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Blurred Lines How The Court in - Commonwealth V Carter - Blurred The Line Between Freedom of Speech and Criminal Liability
Blurred Lines How The Court in - Commonwealth V Carter - Blurred The Line Between Freedom of Speech and Criminal Liability
Blurred Lines How The Court in - Commonwealth V Carter - Blurred The Line Between Freedom of Speech and Criminal Liability
209 (2023)
NOTE
University of Houston Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2024. The Author dedicates
this Note to Professor Zachary D. Kaufman, who furthered her passion for criminal justice
and inspired her to write on the topic of this Note. The Author would like to give a special
thanks to her husband, Bryce, and her family and friends for their unwavering support and
love.
209
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Commonwealth v. Carter, a Massachusetts court convicted
Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of
Conrad Roy through words alone.1 The court ruled that her verbal
conduct “overc[a]me [the victim’s] willpower to live” and therefore
caused the suicide.2 Carter was sentenced to fifteen months in
prison and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2020.3
Even though this case was the first of its kind, about five years
later, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts charged Inyoung You
II. BACKGROUND
responsible for 48,183 deaths in 2021, which is about one death every 11 minutes. The
number of people who think about or attempt suicide is even higher. In 2021, an estimated
12.3 million American adults seriously thought about suicide, 3.5 million planned a suicide
attempt, and 1.7 million attempted suicide.”).
16. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 937 (1877).
17. Edward Richards, History of Suicide Law, PUB. HEALTH L. MAP, https://biotech
.law.lsu.edu/map/HistoryofSuicideLaw.html [https://perma.cc/MR7C-VVSQ] (last updated
Apr. 19, 2009).
18. See generally Gerry Holt, When Suicide Was Illegal, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14374296 [https://perma.cc/SW22-EB8A].
19. Id. (explaining that instead of a Christian burial, the bodies would be carried to
a crossroads in the middle of the night and dumped in a pit); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (“[I]f a man slays himself in weariness of life or
because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain . . . [only] his movable goods [were]
confiscated.” (quoting 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND (George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968))).
20. David S. Markson, Comment, The Punishment of Suicide—A Need for Change, 14
VILL. L. REV. 463, 465 (1969).
21. Id.
22. See id. (stating that there has never been punishment for suicide in the United
States); see also Joseph M. Pierre, Culturally Sanctioned Suicide: Euthanasia, Seppuku,
and Terrorist Martyrdom, 5 WORLD J. PSYCH. 4, 7–11 (2015) (explaining how some cultures
frame suicide as honorable).
23. See Romeo and Juliet, SHAKESPEARE BIRTHPLACE TR., https://www.shakespeare
.org.uk/explore-shakespeare/shakespedia/shakespeares-plays/romeo-and-juliet/ [https://pe
rma.cc/ZB53-PLH7] (last visited July 17, 2023) (providing a summary of Romeo and Juliet).
24. Donald M. Wright, Comment, Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States, 7
N.C. CENT. L. REV. 156, 157 (1975).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
25. Id. (explaining that “[w]ith the removal of the common law punishment, which
only brought shame and poverty to the suicide’s survivors, there was little the courts could
do to deter suicide”); see also N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 1. (“The following punishments only
shall be known to the laws of this State: death, imprisonment, fines, suspension of a jail or
prison term with or without conditions, restitution, community service, restraints on
liberty, work programs, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy and
office of honor, trust, or profit under this State.”).
26. Wright, supra note 24.
27. Id. For example, the legislature of the Providence Plantations, which later
became Rhode Island, declared in 1647 that:
Self-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present
Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a
premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: . . . his goods and
chattels are the king’s custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be
an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712–13 (1997) (quoting THE EARLIEST ACTS AND
LAWS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1647–1719, at 19
(John D. Cushing ed., 1977)).
28. Wright, supra note 24; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.10 (West 2023) (“Common
law crimes are abolished.”).
29. Wright, supra note 24.
30. Robert E. Litman, Medical-Legal Aspects of Suicide, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 395, 395
(1967).
31. E.S. SHNEIDMAN, Approaches and Commonalities of Suicide, in SUICIDE AND ITS
PREVENTION: THE ROLE OF ATTITUDE AND IMITATION 14, 24 (René F.W. Diekstra et al. eds.,
1989); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (making it a crime if a person “aids or
attempts to aid [another] to commit or attempt to commit suicide”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22.08
(2020) (making it a crime if a person “aids or attempts to aid [another] to commit or attempt
to commit suicide”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (2020) (“Assisting suicide consists of
deliberately aiding another in the taking of his own life. Whoever commits assisting suicide
is guilty of a fourth degree felony.”).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
states still listed suicide as a crime,32 and these states have since
removed that classification.33
Today, suicide is no longer a crime in any state.34 Society
punishes criminals to achieve certain goals such as deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and reparation.35
Punishing suicide does not achieve any of these goals and is
therefore contrary to the justifications for punishment in our
criminal justice system.
32. See Wright, supra note 24 (“Today, only South Carolina and Alabama still hold
suicide a crime, although there has been no prosecution for suicide in these states.”).
33. Suicide, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
suicide [https://perma.cc/29JS-96NU] (last updated Aug. 2021) (explaining that “[s]uicide
is no longer considered a crime in the United States”).
34. Id.
35. Carla M. Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide
Manslaughter?, 47 SETON HALL L. REV., 297, 318 (2016) (describing the four main
underlying justifications of criminal punishment).
36. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014).
37. Id. at 211 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a)).
38. See Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474–75 (1876) (“The
question always is, [w]as there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the
injury, a continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events,
so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent
cause intervening between the wrong and the jury?”).
39. Eric A. Johnson, Two Kinds of Coincidence: Why Courts Distinguish Dependent
from Independent Intervening Causes, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 77, 83 (2017) (stating that
intervening causes are “individual temporally intervening events without which the
wrongdoer’s act would not have caused the result”).
40. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 221 (2023).
41. Id.
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Nicholas LaPalme, Note, Michelle Carter and the Curious Case of Causation: How
to Respond to a Newly Emerging Class of Suicide-Related Proceedings, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1443,
1448 (2018).
45. Id. (explaining that “[i]n general, ‘voluntary harm-doing usually suffices to break
the chain of legal cause’”).
46. Id. at 1448–49. In Lewis v. State, a victim’s act of shooting himself with a gun
previously used by the defendant while coaching the victim on how to play Russian roulette,
was found to have superseded the defendant’s act by the Alabama Criminal Court of
Appeals. Lewis v. State, 474 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
47. Cotten v. Wilson, 576 S.W.3d 626, 629, 633–34 (Tenn. 2019) (“In this wrongful
death action, the plaintiff estate seeks to hold the defendant liable for negligently
facilitating the decedent’s suicide.”).
48. Id. at 629.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 653.
52. Carter I, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 2016).
53. Id. at 1057.
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1057–58.
57. Id. at 1058–59.
58. Id. at 1059.
59. Id.; Pippa Raga, The Texts Michelle Carter Sent Sam Boardman Played a Huge
Role in Her Conviction, DISTRACTIFY (July 10, 2019, 6:11 PM), https://www.distractify.c
om/p/michelle-carter-sam-boardman [https://perma.cc/7EKZ-R3FX].
60. Beth David, Carter Found Guilty in Death of Conrad Roy III, FAIRHAVEN
NEIGHBORHOOD NEWS (June 22, 2017), https://fairhavenneighborhoodnews.com/carter-
found-guilty-death-conrad-roy-iii/ [https://perma.cc/GX5X-7LRG].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. I Love You, Now Die: The Commonwealth v. Michelle Carter: Part 1 “The
Prosecution” (HBO 2019).
64. See David, supra note 60.
65. I Love You, Now Die, supra note 63.
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
66. Id.
67. David, supra note 60.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Carter II, 115 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Mass. 2019) (“Manslaughter is a common-law
crime that has not been codified by statute in Massachusetts.”); see David, supra note 60.
71. Carter I, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1061 (Mass. 2016).
72. See id. at 1061–64.
73. David, supra note 60.
74. LaPalme, supra note 44, 1458–59, 1459 n.129 (“Carter is the first person ever
convicted, anywhere, in such unusual circumstances. If this Court affirms, Massachusetts
would be the only state to uphold an involuntary manslaughter conviction where an absent
defendant, with words alone, encouraged another person to commit suicide.” (quoting Brief
for Defendant-Appellant at 28–29, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. SJC-12501 (Mass. June
29, 2018))).
75. Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1062.
76. Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Mass. 1963).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1062 (quoting Atencio, 189 N.E.2d at 224).
80. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d at 226.
81. Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).
82. Id. (explaining that the defendant, with the knowledge of his wife’s two prior
suicide attempts, told her she was “chicken—and wouldn’t do it.”).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 390.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 389; see also Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Mass.
1963); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 89, Commonwealth v. You, No. SJC-13181 (Mass.
Oct. 12, 2020) (explaining that the defendant was present at the time of death and the
victim looked her in the eye before he jumped).
89. Carter II, 115 N.E.3d 559, 565 (Mass. 2019).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
there.90 Her absence gave Roy the opportunity to simply ignore her
calls or hang up the phone, where ignoring someone in person is
more difficult. In Atencio, the gun was passed to the victim directly
by one of the defendants and in Persampieri, the defendant loaded
and handed the gun directly to the victim.91 In Carter, Roy,
without any physical help from Carter, acquired a generator,
researched how to use it, and found a secluded spot to carry out
his suicide.92
III. ANALYSIS
Carter owed Roy a duty because she created the risk of harm.100
The court held that Roy was the cause of the harm up until the
time he got out of the truck.101 When he got out of the truck, he
broke the chain of causation of his own actions; and when Carter
instructed him to get back in, she became the cause of the harm
through words alone.102 She told him to get back in the truck and
he did.103
It can be difficult to ascertain whether an actor’s conduct
created a risk of harm.104 The Third Restatement of Torts provides
an example to better illustrate when a duty is owed because a
defendant created the risk of harm.105 A retail store operating in
an unsafe and isolated area might be portrayed as creating a risk
of criminal activity for customers.106 If the characterization were
accepted, a duty would be imposed on the store to mitigate this
risk for the people on site, including employees and customers.107
Yet, establishing whether the store generated such a potential risk
of criminal activity necessitates an assessment of what might have
transpired if the store were not operating.108 Naturally, questions
arise: would a customer have faced a similar threat of attack
elsewhere, or would they have opted out of late-night shopping but
for the store’s existence?109
In Carter, Roy had been treating his mental health issues for
almost five years.110 The year before his death, Roy attempted to
take his own life by taking an overdose of acetaminophen, but he
was saved by a friend who contacted emergency services.111 Even
before he met Carter, Roy had a history of struggling with similar,
self-harming behaviors that he exhibited on the day of his
suicide.112 Because the risk was already there, the court should not
have concluded that Carter created the risk.
Additionally, depending on the jurisdiction, the fact that
Carter was aware of the victim’s life-threatening situation may
have subjected her to liability.113 Traditionally, American common
law “never imposes a duty to rescue, except when a special
relationship exists.”114 However, as technology continues to
advance, many states have enacted laws that explicitly require a
duty to report.115 Nine states, including Massachusetts, require a
person to report a broad range of crimes, generally including
violence.116 The Massachusetts statute is titled “Reports of Crime
to Law Enforcement Officials” and states that
[w]hoever knows that another person is a victim of
aggravated rape, rape, murder, manslaughter or
armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime
shall, to the extent that said person can do so
without danger or peril to himself or others, report
said crime to an appropriate law enforcement
official as soon as reasonably practicable. Any
person who violates this section shall be punished
by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than
two thousand and five hundred dollars.117
Being that suicide is not listed in this statute, there was no
duty to report. Moving forward, it would be beneficial for the
Massachusetts legislature to amend the statute to include suicide.
If charged under this statute, the punishment would only be a fine,
112. See id.; see also Jan Ransom & John R. Ellement, Texting Suicide Came After
‘Sick Game of Life and Death’, BOS. GLOBE (June 6, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://www.b
ostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/06/woman-charged-with-cajoling-friend-commit-suicide-fac
es-involuntary-manslaughter-trial/8ylBhZifsAYU2ix71ZFQTJ/story.html [https://perma.c
c/L958-YJD8] (“In testimony . . . Lynn Roy said her son took an overdose of an over-the-
counter pain prescription in 2012 and was hospitalized.”).
113. See Sharon Yamen et al., Am I My Brother’s Keeper? How Technology Necessitates
Reform of the Lack of Duty to Rescue or Duty to Report Laws in the United States, 28 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 127–28 (2019).
114. Id. at 117, 127, 137 n.159 (listing the categories in which a legal duty is imposed
to rescue others as follows: statutory duties, duties based upon a special relationship, duty
of a professional rescuer (contractual duty), voluntary assumption of care that secludes the
person, thereby preventing others from rendering aid, negligent injury caused by a rescuer,
an innocent injury caused by a rescuer, and the duty to not prevent the giving of aid).
115. Zachary D. Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: Bystanders and Upstanders
Amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1342, 1346 (2019) (“Twenty-eight
states . . . have adopted a duty to report, although these statutes’ scopes also vary.”).
116. Id. at 1346, 1347 n.150.
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2022).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
but it is better than nothing and would notify people in this kind
of situation of what is and is not legally acceptable.
126. Id. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
127. See Carter I, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1057–59 (Mass. 2016).
128. Id.
129. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015). When it applies strict scrutiny,
the Court requires the government to demonstrate that its law “furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010).
130. See Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, FIRST AMEND. ENCYC., https://ww
w.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest [https://perma.cc/KP9Q-
4CC2] (last visited Jan. 29, 2023) (“An interest is compelling when it is essential or
necessary rather than a matter of choice, preference, or discretion.”).
131. Reed, 576 U.S. at 171.
132. Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional
Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 997
(1974).
133. Richard Parker, Overbreadth, FIRST AMEND. ENCYC., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/1005/overbreadth [https://perma.cc/CS3W-24TS] (last updated Sept.
2017).
134. Carter II, 115 N.E.3d 559, 571 (Mass. 2019) (quoting United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
157. See Niko Dimopoulos, Note, Cause of Death? Speech: The Problems with
Criminalizing the “Encouragement” of Suicide, 24 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 211, 220, 228–
29 (2021).
158. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, Essay, The Enduring and
Universal Principle of “Fair Notice”, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 195 (2013).
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–28 (2010)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Carter II, 115 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Mass. 2019).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Crawford, 722 N.E.2d 960, 966 (2000)).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
said, “it has long been established in common law that wanton or
reckless conduct that causes a person’s death constitutes
involuntary manslaughter.”167
Again, the court seems to work backwards. Even though the
wanton or reckless conduct element is well-established in
Massachusetts, it has not been well-established that words alone
can satisfy that element.168 Similarly, manslaughter is a common
law crime that has not been codified in Massachusetts. In a
majority of states, a person may only be tried for an offense that is
specified in the statutory law of the state.169 For due process
purposes, a “statute must give sufficient notice to enable a
reasonable person to comprehend what is prohibited.”170 In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Washington’s statute criminalizing the promotion of suicide
attempts did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process because the statute provided notice and a right to
assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty
interest.171 This case differs in that there was not a statute
prohibiting the encouragement of suicide and the right to free
speech is a fundamental liberty interest.172 Thus, Carter did not
receive fair notice and was deprived of her due process rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court’s holding in Carter v. Commonwealth was incorrect
because the First Amendment protected Carter’s speech. Though
immoral, the speech was not illegal, and the content-based
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck et al., Criminal Law, BRITANNICA, https://www.britann
ica.com/topic/criminal-law [https://perma.cc/MU8N-F9PU] (last updated June 30, 2023)
(“In the majority of the U.S. states, the common law of crimes has been repealed by
legislation. The effect of such actions is that no person may be tried for any offense that is
not specified in the statutory law of the state.”).
170. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 176 (S.C. 2003); Philip A. Dynia, Vagueness,
FIRST AMEND. ENCYC. (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1027/vague
ness [https://perma.cc/YS2P-BAXK] (explaining that “due process requires that a law
provide fair warning and provides a ‘person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly’” (quoting Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))).
171. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 735 (1997) (“We therefore hold that
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either
on its face or ‘as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths
by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors.’”).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of
speech.”).
61 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (2023)
Victoria Lujan