable and are universally obligatory (454); 3) the analytic
method is a posteriori and is a special case of empirical knowledge, that is,
factual knowledge as per Hume. The phenomenological method is a priori;
it is not a type of experience or factual knowledge (8–9); 4) the analytical
method {experience}, relying on facts that have already been studied and
generalized, ultimately leads, through the study of new individual facts, to new
relative factual generalizations that have boundaries, degrees of applicability,
limitations and even exceptions. The phenomenological method does not
lead to knowledge of the general, but of the idea—the essence (p. 464). The
general is known through induction, the essence through intuition. Essence
exists outside time and reality and is not a temporal or real thing (464).
Page 409. Gross substitution error (“discern appearances in being” instead
of “distinguish between appearances and being”). The manuscript lacks an
opening quotation mark.
In nature we discern a phenomenon in being {distinguish between phenom-
ena and being}. “In the psychical sphere there is no distinction between a
phenomenon and being” (E. Husserl, 1911, p. 25). If nature is being that
manifests itself in a phenomenon, this can by no means be said in regard
to psychical being. Here, phenomenon and being are one and the same”
(452–[45]3).
Pages 410–11. Substitution error: in the original, the reference is to infal-
lible essences in the “spiritual dimension.” The editor uses the phrase “in the
spirit of” as an analogue for the adjective “like.”
And as a result they arrive at a Neoplatonism: in the spirit of {in spirit there
are} infallible essences for which being is the same as appearing!
Page 411. Distortion of meaning through the placement of quotation marks
around “Marxists.”
After all, many “Marxists” will not be able to point to the difference
between their theory of psychological knowledge and that of idealism,
because there is none.
Page 412. Inserted negation.
Furthermore: in introspection, it turns out, it is impossible to immediately
 july–august 2012 79

perceive thinking, comparison—these are unconscious acts. Our introspec-

tional comprehension of them is not a functional understanding, that is,
derived from objective experience ( ).
Page 412. Substitution error.
Who will study this thing that eliminates {that is eliminated} both times,
this kazhimost’?*
Page 414. Removal of quote marks from the following publication: E.
Titchener, Uchebnik psikhologii. Universitetskii kurs [Psychology Textbook:
University Course] (Moscow, 1914), pts. 1, 2, pp. 33–34. (Quoted from: Edward
Bradford Titchener, A Text-Book of Psychology [New York: 1910], p. 40.)
The author finds a way out using a purely verbal subterfuge: mental phenom-
ena can be explained solely in relation to the body. “The nervous system,”
Titchener states, “does not cause, but it does explain mind. It explains mind
as the map of a country explains the fragmentary glimpses of hills and riv-
ers and towns that we catch on our journey through it. . . . Reference to the
body does not add one iota to the data of psychology. . . . It does furnish us
with an explanatory principle for psychology.” If we reject this, then there
are only two ways to overcome fragmentary mental life: either the purely
descriptive way, rejecting explanation, or by allowing for the existence of
{the unconscious}. “Both courses have been tried. But, if we take the first,
we never arrive at a science of psychology; and if we take the second, we
voluntarily leave the sphere of fact for the sphere of fiction. These are scientific
alternatives” (pp. 33–34). This is perfectly clear. But is a science with the
explanatory principle the author has chosen possible? Is it possible to have
a science about the “fragmentary views of mountains, rivers, and cities” to
which the mind is compared in Titchener’s {the} example?
Page 417. Removal of quotation marks around a quote from: V.N.
Ivanovskii, Metodologicheskoe vvedenie v nauku i filosofiiu [Methodological
Introduction to Science and Philosophy] (Minsk: 1923), vol. 1. In addition,
the chapter number (15) has been omitted.
[“]I am convinced that the widespread application of the term “natural”
to everything that exists in reality is entirely rational. “Natural sciences”
are the sciences of nature in the broadest sense: of the nature of the
inorganic, organic, conscious, and social” (_pp. 182-[18]3).

15. The possibility of psychology as science is a methodological problem

first and foremost {par excellence}.

*The subjective appearance of reality—Trans.

80 journal of russian and east european psychology

Page 419. A mention of St. Petersburg University professor A.V. Nemilov

(1879–1942) has been replaced with a mention of I.P. Pavlov.
. . . the verdicts on Bekhterev and Pavlov {Nemilov} from Hegelian
heights;
Page 420. Omission of a reference to: L. Trotskii [Trotsky], “Partiinaia
politika v iskusstve” [Party Policy on the Arts], in Literatura i revoliutsiia
(Moscow: 1923), p. 162.7 The names of Lev Trotsky and Karl Radek, as well
as the phrase “and I along with him”—which belongs to Trotsky rather than
Vygotsky—have been heavily crossed out with a ballpoint pen.
The idea of the need for a mediative {mediating} theory, without which it
is impossible to examine individual particular facts in the light of Marx-
ism, has long been recognized, and all that remains for me is to point out
is how well the conclusions drawn by our analysis of psychology coincide
with this idea. [“]What will the metaphysicians of a purely proletarian
science[,”] Trotsky asks, [“]have to say about the theory of relativity?
Can it be reconciled with materialism or not? Has this question been
decided? Where, when, and by whom? . . . What about Freud’s theory
of psychoanalysis? Can it be reconciled with materialism, as Comrade
Radek, for example, believes (as do I), or is it hostile toward it?” But
to “methodologically gather up” all these new teachings and introduce
them into the context of the dial.-mat. worldview “is not a task for
newspaper and journal articles, but rather belongs to the realm of the
scientific-philosophical milestone, such as The Origin of Species and Das
Kapital”—this will not happen today or tomorrow (__ p. 162).
Page 421. Negation added.
After all, dialectics is not logic, it is even broader.
Page 421. Editing error.
But as {the way that} they now determine whether a given teaching ac-
cords with Marxism, as if it were a matter for an assay office, amounts to
the method of “logical overlaying,” that is, whether or not forms, logical
{formally logical} features match up (monism, etc.).
Page 421. Ideologically motivated substitution.
Neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Plekhanov possessed that truth. This is
the reason behind the fragmentary and abbreviated {contradictory and
precarious} nature of many formulations, their rough-draft-like character,
their strictly contextual meaning.
Page 424. Substitution error.
 july–august 2012 81

The equal sign has been written on paper in a highly mathematical man-
ner. If we recall that Lotze compared psychology to applied mathematics
{metaphysics} ( );
Page 425. Ideologically motivated substitution.
. . . some fear in this name traces of its materialistic {mythological} origins,
others fear that it has lost its old literal and precise meaning.
Page 426. Editing error.
Empirical psychology itself (incidentally, soon it will be 50 years since the
name of this science {this name almost} completely ceased to be used,
as every school adds its own adjective) is dead, like a cocoon left behind
by a butterfly that has died {flown away}, like an egg abandoned by a
fledgling.
Page 426. Editing error.
We are not even aware of any factors among which relationships could be
established in the form of elementary mental acts {laws}.
Page 428. Editing error.
. . . the very attempt to approach the soul scientifically, the effort of free thought
to master the mind, however, it may have been obscured and paralyzed by
mythology, that is, the very idea of the scientific structure {knowledge} of
the soul holds the entire future path of psychology.
Page 431. Removal of a reference to dynamic psychology.
. . . physiological, biological, associative {associational}, dialectical,
dynamic . . . and on and on.
Page 434. Editing error. Vygotsky was referring to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s
philosophy of ego. We assume that the number at the end of this fragment
refers to: William Stern, Person und Sache, System des Kritischen Personal-
ismus (Leipzig: 1923).
The title “the philosophy I” of I {“Philosophy of Ego”} it considers to be
an honor. It is not psychology at all, but philosophy[,] and wishes to be
such (8).
Page 436. The manuscript’s original page 107 was replaced with a sheet of
paper featuring text written in a ballpoint pen and the notation, “manu. 107.”
The text of page 107 starts with the words “center of life.” The ellipsis after
the words “will create a new man . . .” may represent text that was omitted
when the copy was made. The editors then added a paragraph that was not in
82 journal of russian and east european psychology

the manuscript. In Vygotsky’s final version of HMCP, he quotes a series of

points made by Trotsky (in the works “Proletarskaia literatura i proletarskoe
iskusstvo” [Proletarian Literature and Proletarian Art], “Voprosy kul’turnoi
raboty” [Questions of Cultural Work], “O kul’ture budushchego” [The Culture
of the Future], among others). This is probably why page 107 was removed
from the manuscript and replaced with an edited copy.
On the contrary, in the new society our science will become the center of
life. “A leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom”8
will inevitably bring to the fore the question of mastering our own essence,
of subordinating it to our purposes. In this sense Pavlov was correct when
he called our science the last science about man himself. It will indeed be
the last science in the historical period of humanity or in the prehistory of
humanity. The new society will create a new man. . . .
When they speak of the recasting of man as an undoubted feature of the
new humanity and about the artificial creation of a new biological type, this
will be the first and only species in biology to create itself.
“{Here we have the only instance where the words of the paradoxical
psychologist—who defined psychology as the science of the superman—
are justified}: in the society of the future, psychology will indeed be the
science of the new man {superman}. Without this, the perspective of
Marxism and the history of science would be incomplete. But this science
of the new man {superman} will nevertheless be psychology; we now hold
in our hands the thread that leads to it. It matters little that this psychology
will so little resemble the current one as in the words of {according to}
Spinoza—the constellation Canis resembles a dog, the animal that barks
(Ethics, Proposition XVII).

Notes

1. Resp.—[abbreviation of Latin “respective” meaning “respectively” or “corre-

sponding to.” In this context it should be understood as “i.e.” (Latin “id est” meaning
“that is”), “or,” or “the same as.” Therefore, this sentence can be rephrased as follows:
“Here the relationship between the two systems is also primarily established via
catharsis—of constricted affect, that is [the same as] an inhibited mimetic-somatic
impulse.” Similarly, using resp. in the following phrase the author equates “the dis-
charge in the form of a reflex” and catharsis.—Ed.]
2. There are indeed instances where N.A. Ivantsov mentions the analogy method,
such as in the following two examples: “The paths leading from recognition of the
objective existence of another person to recognition of the objective reality of the
entire world are extremely varied. There is, for example, the path of analogy, such
as the following: other people exist, but other beings imagined by me are more or
less similar to these people. The natural and probable conclusion is that they also
exist” (see p. 19, in N.A. Ivantsov, “Problema bytiia vneshnego mira [Okonchanie],”
 july–august 2012 83

Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 1893, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 11–26). “It must be stated from
the outset that there is absolutely no possibility of indisputably proving the existence
or nonexistence of consciousness in anything other than our own brain, although by
analogy we also have the right to assume that it exists in other beings” (see p. 40, in
N.A. Ivantsov, “Gioksli kak predstavitel’ sovremennogo nauchnogo mirovozzreniia,
V–VI [Okonchanie],” Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 1892, vol. 14, pp. 37–74).
3. “[T]he date at which a tendency appears is that one of the many varying dates
at which it has appeared in our ancestry which has been most serviceable in keeping
the stock alive. Thus, suckling, though late in the race, is early in the individual. The
sex instincts, though early in the race, are very late in the individual. Walking on all
fours, though the possession of the race for perhaps millions of years, is evanescent
or non-existent as a human instinct; creeping, though not a duplicate of any important
form of locomotion possessed and then lost in our ancestral line, is one of the most
emphatic transitory tendencies of infancy” (Edward L. Thorndike, Educational Psy-
chology (1913). vol. 1, pp. 252–53; Educational Psychology: Briefer Course (1921),
pp. 105–6. Emphasis added.
4. In his article “Structural Psychology” (1930), Vygotsky introduces the same
quote from Wertheimer but does not provide a source: “‘Imagine,’ says Wertheimer,
‘that a person is dancing. In dance there is fervor, joy. What is going on here? Do we
really have, on the one hand, the separate sum of physical movements of muscles and
limbs and on the other—separately—mental, conscious processes.’ As the physiologi-
cal processes that serve as the basis of our behavior unfold, they reveal structures that
are either identical or related to those that are found in mental processes. In this sense
the outer and the inner aspects of behavior are the same.”
5. Vygotsky is citing D.B. Riazanov’s foreword to Engels’s Dialectics and Nature
(Arkhiv Marksa i Engel’sa, ed. D.B. Riazanov [Moscow: 1925], book 2).
6. Cf., p. 25 of this article: “In the psychical sphere there is, in other words, no
distinction between appearance and being, and if nature is a being that appears in ap-
pearances, still appearances themselves (which the psychologist certainly looks upon
as psychical) do not constitute a being which itself appears by means of appearances
lying behind it—as every reflection on the perception of any appearance whatever
makes evident.” (Quoted from: “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in Phenomenology
and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer [New York; 1965], p. 179.)
7. The entire excerpt from Trotsky’s work reads as follows: “What will the meta-
physicians of a purely proletarian science have to say about the theory of relativity?
Can it be reconciled with materialism or not? Has this question been decided? Where,
when, and by whom? Any simpleton understands that the works of our physiologist
Pavlov adhere entirely to materialism. But what about Freud’s theory of psychoanaly-
sis? Can it be reconciled with materialism, as Comrade Radek, for example, believes
(as do I), or is it hostile toward it? The same could be asked about theories regarding
the structure of the atom, etc., etc. It would be wonderful if we could find a scientist
capable of methodologically gathering up all these new generalizations and introducing
them into the context of the dialectical materialist worldview. In so doing he would
test the new theories and enrich the dialectical method. But I am very worried that
this work—which is not a task for newspaper and journal articles, but rather belongs
to the realm of the scientific-philosophical milestone, such as The Origin of Species
and Das Kapital—will be carried out not today and not tomorrow, or rather, even if
it is produced today, this milestone book risks lying with uncut pages until the day
comes when the proletariat is able to lay down its arms.”
84 journal of russian and east european psychology

8. From Engels’s Anti-Dühring (1878; quoted from K. Marks and F. Engel’s,

Sochineniia, vol. 20 [Moscow: 1961], section 3, ch. 2, p. 295). “The organization of
people into a society that until now has been something imposed on them by nature
and history hereinafter becomes [under socialism] their own free act. The objective
outside forces that have ruled over history until now are coming under the control of
people themselves. And only from this moment forward will people begin, with full
consciousness, to create their own history, only henceforth will the social causes they
set in motion in predominant and ever growing measure yield the consequences that
they desire. This is humanity’s leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom
of freedom.”

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