1. Manosca vs. CA, G.R. No.

106440, January 29, 1996

2. Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999

3. Islamic Da’wah Council vs. Exec Sec, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003

4. American Bible vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil 398 (1957)

5. Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent pf Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256

Ebralinag v Division Supt. of Cebu 219 SCRA 256 (1993)

Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
for raising same issue. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F.
Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school
students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All
minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's
Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A.
Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in
Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same
counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan,
Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these
students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the “Panatang
Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel
transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom.

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice
and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education,
and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners pray that:

i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their
respective schools;

ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or
otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and

iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of
petitioners to their respective schools. (p. 41, Rollo.)

And that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be
issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit
them to their respective classes.

On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).

The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to
be impleaded as respondents in these cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98, Rollo)
defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:

1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school
children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.

2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the
DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion
and worship.

3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of
country, for which the flag stands.

4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not
warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute
ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.

5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.

6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having
scriptural basis.

6. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No.
292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).

Issue: Whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses
may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious
beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the
public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order which was issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531). The 2 fold
aspect of right to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the
realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety,
morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from
the school is not justified.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does
not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were
only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present
any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students
by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free education. The non-
observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic
consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of
government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is
unjustified.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom
(according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to
public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.

Note:
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court in Gerona upholding the
flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be
trifled with.

It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its in
corporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to
re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of
being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut
their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise
of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973
Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
7. Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Facts:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose
F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an
investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not
her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I,
Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow,
her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but
living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of
the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,
respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and
has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.” For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows
members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation
all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith,
the Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot
secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only
couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which requires
the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the
declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the
declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were executed in the usual and
approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where
the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.

Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the couple are
lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s
case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her part,
her mate was still not capacitated to remarry.

Thus, their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they
remain members in good standing in the congregation.

Despite her defense, Escritor was held administratively liable and was suspended for 6 months and 1
day without pay with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely in
accordance with the Civil Service Rules.

Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the case be referred to Executive
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas City for investigation, report and
recommendation. In the course of Judge Maceda's investigation, Escritor again testified that her
congregation allows her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio and it does not consider it immoral. She
offered to supply the investigating judge some clippings which explain the basis of her congregation's
belief and practice regarding her conjugal arrangement. Escritor started living with Quilapio twenty
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She met this woman who
confirmed to her that she was living with her (Escritor's) husband.
On appeal, the issue before the Court is whether or not Escritor is guilty of committing gross and
immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and
immoral conduct

Ruling:IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General
is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts
in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

The Court held that, strictly speaking, Escritor’s conduct is immoral and should necessarily be punished.
However, her defense, anchored on religious freedom, presents a very interesting issue to the Court.

Article III, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution provides that “[n] o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

The Court explained that the Philippines adheres to a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting freedom of
religion cases. Accordingly, the constitutional provisions on tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, optional religious instruction and the preamble all reveal without doubt that
the Filipino people, in adopting the Constitution, did not intend to erect a high and impregnable wall of
separation between the church and state. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of these
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these breaches in the wall of separation to
uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses.

Moreover, it also clarified that the compelling state interest test is proper where conduct is involved because
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be
immediate and short term while others delayed and far reaching.

Thus, using the compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality stance, the Court held that there
are two questions that must be answered in deciding the issue in this case:

(a) Whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened?

According to the Court, there is no doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her
religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.

(b) Whether respondent is sincere in her religious belief?

The Court found that she is sincere in her belief for the following reasons:

· She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary or only after an administrative case
for immorality was filed against her.

· The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner,
Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the judiciary.

· Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovahs Witnesses practice of
securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. The Declaration is not
whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the union of their members under
respondent's circumstances honorable before God and men.

· The Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA to the respondent
regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag ceremony after Circular No. 62 2001 was issued
requiring attendance in the flag ceremony.

Nevertheless, the Court clarified that it cannot, as yet, render a definitive decision in this case absent the showing
of a compelling state interest, especially since the government was not represented in this case. According to the
Court, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of
the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General. The government should, thus, be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.

Note:

1. The court discusses the importance of religious freedom and the need to balance it with the
interests of the state.
2. The court examines different tests used in Philippine jurisprudence to determine the limits of
religious freedom, including the "clear and present danger" test, the "grave and immediate
danger" test, and the "compelling state interest" test.
3. The court concludes that the appropriate test to apply in this case is the "compelling state
interest" test.
4. The court explains that the state must demonstrate a compelling interest that overrides
Escritor's religious freedom.
5. The court finds that the government has not presented sufficient evidence to meet this burden.
6. The case is remanded to allow the government to present evidence on the state's compelling
interest and for Escritor to further demonstrate the sincerity of her religious belief.
7. The court emphasizes that its decision is limited to the realm of public and secular morality and
does not pass judgment on religious beliefs or practices.
8. Escritor's conduct may still be subject to disciplinary action for being prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Carpio dissents and argues that Escritor's conduct is both disgraceful and immoral, as it
constitutes concubinage under Philippine law.
Carpio contends that Escritor's religious belief cannot exempt her from the charge of concubinage, as
sincerity or insincerity in religious beliefs is not a test for exemption from harmful conduct that the
state has a right to suppress.
Carpio argues that a remand of the case is unnecessary, as Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio is an
admitted fact that violates Philippine law.
Carpio concludes that Escritor's conduct is prejudicial to the best interest of the service and should be
subject to disciplinary action.

The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different

reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to
formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether
direct or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens
the programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the
Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society
Accommodationist Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in
the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An
accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for
the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On
the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also
constitutionally required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the
language of the First Amendment. Second, the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes
of the First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to
protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include
ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position
is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths
in a pluralistic nation.
8. Spark vs. QC, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Facts: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew
for minors, respondents Navotas City, City of Manila, and Quezon City started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of
"Oplan Rody." Petitioners, spearheaded by Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an
association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the
protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors argue that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine, as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how
law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators; (b)
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose
arguing that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community. Furthermore, they claim that the
Manila Ordinance’s imposition of penalties contravenes Sec. 57-A of RA 9344 which provides that no
penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no
compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents’ prerogative to impose them in
the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a
compelling interest exists; less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. They further opine
that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, which is mandatory parental counselling
and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew
hours. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the curfew
ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas.

Issue: Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by
the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and
VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

The petition is partly granted. Curfew Ordinances passed by the City of Manila and Navotas City are
declared unconstitutional while Quezon City Ordinance is declared constitutional.

Void for Vagueness

Petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness was denied. A statute or
act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons; especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle. In the present case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the
public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.
The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from
this particular claim. Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide
the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert
any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines . The mechanisms related to the implementation of the
Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of
government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole
consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify
suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in
statutory law when implementing ordinances as provided by Sec. 7 of RA 9344, as amended. This
provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. Pursuant to Sec. 57-A of RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk
and, therefore, covered by its provisions. It is a long-standing principle that conformity with law is one
of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance.

Applying the foregoing, any person, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew may
therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any
competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the
law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which needless
to state should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers
disregard these rules; the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing
authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

Right of parents to rear their child

The contention of the petitioners that the curfew ordinances deprive parents of their natural and
primary right was denied. Sec. 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children. In this provision, the rearing of
children for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only
as parental rights, but also as parental duties, which means that parents are not only given the
privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed
that when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the
child, the State may act to promote these legitimate interests. Thus, in cases in which harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated,
these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of
their children. The Constitution itself provides that the State is mandated to support parents in the
exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision.

In the present case, the Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid
parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. The Curfew Ordinances apply only when
the minors are not whether actually or constructively accompanied by their parents. This serves as an
explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the
importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over
their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative
to allow minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to
their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors'
activities.

Right to travel

Petitioners are partially correct that the Curfew Ordinances violate the people's right to travel. The
Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have
not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech related
conduct. The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing
to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. The right to travel is
recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right under Sec. 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
This right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. However, as the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the
exercise of this right provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law. In the present case, the stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably
serve the interest of public safety.

As to the second requirement, Philippine legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
duty to afford special protection to children, particularly Article 139 of PD 603 which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children, which was done by the respondents in this case. The restrictions set by the Curfew
Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, the
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these
rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.

As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their
rights. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults. For these reasons, the State is justified in setting
restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on
reasonable grounds. While the court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, the
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test. Strict scrutiny
test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in the Philippine legal system guaranteed no
less by the Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is applied. Under this test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
In the present case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public
areas, so as to reduce, if not totally eliminate their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate
them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves as denoted in
the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on
minors. Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances
pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause. In this light, the Court finds that the
local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns
on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for
the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

As to the second requirement, it stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the
purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be
so narrowly drawn. Thus, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the second requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not. It was observed that the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are
not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly
restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. Both ordinances protect the rights to education, to
gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account
for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors'
social, emotional, and intellectual development. Although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose
the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults. The
Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to
free expression.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations,
are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence of any separability clause. The Quezon City Ordinance on the
other hand, stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the
well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent. To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception
found in Sec. 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, that is, "those accompanied by their parents or
guardian,". The curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its
narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.

Penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance

Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of
violations, which, thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions: (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations. These provisions do not prohibit the
enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are
not considered as an offense or penalized. Instead, they prohibit the imposition of penalties on
minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on
minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor
in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Sec. 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs
recognized under Sec. 54. In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid
form of intervention program that a local government could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanour. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or
friendly reproof" or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight." In other words, the disciplinary
measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties as they are not
punitive in nature and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. Their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what
actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment
imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof." The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Philippine
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, hence, prohibited by Sec. 57-A of RA
9344, as amended. Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties as
provided in the various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence that Sec. 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, evidently prohibits. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform to
the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

DOCTRINES:

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

Void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE A statue is
unconstitutional if its language is so broad that it unnecessary interferes with the exercise of
constitutional rights, even though the purpose is to prohibit activities that the government may
constitutionally prohibit. The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

PARENS PATRIAE (PARENT OF HIS OR HER COUNTRY) In the juvenile justice legal system, parens
patriae is a doctrine that allows the state to step in and serve as a guardian for children, the mentally
ill, the incompetent, the elderly, or disabled persons who are unable to care for themselves. The State
has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfil their parental obligations.

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID ORDINANCE (1) Must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.

GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE General welfare clause delegates in statutory form the police power to
LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

9. Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998

Chavez v. PCGG, GR 130716, 9 December 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the
prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy,"alleges that what impelled him to
bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997
These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise,
between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
ill-gotten wealth claiming it is an issue of paramount public interest and has a debilitating effect on
the country's economy
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs
They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has
asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not
yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding
That the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval
in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed
such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even
submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2)
the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and
submission of an inventory of their assets.
Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan
dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact

Issue/s:
Whether or not the General and Supplemental Agreements which the PCGG entered into with the
Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to
law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or
may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as
the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in
this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.

The petitioner has the right to access information regarding the ongoing negotiations and proposals concerning
the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth. The General and Supplemental Agreements entered into by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Marcos heirs are null and void for being contrary
to law and the Constitution.

Ratio:
Writings in the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public,
in line with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. An informed public is crucial in a democracy,
allowing the people to determine whether their government officials are performing their functions honestly and
competently. The recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest. Limitations on access to information include matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information.
Compromises are generally encouraged in civil cases, but there are certain matters that cannot be compromised,
such as civil status, validity of marriage, and future support. A compromise in civil cases does not automatically
terminate criminal proceedings or extinguish criminal liability.

The petitioner has the right to access information regarding the ongoing negotiations and proposals
concerning the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth. The General and Supplemental Agreements between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs are null and void for being contrary to law and the Constitution.

Notes:

The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no
defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may
be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.

However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information - there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, 25 provided that they
are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions -trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure (3) criminal matters - Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those
relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be
seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the
whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.

“Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public