Reference Condonation of Delay Project

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Section 5 – of the Limitation Act provides that When an appeal or application is filed with a

court, it may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant or appellant can
convince the judge that there was a sufficient reason why he didn't file it in the allotted time
frame.

Section 5 provides that any appeal or application (not plaint or suit) may be admitted
after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period.

Section 5 applies only to appeals or applications. The reason for non-applicability of


the Section to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits
extends from 3 to 12 years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6
months.
Introduction
The Limitation Act, 1963, of which the concept of Condonation of Delay is a component, was
enacted on 5th October, 1963, which came into force on, 1st January, 1964.
The concept of Condonation of Delay is a part of Limitation Act, 1963, which was enacted on
5th October, 1963, which came into force on, 1st January, 1964.
The Object of the Act is not to create or define the causes of action, rather it prescribe the
period within which existing rights can be enforced in Courts of Law. 1The Act is based on the
Latin maxim which is - vigilantibus, nor dormientibus jura subveniunt and it means that the
law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights. The Act, with its numerous
Sections and Articles, aims to provide litigants with a thorough guidance in matters of
limitation by outlining the various conditions and time frames under which a lawsuit must be
filed in a court of law in order to avoid having it dismissed from the very beginning.
The Law of Limitation does not create or extinguish rights, except in case of acquisition of
title to immovable property by prescription under Section 27 of the Limitation Act.
However, what if a litigant has, in fact been vigilant, but there were certain circumstances
which hindered him in filing his Suit on time? He cannot be deprived of his Right to Sue
without any fault on his part, where there were other forces at play preventing him in doing
so. This is where the component of Condonation of Delay comes into play.

However if a plaintiff was actually diligent but was prevented from bringing his lawsuit on
time by certain circumstances then he cannot have his right to sue taken away from him in
situations when he had no fault and other factors prevented him from doing so. This is the
point at which the Delay Condonation component becomes relevant. This remedy is
discretionary in nature and the Court is not bound to condone the delay just because an
Application was filed, making out a sufficient cause for the delay. If the Court is dissatisfied
with the claims, it may have sufficient grounds to deny the Application.

A study of Section 5 of the Act:


1
Liv v. Ramji, 3 Bom. 207
The Supreme Court has ruled that, in cases where the delay is not the result of the Appellant's
deliberate inaction, delaying tactics, lack of bona fide, or negligence, the terms "sufficient
cause" in Section 5 should be interpreted liberally in order to achieve substantial justice. 2
The following constitute sufficient cause in the context of the Act:

1. There is some significant changes in the law of the land.


2. The applicant had a severe illness.
3. The Applicant was undergoing an imprisonment.
4. The Applicant is a pardanashin
5. There was Delay in procuring copies from officials. Here, it must be demonstrated
that the applicant made a diligent attempt to obtain the copy; but, the applicant was
unable to do so and submit his appeal or application on time due to a delay on the part
of the concerned officials.
6. The delay was caused by any action or inaction on the part of the lawyer and not the
litigant.

It should be noted that the Section solely regulates Applications and Appeals. Consequently,
no application for a court-ordered delay condonation will be granted if the suit is submitted
after the deadline and may be dismissed on threshold. A lawsuit must always be filed during
the statute of limitations, not after.

If a person, in good faith, initiates proceedings in a Court which does not possess the requisite
jurisdiction to entertain it and if it is done as a bonafide mistake, the time so consumed in
litigating before the wrong Court may be condoned by the Courts at their discretion.

Aditionally, if a person, as a bonafide mistake, takes the wrong course of action i.e., files a
Writ Petition, when, the right course of action would be to file an Appeal, then the time
consumed in such Writ Petition may be condoned.3

Applicability under Special Law/Statutes:

A question would arise as to whether the law laid down in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
affects the working of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Let’s take Section 34 of the
said Act, for instance which speaks about setting aside an Arbitral Award. Clause 3 of the
Section states that,

“An Application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the
date on which the party making the Application had received the Arbitral Award or, if a
request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been
2
Perumon Bhagvathy Devasom v. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8 SCC 321
3
Bhansali v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1968, Mad. 373
disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the Applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the Application within the said period of three
months it may entertain the Application within a period of thirty days but not thereafter.”

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has, in a case, held that this provision in the Arbitration
Act is evidently a substitute for the provisions of Section of the Limitation Act and by
necessary implication, it excludes the applicability of Section 5 to Applications under Section
34 of the 1996 Act. The expression ‘but not thereafter’ as used in the proviso expressly
debars a court from entertaining an Application for setting aside an award thereafter. Section
5 has no application to a case falling under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act.4

Also, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act lays down that it would be the governing law as far
as Limitation is concerned, unless its working is expressly excluded by the Special Law in
question.

The Supreme Court has also held that the crucial words in the language used in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act are ‘but not thereafter’, this amounts to express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would therefore bar the application of that Act, hold
otherwise is would render the above phrase wholly otiose. Apart from the language, express
exclusion may also follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law.5

Relevant Judgements:

 Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji & Ors66:

The Supreme Court specified certain guidelines that must be adhered to when using the
theory of the condonation of delay:

1. Generally, the party who files an appeal late does not stand to gain any benefit.
2. If the Court is refusing to condone the delay, it can result in a meritorious matter
being discarded and the roots of justice being defeated. Actually, when a delay is
condoned, the highest that can happen is that the case will be decided on merits which
means, a decision based on evidence rather than on technical and procedural grounds.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained”, does not imply that the doctrine should be
carried out irrationally. It needs to be used in sensible manner , not literally.
4. Between substantial justice and technical considerations, the substantial deserves to
be preferred for the other. Other side cannot claim that injustice is done because of a
bonafide delay.
5. There is no presumption that the delay is caused deliberately. The litigant has nothing
to gain by delaying the matter and to run a serious risk.

 New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra7:

The Supreme Court stated in this case held that the discretion granted by Section 5 cannot be
construed in a way that would turn a remedy that is discretionary into a strict rule.
4
State of Himachal Pradesh v. M/s Kataria Builders, 2003(1) CCC 169 (H.P)
5
Bhansali v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1968, Mad. 373
6
1987 A.I.R. 1353, 1987 S.C.R. (2) 387
7
1976 A.I.R. 237, 1976 SCR (2) 266
Furthermore, it was decided that there are no hard-and-fast guidelines that can adequately
define the term "sufficient cause."

 Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others8:

The Supreme Court held, that in exercising discretion of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, the
Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction should be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the
former case the considerations of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so that
the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may
arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. In this regard, it is impractical to establish a
hard and fast rule. The Court must utilise its discretion in determining the facts of each case,
bearing in mind that the goal of achieving substantial justice must come first when
interpreting the phrase "sufficient cause."

 Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd9:

It was held that failing to exercise due diligence until the last day of limitation would not
prevent someone from seeking a delay of condonation. Consequently, the period of time from
the point at which time was running out to the application or appeal filing date, as the case
may be , needs to be justified.

Conclusion:

Therefore, it may be concluded that the Limitation Act considers and handles all of the
exigencies and situations that arise when a case is filed on time. You do not lose your right to
sue because of a delay. A delay does not mean you are deprived of your Right to Litigate.
Nevertheless, it also addresses situations in which it would not be fair to condone a delay,
providing the courts with adequate discretion in this regard. A closer look of the judgements
as they have been presented above also shows that this discretion is, for the most particular,
exercised cautiously and carefully, keeping the fair principles of justice in mind. Having said
that, it is important for us as litigants to acknowledge that there are sound reasons for filing a
case on time. It would also be in the interests of justice and our collective interests to be
vigilant of our rights and ensure that we do not abuse the broad permissions and legal leeway
granted to us for unlawful gains and benefits, but rather that we use them wisely.

……………………………………………………………..

Meaning - Condonation of Delay 10 is the defined as the time extended for the prescribed
period in a certain suits by the Courts only when there is the sufficient cause provided by the
appellant for not, “referring appeal” and, “application made” within the meaning of the above
Section, the delay will be considered condoned, exception in case of execution applications 11.
Section 5 is applicable on criminal cases because it is not prohibiting any other Section.

8
A.I.R. 2001 SC 2582: 2001 (5) Supreme 266: 2001 (5) JT 608
9
A.I.R. 1962 SC 361
10
Limitation Act, 1963.
11
Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Reason why Condonation of Delay includes only „Appeal‟ and „Application‟ and not
“Suit”.

The said Section does not include the “suit”, but includes an appeal and application, the
reason behind this is that if Section 5 includes “Suit” then Section 3 of the Act which gives
the provision for the Bar of Limitation, Thus, if there is any institution of a suit, appeal is
preferred and the application is made after the prescribed period the Suit shall be dismissed,
but the limitation act is not a defense so that if there is any extension in the particular suit
which is given by the Sections 4 to 24 which deals with “prescribed period” these Section
will be Considered.

Major reason behind this is that: For, ‘Suit’ extension is given of 3 to 12 years and for
‘appeal’ and application it is 6 months, some concession is allowed to the appeal and
application .Hence, if the Suit is included in Section 5 of the Act, then Section 3 of the act
will be irrelevant, the particular Section will be dilute and will have no effect. Hence, Section
5 is an exception to the rule laid down in Section 3 of the Act. It also does not include
execution proceedings.

It is the applicant's responsibility to provide "sufficient cause" for the delay in order to be
eligible for the benefits of Section 5. The court has the discretion to grant the applicant's
application, and if it finds that the applicant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
and application, it may extend the time limit or condone delay.

The Court may consider two conflicts when considering the application, which are as follows

1. The court will decide the cases on merits rather than advancing on the technical ground of
delay without adjudicating on the issues.

2. The court must take into the consideration the non-filing of the appeal or application by the
applicant means, the applicant valuable right has been created and the right shall not be
defeated by the Court12

General principles for the condonation of delay:

I. The party have to satisfy the Court the reason for delay for not preferring the
appeal or application within the prescribed time, if the party doesn’t have the
sufficient cause, later the period may not be relevant.13
II. The whole period between the last date of the limitation to the current date of
the filing of the application should cover the explanation and the entire period of
delay. The unavoidable event or unfavourable situation should occur before the
expiration of the limitation period, if it has occurred after the expiration of
12
Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195
13
State of Manipur Vs. All Manipur R.P.V.S Teachers Assen. A.I.R 1976.
period then the sufficient cause will not be considered. Therefore, no appeal
and application can be preferred in such cases.14
III. The proof of the sufficient cause by the applicant does not bound court to accept
the appeal and application; it is the sole discretion of the Court to prefer the
appeal and application.15
IV. The discretion of the Court must not be mala fide or arbitrary, it should be
Judicial.

The expression Sufficient Cause:

The above expression is not defined in the Act, it has a wider meaning, it is comprehensive and
broad in nature. The cause must be beyond the control of the invoking. In order to advance the
cause of justice it is has to be construed liberally.16

The two rules were laid down with regards to the expression „sufficient cause‟ by the Court.17

a) The cause must be beyond the control of the invoking party .

b) The parties should have bona fide cause and not to be shown to be negligent or inactive.

Instances where delay condoned:


done

 Applicant suffering from fever.

ii. Applicant suffering from mental shock because of son‟s death and also because of his

wife‟s illness.

iii. Appellants being old people and minor girl unable to understand the procedure of the

Suit.

iv. Illiterate father delay in filing the appeal.

Instances where delay not condoned

i. Delay not condoned because of collecting the money from the people involved
in the case.
ii. If the appellant had to collect a certified copy within 3 months after it is ready to
his knowledge and he had to arrange money to pay the cost of the copy is no
ground of condonation.18

The liberal approach to the term “sufficient cause” was given by the Court.19

a) The main aim of court is to provide justice, refusing to condone the delay can result in

14
Rewa Coldfield case.
15
Manohar Joshi Vs. Nitin Bhanrao Patil (1996) 1 SCC 169.
16
State of W.P Vs. Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366.
17
Krishna Vs. Chattappan (1889) ILR 13M 269.
18
Gurumukh Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR (1970) Punj. 282
19
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Musammath Khatiji AIR 1987 SC 1353.
meritorious matter to be disqualified.

b) For Every day Delay – There is no need to give schedule of each and every minute.

c) For Justice or Technicality – It better to provide justice rather than going with technicality.

d) There should be no presumption from the side of the Court, that the party is voluntarily late.

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