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Global Hybrid warfare

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Special Operations Instruction Center

Hybrid warfare

Niterói-RJ
2022

1
FOREWORD

The concept of hybrid warfare is recent, but its tactics have been used for many
years, strategist Sun Tzu has already referred to irregular warfare as one of the most
effective ways to fight the enemy. Over the years and the advent of technology, the Modus
operandi of troops in combat has adjusted with time. Attacking an enemy indirectly can
make it go on the defensive, leaving it vulnerable to other forms of attack.
Today, weapons of mass destruction, as well as a world with several emerging
powers, impose limits on fighting between the powers. Access to the internet and the
media has made informational warfare extremely important in modern irregular warfare.
In 2016, the European Union, with NATO's endorsement, created the European
Centre of Excelence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) to help its members
understand and better defend themselves from modern hybrid threats. In addition, NATO
develops the Multinational Capability Development Campaign Countering Hybrid Warfare
(MCDC(CHW) Project, a project that aims to help understand the nature and character of
hybrid threats.
In the current context, it may seem that the hybrid threat is limited to the fighting in
Eastern Europe between Ukraine and Russia. But the Chinese expansion in the Pacific and
the growing interest of the Chinese government in South America, is the need for studies
on the issues by Brazilians.

2
 SUMMARY

1. SUMMARY...................................................................................................4
2. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................5
3. DEVELOPMENT......................................................................................... 6

3.1 HYBRID WAR MODEL…………………………………………………………6

3.2 USE OF DISINFORMATION IN HYBRID WARFARE...............................8
3.3 CREATION OF INFORMATION CONTROL LEADERS………………..….9
3.4 INSTRUMENTS USED IN HYBRID WARFARE.......................................10
3.5 HYBRID WARFARE ON THE GREAT POWERS......................................11
3.5.1 RUSSIA.......................................................................................12
3.5.2 USA.............................................................................................16
3.5.3 CHINA.........................................................................................18

4. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................20
5. REFERENCES..............................................................................................22

1. SUMMARY

3
 The following article aims to briefly characterize Hybrid Warfare, and thus show its
applications in the world, along with some examples in history and in the current major
global powers. It also addresses the influence of technological and information in this mode
of combat and its influence on the construction and deconstruction of leaders.
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has highlighted the concept of hybrid
warfare, although it has existed for a long time. During the time this concept underwent
several changes and interpretations, following the technologies and cultural changes of the
peoples. Given the repercussion of contact between belligerents since 2014, we see the
need to delve deeper into the subject. Thus, this article aims to deepen the hybrid warfare
models of the major world powers and the way information and disinformation are used by
these countries.
At first, we will address the models of hybrid warfare, which in turn may have
several nomenclatures and interpretations, but the concept is basically the same, the use of
military and non-military means in modern conflicts.
Next, we will talk about the use of disinformation and the control of information by
countries. We see that Russia's use of disinformation is paramount to its war effort, as well
as us and China's control of information.
Finally, we will address the hybrid warfare strategies of the US, Russia and China.
Countries that approach the concept differently, with different nomenclatures and
strategies. But in general, they all use all expressions of power (economic, political,
psychosocial, military and scientific-technological), in hybrid warfare. Using military and
non-military means in actions.
We conclude that even though the term has gained emphasis today, its employment is
done a long time ago, only with different nomenclatures. We also understand that in the
modern world, where access to information is fast and can be accessed from anywhere
through the Internet, it has made disinformation a primary role in conflicts and that
information control is present, in the fight against disinformation. It is also necessary to
analyze Brazil in this context, where we can verify a certain disparity of the great powers.

2. INTRODUCTION

4
 As is well known the war evolves over the years, from its technological means,
effective employee and tactics. Over time several authors differentiate and describe the
generations of war over time. Other authors only highlight the form of combat and the tools
used.
In this context was emerged the concept Hybrid Warfare, which is attributed to
Mattis y Hoffman the first reference of this denomination, in an article published in 2005, in
the journal Proceedings, under the title Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, text in
which, when discussing the USA. In this article, the authors highlighted that the superiority
of the USA would try other state and non-state agents to seek a technological capacity or
means in the search for advantages, leaving aside the traditional mode of war.
In the course of this article, some concepts will be briefly addressed and explained as
the evolution of war, its characteristics, the tactics employed in disinformation and the
influence on building leadership. Finally, we will address the issues described above
critically and analyze their influence on how to fight in our country.
Several concepts and expressions have been developed to try to explain this new
form of warfare, employing from more traditional terms, such as Unconventional or
Irregular Warfare, or even denominations such as Asymmetric Warfare, 4th Generation
War, New Generation War (or Non-Linear), Unrestricted (or limitless) War, Compound
Warfare, Gray Zone Conflicts, and Hybrid Warfare.
In 2016, the EU created, with NATO's endorsement, the European Centre of
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)6, which aims to help participating
states and institutions to understand and defend themselves against hybrid threats. In
addition, NATO develops the Multinational Capability Development Campaign Countering
Hybrid Warfare (MCDC(CHW) Project7, a multinational project to help understand the
nature and character of modern hybrid threats and counter hybrid warfare. Within this
context, not only seeking to understand the concept of Hybrid Warfare, but also of
developing measures to counter a hybrid threat, both NATO and the EU are developing
strategies to strengthen their defensive capabilities and prevent hybrid attacks. (BARBOSA,
2020, p. 10.)

3. DEVELOPMENT

3.1. HYBRID WAR MODEL

5
 Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the concept of hybrid warfare has
been spreading more and more. This concept is not new, but its way of acting is changeable
in the course of technological developments and the cultural character is directly linked to
how hybrid conflict happens.
For Wither (2016), the existence of many definitions for Hybrid Warfare is not
surprising, since the concept has been delineated in different but related ways, and these
definitions have evolved in a relatively short period of time. apud BARBOSA, 2020, p. 12.

Fonte: WALKER, 1998, p. 5.

Although the author presents the concept of special operations clearly and
objectively, he later cites the American revolution as an example of hybrid warfare, with the
use of irregular forces and regular forces in the conflict. (WALKER, 1998).
For Wither (2016), the emphasis on non-military methods is the main differential of
Hybrid Warfare, in particular the use of coercive information operations. In this context the
author likes the war against the Islamic State, with the war in Ukraine, where non-state
actors, are having a very significant role in the conflict, especially the media and war
propaganda.
According to Reichborn-Kjennerrud and Cullen (2016), the concept of hybrid
warfare concentrated on state and non-state actors, left a great lack of understanding on the
subject, being better presented in this chart.

6
 FIGURE 2 - Model for horizontal and vertical escalation of Hybrid Warfare Source:
REICHBORN-KJENNERRUD; CULLEN, 2016, p. 3

The alternation of the means employed, and their form of intensity can be seen as a
horizontal escalation (alternating the action between the instruments of power) and a vertical
climb (increasing or decreasing the intensity used in each action), which can occur
simultaneously (REICHBORN-KJENNERRUD; CULLEN, 2016).
So, a hybrid threat can alternate the form of attack according to your needs and
interests in the conflict. Creating desired effects simultaneously, breaking the enemy's
defenses.
This combination of efforts multiplies the strength of the effect produced, allowing
the same impact of the large vertical climb of a medium to be achieved by an action of lesser
intensity in other means (horizontal climbing), conjugated or not
(REICHBORNKJENNERRUD; CULLEN, 2016). The maintenance of low intensity actions
in the various instruments of power contributes, as previously mentioned, to the ambiguity
of these actions, since they are below the limits for response established by the opponent,
generating doubt as to their intentions and hindering the decision-making process for a
response, thus acting on the cognitive elements of the war. apud BARBOSA, 2020, p. 13.

7
3.2. USE OF DISINFORMATION IN HYBRID WARFARE

As for modern warfare, information is the new ammunition. The transformation of

information into a weapon, called the Information War, is a key element of Hybrid Warfare.
Considering the relevance of misinformation to Hybrid Warfare, it is important to better
understand its concept, its characteristics and what effects it can produce.
The use of misinformation has been growing in sophistication, reach, intensity and
impact and the information age is rapidly transforming into the age of disinformation.
The EU defines disinformation as "proven false or misleading information that is
created, presented and disseminated to achieve economic gain or to intentionally deceive
the population and can cause public harm" (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018, p. 4).
It differs from propaganda primarily by objectives and the way of dissemination.
While propaganda is associated with tactics and strategies in support of a specific political
cause, ideology or interest and typically employs bold advertising campaigns or secret
intelligence actions, misinformation is a way to foster distrust and antipathy to established
practices and norms (FIOTT; PARKES, 2019). It is not easy to detect and does not have a
discernible political cause or message and can in many cases be confused with conspiracy
theories.
Social networking technologies are manipulated to spread disinformation through a
series of sequential steps: creation, which may involve articles written, complemented or
not by out-of-context images or videos, or the use of new technologies, including based on
artificial intelligence, available to create fake images and videos, which allow you to
manipulate public opinion much more efficiently; amplification, which takes advantage of
fertile ground for the dissemination of disinformation in social media and other online
media and makes use of algorithms, digital advertising models and enabling technologies;
and dissemination by users, who tend to share content without any verification.
The target of misinformation is not the general public, but people who already have
some mistrust of their systems, who are looking for theories or information, however
ridiculous, that corroborate their suspicions. Anonymity and the possibility of denying the
virtual environment, with its fake accounts and spambots, provide an effective camouflage
to be exploited within a hybrid campaign. Similarly, the low cost, reach and speed of the

8
dissemination of ideas through social media contributed to the revitalization of
disinformation as a popular tool to be employed by hybrid actors.
Thus, we conclude that modern disinformation campaigns have been enhanced by
technological development, especially the internet and the media that have made them
grow in sophistication, reach, intensity and impact. However, to be effective,
misinformation must exploit gaps in people's beliefs and a state's political and social fabric
to find support and thrive. It seeks to control the narrative of the facts and, thus, confuse
the other actors, promote internal divisions, erode confidence in institutions and limit
decision-making capacity.

3.3. LEADERSHIP CREATION AND INFORMATION CONTROL

In the society of the informational age, digitization is the source of the sources of
power and as already seen, with technology as an ally, it comes to represent a powerful
weapon that enables the control of society. The internet and the various electronic devices,
even if they allow access to unprecedented information, also allow the concentration of
information and, consequently, is also configured as a space of power.
Speaking on the power side, digital technology can be seen as an element that
allows the control of individuals and society. This statement has three basic principles: (a)
its great ability to concentrate information; and (b) the high speed with which such
information may be programmed, modified, corrected, updated and made available (c) the
manipulation of the contents.
The great issue to be analyzed in this context is that although information is today
more than at any other time in history the main source of power, it is not necessarily the
source of truth, although it can produce ideologically certain versions of reality and impose
them as true.
What seems to be happening through the internet and new digital technologies,
which is expanding every day in the contemporary world, is a growing increase in the
control of society through these means, the implementation of an invisible social control.
The internet, as an information centralizing point, can control with a high degree of
efficiency. And the control exercised is diffuse, almost invisible and imperceptible. Thus, it
does not produce apparent violence. The domination it enables is covered up, which makes

9
it more cynical and efficient. In a way one can consider the internet as the center of gravity
of contemporary society.
Therefore, it is not the fact of having technology that defines the levels of
democracy of a given society, but rather the levels of consensus and conflict within it. It is
the political delay and not the technological absence that produces authoritarianism and
totalitarianism. The possession of technology and computerized systems only greatly
expands the possibilities of control by totalitarian regimes and dictatorships and, perhaps,
decentralization by democracies.

3.4 INSTRUMENTS USED IN HYBRID WARFARE

The diversity of capabilities employed in Hybrid Warfare requires an understanding

of which means are most appropriate and used. The tools that evidence the achievement
of this type of conflict are varied, thus not exactly following, in a linear and Cartesian way,
the use of the same instruments in all situations.
Some types of operation are evidenced during the execution of hybrid conflicts. The
physical, human and informational dimensions are all extremely relevant to the
achievement of objectives. Thus, all expressions of power (economic, political,
psychosocial, military and scientific-technological) are part of the conflict and are affected
by the use of these tools.
The tools, according to Chivvis (2017), which are presented are economic sanctions,
information operations, cyber warfare, proxy war, biological warfare, terrorism, among
others. Moreover, it can be observed that there is also the use of regular troops of the
singular forces, psychological operations and special operations.
MAIN TOOLS USED
Biological warfare
Psychological Operations Trafficking for group financing

Cyber Warfare Irregular Warfare Nuclear Development

Proxy war Terrorism False Flag Operation

Intelligence Economic
Operations Forced migration Sanctions/Incentives

10
 In view of the above we see that a hybrid conflict presents itself as a wide variety of
options. The commanders must explore the existing asymmetries so that there is, above all,
the control of the informational environment, in order to favor the tactical action of the
troops and consequently the achievement of political objectives for this type of conflict
where the beginning of the war itself is not characterized.
3.5 HYBRID WARFARE IN THE GREAT POWERS
In the face of Russia's actions in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the
Ukraine War in 2022, we see that Russia and NATO countries use the Hybrid War in
partially similar ways, with a difference in nato's economic activities. Russia's
annexation of Crimea and the subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine were
carried out through kinetic actions of special forces in conjunction with a series of
very well planned and synchronized diplomatic, cyber, economic, informational and
psychological actions, in what was characterized as Hybrid Warfare (ABBOTT,
2016). NATO in turn focuses on the means employed:
use of military and non-military instruments in
an integrated campaign designed to achieve
surprise, take the initiative, and obtain
psychological and physical advantages using
diplomatic means; fast and sophisticated
information, electronic and cyber operations;
military and information actions secret and
occasionally ostentatious; and economic
pressure (THE MILITARY BALANCE, 2015, p.
5, our translation).

3.5.1 RUSSIA
The Russian Federation and President Vladimir Putin saw the disappearance
of the USSR as a geopolitical disaster for that country and the deepening economic
crisis that Russia entered after the end of the USSR as a distancing of power
compared to the great powers in the global climate.
One thing they would not tolerate was the loss of what they see as their legitimate
sphere of influence. The Russian Empire directly ruled the Baltic States, Belarus,
Moldova, Ukraine, the Caucasus states, as well as a variety of states in modern
Central Asia. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union added its hegemony over a
wide sash of Eastern Europe through its domination of the Warsaw Pact. In the

11
post-dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of these states sought freedom of
Russian dominance or influence. Because of their historical role as hegemonic,
many Russians still feel that eastern European countries should pay attention to
what the Russians say they do and that the former Soviet republics should obey
them. (Hybrid Warfare, 2021, our translation).
The latest update of the Russian concept of hybrid warfare is sometimes called the
'Gerasimov Doctrine', named after Russian General Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov,
chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. He says the West used
hybrid warfare against Russia, citing the Arab Spring and Operation Libya in 2011
as evidence. Although author Mark Galeotti laments that he coined the phrase,
saying he 'was just wanting a grumpy title' and prefers 'to call it nonlinear warfare, or
hybrid warfare, or special war', this is the main phrase used to describe the Russian
point of view. The other popular label is 'New Generation War'. (Hybrid Warfare,
2021, our translation).

Figure 3: Russian hybrid operations. Fonte:

Hybrid Warfare, 2021, p. 23
In this context we see that the war of information and disinformation generated by
Moscow reaches all levels, be it political or even tactical. According to Snegovaya
(2015, p. 9), the Russian Information War "consists of a deliberate campaign of
disinformation supported by actions of the intelligence agencies aimed at confusing
the enemy and gaining strategic advantage at minimal cost." For example, by

12
denying the presence of soldiers in Crimea, Russia was able to slow down the
Ukrainian reaction and occupy strategic positions (SNEGOVAYA, 2015).

Figure 4 – Adapted from a briefing presented by Gen. Valery Gerasimov during the
Third Moscow Conference on International Security, held by the Russian Ministry of
Defense. Source: (MILITARY REVIEW, March-April 2016, p. 50)
One of the most interesting aspects of Gerasimov's article is his perspective on the
relationship between non-military and military measures in the war. The use of all
means of national power to achieve the ends of the state is not something new for
Russia, but now its Armed Forces see war as something far beyond a military
conflict. As the graph extracted from Gerasimov's article illustrates (Figure 5) the
war is conducted, today, with an approximate proportion of four non-military
measures for a military measure. These non-military measures include economic
sanctions, suspension of diplomatic relations, and political and diplomatic pressure.
The crucial point is that while the West regards these non-military measures as
ways to avoid war, Russia regards them as war. (MILITARY REVIEW, March-April
2016, p. 50)

13
 Figure 5 – Graph extracted from Gen Gerasimov's article in Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 Feb 13 [translation from the English version of Charles
Bartles]. Source: (MILITARY REVIEW, March-April 2016, p. 51)
Gerasimov's vision of the future operating environment is, in many ways, very
similar to ours. Like us, Gerasimov predicts a lower frequency of large-scale
combat; increased use of networked command and control systems, robotics and
high-precision weapons; greater importance given to interagency cooperation; more
operations on urban terrain, a fusion of offensive and defensive and a general
reduction of differences between military activities at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels. (MILITARY REVIEW, March-April 2016, p. 51)

14
Figure 6 - Graph extracted from the article of military review magazine, March-April
2016, p. 53

3.5.2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Historically, the United States has a long history of involvement in conflicts

characterized by the use of instruments of hybrid warfare.

In the 20th century, the United States employed non-conveal means characteristic of a
hybrid conflict, when they had an interest in the independence of Panama, with a channel
controlled by the United States. But Colombia was not willing to give in to the then
province of Panama. Without crossing diplomatic boundaries, the U.S. employed military

15
and financial assets, as well as local forces to achieve panama's political goal of
independence. (WEISSMAN, 2021)

Another challenge that exemplifies the use of hybrid tools was the actions of the
United States during the Cold War. They have become adept at supporting rebels,
influencing governments and elections, especially Latin America. (WEISSMAN, 2021)

Figure 7: Differences between Conventional and Irregular Warfare in clausewitz's Trinity.

Source: USA, 2008 p. 1-6.

Today, the U.S. through heavy economic sanctions is fighting other countries. In addition,
through its special operations troops already develop arm local groups to act in accordance
with their geopolitical interests. Massive cyber-attacks are also exploited as a means of
power projection. Recently in the Russia-Ukraine conflict it has supported Ukraine with
various means of military employment, which is considered a proxy war of the western
countries (NATO) with Russia.

The United States has achieved over the years through military might to impose its will
on other countries. But hybrid threats bring insecurity to the United States, since the use of
these tools can bring advantages without at least employing the military means
themselves. In the end, in the end, the will and ability of the American public to defend
liberal movements democracy is the last and best line of defense against hybrid threats.
The "greatest threat to democracy is an ill-educated public," Rothstein concludes,

16
"education is fundamental." He believes that in addition to educating the public about
history and civility, the U.S. and like-minded countries should 'back off' and 'hold countries
accountable' for pushing dangerous views like 'unliberal democracy'. "The most liberal
democracies will recognize [this] threat to Western civilization," he concludes, if we 'lose
control of it' then we lose everything. Europe must help American leaders argue that hybrid
warfare is a real threat to all of us. Sometimes it's lost in the United States. Europeans who
feel most threatened by hybrid warfare need to help U.S. leaders clarify American people
that hybrid is an existential problem for democracy. Hybrid warfare can potentially allow
adversaries to achieve their strategic objectives without firing a shot; if America rebuts its
constitutional values, the authoritarians win. (WEISSMAN, 2021)

3.5.3 CHINA

China has an understanding of modern warfare as a multifaceted environment where

expressions of power are crucial to success today, political, economic, cultural, diplomatic
and military fields are relevant. Chinese strategists describe the concept of hybrid warfare
standing out by the change in four main aspects: (1) from traditional land, sea and air to
multidimensional fields involving means in the terrestrial, maritime, air and space spectra;
(2) tangible military geographic space for invisible and intangible networks and virtual
space; (3) country-based exchanges for a complex range of fighters, including regular forces,
militias, militants, agents and hackers; and (4) from a limited combat design to a more
comprehensive one. (WEISSMANN, 2021)

Chinese analyses focus on cyber and information operations as the central theme of
hybrid warfare. Wang Guifang of the China Academy of Military Sciences emphasized that
the U.S. military prioritizes cyber warfare as a new type of hybrid warfare, strengthening its
exercises for future integrated cyber operations. (WEISSMAN, 2021). These facts evideated
a direction in Chinese doctrine to use these means as tools to obtain advantages in modern
combat.

In addition, some facts indicate that China used information campaigns to question the
origin of the Covid-19 and also to affirm China's success in controlling the progress of the

17
pandemic. However, these narratives may have been used to attract the international focus
so that China would intensify aggressive military actions on the border with India,
overflights in Taiwan, as well as administrative operations in the East and South China Sea.
(WEISSMAN, 2021)

As a future perspective, China envisions new tools in the execution of Hybrid Warfare,
such as the use of means that employ artificial intelligence to execute military kinetic
actions in operations. At first, discussions on hybrid warfare included dissection of
long-range attack weapon systems and scattered Washington targets used

in simultaneous full-depth attack, such as the F-22 and tomahawk cruise missile. More
recently, these analyses have focused on how best to combat air and naval attack means
using artificial intelligence. (WEISSMAN, 2021)

In addition, when evaluating Chinese responses across a spectrum, there is a

movement to integrate kinetic platforms with various levels of autonomy into the strategy
on hybrid warfare. So, while information warfare and cyber warfare can continue to
dominate, China's future depends on an intelligent war or enabled by artificial intelligence.
Chinese inclusion of unmanned systems and even hypersonic vehicles in strategic and
technical hybrid warfare writings indicate that the emphasis on disinformation is
increasingly intertwined with brute force applications in various domains. In short, while
unrestricted warfare, information warfare and cyber warfare are likely to remain at the
center of Chinese discussions about hybrid warfare, strategists are ready to undertake a
future shift toward intelligent warfare and kinetic warfare employing AI. Understanding
what the Chinese understand as hybrid warfare and its nuances becomes crucial. This will
facilitate an anticipation of politicians and military personnel on how China will respond in
the face of a conflict that presents several tools for its solution. (WEISSMAN, 2021)

4. CONCLUSION

18
 In view of the above, it can be observed that hybrid warfare was the result of
the mutations that occurred over the years. In parallel to technological development
and the availability of these means to all getting cheaper and more accessible every
day.

Figure 8- Graphic representation of the concept of hybrid warfare. Source: (EB

Magazines)
The presence of state and non-state agencies brought a diffuse and too
complex environment to control and possess all variables at hand for timely
decision making. Especially when comparing the ancient forms of war when one
could observe both the forces of the belligerents facing each other and acting
conventionally.

19
 Figure 9: - Horizontal and vertical escalation of hybrid warfare
Legend: V1 and V2: Vulnerabilities exploited by synchronized attacks using
tools in the MPECI fields. Colored arrows symbolize the intensity of attacks grouped
by power instruments. Source: CULLEN; REICHBORN-KJENNERUD, 2017, p,9,
adaptation and translation of the author
The threats, in this new context, are not only limited to the theater of
operations in a situation of war, but also the threat of disinformation, and can
influence the attitudes of a target audience to fight their own leader.
Bringing the subject to the reality of Brazil and comparing the measures
taken in the preparation against conflicts by countries such as the USA and Russia,
it is clear the disparity with our country that, in a lower way, is far from preparing
against hybrid threats. However, there is concern of the state in the creation of
intelligence agencies, combat mechanism with special characteristics and military
organizations created to combat disinformation, cyber actions, paramilitary actors,
subreptitious activities and even terrorism.
As was the evolution of war, the measures of preparing a country against
new forms of combat cannot stop and so Brazil follows a correct path, but still
distant from developed countries. Within the theory of scarce means, but with
infinite needs, it is now necessary to consider, sensibly, national problems and
direct resources to national objectives and maintenance of sovereignty.

5. REFERENCES
20
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