Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No.

139465, [January 18, 2000], 379 PHIL 165-251

FACTS: The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark Jimenez,
herein private respondent, to the United States. The request was forwarded the following day by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Pending evaluation of the extradition
documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of the official extradition request and
all pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the proceedings. When his request was denied
for being premature, private respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition.
The trial court issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings,
hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Would private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
Extradition Treaty?

RULUNG:
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing
the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to
private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country’s legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that “[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policyof peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.” Under the doctrine of incorporation,
rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to
make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine ofincorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where
the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
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In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights ofnotice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an “ex parte technical assessment” of the sufficiency of the extradition request
and the supporting documents.
We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to
be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.|||

xxx

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that “the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457
[1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School
vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner’s fears that the Requesting
State may have valid objections to the Requested State’s non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign
land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondent’s liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court’s equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as “justice
outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
“justice outside legality,” since private respondent’s due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic
law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

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Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies ofthe extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic
by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial RelationsonNovember6,2010DueProcess–AdminBodies–CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army.
Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay offof members of National Labor Union Inc.
NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in
Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors
it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were
not able to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE:Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD:The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative
bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1)The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3)While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence ismore than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5)The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6)The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7)The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. Theperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
 G.R. No. 74457, 148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987
Petitioner:RestitutoYnot
Respondents: Intermediate Appellate Court, The Station Commander, Integrated National
Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo and the Regional Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region
IV, Iloilo City
Doctrine: The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers.
LawApplicable: EONo.626-A
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos.

Summary
EO 626-A is unconstitutional because:
1. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power as the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
2. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
3. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
4. Invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

FACTS:
• Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626, which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos.
• Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for
recovery, and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin.
• After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
 ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional. – NO.
RULING:
EO 626-A did not pass the lawful means test. (Sufficient Standard Test)
• To strengthen the original measure, EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that “no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another.” The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
• We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
• The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only.
• In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself,
as forfeited to the government.
• In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
• In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner’s peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se
as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
• Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, EO 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which
alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial
and conviction of the accused.
• The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when
they make their distribution.
OTHER ISSUES
Constitutionality is not always presumed.
• while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted if there be a clear showing of their invalidity,
 and of the need to declare them so, then “will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily,” to recall Justice Laurel’s trenchant warning.
• Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
• EO 626-A is really a presidential decree that promulgates a new rule instead of
implementing an existing law.
• EO 626-A was issued not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of the President’s legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. (whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter
that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law)
• In this case, there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason to question the validity of the executive order.
• Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by
the President “in his judgment, ” a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
History of Due Process Clause
• The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient.
• This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an “iron rule” laying down an implacable and immutable command for
all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require
No Due Process in this case.
• The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness.
• We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to “the law of the land,” which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as “the law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
• This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there
are a number of admitted exceptions.
Police Power, as an exception for due process
• The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process.
EO 622-A as an exercise of Police Power
• The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
“present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the
benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.”
• We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden,
the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
What constitute a valid exercise of police power
• To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (US v.
Toribio)
HOWEVER, the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner’s carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law
was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to
enforce it.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as

affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is
cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
G.R. No. 170146: June 8, 2011

HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the
President et al.,Petitioners, v. ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the
October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of
the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable
for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two
expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to
Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713.The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on
respondent, with all accessory penalties.

Respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints
against him, including the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP.It is argued that
the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770,
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against thePAGC which is not a
constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP.Under said law, it is the Ombudsman who has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government, such as herein
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies in this case

HELD: No.

POLITICAL LAW: Law on Public Officer, Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and
criminal liabilities.

Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the
same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. Res judicata did not set in
because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing
the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment.On the criminal complaint, the
Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.

Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint filed against him.Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative offense (non-
declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019)
and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondents objection on jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained.
Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitutionmandated the Ombudsman to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is empowered to conduct investigations on his own or
upon complaint by any person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is
also given broad powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public officials and
employees.

The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770
Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman
Act is not exclusive but isshared with other similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman
retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the localSangguniansto investigate
complaints against local elective officials. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under thedisciplinaryauthority of the OP.Executive Order

No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was granted the authority toinvestigatepresidential
and also non-presidential employees "who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been involved
with a presidential appointee or ranking officer mentionedx x x." On this score, we do not agree with
respondent that the PAGC should have deferred to the

Ombudsman instead of proceeding with the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his
petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCS jurisdiction.Jurisdiction is a matter of
law.Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated.

GRANTED.
PETER L. SO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
dated November 7, 2016 and Order3 dated February 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 138, in Special Civil Case No. 16-031, which dismissed Peter L. So's (petitioner's) Petition
for Certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Factual Antecedents
Petitioner opened an account with the Cooperative Rural Bank Bulacan (CRBB) on April 17, 2013,
amounting to P300,000, for which he was assigned the Special Incentive Savings Account (SISA) No. 05-
15712-1.5

On the same year, however, petitioner learned that CRBB closed its operations and was placed under
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation's (PDIC's) receivership. This prompted petitioner, together
with other depositors, to file an insurance claim with the PDIC on November 8, 2013.

Acting upon such claim, PDIC sent a letter/notice dated November 22, 2013, requiring petitioner to
submit additional documents, which petitioner averred of having complied with.?
Upon investigation, the PDIC found that petitioner's account originated from and was funded by the
proceeds of a terminated SISA (mother account), jointly owned by a certain Reyes family. Thus, based on
the determination that petitioner's account was among the product of the splitting of the said mother
account which is prohibited by law, PDIC denied petitioner's claim for payment of deposit

insurance. Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the PDIC on
January 6, 2016.10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC.

RTC Ruling

In its November 7, 2016 assailed Decision, the RTC upheld the factual findings and conclusions of the
PDIC. According to the RTC, based on the records, the PDIC correctly denied petitioner's claim for
insurance on the ground of splitting of deposits which is prohibited by law."
It also declared that, pursuant to its Charter (RA 3591), PDIC is empowered to determine and pass upon
the validity of the insurance deposits claims, it being the deposit insurer. As such, when it rules on such
claims, it is exercising a quasi-judicial function. Thus, it was held that petitioner's remedy to the
dismissal of his claim is to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Section 4," Rule
65, stating that if the petition involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or the rules, it shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals (CA).1
In addition, the RTC also cited Section 2213 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3591, as amended, which
essentially states that only the CA shall issue temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions or
preliminary mandatory injunctions against the PDIC for any action under the said Act.

The RTC disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, for lack of jurisdiction, the petition

for certiorari filed by the petitioner is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED, 10

In its February 17, 2017 Order, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition, filed directly to this Court on pure question of law.
Issue

Does the RTC have jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65, assailing the PDIC's
denial of a deposit insurance claim?

Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
There is no controversy as to the proper remedy to question the PDIC's denial of petitioner's deposit
insurance claim. Section 4(f) of its Charter, as amended, clearly provides that:

The actions of the Corporation taken under this section shall be final and executory, and may not be
restrained or set aside by the court, except on appropriate petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of
denial of claim for deposit insurance. (emphasis supplied)

The issue, however, is which court has jurisdiction over such petition.

Petitioner's stance is that the petition for certiorari, questioning PDIC's action, denying a deposit
insurance claim should be filed with the RTC, arguing in this manner: PDIC is not a quasi-judicial agency
and it does not possess any quasi-judicial power under its Charter; It merely performs fact-finding
functions based on its regulatory power. As such, applying Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. 07-7-12- SC, which in part states that if the petition relates to an act or omission of a
corporation, such as the PDIC, it shall be filed with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by this Court; Also, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides
that this Court, the CA, and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus. Applying the principle of hierarchy of courts, the RTC indeed has
jurisdiction over such petition for certiorari.
We do not agree.

On June 22, 1963, PDIC was created under RA 3591 as an insurer of deposits in all banks entitled to the
benefits of insurance under the said Act to promote and safeguard the interests of the depositing
public." As such, PDIC has the duty and authority to determine the validity of and grant or deny deposit
insurance claims. Section 16(a) of its Charter, as amended, provides that PDIC shall commence the
determination of insured deposits due the depositors of a closed bank upon its actual takeover of the
closed bank. Also, Section 1 of PDIC's Regulatory Issuance No. 2011-03, provides that as it is tasked to
promote and safeguard the interests of the depositing public by way of providing permanent and
continuing insurance coverage on all insured deposits, and in helping develop a sound and stable
banking system at all times, PDIC shall pay all legitimate deposits held by bona fide depositors and
provide a mechanism by which depositors may seek reconsideration from its decision, denying a deposit
insurance claim. Further, it bears stressing that as stated in Section 4(f) of its Charter, as amended,
PDIC's action, such as denying a deposit insurance claim, is considered as final and executory and may
be reviewed by the court only through a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.

Considering the foregoing, the legislative intent in creating the PDIC as a quasi-judicial agency is clearly
manifest.
In the case of Lintang Bedol v. Commission on Elections, cited in Carlito C. Encinas v. PO1 Alfredo P.
Agustin, Jr. and PO1 Joel S. Caubang," this Court explained the nature of a quasi-judicial agency, viz.:

Quasi-Judicial or Administrative Adjudicatory Power, on the other hand, is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi- judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or
merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation
is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to
it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is
an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the legislative intent in creating PDIC as a quasi-judicial agency is clearly manifest. Indeed, PDIC
exercises judicial discretion and judgment in determining whether a claimant is entitled to a deposit
insurance claim, which determination results from its investigation of facts and weighing of evidence
presented before it. Noteworthy also is the fact that the law considers PDIC's action as final and
executory and may be reviewed only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
That
being established, We proceed to determine where such petition for certiorari should be filed. In this
matter, We cite the very provision invoked by the petitioner, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC:

Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, a petition for certiorari, questioning the PDIC's denial of a deposit insurance claim should be
filed before the CA, not the RTC. This further finds support in Section 22 of the PDIC's Charter, as
amended, which states that:

Section 22. No court, except the Court of Appeals, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the Corporation for any action under
this Act. xxx.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies

instituted by a private party, the insured bank, or any shareholder of the insured bank. xxx.

Xxxx

Finally, the new amendment in PDIC's Charter under RA 10846, specifically Section 5(g) thereof,
confirms such conclusion, viz.:

The actions of the Corporation taken under Section 5(g) shall be final and executory, and may only be
restrained or set aside by the Court of Appeals, upon appropriate petition for certiorari on the ground
that the action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of denial of claim for deposit insurance. (Emphasis Ours)

As it stands, the controversy as to which court has jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari filed to
question the PDIC's action is already settled. Therefore, We find no reversible error from the findings
and conclusion of the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), on leave.

Endnotes:
*Designated as Acting Chairperson pursuant to Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018.
Rollo, pp. 13-26.

2 Penned by Presiding Judge Josefino A. Subia, id. at 28-36.

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 39-46.

Id. at 16.
Id.

7 Id.

Id. at 83.

Id. at 87.
10 Id. at 17.

Id. at 39-46.

12 Id. at 35.
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

XXX.

14 Id.

15 SECTION 22. No court, except the Court of Appeals, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the Corporation for any action under
this Act (as added by RA 9302).

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, the
insured bank, or any shareholder of the insured bank (as added by RA 9302).

XXX.

Rollo, p. 36.
Globe Telecom v. National Telecommunications Commission
Doctrine:

This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS.
However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations
applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should
not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the
NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and
Smart's SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must
be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position,
promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the
technologies it superintends.
Facts:

Smart Communications filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC to order the immediate
interconnection of Smart's and Globe's GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident
bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart's request for the interconnection of SMS. Globe
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to
comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-
93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. NTC then issued
an Order stating that both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of
cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for
having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls
squarely within the definition of value-added (VAS) service or enhanced- service given in NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their implementation of SMS
interconnection is mandatory.The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been
providing SMS without authority from it. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any
further action in the case. Globe reiterated that the complaint should have been dismissed for
failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule.They claimed
that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing
out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all. They alleged that the Order is a
patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor
Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process. The CA
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe called
the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a
deregulated special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC.

Issue:
Whether or not NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues
providing SMS.
Ruling:

No, the NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue
providing SMS. First, the NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it
sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. There is a lack of clear legal basis for
classifying SMS as VAS, owing to the failure of the NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations to
that effect. Muddled as the legal milieu governing SMS already is, NTC's attempt to apply its
confusing standards in the case of Globe and Smart is even more disconcerting. The very
rationale adopted by the NTC in its Orderholding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy.
Moreover, any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck
down as being arbitrary. And any decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
Second, Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to
the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Third, the imposition of fine is void for violation of
due process. Sections 17 and 21 of the Public Service Act confer two distinct powers on NTC.
Under Section 17, NTC has the power to investigate a PTE compliance with a standard, rule,
regulation, order, or other requirement imposed by law or the regulations promulgated by NTC,
as well as require compliance if necessary. However, Section 17 does not include the power to
impose fine in its enumeration. It is Section 21 which adverts to the power to impose fine and
in the same breath requires that the power may be exercised only after notice and hearing.
Section 21 requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even punitive
in character. Indeed, the requirement is the essence of due process.The right to notice and
hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the
administrative proceedings. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate
SMS or to classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through
unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-
handed manner. This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of
jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant,
jurisdiction over Globe and Smart's SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer
complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC
adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with
the advent of the technologies it superintends.
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No. 78385
August 31, 1987
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, quasi-legislative power,)

Facts: The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and through
respondent Secretary issued Dep Order No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order,
authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner opposed and alleged in a petition
that said order was issued without any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to regulate
school fees does not always include the power to increase the same.

Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power to
regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70 of the same act grants the DECS the power to
issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent
and necessary.
Issue: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of
legislative power.
Held: Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system
includes the power to prescribe school fees. In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this
power include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been
vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged
with the DECS.
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO;
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
GERARD E. GAERLAN, petitioners, vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 209330 | January 11, 2016
FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot dead by
Marlon Recamata. Recamato also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Arans, and
Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario
Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and dismissed the complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-
Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone
communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.

In the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of
investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all accused.
Reyes filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new
evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues
that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the
First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority
and argued that her creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a
quasi-judicial function. They point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to
reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for
the determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not
deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented
from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence.
Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was
already within the discretion of the trial court.
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of
prosecutors was not “unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be
compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since the Panel was
created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He
further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the
Information filed by the Second Panel was void.

ISSUE:
Whether the creation of the Second Panel was an executive function

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of
prosecutor in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case

Whether the Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court

RULING:
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
A quasi-judicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions
if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the
same effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial
functions.
In Santos v. Go:

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot
be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.
An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” In contrast, an act is considered
discretionary “if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed.”63 Considering that “full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not
ministerial.
A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then
conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause to
hold the accused for trial in court. The recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on
whether to dismiss the complaint or to file the corresponding information in court is still
subject to the approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. However,
a party is not precluded from appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of
Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a
reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu
propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state
prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises
control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse,
or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly
act on any “probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff,
regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor.” Accordingly,
the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or
petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.

It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the judicial
determination of probable cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor
who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be
held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself
does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.