Dye Production, Food Supply, and the Laboring Population of Oaxaca, 1750-1820

Author(s): Brian R. Hamnett

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review , Feb., 1971, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Feb., 1971),
pp. 51-78
Published by: Duke University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2512613

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Hispanic American Historical Review

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Dye Production, Food Supply, and the
Laboring Population of Oaxaca, 1750-1820

BRIAN R. HAMNETT*

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THE indigenous population

of the southern Mexican province of Oaxaca still pos-
sessed the bulk of the land in the form of communal
tenure. Indeed, most land disputes there tended to arise between
Indian communities although clashes did occur between them and the
owners of haciendas. The indigenous population provided the labor
force for the production of basic foodstuffs such as maize, beans and
wheat, and of the main export crop, scarlet dye. The- present study
examines first of all, the two central and related aspects of Oaxaca's
economy during the late colonial period: the problems of land tenure
and the relation between the dye export trade and the subsistence
economy. It then describes the worsening crisis in the region after
the 1780s, the causes to which it was attributed, and the economic
conditions there on the eve of Mexican independence in 1821.
The predominance of indigenous landownership distinguished
Oaxaca from the cereal-producing core of Mexico, especially the
Bajilo. Since its haciendas continued in a state of crisis througho
the eighteenth century, their proprietors-among them the Dominican
Province of Oaxaca-put constant pressure on indigenous communal
lands and their labor force. The hacendados in collusion with the
local political authorities, the alcaldes mayores, frequently and bla-
tantly violated the Laws of the Indies and Royal Decrees designed to
protect the Indians of Spanish America. Those of Oaxaca, however,
did not passively resign themselves. They actively engaged in litiga-
tion on their own behalf before the Audiencia of Mexico and the
Intendancy of Oaxaca. In some cases, when legal authorities pro-
crastinated or failed entirely to redress an injustice, they resorted to
limited demonstrations of force to settle particular grievances.

1.

The greatest concentration of Hispanic settlement lay within the

* The author is Assistant Professor of History at the State University of New
York at Stony Brook.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
52 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
Valley of Oaxaca, that is, in the capital city of Antequera de Oaxaca
itself, in the corregimiento of Oaxaca, and in the four partidos of
Zimatlan, Teotitl'an del Valle, the Cuatro Villas del Marquesado, and
Huitzo. These were the most fertile regions, containing the largest
number of haciendas.1 The Valley of Oaxaca included four smaller
valleys: the Valle Grande de Ocotlan, the Valle Chico de Zaachila, the
Valle de Etla, and the Valle de Tlacolula. These were primarily
maize and bean lands, for the Valley climate did not yield the bland,
white wheat flour of Tehuacan and the other Puebla valleys. Only
the Mixteca and, in particular, the partidos of Teposcolula and Noch-
istlan, produced the white flour. In contrast, only the poor in the
city of Oaxaca and neighboring valleys would consume the yellow
flour produced in the Valley of Oaxaca.2
In this most fertile and populous of the regions of Oaxaca, land-
ownership was characterized by small Creole and Spanish estates in
the midst of sizeable Indian holdings, rather than by the dominance
of a few large estates. Certainly a few large estates existed in the
Valley, and instances of landless Indians arose there and elsewhere in
the province, but the indigenous population of the Valley of Oaxaca
cannot be considered serfs captured within the confines of the
large estate. On the contrary, the shortage of hacienda laborers re-
mained endemic throughout the eighteenth century and well into the
nineteenth. Because of the capacity of their subsistence lands to
provide for their requirements most Indian communities strongly re-
sisted pressure to serve on the hacienda lands. Therefore, as certain
land and labor cases referred to in this study clearly indicate, the
hacendados sometimes sought to appropriate Indian labor by force.
3. The Revillagigedo population census of 1793 estimated the Indian pop-
ulation figure at 363,o80 out of a total of 413,336 for all racial groups in the
province. The Creole and Spanish Peninsular figure reached only 26,527, clearly
concentrated in the Valley of Oaxaca, AGN (Archivo General de la Nacion,
Mexico City), Historia, 523. Navarro y Noriega in 181o placed the indigenous
total at 526,466 out of a final total of 596,326. He calculated that 928 pueblos
de indios lay within the Intendancy of Oaxaca, including only 83 haciendas and
269 ranches. These figures should be compared with those for the adjacent
Intendancy of Puebla, also heavily indigenous, which, although it contained 764
Indian villages, also included the large total of 478 haciendas and 911 ranches, F.
Navarro y Noriega, Memoria sobre la Problacion del Reyno de Nueva Espania,
(Publicaciones del Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Hist6rico-Juridicas,
Mexico 1943).
2. Jose Maria Murguia y Galardi, Estadtstica del Estado de Oaxaca, (MSS
1826-28), Vol. i, Apendice a la segunda parte, f. 27 vta., in five unpublished
tomes containing nine volumes in manuscript form, Biblioteca de la Sociedad
Mexicana de Geografia y Estadistica, Mexico City. Hereafter the Biblioteca will
be cited as BSMGE.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCTION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 53

Many of the land disputes between Indian communities continued

over several decades. Two Huitzo communities, the villages of San
Felipe Tejalapan and San Lorenzo Cacaotepec, contended before the
law courts between 1699 and 1786.3 Between 1712 and i8o6 the vil-
lages of Santa Ana Yaguiza (or Yahuiza) and Santa Marla de la
Asunci6n Tlacolula in the Valley of Oaxaca litigated concerning pos-
session of lands in a dispute involving a third party, the Convento de
la Concepci6n in the city of Oaxaca, owner of the Hacienda de San
Francisco Buenavista.4 Three villages in Etla, also in the Valley of
Oaxaca, Santa Maria Tejotepec, Santiago Camotdan, and Santiago
Nanacaltepec, disputed the possession of lands between 1744 and
383i.5
To illustrate the economic crisis of the Oaxaca haciendas we may
examine the plight of an entailed estate, the mayorazgo de Guen-
dulain. Long before Captain Miguel de Guendulain took possession
of these lands upon the death of his father in 1734, they had been in
a state of extreme deterioration. In 1741 the owner requested per-
mission from the Audiencia of Mexico to place upon the Hacienda de
Nuestra Sefiora de la Asunci6n in the Valley of Tlacolula and upon
other estates a censo of 4,000 pesos at 5% interest per annum for a
period of between four to six years.6 The purpose was to secure the
recovery of an estate completely without yokes or tools, where the
houses lay in total disrepair and where the lands could not at that
time be cultivated due to the exhaustion of the soil.7 The owner
3. Los naturales del pueblo de San Felipe Tejalapan contra los del de San
Lorenzo Cacaotepec sobre propiedad de tierras, AGN, Tierras, 1082, exp. 1.
4. Los naturales del pueblo de Santa Ana Yaguiza o Yahuiza contra los del de
Santa Maria de la Asuncion Tlacolula, y el Convento de la Concepcion, poseedor
de la Hacienda de San Francisco Buenavista sobre posesion de tierras, AGN,
Tierras, 1268, exp. 1.
5. Los naturales del pueblo de Santa Marla Tejotepec contra los del de San-
tiago Camotlan y Santiago Nanacaltepec sobre posesion de tierras, AGN, Tierras,
1658, exp. 2. Other cases include the following: los naturales del pueblo de
Santa Catarina M'artir Yutaquini contra los del de Santiago Yolomecatl sobre
posesion de tierras, AGN, Tierras, 1433, exp. 1, (Teposcolula, 1711-67); los
naturales del pueblo de Santiago Tlatepuxco contra los del de San Pedro
Tlatepuxco sobre posesion de tierras, AGN, Tierras, 1441, exp. 24 (Tuxtepec,
1718-1806); los naturales del pueblo de San Miguel Tlalixtac contra los del de
Santo Domingo Tomaltepec sobre posesion de la cafiada de Zempoalatengo, AGN,
Tierras, 1426, exp. 3, (Oaxaca, 1822-24).
6. Censos were the agreement by virtue of which a convent received a 5%
annual interest payment from a private proprietor of an urban or rural property
who had mortgaged his property to the convent in return for a loan of ready
cash. The censo could be cancelled by the property owner's repayment of the
principal.
7. Miguel de Giuendulain to Juan Joseph de Castro y Laso, alcalde ordinario

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 54 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
offered to mortgage both the hacienda, which his representative stated
was worth 25,000 pesos, and his houses in the city of Oaxaca, valued
at more than 12,000 pesos, as guarantee of repayment of the loan to
the ecclesiastical creditors. The Audiencia, however, had limited the
financing of mayorazgos by censo strictly to urban properties, prob-
ably with the intention of preventing inalienable rural estates from
falling under clerical financial control. On January 26, 1742, the
Audiencia granted license to contract a debt of 4,000 pesos, but only
on the houses in the city, and not on the hacienda. However, in the
meantime, the Corregidor of Oaxaca had conducted an official evalua-
tion of the urban properties and concluded that their total value, in
view of their deterioration, was only 8,0oo pesos and that only the sum
of 2,500 pesos would be necessary for their repair.8
In a similar vein, the Dominican Province in Oaxaca in 1771 la-
mented the decay of its haciendas. The Convento de Santo Domingo
in the city of Oaxaca possessed five such estates. During the six-year
period from 1764 to 1769, three of the haciendas, Nuestra Seniora del
Rosario, Nuestra Sefiora de los Dolores, and San Luis-all in the Val-
ley of Oaxaca-rendered the convent a total of 19,442 pesos i real.
However, the cost of running the estates and maintaining the farming
implements reached 25,372 pesos 732 reales. The fourth estate, the
Hacienda de Soriano, in Teotitlan del Valle, was totally stripped of
necessities, and yielded nothing. The fifth estate was an hacienda de
ganado mayor (cattle estate) in Tehuantepec, which annually sent
only a yoke of bulls to the convent for sale in the city of Oaxaca.
Deducting the transportation costs, these animals yielded the meagre
profit of only 150 to i6o pesos. At the same time the convent had
loaned the sum of 20,992 pesos for investment in the Hacienda de
Naranjo in Teposcolula, but no interest payments had been received
for the past six years. In short, the convent's total receipts from its
landed properties came to 137,302 pesos 5 reales, while the operating
costs mounted to 146,016 pesos 3 reales.9 Likewise, the Hacienda

de primer voto y de la Santa Hermandad de Oaxaca, Jan. 28, 1741, AGN,

Vinculos, 51, cuademo no. io, fol. 1-7. After witnesses testified that the estate
was indeed in a state of disrepair, the Fiscal of the Audiencia of Mexico reviewed
the request on Jan. 15, 1742, ibid., fol. 7-9.
8. Diligencias del Corregidor de Oaxaca, ibid., fol. 7-41.
9. Testimonio de las Diligencias hechas en virtud de Superior Despacho del
Exemo. Sr. Marques de Croix con la Provincia de San Hipolito M'artir de Oaxaca
(vino con carta del virrey Marques de Croix, Sept. 19, 1771), Padres Depositarios
de este Convento de Nuestro Padre Santo Domingo de Oaxaca to Fray Juan
Garcla Caballero, Prior Provincial, Aug. 6, 1770, AGI (Archivo General de
Indias, Seville, Spain), Mexico, 2586, fol. 17-18. The revenues of the Dominican
Convent of San Pablo in the city of Oaxaca also suffered through the deterioration

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCIION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 55

de Toquela, belonging to the Dominican vicarage of Ocotlan, was re-

ported on July lo, 1770, to be totally without equipment, capital, or
even cattle, and consequently, unable to yield any returns.10 Similar
views were expressed by the Dominican Provincial of Oaxaca as late
as 1814, indicating no improvement over a course of forty years or
more.11
The state of the haciendas gave added point to the land disputes
between the Indian communities and the hacendados. Between 1708
and 1802, for example, the indigenous communities of Santo Domingo
Zanatepec, San Pedro Tapanatepec, and Santiago Niltepec conducted
a protracted suit against the Dominicans of the Oaxaca Province of
San Hipolito M'artir, owners of the Hacienda de Chicapa. The dis-
pute involved the true ownership of the sitios de la Santa Veracruz
and Nuestra Sefiora del Rosario. These, the Indians claimed, were
traditionally their properties, and they referred to the two sitios de
ganado mayor as their haciendas, illustrating once more the extent of
Indian land-ownership. In May, 1708, the Audiencia of Mexico or-
dered that a special commissioner be sent to the town of Tehuantepec,
before whom the Governor and alcaldes of the Indian village of
Zanatepec should present themselves. In April, 1710, the agent for the
village explained that since time immemorial the Indians had enjoyed
unmolested possession of the sitios by virtue of Royal mercedes or
grant of title. Both properties were administered under the vigilance
of two Indian cofradias. Unfortunately, however, a serious fire had
swept through the village in 1693, consuming the land titles. Never-
theless, one Felipe de Gamboa, a citizen of Oaxaca but resident in
Tehuantepec, had visited Zanatepec on several occasions and testified
that the lands had always belonged to the village. The fact that the
Indians owned haciendas did not indicate that they were prosperous.
On the contrary, the Lieutenant-General of the Alcaldia Mayor of
Tehuantepec pointed out that throughout his thirty years there he
could vouch for the dire poverty of all the villages of the region, due
to the general lack of production and commerce.12

of rented properties and through irregular payment of censo obligations by the

tenants, ibid., fol. 21-21 vta.
1o Vicaria de Ocotlan to Provincial, July 1o, 1770, ibid., fol. 25-25 vta.
33. Provincial to Superior Gobiemo, Oct. 12, 1814, AGN, Tierras, 2788, exp.
3, fol. 37.
12. Los naturales de los pueblos de Santo Domingo Zanatepec, San Pedro
Tapanatepec y Santiago Niltepec contra los religiosos dominicos de la Provincia
de San Hipolito Martir, duefios de la hacienda de Chicapa, sobre propiedad de
los sitios de la Santa Veracruz y Nuestra Sefiora del Rosario, AGN, Tierras,
1076, exp. 1. Officials of the Indian Cabildo (village council) presented these

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
56 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
In November, 1762, the legal agent of the three Indian towns pro-
tested before the Lieutenant-General against the extortion and ill-
treatment suffered by them at the hands of the Dominican vicario
provincial there, who administered the Order's hacienda. The Viceroy
had entrusted the alcalde mayor of Huamelula with the task of order-
ing the hacienda's workers to remove its cattle from the lands of the
Indians, and not to interfere with the Indians' fishing rights in the
rivers. The agent explained that the Indian Hacienda de la Santa
Veracruz lay in what he called a state of total deterioration, and
that the Hacienda de Nuestra Sefiora del Rosario only possessed a
small herd of cattle. The Dominicans, however, possessed over 40,000
head which had drifted on to the Indians' lands.13
The Dominicans, through the agency of the parish priest of Tequi-
sistlan, refused to make concessions. The Indians' legal representative
accused the friars of attempting to appropriate the lands of the pardos
libres of Niltepec, in the midst of whose lands the Dominicans pos-
sessed the Hacienda de los Dolores. The workers from that estate
created disturbances in the villages at all hours of the day and night.
Zanatepec traditionally enjoyed ownership of an abundance of land,
but these rights were now challenged by the Dominican-owned Haci-
enda de la Majada (de ganado mayor) which had entirely covered
the Indians' lands with its cattle. The loss of land by the Indians
and the pardos libres placed the future existence of their villages in
jeopardy.
The mulatto and pardo character of Niltepec considerably con-
fused the Audiencia, which would have had little hesitation in order-
ing the protection of Indian communal land rights. Believing that,
because the Negroid mestizos were not Indians, they must be intruders
in the region, the Audiencia ordered on June 28, 1787, that the ad-
ministrator in Tehuantepec maintain the Dominicans in full possession
of their lands, namely, the Hacienda de los Dolores, to which the
mulattoes, "con nombre de indios," had laid claim. The Audiencia
called for the removal of the mulattoes' cattle enclosures. The Fiscal
of the Audiencia, Ram6n de Posada, on February 14, 1788, went so far
as to state that the Dominicans had been in possession of the lands
for forty years, and that the Indian and pardo communities had no
case.14
statements in the presence of the juez subdelegado or special commissioner
from the Audiencia, April 28, 1710, cuademo 1, fol. 1-7 vta.
13. Escrito del Apoderado de los Naturales, Villa de Guadalcazar de Tehuante-
pec, Nov. 6, 1762, given before Bartolome Bejarano, teniente gene,ral of the
alcaldia mayor of Tehuantepec, ibid., fol. i6 vta.-24 vta.
14. Diligencias practicadas en virtud de las dos Reales Provisiones en ellas

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCrION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 57

Two further cases of indigenous loss of land in the Pacific coast

region illustrate the keen competition between Indians and Creoles
for control of the land. In 1760, the Indian village of San Pedro
Juchatengo, in the jurisdiction of Jicayan, complained of its lack of
subsistence land due to the loss of vital parts of its 6oo varas de fundo
legal. The Audiencia's Real Provision of April i6, 1760, ordered
amparo (proper legal constitution) for the community. The alcalde
mayor of Jicayan, Pedro de Iturribarria y Urquijo, reported to the
Viceroy in 1764 that he had ordered compliance with the amparo,
especially with reference to the lands adjacent to Juchatengo, among
which were several belonging to the sugar-mill of Santa Ana in Zimat-
lan. However, the Real Provisio'n of 1760 was not respected, with the
result that on June i8, 1805, the Subdelegate of Jicayan described to
Viceroy Iturrigaray the miserable state of the village, and requested
verification of the adjudication of 1760. In the meantime, the inhab-
itants lived in extreme poverty.'5
In 1766 the alcalde mayor of Tehuantepec, Juan Baptista de
Echarri, later to be one of the chief cochineal dye merchants of Oaxaca,
became involved in the protracted and insoluble land dispute between
the Huave Indian community of San Mateo del Mar and the Hacienda
de Huazontlan. The Indians claimed that the hacienda cattle had in-
vaded their maize fields, destroying the crops. The maize lands haA
then been incorporated into the hacienda, and put under cattle.
Echarri went in person to the village in company with Colonel Manuel
Vallejo, intending to award the lands of Huazontlan to him. The
Indians were violently dispersed from the maize lands and confined to
a sandy peninsula jutting into the lagoon of Tehuantepec and the
Pacific Ocean. There they suffered frequent flooding and claimed
they were compelled to subsist on a diet solely of fish. They allegedly
were forced to drink sea-water as there was no fresh water. However,
in 1766 the corregidor of Jalapa del Estado, the adjacent jurisdiction,
declared that Echarri's actions had been illegal and that the disputed
lands really belonged to the Indians. Meanwhile, as the Audiencia
was arguing the question, the Indians, in desperation, took matters
into their own hands, and began to reoccupy the lands in order to
plant a maize crop. The result was that their palm huts and church

insertas sobre tierras entre los RR Padres Dominicos de Oaxaca y los pueblos de
Niltepec, Zanatepec y Tapanatepec, ibid., cuaderno 2, fol. 1-12 vta.
15. Los naturales del pueblo de San Pedro Juchatengo sobre posesion de su
fundo legal, AGN, Tierras, 1364, exp. 1.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 58 HAHR j FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
were burned down, and they were forcibly ejected by the alcalde
mayor aided by a force of two-hundred men.16
A similar case of partiality occurred in the Valley of Oaxaca in the
dispute between the village of Soledad Etla and the adjacent Haci-
enda de Guadalupe, beginning in 1791. The new alcalde mayor of the
Cuatro Villas del Marquesado, Adri'an de Cerain, who assumed office
in 1794, took the part of the hacendado, to whom he awarded the
contested lands. The Indians protested that such a decision would
deprive them of their 6oo varas de fundo legal. The alcalde mayor
responded by sending a body of armed men into the Indian village to
arrest the recalcitrant persons. Indian women stoned the armed men,
but were dispersed. The Indian protestors were sent off in irons to
work on the lands of the neighboring haciendas.'7
Such measures contrast ironically with the request made in 1785
to the Superior Government in Mexico City by the Indians of Nejapa
to sell half a sitio de ganado mayor to a local hacendado, Antonio
de la Contoya, owner of the Hacienda de Santo Domingo Narro.'8
Moreover, along the Pacific coast between Acapulco and Tehuantepec
several Indian caciques or communities rented strips of their lands
to groups of negroes and mulattoes, who, living in abject poverty,
cultivated cotton for their local alcaldes mayores, for the lessees of
the neighboring haciendas de ganado mayor, or for merchants in the
Pacific region towns.'9 Over in Teposcolula the owner of the bank-
rupt mayorazgo de Guendulain, D. Manuel Dionisio, senior alcalde
ordinario of the city of Oaxaca, was protesting to the Audiencia of
Mexico between 1797 and i8oo that the Indians of the village of
Xocotipac were attempting to strip him of his lands. The mayorazgo,
in its financial straits, had been compelled to rent its Rancho de Ovos
to the Indians in order to receive the income from its tenants. The
legal defendant of the Indians at the Audiencia, the Fiscal Protector de
Indios, declared on November 28, 1799, that the protestations of
Guendulain were unfounded, that the Indians on entailed estates
36. Autos formados a pedimento del Gobernador y naturales del pueblo de
San Mateo del Mar Guazontl'an, jurisdiccion de Tehuantepec, AGN, Tierras, 1125,
cuademo 1. Autos seguidos por D. Andres Fernandez de Castafieda y los nat-
urales del pueblo de Guilotepec con los de San Mateo del Mar sobre tierras, ibid.,
cuademo 3.
17 Los naturales del pueblo de Nuestra Sefiora de la Soledad Etla contra
Adrian de Cerain, alcalde mayor del Estado y Marquesado del Valle de Oaxaca
sobre malos tratamientos, AGN, Tierras, 1271, exp. 2. See also AGN, Tierras,
1877, exp. 2, for the same case.
38.AGN, Tierras, 1126, exp. 3.
L9. These rented strips were described as ranchertas, Benito Perez to Revilla-
agigedo, April i8, 1793, AGN, Tributos, 34.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCTION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 59

enjoyed the same rights as anywhere else, and that in no way were
they to suffer.20
Land disputes among indigenous communities-as well as between
them and Creole estate owners-continued to be a constant feature of
eighteenth century Oaxaca. Furthennore, the precarious condition of
the haciendas, including those owned by the Dominican Order, was
used as a justification for appeals to local government authorities to
intervene on behalf of their owners in their disputes with the Indians.
The Indians, in turn, countered by appeals to the Audiencia.

2.

The principal economic activity of the province of Oaxaca was

the production of the scarlet cochineal dye. By far the greater part
of this valuable commodity in demand on the world's markets was
produced by the Indians. During the frequent periods of war between
Spain and Great Britain throughout the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries shipments of the dye from Veracruz to C'adiz would
be endangered with serious consequences for the Indian producers
and their merchant-aviadores, most of them located in Mexico City,
who financed the trade.2' The parish priest of Ecatepec attributed
the decline of the cochineal price in that Chontal region of the Alcal-
dia Mayor of Nejapa down to a level of 12 reales per pound to the
outbreak of the war between Spain and Britain waged between 1739
and 1748. This drop in the price of cochineal brought about a great
shortage of foodstuffs throughout the Bishopric of Oaxaca. The priest
explained that in a time of crisis for the chief export commodity of
the region the price of maize would rise. This phenomenon occurred
when, due to his inability to make a livelihood through the sale of
his cochineal, the Indian producer was forced to cut back his produc-
tion and consumption of maize. Moreover, in normal circumstances
many Indian families from the sierra would travel down to the valleys
to purchase maize in return for their cochineal. In a time of crisis,
this put added pressure on the valley food supply. Conversely, if a
crisis in maize production occurred, cochineal production would have
to be cut back in order to employ labor and capital in combatting the
onslaught of famine.22
The parish priest of Lachixio, writing to the Audiencia in 1776,
20. Superior Orden del virrey Azanza, Feb. 28, 18oo, AGN, Indios, 70.
21. For further details see Brian R. Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern
Mexico, (Cambridge Latin American Studies, 12, Cambridge University Press),
to appear early in 1971.
22. Barbro Dahlgren de Jord'an, Nocheztli. La Grana Cochinilla, (Mexico,
1963), pp. 25, 74.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 6o HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNEIT
explained that when his father and the latter's colleagues, who were
engaged in the cochineal trade, returned from Spain in 1722, the price
of the dye in Oaxaca ranged as high as 32 reales per pound, a level
that was equal to the peak price of 1771. By 1740, however, the price
had fallen to 12 reales. A slight rise was experienced in 1741 and
1742 when prices reached 14 and i6 reales respectively. After that
the price held at i8 reales until the renewal of war. When the British
took Havana in 1762, the price of cochineal fell to 12 reales. How-
ever, as had been seen after 1748, with the return of peace in 1763,
the price again rose, and reached a peak of az reales per pound in
1771.23

This peak coincided with the highest levels of production recorded

in the data compiled by the Oaxaca Cochineal Registry set up in 1758.
Dye production experienced a series of periodic, but not too violent,
fluctuations between the years 1758 and 1782. After the latter date a
substantial decline in production set in, which was never reversed.
The years 1758 and 1759 mark the end of one group of low levels,
after which production rose to a new peak in 1760. A new cyclical
pattern of production opened in 1761, reaching its lowest level in 1763,
but rising, after the end of the war, to a new peak in 1765. The down-
ward cycle began again in 1766, reaching its lowest level of production
at 621,000 pounds in 1768. This was followed by a period of acceler-
ated growth between 1769 and 1771. The new cycle was shorter,
reaching its base in 1773, but with its peak in 1774 at 3,408,398 pesos
in value. The year 1776, with the production level of 8o8,550 pounds,
was the base of the 1775-77 cycle. After the high production levels
of 1780 and 1782, at 1,385,43732 and 1,035,675 pounds respectively, a
permanent decay began in the cochineal trade. This time, after the
restoration of peace in 1783, production levels did not rise, but con-
tinued to decline. Symptoms of decline had been reflected in the 1781
wartime figure of only 464,625 pounds produced, a nadir only exceeded
by the famine year figure for 1787, a level of 451,125 pounds. Low
levels, between 430,ooo and 65o,ooo pounds, were maintained between
1783 and 1795, accompanied by price levels between 15 and 17 reales
per pound on the average, or half the peak price level of 32 reales in
1771.24

The crisis in the dye trade can be traced to four basic causes. In
the first place, the ecclesiastical authorities in Oaxaca attempted to
exact a full io% tithe upon Spanish cochineal producers as a result of
23. Ibid.
24. Murguia y Galardi, Estadistica de Oaxaca, vol, viii, Miahuatl'an, fol. i8.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUC1ION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 61

Bishop Ortigoza's Edicto Sangriento of April 7, 1780.25 Secondly,

Viceroy Martin de Mayorga's Bando of October 20, 1780, attempted
to levy an alcabala or sales-tax on all merchandise whenever a trans-
action took place. The aviadores in the dye trade protested that this
ruling meant that the Royal administrators in the regions of produc-
tion exacted a sales-tax when the dye left the partido under the erro-
neous impression that a sale had been made.26 At the same time this
Bando reestablished for the duration of the war against Great Britain
the 2% alcabala de reventa that had been repealed in 1754.27
Thirdly, the two serious famines of 1779-1780 and 1785-87 put the
availability of foodstuffs to the test. In 1779 shortage of rainfall pro-
duced a crop failure and death of livestock. This, in turn, was fol-
lowed by the outbreak of smallpox. Although not as severe as the
yellow fever epidemic of 1739 or the outbreak of 1766 it swept from
Miahuatlan through the Valley of Oaxaca in the first months of 1780.
Because of population losses in their communities, the inhabitants of
Miahuatlan, Teposcolula, Tamazulapan, Tejupa, Yanhuitlan, and Ixte-
peji requested and received relief from tribute payment. In these
and other areas of cochineal production cultivation of the dye was
neglected, and the inhabitants found themselves reduced to extremely
distressed conditions.28 The subsequent famine of 1785-87 coincided
with the fourth cause of the crisis in the dye trade, the establishment
of the Intendant system in the Viceroyalty of New Spain in 1786.
Article 12 of the Royal Ordinance of Intendants provided for the re-
placement of the alcaldias mayores by subdelegations subordinate to
the new office of Intendant, an official who was to reside in the city
of Oaxaca and act as intermediary administrator and judicial official
between the Superior Government and the locality. The Ordinance
strongly prohibited the repartimiento, by means of which the alcaldes
mayores had sought to maintain for their aviadores a commercial mo-
nopoly in the Indian regions. The new subdelegates were forbidden
25. Diferentes cosecheros de Grana de la Intendencia de aquella Provincia
por si y a nombre de los dem'as de ella, AGI, Mexico, 2693, Expeclientes In-
ventariados (1807), Oaxaca, July 22, 18o6, no. 20.
26. Mayorga to Galvez, no. 1683, May 29, 1782, AGI, Mexico, 1400, Duplica-
dos del Virrey (1782).
27. Joaquin de Maniau, Historia de la Real Hacienda, (M6xico 1914), pp.
38-Lg.
28. Expediente promovido por el teniente de justicia de Miahuatlan sobre que
se les releve los tres tercios de Tributos del presente anio de 1780, AGN, Tributos,
14. Los naturales de Santa Catarina Ixtepeji y otros pueblos sobre rebaja de
tributos (1787), AGN, Tributos, 44, f. 40. Superior Orden, Dec. 7, 1780, and
statement of Fiscal de Real Hacienda, Ramon de Posada, Feb. 19, 1781, AGN,
Tributos 48.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
62 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
to trade with the Indians. Their salaries were not to be derived from
the profits of a largely illegal commerce, but from the provision of a
5% levy from the Indian tribute revenue. This legislation was de-
signed to break the financial connection between the Spanish peninsu-
lar merchants and the local royal administrators. Furthermore, this
innovation was attempted at the very time the Indian population was
feeling the effects of the food crisis of 1785-87 and requesting once
again relief from tribute payment.29 It is to this famine that we shall
now turn our attention.
Severe and unseasonal frosts in August and September 1785 pro-
duced the maize crisis of 1785-87 with a resulting population loss
among the Indians.30 On October 25, 1785, the Ayuntamiento of
Oaxaca warned of the danger of food shortage in the city, for it de-
pended on the surpluses from the four valley partidos of Zimatlan,
Teotitlan del Valle, Cuatro Villas, and Huitzo. From them the Al-
ho'ndiga or public granary of Oaxaca received between 45,ooo and
46,ooo fanegas of maize. However, the same areas also supplied the
outlying partidos of Villa Alta, Ixtepeji, Miahuatlan, Teojomulco,
Pefioles, and the Mixteca in general. The latter regions had not con-
centrated on maize cultivation, since their chief occupation was the
production of the cochineal dye. Thus they neglected their basic sub-
sistence needs.3'
From Zimatlan, a major dye region of the Valley of Oaxaca, the
alcalde mayor reported to the Viceroy in October 1785, that the maize
price had risen from i6 reales per fanega to 48. With their low wage
of i12 reales a day, the Indians faced a shortage of food and, as a re-
sult, were refusing to work in the local mines. Moreover, this price
rise followed what the administrator called the "disastrous effects" of
the Viceregal Bando of March 23, 1785, declaring Indians enjoyed
free status and the right to choose whether they remained on the
hacienda where they worked or not. During the present crisis the
hacienda workers had withdrawn their labor, with the result that
sowing had to be cut by half.32
29. Real Ordenanza de Intendentes (Madrid, 1786). A copy may be located
in the Library of the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.
30. Consejo de Indias no. 30, Sept. 3, 1804, AGI, Mexico, 1141.
31. Ayuntamiento to Viceroy, Oct. 25, 1785, AGN, Intendentes, 33. The
Alhondiga of Oaxaca had been founded in 1753, see Autos hechos a pedimento
de la N.C. de Antequera, Valle de Oaxaca, sobre ejidos y sitio para fabricar
alh6ndigas, AGN, Alh6ndigas, 1. For full legislation on the Alhondiga, see J. M.
Zamora y Coronado, Biblioteca de Legislacion Ultramarina en forma de Diccionar-
io Alfab6tico, (6 tomes, Madrid, 1844-49), Tome 1, 223-228.
32. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Oct. 19, 1785, AGN, Intendentes, 33. For
the Viceregal Bando of March 23, 1785, see AGN, Banclos, 13, ff. 344-347.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCMION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION

Similarly in Jicayan, the alcalde mayor reported in November that

the usual harvest price of maize of between io and 12 reales had
climbed to 72 in August. The severity of this rise for the mass of the
population derived from the fact that in the four previous years there
had never been sufficient maize. What maize had been grown gen-
erally would have been lost in the Pacific region's May heat. With the
present harvest, however, the high price level of August had dropped
to its normal rate of io-i2 reales, and no further shortage was expected
for the rest of the year.33
This drop, though anticipated by the alcalde mayor of Huajuapan
when he wrote at the end of October, had not yet occurred there.
Throughout 1785 the prices in his region had risen steadily, beginning
at 6 reales per fanega, reaching io by May and June, i6 in July, and
24 by mid-September; by late October the price was 36 reales.34
In other partidos the story was much the same. At the end of
November Miahuatlan's administrator stated that the populace re-
quired a crop of 31,124 fanegas 19 almudes to feed it, but that only
26,988 were produced due to the sterility of the soil, the absence of
irrigation, and the year-round lack of rain. Nevertheless, the price
rise from 9 to i8 reales there between January and November had
not been too severe.35 In Justlahuaca, however, sharp frosts had
pushed the maize price up from i6 reales in January to 36 in August.
Half the crop had been ruined. By November, though, the price fluctu-
ated between i6 and 24 reales, above which the alcalde mayor did
not expect it to pass.36 A similar downward fluctuation from the
June level of between 24 and 30 reales to 12 reales in October occur-
red in Villa Alta. Maize was by no means abundant there, owing to
the grave shortage of water all year. As there were no cereal pro-
ducing haciendas in the vicinity, the inhabitants depended entirely
on their own subsistence crop.37 In Teutila this crop was often in-
sufficient to meet local needs. The Indians usually exchanged their
cochineal for maize in the nearby villages. The administrator ex-
pected relief from the outside, despite calamities in food supply else-
where in the province of Oaxaca.38
Likewise, Nochistlan, a major dye area, suffered a maize deficiency
that compelled its inhabitants to journey the considerable distance
down to the Valley of Ocotlan to buy maize. Since Nochistlan's soil
33. Alcalde M.ayor to the Viceroy, Nov. 12, 1785, AGN, Intendentes, 33.
34. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Oct. 28, 1785, ibid.
35. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Nov. 20, 1785, ibid.
36. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Nov. lo, 1785, ibid.
37. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Oct. 22, 1785, ibid.
38. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Oct. 27, 1785, ibid.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 64 HAHR I FEBRUARY BRIN L. IAMNETT
was dry and craggy, its chief use was in cochineal production. The
Indians found that by the time they brought the maize from Ocotlan
to Nochistlan transportation costs had increased the original price of
8 reales to 24.39 Tehuantepec also expected to face a shortage. The
intense summer heat on the Pacific coast had ruined much of the 1785
crop, upon which the workers on the local cattle haciendas depended.
They would now be forced to take what surpluses the Indian com-
munities produced.40 Such a surplus was indeed produced in Huame-
lula, westwards along the coast, where in the five towns of that partido
consumer demand for the total crop of 2,950 fanegas of maize came
to only 2,875. In the six villages of Huatulco 3,390 fanegas out of
3,458 was consumed.4'
In some areas improvements were seen in 1788, as the Intendant
of Oaxaca reported. Though Huitzo and Zimatlan, in the Valley of
Oaxaca, enjoyed abundant rains and fine crops, Miahuatlan and
Ixtepeji, both outside the Valley, suffered earth tremors that, in the
former at least, adversely affected the cochineal crop. Tehuantepec
lost both its maize and cochineal because of flooding from excessive
rains.42
During the 1790's the price levels of cochineal continued down-
wards, as is shown in Figure i below. The price level reached only
1332 reales per pound in 1793, indicating that investors tended to view
dye production as an effort rewarded with diminishing returns. In
that year the Minister of the Royal Treasury in Oaxaca, Villarrasa
Rivera, joined the chorus of critics of the Intendant system, and sec-
onded the views of men like Juan Baptista de Echarri, who had
interests in the old system of repartimientos, and called for the re-
storation of the former practices. Villarrasa connected the abolition
of the alcaldias mayores after 1786 with the hacendados' loss of ad-
ministrative support. The new subdelegates lacked the commercial
connections of their predecessors and failed to support the hacienda-
owners' efforts to guarantee themselves a labor force drawn from the
Indian communities. For such reasons, Villarrasa declared, land-
owners' incomes were diminishing.43

3.
The war affected the economy of Oaxaca in other ways too.44 Both
39. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Jan. i8, 1786, ibid.
40. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Oct. 25, 1785, ibid.
41. Alcalde Mayor to the Viceroy, Jan. 20, 1786, ibid.
42. Flores to Porlier, June 25, 1788, AGI, Ind;iferente General, 1560.
43. Villarrasa to Gardoqui, April 22, 1793, AGI, Mexico, 1780, Expedientes
Diarios (1796-97).
44. M. Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio Exterior de Mexico, (Banco Nacional de

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCrION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 65

FIGUmE 1. Annual average prices of maize, beans, and cochineal dye in

the city of Oaxaca, 1785-L799, (see Appendices I and III).

--- cochineal (libra).

- - --maize (fanega).
.... beans (fanega).

so

70

7.

50

w I i:' \: .-'' '~~i, *i

A I~~I
40'' iI I

10

4-

2 r ~

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 66 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRN L. HAMNEIT
dye investors and hacienda-owners suffered from the Spanish Metro-
politan Government's appropriation of the funds of pious works and
chantries (obras pias y capellanias) ordered by the Real Cedula of
December 26, 1804.45 In order to cover the accumulating debts of
the Imperial Government, investors who had borrowed from these
sources were required by the decree to pay back their outstanding
obligations. These funds would then pass into the local Treasury of
the Consolidation in Oaxaca, as in all other Bishoprics in New Spain,
and the product would be shipped to Spain.46
One of the most important hacendados of the Valley of Oaxaca,
Simon Camacho, paid in 3,162 pesos between June, i8o6, and April,
i8o8, as installments towards repayment of a larger debt incurred with
a Oaxaca chantry.47 Jose Maria Murguia y Galardi, a future deputy to
both the Insurgent Congress of Chilpancingo in 1813 and to the
Spanish Cortes in 1821, handed over two token payments of 300
pesos in March, 1807, and March, i8o8, for sums he had borrowed
from the Obra Pia de Dotar Hue'rfanas, and invested in his three
haciendas in the partido of Nejapa. In July, 1807, he paid in 6oo pesos
on behalf of his brother's debt to the parish of Cuilapan, for the
guarantee of which his Hacienda de San Nicolas had been mort-
gaged.48 In June, 1807, already hard-pressed, the Mayorazgo de
Guendulain paid in i,ooo pesos on a debt of 13,000 pesos that had
been incurred with the College of San Bartolome under the guarantee
(fianza) of two leading dye merchants, Alonso Magro and Jose
Fernandez.49 Mariano Castillejos, future companion of Murguia at
Chilpancingo, repaid 2,000 pesos in March, i8o8, a sum invested in
his Hacienda de los Cinco Sefiores, and a further 2,000 pesos in July
was paid in his name as part of a larger debt by the dye merchant,
Ignacio Segura.50
Similarly, Sebastian Gonzalez, dye merchant and Regidor Perpetuo
of Oaxaca, paid in between June, i8o6, and August, 1807, a total of
32,000 pesos, previously borrowed from several pious foundations. In

Comercio Exterior, Mexico 1967), nu'mero 14 (Estado o Balanza General del

Comercio), gives dye exports for the war years, 1793-1808.
45. Real Cedula, Dec. 26, 1804, AGI, Indiferente General, 666.
46. For further details, see Brian R. Hamnett, "The Appropriation of Mexican
Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government: The 'Consolidacion de
Vales Reales' 1805-1809," Journal of Latin American Studies, 3: 2 (Nov., 1969),
85-113.
47. AGN, Consolidacion, 5, fol. 167, 212.
48. Ibid., fol. 182 vta, 184-184 vta., 211.
49. Ibid., fol. 184 vta.
50. Ibid., fol. 211 vta., 215-215 vta.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCrION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 67

December, i8o6, two dye merchants, Jose and Simon Gutierrez, repaid
12,827 pesos, borrowed from a chantry and from thirteen pious funds.5'
Pedro de Estrella, merchant and Regidor Perpetuo, paid up 4,000
pesos between February and June, i8o6, borrowed from the Obra
Pia de Sermones del Carmen, and the Colegio de Ninfas.52
It was not solely upon the merchants and landowners that the
Spanish Metropolitan Government's financial exactions fell, for the
treasuries of the Indian communities were required to pay two-thirds
of their surpluses into the Ca/a de Consolidacion in the diocesan
capital in heavily indigenous provinces such as Oaxaca or Yucatan. In
Oaxaca the Intendant, Antonio de Mora y Peysal, ordered the trans-
fer of the sum of 161,924 pesos 6 reales 1o granos from the indigenous
Cajas de Comunidades into the local treasury of the Consolidation.
These sums were paid in two installments on August 8, i8o6, and
November 25, i8o8. The sums secured from the indigenous com-
munities accounted for more than one-quarter of the total consolidated
sum of 608,656 pesos.53
The Convent of Santo Domingo in the city of Oaxaca had borrowed
heavily from the funds of pious works and chantries, with the result
that the combination of the effects of the Real C6dula of 1804 with
the devastation of the lands and livestock of its haciendas by the
Insurgents under Morelos in 1812 further prevented the recovery of
its properties. The Dominican Provincial wrote to the Superior Gov-
ernment on October 12, 1814, describing the damage to property and
the dearth of capital for investment in repairs. The perennially dilap-
idated state of the convent's haciendas had encouraged heavy bor-
rowing from pious funds and from other convents. In view of their
economic straits the Dominicans were incapable even of paying the
regular 5% per annum interest on such loans, let alone of repaying the
principal. Over the years a sum of up to 70,000 pesos had been bor-
rowed in the hope that its proper investment would refurbish the
deteriorated land-holdings. These haciendas had themselves been
mortgaged as guarantees of repayment. However, by 1814 the debt
on the principal and interest together amounted to 143,500 pesos, be-
sides which an additional sum of 30,000 pesos had been borrowed
from private persons and from other convents in order to feed the
brothers, whose haciendas could not cover their own working costs.
To prevent the inmiinent bankruptcy of the convent, three emergency
51. Ibid., fol. 167, 169 vta., 183 vta.
52. Ibid., fol. iL66-iL66 vta.
53. See Hamnett, "The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth . . . ,
97-98.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 68 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
juntas had concluded that two brothers should proceed to the city of
Puebla to put up for sale the convent's buildings and land.54
After the Royalist forces under Brigadier Melchor Alvarez had
driven the Insurgents from Oaxaca in March 1814, Alvarez assumed
office as Intendant. One of his first actions was to take stock of
the situation of the pious works and chantries. He calculated that
they had permanently lost a sum of 535,845 pesos to the Ramo de
Consolidacio'n in the diocese of Oaxaca. Had the Spanish Metropolitan
Government been in a position to pay it, the interest of 35,723 pesos
might have reassured the creditors that their principal would be re-
payed. All of this had caused great hardship for the local hacendados.
Alvarez estimated that the sum of 217,349 pesos had been the loss sus-
tained by the Spanish and Creole-owned maize-producing haciendas
of the Valley of Oaxaca out of funds borrowed from pious sources.55

4.
The hacendados and merchants of Oaxaca blamed the local ad-
ministration for their problems. An anonymous writer in March, 1809,
explained to Viceroy Garibay that the late Intendant Mora's favorable
disposition towards the indigenous population had contributed to
their refusal to work on hacienda lands. The attempts to restrict debt
peonage resulted in the abandonment of debt obligations by agricul-
tural laborers. The writer stated that the worst situation was that of
Zaachila, in the Valley of Oaxaca, where Mora's appointee was said
to have persuaded Indians to withdraw their labor from the haciendas.
Moreover, the Church also suffered from the Indians' refusal to pay
tithes over the past three years. Anxious for the restoration of the
days before the Intendant system, the writer requested that the
Viceroy withdraw authority from the present administrators in Oaxaca,
accusing them of complicity with the discredited regime of Manuel
Godoy in Spain.56
The Bishop of Oaxaca, Antonio Bergoza y Jordan, also attacked
the late Intendant on the grounds of 'indolence and inaction," that is,
his inattention to the "just complaints of the hacenderos," who could
not secure their labor force from the Indian communities. Mora had
demonstrated, the attack continued, a marked preference for the
interests of the lower classes. This attitude the Bishop attributed to
vanity and the desire to surround the local administration with an
54. Joseph Mariano Patifio to Calleja, Oct. 12, 1814, AGN, Tierras, 2788,
exp. 3, fol. 37.
55. BM (British Museum, London), Add. MSS 17,557, Noticias de America,
fol. 31-33.
56. Anonymous writer to Garibay, March 24, 1809, AGN, Intendentes, 12.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCIION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 69

aura of popular approval. As a result, production on the haciendas had

diminished. Once more Zaachila was singled out for special criticism.
nTe Bishop denounced the long tradition of Indian independence
there as a tradition of "insurbordination and rebellion." The reason
for this sharp attack was the fact that the Indians of Zaachila possessed
some of the best lands of the Valley of Oaxaca, with the result that
t-hey continually refused to leave them and go to work on the adjacent
lands of the haciendas. Bishop Bergoza complained that such re-
calcitrance had ensured that one of the best haciendas of the Valley
of Oaxaca, that of Simon Camacho, had remained uncultivated in
i8o6. Worse still for the hacendados, the Indians had threatened any
of their number who had ventured to work on hacienda lands, and
had at the same time encouraged other villages to resist the payment
of tithes to the Church. In all these actions, the Bishop pointed out
that the Intendant's appointee had supported the Indians.57
In his report to the Audiencia of Mexico in 181o, Bergoza attributed
the decline of both cochineal dye and maize production to the conse-
quences of the establishment of the Intendant system. He regretted
the lack of coercion that had traditionally been administered to the
Indians by the former alcaldes mayores. Without it the Indians had
succumbed to their "natural vices" such as indolence and drunkenness
instead of application to work. What they needed, the Bishop con-
cluded, was not philanthropic philosophies, but the stick. Bergoza
appealed to the Audiencia for a decisive restoration of discipline and
order among the indigenous population of Oaxaca, and, indeed,
throughout the realm.58
As a result of the crisis on the haciendas, Bergoza pointed to the
rise of the price of maize between 18o0 and 181o from lo, 12, or 16
reales per fanega to the unprecedented peak of 56 reales.59 Accord-
ing to the price figures given in the tithe commutation rates drawn
up by the jueces hacedores or tithe administrators in the diocese of
Oaxaca, both maize and beans exhibited a considerable price rise in
the city of Oaxaca between 18o8 and i8ii, as shown in Figure 2 and
Appendix 2.60 The price of maize rose from i8 reales per fanega in
1809 to 42 reales in 181o, and a peak of 48 reales in i8ii. This peak
was considerably higher than that of the cycle of 1788-97 in the city,
57. Bergoza y Jordan to Garibay, April 14, 1809, ibid.
58. AGN, Industria y Comercio, 20, exp. 6.
59. Ibid.
6o. Jueces hacedores were the two canons of the Cathedral to whom had been
delegated supervision over tithe collection. Under them a staff of secretaries and
clerks functioned in the Contaduria de Diezmos. See Woodrow W. Borah, "Tithe
Collection in the Bishopric of Oaxaca, 1601-1867," HAHR, XXIX:4 (Nov. 1949),
498-517.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 70 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
which had reached 36 reales in the second half of 1794, as shown in
Appendix 1. In the case of beans extreme fluctuations took place.
The high level of 1805 at 48 reales had dropped to 36 reales per
fanega by 18o8, and down further to 24 in 1809. The 181o level,
however, spiralled to an unprecedented peak of 96 reales, which was
far above the city peak in the 1788-97 cycle at 6o reales. In i8ii,
despite a drop in price of 50%, the level remained high at 48 reales.61
The immediate causes of these price movements seem to have been
the period of drought and poor crops in the harvest of i8o8, which
was followed by a general drought in 1809 which caused a severe loss
of crops. Unexpected frosts followed this drought, producing the food
crisis of i81o, the year of the outbreak of the Hidalgo revolt in central
New Spain.62
The advance of the Insurgents under Morelos into the Intendancy
of Oaxaca in i8&i and 1812 rendered Bergoza's call for order ineffec-
tual. On November 25, 1812, the city of Oaxaca itself fell to them,
and they remained there until March 29, 1814. As a result the price
of cochineal in Veracruz climbed from ioo pesos per arroba in 1812 to
114 in 1813 and 320 in L814.63 In face of the Insurgent advance
through the Mixteca Alta, masters of mills and owners of haciendas
abandoned their properties as the bulk of their workers joined the
revolution, sacking the wheat, cattle, and sugar estates. Teposcolula,
producer of the best wheat in Oaxaca, suffered heavily.64 In the
Cathedral of Oaxaca no tithe commutation rate was given for the
year, 1813, because of the rebel occupation of the city. The jueces
hacedores reported that the prices of maize and beans fluctuated
because of losses of crops and rebel seizures of crops in the field for
the consumption of their army, resulting in a decline in tithe collec-
tions. For the cited reasons high price levels continued through 1814
and 1815, and in the latter year the price of beans again reached its
1794 peak level of 6o reales.65
The combined effects of the general breakdown of the mechanism
of tithe collection in the Bishopric of Oaxaca, as pointed out by Bishop
Bergoza before the revolution, and the effects of the revolutionary
army's presence there can be seen from the tithe receipts. During
63. Miscelanea de documentos sobre cuentas generales de diezmos, Claveria
de la Catedral de Oaxaca, 1778-1832, Archivo de la Catedral de Oaxaca, Roll
loo, Oaxaca series, Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e HIistoria, Mexico City,
Microfilm collection.
62. Lucas Alamain, Historia de Me'jico, (5 vols., Mexico, 1883-85), I, 296.
63. Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio Exterior, nuimero 14.
64. BM, Add. MSS, 17,557, ff. 31-33.
65. Miscel'anea de documentos sobre cuentas generales de diezmos, ibid.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
FIGURIE 2. Prices of maize, beans, and cochineal dye if the city of
Oaxaca, i8oo-l821 (see Appendices II and III).

cochinea' (libra).
-- - - maize Uanega).
. ..beans ( anega).
io

80

70

60
: I

so~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1

40
0 r- tA
t .

o 0 0 0 0 0
S --

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 72 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
the five-year period 1786-go the average annual tithe yi
Bishopric had been 85,441 pesos, but in the five-year peri
this yield had sunk to 65,370 pesos. During the years 1813 and 1814,
the yield was at its lowest ever, for in the former year only 45,747
pesos was collected, while in the latter only 44,831 pesos, of which
1,046 pesos had been appropriated by the rebels.66
The tithe receipts from the Collection Areas of Etla, Tlacolula,
and Oaxaca during the post-revolutionary period, 1816-20, show a
substantial decline, as can be seen from Figure 3 below.67

Figure 3. Tithe Receipts 1816-20

Pesos Reales
ETLA
i8i6 4,581 6
1817 3,194 0
i88 5,212 5
1819 3,950 7
1820 2,437 2

TLACOLULA
i8i6 3,759 1
1817 2,247 4
i8i8 2,514 7
1819 2,460 0
1820 1,5i8 o

OAXACA
i8i6 2,331 2
1817 2,637 2
818i 2,360 2
1819 2,499 6
1820 1,922 6

This decline can also be seen in the Royal revenues during the
same period, for between 1815 and 1819 the Treasury General of the
Province of Oaxaca received a total income of 3,o96,762 pesos 6 reales,
while facing an expenditure of 3,100,569 pesos 5 reales. In five years
the Intendancy had accumulated a debt of 3,806 pesos 7 reales.68
66. Gruesa de diezmos de Oaxaca, 1771-80, 1781-go, BM, Egerton MSS, 520,
Papeles sobre las Colonias de Espafia, fol. 2o2, no. 6. For the years 1835-39, see
Borah, "Tithe Collection...."
67. Murguia y Galardi, Estadtstica de Oaxaca, vol. ii, second part, fol. 2 vta.,
Documentos de los Productos decimales de la Contaduria de Diezmos en la Santa
Iglesia Catedral.
68. Ibid., vol. i, fol. 23 vta.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCIION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 73

5.
The adverse condition of the haciendas, especially after the In-
surgent occupation of Oaxaca, ensured that the pressure of the hacen-
dados on the indigenous labor force would continue, especially
since the defeat of Morelos seems to have strengthened the alliance
between the authorities and the landowners. In i8i6 citizens of the
city of Oaxaca reported three weeks' shortage of maize in the Alho'n-
diga, with a price rise to 21 reales. This deficiency they attributed to
the labor shortage on the maize-producing haciendas. Therefore, to
overawe the indigenous communities, the Intendant of Oaxaca issued
a Bando on March 20, i86, authorizing hacendados to register the
names of workers who had gone into hiding or had transferred to other
employers without prior settlement of debts. The Royal authorities
were ordered to arrest such persons, handing them over to the ap-
propriate haciendas. This policy of i8i6 contrasted with the policy
of the former Intendant of Oaxaca, Antonio Mora, for the Intendancy
was now employing its authority to support the interests of the
hacendados. The subdelegates were instructed to guarantee labor sup-
plies and work animals for the owners of the haciendas in the corregi-
miento of Oaxaca. As the Indians were free men, however, and not
slaves, the Intendant specified that they should receive the daily
salary of between 2 and 232 reales for their work, and that the labor
squads from the indigenous communities should work only from 6 a.m.
to 6 p.m., with two hours of rest between 12 and 2 p.m. They should
not be ill-treated.69
On June ii, i8i6, the municipal council of Oaxaca complained
that both the Church and the State still suffered from a decline of
their revenues from the land, and that the hacendados of the Valley
were still not receiving indigenous aid in their planting and harvesting.
Under orders from the Intendant, the subdelegate of the Cuatro Villas
examined the issue. The wheat of the Hacienda del Rosario in the
Valley of Etla lay in the fields ungathered, and would face ruin if it
rained. The owner of the Hacienda de Santa Catarina Martir had left
many lands idle, despite the Royal administration's efforts to ensure
him a labor force and work animals. Much of the crop had been lost
in subsequent adverse weather conditions. He denounced what he
called the boldness and defiance of the neighboring Indian com-
munities.
Responding to the hacendados' complaints, the subdelegate, on
May 6, i8i8, ordered the alcaldes of the villages of San Agustmn and
Santiago Etla to see that a labor force was sent to harvest the wheat
69. AGN, Subdelegados, 14, exp. 12, fol. 3-53.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
74 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
crop for the mills of Lasso, warning that action would be taken against
them if they refused to comply. The subdelegate went in person to
the Indian villages, but reported afterwards to the Intendant that the
governors and alcaldes of the fourteen villages of Etla remained deter-
mined to resist the removal of their labor force from their own
harvesting to that of the haciendas.
Therefore, the complaints continued unabated. The administrator
of the Hacienda del Carmen blamed the Indians for depriving -the
land of its labor force, the city of its food supply, and the Church of
its tithes. Basing his opinion on twenty-five years of experience in
managing haciendas in the Valleys of Atlixco and Etla, he declared
that the Indian was a useless vassal of the State unless he were put
to work on the hacienda lands. He explained that after their departure
from the haciendas as a result of the Viceregal Bandos of October 1i,
1785 and August 7, 1786, they had sunk into drunken sloth, lived in
idleness in the villages, or fled to the mountains as vagrants, earning
their living from robbing the haciendas and villages. The other hacen-
dados of the Valley of Oaxaca concurred with such views. The owner
of the Hacienda de Coronacion denounced "agitators" among the
Indian communities.70
The agricultural laborers took advantage of their withdrawal of
services to extract increased wages and better conditions from the
hacendados. Back in 1791, when, taking advantage of the 1785 Bando,
the local Indians had removed their labor from the Hacienda del
Rosario and the Rancho Ortega, they had been receiving from Alonso
Magro, the hacienda-owner and dye merchant, the daily wage of 1
real. They had departed to work on other lands, or removed them-
selves to their own communal holdings. Of 65 day laborers, only 6
or 7 stayed on Magro's lands. The alcalde mayor of the Cuatro Villas
del Marquesado had sworn to drag them back in chains if they refused
to work on the hacienda. Before 18oo the lessee of the Hacienda de
los Padres de Guadalupe in Zimatlan, present owner of the Hacienda
de Santa Catarina Mtartir in 1816, had paid his workers 1i%2 reales per
day. When he moved to Etla in 18oo he had increased the wage to
2 reales. After 18i6, the Etla ranch-owner, Rafael Ojeda, had in-
creased his workers' wages from 1i2 or 2 reales per day to 232. On the
Rancho de Matey salaries for day laborers had risen from i332 to 2
reales, and fees for the hire of yokes of oxen from the Indian com-
munities had risen from 2z2% or 3 reales to 3 or 4 reales daily. Agustin
Mantec6n, owner of the Hacienda de Guadalupe, and regidor of the
70. Ibid.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCTION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 75

municipal council of Oaxaca, complained of a similar rise in rental

costs of Indian oxen. In face of this, the administrator of the Hacienda
del Carmen pointed out that the maize price had risen to 24 reales,
which, he said, was a higher price than in times of shortage. The
Indians of the fourteen villages of Etla demanded daily wages of 2!A
or 3 reales, and a fee of 5 reales for the rental of their oxen by the
haciendas. The same administrator complained that the Indians were
deriving positive benefits from not working on the hacienda lands,
since they engaged in trade in the products of their own subsistence
lands. Thus, to the detriment of the hacendados, they had themselves
become merchants and middle-men. Such activity and enterprise on
the part of the Indians, combined with their refusal to labor on
hacienda lands, prevented the hacendados from paying their debts to
their creditors, the most prominent of which were probably ecclesias-
tical.71
In response to these allegations made against the Indians by the
hacendados, the Subdelegate of the Cuatro Villas called in troops on
May 22, 1818, and led them to the villages, where he manhandled
the Indian alcaldes, billeted soldiers in the communities, and ordered
the Indians to work on the hacienda lands. In this way, Royal author-
ity was employed to the advantage of private parties.72

The unabated deterioration of the land in Oaxaca in the latter

part of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century affected
both the haciendas and the indigenous communities. In many cases
in the Valley of Oaxaca, however, where the best land of the province
lay, the substantially large indigenous holdings enabled the Indian
population to supply itself with basic foodstuffs. The local hacendados
continually attempted to put pressure on the Indians to act as the
labor force on hacienda land. This the Indians firmly and often suc-
cessfully resisted when they could, depending, as they did in the
Valley, on their own communal maize crop.
Because of the soil exhaustion and the poor condition of the
haciendas, which were often bound by debts to pious works and
chantries or held censo agreements with convents, investors tended
to prefer the highly prized scarlet cochineal dye over agriculture.
The Indian communities of Oaxaca, moreover, were the principal
producers of this export commodity. On behalf of their merchant-
71. Los ganianes de la hacienda del Rosario contra Juan Jose Ferraud, arrenda-
tario de la misma, sobre malos tratamientos y liquidacion de salarios, AGN,
Tierras, 1216, exp. 1, fol. 8i.
72. AGN, Subdelegados, 14, exp. 12, fol. 1-51.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
76 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT
aviadores in Mexico City the alcaldes mayores of Oaxaca sought to
use the repartimiento as a means of binding indigenous communities
to the production of the dye. In violation of the Laws of the Indies
they consistently attempted to create commercial monopolies within
the partidos. As a result-and this was especially the case outside
the Valley of Oaxaca-many Indian communities neglected their sub-
sistence maize crop, subsequently endangering health and even sur-
vival during the four main famines and epidemics of the eighteenth
century in 1739, 1766, 1780, and 1785-87. Until the concerted efforts
of the Intendant of Oaxaca, Antonio de Mora y Peysal, after 1787, the
pressure of the repartidores never abated. Even after the prohibition
of the repartimiento by article 12 of the Royal Ordinance of Intendants
in 1786, it often continued through the new subdelegate system, de-
spite Royal efforts to remove it.
After 1781 the decline of the scarlet dye trade of Oaxaca accom-
panied the long, slow decline of the haciendas. The introduction of
the subdelegate system after 1786 only temporarily served to lessen
the pressure of the hacendados on the Indian labor force. Though
Mora y Peysal attempted to protect the Indian population, his suc-
cessors and their subordinates, remembering the experience of the
revolution of 1810-15, collaborated with the hacendados.

APPENDIX I BI-ANNUAL PRICE TRENDS IN THE CITY OF

OAXACA, 1788-97*

Semester Maize Beans Wheat flour

(reales per fanega) (pesos per carga)
Tehuacan Mixteca Valley
Jan.-June, 1788 8-io 24 18-20 18-20 9
July-Dec., 1788 12 36 16 16 9
Jan.-June, 1789 24 36 i8 i8 15
July-Dec., 1789
Jan.-June, 1790 14 36
July-Dec., 1790 i8 48
Jan.-June, 1791 10-12-18 35 11
July-Dec., 1791 17 36 i6 i6 10
Jan.-June, 1792
July-Dec., 1792 12 28
Jan.-June, 1793 14 6o 20 15-16
July-Dec., 1793
Jan.-June, 1794 24 6o 22-25 22-25 14-16

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DYE PRODUCTION, FOOD SUPPLY, LABORING POPULATION 77

July-Dec., 1794 36 6o 26-28 26-28 i6-i8

Jan.-June, 1795
July-Dec., 1795 8% 30 20 8
Jan.-June, 1796 8-9 36
July-Dec., 1796
Jan.-June, 1797
July-Dec., 1797 24 56

* Maize, beans, and wheat were measured in the following way: 4 cuartillas
= 1 almud; 12 almudes= 1 fanega; .2 fanegas = 1 carga. Currency relation-
ships were as follows: 12 granos = i real; 8 reales peso.
Sources: Mora to Flores, Jan. 22, 1788, AGN, Intendentes, 6i; Mora to Flores,
July 22, 1788, AGN, Intendentes, 81; Mora to Revillagigedo, no. 3, March 31,
1789, AGN, Intendentes, lo; Mora to Revillagigedo, Aug. 17, 1790, AGI, In-
diferente General, 1560; Revillagigedo to Porlier, no. 266, May 7, L7gL, ibid.;
Revillagigedo to Bajamar, no. 313, Sept. 26, 1791, ibid.; Revillagigedo to Bajamar,
no. 415, June 30, 1792, ibid.; Revillagigedo to Acufia, no. 586, May 29, 1793,
ibid.; Branciforte to Llaguno, no. 40, Nov. 30, 1794, ibid.; Branciforte to Llaguno,
no. 125, May 29, 1795, ibid.; Branciforte to Llaguno, no. 316, July 27, 1796, ibid.;
Branciforte to Llaguno, no. 313, Nov. 27, 1796, ibid.; Mora to Azanza, June 29,
1798, ibid.

APPENDIX II ANNUAL PRICE TRENDS IN THE CITY OF

OAXACA, 1805-15

Year Maize Beans

(reales per fanega) (reales per fanega)
i8o5 i6 48
i8o6
1807
i8o8 28 36
1809 i8 24
i8io 42 96
i8ii 48 48
1812 i8 36
1813
1814 30 24
1815 24 6o

Sources: Miscel'anea de documentos sobre cuentas generales de diezmos, Claveria

de la Catedral de Oaxaca, 1778-1832, Archivo de la Catedral de Oaxaca, Roll
loo, Oaxaca series, Instituto Nacional de Antropologla e Historia, Mexico City,
Microfilm collection.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
78 HAHR I FEBRUARY I BRIAN L. HAMNETT

APPENDIX III DYE PRICES IN THE CITY OF OAXACA,

1780-1821

Year Price in reales Year Price in reales

per pound per pound
1780 17 i8oo 19
1781 17 i8oi i8
1782 17 1802 19
1783 i8 1803 21
1784 i6 1804 282
1785 17 i8o5 23
1786 i62 i8o6 27
1787 i6 1807 29
1788 i6 i8o8 29
1789 15 1809 33
1-790 i-6 i8io 29
1-791- i- 632 i8ii 2832
1792 15 1812 20
1793 133 1813 15
1794 1iO. 1814 25
1795 12 i8i5 24
1796 172 i8i6 32
1797 152 1817 29
1798 i8 iSi8 282
1799 .192 1819 272
1820
1821 23

Sources: Murguia y Galardi, Estadtstica de Oaxaca, volume viii, Miahuatlan,

fol. i8, BSMGE, mss.

This content downloaded from

132.248.137.249 on Tue, 02 Apr 2024 22:52:34 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms